These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
View of Mogadishu fishing harbor from the Aruba Hotel 06 August 2012, in the Somali capital Mogadishu. AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE
From Cia Facebook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Population: 11,757,124 (July 2020 est.) /note: this estimate was derived from an official census taken in 1975 by the Somali Government; population counting in Somalia is complicated by the large number of nomads and by refugee movements in response to famine and clan warfare
Nationality: Somali(s)
Ethnic groups: Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)
Languages: Somali (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Arabic (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English
Religions: Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)
Demographic profile:
Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.
A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.
During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.
As of 2016, more than 1.1 million Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while more than 1.1 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014.
a. Rule of Law. Respect for the Rule of Law at a national level in Somalia remains tenuous at best. While there are many codified ramifications for illegal behaviors, the FGS does not have the wherewithal—in either intent or practical reality—to enforce the laws. Despite several U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-facilitated peace forums, the judicial and detention systems remain broken and corrupt, with justice still served at local institutional levels only. However, a landmark ruling in Somalia’s Puntland state sentenced five men to prison for gang raping a teenage girl and badly beating up another. It is precedent-setting in a country where sexual violence is rarely prosecuted. In May 2018, the Somalia Council of Ministers approved a Sexual Offenses Bill to strengthen investigative procedures and prosecutions for sexual crimes
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
View of Mogadishu fishing harbor from the Aruba Hotel 06 August 2012, in the Somali capital Mogadishu. AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Military and security forces: Somali National Security Forces: Somali National Army (SNA), Somali National Police (SNP, includes a maritime unit), National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) (2019).
Military and security service personnel strengths: estimates of the size of Somali National Army (SNA) vary widely because of inconsistent and unreliable data, as well as the ongoing integration of various militias; as of January 2020, estimates ranged from approximately 10,500-20,000; note – in 2017, the Somali Government announced a plan for the SNA to eventually number 18,000 troops; the same plan called for 32,000 federal and regional police (2019 est.) /note: the US-trained Danab (“Lightning”) Brigade numbers about 850 personnel as of April 2020; the unit intends to eventually have as many as 3,000 soldiers.
Military equipment inventories and acquisitions: the SNA inventory includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received limited quantities of second-hand equipment from China, France, Italy, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, usually as aid/donations (2019 est.).
Military service age and obligation: 18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service (2012).
Maritime threats: the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean as a region of significant risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; during 2018, two vessels were attacked compared with five in 2017; Operation Ocean Shield, the NATO naval task force established in 2009 to combat Somali piracy, concluded its operations in December 2016 as a result of the drop in reported incidents over the last few years; additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, have reduced piracy incidents in that body of water; Somali pirates tend to be heavily armed with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades; the use of “mother ships” from which skiffs can be launched to attack vessels allows these pirates to extend the range of their operations hundreds of nautical miles offshore.
Military – note: Somali military forces are heavily engaged in operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, including joint operations with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM has operated in the country with the approval of the United Nations (UN) since 2007; AMISOM’s peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; as of early 2020, AMISOM had about 19,000 military troops and about 1,000 police personnel from six African countries deployed in Somalia.
UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the Federal Government of Somalia to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community.
The UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM.
the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military.
The US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia (2020).
Other information on Somalia – Military / Security:
Despite some achievements, the security situation in Somalia remains tenuous, due largely to the limited capability of Somalia’s National Army and Police Force and the resulting inability to provide liberated areas with reliable security. As expressed in April 2018 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the UNSOM, “managing the politics of security is a prerequisite for success in building security institutions.” He further stated:
Obstacles to be overcome include domestic Somali opposition particularly from those groups whose patronage and power will be negatively affected; an ongoing fractious political landscape with competition between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and emerging and existing FMS whereby the FGS insists that partners (both troop contributing countries as well as security donors) align their support to nationally agreed priorities and plans; urgent security timelines that deny real space and time for Somali politico-security negotiations; the dilemma emanating from restructuring security forces while actively fighting a war; and international approaches to security driven by domestic/homeland (rather than Somali) security priorities or by imperatives relating to other agendas and rivalries in the region.
State Armed Groups.
Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), Somalia National Army (SNA), and Somalia Police Force (SPF). 18 is the minimum age for military service. While the armed forces also contain a small navy and air force, the bulk of the personnel serve in the army.
TheSNA operates in concert with AMISOM forces to dislodge al-Shabaab from safe havens. It is infantry-heavy but support- and logistics-light. Currently it is still clan-based within units and lightly armed. In April 2018, one official highlighted:
…the SNA is much less combat-ready, despite the continued efforts of AMISOM, the US [sic], and other Western partners…It remains undermanned, poorly equipped, and ineffective. Officials tell stories of SNA forces training without firearms. SNA forces sometimes flee their positions at the first rumors of approaching Al Shabaab forces.
AMISOM and the Government of Somalia report that 20,000 forces are under federal control. However, a2017 World Bank/United Nations Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review suggested there are 40-45,000 total Somali armed personnel, with 17,000 of them serving in the SNA. Many soldiers allegedly sell their equipment and/or defect to clan-based armed groups or even to al-Shabaab. Some have turned to crime (e.g., extortion at illegal checkpoints, armed robberies). The FGS goal is to grow the SNA to 28,000-strong national army and the police force to 12,000.
There are apparently still hostile divisions within the SNA, which were displayed during the fighting at the UAE Mogadishu training facility in April 2018. When the UAE and Somalia suddenly terminated their security cooperation agreement, the UAE personnel left the facility in the hands of some Somali forces in the midst of their training. Soon afterwards, other SNA forces attacked the base, possibly to loot the equipment. The two groups exchanged gunfire until the presidential guard secured the area.
The Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) leads national counter-terrorism efforts, albeit with troubling issues with human rights. The Alpha Group (Gaashaan, or “lightning”), is a force of 600 security personnel based in Mogadishu. It was allegedly trained and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and U.S. Special Forces Command.
Other government-funded forces include the following: Somaliland’s forces; Puntland’s forces; Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA); and Jubbaland forces. They are aligned with the specific states or semi-autonomous regions in Somalia and are not available for operations within other Somalia regions—except when arrayed against each other, such as in the recurrent violence between Galmudug and Puntland.
Non-state armed groups — especially clan paramilitaries — have successfully adapted to the re-establishment of the formal security sector by colonizing it. The multiple hatting of armed men in Mogadishu, as soldiers or police, private security guards, and members of clan paramilitaries is a good business model as long as external actors are willing to underwrite the formal security sector. But it makes for a weak and unreliable security sector that is not autonomous from more powerful communal groups.
While there are many small armed groups, generally for local or clan self-defense, the major non-state armed groups are:
Al-Shabaab. (AS). According to some sources, al-Shabaab controls about a fifth of Somalia and is considered the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia. The group emerged as the youth wing of Somalia’s previous Union of Islamic Courts. According to the Department of National Intelligence (DNI), the group’s members are mostly concerned with the fight against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and are not supportive of global jihad.[i] However, some of the group’s leaders are affiliated with al-Qaeda. AS fighters do not always wear a uniform that is distinguishable. Yet, when conducting an attack, they frequently wear orange bandanas on their arms and foreheads.[ii]
Al-Shabaab aggressively recruits new forces from the Bay and Bakol region, including children who are indoctrinated through local Islamic schools.[iii] While the group has had reverses, it remains capable of targeting AMISOM, Somali security forces, and government officials with ambushes, IEDs, and small-level attacks throughout much of the country, including Mogadishu. AS has also targeted peace and democracy activists, civil society leaders, and humanitarian workers. The group is also responsible for numerous high-profile terrorist attacks in neighboring Kenya and Djibouti.
Perhaps the most significant distinction of al-Shabaab compared to the FGS is its ability to exert control and offer services to the population:
Al-Shabaab remains a viable local actor for the provision of basic services and, in particular, security and justice. To date, national security forces have focused on force alone and have neglected building political consensus and legitimacy within communities they serve. They are thus yet to demonstrate their comparative value to al-Shabaab in many areas. At present, al-Shabaab presents itself as providing Somalia’s only effective justice system.
Al-Shabaab also exerts regular taxes (zakawatt) upon the population, providing them with receipts for the payments. These receipts give the population some assurance that they won’t be repeatedly taxed. Payments are in the form of monetary compensation from road tolls and businesses, as well as livestock, valued at an estimated $27 million in annual revenue.[iv]
Mu’min, a British citizen, fled the UK for Somalia, his native country, when he was sought for questioning regarding his role in radicalizing local Muslim youth. He is from the Ali Salebaan sub-clan of the Darod/Marjeteen, whose members inhabit the Bari region.In August 2016, the U.S. State Department declared Mu’min a “specially designated global terrorist” and placed him under financial sanctions.
Daesh. Heavily-armed Somali Islamic State (IS) fighters operate in Somalia’s Puntland overlooking the Gulf of Aden. Their leader, Sheikh Abdulqadir Mu’min, defected from al-Shabaab. In 2015, Mu’min video-taped a pledge of allegiance (bay’a) to Daesh. While the defection failed to split al-Shabaab, it did challenge its ideological cohesion and allegiances within the Somali clans. It is alleged that Mu’min recruits through kidnapping of children. In early 2017, Daesh elements moved away from the urban areas of Puntland and into the mountains, but continued its attacks in the urban areas. In November 2017, U.S. airstrikes targeted the area where Mu’min was allegedly located, but did not find him there.
Clan Militias: Perhaps the most complicated challenge for the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) is Somalia’s multitude of militias, many of which are “clan-based self-protection forces,” who put clan loyalty above federal government loyalty.
Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational): Pervasive and violent crime is an extension of the general state of insecurity in Somalia. Crimes are often brutal—sometimes fatal—and include kidnapping. Organized crime in Somalia exists at all levels of society and in many forms, the most prevalent being piracy. Al-Shabaab is allegedly financed through a diverse portfolio of criminal racketeering, illicit trafficking, extortion, and corruption as part of a larger transnational criminal enterprise.
c. Other International Actors. In the past decade, Somalia began reintegrating into the international community by establishing and developing stronger ties with the United States and the European Union among others.
Regional Neighbors. The political turmoil in Burundi is dangerous to Somalia for at least two reasons: the “spill over” of instability (due to refugees and other related discord) continues to have significant regional impact in general, and the Burundi government may choose to withdraw its forces from AMISOM earlier than currently planned.
The Ethiopian government essentially consists of Tigrayan ethnic minority members. Protests in 2016-17 revolved around perceptions of partiality in the job market and public policy. The government allegedly detained some 25,000 people and killed several hundred others.
Ethiopia has generations of influence and conflict with Somalia. In the more recent decades, Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia has been “invited” by Somali authorities or as a participant in AMISOM. However, many in Somalia regard the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia’s security affairs with great suspicion as a strategic ploy to annex more Somali land. Ethiopia recently began the withdrawal of their troops from AMISOM early, allowing the militant groups to claim significant areas without opposition. While many experts believe the force reduction is due to unrest in Ethiopia, the government cited the “financial burden” and “lack of support” as the influential factors.
