



Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Report

Summary of Observations & Recommendations Concerning Security Sector Reform

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Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
Publications and Knowledge Management Division (PKM)
22 Ashburn Drive, Upton Hall, Room 200
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

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From: Chief, Lessons Learned, Publications & Knowledge Management Division (PKM)
To: Staff and Faculty, USAWC - AY11
Via: Chief, PKM (COL Radovich)
Deputy Directory, PKSOI
Director, PKSOI

Subject: UNDERSTANDING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM / SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE - LESSONS SUMMARY

1. GENERAL

This report provides a roll-up of Observations and Recommendations ("O&Rs") contained within the SOLLIMS data repository related to "security sector reform / security force assistance." References referred to in the individual 'Recommendations' sections or elsewhere in the O&Rs are available for download on SOLLIMS. SOLLIMS can be accessed at: <http://www.pksoi.org>. Although SOLLIMS is available/accessible without the requirement of a US DoD "CAC card", SOLLIMS is I/D and Password protected; users must request an account. Once the account is approved, users may then access SOLLIMS data based on their assigned level of site privileges/authorities.

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You will note that a number is displayed next to the title of each lesson/observation included in the SOLLIM report. This number is cross-linked to the actual O&R that exists within SOLLIMS; click on the highlighted O&R number to access the O&R entry in SOLLIMS. You must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to do this.

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2. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Topic. The Combined Approach to Partnership (668)

Observation.

Much can be gained through a “combined approach” to partnership in Stability Operations. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Host Nation Security Force have recently taken such a combined approach to their partnership. Their new combined partnership is essentially an “embedded” partnership – where forces and personnel are “embedded” through co-location. An “embedded” partnership facilitates development of a common operating picture (COP), allows fully integrated operations, and improves effectiveness of the team – from planning through execution. Additionally, when the activities of the “embedded” partnership are synchronized with other civil component efforts – especially at the local level – greater efficiencies are gained toward building capacity and achieving stability.

Discussion.

In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has learned that to be successful, its partnership with the Host Nation Security Force must be a true partnership. It must be a partnership of “equals.” Prior to 2009, when the ISAF largely established training teams that worked with the Host Nation Security Force on a recurring basis, the ensuing relationship with the Host Nation Security Force was seen as hierarchical – one of superior to subordinate. Communication gaps and misunderstanding between forces, during planning and execution, often developed. On the other hand, when the International Security Assistance Force changed its approach, and actually “embedded” personnel and staffs with Host Nation Security Forces – i.e., physically co-located these individuals – then misperceptions and communication gaps were greatly diminished, and cooperation markedly improved.

In late 2009, the International Security Assistance Force decided to co-locate personnel/staff with the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, Afghan National Border Police, and National Directorate of Security. It established/expanded combined bases well beyond the Regional Command. This integration took place at every level of command – at Forward Operation Bases and at combat outposts across the entire area of operations. In this combined approach, those co-located elements are now able to conduct “combined” planning, briefing, rehearsals, execution, assessment, and retraining. This combined approach has resulted in greater information-sharing, situational understanding, and combined analysis. This combined approach has vastly improved decision-making, accountability, and ownership. Plans and orders are now written in both languages, which facilitates understanding and ownership. Back-briefs are now attended by leaders from ISAF and the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other Afghan security team members, which facilitates feedback and decision-making. Overall, this new combined approach has resulted in greater teaming

and operational success. It has likewise earned greater respect from the Afghan people who have seen this improved teamwork on the ground.

The Combined Team (team of “embedded” security partners) has moreover learned to focus its presence and its security operations down at the local level. In Afghanistan, politics are primarily local. Tribal loyalties are primarily local. Local population centers (which equate to the “key terrain”) do not look to the central or provincial government for security assistance or other services. They seek security assistance from local sources and from the district level government, at most. Hence, it is at the local level and district level where the presence and impacts of the Combined Team are now being made.

Additionally, the Combined Team (the International Security Assistance Force and Host Nation Security Force, co-located and integrated at bases across the area of operations, with focused attention on the district and local levels) has learned that it is not a stand-alone team. Its team and its “combined approach” are now synchronized with other civil component contributors working in the broader scheme of stability operations throughout Afghanistan. Key civil component contributors include: the Afghan Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and the Afghan Civil Service Institute. The IDLG has played a particularly important role in identifying shortfalls and capacity gaps inside the districts, and then coordinating the allocation of District Delivery Packages (DDPs) – which have provided critical support to hiring efforts, training, and education at the local level. As the IDLG and other civil component organizations are included in the Combined Team’s scheme, and as they synchronize efforts, the whole team is now able to build greater institutional capacity at the local levels, expand civil service, and improve security and stability.

Recommendation.

