

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Volume 1

Issue 1



***Protecting Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations***



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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## FOREWORD

This is the first edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler”. The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an **Introduction** that provides an operational perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “**Quick Look**” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic/issue-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related **Lessons Learned report\***, and (4) links to one or two **additional reports or other references** that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to the protection of civilians in conflict environments available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These observations are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as civilian practitioners with a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed into conflict environments, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy makers and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

**Lessons Format.** Each lesson is provided in the form of an Observation and Recommendation (O&R). The “O & R” follows a standard format:

- Title (Topic)
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications
- Event Description

Occasionally you may see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author of the “O&R” to provide additional personal perspective on the Observation. The “Event Description” section provides context for the Observation in that it identifies the source or event from which the content was developed.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson / observation. This number is hyper-linked to the actual O&R within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted O&R number to display the O&R entry and access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included within SOLLIMS for this O&R. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a few short minutes to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We plan to publish the “Sampler” on a quarterly basis as a minimum, although it may be published every month based on operational needs of the SO community or on a specific interest. Special reports / editions of the “Sampler” may be published based on responding to a Request for Information (RFI) and the associated value of the RFI information to the SO community at large.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective as related to a single observation / lesson in this report, or to the overall value of this “Sampler” as a reference or guide for you and your unit/organization and staff.

**By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each O&R – seen when you open the O&R in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments and observations on this O&R.** We welcome your input. We encourage you to become an regular contributor to the SOLLIMS Community of Interest !!!

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At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our web site at [ <http://pksoi.army.mil> ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ <http://www.pksoi.org> ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems – we welcome your comments and insights.

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***\*All reports in the “Sampler” are generated by the SOLLIMS Lessons Report Builder tool.***

## INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the July 2010 edition, the very first edition, of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Lessons Learned “Sampler”. The focus for this edition is on Protection of Civilians during Peacekeeping Operations.

*“... The [UN Security] Council expressed its deepest concern that civilians continue to account for the majority of victims of acts of violence committed by parties to armed conflicts, including as a result of deliberate targeting, indiscriminate and excessive use of force, use of civilians as human shields and of sexual and gender based violence ...”* (Aide Memoire: For the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. UNOCHA, May 2009.)

Over the last decade as the “face” of conflict has changed from uniformed forces using armored vehicles, missiles and sophisticated airborne weapon systems, to a ‘face’ often concealed in the shadows of small villages and the hills of Afghanistan –possessing deadly and highly sophisticated weaponry, it has become evident that, during the conduct of conflict and associated peacekeeping and stability operations, that the protection of civilians has become an increasingly significant challenge. This almost always effects the indigenous populace – with internally displaced personnel (IDP) and other ‘non-combatants’ being ready targets for violence and mistreatment. Additionally, this problem often includes other civilian groups – those responding to a crisis or conflict situation, such as members of NGOs, IOs and other multi-national support groups, and contractors who are members of the “peacekeeping and reconstruction force.”

In some cases these civilian elements have their own security assets - e.g. contractors. These security assets are most often restricted to providing protection to their own workforce – they may even be hostile to the local populace and the indigenous, local leadership. These security assets are generally not available to support or provide protection for any other peacekeeping / peace-building elements / agencies / teams – either those providing support to ongoing or planned ‘peace operations’, or those working on actual reconstruction projects within the stressed nation/state.

This “Sampler” provides just a glimpse of the challenges of protection of civilians facing military commanders, units, the indigenous government and other civilian actors and stakeholders (NGOs, IOs) conducting post-conflict / post-disaster, stability and reconstruction operations in a highly stressed national environment.

Focus on Protection of Civilian in Conflict Environments	
Table of Contents	
Quick Look – Protecting Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations	Page 6/7
FOCUS – Protecting Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations	Pages 8 – 41
Related References / Links	
Observations & Recommendations Concerning HA/DR Operations Conducted in Haiti January – March 2010. <a href="#">(Link)</a>	Page 41
95 <sup>th</sup> CA Brigade 2010 Global Civil Conference Summary Report <a href="#">(Link)</a>	Page 41
Mass Atrocities Response Operations (MARO) Handbook <a href="#">(Link)</a>	Page 41

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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## **Sampler "Quick Look":**

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to Sampler topic.

- The protection of civilians must be at the forefront of planning for all peacekeeping missions and operations. "Civilians" expect to be protected when they are in the presence of peacekeepers. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- The mandate to protect civilians extends to humanitarian aid workers as illustrated by the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- Civil society actors have the potential to serve as peace enforcers or as spoilers in fragile peace processes. Civil society has a role, along with national government and the international community, in efforts to build sustainable peace. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- Deploying a UN-sponsored "bridging force" offers a solution to providing an interim peacekeeping force that can offer some protection for civilian elements before a fully-staffed UN peacekeeping force is authorized, organized, and deployed to a conflict or post-conflict area. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- The military can be part of a whole-of-government response to threats of genocide and mass atrocities. Although most militaries do not train specifically for counter-genocide operations, they often have the skills and capabilities to quickly respond and support counter-genocide operations and prevent mass atrocities. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- Specific capabilities and key enablers will need to remain in place throughout transition to maintain sufficient levels of operational effectiveness and provide adequate levels of force protection – and protection of civilians – during and throughout transition. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- Despite recognition by USG civilian agencies, the military, and NGOs of each others' importance in achieving peace and stability in conflict zones, significant obstacles still remain to achieving effective IA cooperation. Given the emerging consensus/realization that none of these actors operates in vacuum, practitioners at all levels should strive to cooperate across communities, as long as doing so does not compromise their core principles. Developers of training and doctrine especially can set a strong example, by ensuring civil-military integration and understanding of NGO roles in their products and processes. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)
- One key goal for stability operations in a failed state is to provide an alternative source for essential services – the services that comprise the infrastructure of the state, including a reliable local police force, trustworthy penal and judicial institutions that can enforce the rule of law – and institutions that serve in the generation and management of state revenues, when these have ceased to function. These services combine to form a 'social contract' that exists between the citizens and the state when they are functioning properly. The process of establishing the professional workforce that facilitates this social contract is fundamental to curtailing violence and providing a lasting peace. [\[ Read More ... \]](#)

- The considerable capabilities gap that exists between unarmed civilian police and heavily armed military forces needs to be addressed, especially when considering security for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. Formed Police Units (FPU) could potentially play a role in filling this gap, but many of their members are still ill-trained, ill-equipped, often lacking language skills, and too often appearing as a military force. This then leaves some FPU as ill-suited for such missions as crowd control, protection of the mission, and deterrence through presence (patrols). [ [Read More ...](#) ]

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**Subject: SOLLIMS REPORT - PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

**1. GENERAL**

It has become evident that, during the conduct of peacekeeping and stability operations, the protection of civilians has become an increasingly significant problem. This includes both members of NGOs, IOs and other multi-national support groups as well as the indigenous personnel that interface with these NGOs/IOs and military elements of the "peacekeeping force."

Civilian elements that have their own security assets - e.g. contractors, may have the competencies to protect their own workforce, but these assets are most often not available to support protection of any other elements / agencies / teams providing support to ongoing or planned 'peace operations.'

This report contains the observations, insights, and lessons currently available within the SOLLIMS knowledge base.

**2. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS**

**a. Topic. Protecting Civilians ([586](#))**

**Observation.**

The protection of civilians must be at the forefront of all United Nations peacekeeping missions and operations. People expect to be protected in all situations including violence and attacks when they are in the presence of peacekeepers. The UN mandates should be clear and the supporting operational tasks understood by the mission leaders and peacekeepers.

**Discussion.**

This report from Refugees International, based on field analysis and recommendations, outlines steps that the United Nations (UN) Security Council, UN member states, and the United States can take to address the challenges

and improve peacekeeper's ability to keep people (civilians) safe in times of armed conflict.

The first challenge is that protection of civilians is not the only priority for peacekeeping missions. Modern peacekeeping operations are asked to support a wide range of things from ceasefire agreements to long-term peace building and reconstruction activities. Every peacekeeping mission is different and the operational and support tasks have to be tailored to the operational environment. The threat can range from large-scale attacks to localized violence and banditry.

