Category POET Content

Jihadists

JNIM

JNIM, an umbrella coalition of al-Qaeda-aligned groups, announced its existence in March 2017 in a video release featuring the leaders of its component parts – Ansar al-Din, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mourabitoun, and Katibat Macina. Headed by Tuareg militant leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM has since established an independent media arm and regularly claims responsibility for attacks throughout Mali. It took credit for the January 2019 attack that killed ten UN peacekeepers in Aguelhoc, recent devastating attacks on Malian army bases in Dioura and Guiré, and several attacks against security forces as well as other armed groups in Niger and Burkina Faso.

Broadly speaking, JNIM’s aim is to drive foreign (especially French and UN) forces out of Mali, and to impose its version of Islamic law. It maintains its allegiance to al-Qaeda and seeks to spread the reach of jihadist groups in the region. Although the components within JNIM act relatively autonomously, they have still consistently reaffirmed their membership in the umbrella group. Katibat Macina leader Amadou Kouffa in particular has consistently confirmed the centrality of Iyad Ag Ghali to the movement and to any potential negotiations with them. Despite heavy losses at the hands of French forces, JNIM continues to operate throughout Mali and into Burkina Faso and Niger, conducting complex attacks, assassinations, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on UN, Malian, and French forces.

“KATIBAT SÈRMA” AND KATIBAT AAA

According to local sources as well as international security observers, these groups are largely autonomous collections of fighters associated with JNIM. One was formerly headed by a Malian National Guard member and Imghad Tuareg Almansour Ag Alkassoum (whose initials constitute the “AAA”), and the group has continued to operate extensively between the Malian towns of Douentza, Boni, and Hombori. It is also believed to have conducted some operations in Burkina Faso in support of the Burkinabe jihadist group Ansarul Islam, though the group very rarely claims attacks. Despite Ag Alkassoum’s death during a French military operation in November 2018, the group remains active in conducting improvised explosive device (IED) and other attacks on Malian and UN forces. The area between Douentza, Boni, and Hombori remains one of the major areas of attacks recently against these forces, while also purportedly operating at times both with JNIM and groups close to JNIM like Ansarul Islam. The other represents a loose collection of fighters operating largely in the Sèrma forest near Burkina Faso, with the appellation “Katibat Sèrma” coined by the analyst Hèni Nsaibia.

ANSARUL ISLAM

This group began as a localised insurgency in the northern provinces of Burkina Faso, under the leadership of Malam Ibrahim Dicko. Dicko was a Peul commander linked to Ansar al-Din who was arrested by French forces in Mali in 2015 and then later released. The group’s first attack against Burkinabe forces was in December 2016, when they killed 12 gendarmes in Nassoumbou. The insurgency has quickly expanded since then. Today, Ansarul Islam is composed largely of Peul fighters and it conducts attacks across northern and eastern Burkina Faso, as well as operating on the other side of the Malian border. It is believed to be in close contact with members of Katibat Macina as well as Almansour Ag Alkassoum (before his death) and his fighters. It also operates increasingly along Burkina Faso’s border with Niger. When Malam Dicko died in 2017, he was replaced by his brother, Jafar Dicko, as leader.

THE ISLAMIC STATE IN THE GREATER SAHARA (ISGS)

This local branch of the Islamic State group (ISIS) was at first self-proclaimed, the outgrowth of a schism within MUJAO. The group’s leader, the former MUJAO commander Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, declared his adherence to the Islamic State in May 2015, although ISIS only recognised the pledge of allegiance (bay’a) to its leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016. ISGS began receiving regular attention from formal ISIS media outlets in spring 2019. The group operated first in western Niger and Ménaka, in north-eastern Mali, while also conducting several attacks in Burkina Faso near the border with Mali and an attack on a high-security prison near Niger’s capital Niamey in October 2016. ISGS fighters fought a battle in June 2015 with al-Mourabitoun fighters loyal to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, but subsequently the groups have avoided clashes. At times, ISGS has operated in proximity – and possibly even cooperation – with fighters from JNIM.