- Partnering: International Security Assistance Forces should physically embed (co-locate) personnel/teams with Host Security Forces to the greatest extent possible – forming a “Combined Team” throughout the area of operation. This co-location/integration should include the institution of permanent exchange officers and permanent translators. Combined activities should include information-sharing, COP development, planning, briefing, rehearsing, executing, assessing, and retraining.
- Planning: In developing plans for Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Afghanistan, planners should continuously take heed that “key terrain” is the local populace.
- Civil-Military Operations: The Combined Team should coordinate continuously with important civil component elements (local governance, reconstruction teams, and civil servants) to synchronize efforts in order to expand the Combined Team’s reach and impact on the local populace.

Implication.

- If “embedded” partnering is not adopted from the outset in Stability Operations, then potential for cooperation, common understanding, and trust will not be fully realized.
- If “embedded” partnering is to be adopted for Stability Operations, then pre-deployment training and plans should be developed accordingly. Pre-deployment training and plans need to incorporate all aspects and requirements of co-location: facilities, security requirements, communication networks, integrated staffs, exchange officers, translators, supporting resources, etc. Commanders should request that Host Nation Security Force officers attend unit-based training in preparation for missions.
- If the local populace is the “key terrain” in a given Host Nation, then resources – to include Strategic Intelligence resources – should be dedicated to understanding, influencing, and tracking this key terrain, so that the Combined Team can gain and maintain continuous situational awareness and understand the affects of its operations.
- If the Combined Team is to have the ability to share information and coordinate operations with certain civil components (local governance, reconstruction teams, civil service, etc.), as well as leverage their capabilities, then processes, procedures, and resources (information systems) need to be identified, established, and maintained to effect this coordination.
- As the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police expand force structures and employees in the immediate future, the ISAF will need to grow the partnership and “embed” forces accordingly. “Right-sizing” the forces should be based on recent “combined approach” experiences, operational capacity of forces, and key terrain.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article The Combined Team: Partnered Operations in Afghanistan, by Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. and David W. Pendall in SMALL WARS JOURNAL, May 25, 2010. The above image and the attached article are reprinted from SMALL WARS JOURNAL per the Creative Commons License, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/the-combined-team-partnered-op/> .

Comments.

Unity of effort and synchronized operations are the over-arching goals of the Combined Team.

That said, one should not lose sight of an extended goal: that of the Host Nation Security Force being able to stand on its own feet, earn the full trust of the local

populace, and able to serve their security needs. Milestones toward achieving this extended goal should be established and tracked.

b. Topic. Security Sector Reform (SSR) must recognize that corruption is a major challenge to security. (606)

Observation.

Police and military forces are the first line of defense against corruption, but they can also engage in corrupt practices. This seminar focused on how corruption can undermine confidence in government and enables criminal elements to gain advantages. Efforts to reform the security sector must recognize that corruption is a major inhibitor to reform and programs must be developed to deal with it accordingly. Several SSR experts articulated thoughts on best practices for dealing with corruption.

Discussion.

Curbing corruption in the security sector is now seen as one of the major program elements of Security Sector Reform (SSR). The international community has come to recognize high corruption levels in one country can facilitate international trafficking of drugs, arms, or human beings, money laundering and subsequent terror financing. In addition, corruption was acknowledged to be one of the basic impediments to economic growth. SSR programs need to enforce transparency and accountability but more specific recommendations are elusive as exact policies, steps, or measures for SSR are not easily defined, largely due to peculiar nature of the problems and social conditions in different countries.

Compounding this problem is the ambiguity of / around the definitions of the security sector itself as organizations are usually included in the sector if they are related to security sector in any way (directly or indirectly) and can include: Criminal justice organizations (police, judiciary etc.); Management and oversight bodies (executive and legislative branches, municipal legislatures etc); Military and intelligence services (armed forces, paramilitary forces, borderguards etc.); and even Non-core institutions (customs and other uniformed bodies).

Speakers revealed that corruption in the security sector can be especially negative in terms of the influence on development by impeding investment and the resulting unstable economic environment and physical insecurity of investors. Corruption establishes informal rules, to which all actors engaged in shadow economy abide, which begets informal protection from the side of law enforcement in exchange of bribe payments.

Overall corruption can be especially pernicious in the Security Rector because it creates large incentives enabling a shadow economy to flourish in the country. Shadow

economies are harmful because their opaqueness hides information about a country's economic activities, GDP, and real average income, impeding implementation of sound fiscal and monetary policies.

Recommendation.

Distinctions were not made as to what are the particular differences are between weak and fragile countries versus those emerging from conflict.

There exists lots of confusion around roles of police in Security Sector Reform that was not exactly pertinent to the topic of corruption.

Michael Berkow's past experiences as a Police Chief led him to focus on the organization of police and their role in COIN, Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime.

More information about some of the great work that USAID has sponsored in conduction corruption assessments as part of Security Sector Reform would have been helpful.

