Independence: 1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on 26 June 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic).
Constitution:
history: previous 1961, 1979; latest drafted 12 June 2012, approved 1 August 2012 (provisional).
amendments: proposed by the federal government, by members of the state governments, the Federal Parliament, or by public petition; proposals require review by a joint committee of Parliament with the inclusion of public comments and state legislatures’ comments; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote in both houses of Parliament and approval by a majority of votes cast in a referendum; constitutional clauses on Islamic principles, the federal system, human rights and freedoms, powers and authorities of the government branches, and inclusion of women in national institutions cannot be amended.
Legal system: mixed legal system of civil law, Islamic (sharia) law, and customary law (referred to as Xeer).
Executive branch:
chief of state: President Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed “Farmaajo” (since 8 February 2017).
head of government: Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein ROBLE (since 27 September 2020).
cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the prime minister, approved by the House of the People.
elections/appointments: president indirectly elected by the Federal Parliament by two-thirds majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a single 4-year term; election last held on 8 February 2017 (previously scheduled for 30 September 2016 but postponed repeatedly); prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of the People.
election results: Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed “Farmaajo” elected president in second round; Federal Parliament second round vote – Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed “Farmaajo” (TPP) 184, HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (PDP) 97, Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed (ARS) 46.
Legislative branch:
description: bicameral Federal Parliament to consist of:
Upper House (54 seats; senators indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 4-year terms)
House of the People (275 seats; members indirectly elected by electoral colleges, each consisting of 51 delegates selected by the 136 Traditional Elders in consultation with sub-clan elders; members serve 4-year terms)
elections:
Upper House – first held 10 October 2016 (next NA).
House of the People – first held 23 October – 10 November 2016 (next NA).
election results:
Upper House – percent of vote by party – NA; seats by party – NA; composition – men 41, women 13, percent of women 24.1%.
House of the People – percent of vote by party – NA; seats by party – NA; composition – men 208, women 67, percent of women 24.4%; note – total Parliament percent of women 24.3%.
note: the inaugural House of the People was appointed in September 2012 by clan elders; in 2016 and 2017, the Federal Parliament became bicameral with elections scheduled for 10 October 2016 for the Upper House and 23 October to 10 November 2016 for the House of the People; while the elections were delayed, they were eventually held in most regions despite voting irregularities; on 27 December 2016, 41 Upper House senators and 242 House of the People members were sworn in
Judicial branch:
highest courts: the provisional constitution stipulates the establishment of the Constitutional Court (consists of 5 judges, including the chief judge and deputy chief judge); note – under the terms of the 2004 Transitional National Charter, a Supreme Court based in Mogadishu and the Appeal Court were established; yet most regions have reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular, traditional Somali customary law, or Islamic law.
the judge selection and term of office: judges appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Judicial Service Commission, a 9-member judicial and administrative body; judge tenure NA.
subordinate courts: federal courts; federal member state-level courts; military courts; sharia courts.
Government – note: regional and local governing bodies continue to exist and control various areas of the country, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
View of Mogadishu fishing harbor from the Aruba Hotel 06 August 2012, in the Somali capital Mogadishu. AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Economy – overview:
Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia’s government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017.
Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia’s small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal.
In recent years, Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city’s first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu’s main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery.
GDP (official exchange rate): $7.052 billion (2017 est.)
“…over the past three decades, Somalia’s livestock and crop subsectors have been buffeted by an increasingly fragile and degraded natural environment and more frequent and severe cycles of drought and floods. These factors, combined with insecurity, weak government institutions, and a deterioration of flood control, irrigation, and transport infrastructure in the south-central regions, have led to a severe decrease in crop yields…Livestock and crops remain the main sources of economic activity, employment, and exports in Somalia. Agriculture’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) is approximately 75% and represents 93% of total exports, mostly linked to robust livestock exports in the recent pre-drought years. Sesame is now the largest export among crops, followed by dried lemon, in the wake of the total collapse of banana exports. Despite Somalia’s rich fish stocks, coastal fishing has remained small-scale and artisanal while foreign commercial vessels have enjoyed both legal and illegal harvesting offshore.” [i]
Somalia has been able to maintain a robust informal economy where private sector enterprises, albeit small, have had notable successes. Studies on the Somali economy have demonstrated that remittances from overseas-based Somalis (Somali Diaspora) account for a significant source of revenue for Somalia, with perhaps as much as 40% of the population relying on them for income. However, the lack of consistent and secure banking structures force the population to use other banking methods, such as “hawalas,” which are not recognized internationally.
Hawalas “are informal nationwide arrangements known as money service businesses (MSBs). In 2013, UK’s Barclays Bank cut ties with Somalia’s MSBs in reaction to (accusations of funding terrorism)…Most other Western banks did the same either before or right after Barclays. These actions have made it very difficult for Somalians to receive funds, especially in a legal way.”
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
View of Mogadishu fishing harbor from the Aruba Hotel 06 August 2012, in the Somali capital Mogadishu. AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE
From BBC.News (link accessed on 02 September 2020)[i]
Somalia’s disintegration is reflected in its fragmented and partisan media. The media operate in a hostile environment. Somalia is one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, says Freedom House. The Committee to Protect Journalists includes Somalia in its list of countries where the murders of journalists go unpunished. It says the militant group Al-Shabab is suspected in the majority of media murders. Journalists and media outlets complain about intimidation at the hands of state security agencies. Nevertheless, professionally-run media outlets have emerged – in particular, FM radios with no explicit factional links. The TV and press sectors are weak and radio is the dominant medium. There are around 20 radio stations, but no national, domestic broadcaster. Many listeners tune to Somali-language media based abroad, in particular, the BBC Somali service. Somali satellite channels are a significant part of the TV scene. Most of these are based in the UK. Somalis abroad are active online but domestic web access is held back by poor infrastructure. There were 1.2 million internet users by the end of 2017 (InternetWorldStats.com) – around 8% of the population. Twitter and Facebook are popular online resources. Islamists use social media for self-promotion while their opponents mount strong rebuttals. In secessionist Somaliland and Puntland, the authorities maintain a tight hold on broadcasting.
