U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap

The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation’s security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state.

Summary of Observations & Recommendations Concerning Security Sector Reform

Much can be gained through a “combined approach” to partnership in Stability Operations. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
Host Nation Security Force have recently taken such a combined approach to their partnership. Their new combined partnership is essentially an “embedded” partnership – where forces and personnel are “embedded” through co-location. An “embedded’ partnership facilitates development of a common operating picture (COP), allows fully integrated operations, and improves effectiveness of the team – from planning through execution. Additionally, when the activities of the “embedded” partnership are synchronized with other civil component efforts – especially at the local level – greater efficiencies are gained toward building capacity and achieving stability.

To read this SOLLIMS Report please click on the link below or to download click on the button below.

SOLLMS Sampler Volume 1 Issue 1- Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to the protection of civilians in conflict environments from the former SOLLIMS data repository. All data from SOLLIMS has been transitioned to JKO. These observations are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as civilian practitioners with a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed into conflict environments, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy makers and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

The State-Owned Enterprise as a Vehicle for Stability

As providers of essential public or commercial services, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important in modern economies. Since SOEs are ubiquitous in the global economy, they are likely to be present in conflict-prone societies. In such environments, the defining political and economic systems within which the SOEs exist are likely to embody the interests both of participants in the conflict and of those hoping for an end to the conflict.

Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building

In this paper Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building, the authors explore the definition of SSR as it has emerged in the international community, including the United States, its bilateral partners, and various intergovernmental organizations. It examines the makeup of the security sector, identifies emergent principles for implementing SSR in the community of practice, and specifies the outcomes that SSR is designed to produce.

A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003)

Foreword by General Stanley A. McChrystal

This PKSOI Paper A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003) is designed to further the U.S. and other interested international governments’ understanding of how Security Sector Reform (SSR) was conducted in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. This was America’s first attempt at conducting formalized SSR, so it offers readers an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for reform, and how well the United States and its partners met the typical challenges of SSR.

Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy

This monograph Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy builds on two previous works by the author—Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development and The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower. It frames the contemporary defense decision making environment. It describes the concept of risk management as a founding principle for contemporary defense strategy development.

Rule of Law Activities: Lessons Learned

Restoring and promoting rule of law is one of the most critical elements of stabilization reconstruction in failed, failing or fragile states. It is increasingly recognized as both a critical enabler of and contributor to security sector reform. U.S.-led stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan recognize rule of law as an essential component of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, and important lessons are emerging from both conflicts. This paper Rule of Law Activities: Lessons Learned will review some of the most important best practices emerging from U.S. rule of law activities.

To read this Perspective please click on the link below or to download click on the button below.

The Economic Instrument in Stability Operations

On April 6, 2009, CNA and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute hosted a conference in Washington, DC, on governance, security sector reform, and economic growth. During the latter part of the conference, the participants examined the findings of a workshop on stabilization and economic growth of November 2008 that had focused on economic initiatives to be pursued during stability operations. These operations “encompass various military… activities con­ducted outside the United States in
coordi­nation with other instruments of national power to [1] maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to [2] provide essential governmental services, emergency
infra­structure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief effort.” 1 The counterinsurgency that we are pursuing in Afghanistan—the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions” that we are taking “to defeat [the] insurgency”2—is a subset of stability operations. It is hoped that this article will help focus our civil ­military economic effort in Afghanistan, our premise being that “correct thinking leads to correct actions; incorrect thinking leads to incorrect actions.”

To read this Perspective click on the link below to download the Lesson Report click on the Download button.