More vignettes on the effect of Security Sector Reform and how to incorporate procedures to abate corruption would have helped with efforts to improve program effectiveness.

Corruption is not an absolute in many fragile states. Much of the population may subscribe to shadow institutions and informal practices because the relevant state institutions may not exist or function. Thus it is important to concentrate on critical institutions in security sector such as police, customs and border guards.

Implication.

Not addressing corruption in the security sector damages image of the state and impedes the flow of investments in the country, which is the basic precondition for development.

Corruption in security sector acts like a tax on businesses, and thus discourages local and foreign investments.

Corrupt security sector results in the lack of physical security in the country, and high levels of organized crime, further discouraging local and foreign investments.

Fighting corruption in security sector should be given priority over the entire anti-corruption reforms in the country, since the security sector is the major fighting force against corruption in the other parts of government.

Economic development greatly depends on political will of the leadership and their commitments to reforms (particularly in the security sector).

Event Description.

As a reservist assigned to the Security, Reconstruction, and Transition (SRT) Division of PKSOI I am interested in helping to broaden the understanding of how to better design programs that address sectoral reforms.

c. Topic. Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration ([536](#))

Observation.

The integration of non-state military forces / para-military forces into the state's security profile is seen to be an element of the wider post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building process. However, there is no single, "template solution" for implementing military integration during the Security Sector Reform process. We have come to realize that there are many approaches and solutions for achieving effective, but not over-whelming, integration of multiple "military force components" into a single military force as part of post-conflict peacekeeping and stability operations.

Discussion.

Military integration during Security Sector Reform is a complex and diverse process. However, there are consistent themes used in many of the case studies conducted for this research. The primary case studies were from Bosnia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and The Philippines. Secondary case studies included Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Ossetia, Haiti, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Uganda. These case studies provide key issues and lessons from academic and policy papers focused on issues related to the integration of non-state and government military forces, as part of a wider peace settlement following civil war.

An example of successful integration is illustrated by Mozambique. The fully implemented integration process in the peace settlement required government troops and Mozambican National Résistance (RENAMO) forces to be integrated in order to form a new national army. Despite a delayed start, demobilization of the old "national army," as an element of the integration process, proved so successful that the country's President announced that conscription would be necessary to get the new, integrated Mozambique Democratic Armed Forces up to full strength.

Partial implementation is a common outcome of integration efforts as highlighted by Angola. The 1991 peace accords from that civil war called for the creation of a 40,000 man national army, evenly divided between the government troops and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) troops. Although the integration

process was concluded in 1998, and despite claims of full demobilization, it was reported that UNITA still had 25,000-30,000 fully equipped and mobilized troops.

Recommendation.

The following are the Lessons Identified in the research report "SSR: Post-conflict Integration."

1. In conflicts resulting in political defeat or stalemate, where neither military force achieved a decisive victory, a 1+1=3 formula could usefully be applied. This indicates that two separate forces integrating should result in a new, more effective third force. It is important that neither the existing military structures, personnel nor cultures should dominate the new force.
2. The political solution to ending the conflict is the most pressing contextual factor in which the military integration will be implemented. The integration process will more likely be successful if it closely reflects the prevailing political solution.
3. A military integration process requires parties to a conflict, and individuals engaged in the conflict, to forgo the instruments that are seen to provide for their security. Therefore intense feelings of insecurity and resistance are likely to emerge around the military integration issue.
4. Progress on military integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation. Military integration constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups.
5. Poorly conceived and implemented military integration processes are more likely to fail. Failure of military integration has a disproportionately negative effect upon the wider peace process.
6. Military integration is often viewed by individual combatants primarily through an economic or livelihood perspective. In cases where military integration could not provide a security guarantee, it was successful by achieving an economic objective.
7. Military integration should be placed within a larger state-building plan, incorporating a National Defense Strategy that informs (= and determines) the role and structure of the military. The military should be conceived within a sustainable state revenue projection.
8. The degree of success achieved within any given context is often shown to be contingent upon the capacities of structures and bodies responsible for military integration.

9. Inclusive military integration processes that are planned and managed by bodies comprising representation of all parties to the conflict are likely to be successful.
10. Police forces, and other uniformed services, can often be misused as a political safety valve for ex-combatants; these individuals are not required by, nor should they be selected by the military integration process to join the military.
11. A comprehensive military integration process should include planning for the individual selection, education and training of personnel for the police, as a separate process to the military.
12. Military integration process should be conceived and planned with a specific civilian reintegration component, for those individuals not selected for military service.
13. The civilian reintegration programs should be planned and managed by the same body responsible for military integration.
14. International assistance can greatly enhance the prospects for successfully achieving military integration processes. The most commonly witnessed assistance program incorporates flexible 'process' support, and technical military training.
15. International actors can play vital arbitration roles, as well as technical roles, if invited to do so by both parties to the military integration process; the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in South Africa being the exemplary case.