According to interviews with local observers as well as regional and international sources, ISGS has drawn many of its fighters from those native to the areas in which it operates, especially Nigerien Peul as well as Dawsahak fighters whose origins are in Ménaka and the Malian city of Gao. ISGS fighters were responsible for the deadly attack that killed four American soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers at Tongo Tongo in the province of Tillabéry, as well as dozens of attacks against Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe troops, militias like the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA), and Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA). It has in recent months expanded its territorial operations along the Niger-Burkina Faso border, as well as into the Gourma region south of Timbuktu in Mali.

Non-Jihadists

​​​​​​​CMA

CMA is one of the signatory groups of the Algiers Peace Accords signed in June 2015. It is composed of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), and part of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA-CMA). The CMA is ostensibly united around the formerly pro-independence movements in northern Mali, but it is really more an umbrella organisation that does not represent one unified ideology.

PLATEFORME

The Plateforme comprises several groups that favour Malian state authority, though it is also heavily implicated in local disputes and attempts at communal control. The Plateforme is the other signatory armed group of the 2015 Algiers Accords. The main groups that make up the Plateforme are: the Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), the MAA-Plateforme, and the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR-1).

MOUVEMENT POUR LE SALUT DE L’AZAWAD (MSA)

The MSA formed in September 2016 under the leadership of Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a young intellectual who was a founding member and political representative of the MNLA. However, as Gao- and Ménaka-based communities sought greater political representation and a larger role in local security with the planned implementation of the Algiers Accords, the MSA broke away from the CMA and especially from the MNLA. The MSA was at first a joint movement of largely Dawsahak as well as Chamanamass Tuareg communities, though the Chamanamass soon split away and constituted a separate MSA branch, referred to here as the MSA-C. The MSA-D is the component part of the alliance with GATIA (though not a part of the Plateforme), and continues to conduct security operations in the eastern part of the Gao region as well as in Ménaka. It has also often joined French forces in operations in the region. It has moved away from pushing for independence and now cooperates with the Malian government. These operations – described as counterterrorism operations largely against ISGS but also against JNIM – have prompted a series of attacks against its forces and assassinations of key MSA figures like the group’s former military commander Adam Ag Albachir in October 2017 and Hadama Ag Haynaha in April 2019. It has also conducted a number of local patrols meant to restore security and prevent theft of property and livestock, although it too has faced accusations of theft and abuses against civilians in the region.

COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS DE L’ENTENTE (CME)

The CME is a loose coalition of armed groups that are not formally part of the peace process in Mali, but advocate for their own inclusion in the process. These groups have largely localised power bases and split away either from the CMA (especially the MNLA) or the Plateforme. They include the MSA-C, the Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad based in Timbuktu and the Gourma, the Congrès Pour la Justice dans l’Azawad formed almost entirely of former MNLA members from the Kel Antessar Tuareg confederation based in and around Timbuktu, the Front Populaire de l’Azawad (FPA), and the Mouvement Populaire pour le Salut de l’Azawad, largely composed of Timbuktu-area Arab and some Tuareg populations, a portion of which recently announced that they had rejoined the MNLA. These groups participate in some parts of the peace process such as the Comité Technique de la Sécurité and the Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination (MOC), as well as the new accelerated DDR programme. But they are not participants in the Comité de Suivi des Accords meetings with the international community and cannot be full participants in the peace process without joining the CMA or the Plateforme.

