• 

From Cia Facebook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)

Population: 5,990,855 (July 2020 est.) / note: estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected

Nationality: Central African(s)

Ethnic groups: Baya 28.8%, Banda 22.9%, Mandjia 9.9%, Sara 7.9%, M’Baka-Bantu 7.9%, Arab-Fulani (Peul) 6%, Mbum 6%, Ngbanki 5.5%, Zande-Nzakara 3%, other Central African Republic ethnic groups 2%, non-Central African Republic ethnic groups .1%

Languages: French (official), Sangho (lingua franca and national language), tribal languages

Religions: Christian 89.5%, Muslim 8.5%, folk 1%, unaffiliated 1% (2010 est.) / note: animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority

Demographic profile:

The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since a coup in March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which is impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers are displaced by violence.

Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 are displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness. (2019).

---

Other information about Central African Republic – Social:

a. Rule of Law. Lack of Rule of Law processes and institutions delays the improvement of the country across all its sectors. However, in November 2016, a Brussels international donors’ conference requested over US$105 million to “operationalize” the Special Criminal Court (SCC) (a ‘hybrid’ court of national and international judges and staff). The SCC was intended to bring to justice to those individuals suspected of having committed crimes under international law during the conflict.

The UN’s “Mapping Report”, which highlights the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law from 2003 to 2015, provides a roadmap for the SCC. However, the SCC needs full funding and procedures to protect witnesses and to secure court personnel.

b. Humanitarian Assistance. CAR ranks last out of 188 countries on the UN Human Development Index. UN OCHA estimates that 2.9 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance due to rising food insecurity and continued violence throughout the country which has led to the displacement of nearly 600,000 people.^[i] Yet, theUN’s humanitarian appeal for $430.7 million for needs in 2019 is only 29% funded halfway through the year.

Less than 25% of the total population has access to improved sanitation (compared to the 65% of the population with improved drinking sources). Consequently, the degree of risk for major infectious diseases is defined as “very high” and includes the food or waterborne diseases of bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever, as well as the water contact disease of schistosomiasis. The CAR population is also susceptible to malaria, dengue fever, and meningococcal meningitis. 

c. Human Rights. Respect for human rights has long been deficient in CAR, and extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, harassment, and physical assault continue. In August 2017, the UN reported early warning signs of genocide in CAR. The sexual violence against women and children is unabated, with Human Rights Watch reporting that armed groups in CAR “used rape and sexual slavery as a tactic of war across the country during nearly five years of conflict.”

Where there is stability, it is maintained by separation in that many towns and communities have become homogeneous due to the displacement of either its Muslim or Christian populations. One of the most important programs in CAR is the reintegration of child soldiers back into society. 

^[i] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Central African Republic: Humanitarian Situation and Urgent Funding Requirements, 27 March 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HNO-Light-26032019-%28001%29.pdf

[ii] The World Bank. (2019). The World Bank in the Central African Republic. Based on data set released 2019-11-25 and accessed 2020-10-06 at https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview Terms of use http://go.worldbank.org/OJC02YMLA0

From refliefweb

Evolution of needs over the last six months and key humanitarian consequences (September 2019 – February 2020)

CAR continues to face a serious protection crisis, with unabated violations of human rights and international humanitarian law despite the signature of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on 6 February 2019. Consequently, civilians continue to pay the highest price of uninterrupted violence. Notwithstanding some initial progress made on the political dialogue, the population has yet to see tangible peace and protection dividends, as some two million people, or 60 per cent of the population in CAR, are still in need of protection.

The security situation has further deteriorated in some locations. Between September 2019 and February 2020, armed conflicts occurred in Vakaga (Birao), Haute-Kotto (Bria), Basse Kotto (Alindao and Mingala), Mbomou (Nzako) and in Bangui’s third district (PK5) causing onset and multiple displacement of population in urgent need of multi-sectorial assistance. In the same reporting period, the UNICEF/Rapid Response Mechanism recorded 33 new alerts, with 49 per cent of them due to violence. In addition to the 12 prefectures that had already issued alerts earlier this year, the prefectures of Haute-Kotto, Mamberei-Kadei and Lobaye were also affected.
Since October 2019, violence has resumed or continued in several areas of the country.

According to the latest 2P-tool analysis on perception of protection priorities (see illustration below), between October 2019 and February 2020, the situation has deteriorated in Bria, Birao, Alindao, Ndélé and Bangui’s third district. Paoua, Ngaoundaye, Batangafo, Kaga Bandoro, Mbres, Bambari and Ippy continue to be high priority areas in terms of protection concerns. Yalinga and Satéma are no longer blind spots, following humanitarian missions in these two hard-to-reach areas; which were possible thanks to the increased UNHAS helicopter capacity.

One in four Central Africans has been forced to seek refuge either internally or in neighboring countries due to insecurity and violence. The number of IDPs saw a 15 per cent increase between September and October 2019 only, from 600,000 to 693,000. As of 31 January 2020, 67 per cent of the 682,000 IDPs are living in host families and the rest in 91 sites (77 official IDP sites and 14 informal settlements) across the country. Only 66 per cent of sites have a site manager. A major threat to the over 214,000 IDPs living on sites is the systematic violation of the civilian character of IDP sites, due to the widespread infiltration of weapons and armed elements (Commission Mouvement de Population – CMP December 2020).

In the last quarter of 2019, 29,249 IDPs and 3,168 Central African refugees returned to their homes, a decreasing number compared to the movement registered following the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in February. Return areas are still affected by ongoing violence, such as in Vakaga, Mboumou, Ouham Pendé, Ouham (Protection Cluster, January 2020). Almost one returnee out of two fears for the security of the children (46 per cent) and the adults (47 per cent) of the household (Multisectoral Need Assessment – MSNA, 2019) and their living conditions are often tougher than the displaced themselves. For instance, out the 197 hard-to-reach localities that reported the presence of returnees in December 2019, 7 per cent indicated that returnees had no shelter at all and 43 per cent emergency shelters only (Hard to reach, REACH, December 2019).

In return areas, mainly due to exclusion practices, female heads of households face more obstacles to gain access to employment as well as land ownership. In addition, the representation in community structures remains skewed towards men.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to learn more about OCHA’s activities, please visit https://www.unocha.org/.

---

OCHA Humanitarian data: https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-humanitarian-dashboard-january-june-2020

---

---

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.