Implication.

- The worst case scenario of no military integration is that opposing factions resume open aggression and conflict. The opposing parties would once again have to be convinced to come back to negotiations or mediation to determine points of contention and problems. The peace process may have to start from a clean slate or with major modification to previous accords.
- Another scenario is that military integration is delayed or the pace of integration is slow. The risk is that some members of the conflict parties lose patience with the pace of integration or even the peace accords themselves. This would cause soldiers and rebels to leave or break away to form separate groups not included in the original peace negotiations.
- Military integration is another way to provide jobs thereby reducing unemployment. Lack or delaying integration causes unemployment and risks people becoming disillusioned with the process and not supporting the peace process. Related to this is rejecting former combatants from joining the new military organization. Again, many people may become unemployed creating yet another potential threat to the overall peace process.

- Another scenario is that opposing parties form separate security or police units outside of the agreed military integration accords. Again, this creates mistrust and is a problem to the overall peace process. Additionally, this becomes a problem in trying to build a single, national, professional military and police force and implement standards for selection, education, and training.
- Military integration may ultimately depend on the resources that are committed to accomplish it. Most resources will come from the host government and international support. It is important that adequate resources be available for the development of the integration plan and to maintain the new military structure after integration is complete. Inadequate resources may delay the eventual integration or result in the new military structure having poor leadership, lacking a training strategy /training resources, with little to no standards - leading to an imbalanced and ineffective organization.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the research paper "Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration," by Mark Knight, August 2009, commissioned by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR). The views presented in the paper are the authors and not the necessarily GFN-SSR.

d. Topic. Security and Rule of Law Provides Legitimacy to Government (524)

Observation.

Over the last 15 years, Colombia's legal system has undergone significant changes which provide examples of the linkage between security and rule of law. As these two areas improve over time, the government and its institutions will strengthen its legitimacy with its people.

Discussion.

This paper explores the impact of the changes in the administration of law on governance in Colombia. While fighting a long and difficult war against terrorists and narcotics traffickers, Colombia began converting its judicial system from the Roman law based inquisitorial system to an accusatory system. The United States has assisted with money and advice as part of its overall support program under Plan Colombia. There have been many lessons learned from Colombia's legal system transformation. For example, rule of law programs cannot be sustained without adequate security, which must also be established within legal norms. The host country must design, implement, and make the sacrifices for its own program of reform and institution building in order for the effort to take deep roots in the political culture. Moreover, the primacy of legitimacy and the rule of law must be a central component of instruction, doctrine, and education and planning for post-conflict reconstruction governance activities.

The author also delves into security and the rule of law. Although security, state presence, and social and economic progress are all-important, mutually reinforcing elements in establishing a government's authority and legitimacy, it is the rule of law and its acceptance by the people that binds them all together. Achieving security and the rule of law requires political will, resources, and time to repair and build institutions and develop the rules of democratic community that are generally accepted by the populace.

The Lessons Learned from this paper are applicable to many countries besides the United States:

1. Reform programs are more likely to succeed if there is a strong convergence of national interests between the United States and the host country, and if the host country's political leadership is fully committed, and if there is national citizen-level commitment.
2. Host nation structural change is more likely to occur if there is a long-term process of familiarization and institutionalization of the program, involving people and agencies, as well as continuity of programs. For example, the U.S. assistance program to Colombia has roots going back over 40 years to the 1960s.
3. Rule of law programs cannot be sustained without adequate security, which must also be established within legal norms.
4. Rule of law programs must be part of an integrated whole of governance strategy, to include economic and social development.
5. The host country must design, implement, and make the sacrifices for its own program of reform and institution building for the effort to take deep roots in the political culture.
6. Big reforms are expensive, requiring money not only from the supporting country but budgetary commitment from the host country. Some reforms, such as rule of law, are relatively inexpensive and have a high payoff that will legitimize and strengthen the effectiveness of other reforms and reconstruction efforts.
7. The primacy of legitimacy and rule of law must be central components of instruction, doctrine, and education for post-conflict reconstruction governance activities.

Recommendation.

The recommendations from this publication were specific to the United States and Colombia but can be applied to country(s) actively supporting governance and rule of law programs in other countries:

- Continue to provide financial and technical assistance to a host country's legal system. The emphasis should be on improving professionalism and modernizing equipment and techniques to bring it closer to "western" standards.
- Continue financial support to educate and promote a host country's rule of law, judicial reform, and capacity building. Expand any existing judicial or law exchange programs.
- Limit the number of supporting government and military personnel to strengthen ownership of the host country to its efforts of improving governance and security. This will legitimize host government efforts with its people.
- Supporting country Defense Departments/Ministries continue to emphasize rule of law and professionalism in its programs and peer-to-peer training and contacts with the Colombian military.
- Supporting government agencies must continue to emphasize for the protection of its government employees working on various programs.