UN peacekeepers have developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the threats and situations. Despite the different solutions to problems, there is a need for a uniform operational definition of what protection means from a peacekeeping perspective to guide planning and operations. Training that incorporates protection of civilians is also important for peacekeepers to understand and act in situations where civilians are under threat. To back up the operational peacekeepers, the UN leadership, member states, and mission leaders must work and agree on clear and enforceable mandates, properly resourced forces, and mission plans.

The United States and other advanced countries possess resources and capabilities to enhance peacekeeping operations. These include military expertise, specialized equipment, and transportation systems. The advanced countries also have sophisticated intelligence assets that many peacekeeping leaders feel they need to support their operations.

### **Recommendation.**

#### **Assessment:**

1. Assessment and planning teams need to include protection during the early stages of mission development. Team members must identify the threats to civilian safety and must be directed to make protection a core part of assessments.
2. The UN Secretary General must be stronger in his reports and discussions with the Security Council. According to this report, the Secretary General and Peacekeeping mission leadership continue to be timid when discussing peacekeeping needs. In return, the Security Council must adjust mandates and resources accordingly and in a timely manner.

#### **UN DPKO and Mission Leaders:**

1. UN DPKO must ensure that troop contributing countries (TCC) clearly understand and accept the expectations being placed on their peacekeepers with regard to protection of civilians.
2. The mission leadership must assume the demands of a protection mandate. They need to be held accountable for the production of mission-wide strategies and orders and reporting accurate results.

#### Mandates and Mission Development:

1. The UN Security Council must ensure there are clear, achievable mandates.
2. UN Security council members must ensure they have strong political backing from their countries and other applicable parties.
3. Planning and assessment teams must understand protection issues in order to develop the Concept of Operations, courses of actions and a detailed plan.

#### Preparations:

1. Incorporate the operational definition of "Protection" in peacekeeping doctrine and policy. This should reflect the protection needs in terms of day-to-day protection strategies and the event of violence or attacks.
2. Peacekeepers need to be trained on "Protection." Peacekeeping tasks have to be developed from the protection mandates. Additionally, training initiatives need to incorporate evolving guidance and lessons learned in training modules and shared across the peacekeeping and stability operations community.
3. UN member states have to provide the resources to match capabilities to tasks. This report also recommends that UN administrative systems must be reformed so that a qualitative approach replaces the quantitative approach.

#### Implications.

- If recommendations are not accepted, the UN Secretary General, Security Council members, and TCCs will continue to under resource peacekeeping missions and operations. The necessary capabilities will not match the tasks needed to support the overarching mandate. Operations will not keep up with the complex nature of modern peacekeeping operations.
- The peacekeeping profession will not improve without incorporating up-to-date lessons and doctrine from peacekeeping initiatives, peacekeeping organizations, and training partners. There has to be continued interaction between leaders,

peacekeeping practitioners, and the peace and stability operations community of interest.

- The recommendations will strengthen the legitimacy of United Nations and international peacekeeping. There are always high level political goals for missions but the essence should be about protecting and saving of lives. It is this fact that will positively affect behavior and attitude towards peacekeepers.

- The last recommendation offers an approach to integrate UN member states capabilities into a more effective peacekeeping mission and force. This will require the UN DPKO to develop (if none exists) and update a database of potential and available capabilities for peacekeeping missions. This also requires cooperation from member states to be honest, candid, and provide the information for a comprehensive database on peacekeeping resources and assets.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the report "[The Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civilians.](#)" Refugees International, February 2010. [\[Top...\]](#)

## **b. Topic. Protecting Humanitarian Aid Workers ([560](#))**

### **Observation.**

The mandate to protect civilians extends to humanitarian aid workers as illustrated by the conflict in Darfur, Sudan.

### **Discussion.**

There are many reasons for why there is an increase in attacks against humanitarian workers. These include: increase in the number and duration of conflicts; more intra-state conflict than interstate; aid agencies are perceived as 'soft' targets that can be attacked with impunity; that there is a loss of neutrality among aid agencies; and that there is a culture of competition between humanitarian NGOs which enhances the pressure to get to a conflict zone first and work closer to the lines of confrontation.

As a result of increased attacks on aid workers, humanitarian agencies have been forced to take more proactive measures to provide for their own security -- besides relying on the principles of humanitarian action. It has become more common for humanitarian NGOs to take precautions by using protection and deterrence tactics. This trend can be summarized in what has come to be known as the 'Security Triangle' paradigm. Until after the Cold War humanitarian

organizations relied mostly on acceptance by the local populace and leadership to ensure their security. However, incidents like the massacre of six International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) personnel in Chechnya in December 1996, demonstrated that passive acceptance was no longer sufficient to provide security for aid workers. This led a small group of people within the humanitarian community to modify the acceptance approach. They developed what has been named the 'security triangle'. This approach centers on what is required by the mission and has its focus on the traditional **acceptance** strategy, but in addition, there is added emphasis on active **protection** and **deterrence**.

**Acceptance** refers to when the community (populace and leadership) in which humanitarian agencies are working supports and accept their presence, and out of that acceptance grows security. What is meant by **Protection** is the "ways and means" needed to provide security. This includes: **equipment** -- such as walkie talkies, barbed wire and helmets; **operational policies and procedures** - such as curfews, training and clearly understood policies on vehicle operations and finances; **and coordinated operations** -- such as coordination and cooperation with the UN.

Finally, **Deterrence** signifies posing a counter threat, and involves such measures as **utilizing guards and** coordination of activities with external **international military forces** in peacekeeping missions. The latter is the least preferred and least common form of deterrence, but has been employed in Iraq, Bosnia and Somalia. Acceptance strategies are favored by most humanitarian NGOs, as it offers them a way to connect with the local people without taking sides in a conflict.

### **Recommendation.**

- Humanitarian groups/NGOs must be flexible in terms of their personal security and understand the operational environment they will be working in so they can adapt to new risks and be able to react to them. Darfur is an unpredictable and insecure environment. Over the course of the conflict, NGOs have been expelled, workers kidnapped and murdered, NGO property vandalized, bombings, car-jackings, and banditry.

The following strategies can be used by NGOs and humanitarian groups to reduce their risk of being targeted by armed groups:

- Emphasize and adhere to the principles of humanitarian action: neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

- Identify yourself and property with organizational flags, markers, and stickers.

- Temper vocal support to organizations, like the UN, so what is said does not reach armed groups/opposition parties.

- Temper vocal advocacy against atrocities and human rights violations so this also does not reach armed groups/opposition parties.

- Carefully choose where and when to use international and national staff personnel. National staffs are more at risk but they can reduce this risk by being less visible to armed/opposition groups.

### **Implications.**

- The experiences in Darfur will affect training, planning, and methods by NGOs and humanitarian agencies for future missions and operations. With the ever more complex and dangerous nature of aid/relief operations, NGOs will have to include more security training and be ready to rapidly change their procedures during missions.

- NGOs and humanitarian agencies will have to rethink how and where they use their national workers to reduce their exposure to conflict parties. If trends continue, future peacekeeping operations will be more dangerous to humanitarian and aid workers. The trends also show that host-nation aid workers in the employ of NGOs and local aid agencies face more physical harm than their international worker counterparts.

- NGOs and aid agencies may change how they normally conduct day-to-day business with the UN mission and local leaders during humanitarian operations. Sensitivities are high and groups involved in a conflict can exploit an actual or perceived bias on the part of humanitarian groups and personnel. Personnel will have to be attuned to changes in their working environment.