Kenya has a significant number of Somalia minority in its population. It also has a long history of intervening or sending its security forces in Somalia. In 2011, Kenya launched an offensive operation against al-Shabaab in Somalia codenamed “Operation Linda Nchi” (Operation Protect the Nation). While it was given as a reaction to a series of kidnappings, the scale of the operation indicates that plans for such an offensive had been underway for some time.In more recent years,Kenya’s security agents in the northeastern country of Mandera began working with the Somalia administration in Bula Hawo to help curb cross-border incursions by the Islamist militants. In October 2016, the Kenyan government commenced the building of a 30-kilometer security wall “to ward off infiltration by al-Shabaab militants,” but suspended construction in March 2018 due to protests on the Somali side of the border.
Other Countries. Turkeyis the second largest donor of humanitarian aid in Somalia. Sometimes referred to as the Turkish model, Turkey provided Somalia almost USD$122 for infrastructure and water projects, hospitals, schools, and mosques, as well as its largest overseas military training camp. Turkey appears to be competing against the UAE, which established a base in Somaliland and a presence in Puntland.
China spends a great deal of money in Somalia between AMISOM contributions and business agreements (notably, a separate agreement with Puntland to conduct oil and gas exploration, both inland and off-coast). Russia may also have an interest in Somalia as part of its “Pivot to Africa.” For example, according to unconfirmed reports, Russia is building a military base in Somaliland in exchange for international recognition as a sovereign state and military training for Somaliland’s own “army.” North Korea has a history of several decades of Somali military engagement, from the 1970s technical assistance to Somali against Ethiopia, continuing to 2017’s alleged sale of arms to all parties of the Somali conflict.
While the U.S. and European countries provided Somalia more money—if not direct aid—than Turkey has to date, “Turkey has cemented its place in the hearts of the Somali people.” One observer explained this fidelity: Muslim organizations…operate on trust. They are based in-country. They focus on development and switch to emergency when necessary. They buy food-aid locally. They are pragmatic, quick to respond. They deal with people directly. And with much money flowing in direct from the faithful – obligatory charitable giving is one of the five pillars of Islam – they don’t waste time and resources on paperwork.In contrast…Western NGOs focus on ticking boxes. They operate out of Nairobi. They compete for funding for specific projects, which is not necessarily what people need. They usually import food. They do less on development. They are slow to respond to emergency situations. They concentrate most on proposal writing to capture more market share.
[iii] Al-Shabaab Military Machine, Hiraal Institute, December 2018.
[iv] Al-Shabaab Finance System, Hiraal Institute, July 2018.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
Independence: 1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on 26 June 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic).
Constitution:
history: previous 1961, 1979; latest drafted 12 June 2012, approved 1 August 2012 (provisional).
amendments: proposed by the federal government, by members of the state governments, the Federal Parliament, or by public petition; proposals require review by a joint committee of Parliament with the inclusion of public comments and state legislatures’ comments; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote in both houses of Parliament and approval by a majority of votes cast in a referendum; constitutional clauses on Islamic principles, the federal system, human rights and freedoms, powers and authorities of the government branches, and inclusion of women in national institutions cannot be amended.
Legal system: mixed legal system of civil law, Islamic (sharia) law, and customary law (referred to as Xeer).
Executive branch:
chief of state: President Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed “Farmaajo” (since 8 February 2017).
head of government: Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein ROBLE (since 27 September 2020).
cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the prime minister, approved by the House of the People.
elections/appointments: president indirectly elected by the Federal Parliament by two-thirds majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a single 4-year term; election last held on 8 February 2017 (previously scheduled for 30 September 2016 but postponed repeatedly); prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of the People.
election results: Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed “Farmaajo” elected president in second round; Federal Parliament second round vote – Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed “Farmaajo” (TPP) 184, HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (PDP) 97, Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed (ARS) 46.
Legislative branch:
description: bicameral Federal Parliament to consist of:
Upper House (54 seats; senators indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 4-year terms)
House of the People (275 seats; members indirectly elected by electoral colleges, each consisting of 51 delegates selected by the 136 Traditional Elders in consultation with sub-clan elders; members serve 4-year terms)
elections:
Upper House – first held 10 October 2016 (next NA).
House of the People – first held 23 October – 10 November 2016 (next NA).
election results:
Upper House – percent of vote by party – NA; seats by party – NA; composition – men 41, women 13, percent of women 24.1%.
House of the People – percent of vote by party – NA; seats by party – NA; composition – men 208, women 67, percent of women 24.4%; note – total Parliament percent of women 24.3%.
note: the inaugural House of the People was appointed in September 2012 by clan elders; in 2016 and 2017, the Federal Parliament became bicameral with elections scheduled for 10 October 2016 for the Upper House and 23 October to 10 November 2016 for the House of the People; while the elections were delayed, they were eventually held in most regions despite voting irregularities; on 27 December 2016, 41 Upper House senators and 242 House of the People members were sworn in
Judicial branch:
highest courts: the provisional constitution stipulates the establishment of the Constitutional Court (consists of 5 judges, including the chief judge and deputy chief judge); note – under the terms of the 2004 Transitional National Charter, a Supreme Court based in Mogadishu and the Appeal Court were established; yet most regions have reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular, traditional Somali customary law, or Islamic law.
the judge selection and term of office: judges appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Judicial Service Commission, a 9-member judicial and administrative body; judge tenure NA.
subordinate courts: federal courts; federal member state-level courts; military courts; sharia courts.