The international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Reporters without Borders, ranked Somalia as 164thin the world in the category of “freedom of information” in its annual report:
“Somalia continues to be one of the most dangerous countries in Africa for media personnel, with three more journalists killed in 2019, bringing the total killed in the past ten years to 50. Political violence and corruption undermine the freedom to inform in Somalia. The pressure on journalists can come from many quarters, especially as much of the country is controlled by non-state entities or by autonomous regional governments that either do not or only barely recognize the central government’s authority.
Journalists who refuse to censor themselves are liable to be the targets of bombings or shootings by Al-Shabaab militants – the leading killers of media personnel – or are exposed to arbitrary detention (of which 2019 saw more than 20 cases), to torture or to the closure of their media by the authorities. The governments in the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland are particularly authoritarian and put a great deal of pressure on the local media. Journalists are often brought before military courts or before courts that apply laws dating back to the military dictatorship.
The media bill adopted by parliament in a completely opaque manner at the end of 2019 contains many draconian provisions and gives the information minister the extraordinary power to control all news production. If the president signs it into law, it will undermine the encouraging efforts seen recently. Although journalists have until now been subjected to abuses almost systematically and with almost total impunity, the authorities had given some positive signals. A policeman who fatally shot a cameraman in Mogadishu in July 2018 was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison, even if he has not yet been arrested. Two soldiers were discharged from the army for tying up two journalists and leaving them in the sun. This was unprecedented in Somalia.” (https://rsf.org/en/somalia, accessed on September 17, 2020)
[i] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a British public service broadcaster.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.
Elections in 2016 brought an end to three years of political transition and turmoil.
Since 2016, the Central African Republic has been governed by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji. Thenext presidential elections are scheduled to be held between December 2020 and March 2021.
On February 6, 2019, the Government of the Central African Republic signed an African Union-mediated peace agreement with 14 armed groups. This agreement has been endorsed by the international community. The African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) serve as guarantors of the agreement, while the UN peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) plays a critical support role in the background.
In July, the Council is expected to renew the 2127 Central African Republic (CAR) sanctions regime, which expires at the end of the month; the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee expires on 31 August and is also expected to be renewed in July.
The mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) expires on 15 November.
Key Recent Developments
On 22 June, the Security Council convened an open videoconference (VTC) meeting, followed by a closed VTC session, on the Secretary-General’s latest report on MINUSCA. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix was joined by Matias Bertino Matondo, AU Special Representative and head of the AU Office in the CAR, and Koen Vervaeke, Managing Director for Africa at the European External Action Service of the European Union. Lacroix told members that despite the increased challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, CAR continues to make progress on the implementation of the Political Peace Agreement, which was signed in Bangui by the CAR government and 14 armed groups on 6 February 2019. A recent resurgence in violence has, however, undermined the process.
The security situation in the CAR remains precarious. A number of violent clashes throughout the spring in the CAR’s north-east as well as violence in and around the towns of Bria and Ndélé have left dozens dead and displaced over 2,000 people. MINUSCA announced on 17 May that it was launching Operation “Igana siriri“ (“Bringing Peace” in the local Sango language) in Ndélé to help stabilise the situation. On 17 June, MINUSCA announced another operation in coordination with the Central African armed forces (FACA) to end violence against civilians in western CAR committed by the 3R (Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation) armed group.
The difficult humanitarian and socio-economic situations have been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Approximately 2.6 million people require humanitarian assistance in CAR, with 697,000 civilians internally displaced and another 593,000 people having sought refuge outside CAR. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report, the CAR government has put in place several mitigating measures for COVID-19, and the number of confirmed cases remains relatively low in the country. The impact of the pandemic on the socio-economic situation, however, has been considerable; border closures and reduced availability of food have led to price increases, and social distancing measures have caused urban transportation costs to rise substantially.
Despite security- and COVID-19-related concerns and the recent uptick in violence, presidential, legislative and local elections are scheduled for December 2020 and early 2021. The Secretary-General’s most recent report noted that the elections “will be affected by the challenges of organizing a sensitive political process in the midst of a global pandemic” and commended the CAR’s electoral authorities for publishing a revised electoral calendar that clearly recognises these challenges but adheres to prescribed constitutional timelines. On 16 May, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) announced that registration forms, critical to the authorities for establishing a voters’ list, had arrived at Bangui airport. Another 32 tonnes of registration materials were delivered to Bangui on 15 June.
Sanctions-Related Developments
In January, negotiations on the renewal of sanctions proved to be difficult, with the main points of disagreement revolving around the question of whether or not to ease the arms embargo on the CAR government. For several years, CAR government officials have requested that the arms embargo on their armed forces be lifted. In 2019, a wide consensus amongst Council members on the need to accommodate some of these concerns about the arms embargo resulted in the amendment of the sanctions regime in resolution 2488 of 12 September 2019. The resolution exempts, after notifying the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended for humanitarian or protective use and supplies to the CAR security forces of weapons with a caliber of 14.5mm or less that are intended solely for the support of or use in the CAR security sector reform process. Resolution 2507, renewing the sanctions regime, passed by a vote of 13 in favor to none against. China and Russia, citing their view that the Council should do more towards the complete lifting of sanctions on the CAR government, abstained. This was a departure from previous unanimous renewals of the sanctions regime.
Another issue that came up during the January negotiations was the duration of the sanctions regime’s renewal. Given the upcoming elections in December 2020 and early 2021, some Council members raised concerns that renewing the mandate for one year might lead to the politicisation of the next mandate renewal, as it would coincide with the run-up to the elections. Resolution 2507 requested the Secretary-General to assess the progress achieved by the CAR authorities on the key benchmarks of the arms embargo no later than 30 June 2020. It further requested the CAR authorities to report by 30 June 2020 on progress made in security sector reform; the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation process; and the management of weapons and ammunition.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 18 June, the Human Rights Council held a high-level interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in the CAR as part of its resumed 43rd session which had been suspended on 13 March due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Nada Al-Nashif, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted the positive developments connected to the February 2019 Peace Agreement, particularly progress in formally establishing the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission. However, she expressed concern that attacks on civilians and other human rights violations and abuses remained “commonplace”, including 634 incidents between September 2019 and May 2020. During the same meeting, the independent expert on human rights in the CAR, Yao Agbetse, said that at least 80 percent of 446 violations in 2019 were due to armed groups. Violations had increased since January with a series of attacks in Ndélé, some of which intentionally targeted civilians.