Protection of Civilians (PoC)

MINUSCA has a Protection of Civilians working group which coordinates information-sharing, analysis and response to protection threats. The mission “takes an integrated approach to protecting civilians which includes combining physical protection with prevention, dialogue and local peace processes.”^[i]

According to a report by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), violence against civilians in CAR can be broken down into four distinct phases of the conflict:

1. Predatory violence by the Séléka rebel alliance, a predominantly Muslim group also comprised of foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan, against the Christian population (August 2012-September 2013)
2. Communal violence due to increasing number of Christian anti-Balaka self-defense militias. During this period the French Sangris military intervention sought to disarm the Séléka, which strengthened the position of anti-Balaka forces (September 2013-January 2014)
3. Ethnic cleansing of Muslims by anti-Balaka forces in the West (Early 2014)
4. Predatory violence by all parties to the conflict as Séléka and anti-Balaka forces fragmented, with increasing violence in the East and an increase in criminality in the center (Spring 2014)^[ii]

The FFI report further outlines how young people became increasingly involved in the anti-Balaka movement for the purpose of self-defense and pastoralist communities joined Séléka forces to protect their economic interests, particularly their cattle from being raided. This engagement of the civilian population in the fighting increased the severity of violent incidents and further spread the conflict.  

To further reduce the spread of violence, the UN established 83 community-based protection committees, with a total of 220 members, and 109 protection networks across the country.^[iii] MINUSCA also trained community liaisons in all 16 prefectures who collaborate with the mission and national security forces to facilitate rapid response to threats against civilians.^[iv] The mission also utilizes a Community Alert Network (CAN), a hotline that collects information on potential threats to civilians.

In 2019, MINUSCA also deployed civilian surge teams to Alindao and Batangafo, to improve outreach and early warning mechanisms since the mission does not have a permanent civilian presence in those locations. Joint assessment teams were deployed to assess protection risks in the following areas:

MINUSCA military forces have been active in the physical protection of civilians in the following areas:

Despite these efforts, there continue to be significant protection incidents, such as:

CAR is working to document and address gross human rights violations that have occurred since the conflict began. It has adopted a UN Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and all Forms of Discrimination, which resulted in the establishment of a National Committee against Genocide and related crimes. There is also a national Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission, and some war crimes cases have been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)

In January 2019, the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) signed an Action Plan with the UN to end and prevent grave violations against children. The plan addresses four violations for which the FPRC is listed:

1. Recruitment and use of children
2. Killing and maiming
3. Rape and other forms of sexual violence
4. Attacks on schools and hospitals^[v]

The UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict has recommended that all armed actors within CAR issue command directives prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In 2017, the FPRC issued a command directive in this regard, which allowed the UN access to verify that children were no longer in the ranks.^[vi] The UN signed a similar Action Plan was signed with the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) in May 2018.

The Report of the Secretary General on CAAC on 20 June 2019 gives specific figures for violations recorded in 2018:

Grave Violations                                 Total                Girls                 Boys

1. Recruitment/Child Soldiers            75                    14                    6          
2. Killed                                                    71
3. Maimed                                               43
4. Attacks Schools                                 34
5. Attacks Hospitals                              22
6. Abductions                                         62                    28                    34
7. Denial Humanitarian Access         112
8. Killing of Aid Workers                       6

The SG report on CAAC also acknowledges that two anti-Balaka leaders were arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes including child recruitment.^[vii] As part of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme initiated at the end of 2018 in Paoua, 389 children were confirmed to have been associated with both factions of Révolution et justice (RJ). The report also specifically calls upon the leadership of UPC to develop an action plan against the recruitment of children. 

In September 2017, the Government of CAR ratified the Operational Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The Secretary General’s Report also encourages the Government of CAR to adopt a protocol for the handover of children associated with armed groups to child protection actors. UNICEF is actively engaged in child demobilization efforts in Paoua.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)

In 2014, CAR became embroiled in a Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) scandal. A Human Rights Officer working in MINUSCA became aware of allegations that French Sangris forces had sexually abused several young boys between the age of 9 and 13 in exchange for food and cash.^[viii] The abuse occurred near a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) close to the Bangui International Airport, where soldiers allegedly coordinated with one another by bringing children onto their base. These reports were significantly mishandled once they were sent up the chain, passing from “desk to desk, inbox to inbox with no one willing to take responsibility” to investigate the violations.^[ix]

Some of the confusion was due to the fact that French forces were not under UN leadership, and therefore fell outside traditional SEA reporting mechanisms. However, even after the cases were referred to France for further investigation, a panel of French judges threw out the case due to insufficient evidence from the alleged victims.^[x]

A report from the Independent Review of SEA in CAR found that the Human Rights and Justice Section (HRJS) of the mission failed to investigate the claims once it became aware of them, and senior leaders within the mission who became aware of the allegations also did not take measures to investigate. This further implicated the UN Children’s Agency, UNICEF, which referred the cases to a local NGO that failed to properly document the cases and did not offer the children medical or psycho-social support.^[xi] UNICEF only followed up with the children directly after the cases received significant media attention, a full year after the initial allegations were brought forward. 

The CAR scandal initiated changes in the way the UN manages SEA claims. The Secretary General took leadership by instituting a number of reforms, including publicly reporting SEA allegations by TCC, and insisting that forces found guilty of abuse are repatriated. However, UN forces remain under the legal authority of their respective nations, requiring TCCs to refer SEA cases to the proper national authority for further investigation. In actuality, this means that few cases result in prosecution. To address this challenge, the Secretary General established an office of the UN Special Coordinator for improving the response to SEA, which developed a Voluntary Compact on SEA highlighting the mutual responsibility of the UN and the member state to prevent and respond to SEA cases. As of January 2019, 101 member states had signed onto the Compact.^[xii]

As a result of the CAR scandal, the U.S. State Department also developed a new SEA policy mandated by Congress which has strengthened accountability through bilateral follow up with TCCs. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has also funded new training for National Investigative Officers (NIO) on the procedures for following up on SEA claims.  

Despite reforms, significant numbers of SEA cases continue in MINUSCA. In 2016, 41 cases, 25 of which involved the abuse of children, were corroborated involving peacekeepers from Gabon and Burundi. In 2017, the UN demanded the repatriation of the entire Rwandan military contingent (but not the police contingent), and the Republic of Congo contingent, after the Force Commander conducted a review of its performance and behavior.

In 2018, there were 43 reported cases of SEA in CAR involving forces from Burundi, Cameroon, the Congo, Mauritania, Morocco, and Niger. The UN has requested that all personnel of the mission be vetted for a history of misconduct in the service. Despite these preventative efforts, SEA remains a serious problem in the mission.

In the first quarter of 2019, 18 cases of SEA have been reported in CAR. From these, 7 cases involve military officers from Cameroon, 4 from Burundi, 2 from the DRC, 1 from the Congo, 1 from Gabon, 1 from Senegal, and 1 from Serbia, and 1 involving a civilian contractor.^[xiii] The cases have involved allegations of exploitative relationships, transactional sex, rape, attempted rape, and abuse of children.