DAN NA AMBASSAGOU

This group, whose name means “those who put their trust in God” in Dogon, operates in the central and eastern part of the Mopti region, in areas colloquially referred to as the “Pays Dogon”. In Mali, which is nearly 90 percent Muslim, the Dogon makes up a sizeable portion of the non-Muslim population, though there are also ethnic Dogon communities that are Muslim. Dan Na Ambassagou emerged in late 2016 from traditional hunters’ brotherhoods. They represent a loose coalition of largely Dogon self-defense militias that operate under the military authority of Youssouf Toloba. They are very present around Bankass, Bandiagara, Koro, and Mondoro, and are believed to have committed a series of massacres against Peul populations, including at Kolougon in January 2019 and Ogossagou in April 2019. They frequently attack Peul villages and encampments, alleging that jihadists affiliated with Katibat Macina take refuge there. They have also clashed with Peul self-defense groups, which they accuse of cooperating with jihadist fighters. Peul activists and NGO officials have also alleged that several former Malian military officers still in contact with the government are involved with Dan Na Ambassagou, and that their fighters have at times cooperated with Malian defense and security forces operating in their areas.

Other groups of local “hunters” sometimes referred to as Dozo – both Dogon communities and also Bambara speakers – exist in areas near Douentza, Djenné, and Segou. However, these groups are fluid and do not have the same kind of military organisation as a group like Dan Na Ambassagou, even as they have still been allegedly responsible for atrocities in these areas.

Foreign Actors

Operation Barkhane

The French-led Operation Barkhane succeeded Operation Serval in August 2014, but with a much wider geographic focus. The force, with approximately 4,500 soldiers, is spread out between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. While its headquarters is in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital, it also has fighter aircraft and bases for intelligence collection and operations in Niger’s capital Niamey, Agadez, Arlit, Tillabéry, and several other sites, as well as around 1,500 troops in northern Mali scattered between the large base at Gao, others at Kidal, Timbuktu, and Tessalit, and more recently a base at Gossi closer to central Mali as well as the border with Burkina Faso. France’s Special Operations Task Force for the region, Operation Sabre, is in Burkina Faso.

Operation Barkhane is France’s largest overseas operation, with a budget of nearly €600m per year. It engages in everything from combat patrols alongside Malian forces and partner militias to intelligence gathering and training to local development activities meant to fill the hole left by an absent government. Despite this range, French officials insist that Barkhane’s priority is counterterrorism and it has undertaken operations to kill important jihadist leaders, including two of the five founding leaders of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) as well as Almansour Ag Alkassoum and a number of others.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has two Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Mali and one in Niger. In Mali, these are the EU Training Mission (EUTM), which provides training for the Malian armed forces, and the EU Capacity and Assistance Programme (EUCAP) mission, which largely focuses on police and internal security forces. The EUCAP mission in Niger has since 2016 focused much more on migration, whereas the two missions in Mali remain focused on counterterrorism training, core military and police capacity building, and improving awareness of human rights. These missions do not deploy offensively or in the field in support of the forces they train, though they have faced attack at their base in Koulikoro as well as in Bamako. EUTM and EUCAP have expanded their operations to include trainings conducted in central and northern Mali, in part in response to concerns that they had overly focused their activities in southern Mali.

AFRICAN UNION (by DCAF)

– The political section aims to accompany the strenghtening of the benefits of peace and security; to promote the rule of Law and to contribute to the reinforcement of the democratic institutions in the Sahelian region, including the protection of Human Rights, capacity building for the national Human Rights institutions, the judicial sector and the organisations from the civil society. Through this project, the MISAHEL also works on humanitarian issues, especially in the Northern Region.

– The second section is dedicated to the security in the Sahelian Region. Its main objective is to oversee the efforts of the AU as regards the security challenges, and in particular conflicts, terrorism, and various organized crime networks.

– The last section focuses on the development and environmental issues in the region, such as the deterioration of the environment, and the consequences of underdevelopment. 

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

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from Mali Media Profile by BBC

The media environment in Bamako and the rest of the south is relatively open, but the presence of armed militant groups in the north poses dangers for media workers, says Freedom House.

Reporters Without Borders says there is a significant degree of media pluralism, but a lack of money means that outlets are susceptible to editorial influence from those who fund them.