Key Issues and Options
The further lifting of the arms embargo and the length of the sanctions regime renewal and that of the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee will be key issues during the upcoming negotiations. Council members may want to take account of the Secretary-General’s report on the key benchmarks of the arms embargo in order to assess progress. They may also want to consider renewing the mandate for 12 rather than six months to avoid concerns that the following mandate renewal could be politicised during the run-up to the elections.
Council and Wider Dynamics
There is consensus on the Council in support of the Political Peace Agreement. However, differences regarding CAR sanctions persist. Several Council members are of the view that the sanctions regime continues to promote security in the CAR and can also serve to pressure the parties to implement the peace agreement, while other members have argued that more progress should be made towards the complete lifting of the arms embargo. The difficult negotiations and subsequent vote on resolution 2507 renewing the CAR sanctions regime ahead of its 31 January expiry demonstrated such divergences of opinion. Unlike previous unanimous renewals of the sanctions regime, China and Russia abstained on the resolution, arguing that the Council should do more to lift sanctions on the government.
France is the penholder on the CAR, and Ambassador Abdou Abarry (Niger) chairs the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Military and security forces: Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Ground Forces (includes Military Air Service), General Directorate of Gendarmerie Inspection (DGIG); National Police (2019).
Military expenditures:
1.5% of GDP (2019)
1.41% of GDP (2018)
1.44% of GDP (2017)
1.53% of GDP (2016)
1.69% of GDP (2015)
Military and security service personnel strengths: the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) have an estimated 8,000 Army troops (including an Air Service component of about 150) and 1,500 Gendarmerie (2019 est.).
Military equipment inventories and acquisitions: the FACA is armed mostly with second-hand equipment donated by Russia; since 2010, it has received limited quantities of second-hand equipment from China and Ukraine as aid (2019 est.).
Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age for military service; no conscription (2019).
Military – note: the FACA is currently assessed as unable to provide adequate internal security for the country; the military was dissolved following the 2013 rebel seizure of the government and has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; France, Russia, the UN, and the European Union are providing various levels of security assistance.
The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of March 2020, MINUSCA had approximately 13,200 total personnel, including about 10,700 troops and 2,000 police.
The European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016; the EUTM-RCA contributes to the restructuring of the country’s military and defense sector through advice, training, and educational programs (2020).
Other information on Central African Republic – Military / Security
a. National Security Forces. President Touadera has re-established the Central African Armed Forces, also known as the Forces Armees Centreafricaines (FACA). The SG report from June 2019 indicates that CAR has 7,087 national armed forces, a small fraction of which (1,438) are deployed outside of Bangui.[i] Another 1,024 out of 3,686 internal security forces were deployed outside the capital, including 25 female gendarmes and 13 female police officers. With MINUSCA’s support, 1,023 new military recruits have been trained, and plans are underway to recruit 1,000 police officers in 2019.
The FACA is comprised of an Army, an Air Force, and paramilitary outfits. There is no navy (as CAR is land-locked) but there is a riverine patrol boat squadron.[ii] The 800-strong Presidential Guard Battalion is also known as the Special Forces for the Defense of the Democratic Institution (FORSDIR).
According to the Secretary General report, armed groups submitted a list of eligible members for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration program. The MINUSCA disarmament program is currently located in Paoua.
CAR’s Minister of Defense, Marie-Noëlle Koyara, is working to reconstruct national security forces by instituting reforms such as background checks, training, and deployments throughout the country.[iii] MINUSCA has been providing national armed forces with logistical support and sustainment including fuel supply, casualty evacuation, and weapons storage facilities.
Prior to the 2013 crisis, successive governments weakened the FACA to mitigate coup threats and it was subsequently disintegrated along with the country’s other institutions. When MINUSCA arrived in CAR in 2014, it began the process of building the new FACA, first by vetting soldiers to determine if any had human rights violations. CAR’s military remains a small force. It also lacks equipment and weapons due to the on-going arms embargo levied by the UN Security Council.
In January 2019, the UN renewed the arms embargo with some exceptions so that CAR forces could receive needed supplies (UNSCR 2454, 2019). The previous sanctions resolution, UNSCR 2339 (2017) included a new provision recognizing sexual violence allegations as a distinct “asset-freeze listing criterion,” the first of its kind. The U.S. has provided CAR with nonlethal assistance including trucks and communications equipment. Russia’s growing influence in CAR has been controversial. Russia sent 500 trainers to the country that have trained more than 1,000 soldiers, including Special Forces.[iv]
The security situation in CAR remains fragile. CAR’s main security threats include non-state armed groups, unpoliced borders with neighboring countries, intercommunal conflict, and civil unrest which may increase due to unmet expectations after the recent elections. Muslim-dominated ex-Séléka and Christian anti-Balaka factions still control vast parts of the country. The national forces are still a weak institution and are not present in vast areas of the country.
b. Non-State Armed Groups. There are two prevailing rebel groups, the Muslim-dominated ex-Séléka, and the predominantly Christian anti-Balaka. In the last five years, however, the rebel groups and militias have splintered into other armed factions that often target each other—despite religious commonalities. In addition, these splintered factions may also support other armed groups in alliances of convenience—despite religious differences. Few of the armed groups are inclined to permanent disarmament and reconciliation, although most of them had representatives at recent peace negotiations. In some parts of the country, local communities support neither ex-Séléka nor anti-Balaka armed groups, but have formed their own self-defense groups in lieu of government-provided security.
1)Ex-Séléka (or, Séléka). “Séléka” is the Sango word for “coalition” (or “alliance” or “union”). While Séléka was not originally a religious movement, it was dominated by persons of Muslim faith. Séléka was comprised of two major groups based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), but it also included the lesser-known Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Two other groups based in northern CAR were considered allied with Séléka: the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) and the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR).
The Séléka overthrew the CAR government in spring of 2013, committing atrocities across the country, but mostly against former government members and Christian communities. In the fall of the same year, Michel Djotodia (the installed post-rebellion president) allegedly dissolved Séléka. However, the various militia groups, then calledex-Séléka, continued their atrocities against government and Christian communities, sometimes in conjunction with Muslim herders known as the Fulani.