The UN has established a Trust Fund in Support of Victims of SEA, which allows UN agencies to provide specialized services to those affected, address gaps in services to provide assistance, and provide other support mechanisms for communities and children born as a result of SEA. As of June 2019, 19 Member States have donated to the Trust Fund, bringing its total to USD 2 million, including some USD 400,000 received from payments withheld from United Nations personnel against whom allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have been substantiated.^[xiv] In addition, the Secretary General has placed a Victim’s Rights Advocate within missions with high levels of SEA, including MINUSCA, to facilitate assistance to those affected.^[xv]

Behind the significant number of cases is the underlying question; why is SEA such a problem? 

The Secretary General points out that one reason is the systemic gender inequality, which makes women and girls more vulnerable in conflict. However, the UN system continues to grapple with other root causes including a culture of impunity and weak legal frameworks within host nations that consider sexual violence a misdemeanor rather than a serious crime.^[xvi] In one UNICEF report, experts argued that the UN has been plagued by an “over-emphasis on structures and guidance” and a lack of focus on implementation.^[xvii] Indeed, it is hard to determine what impact the many high-level reforms have had on vulnerable populations on the ground in CAR.

Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

The new government which formed in late March 2019 included a number of women appointed to ministerial posts. However, only three women were elected to the National Assembly, which is far below the requirement in the law on gender parity adopted in November 2016. The law mandates 35% representation of women in state and private institutions for a transitional period of 10 years. The American Bar Association (ABA) has received support from the State Department Bureau of African Affairs Women, Peace and Security Initiative to support Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in monitoring the implementation of the law.^[xviii]

In April 2019, the National Assembly adopted the electoral code in preparation for elections in 2020 and 2021. According to the Secretary General’s June 2019 report, members of civil society criticized the code, stating it failed to ensure the adequate representation of women based on the law. In June, the Constitutional Court ruled that the gender parity law was applicable to the electoral code and returned the code to the National Committee stating it could not be passed until it complied with the gender parity law.^[xix] Thus, it is expected that the 35% quota for female representation will be met in the upcoming elections. 

Prevention of Conflict

The local Peace Committees established to monitor the Peace Agreement includes women’s groups, civil society representatives, and members of armed groups working on conflict prevention and dispute resolution measures. Women’s involvement in the committees at the community level has been crucial to de-escalating tensions and preventing violence. For example, Barbara Sanga, who serves on the local Peace Committee in Bangui, described how things are changing to a peacebuilding NGO:

The situation in our arrondissement during the crisis was really terrible. I will give you a statistic. During the crisis no less than 1700 houses in our arrondissement were destroyed and no Muslims could come to the crossroads at the beginning of our arrondissement. Since 2014, we have been working with the 3rd arrondissement who are our neighbors and collaborating with them, and now I can tell you that we have 75% security.

We also set up a local security council. If something is not going right in our arrondissement, we hold a security meeting and we advocate to the local authorities and pass on information to them. And sometimes with the local authorities we advocate to the ministry of public security. We have contributed to the return of the police station. They have worked with the young people because at the beginning many young people did not want the police circulating in the 5th arrondissement. Now they have more trust in the international forces (MINUSCA). And now tensions have reduced and we can sleep at night in the 5th arrondissement.^[xx]

Protection from Violence

Sexual violence against women and girls is widespread. The CAR report of the UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict indicates that the majority of violent incidents against women and girls in 2018 occurred in the south-east region as a result of widespread attacks against the civilian population by anti-Balaka and Union pour la paix en Centreafrique (UPC) forces. Women were attacked during farming activities and while fleeing to safety.^[xxi] In 2018, the UN documented 259 incidents of sexual violence by the following parties to the conflict:

These incidents involved rape, forced marriage, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence. Almost 70 per cent of the crimes were committed by more than one perpetrator. MINUSCA also verified the recruitment of young females ranging from age 11-17, as wives for members of armed groups. These cases were attributed to anti-Balaka (5), ex-Séléka factions (3) and Lord’s Resistance Army (2). 

The mission also worked with the Government of CAR to establish a Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children (UMIRR) which documented another 33 cases of conflict-related sexual violence and reported another 320 cases of sexual violence to the Bangui Criminal Court.^[xxii] This special unit also worked with UN Police to investigate allegations of mass rape allegedly committed by Fulani groups in Nana, Bakassa sub-prefecture. However, the response unit did not receive regular funding from the government budget to continue operations. Also, only a few of the cases reported to the court resulted in trials. The UN is working to establish a Special Criminal Court and to develop investigative and prosecutorial procedures to ensure that perpetrators of sexual violence are held accountable for their crimes. 

^[i] UN Report of the Secretary General on the Central African Republic, 17 June 2019, https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/498

^[ii] Oen, Ulrik Hallen. Protection of Civilians in practice – emerging lessons from the Central African Republic, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) Rapport 2014/01918, 23 October 2014, https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-01918.pdf

^[iii] UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, CAR Report https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/countries/central-african-republic/

^[iv] Ibid, UN Report of the Secretary General, June 2019

^[v] Relief Web, “Central African Republic: Signature of a New Action Plan to Protect Children,” 5 July 2019,https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-signature-new-action-plan-protect-children

^[vi] Ibid, Relief Web, July 2019

^[vii] UN Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict, 20 June 2019, https://undocs.org/S/2019/509

^[viii] Deschamps, Marie and Jallow, Hassan B. and Sooka, Yasmin. Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic, 17 December 2015, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Independent-Review-Report.pdf

^[ix] Ibid, Deschamps 2015. 

^[x] Morenne, Benoit. “No Charges in Sexual Exploitation Case Involving French Soldiers,” New York Times, 6 January 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/world/africa/french-peacekeepers-un-sexual-abuse-case-central-african-republic.html

^[xi] Ibid, Deschamps 2015.

^[xii] United Nations, Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Voluntary Compact as of 23 January 2019, https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/voluntary-compact

^[xiii] UN Peacekeeping, Conduct in UN Missions, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations as of May 2019, https://conduct.unmissions.org/table-of-allegations

^[xiv] United Nations, Note to Correspondents: United Nations and Member States pledge further commitments to the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 21 June 2019, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2019-06-21/note-correspondents-united-nations-and-member-states-pledge-further-commitments-the-trust-fund-support-of-victims-of-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse

^[xv] United Nations Report of the Secretary General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach, 28 February 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_a_71_818_special_measures_for_protection_from_sexual_exploitation_and_abuse.pdf

^[xvi] Williamson, Sarah. The U.S. WPS Agenda and UN Peacekeeping, U.S. Civil Society Working Group Policy Brief, 10 January 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/US-CSWG-Policy-Brief-US-WPS-Agenda-and-UN-Peacekeeping.pdf

^[xvii] UNICEF, Independent Panel Review of the UNICEF Response to PSEA, September 2018, https://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/Independent_Panel_Report_UNICEF_Review_PSEA.pdf

^[xviii] American Bar Association (ABA), Seeking Peaceful Governance through Women in the Central African Republic, 01 February 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/africa/central-african-republic/news/news-car-seeking-peaceful-governance-0117/

^[xix] [xix] Ibid, UN Report of the Secretary General, June 2019

^[xx] Central African Women have a great role to play in national peacebuilding, Conciliation Resources online article, https://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/stories/central-african-women-have-great-role-play-national-peacebuilding

^[xxi] UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Central African Republic (CAR) Report 2019, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/countries/central-african-republic/

^[xxii] Ibid, UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence 2019

---

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.