- Humanitarian groups and personnel will have less time devoted to actual aid work as they allocate more time to security. This means less direct contact with the people they are supposed to be helping and perhaps their partner, host-nation aid workers.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the report [\*The Protection of Aid Workers: Principled Protection and Humanitarian Security in Darfur\*](#), Security in Practice 2, 2010/NUPI Working Paper 770, by Karoline R. Eckroth, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), January 2010. [\[Top...\]](#)

### **c. Topic. Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping ( [642](#) )**

#### **Observation.**

Civil society actors have the potential to serve as peace enforcers or as spoilers in fragile peace processes. Civil society has a role, along with national government and the international community, in efforts to build sustainable peace. The situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone before and after the establishment of United Nations peacekeeping missions provides examples of supporting the peace process. The close partnership between peacekeeping missions and civil society has the potential of bringing more value to the work of the United Nations system in post-conflict countries.

#### **Discussion.**

A definition of civil society: other organized social networks and associations outside the governmental sector, whose activities and programmes influence and influence the lives of wide sectors of the community. They include voluntary associations, non-governmental organizations, social movements, traditional organizations community-based associations, and faith-based organizations. The range of activities that influence the work of these civil society organizations include: the provision of basic social services; monitoring implementation of national government policies according to established national and international standards; undertaking advocacy for, and working to promote social justice and equality; and providing moral and/or cultural leadership at the community level.

Civil society is often presented as a complementary pillar to the work of government at the national level. Given that many civil society organizations in developing and post-conflict countries are engaged at the community level, they are often considered an effective vehicle for translating national level policies into practical programmes and activities for the benefit of wide sections of the population. In communities where the impact of national policies may not have taken sufficient root at the local level, traditional leaders and religious/faith-based groups often wield strong influence in the governance of the day-to-day lives of the population. Civil society groups can also provide an independent voice to monitor the implementation of government policy and to advocate and negotiate for socially just policies and programmes.

According to the basis of this observation finding, civil society plays an important role in transitions to sustainable peace. Successful partnerships between UN peacekeeping missions and civil society mainly have been the commitment of peacekeeping personnel. Poor performance at the operational and strategic level have been attributed to lack of clear policy framework, prevailing institutional culture in peacekeeping, bureaucratic and administrative procedures, and inadequate resources.

The most successful areas of partnership-building have been in logistical and training support by UN peacekeeping missions to some sectors of civil society. However, at the level of strategic engagement, peacekeeping missions have invested little in understanding how the influence of civil society at the ground level wide outreach capacity, knowledge of the operational environment and trust and respect that specific sectors of civil society command at the community level) could be better; harnessed to facilitate implementation of mission mandates. A fundamental point is that in order to facilitate the establishment of democratic structures in post-conflict countries, peacekeeping missions must invest as much in strengthening government structures, as in strengthening structures within civil society, since this latter can support local-level peace-building initiatives and can also help to monitor the exercise of accountable governance.

### **Recommendation.**

#### **Lessons Learned:**

1. **A context analysis is important to understand the role played by civil society during the conflict.** The assessments prior to peacekeeping missions should include an understanding of the role played by civil society in the conflict and its potential during post-conflict. The assessment results should inform and shape the nature of relations developed between peacekeeping missions and civil society during post-conflict.
2. **Civil society representatives are not innocent bystanders but actors who have affected or have been affected by the conflict.** Peacekeepers should recognize the influence of civil society groups within their communities – whether positive or otherwise. Civil society can serve as partners, capable of providing essential information to peacekeepers based on their knowledge of the operational environment. This approach should enable peacekeepers to recognize any divisions within or among different sectors of civil society as a result of the conflict, which could work to undermine the peace process.
3. **Civil society has a key role to play in facilitating implementation of the mandates of peacekeeping missions.** An illustration of this point was the strategic support from women's organizations in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process overseen by the ECOMOG regional peacekeeping force in Liberia. Civil society organizations also have been supporting reintegration of ex-combatants back into society by providing psycho-social counseling services for mental healing and ceremonial cleansing rites performed by faith-based groups.
4. **The mission mandate provides the best starting point for defining partnership engagement with civil society.** Peacekeeping missions can be

enhanced by including civil society partnership in peacekeeping mandates which provides a sense of collective ownership.

**5. Peacekeeping pre-deployment training should include instruction on civil society elements present in the host country.** This would help peacekeepers be aware and recognize the potential of civil society actors in the operational area. This could help peacekeepers implement their mission mandates(s).

**6. An institutional approach is necessary to implement partnership-building with civil society.** A more institutionalized policy framework is necessary in order to maximize the partnership potential with civil society elements and set it on a sustaining footing. This requires a structured mechanism be established to facilitate dialogue and communication between civil society and the peacekeeping leadership. As a good practice, a Civil Affairs officer should be appointed who would be responsible for supporting partnership engagement with civil society.

**7. The mission leadership style can work to facilitate or hinder partnerships with civil society.** In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the representatives of civil society interviewed for the study noted that their ability to engage effectively or otherwise with the peacebuilding mission was significantly influenced by the leadership style of the SRSG, and referenced both positive and negative experiences in this respect.

**8. Partnership-building with civil society requires some capacity-building investments to support the exercise of democratic governance.** This would require a shift in policy emphasis to underline capacity-building of civil society to complement the technical and logistical assistance that has largely defined the scope of partnership engagement between peacekeeping missions and civil society. Capacity-building of civil society should enable them to effectively monitor accountable and transparent governance practices in post-conflict countries and provide feedback to peacekeeping missions on the effectiveness of its governance programs.

**9. Capacity-building of civil society also requires some financial resources to enhance the activities of this sector.** This would require revisiting the rules and procedures that govern the use of peacekeeping budgets to ensure that some flexibility is provided through for example, the use of the quick impact project (QIPS) mechanism to facilitate capacity-building support to civil society.

**10. Civil society actors are well-placed to facilitate outreach to the wider population.** The peacekeeping mission mandates need to be understood by the host-country population which is often not the case. Civil society actors with the capacity to mobilize wide sectors of the population can help to inform and educate the population on the mandate of peacekeeping missions. More

interaction between peacekeepers and the local population should be encouraged to facilitate confidence-building with the local population.

**11. Enhancing the civilian face of peacekeeping offers an important entry point for better outreach to civil society.** A stronger engagement by civilian peacekeepers with the local population can help to dispel the perception that peacekeeping is a largely militaristic exercise, and can also facilitate closer relations between peacekeepers and the civilian population. In this regard, the deployment of more women peacekeepers can also help facilitate better interactions with women in the local population, as was underlined by women in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

**12. Civil Society should be involved in the exit strategy of a peacekeeping mission so that civil society has subsequent mechanisms ready to support the peace-building process.** As an example, in Sierra Leone, civil society representatives noted that their limited input in the formulation of the exit strategy of the peacekeeping mission slowed down the momentum of their partnership engagement with the follow-on integrated mission.

**13. Other UN entities should engage with civil society actors to strengthen the integrated approach to partnership-building.** This approach is necessary to sustain the efforts of peacekeepers. It would also ensure that the UN peacekeeping mission complements efforts from other international partners. This would promote a unified approach to support post-conflict peace-building processes.

### **Implications.**

If lessons and recommendations are used:

1. Peacekeeping missions will not engage with all civil society elements. Pre-mission assessments will identify good and bad civil society elements. Further analysis will show which civil society elements will help facilitate the mission and operations. Mission leaders need to plan accordingly for those civil society elements that are excluded or have a minor role in engagement with the peacekeeping mission. Continual mission reviews will be needed to track the impact and effectiveness of civil society elements especially if they receive resources from the peacekeeping mission. The relationship with a civil society element may warrant a change based on its level of effectiveness.

2. Mission leaders and personnel need to be careful with their relationship with civil society elements. Some may be more capable than others but the relationship should be perceived as fair and even-handed. Civil society elements, in most cases, will not have the capacity, transparency, or accountability to help the mission. Initially, civil society elements will need

assistance to build capacity but subsequently demonstrate its effectiveness and impact to the mission.

3. Civil society actors will provide useful information and help peacekeepers gauge progress toward fulfilling their mandate. However, civil society cannot be the only or single source of information. Peacekeepers will continue to do most of its work directly with the population even without coordination or assistance from civil society elements. Additionally, peacekeepers should obtain specific information from more than one element within civil society. Likewise, broadbase engagement with the population should also use as much of civil society as possible.