Today, among the various ex-Séléka groups, the most well-known are the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique(UPC), consisting mostly of ethnic Peuhl, and the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). Following the election cycle, the FPRC tried to reestablish the Séléka coalition, merging with other groups such as the Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and the Assembly for the Renaissance of Central Africa (RPRC). However, the UPC refused to join them, and the groups have been in conflict with each other since then. These groups were accused of several atrocities in November 2016. In particular, many Fulani—previously aligned with some ex-Séléka groups—were killed in door-to-door assassinations by the FRPC, which had aligned itself with anti-Balaka elements.
In recent months, some observers have, once again, labeled these particular armed groups as “Séléka”—dropping the “ex-“—in recognition of their reemergence as a coalition.
2) Anti-Balaka. “Balaka” is the Sango word for “machete”. “Anti-Balaka” has come to mean, also, “invincible”—in part to the power allegedly bestowed by the charms that hang around the necks of most members. The anti-balaka are predominately Christian and were initially designed for self-defense against bandits and cattle raiders. However, the “anti-Balaka” phrase has since become a generic term for the people resisting the Séléka.
The word “balaka” may also refer to the French phrase for bullets of an automatic rifle, “balle AK”
3) Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is active in the country’s east, far from Bangui and the majority of MINUSCA’s operations. In spring 2017, the U.S. and Uganda forces ended their six-year-long partnership to capture the group’s leader, Joseph Kony, by withdrawing approximately 2,500 Ugandan troops (although some reports suggest the number of troops was never more than 1,500 in total) and 100 U.S. Special Forces soldiers.
Despite its limitations in size and funding, the AU-RTF appears to have been successful in reducing the LRA from over 2,000 in number to “less than 120 armed men,” with a corresponding decrement of the LRA’s operational territory. However, the remote eastern areas of CAR appears to be “the perfect hideaway” for the remainder of the LRA. Notwithstanding its alleged “disarray,” most of the LRA attacks against the population in the past six months—which includes kidnappings—have occurred in CAR.
4) Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational): Organized crime exists in many forms, the most prevalent being poaching, extortion, and illegal control of the country’s natural resources. Much of the poaching and looting of CAR’s natural resources is by transnational terrorists or other armed elements, such as the LRA and even the Janjaweed militia from Sudan’s Darfur region. According to one observer: “They are involved in looting food, looting gold, diamonds, killing elephants in [Congo’s] Garamba national park and Zemongo national park in CAR…It is a revenue stream that could keep them armed for years.”[v]
c. Other International Actors.
1) Regional Neighbors.
Chad. Chadhas long sought to influence the fortunes of its southern neighbor, CAR. During the coup period of 2012-2013, then Chadian President Idriss Deby sent troops to support the Séléka-backed new government of Djotodia. Many of the CAR population still perceive their northern citizens as more “Chad” than CAR in loyalties.
DRC. CAR has important historical connections to the South. For over twenty years, from its mid-1960s independence through the 1980s, two of Africa’s most notorious and flamboyant dictators, Zaire’s President Mobutu and CAR’s Emperor Bokassa, reigned over the Central African sub-region ruthlessly, while eating at each other’s table regularly as self-professed brothers.
South Sudan. In 2017, South Sudan offered to assist in training the FACA, “with a view to enabling them to better contribute in the fight against the LRA.” This is an ironic offer, as the South Sudanese military forces are, themselves, in need of professionalism and training.
Uganda. Uganda had between 1,500 and 2,500 troops operating in eastern CAR as part of the AU-RTF toterminate the LRA. Although Uganda withdrew from CAR due to the end of the LRA mission, it has indicated a willingness to support “capacity-building” of its national forces.
2) Other International Countries.
China. While China does not provide troops to MINUSCA, it is a TCC for MINUSCO and other African peace missions. It has also provided the African Union with US$100 million in military assistance for its peacekeeping operations.[vi] China certainly has significant—and increasing—business interests in Africa. Some observe that:
In essence, China deploys peacekeeping troops because it needs to protect its multi-billion investments and numerous assets, enterprises and citizens abroad. Through its peacekeepers, Beijing can also elevate its status as a responsible stakeholder and security provider in the international community and improve operational capabilities of Chinese military and police forces.
France. In October 2016, France ended a three-year military peacekeeping operation, called Operation Sangaris.France’s presence in the country, which eventually grew to 2,500 soldiers, provided a stabilizing force and enabled Samba-Panza’s transitional government to take over from Djotodia, who had been incapable of asserting his government’s rule. France still has some forces in CAR.
Russia. Russia has played an important role in CAR by providing national forces with weapons and advanced military training. Russian national Valery Zakharov is a security adviser to President Faustin-Archange Touadera, and has helped him negotiate with armed groups and militias.[vii]
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 06, 2020)
Location: Central Africa, north of Democratic Republic of the Congo
Area:
total: 622,984 sq km
land: 622,984 sq km
water: 0 sq km
Land boundaries:
total: 5,920 km
border countries (6): Cameroon 901 km, Chad 1556 km, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1747 km, Republic of the Congo 487 km, South Sudan 1055 km, Sudan 174 km
Coastline: 0 km (landlocked)
Maritime claims: none (landlocked)
Climate: tropical; hot, dry winters; mild to hot, wet summers
Terrain: vast, flat to rolling plateau; scattered hills in northeast and southwest
Population distribution: majority of residents live in the western and central areas of the country, especially in and around the capital of Bangui.
Natural hazards: hot, dry, dusty harmattan winds affect northern areas; floods are common
Environment – current issues: water pollution; tap water is not potable; poaching and mismanagement have diminished the country’s reputation as one of the last great wildlife refuges; desertification; deforestation; soil erosion.
Other sources about Central African Republic Geography
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
history: several previous; latest (interim constitution) approved by the Transitional Council 30 August 2015, adopted by referendum 13-14 December 2015, ratified 27 March 2016.
amendments: proposals require support of the government, two thirds of the National Council of Transition, and assent by the “Mediator of the Central African” crisis; passage requires at least three-fourths majority vote by the National Council membership; non-amendable constitutional provisions include those on the secular and republican form of government, fundamental rights and freedoms, amendment procedures, or changes to the authorities of various high-level executive, parliamentary, and judicial officials.