• 

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 06, 2020)

Electricity – production: 171.4 million kWh (2016 est.)

Electricity – consumption: 159.4 million kWh (2016 est.)

Crude oil – proved reserves: 0 bbl (1 January 2018 est.)

Natural gas – proved reserves: 0 cu m (1 January 2014 est.)

Airports: 39 (2013)

unpaved: 23,300 km (2018)

Waterways: 2,800 km (the primary navigable river is the Ubangi, which joins the River Congo; it was the traditional route for the export of products because it connected with the Congo-Ocean railway at Brazzaville; because of the warfare on both sides of the River Congo from 1997, importers and exporters preferred routes through Cameroon) (2011)

Ports and terminals: river port(s): Bangui (Oubangui) and Nola (Sangha)

---

Read more: https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Central-African-Republic-INFRASTRUCTURE-POWER-AND-COMMUNICATIONS.html#ixzz6VOqZ4OFn

---

---

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.

• 

---

---

From BBC

Given the shortage of electricity, remote locations rely on word-of-mouth and messengers. Newspapers are privately owned, and their reach is limited by low literacy levels and a lack of distribution in rural areas. Around 5% of the population is online and approximately 22% of the population has cell phones. As in many African countries, radio stations are the most effective means to reach large segments of the population. The country has one government-controlled television station and about two dozen privately-owned radio stations. Many of them are run by religious organizations. BBC World Service (90.2 FM), Radio France Internationale and the Voice of America are available via local relays in Bangui. Radio Ndeke Luka (“bird of luck”), run by Swiss Non-Government Organization (NGO) Fondation Hirondelle, provides balanced output and rebroadcasts international news bulletins. MINUSCA runs Guira FM, which is available in the capital and in the regions. The station is named after a tree under which differences are solved and it works to bring together Muslim and Christian communities.

Radio is the most popular medium. State-run Radio Centrafrique has limited FM coverage.

Radio Ndeke Luka (“bird of luck”), run by Swiss NGO Fondation Hirondelle, provides balanced output, and rebroadcasts international news bulletins.

The UN stabilisation mission (MINUSCA) runs Guira FM, which is available in the capital and in the regions. The station is named after a tree under which differences are solved. 

There are about two dozen privately-owned radio stations. Many of them are run by religious organisations. 

Newspapers are privately-owned. Their reach is limited by low literacy levels and a lack of distribution in rural areas. 

BBC World Service (90.2 FM), Radio France Internationale and the Voice of America are available via local relays in Bangui.

Around 224,000 citizens were online by 2016 – around 4.5% of the population (InternetLiveStats.com). Internet access is mainly confined to Bangui. 

Press

Television

Radio

Internet

 

---

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.

Last update on: 19 November 2020

• 

---

---

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 06, 2020)

Economy – overview:

Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR’s landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro.

Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government’s additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR’s fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR’s capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR’s fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government’s management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery.

Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth.

GDP (official exchange rate): $1.937 billion (2017 est.)

GDP – per capita (PPP):

$700 (2017 est.)

$700 (2016 est.)

$600 (2015 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars

Population below poverty line: 62% NA (2008 est.)

Agriculture – products: cotton, coffee, tobacco, cassava (manioc, tapioca), yams, millet, corn, bananas; timber

Industries: gold and diamond mining, logging, brewing, sugar refining

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html

---

Other sources about Central African Republic Economy

From World Bank

Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR’s landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro.

Years of insecurity have exerted a heavy toll on the country. Per capita income ranges between $550-700 annual, although the World Bank states that the last household income survey was done in 2008.^[i] Livestock availability is less than 50% of the pre-crisis levels, and infrastructure damaged the fishing industry to 40% of its previous capacity. The formerly lucrative cotton and coffee sectors are now essentially non-existent. Disrupted markets led to soaring food prices, resulting in purchasing power decreasing about one third in 2015. Unemployment is high and the population in the north is particularly marginalized. 

^[i] The World Bank. (2019). The World Bank in the Central African Republic. Based on data set released 2019-11-25 and accessed 2020-09-23 at https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview Terms of use https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/legal/terms-and-conditions.

---

---

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusca.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca.

16 July 2020

By Dr. Raymond A. Millen and the PKSOI Team

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Since pandemics are global by definition, the United States must choose where to intervene when national interests and strategic objectives are threatened. As the 28 April 2020 PKSOI paper, US Global Stabilization Strategy for the COVID 19 Pandemic avers, sharing the response burden with partner nations, international organizations, and NGOs is pragmatic. Burden-sharing is a time-honored tradition among great powers and makes good strategic sense.

Domestic security and rule of law are generally the greatest challenges for fragile states. The added stressor of a pandemic can trigger a collapse of both. Fragile states should receive the highest priority when considering where to intervene. If the United States must intervene in a country devastated by an epidemic, establishing security becomes imperative.

As a critical joint stability function, the ability to maintain security during an epidemic is a key indicator of a country’s resiliency. Aside from medical services, the police are the most vulnerable to epidemics because of their close association with the public. If the police services are incapacitated due to illness or death, law and order becomes paralyzed, and hence the fabric of society can quickly unravel.

Law and order is largely psychological stemming from the tacit consent of the populace to obey laws. Criminal elements are normally the first to exploit the breakdown in police authority, resulting in a spike in crime. Once disorder and panic become widespread, a state of anarchy occurs with general mayhem infecting the populace. Without basic law and order, comprehensive rule of law principles become meaningless. At this point, the police cannot regain control, and thus martial law under a military occupation is a normal recourse.

In the immediate onset of a pandemic, the reinforcement or establishment of security is a preventive measure to uphold the integrity of society. This paper addresses the essential activities to preserve security: 1) re-establishing the police; 2) securing critical facilities; 3) protecting emergency services; and 4) combatting detrimental tendencies. Hence, preserving the psychological component of law and order becomes the overriding objective.