Government – note: regional and local governing bodies continue to exist and control various areas of the country, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
View of Mogadishu fishing harbor from the Aruba Hotel 06 August 2012, in the Somali capital Mogadishu. AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Economy – overview:
Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia’s government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017.
Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia’s small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal.
In recent years, Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city’s first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu’s main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery.
GDP (official exchange rate): $7.052 billion (2017 est.)
“…over the past three decades, Somalia’s livestock and crop subsectors have been buffeted by an increasingly fragile and degraded natural environment and more frequent and severe cycles of drought and floods. These factors, combined with insecurity, weak government institutions, and a deterioration of flood control, irrigation, and transport infrastructure in the south-central regions, have led to a severe decrease in crop yields…Livestock and crops remain the main sources of economic activity, employment, and exports in Somalia. Agriculture’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) is approximately 75% and represents 93% of total exports, mostly linked to robust livestock exports in the recent pre-drought years. Sesame is now the largest export among crops, followed by dried lemon, in the wake of the total collapse of banana exports. Despite Somalia’s rich fish stocks, coastal fishing has remained small-scale and artisanal while foreign commercial vessels have enjoyed both legal and illegal harvesting offshore.” [i]
Somalia has been able to maintain a robust informal economy where private sector enterprises, albeit small, have had notable successes. Studies on the Somali economy have demonstrated that remittances from overseas-based Somalis (Somali Diaspora) account for a significant source of revenue for Somalia, with perhaps as much as 40% of the population relying on them for income. However, the lack of consistent and secure banking structures force the population to use other banking methods, such as “hawalas,” which are not recognized internationally.
Hawalas “are informal nationwide arrangements known as money service businesses (MSBs). In 2013, UK’s Barclays Bank cut ties with Somalia’s MSBs in reaction to (accusations of funding terrorism)…Most other Western banks did the same either before or right after Barclays. These actions have made it very difficult for Somalians to receive funds, especially in a legal way.”
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
View of Mogadishu fishing harbor from the Aruba Hotel 06 August 2012, in the Somali capital Mogadishu. AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE
From BBC.News (link accessed on 02 September 2020)[i]
Somalia’s disintegration is reflected in its fragmented and partisan media. The media operate in a hostile environment. Somalia is one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, says Freedom House. The Committee to Protect Journalists includes Somalia in its list of countries where the murders of journalists go unpunished. It says the militant group Al-Shabab is suspected in the majority of media murders. Journalists and media outlets complain about intimidation at the hands of state security agencies. Nevertheless, professionally-run media outlets have emerged – in particular, FM radios with no explicit factional links. The TV and press sectors are weak and radio is the dominant medium. There are around 20 radio stations, but no national, domestic broadcaster. Many listeners tune to Somali-language media based abroad, in particular, the BBC Somali service. Somali satellite channels are a significant part of the TV scene. Most of these are based in the UK. Somalis abroad are active online but domestic web access is held back by poor infrastructure. There were 1.2 million internet users by the end of 2017 (InternetWorldStats.com) – around 8% of the population. Twitter and Facebook are popular online resources. Islamists use social media for self-promotion while their opponents mount strong rebuttals. In secessionist Somaliland and Puntland, the authorities maintain a tight hold on broadcasting.
The international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Reporters without Borders, ranked Somalia as 164thin the world in the category of “freedom of information” in its annual report:
“Somalia continues to be one of the most dangerous countries in Africa for media personnel, with three more journalists killed in 2019, bringing the total killed in the past ten years to 50. Political violence and corruption undermine the freedom to inform in Somalia. The pressure on journalists can come from many quarters, especially as much of the country is controlled by non-state entities or by autonomous regional governments that either do not or only barely recognize the central government’s authority.
Journalists who refuse to censor themselves are liable to be the targets of bombings or shootings by Al-Shabaab militants – the leading killers of media personnel – or are exposed to arbitrary detention (of which 2019 saw more than 20 cases), to torture or to the closure of their media by the authorities. The governments in the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland are particularly authoritarian and put a great deal of pressure on the local media. Journalists are often brought before military courts or before courts that apply laws dating back to the military dictatorship.
The media bill adopted by parliament in a completely opaque manner at the end of 2019 contains many draconian provisions and gives the information minister the extraordinary power to control all news production. If the president signs it into law, it will undermine the encouraging efforts seen recently. Although journalists have until now been subjected to abuses almost systematically and with almost total impunity, the authorities had given some positive signals. A policeman who fatally shot a cameraman in Mogadishu in July 2018 was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison, even if he has not yet been arrested. Two soldiers were discharged from the army for tying up two journalists and leaving them in the sun. This was unprecedented in Somalia.” (https://rsf.org/en/somalia, accessed on September 17, 2020)
[i] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a British public service broadcaster.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Military and security forces: Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Ground Forces (includes Military Air Service), General Directorate of Gendarmerie Inspection (DGIG); National Police (2019).
Military expenditures:
1.5% of GDP (2019)
1.41% of GDP (2018)
1.44% of GDP (2017)
1.53% of GDP (2016)
1.69% of GDP (2015)
Military and security service personnel strengths: the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) have an estimated 8,000 Army troops (including an Air Service component of about 150) and 1,500 Gendarmerie (2019 est.).
Military equipment inventories and acquisitions: the FACA is armed mostly with second-hand equipment donated by Russia; since 2010, it has received limited quantities of second-hand equipment from China and Ukraine as aid (2019 est.).
Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age for military service; no conscription (2019).
Military – note: the FACA is currently assessed as unable to provide adequate internal security for the country; the military was dissolved following the 2013 rebel seizure of the government and has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; France, Russia, the UN, and the European Union are providing various levels of security assistance.
