Welcome to the first installment of the Fiscal Year (FY) 25 Semi Annual Lessons Learned Report, and the inaugural one, for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center’s Security Force Assistance & Stability Integration Directorate, or SFASID, formerly known as the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, or PKSOI. The Lessons contained herein reflect one of the US Army’s Collection Topics for its FY25 Army Lessons Learned Plan (ALLP): See, Sense, Understand, and Direct.
DoD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. DoD’s role in stabilization fits within the larger whole of government context of laws, regulations and policies.
This lesson collection offers some insight into topics and concepts the DoD should recognize or consider as it plans and programs itself to partner with other federal agencies across the stabilization spectrum.
This publication presents DSS opportunities and challenges both externally and internally.
KYIV, UKRAINE 10.19.2021 Photo by Chad McNeeley Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs
As the Ukraine military executes a counter-offensive against the Russian military in October 2022, some observers say postwar military planning needs to wait until war’s end. They argue that postwar planning and reconstruction would only be a distraction from the current battle rhythm and the future is uncertain.
But uncertainty is no excuse not to plan. In fact, delaying planning and civilian reconstruction is arguably a mistake.
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA 03.04.2022 Photo by: Petty Officer 1st Class Fred Gray IV U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine set the wheels in motion for the Global Food Crisis of 2022. As epicenters of world food, fertilizer, cooking oil, and gas production, the removal of Russian and Ukrainian exports created an enormous supply shock sending food prices soaring. The least resilient and food insecure nations were hit the hardest.
The rise in prices prompted an increase in alternative sources of supply, but only after several difficult months. The gap was partially filled by exhausting existing food and cash reserves as well as extending credit. On the diplomatic front, the signing of the BSGI also proved instrumental by allowing at least a portion of blockaded food supplies to be exported. For its part, the US government response was dramatic: extending aid, resources, and credit. That said, with many resources exhausted, the risk of a future food crisis remains concerning.
Food supply shocks are best understood through a pricing perspective and resiliency efforts best assessed by their ability to place downward pressure on food prices. The Food Supply Shock model provides a useful tool for planners to understand, shape and assess their actions. Rather than being proscriptive, planners can assess actions and activities based on how they can address the pricing issue, and thus open an array of creative and non-standard solutions.
Traditionally, USG efforts have relied on the Diplomatic and Development aspects of foreign policy to address food insecurity. This is understandable given the nature of the task to build resiliency in fragile states. That said, Defense has an important and underappreciated role in preparing for the next food supply shock. It’s unique suite of defense stability tasks can provide significant downward pressure on food prices.
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This paper addresses the weaponization of energy supplies by Russia to achieve economic, political, and military objectives and Europe’s subsequent and effective parry and riposte of Russia’s efforts.
BALTIC SEA 03.27.2023 Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Sawyer Connally U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet
The Energy War: How Europe Turned the Tables on Russia will be included as a chapter in the upcoming book “The Great Power Competition Volume 5” published by Springer Nature.
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FOREWORD Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) was created to ensure that the Army did not lose the knowledge required to conduct peacekeeping and stabilization and to anticipate what might be on the horizon. From Mass Atrocity Response Operations to Women, Peace and Security and much in between (transitions, stability policing, transitional public security, competition, etc.) PKOSI has been a thought leader. As one young PKSOI intern, now public servant opined, PKSOI is not a “think tank” but a “do tank.” Transitional Public Security: Establishing Security in the “Golden Hour” is another example of “doing.”
Transitional Public Security (TPS) is necessary to ensure that communities in post-conflict environments, or when law and order has broken down, are stabilized; thus, preventing bad actors from flourishing. It may well be that Department of Defense (DoD) is tasked to conduct TPS in accordance with DoD policy. A lot of work has been done to ensure that DoD is prepared to implement the policy and much more needs to be done. This is the story of where we are now and how we got there.
As Dr. Finkenbinder departs The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, we believed it necessary to ensure that we record progress to date so the community of practice can determine where to go from here. After all, “public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not do.”1 If TPS is truly to become policy, it must become institutionalized.
Jay Liddick Colonel, Civil Affairs Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute October 2021
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Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs for Military Practitioners serves as a guide for organizing, planning, preparing, and executing activities in support of such operations. As the book underscores, the military’s supporting role is not passive; instead, it practices active engagement by incorporating the experience and expertise of DDR partners. Achieving a sense of teamwork among diverse organizational cultures requires creative thinking. While recognizing that DDR is essentially a civilian-led venture, the military can furnish key enablers that enhance performance and effectiveness. PKSOI regards this book as a valuable reference for military and civilian organizations coming together to implement meaningful DDR.
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Maritime Stability Operations – China: Bullying Their Way Into the Arctic -The US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds approximately 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil which is about 13 percent of global estimates and 30 percent of the Earth’s undiscovered natural gas.[i] This increase in regional shipping and resource mining may cause regional instability in the Arctic as China, Russia, and the United States and its Arctic State partners compete to ensure their interests are attended to in this newly marketable portion of the Arctic.
The U.S. Army has always worked among people in areas of conflict. In recent times, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are wrestling with what human security means, how military operations impact it, and what can be done to mitigate the harm. This primer is published to inform those within DOD working in this area, whether commanders, planners or curious soldiers and civilians. If we have learned nothing else in the past 20 years of war and its aftermath, it should be that the human domain is complex. If we fail to get our efforts right in these areas, we may well have tactical successes and strategic failure.
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Death by a Thousand Cuts explores the application of national reconciliation programs to undermine insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national reconciliation programs. Such programs have received little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study provides insights of particular interest for US assistance to countries suffering from an insurgency.