Re-establishing the Police

As with any devastating disaster, people become paralyzed by fear and the enormity of the event. Afflicted governments normally mobilize the police and military forces in response. If they prove inadequate (or fall victim to the epidemic), an intervention with international police is the ideal choice to support the police. However, if the environment is non-permissive or access is limited, then US military forces would be the first responders. If available, expeditionary police (e.g., NATO carabinieri and gendarmerie) should accompany military forces.  These police have a mandate to police civilians and are the best choice. However, in the absence of such deployable police, US military police would be the next best option.

As an organizational technique, small civil affairs (CA) and police teams (8 personnel) should accompany military tactical units into affected urban areas to establish transitional public security. Only those urban areas experiencing pronounced insecurity require a tactical sweep to establish immediate authority. Otherwise, the CA/police teams may enter alone.

Upon entering an urban area, the CA/police team immediately locates the political authorities and chief of police, or appoints new ones if needed. Since the authorities may be paralyzed by the chaos, the team’s initial task is to spur the community into restorative action. The guiding principle of the team is to govern indirectly, supervising the activities of established authorities.

The CA/police team distributes the joint commander’s proclamations and ordinances to the political authorities to disseminate to the populace (e.g., bulletin boards, all media, and town hall meetings). The proclamations inform the local populace of the reason and intent of the intervention, assuring them that existing laws, customs, and institutions shall remain unchanged. The ordinances serve to restore public order (e.g., curfews and prohibited areas). Generally, they include temporary prohibitions on movement and activities that may interfere with military operations. The establishment of martial law is a senior political decision and is used only in extreme circumstances.

The CA/police team directs the chief of police to recall all police, including retired police, for accountability and security assignments. If needed, the team authorizes the police chief to deputize responsible citizens as auxiliary police, providing the list of enrolled police for team review. Local militias, neighborhood watches, and private security for businesses are acknowledged as emergency security measures. The team may need to provide salaries for the police and auxiliary police, so the military chain of command must provide guidance or funds for this purpose. As an alternative, the team may use existing municipal funds at the bank for salaries, but due care is required to ensure financial accountability is strictly maintained.

Securing Critical Facilities

The police chief is directed to deploy the police immediately to secure: financial institutions, post offices, government facilities (e.g., city hall, courts, and revenue collection), jails/prisons, cultural centers, and key utilities. Critical facilities are the first places looted and destroyed, so they receive priority. In extreme cases, the teams may request the temporary deployment of tactical units to the urban area if situation warrants.

Financial institutions (e.g., banks, insurance, and depositories) should remain open but with increased security as a deterrent to robbery and burglary. Temporary closures may trigger a financial panic, which must be avoided at all costs. The prevention of looting signals that wanton behavior is not tolerated, thereby curbing disorder early. Clear rules of engagement are required to protect property with the minimum use of force.

The protection of post offices ensures money orders and related financial documents remain safe. The preservation of government and legal documents is to prevent their destruction by criminal elements. As a public safety, preventing the release of incarcerated criminals or political prisoners staunches future instability. Safeguarding works of art, monuments, and similar national treasures thwarts illicit trading.

While wanton damage and ransacking of public utilities is a self-inflicting wound to the community, it happens so frequently that protection is a security necessity. Disruptions to electrical grids, power stations (e.g., nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, and wind), waterworks, and waste disposal quickly affect health, so security, repair, and maintenance are required. If local utility workers cannot repair damaged utilities, the CA/police team alerts the chain of command for the deployment of technical specialists.

Protecting Emergency Services

Fire and medical services are essential to rescue and health care. The police must protect fire equipment, medical facilities, and medicines from theft and damage. Stolen medicine quickly becomes a black market commodity, so securing medical storage units is both a medical and criminal prevention necessity. The prompt implementation of emergency services reassures the populace that their safety is foremost, thereby mitigating possible upheavals due to frustration, anger, and panic.

Since epidemics result in inordinate death rates, emergency services must visit all homes to recover bodies for burial. Teams may need to request assistance and equipment for mass burials from the chain of command. In the interim, the CA/police team may hire local labor for burial details. Similarly, medical services may become overwhelmed by mass casualties, so additional military medical support would be required.

Heightened police or neighborhood patrols serve to protect vulnerable houses and businesses from burglary or ransacking. An epidemic may so devastate the population, that several houses and businesses become vacant. Immediate response to even small criminal activities is necessary to maintain public confidence in law enforcement.

Local and supplemental medical services establish quarantine measures to isolate and care for infected people. Medical services advises the CA/police team on the most vulnerable groups for isolation. Those groups most resilient to the disease may continue daily activities to generate herd immunity. Additionally, the team must remain vigilant to outbreaks of other diseases. Virulent viruses often exhaust antibodies and cause weakened autoimmune systems. In such cases, people become susceptible to pneumonia because the body cannot combat the introduction of ordinary germs. 

Combatting Detrimental Tendencies

Aside from looting, hoarding results in critical shortages of commodities and fuels the black market. Farmers and other food providers may resort to hoarding in order to raise the price of commodities. Police must actively seek information on hoarding activities and storage locations. Police raids and anticorruption operations are generally an immediate remedy.

The police chief should provide the CA/police team with information on local criminal bosses or warlords. The team should establish a polite but firm dialogue with them. The idea is not to ignore them but acknowledge their presence and come to a working understanding. Gaining their cooperation for security may not be possible, but talking with them reduces potential tensions.

Although militias are often instrumental in providing immediate security, over time they can become a public threat, preying upon the populace. The CA/police team must address any acts of drunkenness, theft, or intimidation with the militia leaders. Once the crisis subsides, the team may seek an informal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the militia, but this often takes a great deal of persuasion. DDR discussions may serve to identify potential candidates for recruitment in the police and military forces. Accordingly, the police chief and host nation military commanders may enlist qualified militiamen to replace losses.

Conclusions

Epidemics generally do not infect an entire country evenly. Some areas are impacted harder and faster than others. Logically, intervention forces deploy into the high-threat areas first and attend to the other areas later. The immediate objective of establishing immediate security in an urban area is to staunch disorder before it turns into widespread mayhem. Often, the presence of police suffices to deter criminal behavior and reassure the populace. The presence of corrupt and incompetent police is likely, but the exigencies of the crisis require their continued employment. CA/police teams should identify them in situation reports for host nation government awareness and action after the crisis.

Small CA/police teams are an appropriate instrument to prompt restorative action during an epidemic. Once security is restored in one community, a CA/police team may expand its area of responsibility by conducting maintenance visits to other nearby communities. This method frees up other CA/police teams for deployment to other communities showing signs of the epidemic.

Transitioning responsibility to international police, civilian organizations, or the host nation should occur from the lowest levels and then progress upwards. This approach enhances local capacities and ensures central government capacity is not overwhelmed by the enormity of the disaster. In line with global interests and strategy, the United States should optimize the use of stabilization partners for most affected countries. When US military intervention is necessary, the approach as outlined in this paper provides the requisite security for the prompt recovery of the afflicted country.