Implication.

- The United States must continue engagement with Colombia to consolidate gains in the rule of law/judicial programs and keep improving respect for law, professionalism, legitimacy, and ethics of all concerned Colombia entities. Colombia is described as neither a failed or failing state but still in constant conflict with narco-traffickers, paramilitary groups and dealing with a high crime rate and widespread poverty.
- Colombia can fall into a failing state without solidifying conversion from its former inquisitory system to its current accusatory system. The government and ultimately its citizens must embrace and accept higher standards of law, ethics, and honesty instead of corruption, graft, violence, and illegal drugs.
- A long-term approach and plan has to be taken because a new judicial system (accusatory vs. investigative) will not happen quickly because the previous system was in place since Colombia gained independence in the early 1800's. This is a process that will take a generation or more to grow and mature. There are also many areas in Colombia where the paramilitaries and narco-traffickers are still in control or exert great influence and strength.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the publication, *Democratic Governance and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Colombia*, by Gabriel Marcella, December 2009.

e. Topic. Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity (502)

Observation.

During 2007-2008, the Iraqi Security Forces underwent rapid growth in size and improved its operational capability due to partnering with the U.S. and reforming its Ministries of Interior and Defense. Future conflicts will likely arise in failing state and will involve the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency or stability operations. The U.S. Army will have an enduring requirement to build security forces and security ministries.

Discussion.

The United States has long relied on U.S. Special Forces or specially-trained advisors to train security forces of other nations. This is now a core requirement for conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author's contention is that this mission is not an aberration but will be an enduring requirement in the future especially with assisting a failing or failed state. LTG Dubik described his organization's role as an "indirect approach to transition." MNSTC-I is in the "security business" instead of the accepted belief that it exists to transition the training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces to Iraqi control.

Key Findings:

- The responsibility for defeating an insurgency lies with U.S. as well as indigenous forces. Passing on an active insurgency to weak indigenous forces is a failing strategy.

- Training Commands must actively support the efforts of the overall operational commander. • MNSTC-I in 2007 generated Iraqi units to fulfill specific needs identified by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno - then the operational commander in Iraq - as he planned his surge campaign and assigned U.S. and Iraqi forces to tasks.

- MNSTC-I had a direct effect on helping the Iraqis contribute to the counter-offensive, and thus improve the security situation.

- The end result would ultimately be the indirect effect we all sought: transition of security responsibility to Iraqi control.

- Increasing indigenous security forces reduces but does not eliminate the need for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency conflicts and in the state-building efforts that follow. Policymakers mistakenly equate developing indigenous security forces with an exit strategy from conflict, arguing that as indigenous troops stand up, American forces can "stand-down."

- U.S. efforts to build indigenous security forces can and should stimulate state-building as a whole, providing the impetus and resources for the development of

ministries, financial systems, budgeting, contracting, legal development, and other necessary functions of state and industry - as they did in Iraq in 2007-2008.

- Building armies and the institutions that support them takes years. Our transition commands consequently tend to focus on executing long-term development plans. Although such plans are necessary, the transition command must provide a series of achievable, short-term tasks upon which the trainers and advisors can focus attention.

- The perceived trade-off between quality and quantity is a false dichotomy. The U.S. needs to develop indigenous forces that are good enough to fight and defeat specific insurgents in conjunction with U.S. forces. Over time, these forces will have to metamorphose in size and composition ultimately to defend their country against external enemies. These countries will require residual U.S. assets even after the COIN fight, as they acquire these more sophisticated capabilities for national defense. Quantity has a quality of its own.

- Train forces iteratively to increase quality without compromising the availability of forces. Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard is good enough, given the enemy and other key factors of the situation. Once a force, or part of it, meets that standard, it can be raised and continually improved-especially as part of a coherent partnership program.

- U.S. forces fighting on the ground played a vital role in continuing the training of the Iraqi Army and Police forces. That role included the embedded training teams, the Coalition maneuver units-called "partner units"-who fought side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts, and the contracted civilian police trainer/advisors. The advisors, trainers, and war fighters continuously upgraded Iraqi combat skills, developed their leadership techniques, and improved maintenance and maintenance management procedures.

- Balancing a force between the Army and the Police requires developing each institution at the right time for use at the right stage of the conflict. The relative requirements for Army and Police forces will change over time, as the state develops.

- Decelerate the growth and fielding of forces that are ill-suited for current or likely future situations on the ground. Police forces - especially beat-cops rather than paramilitary forces - are poorly suited for a COIN mission, as they cannot link to an effective legal system and cannot stand up to enemy forces. Once counter-offensive operations were completed in an area, and sufficient coalition and Iraqi forces were available to hold and build, the construction of police facilities could take place.