4. Military forces will continue to be the public perception of peacekeeping despite the presence or call for more civilians in peacekeeping missions. Numerous lessons learned and best practices demonstrate the need for civilians because of unique skills and expertise needed for the mission. For policing tasks, civilian police are preferable over military police and conventional military forces pressed into policing tasks. However, military forces have the capacity to train, staff, and organize, and deploy fairly quickly for peacekeeping operations. Pre-deployment assessment can identify positions where civilians can have the best impact for a mission. Non-governmental organizations can also help improve public perception of peacekeeping operations despite not being affiliated with the UN.

5. Civil society will be one of many factors in a peacekeeping exit strategy. As in collecting information, civil society cannot be the only source to develop and determine the strategy.

6. Be prepared to provide financial resources to civil society organizations. There has to be a system established to monitor and account how the money is used by those organizations.

If lessons and recommendations are not used:

1. Civil society organizations will not receive due recognition of its influence to help the peace process. For example, civil society can strengthen the capacity to monitor and be a partner in the establishment of legitimate governance. Civil society can be one of the partners with the UN to implement peacekeeping mandates. Civil society organizations can be one source to help peacekeepers engage with the population and measure the population's support.

2. Not engaging with civil society leaves out an important stakeholder especially if they yield influence and respect with the host nation population. Peacekeeping forces should reach out to as many legitimate entities to build partnership. Civil society organizations' influence probably will extend after peacekeeping forces

depart when the mission ends.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on Research paper, [Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping: Strengthening Strategic Partnerships between United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Local Civil Society Organisations during Post-conflict Transitions](#), August 2007, by Comfort Lamptey, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The research included interviews with personnel from the UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone; representatives of civil society from both those countries; and representatives from the UN, international agencies, and NGOs. [\[Top...\]](#)

#### **d. Topic. UN Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection ( [554](#) )**

### **Observation.**

The United Nations (UN) faces many difficulties in providing forces for peacekeeping missions and operations. A "bridging force" offers a solution to provide an interim peacekeeping force before a fully-staffed UN peacekeeping force is authorized, organized, and deployed to a conflict area.

### **Discussion.**

The need for peacekeepers has never been more important than now. The total number of peacekeepers deployed has risen from 20,000 in 2000 to over 93,000 in 2009. Peacekeepers are routinely under threat of violence but remain committed to protect civilians. The ideal situation for peacekeepers is when one or more parties to a conflict consent to the deployment of peacekeepers. It is usually not appropriate for UN peacekeepers to undertake a mission if the parties do not consent to their presence.

A sovereign state is ultimately responsible for the protection of its people. Historically, however, humanitarian and political actors, as well as domestic and international security forces have divided the protection roles and tasks. One concept that has gained wide acceptance is "[the responsibility to protect](#)." State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. If a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure, and the state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, then it becomes an international responsibility to protect.

The UN faces many challenges when the use/deployment of a peacekeeping force is determined to be the most appropriate tool to protect people caught in a

conflict. Missions are often slow to deploy and the quality of forces are inconsistent. Additionally, Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) then have to negotiate their own agreement with the UN. TCCs have different training standards, combat capabilities, and leadership philosophies. One recommendation that this report makes is that the United States should take a more active role in peacekeeping operations -- a recommendation that has been reiterated in the last ten years by many countries and organizations.

The evolving strategies to provide some kind of armed force to protect civilians in time(s) of conflict have included developing the African Union (AU) capability and the European Union rapid deployment capacity. One option that appears to work is the use of a "bridging operation" such as the one conducted in Chad and the Central African Republic. A UN authorized European Union bridging force (EUFOR) deployed to Chad in March, 2008, followed by an expanded UN peacekeeping operation (MINUCRAT) in March, 2009. Although initially there was resistance to the plan, France, a strong ally of the Chadian government, backed the idea and Chadian government eventually agreed to the deployment of a EU peacekeeping force, which would eventually hand over responsibility to a UN mission. The EUFOR peacekeepers built up a strong foundation of knowledge of the country and good relations with Chadian people. This helped to establish a firm base from which the UN peacekeepers could start.

### **Recommendation.**

The transfer of authority from the EU to the UN forces was generally seen as a success. The lessons from this experience may be applied to future "bridging" operations.

1. The outgoing and incoming force headquarters and leadership must work closely together to capture institutional memory and knowledge in order for the transition to be smooth. For example, the MINURCAT force Chief of Staff was with the military planners at UN headquarters.
2. More senior mission leadership, including the Force Commander, should be included in the planning team at UN headquarters.
3. The UN peacekeeping follow-on mission should be implemented as early as possible
4. If possible, planners should try to "re-hat" troops from the bridging force to the UN force and bring them under UN authority. This would retain experience, operational standards, and established relationships with local people in the UN mission force.
5. Bridging force and UN planners must include civil-military information sharing procedures and systems to identify how the division of labor and working

relationships will be handled from the military-heavy bridging force to the new civilian components of the UN mission.

6. The UN must be (more) flexible in its force generation standards so that it can more readily accept non-traditional military forces as well as the traditional forces. Many countries offer contingents with unique capabilities.

7. Train and equip indigenous/national elements to complement the UN peacekeepers. A Chadian police force was created to work alongside UN peacekeepers to enhance security and protect humanitarian personnel in eastern Chad. This police force was under the direct command and control of Chadian authorities but supported by UN police mentors.

### **Implications.**

- The peacekeeping environment has significantly changed in last 20 years. Peacekeeping missions have grown in numbers, scope, and complexity. The recommendations offer a way for the UN to reduce the lag time to deploy a peacekeeping force whether UN or a regional organization. Realistically (today) , the UN process often takes many months if not years to deploy peacekeepers.

- The UN will have to be more flexible and adaptable if it implements these recommendations. It can no longer be as selective or discriminating on peacekeeping forces from troop contributing countries. **The total number of troops may not be as important as the capability a contingent provides.** The UN cannot count on the larger TCCs to provide robust peacekeeper / peacekeeping resources over the next five years.

- UN agencies will have to actively seek out and directly coordinate with TCCs and regional organizations at their locations instead of waiting for TCC/regional military leaders to come to them (at UN headquarters). The UN will have to be inclusive instead of exclusive in its relationship with TCCs and regional organizations.

- The UN will have to use and adapt best practices and procedures from TCCs rather than rely on those generated within the UN structure. This may result in accepting more risk for the security of the UN mission and peace process.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the report [Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection](#), by Erin A Weir, Refugees International (an independent, non-profit humanitarian advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C.), July 2009. [\[Top...\]](#)

**e. Topic. Military Challenges to Prevent Genocide ( [497](#) )**

**Observation.**

The use of the U.S. military does not have to be an 'all-or-nothing' proposition when dealing with genocide prevention. The military can be part of a whole-of-government response to threats of genocide and mass atrocities. Although the military does not train specifically for counter-genocide operations, it has the skills and capabilities to quickly respond and support counter-genocide operations and prevent mass atrocities.

**Discussion.**

Genocide and mass atrocities are a direct assault on universal human values; fundamentally the right to life. These crimes also threaten core U.S. national interests in several ways:

First, genocide fuels instability, usually in weak, undemocratic, and corrupt states. It is in these same types of states that we find terrorist recruitment and training, human trafficking, and civil strife, all of which have damaging spillover effects for the entire world.

Second, genocide and mass atrocities have long-lasting consequences far beyond the states in which they occur. Refugee flows start in bordering countries but often spread. Humanitarian needs grow, often exceeding the capacities and resources of a generous world. The international community, including the United States, is called on to absorb and assist displaced people, provide relief efforts, and bear high economic costs. And the longer we wait to act, the more exorbitant the price tag. For example, in Bosnia, the United States has invested nearly \$15 billion to support peacekeeping forces in the years since we belatedly intervened to stop mass atrocities.

Third, America's standing in the world-and our ability to lead-is eroded when we are perceived as bystanders to genocide. We cannot be viewed as a global leader and respected as an international partner if we cannot take steps to avoid one of the greatest scourges of humankind.