A team of researchers at PKSOI is looking to expand an annotated bibliography on Peace, Stability, and Irregular Warfare. We are focusing specifically on additions from 2010 or later, but are open to all submissions. All pieces of media (books, journal articles, movies, etc) are welcome. To submit Click Here.  Any questions can be directed to ISPBibliography@gmail.com Thank you for supporting our project!

June 2, 2020

By Anthony S. Lieto and the PKSOI Team

The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 titled Stabilization identifies that stabilization is an inherently political endeavor and requires aligning U.S Government efforts to create conditions to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. The Department of State is the overall lead for Governance and other stabilization efforts. The tasks and actions of the U.S. military in support of governance is to assist other U.S. governmental agencies, mainly the Department of State, to aid foreign nations and their people to share, access, and voice their opinion through non-violent processes and enjoy the collective benefits and services of their nation (JP 3-07). External and internal pressures placed on a nation in crisis can disrupt governance and cause unintended consequences. Disease, pandemics, or other medical disruptions to the balance within a nation, especially a fragile nation, can cause assistance by donor nations or international organizations, if not synchronized, to overwhelm the ability of the nation to absorb this assistance (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Publications 3-40). For example, the drought, death, and disease of the livestock in Somalia caused a famine which caused the governance structure within Somalia to collapse and the result was the rise of the warlords. International organizations and military support were not well synchronized or coordinated. The lack of a coordinated and synchronized relief effort caused the governance structure to collapse, warlords took control, and the result was a suffering population. The current ongoing conflict in Yemen with famine, diseases, like cholera, and malaria, has decimated the health care system and caused the disintegration and splintering of the Yemeni government (ICRC Report). Governance within Yemen has ceased to exist. Similarly, the ongoing COVID 19 virus has the potential to cause major disruptions in the governance in fragile nations.

The question exists, what is meant by Good Governance and what effect does Governance have on fragile states?  The concept of governance is not new.  Governance means the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented (UN-ESCAP).  Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, identifies Governance as the nation’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behaviors by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (i.e., rule of law).  The government of a nation is only one of the aspects of governance.  In rural areas governance may include landlords or tribal leaders who establish rules and behaviors, manage resources, and exercise power, while governance within urban areas remains more complex.  Currently, according to several views, good governance has eight major characteristics.  These characteristics include participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable, and inclusive and follows the rule of law.  JP 3-07 provides more guidance on stable governance which provides economic activity, a public sector strategy, a public sector management, a governmental structure, civil society participation and voice, and political accountability which is the foundation on which rule of law and economic activity can thrive and become drivers of security and stability.

So how does governance within a fragile nation deal with Pandemics?  Pandemics are large-scale outbreaks of infectious disease that increase morbidity and mortality over a wide geographic area and cause significant economic, social, and political disruption to the balance of effective, efficient, inclusive, and responsive governance.  History and recent events with Ebola, SARS, MERS, and COVID 19 suggest that the likelihood of other pandemics will occur because of increased global travel and integration, urbanization, changes in land use, and greater exploitation of the natural environment (African Risk Capacity 2016).  These trends will continue and intensify causing governance in fragile nations to absorb the consequences and suffer the effects if not prepared.  Fragile nation’s policy should focus on the characteristics of “good governance” and the need to identify and limit the damage pandemic outbreaks can cause to the governmental institutions, social structure, and to the security capability and capacity within the nation.  Fragile nations should not assume donor nations or international organizations will provide timely, coordinated, and synchronized support and assistance.

Pandemic Social and Political Impacts to Governance

Epidemics and pandemics have significant social and political consequences, creating clashes between nations and citizens, eroding a nation’s capacity, driving population displacement, and heightening social tension and discrimination (ASPR, 2014).  Historically, some significant social and political upheaval was associated with pandemics or diseases.  The death rates and the resulting demographic shifts resulted in governance institutions collapsing.  The introduction of smallpox, typhoid, malaria, and other diseases led to the collapse of governance, national institutions and weakened the societies within a nation’s military capacity and capability to provide security to the extent that the nations were vulnerable to conquest (Diamond 2009).  With the improvements in medicines, preventions, cures, and care, recent diseases and pandemics did not result in such dramatic effects on governance institutions specifically political and social instability, because the potential population was informed, took precautions, and received international assistance.

Evidence and recent studies suggest that epidemics and pandemics can amplify existing political tensions and spark unrest, particularly in the governance of fragile states with legacies of violence and weak institutions.  During the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic, steps taken to mitigate disease transmission, such as quarantines and curfews by security forces, were viewed with suspicion by segments of the public and opposition political leaders.  This led directly to riots and violent clashes with security forces (McCoy 2014).  In Liberia political tensions from warring factions reemerged early in the epidemic and were linked with threats to health care workers as well as attacks on governance institutions specifically public health personnel and facilities.  The Ebola epidemic amplified political tensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  In Sierra Leone, quarantine in opposition-dominated regions was delayed because of concerns that it would be seen as politically motivated (ICG 2015).  Poor governance in countries with high levels of political polarization, recent civil wars, or weak government institutions, a sustained pandemic or outbreak can lead to overwhelming pressure and political tensions impacting the governance structure of the nation.  

Pandemics also can have longer-term impacts on a nation’s security capability and capacity. In the 1990s and early 2000s extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates among African militaries, led to increased absenteeism, decreased military capacity, and decreased readiness (Elbe 2002). Similar effects on security within the governance framework can reduce a nation’s capacity to manage stability, thereby increasing the risks of civil war and other forms of violent conflict.

Large-scale outbreaks of infectious disease have direct and consequential social impacts which can lead to rapid population migration. Sudden population movements have destabilizing effects on governance, and migrants face elevated health risks arising from poor sanitation, poor nutrition, and other stresses. Migration also poses the risk of further spreading an outbreak, one just has to look at the migrate issues facing southern Europe.

The majority of threats to governance originate in nation’s where the citizens do not see their government as legitimate, or where legitimate governments are unable to extend their lawful powers across their entire geographies (JP 3-07). The lack of legitimate governing institutions (governance) are an invitation for illicit forces. Terrorists find their greatest safe haven in countries where governments cannot or will not control their territory. Pandemic diseases which go undetected and untreated due to governments not properly addressing health care needs are an invitation for organized criminal groups to create networks when corrupt governments are complicit (corruption) or unable to take steps to mitigate the threats (inadequate security). The missing links in all of these cases are legitimate governing institutions that reflects the will of the people, responds to their needs, and extends their authority across the entire populace, in essence good governance.