Radio is the leading medium. There are hundreds of stations, operated by private and community broadcasters and by the state-run Office de Radiodiffusion-Television du Mali (ORTM).

The TV sector is much smaller.

Almost all daily and weekly newspapers publish from Bamako. Circulation figures are low. L’Essor is the leading title.

The BBC broadcasts in Bamako (88.9 FM) and Radio France Internationale (RFI) is widely available on FM.

By mid-2019, 12.5 million Malians were online – around 63% of the population (InternetWorldStats.com).

Social media use is concentrated in the cities and among young people. Facebook is the top platform, followed by Instagram.

The authorities have sometimes restricted access to social media to obstruct attempts to mobilise protesters, and blocked internet access in 2018 ahead of a presidential run-off vote.

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 13, 2020)

Location: interior Western Africa, southwest of Algeria, north of Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, west of Niger

Coastline: 0 km (landlocked)

Climate: subtropical to arid; hot and dry (February to June); rainy, humid, and mild (June to November); cool and dry (November to February)

Natural resources: gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, uranium, gypsum, granite, hydropower, note, bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and copper deposits are known but not exploited

Population distribution: the overwhelming majority of the population lives in the southern half of the country, with greater density along the border with Burkina Faso.

Natural hazards: hot, dust-laden harmattan haze common during dry seasons; recurring droughts; occasional Niger River flooding

Environment – current issues: deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; loss of pasture land; inadequate supplies of potable water

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

AMISOM has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a humanitarian section.^[i]

The Military Component is the biggest of the three components of the AU Mission in the country. The component is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the Mission to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation.

Headed by the AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant Gen. Jim Beesigye Owoyesigire, the component also provides protection to the country’s Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia’s key infrastructure including its airports and seaports.

Currently, the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. According to AMISOM, these are the current force levels and areas of operation:

First deployed in March 2007, the AMISOM military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National Security Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, out of much of southern Somalia including most major towns and cities. It has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to begin establish accountable local governance institutions that can begin to deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government.

Mogadishu is today transformed. The local economy is booming and the effects are far from confined to Mogadishu. Securing the capital allowed AMISOM to move into the second phase of its original concept of operations, deploying across the country and expanding the authority of the state.

The humanitarian component fulfills the mission mandate to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, assisting in the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. AMISOM has worked to secure transport routes including the seaport, airport, and roads around Mogadishu in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

^[i] Ibid, AU Mission in Somalia

^[i] AU Mission in Somalia website, http://amisom-au.org/#

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From AMISOM News (linked accessed on 02 September 2020)

AMISOM and Civil Society Organizations meet to prepare for 2020/21 elections

Mogadishu, 22 November—A technical preparatory meeting organized by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on Thursday in Mogadishu brought together AMISOM and Somali Civil Society Organizations (CSO) to develop a work plan ahead of the 2020/21 elections.

Convened by AMISOM’s Political Unit and the Protection, Human Rights, and Protection Group (PHRG) the meeting also discussed activities undertaken by AMISOM’s military, police, and civilian components in the areas of early recovery, stabilization, political reconciliation, human rights, gender, and protection.

AMISOM maintains a close working relationship with CSOs in Somalia through monthly technical meetings as well as quarterly strategic events involving senior officials of the mission. The civilian component of AMISOM actively works with civil society organizations in the protection of human rights and vulnerable groups, promoting inclusive politics, preventing and countering violent extremism, stabilization, and early recovery as well as rehabilitation of disengaged combatants.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

It is difficult to determine AMISOM losses because, unlike most UN-managed missions, AMISOM does not publicly acknowledge casualties. In addition, its record-keeping is inexact and family compensation is irregular. Therefore, most AMISOM casualty figures estimates are determined by extrapolation from media reports.

Information on AMISOM casualties can be found at:

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM is led by a civilian Special Representative of the African Union who oversees the military and police divisions:

The United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated with establishing the Federal Government of Somalia. UNSOM leadership includes:

The UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing strategic logistics support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM. The Head of UNSOS is Assistant Secretary General (ASG) Lisa Filipetto, Head (Australia). 