Although it should be used as a last resort, military options have to be weighed carefully considering the following challenges: the nature of the genocide itself, domestic political issues, international politics, and military issues. Genocide is often state-supported and part of a larger armed conflict. Genocide and mass atrocities are aimed at civilians. Military intervention to prevent or halt genocide falls between traditional warfighting and peacekeeping. The environment and situation range from permissive to non-permissive. All of this adds to a politically

and militarily difficult situation. Senior civilian and military leaders must be clear in presenting the range of options in order to come up with a response.

A factor that hinders effective political decision is a lack of clear understanding on the military options. According to the report, this lack of understanding military options prevented effective action to halt the atrocities in Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995) and Darfur (2004-present). Senior leaders wrestle with questions on military options including: relevance to national security, popular support, casualties, effects and consequences.

Military options will be considered within national and international legal and political structures. Such structures include the United Nations and the Security Council. Authorization from the United Nations makes it easier to justify counter-genocide operations. However, action can be taken without UN authorization such as the 1999 NATO airstrikes against Serbia. But it makes the situation more difficult by calling into question its legitimacy and reduced international support.

Using military capabilities presents challenges in that units and troops will focus on protecting the population instead of defeating an enemy or capturing territory. However, maintaining the peace and stability is equally, if not more, important when using military force. Other elements of power have to follow in order to provide and build essential public services and perhaps stability police units (e.g. *carabinieri* or *gendarmerie*).

U.S. military force is the most capable and best-prepared to respond to a counter-genocide situation. The U.S. has the assets and command and control structure to do this with its six geographic combatant commands providing planning and situational awareness on specific or potential hot spots.

The report concludes that preventing genocide is an achievable goal. It requires planning and to be systematically carried out. Governments and organizations can recognize the signs and symptoms. But, it will require organizational structures, strategies, and partnerships. Above all, it takes leadership and political will to act on preventing genocide and mass atrocities.

### **Recommendation.**

The following were recommendations from the Genocide Prevention Task Force:

Recommendation 5-1: The secretary of defense and U.S. military leaders should develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response and incorporate it into Department of Defense (and interagency) policies, plans, doctrine, training, and lessons learned.

Recommendation 5-2: The director of national intelligence and the secretary of defense should leverage military capacities for intelligence and early warning and strengthen links to political-military planning and decision making.

Recommendation 5-3: The Departments of Defense and State should work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and other regional and subregional bodies to employ military options to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities.

Recommendation 5-4: The Departments of Defense and State should work with NATO, the European Union, and capable individual governments to increase preparedness to reinforce or replace United Nations, African Union, or other peace operations to forestall mass atrocities.

Recommendation 5-5: The Departments of Defense and State should enhance the capacity of the United States and the United Nations to support a transition to long-term efforts to build peace and stability in the wake of genocidal violence.

### **Implications.**

Although the U.S. military cannot be considered the only option in response to threats of genocide and mass atrocities, it could be the first responders in such instances. Past occurrences suggest that there must be a comprehensive political-military response and solution. In many instances, it also has to be a multinational response with an international solution using elements of diplomatic, military and civilian capabilities.

While the United States military continues to conduct overall operations at the same level while fighting two wars it will fall on the U.S. government civilian agencies to provide the personnel in various organizations and processes in areas where there is the threat of genocide and potential mass atrocity.

If the United States military cannot support operations aimed at preventing genocide or mass atrocities then it will fall on the U.S. government to increase engagement or support for other organizations, such as the United Nations or African Union, to conduct preventive genocide efforts. Perhaps the African Union can be the focal point for efforts to prevent genocide since the African continent has been the area where most of the notorious genocides and mass atrocities have occurred in the past 30 years.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on chapter 5 (Employing Military Options) of the USIP report, [Preventing Genocide](#), published by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), 2008. This was a project sponsored by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial

Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and USIP. The fundamental goal of the report was to identify practical steps to enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.

[\[Top...\]](#)

**f. Topic. Retention of Critical Capabilities during Transition ( [217](#) )**

**Observation.**

As Coalition stabilization and reconstruction forces transition out of a post-crisis, developing nation, the military will realize that it will be forced to do less as resources and capabilities are removed. However, specific capabilities and key enablers will need to remain in place throughout transition to maintain sufficient levels of operational effectiveness and provide adequate levels of force protection.

**Discussion.**

During transition there will likely be a large drop in intelligence capability. As the local population sees the Coalition leaving, there will be little incentive for the populace to continue providing them with information and put themselves at risk with insurgent groups. With this expected drop it will be critical for forces on the ground to retain as much intelligence capability as possible in order to maintain high levels of situational awareness. During later stages of transition, intelligence functions will be extremely important as stability and reconstruction forces are retooled to focus on force protection.

While Coalition air assets will not typically be used to support the Host Nation / indigenous security forces in later stages of transition, the assets must be available if and when an embedded Coalition presence is in need of them. Any Quick Reaction Force (QRF) type mission during transition will require internal air capabilities that can be sent out in quick order. The capabilities that aviation provides including battlefield mobility, airlift, medical evacuation, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and support for counter-terrorism, and humanitarian operations will be required for operations throughout transition.

As Coalition stability and reconstruction forces drawdown, it may be necessary to institutionalize a regional reconstruction operations center. With fewer Coalition forces there will be an increased need for PRTs, NGOs, and other civil affairs organizations. While the Host Nation will be able to provide for much of its own security through their own security forces, the Host Nation governance and infrastructure is still in its infancy and will need the support of PRTs and NGOs in order to continue to increase the government's ability to provide essential services to the population.

Robust Strategic Communication and IO are capabilities that will need to be retained.

Domestic and international legitimacy are crucial during transition and the Coalition members must control the message that is sent to the Host Nation populace, and the international community. Without the ability to conduct IO, a spectacular attack by insurgency elements/"spoilers" could be sold as a returning of these elements to power and an increase in its operational capability, despite facts that may prove contradictory to the assertion. It is important to have the ability to project an attitude and a message of success and that Coalition forces/agencies will continue to support the Host Nation government and the indigenous populace in the future.

Additional liaison capabilities to increase interaction and coordination with the Host Nation security forces, as well as logistical support to shore up inadequacies in the Host Nation security forces logistics until the capability is built, will also need to be present as transition progresses.

### **Recommendation.**

During Transition Operations Civ-Mil planners/staff should:

- Maintain a robust intelligence capability; military-supported intelligence operations/elements should be part of the final drawdown of forces;
- Maintain sufficient air assets to support intelligence operations and probable Quick Ready Force (QRF) type missions;
- Establish a Regional Reconstruction Center; use this Center to coordinate Host Nation provided security forces support for NGOs, IOs, PRTs; priority of effort to projects providing essential services to the population;
- Maintain a robust Strategic Communication and IO capability; continue to tell the "good news" to combat negative/"spoiler" media coverage/efforts; primary target is the Host Nation populace, then the international community;
- Maintain a liaison infrastructure and appropriate logistics "footprint" to ensure transition teams and units are adequately supported

### **Implications.**

**INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION:** maintaining a consistent intelligence 'picture' as drawdown and transition takes place minimizes the number of 'gaps' that will occur; the 'enemy' will target periods just after transition takes place to act assuming that something will 'slip through the cracks' during transition; consistent intelligence also supports ongoing Information Operations (IO) by helping focus

IO efforts at the right audience(s) and the right time(s).

**SOCIAL/SOCIETAL:** the Regional Reconstruction Center must have Host Nation involvement and should integrate regional leadership within the planning cell; regional leaders understand regional priorities for establishing and ensuring security for essential services projects.

### **Event Description.**

JUW is a U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Joint Forces Command co-sponsored war game designed to address and improve joint and combined urban operations concept development and experimentation (CD&E). The most recent iteration, JUW 08, was conducted 7-11 April 2008 at the Bolger Center in Potomac, MD. War game participants included the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint IED Defeat Organization Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JIEDDO COIC), students from the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff Colleges, representatives from 18 partner nations, and members of academia.