Way Forward:

The United States will always take immediate action to address urgent dangers in order to mitigate major threats before they arise—and to sustain global support for the institutions of good governance. The following three steps are recommended for providing good governance and the rule of law fragile states, in cooperation with to partner nations whose stability is in the U.S. national interest. These steps are a composite outlined in JP3-07, FM 3-07 and UN publications. The U.S. military’s support to governance effort is listed below.

The United States must help strengthen the legitimacy of fragile states across the world and focus efforts in particular on supporting willing partner countries whose instability and fragility could pose direct threats to U.S. national security.The U.S. military uses its extensive security cooperation network and enterprise to assist nations with security force assistance.

States that cannot prevent threats from taking root within their borders must be supported by the United States in partnership with the rest of the world—with other donor nations, international organizations, and private sector entities. The U.S. military can provide coordination, synchronization, and C2 assets to assist.

Support the Rule of Law with nations that enjoy true legitimacy, internal support for the system of government expressed voluntarily by the people.Supporting these nations who have good governance characteristics would require channeling U.S. resources and diplomacy toward bolstering these fragile nations. The U.S. military support elements could include, legal support to a recognized justice and dispute resolution system perceived as fair (rule of law), engineer support to provide basic services for its citizens, medical and veterinary teams to mitigate disease, military training teams to assist local security forces, and ministerial advisors to governing security forces and their institutions.

Endnotes:

ARC (African Risk Capacity). 2016. “African Risk Capacity Strategic Framework 2016–2020.” Strategy and policy document, ARC, Johannesburg, South Africa.

ASPR (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response). 2014. “Public Health and Medical Situational Awareness Strategy.” Strategy document for situational awareness implementation plan U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC.

Diamond J. 2009. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton.

McCoy T. 2014. “Why the Brutal Murder of Several Ebola Workers May Hint at More Violence to Come.” Washington Post, September 19.

Elbe S. 2002. “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa.” International Security.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2015. The Politics behind the Ebola Crisis. Crisis Group Africa Report 232, International Crisis Group, Brussels, October 28.

Ministry of Defence, 2010, Joint Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution, Shrivenham, UK.

United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2012, ‘What is Good Governance,” Bangkok, Thailand.

Joint Publication 3-07, 2016, Stability, Washington DC.

DoD Directive 3000.5, Stabilization, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 13, 2018.

Foreword

Death by a Thousand Cuts explores the application of national reconciliation programs to undermine insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national reconciliation programs. Such programs have received little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study provides insights of particular interest for US assistance to countries suffering from an insurgency.

The insurgency in Malaya served as a testbed for a national reconciliation program, providing astute observations on the character of the insurgency. In this case, the British and Malayan authorities studied insurgent motivations for surrendering and adapted information operations and the reconciliation program accordingly. In time, they incorporated the reconciliation program into the counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately proved efficacious. The allies employed the voluntary services of former insurgents in information operations, intelligence collection, and military operations, with great success. Of interest to enduring stability, reconciliation allowed former insurgents to atone for their misdeeds and reintegrate into society.

As most Americans are aware, the Vietnam conflict was an acute threat to South Vietnam’s sovereignty. Following the example and advice of British efforts in Malaya, US and South Vietnamese authorities adopted a national reconciliation program called Chieu Hoi (Open Arms). Also noting Viet Cong disaffection in the ranks, the allies designed information operations and the Chieu Hoi program to encourage surrenders. Moreover, the Republic of Vietnam government established scores of reintegration centers throughout the country, which provided care, education, and vocational skills for ralliers. As in Malaya, the allies employed former Viet Cong in extensive information operations, intelligence exploitation, military operations, and local security. While former Viet Cong successfully reintegrated into society, the long-term effects are unknown, in view of the North Vietnamese invasion and occupation of South Vietnam in 1975.

The insurgency in Iraq is relatively fresh in most American minds. Fortunately, a number of books and the official history of the conflict provide detailed observations of the conflict. From these sources, it appears that US officials initially focused on trying to avert an insurgency, which proved unavailing. Despite the lack of a formal national reconciliation program, Sunni insurgents (and some Shi’a) began making overtures to coalition commanders in 2005, which bore fruit in 2007. Of interest to this study, the use of reintegration programs in detention facilities provides insights for including reconciliation opportunities for incarcerated insurgents.

As Dr. Millen reveals in this study, some telling observations from these case studies are worth noting. First, insurgent cohesion is more friable than assumed, so a reconciliation program must provide a way out for the insurgent’s predicament. Information operations and national reconciliation programs must be designed to inform insurgents of the program, help them surrender safely, assure them of good treatment, and provide opportunities to reenter society as a productive citizen.

Second, host government commitment to the reconciliation program is imperative. Since long-term legitimacy and credibility of reconciliation rests on the host government’s buy-in, allied patrons must devote considerable energy early to that end. Host nation management, resources, and linguistic/cultural acuity make the reconciliation program viable. While a counterinsurgency strategy without a reconciliation program is possible, long-term stability with such a program will not likely endure.

Third, a national reconciliation program requires time, resources, and funding. For counterinsurgency strategists, such an effort may appear inappropriate given the exigencies of the emergency. However, by their nature, insurgencies average ten years, so they are marathons, not sprints. In terms of potential military costs, casualties, and damage, the benefits of a national reconciliation program are worth the investment. The construction of reintegration centers during the insurgency can serve the same purpose for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the aftermath of conflict. Again, the value of the investment provides a variety of dividends.

Death by a Thousand Cuts provides a roadmap for assistance to countries embroiled in prolonged insurgencies. The Malayan and South Vietnam case studies provide practical details for the establishment and implementation of a national reconciliation program. The Iraqi case study adds to this knowledge with the use of reconciliation programs as part of detention operations. The defense community would find this PKSOI study profitable for extending global stability.

Scot N. Storey
Colonel, Civil Affairs Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 29 April 2020

To read more or to download this document please click on the link or button below.

8 April 2020

In the wake of the COVID 19 pandemic, the United States should continue to confirm its global leadership. As a global power and largest contributor of foreign aid ($47 billion to 212 countries), the United States possesses the international prestige and trust to provide direction in the aftermath of the pandemic. Accordingly, the United States must inspire worldwide action, provide strategic guidance for international responses, and coordinate the effort through various organizations, such as USAID.1 This paper, which is the second in a series focused on issues 0F surrounding COVID-19, addresses recommended US international messaging, planning considerations for global recovery, in order to utilize the core stability functions to engage the stabilization activities for countries impacted by the pandemic.

This PKSOI paper recommends that the US response to the pandemic, employing the existing integrated approach to stabilize areas most affected by COVID-19. As stated in Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, the five joint stability functions are security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions reflect the US whole of government approach and are easily adjusted from a traditional response to one that focuses on the destabilizing factors caused by the virus and its effects on fragile nations. In order to optimize the effectiveness of US global leadership and stimulate global action, international messaging is essential.

