This is a concept paper. Its overall purpose is to discuss the viability and potential of the author’s War to Sustainable Positive Peace analytical framework for better understanding the elements and dynamics of a peace and stability operation environment, and preparing leadership and personnel for related planning, decision making, and engagement. The data shown is real data from the author’s Bosnia in-country field-testing (2009) of the framework.
In December 2010, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy co-hosted a workshop on Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). The event followed the earlier publication of the MARO Military Planning Handbook, and was attended by 85 people from a diverse range of organizations.
In an effort to better understand “transitions” the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and its 13 co-sponsors convened the “Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions Conference” at Carlisle Barracks in November of 2010. Resulting from an open call for papers, this text is a series of essays from across the international spectrum of government, military, academia, and assistance non-governmental organizations that develop and share what the community knows about “transitions.”
On April 6, 2009, CNA and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute hosted a conference in Washington, DC, on governance, security sector reform, and economic growth. During the latter part of the conference, the participants examined the findings of a workshop on stabilization and economic growth of November 2008 that had focused on economic initiatives to be pursued during stability operations. These operations “encompass various military… activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to  maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to  provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief effort.” 1 The counterinsurgency that we are pursuing in Afghanistan—the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions” that we are taking “to defeat [the] insurgency”2—is a subset of stability operations. It is hoped that this article will help focus our civil military economic effort in Afghanistan, our premise being that “correct thinking leads to correct actions; incorrect thinking leads to incorrect actions.”
To read this Perspective click on the link below to download the Lesson Report click on the Download button.