Category Publications

Foreword by General Stanley A. McChrystal

This PKSOI Paper A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003) is designed to further the U.S. and other interested international governments’ understanding of how Security Sector Reform (SSR) was conducted in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. This was America’s first attempt at conducting formalized SSR, so it offers readers an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for reform, and how well the United States and its partners met the typical challenges of SSR.

This monograph Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy builds on two previous works by the author—Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development and The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower. It frames the contemporary defense decision making environment. It describes the concept of risk management as a founding principle for contemporary defense strategy development.

Restoring and promoting rule of law is one of the most critical elements of stabilization reconstruction in failed, failing or fragile states. It is increasingly recognized as both a critical enabler of and contributor to security sector reform. U.S.-led stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan recognize rule of law as an essential component of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, and important lessons are emerging from both conflicts. This paper Rule of Law Activities: Lessons Learned will review some of the most important best practices emerging from U.S. rule of law activities.

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On April 6, 2009, CNA and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute hosted a conference in Washington, DC, on governance, security sector reform, and economic growth. During the latter part of the conference, the participants examined the findings of a workshop on stabilization and economic growth of November 2008 that had focused on economic initiatives to be pursued during stability operations. These operations “encompass various military… activities con­ducted outside the United States in
coordi­nation with other instruments of national power to [1] maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to [2] provide essential governmental services, emergency
infra­structure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief effort.” 1 The counterinsurgency that we are pursuing in Afghanistan—the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions” that we are taking “to defeat [the] insurgency”2—is a subset of stability operations. It is hoped that this article will help focus our civil ­military economic effort in Afghanistan, our premise being that “correct thinking leads to correct actions; incorrect thinking leads to incorrect actions.”

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This monograph The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower describes one among many potential points of departure for upcoming QDR deliberations on landpower force planning. In opening up decision space for the new defense team, it concludes that DoD should initiate an unconventional revolution when fashioning U.S. land forces so as to optimize them for employment against less traditional but still violent—and often nonmilitary—threats to core U.S. interests.

This monograph Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development argues that thoughtful evaluation of the most plausible defense-relevant shocks and their deliberate integration into DoD strategy and planning provides senior defense officials with key checks on excessive convention. Further, the institutionalization of deliberate net and risk assessment of defense-relevant shocks, reasoned judgments about their origins, and preliminary analysis of the most appropriate responses to them promises to routinize prudent hedging in DoD strategy and planning.

This introductory paper The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World concerns the role of the American military advisor. Military officers have frequently been called upon to serve as advisors to foreign officials and to play seminal roles in the political and development realms overseas.