The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of March 2020, MINUSCA had approximately 13,200 total personnel, including about 10,700 troops and 2,000 police.
The European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016; the EUTM-RCA contributes to the restructuring of the country’s military and defense sector through advice, training, and educational programs (2020).
Other information on Central African Republic – Military / Security
a. National Security Forces. President Touadera has re-established the Central African Armed Forces, also known as the Forces Armees Centreafricaines (FACA). The SG report from June 2019 indicates that CAR has 7,087 national armed forces, a small fraction of which (1,438) are deployed outside of Bangui.[i] Another 1,024 out of 3,686 internal security forces were deployed outside the capital, including 25 female gendarmes and 13 female police officers. With MINUSCA’s support, 1,023 new military recruits have been trained, and plans are underway to recruit 1,000 police officers in 2019.
The FACA is comprised of an Army, an Air Force, and paramilitary outfits. There is no navy (as CAR is land-locked) but there is a riverine patrol boat squadron.[ii] The 800-strong Presidential Guard Battalion is also known as the Special Forces for the Defense of the Democratic Institution (FORSDIR).
According to the Secretary General report, armed groups submitted a list of eligible members for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration program. The MINUSCA disarmament program is currently located in Paoua.
CAR’s Minister of Defense, Marie-Noëlle Koyara, is working to reconstruct national security forces by instituting reforms such as background checks, training, and deployments throughout the country.[iii] MINUSCA has been providing national armed forces with logistical support and sustainment including fuel supply, casualty evacuation, and weapons storage facilities.
Prior to the 2013 crisis, successive governments weakened the FACA to mitigate coup threats and it was subsequently disintegrated along with the country’s other institutions. When MINUSCA arrived in CAR in 2014, it began the process of building the new FACA, first by vetting soldiers to determine if any had human rights violations. CAR’s military remains a small force. It also lacks equipment and weapons due to the on-going arms embargo levied by the UN Security Council.
In January 2019, the UN renewed the arms embargo with some exceptions so that CAR forces could receive needed supplies (UNSCR 2454, 2019). The previous sanctions resolution, UNSCR 2339 (2017) included a new provision recognizing sexual violence allegations as a distinct “asset-freeze listing criterion,” the first of its kind. The U.S. has provided CAR with nonlethal assistance including trucks and communications equipment. Russia’s growing influence in CAR has been controversial. Russia sent 500 trainers to the country that have trained more than 1,000 soldiers, including Special Forces.[iv]
The security situation in CAR remains fragile. CAR’s main security threats include non-state armed groups, unpoliced borders with neighboring countries, intercommunal conflict, and civil unrest which may increase due to unmet expectations after the recent elections. Muslim-dominated ex-Séléka and Christian anti-Balaka factions still control vast parts of the country. The national forces are still a weak institution and are not present in vast areas of the country.
b. Non-State Armed Groups. There are two prevailing rebel groups, the Muslim-dominated ex-Séléka, and the predominantly Christian anti-Balaka. In the last five years, however, the rebel groups and militias have splintered into other armed factions that often target each other—despite religious commonalities. In addition, these splintered factions may also support other armed groups in alliances of convenience—despite religious differences. Few of the armed groups are inclined to permanent disarmament and reconciliation, although most of them had representatives at recent peace negotiations. In some parts of the country, local communities support neither ex-Séléka nor anti-Balaka armed groups, but have formed their own self-defense groups in lieu of government-provided security.
1)Ex-Séléka (or, Séléka). “Séléka” is the Sango word for “coalition” (or “alliance” or “union”). While Séléka was not originally a religious movement, it was dominated by persons of Muslim faith. Séléka was comprised of two major groups based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), but it also included the lesser-known Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Two other groups based in northern CAR were considered allied with Séléka: the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) and the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR).
The Séléka overthrew the CAR government in spring of 2013, committing atrocities across the country, but mostly against former government members and Christian communities. In the fall of the same year, Michel Djotodia (the installed post-rebellion president) allegedly dissolved Séléka. However, the various militia groups, then calledex-Séléka, continued their atrocities against government and Christian communities, sometimes in conjunction with Muslim herders known as the Fulani.
Today, among the various ex-Séléka groups, the most well-known are the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique(UPC), consisting mostly of ethnic Peuhl, and the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). Following the election cycle, the FPRC tried to reestablish the Séléka coalition, merging with other groups such as the Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and the Assembly for the Renaissance of Central Africa (RPRC). However, the UPC refused to join them, and the groups have been in conflict with each other since then. These groups were accused of several atrocities in November 2016. In particular, many Fulani—previously aligned with some ex-Séléka groups—were killed in door-to-door assassinations by the FRPC, which had aligned itself with anti-Balaka elements.
In recent months, some observers have, once again, labeled these particular armed groups as “Séléka”—dropping the “ex-“—in recognition of their reemergence as a coalition.
2) Anti-Balaka. “Balaka” is the Sango word for “machete”. “Anti-Balaka” has come to mean, also, “invincible”—in part to the power allegedly bestowed by the charms that hang around the necks of most members. The anti-balaka are predominately Christian and were initially designed for self-defense against bandits and cattle raiders. However, the “anti-Balaka” phrase has since become a generic term for the people resisting the Séléka.
The word “balaka” may also refer to the French phrase for bullets of an automatic rifle, “balle AK”
3) Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is active in the country’s east, far from Bangui and the majority of MINUSCA’s operations. In spring 2017, the U.S. and Uganda forces ended their six-year-long partnership to capture the group’s leader, Joseph Kony, by withdrawing approximately 2,500 Ugandan troops (although some reports suggest the number of troops was never more than 1,500 in total) and 100 U.S. Special Forces soldiers.