- Strong indigenous senior leaders can and must reform broken institutions - when advised, supported, and even criticized by their U.S. partners, who have leverage with them. Security ministries must be strong enough to manage malign or corrupt actors within their ranks through their own internal affairs processes.

Conclusions:

In fragile, failing, or failed states, it may take a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment, in which case the U.S. must prepare to engage in a long-term cooperative security arrangement with the host nation.

Nations that require security force assistance and security sector reform are likely also to require external funding for these tasks. Foreign contributions are necessary for success and can have a double benefit - by contributing to the growth of state finances as well as security forces.

Organizations with responsibilities like MNSTC-I have to be staffed with leaders experienced in operating large, institutional organizations and staffed with members able to link their tactical, day-to-day actions to strategic effects. The Army must train its officers and its general officers better to meet these management requirements.

Recommendation.

These recommendations were based on 'Executing the Program' and 'Reflections' portions of LTG Dubik's report.

- Establish a leadership program in the training command. The senior military and civilian leaders worked together to create a vision and worked to align the organization around that vision. It was important that the senior leadership have a presence at all training locations in the command. The command ensured senior leaders were visible at those locations. It was important that there was constant communication and feedback throughout the command as the Iraqi security forces rapidly grew in strength and capability.

- Establish a management program. The goal was to make sure the command was executing the tasks correctly, on time, and within the budget and the law. This included daily briefs and presentation, quarterly reviews, external audits, and weekly senior leader reviews.

- Improve Security by applying enough force to reduce violence to an acceptable level as quickly as possible, and then keep it down. Often, improving the military comes before police, national police before local police.

- Define 'sufficiency.' Trainers and advisors must know the training standards. This will set the bar for trainees and trainers. Training commands must not set the standards to a level that is achievable for trainees. Minimal standards may be enough so that indigenous units are capable enough to operate in combat situations.

- Approach quality iteratively. This is related to sufficiency. Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard might be good enough. Afterwards, the standard can be raised and improved.

- **Develop Partners.** developing the security sector requires partners from the tactical to strategic level. These partners include a combat force, the host nation, and other organizations responsible for development of the host nation's governmental capability. There must be unity of effort, clear lines of responsibility, and leaders who can forego ego to the mission.

- **Build the enterprise.** Both the security ministries and the security forces have to grow and develop simultaneously. This requires a training command with a wide range of skills - from tactical, fighting skills to national organizational and procedural skills. The U.S. must prepare to engage for the long-term if it requires a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment.

- **Create balanced forces.** Both the military and police forces must be developed so that their components cannot support one another. For example, military maneuver elements should have intelligence and logistical components that are capable to support operations. The police forces should be linked to a judicial and penal system so that it is a synchronous system.

- **Plan for the long-term and execute for the near-term.** Developing the security sector is a long-term proposition. However, there must be specific, achievable short-term tasks that trainers and advisors can focus on. The organization that combines short-term tasks with long-term objectives improves the probability of success.

- **Secure funding.** The training command must be the advocate for resources to support the assisted nation. Growth and development of the security sector cannot happen without outside assistance. There must be a coherent plan with desired outcomes.

Implication.

The Iraqi security forces will not be a capable force to eventually operate on its own unless it receives sufficient and relevant training and equipment. Support for OEF and OIF make it imperative for the training commands to accelerate training of military and police forces. However, the quality and training standards must be good enough so that military and police forces can either operate on its own or with some assistance from advisors. The long-term goal is to field a robust and capable Iraqi security force.

Training commands like MNSTC-I will enable indigenous forces to grow in size and capability. As these forces mature and more professional, they will be able to train on their own or take over the business of primary training. Training commands do that but also help to identify and develop potential leaders. Adequate resources to training commands will enable them to provide good training and equipment to indigenous forces. Long-term, Iraqi (and Afghanistan) security forces should be able to have its own baseline and cadre of professionals so that it needs less outside assistance.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the report, *Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer*, by Army LTG (Ret.) James M. Dubik, a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), August 2009. LTG (Ret.) Dubik was the former commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 2007 to August 2008.

f. Topic. Security Sector Reform Missions: Planning and Evaluation (269)

Observation.

The role of commercial contractors in training Iraqi and Afghan security forces demonstrated the latest chapter in the growth of the private sector in Security Sector Reform (SSR). Outsourcing for US police advisors in UN peace operations began with the US -led intervention in Haiti in 1994 and today, provision of police and military advisors, plus logistics and support personnel is a multi-billion dollar industry.

Should the US Government policy makers worry about private sector involvement in what previously has been a government function?

Discussion.

Since security is a precondition of sustainable development, security sector reform (SSR) is essential in the transition from war to peace in conflict-affected countries.

SSR is the complex task of transforming the “security sector”—those organizations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats—into professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors.

SSR remains an unmet challenge for the United Nations and the international community, despite the growing demand for it in peacekeeping missions around the world. This lack of reform has perpetuated the cycle of violence and prolonged costly peacekeeping missions.