Legal system: civil law system based on the French model.
Executive branch:
chief of state: President Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (since 30 March 2016).
head of government: Prime Minister Firmin NGREBADA (since 25 February 2019).
cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president.
elections/appointments: under the 2015 constitution, the president is elected by universal direct suffrage for a period of 5 years (eligible for a second term); election last held 30 December 2015 with a runoff 20 February 2016 (next election scheduled to be held in December 2020).
election results: Faustin-Archange TOUADERA elected president in the second round; percent of vote in first round – Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE (URCA) 23.7%, Faustin-Archange TOUADERA (independent) 19.1%, Desire KOLINGBA (RDC) 12.%, Martin ZIGUELE (MLPC) 11.4%, other 33.8%; percent of vote in second round – Faustin-Archange TOUADERA 62.7%, Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE 37.3%.
note: rebel forces seized the capital in March 2013, forcing former President BOZIZE to flee the country; Interim President Michel DJOTODIA assumed the presidency, reinstated the prime minister, and established a National Transitional Council (CNT) in April 2013; the NTC elected Catherine SAMBA-PANZA interim president in January 2014 to serve until February 2015, when new elections were to be held; her term was extended because instability delayed new elections and the transition did not take place until the end of March 2016.
Legislative branch:
description: unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (140 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote with a second round if needed; members serve 5-year terms).
elections: last held 30 December 2015 (results annulled), 14 February 2016 – first round and 31 March 2016 – second round (next to be held on 27 December 2020).
election results: percent of vote by party – NA; seats by party – UNDP 16, URCA 11, RDC 8, MLPC 10, KNK 7, other 28, independent 60; composition – men 129, women 11, percent of women 7.9%.
Judicial branch:
highest courts: Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (consists of NA judges); Constitutional Court (consists of 9 judges, at least 3 of whom are women).
judge selection and term of office: Supreme Court judges appointed by the president; Constitutional Court judge appointments – 2 by the president, 1 by the speaker of the National Assembly, 2 elected by their peers, 2 are advocates elected by their peers, and 2 are law professors elected by their peers; judges serve 7-year non-renewable terms.
subordinate courts: high courts; magistrates’ courts.
From International Crisis Group (ICG)
National Governance
The Government of CAR and 14 armed groups signed a Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on 6 February 2019. The agreement makes commitments to integrate the forces of fighting factions into the national army and provide opportunities for the leaders of various factions to join the government, but fighting has continued in the provinces. The agreement does not include provisions on reducing violence within the armed factions, which are the cause of considerable violence.[i]
CAR’s president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra has committed to an “inclusive government” which many have taken to mean incorporating elements of various armed groups.[ii] When the new Prime Minister announced the formation of a new government in March 2019, the armed factions were not significantly represented, causing them to threaten walking out on the agreement. In an effort to salvage peace talks, the African Union (AU) advised the formation of a new government weeks later, giving various groups positions within areas already under their control.
The population has expressed dissatisfaction with the formation of the government, with many believing that too many concessions are being made to armed groups, therefore “rewarding predatory militants” with government positions without any beneficial return.[iii] The National Youth Council protested the inclusion of armed groups in the government, and the government responded by arresting the leader of the council in April, a move that was highly criticized by civil society leaders, which led to his release several days later.[iv]
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has recommended the government and international community establish benchmarks for the demobilization of armed groups that would qualify them for government positions and other benefits. Such benchmarks would include reducing violence, allowing unimpeded humanitarian access, and permitting state officials to work in the provinces without being threatened.
Security Sector Reform
The peace agreement creates Special Mixed Security Units, merging some groups of combatants with Army formations. According to the ICG, this effort has been hampered by different understandings of the group command structure, and the reluctance of some groups to demobilize entirely. The first mixed security units will be trained and deployed in Bouar and Bambari, respectively.[v] Security sector reform and demobilization efforts are being coordinated by multiple stakeholders including the European Union, France, Russian Federation, and the United States.
The peace agreement was brokered by the AU. Neighboring countries are involved in monitoring the implementation of the agreement, including Chad which has been a source of new recruits and resupply for the armed factions.[vi] Sudan is also an important neighbor to CAR, and Russia is playing an increasingly influential role.
Local Peace Committees
The government has supported the establishment of 26 local Peace Committees to support national reconciliation, some of which existed prior to the agreement. Local Peace Committees have brokered agreements contributing to the cessation of hostilities and restoration of trust within local communities (ICG). MINUSCA has also facilitated dialogue between the committees and armed groups, which has resulted in the signing of several local peace agreements. The Secretary General’s June 2019 report highlights several examples:
The Gambo and Pombolo communities in the Mbomou prefecture signed an agreement marking the first meeting between the communities since recurrent reprisal killings between the Unite pour la paix en Centreafrique and anti-balaka associated militias in 2017.
Representatives of Christian and Muslim communities in Castor and Yakite neighborhoods in Bangui’s third district signed a reconciliation agreement, committing themselves to ceasing all hostilities, forbidding the carrying of firearms by civilians and permitting the return of displaced persons.
In Alindao, the Unite pour la paix en Centrafrique and anti-Balaka reached an agreement which included the deployment of national forces to secure the area.
These local agreements, and the inclusion of women and youth in brokering truces between armed factions, have the greatest potential to sustain peace.
Elections 2020-2021
Presidential, regional and municipal elections will be held in 2020 and 2021. If planned correctly, the elections could be a confidence building measure with civil society, allowing it to vote members of armed groups in or out of the government.
Government presence outside of the capital city of Bangui is limited. A UN effort to map the presence of civil servants outside of Bangui found that 72% of all government employees worked for the Ministry of Health and Education and that the backlog of salaries to civil servants dated back to 2002.[vii] Thus, it is a priority for the central government to establish new offices outside the capital which can administer services such as local mayoral and gendarmerie offices.