***For more information about JUW 08, please contact:***

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory  
Wargaming Division  
(703) 784-3276 DSN 278

### **Comments.**

Within the Regional Reconstruction Center, it might be appropriate to include women from the region who can relate to the population from a more humanitarian perspective. This would be appropriate for resolving/addressing Issues such as education for girls, education in general; relief /sanitation operations in refugee camps. Make sure this is appropriate; don't bring in the complainers, bring in those who can help get things done.

### **Attachments**

1/ [Joint Urban Warrior 08 Final Report](#)

2/ [Joint Urban Warrior 08 Quicklook Final 30May2008](#)

[\[Top...\]](#)

**g. Topic. Ensuring CIV-MIL Integration & NGO Input in USG Peace & Stability Operation ( [423](#) )**

**Observation.**

Despite recognition by USG civilian agencies, the military, and NGOs of each others' importance in achieving peace and stability in conflict zones, significant obstacles remain to their cooperation. Understandable differences in mission and culture lie behind these obstacles. Nonetheless, given the emerging consensus that none of these actors operates in a vacuum (when in a Peace and Stability Operations context), practitioners at all levels should strive to cooperate across communities, whenever doing so does not compromise their core principles. Developers of training and doctrine especially can set a strong example, by ensuring civil-military integration and understanding of NGO roles in their products and processes.

**Discussion.**

The civilian, military, and NGO communities may in theory agree on cooperation, but in practice, differences between their respective cultures and missions can intervene, especially in the field. Within the USG, civilian agencies coordinating with the the military face the handicaps of fewer resources, lower float capacity, and lack of a planning culture. In the field, an NGO's interactions with the USG--especially the military--have the potential to compromise the NGO's neutrality and safety. Thus in Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO), a coordinated effort among external actors is often hampered by complex relationships and the fear of putting a "uniformed" face on civilian and NGO activity.

Developers of training and doctrine should recognize these as challenges to overcome. Leveraging interagency contributions and accepting NGO concerns are critical to the USG's success in P/SO, in which the U.S. military continues to bear most of the burden for planning and implementation. "Nothing in the Army's roles and missions for SO is as challenging as the need to integrate civilian and interagency expertise into planning and operations, and that integration is critical to the Army's capacity to fulfill almost all of its other missions." (CPT A. Heather Coyne, Army Stability Operations Roles and Missions, PKSOI Bulletin, I, 3) Likewise, "the existing and emerging U.S. government and military policy and doctrine reflect an appreciation of both the tangible as well as the intangible benefits of NGO community contribution to the stabilization efforts. Security permitting, they are an essential part of the reconstruction and stabilization process, especially at the local level." (Roy Williams, "Stability Operations" and NGOs: What's in a Name? PKSOI Bulletin, I, 2)

Cooperating across communities early--well before civilians, the military, and NGOs deploy to a given crisis--is one approach to addressing civil-military and

USG-NGO differences. Two examples are instructive in this regard. First, exercising the Interagency Management System (IMS, a framework for whole-of-government planning and implementation of P/SO) teaches military and civilian officials to work jointly. "The IMS systems are gradually earning acceptance as a way to manage interagency collaboration for SO, and--in their modular form--may become a more common phenomenon in 21st century conflict. In the meantime, testing and validation of the whole IMS system, including aspects that have not yet been implemented in a real-world contingency, would increase familiarity with and confidence in the system." (Coyne)

Second, a recent U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) initiative contributed to improved USG-NGO relations in the field. USIP and Interaction, the largest consortium of U.S.-based NGOs, developed guidelines for relations between NGOs and the military. This guidance meets both sides' requirements, by suggesting how to mutually improve situational awareness, and how to safeguard NGO neutrality. Copies of the document can now be found at many Combatant Commands and NGO field offices. (Document entitled "Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations," available in the SOLLIMS Knowledge Library).

### **Recommendation.**

These two cases illustrate how cooperating across communities on training and doctrine--i.e., well before deployment--lead to the improvement of civil-military integration and USG-NGO relations in the field. Therefore:

- Developers of military exercises should recognize and seize opportunities to include interagency partners. When a whole-of-government planning scenario is appropriate, the IMS should be incorporated and all relevant agencies should be represented.

- By extension, the owners of the exercise should provide sufficient context to supervisors of individuals receiving these invitations. In civilian agencies, low float capacity can make individuals reluctant to take time off for an exercise / training.

- On the military side, relevant commanders should set the tone that interagency participants are necessary partners; on the civilian side, relevant team leads should set the tone that the military, whether as a supported or a supporting partner, is also necessary.

- Developers of doctrine, whether military or USG in general, should recognize and seize opportunities to incorporate input from interagency partners and from the NGO community. Precedents include FM 3-07, the U.S. Army's Field Manual for Stability Operations, as well as the USIP Handbook of Guiding Principles for Peace Operations.

-Practitioners on the ground should be aware of existing doctrine, and use relevant guidance to improve cross-community interactions. Conversely, if said guidance is unrealistic, they should make this known in after action reporting.

### **Implications.**

Improvements in civil-military integration and USG-NGO relations in the field will not improve on their own. Without sufficiently exercising tools like the IMS, the military and civilian agencies will never learn to fully leverage interagency assets. Only through significant, visible socializing of such tools will the large USG institutions involved in P/SO be able to utilize them in actual operations. Similarly, repeated collaborations between the USG and NGOs in Washington will build confidence and knowledge of each other's roles and limitations, which can greatly improve relations in the field. Trainers in these various organizations who take the time to recognize such partnerships are therefore key to ensuring that preliminary progress by the IMS and USIP projects continues to grow.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is an 'extract' from articles in issues 2 and 3 of the PKSOI Bulletin, volume I.

### **Comments.**

#### **Attachments:**

- 1/ [PKSOI Bulletin Volume 1, Issue 2](#)
- 2/ [PKSOI Bulletin Volume 1, Issue 3](#)

[\[Top...\]](#)

## **h. Topic. Training a Professional Workforce within an Indigenous Population ( [444](#) )**

### **Observation.**

Following a period of increased instability, there is a tendency for an elite portion of a failed nation's population to disperse due to concerns of safety amid shifting political realities. This group of highly educated individuals frequently departs en masse prior to/during/or following a violent state conflict. The flight of these highly skilled individuals who serve in important leadership positions takes place in both the public and private sectors. The failed state then suffers for a lack of leadership in multiple sectors thereby disabling the society's ability to function effectively once violence ends and the rebuilding process begins, leaving it susceptible to corruption or negative outside influence. This professional

workforce is an essential group for future effective governance by an indigenous population and the training of replacements for those who depart is a key variable for the success of a stability operation. The task of this training falls on the international stability operations staff arriving as experts also known as outside interveners, to temporarily take over important institutions until a highly skilled indigenous workforce can be trained to take over.

### **Discussion.**

The process of training and rebuilding a professional workforce capable of taking over key institutions from an unskilled indigenous population is arduous and takes time. Solving this complicated problem is fundamental to establishing success during a stability operation despite the international pressure to reach goals quickly. If the end goal of a stability operation is to create a sovereign and independent host nation; the training of an indigenous professional workforce at all levels is fundamental.

A need to focus on important infrastructural requirements is frequently cited as primary to stability operations including institutions capable of serving the public in fundamental ways: establishing a reliable local police force, enabling trustworthy penal and judicial institutions that can enforce the rule of law, and restoring institutions that serve in the generation and management of state revenues. Stability operations frequently allow outside experts to shoulder these multiple tasks in initial stages but fail by remaining too long rather than training civilians of the host country to take over for the work. This tendency is often referred to as the “driving” effect.

An important example lies in the control/management of the financial system of a host nation during a stability operation. Frequently, a failed state’s financial system functioning post-conflict receives large infusions of international capital and is incapable of absorbing and managing the monies in a weakened state. The void of indigenous leadership opens the country to the driving effect where outside interveners take the helm of key posts for an extended period. However, the rush to allow the indigenous population to take over during a stability operation too soon is often based on unrealistic timelines with high expectations leading to a weak financial system susceptible to bribery, corruption and further financial ruin.