Work on SSR remains in its early stages, with most organizations still focusing on common definitions and fundamental concepts and on “mainstreaming” their ideas within the larger international community.

There is no U.S. government doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology concerning SSR. This is primarily due to SSR’s recent conceptual development, the inherent difficulty in implementing SSR programs, and the lack of an official interagency policy coordinating committee within the current administration.

SSR can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention and conflict management in changing threat environments.

Recommendation.

The USIP SSR working group recommended the following:

- U.S. government key policymakers and stakeholders need to agree on a common description for SSR goals and a terminology for SSR activities. The U.S. government needs to move from ad hoc SSR projects to a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to SSR. This effort should begin with the formal establishment of a policy coordinating committee (interagency working group) chaired by a senior member of the National Security Council staff and including stakeholders from relevant agencies and departments.
- A comprehensive and institutionalized U.S. approach to SSR should include doctrine at the strategic level, implementation guidelines at the operational level, and specific programming tools at the tactical level. In building its own SSR capacity, the United States should seek to integrate and incorporate the knowledge base and policy guidance from international organizations, such as the OECD, that have already made substantial progress in the SSR field.

Implication.

The absence of an integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to SSR has produced ad hoc programs with limited and, at times, counter-productive impacts. This has jeopardized the international community's ability to achieve sustainable stability and development in societies emerging from conflict. SSR is multifaceted reform, requiring significant interagency cooperation and frustrated by conflicting bureaucratic perspectives, methods, cultures and objectives.

International institutions and donor governments need to develop SST-tailored tools if they want to move from ad hoc efforts of limited impact to durable SST outcomes. Performance metrics are required to monitor, review, and evaluate SST programs.

Event Description.

SSR is vital to global peace and security, especially in post-conflict states and nation building. In fragile states, the construction or reconstruction of the security sector is a precondition for development, since no other reform—political, economic, or social—can take root without security. Additionally, helping failed states recover is critical to global security, since they can constitute a chronic international problem; induce regional instability; result in humanitarian tragedy; provide safe havens, training grounds, and bases of operation for global terrorists; and abet international criminal organizations that traffic in narcotics, people, small arms, terrorist skills, weapons of mass destruction, and other illicit products and services.

g. Topic. Integrating SSR Provisions in Peace Agreements (531)

Observation.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) provisions are important items in peace agreements. There are many risks associated with failing to address and integrate SSR issues into peace negotiations and agreements.

Discussion.

This report is the result of a research project which examines peace agreements from eight countries in Africa (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), two from Central America (El Salvador and Guatemala) and one from Asia (East Timor). The report demonstrates that there is a potentially high price to be paid for failing to integrate SSR issues into peace negotiations and agreements at the very outset, or for doing so in a selective and shallow manner.

The risks associated with failing to incorporate SSR provisions include:

- subsequent reforms will lack buy-in; failure to anticipate activities of spoilers; unrealistic view of reform efforts and required resources; poorly conceived and coordinated reforms
- dysfunctional and ineffective security and justice institutions; sense of impunity and militaristic practices carried over from the war; worsening poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and crime;

Recommendation.

1. SSR provisions need to be included in a consistent way in every peace agreement. Try to avoid a 'one-size-fits-all' approach and tailor SSR provisions to the situation; support comprehensive SSR provision by meaningful implementation mechanism and appropriate international support; avoid overselling SSR which may lead to unrealistic expectations.
2. Encourage a broad range of stakeholders in the peace negotiations; Include women and youth in peace negotiations; include security concerns from non-state armed groups, civil society, and women's groups.

3. Design negotiations in such a way as to foster trust, mutual confidence, and commitment to a common vision of the future.
4. Implementation mechanisms should be as representative, participatory, and transparent as possible, and subject to monitoring, evaluation, and oversight by a neutral agency, preferably the United Nations. Successful implementation also requires national ownership; dedicated and meaningful resources; addressing other root causes of conflict alongside SSR.
5. Implement strategies for containing spoilers. Strategies include patient, open-ended negotiations, inducements, and sanctions. The goal is to not inadvertently entrench or increase the power and influence of spoilers.
6. Legitimate non-state justice and security organs should be integrated into peace agreements and into the design of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and SSR exercises; Demobilizing armed opposition movements and converting them into legitimate political parties are not only essential for channelling violence into peaceful political competition, but also for nurturing a credible democratic opposition.
7. There is a need to understand the 'contextual politics' of SSR and to pay attention at the outset to the impact that the political arrangements installed under a peace agreement may have on the implementation of SSR; encourage mutual trust, consensus building, and national reconciliation through the peace negotiations as an essential prop of a post-conflict security strategy; support and empower NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), and women's groups that are committed to peace and dialogue, enabling them to fully participate in the SSR process.
8. Decision-makers and practitioners must include political analysis in their strategies and approaches to SSR processes; the SSR process need to include more than physical disarmament but also demilitarizing the national political culture and the minds of those involved in acts of violence.
9. The international community, United Nations, and regional organizations need improved capacity and strategies to be more effective in SSR. The regional organizations should accept and comply with a common SSR framework.
10. The United Nations needs to: write SSR provisions more comprehensively and coherently into its mandates; better balance mandates and resources within its missions; address the disconnect between short-term peacekeeping needs and long-term institutional reforms; clarify the division of labor among the UN organizational departments and divisions; improve and increase technical capacity and resources; use bilateral leads in SSR; improve accountability in the UN staff and its member states.
11. SSR needs to be seen as a long-term commitment. Donors should commit their support for at least ten years. International commitments and assistance need to continue well beyond formal conclusion of peacekeeping missions.