[vii] Ibid, UN Report of the Secretary General, June 2019
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
From Cia Facebook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Population: 5,990,855 (July 2020 est.) / note: estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected
Nationality: Central African(s)
Ethnic groups: Baya 28.8%, Banda 22.9%, Mandjia 9.9%, Sara 7.9%, M’Baka-Bantu 7.9%, Arab-Fulani (Peul) 6%, Mbum 6%, Ngbanki 5.5%, Zande-Nzakara 3%, other Central African Republic ethnic groups 2%, non-Central African Republic ethnic groups .1%
Languages: French (official), Sangho (lingua franca and national language), tribal languages
Religions: Christian 89.5%, Muslim 8.5%, folk 1%, unaffiliated 1% (2010 est.) / note: animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority
Demographic profile:
The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since a coup in March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which is impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers are displaced by violence.
Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 are displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness. (2019).
Other information about Central African Republic – Social:
a. Rule of Law. Lack of Rule of Law processes and institutions delays the improvement of the country across all its sectors. However, in November 2016, a Brussels international donors’ conference requested over US$105 million to “operationalize” the Special Criminal Court (SCC) (a ‘hybrid’ court of national and international judges and staff). The SCC was intended to bring to justice to those individuals suspected of having committed crimes under international law during the conflict.
The UN’s “Mapping Report”, which highlights the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law from 2003 to 2015, providesa roadmap for the SCC. However, the SCC needs full funding and procedures to protect witnesses and to secure court personnel.
b. Humanitarian Assistance.CAR ranks last out of 188 countries on the UN Human Development Index. UN OCHA estimates that 2.9 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance due to rising food insecurity and continued violence throughout the country which has led to the displacement of nearly 600,000 people.[i] Yet, theUN’s humanitarian appeal for $430.7 million for needs in 2019 is only 29% funded halfway through the year.
Less than 25% of the total population has access to improved sanitation (compared to the 65% of the population with improved drinking sources). Consequently, the degree of risk for major infectious diseases is defined as “very high” and includes the food or waterborne diseases of bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever, as well as the water contact disease of schistosomiasis. The CAR population is also susceptible to malaria, dengue fever, and meningococcal meningitis.
c.Human Rights. Respect for human rights has long been deficient in CAR, and extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, harassment, and physical assault continue. In August 2017, the UN reported early warning signs of genocide in CAR. The sexual violence against women and children is unabated, with Human Rights Watch reporting that armed groups in CAR “used rape and sexual slavery as a tactic of war across the country during nearly five years of conflict.”
Where there is stability, it is maintained by separation in that many towns and communities have become homogeneous due to the displacement of either its Muslim or Christian populations. One of the most important programs in CAR is the reintegration of child soldiers back into society.
Evolution of needs over the last six months and key humanitarian consequences (September 2019 – February 2020)
CAR continues to face a serious protection crisis, with unabated violations of human rights and international humanitarian law despite the signature of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on 6 February 2019. Consequently, civilians continue to pay the highest price of uninterrupted violence. Notwithstanding some initial progress made on the political dialogue, the population has yet to see tangible peace and protection dividends, as some two million people, or 60 per cent of the population in CAR, are still in need of protection.
The security situation has further deteriorated in some locations. Between September 2019 and February 2020, armed conflicts occurred in Vakaga (Birao), Haute-Kotto (Bria), Basse Kotto (Alindao and Mingala), Mbomou (Nzako) and in Bangui’s third district (PK5) causing onset and multiple displacement of population in urgent need of multi-sectorial assistance. In the same reporting period, the UNICEF/Rapid Response Mechanism recorded 33 new alerts, with 49 per cent of them due to violence. In addition to the 12 prefectures that had already issued alerts earlier this year, the prefectures of Haute-Kotto, Mamberei-Kadei and Lobaye were also affected. Since October 2019, violence has resumed or continued in several areas of the country.
According to the latest 2P-tool analysis on perception of protection priorities (see illustration below), between October 2019 and February 2020, the situation has deteriorated in Bria, Birao, Alindao, Ndélé and Bangui’s third district. Paoua, Ngaoundaye, Batangafo, Kaga Bandoro, Mbres, Bambari and Ippy continue to be high priority areas in terms of protection concerns. Yalinga and Satéma are no longer blind spots, following humanitarian missions in these two hard-to-reach areas; which were possible thanks to the increased UNHAS helicopter capacity.
One in four Central Africans has been forced to seek refuge either internally or in neighboring countries due to insecurity and violence. The number of IDPs saw a 15 per cent increase between September and October 2019 only, from 600,000 to 693,000. As of 31 January 2020, 67 per cent of the 682,000 IDPs are living in host families and the rest in 91 sites (77 official IDP sites and 14 informal settlements) across the country. Only 66 per cent of sites have a site manager. A major threat to the over 214,000 IDPs living on sites is the systematic violation of the civilian character of IDP sites, due to the widespread infiltration of weapons and armed elements (Commission Mouvement de Population – CMP December 2020).
In the last quarter of 2019, 29,249 IDPs and 3,168 Central African refugees returned to their homes, a decreasing number compared to the movement registered following the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in February. Return areas are still affected by ongoing violence, such as in Vakaga, Mboumou, Ouham Pendé, Ouham (Protection Cluster, January 2020). Almost one returnee out of two fears for the security of the children (46 per cent) and the adults (47 per cent) of the household (Multisectoral Need Assessment – MSNA, 2019) and their living conditions are often tougher than the displaced themselves. For instance, out the 197 hard-to-reach localities that reported the presence of returnees in December 2019, 7 per cent indicated that returnees had no shelter at all and 43 per cent emergency shelters only (Hard to reach, REACH, December 2019).
In return areas, mainly due to exclusion practices, female heads of households face more obstacles to gain access to employment as well as land ownership. In addition, the representation in community structures remains skewed towards men.