International Messaging

U.S. international messaging must make the case for global cooperation in the recovery. As a global leader, the United State must adhere to the facts, not conjectures, regarding the origins of the pandemic. Through the international community, the United States should stress Chinese government accountability for its mishandling of the epidemic, its lack of transparency in warning the world, and its attempts to deflect blame. Since honor is a cultural imperative to China, the Chinese government can save face by making amends for its behavior. As such, the UN should advise the Chinese government to provide humanitarian assistance, financial relief, and/or debt forgiveness to countries affected by the pandemic.

US international messaging should encompass senior administration officials conducting interviews, news conferences, speeches, and other media platforms to underscore the facts behind the pandemic. US messaging should recount the continuing stabilization efforts of the US government, agencies, and NGOs before and during this pandemic and previous epidemics in other countries. Nonetheless, US messaging should stress that recovery requires international engagement and should include a request for the assistance of partners and donors (e.g., specific countries, international organizations, regional organizations, and NGOs). The US president and secretary of state should personally address the UN General Assembly for Chinese government accountability and a US proposal for international cooperation through a UN resolution. The crux of the UN resolution is not censure or sanctions against China, but direct compensation for the global harm it has inflicted. Since countries affected by COVID 19 suffered economically and expended large sums of money in response to the pandemic, they must demand financial compensation and direct humanitarian assistance from China. If China does not respond appropriately, injured countries can unilaterally nullify their debts to China, citing the UN resolution as the legal right.

Planning Considerations for Global Recovery

The US stabilization strategy must be pragmatic, focused, and measured. Developed countries with resilient medical services, infrastructure, and government institutions can handle the epidemic with available resources. If extra assistance is required, regional organizations can provide it: EU/NATO, Organization of American States, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Association of Asian Pacific Community Health Organizations, African Union, etc. Nations should offer assistance to afflicted countries, with which they have historic relations (e.g., colonial or traditional). From a global stability perspective, the United States should focus its assistance to geostrategic-important countries hit by the pandemic. In order to minimize redundancies and untapped resources, the United States and global partners should address a division of responsibility concerning unique capabilities (e.g., logistics, medical, organizational, transportation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response). These actions should complement and strengthen extant UN resolutions and plans regarding the COVID 19 pandemic.

The United States should encourage charities, clubs, and associations to donate needed supplies, funds, and people, perhaps in coordination with USAID and other government agencies. These organizations may be of greater use after the emergency to help stricken communities recover. It is important to stress that continued charitable assistance is required after major government measures cease. Charitable donations and government assistance to NGOs working in debilitated countries are efficient ways to provide immediate and continued care to suffering people.

Overview of Shifts in Stability Functions

Assisting countries and organizations should focus on specific stabilization activities for fragile countries affected by COVID 19. Deploying personnel must receive relevant immunizations and influenza tests prior to departure, as well as training on proper techniques to prevent viral spread. The United States and partner countries should make a collective effort to insure these items are available during preparation for overseas deployment. Deployed personnel must be tested before returning to their home countries and isolated for the entirety of the possible incubation period as well.

Assisting nations should conduct a stabilization assessment of each country (embassy country teams should provide the data) in order to tailor the response: security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. The priority and level of assistance for each stabilization task is predicated on the degree of damage to individual states and their economic development prior to the pandemic.

Joint Stability Function One

Establishing or maintaining security is imperative to prevent looting and immediate crime. Military forces and international police may need to support local police and military services devastated by the pandemic. For most emergencies, the host nation government may need to impose curfews and other restrictions. The host nation government should only impose martial law as the last resort. The local police must devote particular attention to the prevention of hoarding and the black market. Failure to do so not only undermines the rule of law, but also impedes economic recovery. The main focus is to minimize criminal activity and corruption (black market of need supplies).

Joint Stability Function Two

Resuming essential services requires a prioritized response, which can be accomplished through foreign humanitarian assistance. Medical assistance is the highest priority to prevent societal collapse. While support to existing hospitals and clinics is recommended, assisting countries should be prepared to establish field hospitals and testing sites in order to lighten the burden on host nation medical services. Assistance personnel need to organize body recovery, transportation, and burial details for victims. Since many victims often die in their homes, this activity will take time. In areas experiencing high numbers of deaths, mass burials may be required to prevent the spread of disease. Assistance personnel must test and purify water to prevent water borne diseases, such as cholera and dysentery. The resumption of waste disposal is required to prevent rodent infestation and vector diseases. The provision of food and shelter may be required, depending on the extent of breakdown to the local communities. The resumption of energy (e.g., electricity, gas, coal, and wood) is needed for the cooking of food and purification of water. Assistance personnel should optimize existing transportation, perhaps organizing transportation pools, to include POL points and maintenance, to assist in the resumption of essential services.

Joint Stability Function Three

Economic recovery requires prioritization as well, through economic stabilization and infrastructure. Assistance for food production may vary depending on the local circumstances. Farmers may need assistance with harvesting and transportation of products to the market. At times, host governments may order the killing of livestock, such as chickens and pigs, since they may be influenza carriers, so providing replacements and veterinary assistance will preserve that market. Fishermen may need assistance with fuel and equipment repairs (nets, engines, and boats). With these basic needs attended as well, economic recovery in other sectors will proceed in due course.

Joint Stability Functions Four and Five

Advisory assistance to governance and civil control is indispensable. Advisors must work through the local officials to maintain their authority with the populace. While assistance personnel may need to provide funding and resources, the local authorities should dispense them. Indirect governing is the most effective way to interact with political, police, fire, medical, and other essential personnel. In order to preserve self-worth and dignity, assistance should never appear as charity. Hence, working through local government is paramount. This action provides legitimacy to the local, regional, and national government structures.

Conclusions

U.S. international prestige rests on encouraging international cooperation and direction as a global leader. The United States must demonstrate that even in a pandemic, it continues to display empathy to all inflicted countries and strong resolve in meeting this crisis. US actions speak louder than Chinese disinformation. Everyone matters, or no one matters. Shifting the five joint stability functions permits the United States to use existing infrastructure to empower desires end states: specifically, to achieve security, provide humanitarian assistance, ensure economic stabilization, promote rule of law, and encourage good governance and participation. This targeted systematic response to the pandemic not only allows the United States to use existing infrastructures but also to continue to be the global leader.

As a global leader in the pandemic recovery, the United States understands that concerted response bolsters global security. Global recovery ensures that US security cooperation activities continue unabated to ensure fragile states do not collapse from internal or external threats. The United States must ensure that both fragile states and trade partners recover quickly in order to maintain stability in critical regions and preserve the rights of states to freely transit the global commons (Preparing for the National Security Strategy 2020 and Beyond).