Training and coaching host country nationals so they may take the helm of critical institutions is an important step to maintaining peace once hostilities have calmed. If the outside experts of the stability operations remain at the helm of an institution too long, they risk losing the confidence of the host country and its population. However, if the stewardship of the institution is relinquished too soon, incompetent replacements from the indigenous population could irreparably damage the institution.

### **Recommendation.**

- Outside experts should lead important institutions as a short-term policy during stability operations. This will limit the effect of “driving” by outside interveners referred to in the discussion. The institution must return to its highest operational level with outside help without allowing foreign experts to remain indefinitely.
- Use coaching and mentoring strategies to train the local population. These are preferable but institutions must be created that move beyond a two-dimensional training/educational approach. The concept of coaching encompasses both “advising and action” whereby the knowledge is transferred first and not long after, the responsibility.
- Give host country nationals the opportunity to take the helm of implementing projects once they are effectively trained. A stability operation should aim for the local citizens to quickly take the wheel and drive the process of effectively leading themselves.
- Outside experts must develop project management programs to handle massive infrastructure reconstruction. The programs should include the apprenticeship of local trainees with the development of a professional workforce being the long-term goal.
- Continue the mentoring and coaching of local individuals to gain expertise in leadership, management and technical skills. This is important once stability operations culminate. This long term phenomena should be accompanied by a willingness to be patient and thorough by the implementing authorities.

### **Implications.**

The purpose of stability operations in a failed state is to make progress when the services that comprise the infrastructure of the state, including a reliable local police force, trustworthy penal and judicial institutions that can enforce the rule of law, and institutions that serve in the generation and management of state revenues have ceased to function. These services combine to form a ‘social contract’ that exists between the citizens and the state when they are functioning properly. The process of establishing the professional workforce that facilitates this social contract is fundamental to curtailing violence and providing a lasting peace. Since this highly skilled group is frequently absent in a failed state, rebuilding the social contract by effectively training and enabling host nation leaders in the private sector, civil society groups and government is an essential part of stability operations. If an effective training policy is not used to enable infrastructure quickly the safety of skilled international experts cannot be guaranteed. Hostilities may continue due to feelings of disenfranchisement from the local population. This could then lead to a downward spiral of violence that

prevents the indigenous population from being trained to eventually comprise the professional workforce. Without effective coaching and mentoring techniques used simultaneously with knowledge training, the costs will continue to rise and the host country will remain unstable, at risk and in conflict indefinitely.

### **Event Description.**

On October 28, 2008, the Center for Naval Analyses (CAN), the Institute for Public Research, and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) hosted a Nation-State Building 101 Workshop. This workshop focused on the role of stability operations in rebuilding legitimate and effective national, sub-national and, local governments and fostering civil society and social reconciliation. The information referred to is from Panel 1, Interim Government and the Transition to Sovereignty. This panel was chaired by Dr. Phyllis Dininio, formerly Senior Governance Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State. The keynote speaker was Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who is the founder and currently Director, Institute for State Effectiveness and most recently served as the Minister of Finance, Afghanistan. The panelists included Dr. Derick Brinkerhoff, Senior Research Fellow, Research Triangle Institute and Dr. Karen Guittieri, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and a research professor for PKSOI.

### **Comments.**

#### **Attachment:**

> [Final Report: National Building 101 \(Kramer\)](#)

[\[Top...\]](#)

### **i. Topic. Protecting Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations ( [640](#) )**

#### **Observation.**

Many efforts have taken place to improve UN peacekeeping operations including capabilities to protect civilians. Current peacekeeping missions are more multidimensional than previous missions and leaders recognize the need to physically protect civilians. However, many aspects need further development and improvement such as planning, doctrine and training, and leader development; all relating to operationalizing Protection of Civilians (POC).

#### **Discussion.**

An independent study, jointly commissioned by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), examined the United Nations' efforts to implement

protection of civilians' mandates in UN peacekeeping operations. The study traces protection of civilians' mandates from their elaboration in Security Council resolutions to their implementation in the field. It follows closely the realities on the ground and the complexities of the issues, bringing out in the process a number of shortcomings. The report provides findings and specific recommendations for improvement to key actors involved in protecting civilians in peacekeeping contexts.

The study's core points:

1. The protection of civilians is intrinsic to UN peacekeeping missions.
2. UN peacekeeping missions have a unique responsibility and role to play in the protection of civilians.
3. UN peacekeeping missions must do more to protect civilians.
4. Peacekeeping operations cannot 'protect everyone from everything' and they need to manage expectations.
5. The role of peacekeeping missions as protection actors must be defined for operational purposes.
6. The lack of follow-up to Security Council peacekeeping mandates to protect civilians is widespread across the UN system.
7. Leadership matters at all levels. Across the system, in the field, within UN member states, and on the Security Council, leadership makes a substantive difference in how these mandates to protect are perceived and implemented.

### **Recommendation.**

There was a wide range of recommendations from the study but the following are operational-level recommendations for DPKO and military forces:

#### **1. On the links between the UN Security Council and field operations.**

There are gaps in policy, planning, and preparedness.

*On Policy:*

- DPKO should lead the development, in consultation with humanitarian and human rights actors, of an operational concept of protection of civilians to assist with development of planning, preparedness, and guidance for future peacekeeping missions. This includes doctrine development.

- DPKO and OCHA need to have more integrated policy discussions concerning the Protection of Civilians (POC). The humanitarian community should also be brought in especially at the United Nations and mission headquarters.

*On Preparedness:*

- DPKO should survey Troop-contributing countries (TCC) and Police-contributing countries (PCC) about what they use for guidance when preparing their military and police personnel to deploy to missions with POC mandates. DPKO should collect and use those existing policy, guidance, training, and doctrine used by TCCs and PCCs prior to deployment. Related to this is also collecting existing views on how POC missions should be carried out at all levels of leadership—mission leadership, brigade commanders, and junior officers—and working with other actors, command relationships, and capabilities in UN peacekeeping operations.

- The Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping and the Office of the Military Adviser in DPKO should issue guidance on the use of force directly to the Force Commanders, police commissioners, and senior civilian leadership of all peacekeeping missions. Related to this are member states' national caveats and its influence on missions.

- DPKO Integrated Training Service should:

- a. Identify and draft baseline elements for pre-deployment training that can be used generally to brief TCCs on missions mandated to protect civilians. Training should be administered to incoming staff officers, mission force commanders and their troops as well as those rotating to other missions, to impart how POC can impact tactics and strategies.

- b. Emphasize POC during pre-deployment and academy training. In addition, individual police and Formed Police Units (FPU) should receive mission-specific training that addresses their role in physical protection. Training should also include use of force, rules of engagement (ROE), and POC tasks.

- DPKO should establish a joint team at headquarters level for education and outreach.

- DPKO should produce a clear operational requirement for protection-related tasks to units early and prior to pre-deployment training. Memorandums of Understanding between TCCs and DPKO should reflect the requirement for POC-related tasks. This may require certain equipment, training, and language skills for units.

- DPKO should collect and collate POC information with evaluation of impacts and consequences, and oral histories of senior leaders with professional

interviews on key topics. This should be included in its lessons learned program. Mission commanders and staff should be interviewed on their field experiences and incorporated in lessons learned.

*On Planning:*

- DPKO should include protection of civilians in early planning sessions including the strategic assessment, Technical Assessment Mission report, Secretary-General's Report to the Council, military CONOPS, resources, logistics, ROE, and briefings to TCCs

- Provide DPKO with additional civilian planning staff.

## **2. Mission-wide strategy and crisis planning:**

- Produce a strategy: SRSGs should ensure the production of mission-wide strategies, in conjunction with the mission and the UN Country Team. The strategies should include day-to-day operations, anticipation of violence against civilians, crisis planning and response.

- Provide basic elements: During mission planning and deployment, SRSGs and DPKO should ensure the provision of the following four basic elements: a designated senior mission leader to develop and 'drive' the strategy; a systematic approach analyze threats and vulnerabilities of the civilian population; a mission structure to collect data, develop analysis, and disseminate the information; a specific methodology to anticipate, plan, and run scenarios for violence and other protection crises.