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to learn more about OCHA’s activities, please visit https://www.unocha.org/.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
Updates from the Central African Republic (CAR) by IPI, Global Conflict Tracker, and ZIF:
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic – MINUSCA, by EPON (Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network) – Report
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
MINUSCA has a Protection of Civilians working group which coordinates information-sharing, analysis and response to protection threats. The mission “takes an integrated approach to protecting civilians which includes combining physical protection with prevention, dialogue and local peace processes.”[i]
According to a report by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), violence against civilians in CAR can be broken down into four distinct phases of the conflict:
Predatory violence by the Séléka rebel alliance, a predominantly Muslim group also comprised of foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan, against the Christian population (August 2012-September 2013)
Communal violence due to increasing number of Christian anti-Balaka self-defense militias. During this period the French Sangris military intervention sought to disarm the Séléka, which strengthened the position of anti-Balaka forces (September 2013-January 2014)
Ethnic cleansing of Muslims by anti-Balaka forces in the West (Early 2014)
Predatory violence by all parties to the conflict as Séléka and anti-Balaka forces fragmented, with increasing violence in the East and an increase in criminality in the center (Spring 2014)[ii]
The FFI report further outlines how young people became increasingly involved in the anti-Balaka movement for the purpose of self-defense and pastoralist communities joined Séléka forces to protect their economic interests, particularly their cattle from being raided. This engagement of the civilian population in the fighting increased the severity of violent incidents and further spread the conflict.
To further reduce the spread of violence, the UN established 83 community-based protection committees, with a total of 220 members, and 109 protection networks across the country.[iii] MINUSCA also trained community liaisons in all 16 prefectures who collaborate with the mission and national security forces to facilitate rapid response to threats against civilians.[iv] The mission also utilizes a Community Alert Network (CAN), a hotline that collects information on potential threats to civilians.
In 2019, MINUSCA also deployed civilian surge teams to Alindao and Batangafo, to improve outreach and early warning mechanisms since the mission does not have a permanent civilian presence in those locations. Joint assessment teams were deployed to assess protection risks in the following areas:
Bangassou
Bria
Ndele
Paoua
MINUSCA military forces have been active in the physical protection of civilians in the following areas:
Basse Kotto
Nana-Mambere
Ouaka
Despite these efforts, there continue to be significant protection incidents, such as:
May 2019 – Fighters from the armed group Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation, or 3R, killed at least 46 civilians in three attacks in Ouham Pendé province. The 3R commander, General Sidiki Abass (also known as Bi Sidi Souleymane) was appointed by presidential decree a military adviser to the Prime Minister (Human Rights Watch July 2019).
October 2018 – Two armed groups, the FPRC and MPC, attack the city of Batangofa destroying IDP camps
November 2018 – Another ex-Séléka group attacks the town of Alindao, burning down a church with people inside and destroying IDP camps
Ongoing threats against civil society, women leaders, and human rights defenders
CAR is working to document and address gross human rights violations that have occurred since the conflict began. It has adopted a UN Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and all Forms of Discrimination, which resulted in the establishment of a National Committee against Genocide and related crimes. There is also a national Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission, and some war crimes cases have been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)
In January 2019, the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) signed an Action Plan with the UN to end and prevent grave violations against children. The plan addresses four violations for which the FPRC is listed:
The UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict has recommended that all armed actors within CAR issue command directives prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In 2017, the FPRC issued a command directive in this regard, which allowed the UN access to verify that children were no longer in the ranks.[vi] The UN signed a similar Action Plan was signed with the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) in May 2018.
The Report of the Secretary General on CAAC on 20 June 2019 gives specific figures for violations recorded in 2018:
Grave Violations Total Girls Boys
Recruitment/Child Soldiers 75 14 6
Killed 71
Maimed 43
Attacks Schools 34
Attacks Hospitals 22
Abductions 62 28 34
Denial Humanitarian Access 112
Killing of Aid Workers 6
The SG report on CAAC also acknowledges that two anti-Balaka leaders were arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes including child recruitment.[vii] As part of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme initiated at the end of 2018 in Paoua, 389 children were confirmed to have been associated with both factions of Révolution et justice (RJ). The report also specifically calls upon the leadership of UPC to develop an action plan against the recruitment of children.
In September 2017, the Government of CAR ratified the Operational Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The Secretary General’s Report also encourages the Government of CAR to adopt a protocol for the handover of children associated with armed groups to child protection actors. UNICEF is actively engaged in child demobilization efforts in Paoua.
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)
In 2014, CAR became embroiled in a Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) scandal. A Human Rights Officer working in MINUSCA became aware of allegations that French Sangris forces had sexually abused several young boys between the age of 9 and 13 in exchange for food and cash.[viii] The abuse occurred near a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) close to the Bangui International Airport, where soldiers allegedly coordinated with one another by bringing children onto their base. These reports were significantly mishandled once they were sent up the chain, passing from “desk to desk, inbox to inbox with no one willing to take responsibility” to investigate the violations.[ix]
Some of the confusion was due to the fact that French forces were not under UN leadership, and therefore fell outside traditional SEA reporting mechanisms. However, even after the cases were referred to France for further investigation, a panel of French judges threw out the case due to insufficient evidence from the alleged victims.[x]
A report from the Independent Review of SEA in CAR found that the Human Rights and Justice Section (HRJS) of the mission failed to investigate the claims once it became aware of them, and senior leaders within the mission who became aware of the allegations also did not take measures to investigate. This further implicated the UN Children’s Agency, UNICEF, which referred the cases to a local NGO that failed to properly document the cases and did not offer the children medical or psycho-social support.[xi] UNICEF only followed up with the children directly after the cases received significant media attention, a full year after the initial allegations were brought forward.
The CAR scandal initiated changes in the way the UN manages SEA claims. The Secretary General took leadership by instituting a number of reforms, including publicly reporting SEA allegations by TCC, and insisting that forces found guilty of abuse are repatriated. However, UN forces remain under the legal authority of their respective nations, requiring TCCs to refer SEA cases to the proper national authority for further investigation. In actuality, this means that few cases result in prosecution. To address this challenge, the Secretary General established an office of the UN Special Coordinator for improving the response to SEA, which developed a Voluntary Compact on SEA highlighting the mutual responsibility of the UN and the member state to prevent and respond to SEA cases. As of January 2019, 101 member states had signed onto the Compact.[xii]
As a result of the CAR scandal, the U.S. State Department also developed a new SEA policy mandated by Congress which has strengthened accountability through bilateral follow up with TCCs. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has also funded new training for National Investigative Officers (NIO) on the procedures for following up on SEA claims.