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

The UN—and the United States (U.S.) by extension—has an inconsistent history in Somalia. Somalia collapsed into anarchy after the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. By 1992, the UN formed the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) [UNSCR 751(1992)] to provide humanitarian assistance. When the feuding clans compromised the delivery of the food, the U.S. authorized Operation Restore Hope, with U.S. forces dispatched to assist with the famine relief as part of the UN’s United Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF transitioned to UNOSOM II in March of 1993. After the tragic events of 3 October 1993 (the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somalis), the U.S. removed its troops. The UN withdrew all forces from Somalia by March 1995. 

For the next 15 years, Somalia endured frequent humanitarian crises, a short-lived Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mission (IGADSOM), an invasion by Ethiopia, and the eventual ascendancy of the Islamist group al-Shabaab, which seized Mogadishu in 2006. 

AMISOM was created by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007 and approved by the UN Security Council a month later. In 2010, AMISOM assumed the offensive against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM is largely credited with driving Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and major population centers. In August 2017, UNSCR 2372 (2017) renewed the AMISOM mandate until 31 May 2018. This renewal included “the first-ever” reduction in forces for AMISOM while transitioning security responsibilities to Somali authorities.

In 2013, the UN established UNSOM  [UNSCR 2102(2013)], a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) field mission. In late March 2018, The UN Security Council renewed the UNSOM mandate with UNSCR 2408(2018) until 31 March 2019. The decision to extend “underscored the importance of the Mission’s support to the Somali Government‑led political process as well as the importance of its support to the federal Government of Somalia on preparations for the delivery of inclusive, credible and transparent elections” and “requested continued support for the Government’s efforts to implement the country’s National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to prevent and counter terrorism.” UNSOM is responsible for the implementation of the UN Strategic Framework Somalia (2017-2020) as well as a specific policing mission.

Among other UN mandates with respect to Somalia are UNSCR 2383(2017) and UNSCR 2385(2017). In early November 2017, UNSCR 2383(2017) renewed authorization for international naval forces to combat piracy off Somali coast for another year. In summary, the UN Security Council:

…affirmed the primary responsibility of Somali authorities in the effort to combat piracy…(and)…renewed the call upon States and regional organizations that were able to do so to cooperate with those authorities and each other…(and)…commended the contributions of the European Union’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community, as well as individual States for naval counter‑piracy missions and protecting ships transiting through the region…(and)…reaffirmed that the authorizations renewed in the resolution applied only with respect to the situation in Somalia and did not affect rights, obligations and responsibilities of Member States under international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

On 14 November 2018, UNSCR 2444(2018) extended the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 November 2019, as well as providing: “authorization for maritime interdiction of illicit arms imports and charcoal exports, and the humanitarian exemption.”  It also decided to terminate the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) and replace it with a Panel of Experts to oversee sanctions.

Another UN mission operating in Somalia is the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). UNSOS was established by UNSCR 2245(2015). UNSOS is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM. UNSOS’ most recent mandate renewal was UNSCR 2372(2017) (30 August 2017). Its period of existence is characterized as “open.” 

From AMISOM website

Background by AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate.

AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006.IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Originally IGASOM was proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By May 2006, the situation was radically different, as the ICU had engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism or ARPCT and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. By June, they had established control of the capital.

Plans for IGASOM continued, though by July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiative as a western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement. Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued in December 2006.

On 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744(2007)13. The aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.

In October, 2014, the Security Council (Resolution 2182 (2014) gave a green light to the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30th November 2015. Furthermore the council authorized the African Union mission to take all measures, as appropriate, to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society.