- Ensure leadership and accountability: The SRSG should produce and report on the protection strategy; clear protection of civilians responsibilities are detailed in the Secretary-General's directives to SRSGs and in compacts between the Secretary-General and SRSGs; adequate resources to support POC-related activities above and beyond the normal functioning of a mission—for example, enhanced mobility assets or a small contingency reserve for a crisis.

- Ensure effective analysis of threats and vulnerabilities: DPKO, the Department of Field Support, and missions should consider the development of a 'local' Joint Mission Analysis Cell for regional peacekeeping offices. The Cell would distribute analysis and information to UN field offices about current and anticipated situations.

- Implement crisis scenario planning: 1) Missions need to identify the baseline capacity and strategy for crisis response in mission areas where civilians may face systematic or extreme violence. Some tools to use that would help: table-top exercise(s) for peacekeeping mission leaders and discussion between senior leaders in a mission area soon after deployment. 2) Establish crisis planning in

which each peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate for POC anticipates likely or significant events and develop plans working with other actors and UN Headquarters.

**3. Improving the role of uniformed personnel.** The role of the mission as a whole, and the military and police components in particular, must include a means to prevent mass or systematic violence against civilians. Addressing such threats requires comprehensive, integrated action across the entire mission. The more acute the threat, the larger the potential role for uniformed peacekeepers.

For uniformed peacekeepers, addressing such threats may involve a broad range of information, liaison, and training operations to influence potential perpetrators; information gathering operations to identify and describe potential threats to civilians; defensive operations to protect population centres; patrolling to dominate roads and key areas; and operations to disrupt the ability of perpetrators to attack civilians. Determining the optimal balance between these activities will depend upon the mission's mandate, its context, and its capacity.

Recommendations for the military:

- Build knowledge. Military and civilian leadership should include education on and tactics at the brigade, battalion, and company levels for those potentially involved in POC.
- Set standards. New units arriving in a mission to undertake POC tasks should be reviewed by the Force Headquarters against the same operational requirement provided to the TCC for pre-deployment training, and any deficiencies should be addressed. This would help to determine if a unit/force is ready to deploy and assume the mission-assigned function.
- Strengthen support capacity. Mission support planners should budget for small contingency lines where a POC mandate is issued and where the threat of violence is real so that additional security measures (such as lights, concertina wire, and water) may be provided for people in or near a UN camp.
- Enhance reaction capacity. Missions with POC mandates that risk or anticipate potential larger-scale violence will require mobility and support, which may well include air assets, a rapid reaction force, strategic reserve within the mission area, or other operational support.
- Engage in dialogue and reach agreements with the host state. Advance discussions must be held with the host government regarding the role of the mission and that of the uniformed personnel in the case of an increase in violence; these discussions must include the state's role in preventing or responding to such violence.

- Clarify defensive to offensive action. Identify how far the impartial support to protection of civilians can go in taking action against belligerents—in a range from presence, to active patrolling, to site defence, to control of freedom of movement, to coercive actions to halt belligerents, to direct offensive action against those who are hostile or have demonstrated hostile intent. A related aspect is to identify how far NGOs and humanitarians can go in providing information about what is happening among populations with vulnerable civilians.

The police component. The role of UN Police is a key area where new thinking is needed to consider their future role in the protection of civilians. Certainly the role of police in peacekeeping is especially unique. On the one hand, deploying police seems to offer a great opportunity to benefit from personnel trained to ‘protect’ civilians, as police are used to support civil society and to reduce danger for the population. Yet the role of police—either as individual UNPOL or as FPU—in UN missions is quite counterintuitive, as it tends to focus more on longer-term preventative measures and capacity building than direct support to civilians.

FPU, on the other hand, are armed but are often meant to support crowd control and protect mission personnel. The discrepancy between FPU operational guidance (DPKO policy and draft doctrine) and the use of FPU in practice needs to be addressed. The most recently mandated UN peacekeeping missions, MINURCAT and UNAMID, have had the most direct implications for FPU in the protection of civilians, with the existence of very large IDP camps. If FPU are to be tasked with activities linked to direct protection of civilians, the conceptual confusion regarding their role must be addressed.

The considerable gap between unarmed civilian police and heavily armed military needs to be addressed, especially for IDP camps. FPU could potentially play a role in filling this gap, but many of their members are still ill-trained, ill-equipped (lacking language skills and in one instance armed with Kalashnikovs), and too often militarized. This leaves some FPU ill-suited for crowd control, protection of the mission, and deterrence through presence (patrols).

#### Recommendations for the police:

- While the UN Police Division is small and without sufficient capacity to meet the high demands already placed upon it, the division should take advantage of the opportunity to increase and improve its role in supporting the protection of civilians. This work will require a commitment to rethink how police are recruited, trained, vetted, and compensated for their work in UN missions.

- Together with DPKO, PCCs could help identify examples of good practice from domestic policing techniques to identify and monitor threats to the population, and to select techniques that reduce and defuse violence in urban and rural settings.

A professionalized UN police force would help fill the gap between external military actors and UN individual police who help train the local police of host states. FPU's could fill this role but many are currently not 'fit for purpose' as they are often ill-trained, ill-equipped, and incorporate military personnel. A paramilitary police force might be able to fill the gap but should not replace serious efforts at non-militarized police training for the host nation.

### **Implications.**

#### **If recommendations are adopted:**

1. The United Nations takes the recognized lead on Protection of Civilians (POC). POC becomes a major peacekeeping task that will receive doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) emphasis. This will help to build and expand institutional knowledge, develop and retain experts, and conduct formal training and education.
2. Senior UN, DPKO and mission leaders, military and civilian, will go through education and training to increase their knowledge and understanding of the POC concept and approach to peacekeeping operations. Mission commanders will become involved earlier in the planning process. Many other lessons learned already point out that mission leadership has to be involved from the onset of any potential operation and mission. The mission commander influences and shapes planning and execution of the operation. This gives the commander, staff, and subordinates maximum time to be prepared and operationalize POC.
3. UN and DPKO will commit more resources to POC. However, resources will be diverted from other programs to support POC. This is attainable but will affect other programs in a fiscally constrained environment.
4. There will be further consideration and for expanding the existing UN Police Division into a more robust UN police organization with broader responsibilities. POC will become a core task and competency for UN police.
5. Formal adoption of Protection of Civilians may improve the cooperation from host nations and conflict parties to a UN mission/SRSG, peacekeeping forces, and humanitarian organizations/protection clusters. The actions of all these entities become mutually reinforcing.

#### **If recommendations are not adopted:**

1. Peacekeeping mission forces continue to have a gap in its mandate and possibly at odds with humanitarian organizations.

2. There will be some people that will regard UN mission and forces as unreliable and less credible. Unclear rules and tasks may attenuate this perception if peacekeeping forces delay or reserve their actions in situation where civilians are under threat.

3. Protection of Civilians remains a divisive issue in a peace process or agreement. The legitimacy of the host government (and UN actions) will be weak if UN peacekeeping missions are unable to prevent violence against civilians.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the publication [\*Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations\*](#), by Victoria K. Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the United Nations, November 2009. This study was based on interviews with UN/DPKO/OCHA military and civilian leaders and desk-side research. [\[Top...\]](#)

### **3. CONCLUSION**

Protection of civilians – whether they be elements of the indigenous population, aid workers (NGOs, IOs, etc), or members of an in-country contractor team – needs to be considered as a primary concern, a “necessary mission” for those planning or conducting conflict/post-conflict stability operations. Failure to address this mission may lead to unnecessary injury and loss of life – which is often highly visible and something the international media may depict as an indicator of the effectiveness of other ongoing stability operations.

(Next Sampler: November/December, 2010.)

### **4. PKSOL Point of Contact**


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## Related Documents, References, and Links

- SOLLIMS Report: [Haiti HA/DR Operations](#)
- SOLLIMS Report : [95<sup>th</sup> CA Brigade Conference Summary](#)
- [Mass Atrocities Response Operations \(MARO\) Handbook](#)

[\[Top...\]](#)

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