Despite reforms, significant numbers of SEA cases continue in MINUSCA. In 2016, 41 cases, 25 of which involved the abuse of children, were corroborated involving peacekeepers from Gabon and Burundi. In 2017, the UN demanded the repatriation of the entire Rwandan military contingent (but not the police contingent), and the Republic of Congo contingent, after the Force Commander conducted a review of its performance and behavior.
In 2018, there were 43 reported cases of SEA in CAR involving forces from Burundi, Cameroon, the Congo, Mauritania, Morocco, and Niger. The UN has requested that all personnel of the mission be vetted for a history of misconduct in the service. Despite these preventative efforts, SEA remains a serious problem in the mission.
In the first quarter of 2019, 18 cases of SEA have been reported in CAR. From these, 7 cases involve military officers from Cameroon, 4 from Burundi, 2 from the DRC, 1 from the Congo, 1 from Gabon, 1 from Senegal, and 1 from Serbia, and 1 involving a civilian contractor.[xiii] The cases have involved allegations of exploitative relationships, transactional sex, rape, attempted rape, and abuse of children.
The UN has established a Trust Fund in Support of Victims of SEA, which allows UN agencies to provide specialized services to those affected, address gaps in services to provide assistance, and provide other support mechanisms for communities and children born as a result of SEA. As of June 2019, 19 Member States have donated to the Trust Fund, bringing its total to USD 2 million, including some USD 400,000 received from payments withheld from United Nations personnel against whom allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have been substantiated.[xiv] In addition, the Secretary General has placed a Victim’s Rights Advocate within missions with high levels of SEA, including MINUSCA, to facilitate assistance to those affected.[xv]
Behind the significant number of cases is the underlying question; why is SEA such a problem?
The Secretary General points out that one reason is the systemic gender inequality, which makes women and girls more vulnerable in conflict. However, the UN system continues to grapple with other root causes including a culture of impunity and weak legal frameworks within host nations that consider sexual violence a misdemeanor rather than a serious crime.[xvi] In one UNICEF report, experts argued that the UN has been plagued by an “over-emphasis on structures and guidance” and a lack of focus on implementation.[xvii] Indeed, it is hard to determine what impact the many high-level reforms have had on vulnerable populations on the ground in CAR.
Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
The new government which formed in late March 2019 included a number of women appointed to ministerial posts. However, only three women were elected to the National Assembly, which is far below the requirement in the law on gender parity adopted in November 2016. The law mandates 35% representation of women in state and private institutions for a transitional period of 10 years. The American Bar Association (ABA) has received support from the State Department Bureau of African Affairs Women, Peace and Security Initiative to support Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in monitoring the implementation of the law.[xviii]
In April 2019, the National Assembly adopted the electoral code in preparation for elections in 2020 and 2021. According to the Secretary General’s June 2019 report, members of civil society criticized the code, stating it failed to ensure the adequate representation of women based on the law. In June, the Constitutional Court ruled that the gender parity law was applicable to the electoral code and returned the code to the National Committee stating it could not be passed until it complied with the gender parity law.[xix] Thus, it is expected that the 35% quota for female representation will be met in the upcoming elections.
Prevention of Conflict
The local Peace Committees established to monitor the Peace Agreement includes women’s groups, civil society representatives, and members of armed groups working on conflict prevention and dispute resolution measures. Women’s involvement in the committees at the community level has been crucial to de-escalating tensions and preventing violence. For example, Barbara Sanga, who serves on the local Peace Committee in Bangui, described how things are changing to a peacebuilding NGO:
The situation in our arrondissement during the crisis was really terrible. I will give you a statistic. During the crisis no less than 1700 houses in our arrondissement were destroyed and no Muslims could come to the crossroads at the beginning of our arrondissement. Since 2014, we have been working with the 3rd arrondissement who are our neighbors and collaborating with them, and now I can tell you that we have 75% security.
We also set up a local security council. If something is not going right in our arrondissement, we hold a security meeting and we advocate to the local authorities and pass on information to them. And sometimes with the local authorities we advocate to the ministry of public security. We have contributed to the return of the police station. They have worked with the young people because at the beginning many young people did not want the police circulating in the 5th arrondissement. Now they have more trust in the international forces (MINUSCA). And now tensions have reduced and we can sleep at night in the 5th arrondissement.[xx]
Protection from Violence
Sexual violence against women and girls is widespread. The CAR report of the UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict indicates that the majority of violent incidents against women and girls in 2018 occurred in the south-east region as a result of widespread attacks against the civilian population by anti-Balaka and Union pour la paix en Centreafrique (UPC) forces. Women were attacked during farming activities and while fleeing to safety.[xxi] In 2018, the UN documented 259 incidents of sexual violence by the following parties to the conflict:
Muslim ex-Séléka groups (101),
Fulani pastoralists, who may have been affiliated with the ex-Séléka (62),
Christian anti-Balaka (45),
Lord’s Resistance Army (2),
5 to Retour, Reclamation et rehabilitation-Abbas Sidiki (5),
Bangui-based armed gangs (7),
Révolution et justice (2),
Unidentified perpetrators (27),
Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (3)
These incidents involved rape, forced marriage, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence. Almost 70 per cent of the crimes were committed by more than one perpetrator. MINUSCA also verified the recruitment of young females ranging from age 11-17, as wives for members of armed groups. These cases were attributed to anti-Balaka (5), ex-Séléka factions (3) and Lord’s Resistance Army (2).
The mission also worked with the Government of CAR to establish a Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children (UMIRR) which documented another 33 cases of conflict-related sexual violence and reported another 320 cases of sexual violence to the Bangui Criminal Court.[xxii] This special unit also worked with UN Police to investigate allegations of mass rape allegedly committed by Fulani groups in Nana, Bakassa sub-prefecture. However, the response unit did not receive regular funding from the government budget to continue operations. Also, only a few of the cases reported to the court resulted in trials. The UN is working to establish a Special Criminal Court and to develop investigative and prosecutorial procedures to ensure that perpetrators of sexual violence are held accountable for their crimes.
[ii] Oen, Ulrik Hallen. Protection of Civilians in practice – emerging lessons from the Central African Republic, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) Rapport 2014/01918, 23 October 2014, https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-01918.pdf
[xxii] Ibid, UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence 2019
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.