Despite its limitations in size and funding, the AU-RTF appears to have been successful in reducing the LRA from over 2,000 in number to “less than 120 armed men,” with a corresponding decrement of the LRA’s operational territory. However, the remote eastern areas of CAR appears to be “the perfect hideaway” for the remainder of the LRA. Notwithstanding its alleged “disarray,” most of the LRA attacks against the population in the past six months—which includes kidnappings—have occurred in CAR.
4) Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational): Organized crime exists in many forms, the most prevalent being poaching, extortion, and illegal control of the country’s natural resources. Much of the poaching and looting of CAR’s natural resources is by transnational terrorists or other armed elements, such as the LRA and even the Janjaweed militia from Sudan’s Darfur region. According to one observer: “They are involved in looting food, looting gold, diamonds, killing elephants in [Congo’s] Garamba national park and Zemongo national park in CAR…It is a revenue stream that could keep them armed for years.”[v]
c. Other International Actors.
1) Regional Neighbors.
Chad. Chadhas long sought to influence the fortunes of its southern neighbor, CAR. During the coup period of 2012-2013, then Chadian President Idriss Deby sent troops to support the Séléka-backed new government of Djotodia. Many of the CAR population still perceive their northern citizens as more “Chad” than CAR in loyalties.
DRC. CAR has important historical connections to the South. For over twenty years, from its mid-1960s independence through the 1980s, two of Africa’s most notorious and flamboyant dictators, Zaire’s President Mobutu and CAR’s Emperor Bokassa, reigned over the Central African sub-region ruthlessly, while eating at each other’s table regularly as self-professed brothers.
South Sudan. In 2017, South Sudan offered to assist in training the FACA, “with a view to enabling them to better contribute in the fight against the LRA.” This is an ironic offer, as the South Sudanese military forces are, themselves, in need of professionalism and training.
Uganda. Uganda had between 1,500 and 2,500 troops operating in eastern CAR as part of the AU-RTF toterminate the LRA. Although Uganda withdrew from CAR due to the end of the LRA mission, it has indicated a willingness to support “capacity-building” of its national forces.
2) Other International Countries.
China. While China does not provide troops to MINUSCA, it is a TCC for MINUSCO and other African peace missions. It has also provided the African Union with US$100 million in military assistance for its peacekeeping operations.[vi] China certainly has significant—and increasing—business interests in Africa. Some observe that:
In essence, China deploys peacekeeping troops because it needs to protect its multi-billion investments and numerous assets, enterprises and citizens abroad. Through its peacekeepers, Beijing can also elevate its status as a responsible stakeholder and security provider in the international community and improve operational capabilities of Chinese military and police forces.
France. In October 2016, France ended a three-year military peacekeeping operation, called Operation Sangaris.France’s presence in the country, which eventually grew to 2,500 soldiers, provided a stabilizing force and enabled Samba-Panza’s transitional government to take over from Djotodia, who had been incapable of asserting his government’s rule. France still has some forces in CAR.
Russia. Russia has played an important role in CAR by providing national forces with weapons and advanced military training. Russian national Valery Zakharov is a security adviser to President Faustin-Archange Touadera, and has helped him negotiate with armed groups and militias.[vii]
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
Elections in 2016 brought an end to three years of political transition and turmoil.
Since 2016, the Central African Republic has been governed by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji. Thenext presidential elections are scheduled to be held between December 2020 and March 2021.
On February 6, 2019, the Government of the Central African Republic signed an African Union-mediated peace agreement with 14 armed groups. This agreement has been endorsed by the international community. The African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) serve as guarantors of the agreement, while the UN peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) plays a critical support role in the background.
In July, the Council is expected to renew the 2127 Central African Republic (CAR) sanctions regime, which expires at the end of the month; the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee expires on 31 August and is also expected to be renewed in July.
The mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) expires on 15 November.
Key Recent Developments
On 22 June, the Security Council convened an open videoconference (VTC) meeting, followed by a closed VTC session, on the Secretary-General’s latest report on MINUSCA. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix was joined by Matias Bertino Matondo, AU Special Representative and head of the AU Office in the CAR, and Koen Vervaeke, Managing Director for Africa at the European External Action Service of the European Union. Lacroix told members that despite the increased challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, CAR continues to make progress on the implementation of the Political Peace Agreement, which was signed in Bangui by the CAR government and 14 armed groups on 6 February 2019. A recent resurgence in violence has, however, undermined the process.
The security situation in the CAR remains precarious. A number of violent clashes throughout the spring in the CAR’s north-east as well as violence in and around the towns of Bria and Ndélé have left dozens dead and displaced over 2,000 people. MINUSCA announced on 17 May that it was launching Operation “Igana siriri“ (“Bringing Peace” in the local Sango language) in Ndélé to help stabilise the situation. On 17 June, MINUSCA announced another operation in coordination with the Central African armed forces (FACA) to end violence against civilians in western CAR committed by the 3R (Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation) armed group.
The difficult humanitarian and socio-economic situations have been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Approximately 2.6 million people require humanitarian assistance in CAR, with 697,000 civilians internally displaced and another 593,000 people having sought refuge outside CAR. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report, the CAR government has put in place several mitigating measures for COVID-19, and the number of confirmed cases remains relatively low in the country. The impact of the pandemic on the socio-economic situation, however, has been considerable; border closures and reduced availability of food have led to price increases, and social distancing measures have caused urban transportation costs to rise substantially.