12. SSR planning should precede DDR. DDR should be planned with an awareness of future security constructs and defense and security personnel planning and training requirements; DDR should be conducted, wherever possible, on a regional instead of local or national basis; the international community should emphasize more the reintegration of former fighters into society and SSR.

13. Begin an SSR operation with an initial security needs assessment followed as soon as possible by the development of a strategic framework; include broad consultations in the needs assessment and designing the strategic framework; agree on and insist on which organization(s) will lead the SSR operation; promote coherence and coordination across national governmental departments involved in SSR.

14. Strengthen justice and rule of law provisions in peace agreements; take into account traditional and non-formal justice institutions.

15. Practitioners should explore the commonalities and differences between transitional justice and SSR; find and integrate those things between the two that can improve peace building.

16. Strengthen gender provisions in peace agreements and SSR programs

17. Legislature/parliamentarian governance and oversight has to be strengthened in step with security sector reforms.

18. Local ownership has to be the priority -- ultimately this is where SSR commitment and sustainability derives; international entities must *support* rather than *preempt* local ownership; build capacity for local ownership to succeed; involve NGOs and civilian think tanks in SSR; develop and empower national and regional SSR networks; security institutions must be viewed as primary stakeholders in SSR.

19. Be more even handed with support for peacekeeping operations and SSR. Africa is mentioned as a region not treated fairly or provided enough resources.

20. Planning needs to consider longer-term financial and fiscal sustainability issues especially after UN missions and operations officially cease; multi-lateral funding mechanisms, like the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, should be used in peacekeeping programs and strengthen local ownership.

21. Institute external evaluation of SSR programs and make it a matter of practice and standard procedure.

22. Link economic development to security through SSR. The fiscal, macroeconomic, and development framework should support SSR instead of undermining it. Poverty reduction and managing natural resources are important issues that should be addressed in SSR.

23. Related recommendations include funding more SSR-related research and changing the notion that SSR is not for post-conflict situations only. The scope of SSR can be applied to all transitioning countries and even to advanced countries where security governance is a problem.

Implication.

- Security Sector Reform is one of the most, if not the most, important factor in peace building. It is the linchpin of all the other factors. Planners must give SSR careful thought and evaluation and extend it out past and envisioned peacekeeping operations or mission. The UN planners should be a highly adaptable and creative group who can develop SSR initiatives while depending on limited and constrained resources.
- Negotiators and planners alike have to be in synch to implement and sustain SSR in peace agreements. A good, broad-based SSR plan improves the chance of success for peace agreements.
- In the background of the recommendations is the difficulty in resourcing SSR initiatives and peacekeeping, in general. The major contributing nations have scaled back their contributions to the United Nations, especially the United States, in the current geopolitical climate. The realistic assessment is that contributions and donations to UN peacekeeping operations and missions will be lean in the near-to-mid-term (3-5 years). The UN should expect little to no increase in its peacekeeping operations budget.
- Local ownership of SSR is the ultimate goal in peace building. However, that does not free the UN and member nations from responsibility. In the long-term, the UN and others will have to monitor and evaluate and commit resources to ensure SSR is being done effectively and according to peace agreements.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the report "Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements," January 2009, by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.

3. CONCLUSION

It is intended that this report be used by USAWC Staff, Faculty and Students, as well as other readers / SOLLIMS users, to assist them with incorporating key Security Force Reform / Security Force Assistance concepts, lessons and best practices into their Programs of Instruction (POI), projects, and research / study efforts.

4. COMMAND POC

Mr. Dan French
Chief, Lessons Learned
Publications & Knowledge Management Divn

CARL_sollims@us.army.mil

Comm: 717.245.3755

DSN: 242.3755

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<http://www.pksoi.org>

COL Rory Radovich
Chief, Publications & Knowledge Management Division

Dan French
Chief, Lessons Learned

Dave Mosinski
Senior Lessons Learned Analyst

Contact PKSOI: CARL_SOLLIMS@us.army.mil