In August 2017, the UN Security Council issued resolution 2372 enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a humanitarian section.[i] Currently the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. According to AMISOM, these are the current force levels and areas of operation:

Source: AMISOM Military Component (accessed on September 21, 2020)

There were varying rationales for each country to contribute to the AMISOM mission. One study suggested: …there is no single or uniform explanation for why these six states joined AMISOM. Nevertheless, the most common official justifications based on assertions that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the TCCs and normative commitments to African solidarity were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. Specifically, a combination of institutional benefits (related to the armed forces), political advantages (concerning prestige and partnerships with key external actors), and economic support (for individual peacekeepers and the domestic security sector) was generally more important in understanding why these six states became AMISOM TCCs. Joining AMISOM did help alleviate some regional security concerns but more important were the tangible benefits the decision brought at home to both the troop-contributing governments and their militaries.

The police component is tasked “to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organization adhering to strict international standards.”^[ii]AMISOM has several Formed Police Units (FPUs) from Uganda, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone which play a critical role in improving security in liberated areas through joint patrols with the SPF. Individual Police Officers (IPOs) come from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia. 

The civilian component of AMISOM is led by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), and is comprised of the following pillars:

(1) Mission Support

(2) Political Processes

(3) Stabilisation and Early Recovery

(4) Protection, Human Rights and Gender

(5) Security Sector Reform

The humanitarian component fulfills the mission mandate to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, assisting in the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. AMISOM has worked to secure transport routes including the seaport, airport, and roads around Mogadishu in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

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^[i] AU Mission in Somalia website, http://amisom-au.org/#

^[ii] Ibid, AU Mission in Somalia

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From AMISOM webpage

On 31 May 2019, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2472 extending the mandate of AMISOM through 31 May 2020 and reducing troop levels by 1,000 to a maximum level of 19,626 by 28 February 2020, unless the Security Council decides to adjust the pace of the reduction according to the conditions in the Transition Plan, including the ability of Somalia to generate able, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground (S/RES/2472/2019). 

The new mandate emphasizes the need to consolidate a political agreement between the federal government and regional states, to delineate responsibilities of the security sector according to the Transition Plan, and to prepare for national elections in 2020 or 2021. It also emphasizes a comprehensive approach to security that is agreeable to federal and regional authorities as well as donors, partners and the international community. It specifically calls for increased collaboration between AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, the FGS and FMS at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) mechanism. 

The mandate specifies the following changes in troop levels:

Authorizes the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2020, including a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five Formed Police Units, and to reduce the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel by 1000 to a maximum level of 19,626, by 28 February 2020, in line with the Transition Plan, and the handover to Somali security forces, unless the Security Council decides to adjust the pace of the reduction taking into account conditions set out in the Transition Plan, including the ability of Somalia to generate able, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground.

As per the UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) AMISOM is mandated to pursue the following strategic objectives:

1. Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia;
2. Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
3. Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia;

Under the same UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017), AMISOM is also authorized carry out the following priority tasks to achieve these objectives:

1. Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritizing the main population centres;
2. To assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peace building, and security for key infrastructure;
3. To protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;
4. To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;
5. To conduct targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces;
6. To mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture;
7. To reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration through the Secretary-General;
8. To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia;

MANDATE RENEWAL [2019] :   Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 848th meeting held on 9 May 2019 on the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the 5th AU-United Nations (UN) Joint Review of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and renewal of the mandate of AMISOM 

UPDATE [2019] :   Adopted by the Security Council at its 8537th meeting, on 31 May 2019 

UPDATE [2017] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 8035th meeting, on 30 August 2017

UPDATE [2016] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on 7 July 2016

UPDATE [2014] : Adopting Resolution 2182 (2014), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia for One Year, Amends Sanctions Regime – 7286th Meeting

UPDATE [2013] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 7061st meeting, on 18 November 2013

UPDATE [2012]: Resolution 2073 (2012) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6854th meeting, on 7 November 2012

UPDATE [2011]: Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia until 31 October 2012, Adopting Resolution 2010 (2011)

2006 -2007: Mandate

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.