Despite security- and COVID-19-related concerns and the recent uptick in violence, presidential, legislative and local elections are scheduled for December 2020 and early 2021. The Secretary-General’s most recent report noted that the elections “will be affected by the challenges of organizing a sensitive political process in the midst of a global pandemic” and commended the CAR’s electoral authorities for publishing a revised electoral calendar that clearly recognises these challenges but adheres to prescribed constitutional timelines. On 16 May, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) announced that registration forms, critical to the authorities for establishing a voters’ list, had arrived at Bangui airport. Another 32 tonnes of registration materials were delivered to Bangui on 15 June.
Sanctions-Related Developments
In January, negotiations on the renewal of sanctions proved to be difficult, with the main points of disagreement revolving around the question of whether or not to ease the arms embargo on the CAR government. For several years, CAR government officials have requested that the arms embargo on their armed forces be lifted. In 2019, a wide consensus amongst Council members on the need to accommodate some of these concerns about the arms embargo resulted in the amendment of the sanctions regime in resolution 2488 of 12 September 2019. The resolution exempts, after notifying the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended for humanitarian or protective use and supplies to the CAR security forces of weapons with a caliber of 14.5mm or less that are intended solely for the support of or use in the CAR security sector reform process. Resolution 2507, renewing the sanctions regime, passed by a vote of 13 in favor to none against. China and Russia, citing their view that the Council should do more towards the complete lifting of sanctions on the CAR government, abstained. This was a departure from previous unanimous renewals of the sanctions regime.
Another issue that came up during the January negotiations was the duration of the sanctions regime’s renewal. Given the upcoming elections in December 2020 and early 2021, some Council members raised concerns that renewing the mandate for one year might lead to the politicisation of the next mandate renewal, as it would coincide with the run-up to the elections. Resolution 2507 requested the Secretary-General to assess the progress achieved by the CAR authorities on the key benchmarks of the arms embargo no later than 30 June 2020. It further requested the CAR authorities to report by 30 June 2020 on progress made in security sector reform; the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation process; and the management of weapons and ammunition.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 18 June, the Human Rights Council held a high-level interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in the CAR as part of its resumed 43rd session which had been suspended on 13 March due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Nada Al-Nashif, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted the positive developments connected to the February 2019 Peace Agreement, particularly progress in formally establishing the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission. However, she expressed concern that attacks on civilians and other human rights violations and abuses remained “commonplace”, including 634 incidents between September 2019 and May 2020. During the same meeting, the independent expert on human rights in the CAR, Yao Agbetse, said that at least 80 percent of 446 violations in 2019 were due to armed groups. Violations had increased since January with a series of attacks in Ndélé, some of which intentionally targeted civilians.
Key Issues and Options
The further lifting of the arms embargo and the length of the sanctions regime renewal and that of the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee will be key issues during the upcoming negotiations. Council members may want to take account of the Secretary-General’s report on the key benchmarks of the arms embargo in order to assess progress. They may also want to consider renewing the mandate for 12 rather than six months to avoid concerns that the following mandate renewal could be politicised during the run-up to the elections.
Council and Wider Dynamics
There is consensus on the Council in support of the Political Peace Agreement. However, differences regarding CAR sanctions persist. Several Council members are of the view that the sanctions regime continues to promote security in the CAR and can also serve to pressure the parties to implement the peace agreement, while other members have argued that more progress should be made towards the complete lifting of the arms embargo. The difficult negotiations and subsequent vote on resolution 2507 renewing the CAR sanctions regime ahead of its 31 January expiry demonstrated such divergences of opinion. Unlike previous unanimous renewals of the sanctions regime, China and Russia abstained on the resolution, arguing that the Council should do more to lift sanctions on the government.
France is the penholder on the CAR, and Ambassador Abdou Abarry (Niger) chairs the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 06, 2020)
Location: Central Africa, north of Democratic Republic of the Congo
Area:
total: 622,984 sq km
land: 622,984 sq km
water: 0 sq km
Land boundaries:
total: 5,920 km
border countries (6): Cameroon 901 km, Chad 1556 km, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1747 km, Republic of the Congo 487 km, South Sudan 1055 km, Sudan 174 km
Coastline: 0 km (landlocked)
Maritime claims: none (landlocked)
Climate: tropical; hot, dry winters; mild to hot, wet summers
Terrain: vast, flat to rolling plateau; scattered hills in northeast and southwest
Population distribution: majority of residents live in the western and central areas of the country, especially in and around the capital of Bangui.
Natural hazards: hot, dry, dusty harmattan winds affect northern areas; floods are common
Environment – current issues: water pollution; tap water is not potable; poaching and mismanagement have diminished the country’s reputation as one of the last great wildlife refuges; desertification; deforestation; soil erosion.
Other sources about Central African Republic Geography
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
history: several previous; latest (interim constitution) approved by the Transitional Council 30 August 2015, adopted by referendum 13-14 December 2015, ratified 27 March 2016.
amendments: proposals require support of the government, two thirds of the National Council of Transition, and assent by the “Mediator of the Central African” crisis; passage requires at least three-fourths majority vote by the National Council membership; non-amendable constitutional provisions include those on the secular and republican form of government, fundamental rights and freedoms, amendment procedures, or changes to the authorities of various high-level executive, parliamentary, and judicial officials.
Legal system: civil law system based on the French model.
Executive branch:
chief of state: President Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (since 30 March 2016).
head of government: Prime Minister Firmin NGREBADA (since 25 February 2019).
cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president.
elections/appointments: under the 2015 constitution, the president is elected by universal direct suffrage for a period of 5 years (eligible for a second term); election last held 30 December 2015 with a runoff 20 February 2016 (next election scheduled to be held in December 2020).
election results: Faustin-Archange TOUADERA elected president in the second round; percent of vote in first round – Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE (URCA) 23.7%, Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (independent) 19.1%, Desire KOLINGBA (RDC) 12.%, Martin ZIGUELE (MLPC) 11.4%, other 33.8%; percent of vote in second round – Faustin-Archange TOUADERA 62.7%, Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE 37.3%.
note: rebel forces seized the capital in March 2013, forcing former President BOZIZE to flee the country; Interim President Michel DJOTODIA assumed the presidency, reinstated the prime minister, and established a National Transitional Council (CNT) in April 2013; the NTC elected Catherine SAMBA-PANZA interim president in January 2014 to serve until February 2015, when new elections were to be held; her term was extended because instability delayed new elections and the transition did not take place until the end of March 2016.
Legislative branch:
description: unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (140 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote with a second round if needed; members serve 5-year terms).
elections: last held 30 December 2015 (results annulled), 14 February 2016 – first round and 31 March 2016 – second round (next to be held on 27 December 2020).
election results: percent of vote by party – NA; seats by party – UNDP 16, URCA 11, RDC 8, MLPC 10, KNK 7, other 28, independent 60; composition – men 129, women 11, percent of women 7.9%.
Judicial branch:
highest courts: Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (consists of NA judges); Constitutional Court (consists of 9 judges, at least 3 of whom are women).
judge selection and term of office: Supreme Court judges appointed by the president; Constitutional Court judge appointments – 2 by the president, 1 by the speaker of the National Assembly, 2 elected by their peers, 2 are advocates elected by their peers, and 2 are law professors elected by their peers; judges serve 7-year non-renewable terms.
subordinate courts: high courts; magistrates’ courts.
From International Crisis Group (ICG)
National Governance
The Government of CAR and 14 armed groups signed a Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on 6 February 2019. The agreement makes commitments to integrate the forces of fighting factions into the national army and provide opportunities for the leaders of various factions to join the government, but fighting has continued in the provinces. The agreement does not include provisions on reducing violence within the armed factions, which are the cause of considerable violence.[i]
CAR’s president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra has committed to an “inclusive government” which many have taken to mean incorporating elements of various armed groups.[ii] When the new Prime Minister announced the formation of a new government in March 2019, the armed factions were not significantly represented, causing them to threaten walking out on the agreement. In an effort to salvage peace talks, the African Union (AU) advised the formation of a new government weeks later, giving various groups positions within areas already under their control.
The population has expressed dissatisfaction with the formation of the government, with many believing that too many concessions are being made to armed groups, therefore “rewarding predatory militants” with government positions without any beneficial return.[iii] The National Youth Council protested the inclusion of armed groups in the government, and the government responded by arresting the leader of the council in April, a move that was highly criticized by civil society leaders, which led to his release several days later.[iv]
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has recommended the government and international community establish benchmarks for the demobilization of armed groups that would qualify them for government positions and other benefits. Such benchmarks would include reducing violence, allowing unimpeded humanitarian access, and permitting state officials to work in the provinces without being threatened.
Security Sector Reform
The peace agreement creates Special Mixed Security Units, merging some groups of combatants with Army formations. According to the ICG, this effort has been hampered by different understandings of the group command structure, and the reluctance of some groups to demobilize entirely. The first mixed security units will be trained and deployed in Bouar and Bambari, respectively.[v] Security sector reform and demobilization efforts are being coordinated by multiple stakeholders including the European Union, France, Russian Federation, and the United States.
The peace agreement was brokered by the AU. Neighboring countries are involved in monitoring the implementation of the agreement, including Chad which has been a source of new recruits and resupply for the armed factions.[vi] Sudan is also an important neighbor to CAR, and Russia is playing an increasingly influential role.
Local Peace Committees
The government has supported the establishment of 26 local Peace Committees to support national reconciliation, some of which existed prior to the agreement. Local Peace Committees have brokered agreements contributing to the cessation of hostilities and restoration of trust within local communities (ICG). MINUSCA has also facilitated dialogue between the committees and armed groups, which has resulted in the signing of several local peace agreements. The Secretary General’s June 2019 report highlights several examples:
The Gambo and Pombolo communities in the Mbomou prefecture signed an agreement marking the first meeting between the communities since recurrent reprisal killings between the Unite pour la paix en Centreafrique and anti-balaka associated militias in 2017.
Representatives of Christian and Muslim communities in Castor and Yakite neighborhoods in Bangui’s third district signed a reconciliation agreement, committing themselves to ceasing all hostilities, forbidding the carrying of firearms by civilians and permitting the return of displaced persons.
In Alindao, the Unite pour la paix en Centrafrique and anti-Balaka reached an agreement which included the deployment of national forces to secure the area.
These local agreements, and the inclusion of women and youth in brokering truces between armed factions, have the greatest potential to sustain peace.
Elections 2020-2021
Presidential, regional and municipal elections will be held in 2020 and 2021. If planned correctly, the elections could be a confidence building measure with civil society, allowing it to vote members of armed groups in or out of the government.
Government presence outside of the capital city of Bangui is limited. A UN effort to map the presence of civil servants outside of Bangui found that 72% of all government employees worked for the Ministry of Health and Education and that the backlog of salaries to civil servants dated back to 2002.[vii] Thus, it is a priority for the central government to establish new offices outside the capital which can administer services such as local mayoral and gendarmerie offices.
[vii] Ibid, UN Report of the Secretary General, June 2019
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
