AMISOM – Deployment of Forces

AMISOM has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a humanitarian section.[i]

The Military Component is the biggest of the three components of the AU Mission in the country. The component is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the Mission to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation.

Headed by the AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant Gen. Jim Beesigye Owoyesigire, the component also provides protection to the country’s Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia’s key infrastructure including its airports and seaports.

Currently, the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. According to AMISOM, these are the current force levels and areas of operation:

Force Levels 2020 (as of September 24, 2020)

Uganda         The Ugandan contingent remains the largest contingent in AMISOM with 6,223 troops based in Sector 1 which comprises Banadir (Mogadishu), Middle and Lower Shabelle regions.

Ethiopia         The Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) has provided 4,395 uniformed personnel located in Sector 3.

Burundi          The Burundi contingent is the second largest within AMISOM with 5,432 troops. Based in Baidoa, the contingent is primarily responsible for operations in Sector 3, which covers Bay and Bakool regions but also maintains troops in Sector 1 where they work closely with the Ugandan forces.

Kenya             There are 3,664 troops from Kenya located in Sector 2, which has its headquarters in the port city of Kismayo, which is comprised of Lower and Middle Juba.

Djibouti          The country has deployed a contingent of 960 troops into Somalia and they are based in Beletweyne which serves as Sector 4 headquarters which covers the Hiiran region.

Total           20,674

First deployed in March 2007, the AMISOM military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National Security Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, out of much of southern Somalia including most major towns and cities. It has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to begin establish accountable local governance institutions that can begin to deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government.

Mogadishu is today transformed. The local economy is booming and the effects are far from confined to Mogadishu. Securing the capital allowed AMISOM to move into the second phase of its original concept of operations, deploying across the country and expanding the authority of the state.

The civilian component of AMISOM is led by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), and is comprised of the following pillars:

  • (1) Mission Support
  • (2) Political Processes
  • (3) Stabilization and Early Recovery
  • (4) Protection, Human Rights and Gender
  • (5) Security Sector Reform

The humanitarian component fulfills the mission mandate to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, assisting in the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. AMISOM has worked to secure transport routes including the seaport, airport, and roads around Mogadishu in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

[i] Ibid, AU Mission in Somalia

[i] AU Mission in Somalia website, http://amisom-au.org/#

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Mission’s Political Activities

From AMISOM News (linked accessed on 02 September 2020)

AMISOM and Civil Society Organizations meet to prepare for 2020/21 elections

Mogadishu, 22 November—A technical preparatory meeting organized by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on Thursday in Mogadishu brought together AMISOM and Somali Civil Society Organizations (CSO) to develop a work plan ahead of the 2020/21 elections.

Convened by AMISOM’s Political Unit and the Protection, Human Rights, and Protection Group (PHRG) the meeting also discussed activities undertaken by AMISOM’s military, police, and civilian components in the areas of early recovery, stabilization, political reconciliation, human rights, gender, and protection.

AMISOM maintains a close working relationship with CSOs in Somalia through monthly technical meetings as well as quarterly strategic events involving senior officials of the mission. The civilian component of AMISOM actively works with civil society organizations in the protection of human rights and vulnerable groups, promoting inclusive politics, preventing and countering violent extremism, stabilization, and early recovery as well as rehabilitation of disengaged combatants.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Casualties

It is difficult to determine AMISOM losses because, unlike most UN-managed missions, AMISOM does not publicly acknowledge casualties. In addition, its record-keeping is inexact and family compensation is irregular. Therefore, most AMISOM casualty figures estimates are determined by extrapolation from media reports.

Information on AMISOM casualties can be found at:

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Senior leaders of the Mission

AMISOM is led by a civilian Special Representative of the African Union who oversees the military and police divisions:

The United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated with establishing the Federal Government of Somalia. UNSOM leadership includes:

  • Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), James Swan (United States) took over from Nicholas Haysom (South Africa) as of May 2019
  • Deputy Special Representatives: Raisedon Zenenga (Zimbabwe) and 
  • George Conway (Canada) UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia

The UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing strategic logistics support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM. The Head of UNSOS is Assistant Secretary General (ASG) Lisa Filipetto, Head (Australia). 

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Background of Conflict

The UN—and the United States (U.S.) by extension—has an inconsistent history in Somalia. Somalia collapsed into anarchy after the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. By 1992, the UN formed the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) [UNSCR 751(1992)] to provide humanitarian assistance. When the feuding clans compromised the delivery of the food, the U.S. authorized Operation Restore Hope, with U.S. forces dispatched to assist with the famine relief as part of the UN’s United Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF transitioned to UNOSOM II in March of 1993. After the tragic events of 3 October 1993 (the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somalis), the U.S. removed its troops. The UN withdrew all forces from Somalia by March 1995. 

For the next 15 years, Somalia endured frequent humanitarian crises, a short-lived Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mission (IGADSOM), an invasion by Ethiopia, and the eventual ascendancy of the Islamist group al-Shabaab, which seized Mogadishu in 2006. 

AMISOM was created by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007 and approved by the UN Security Council a month later. In 2010, AMISOM assumed the offensive against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM is largely credited with driving Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and major population centers. In August 2017, UNSCR 2372 (2017) renewed the AMISOM mandate until 31 May 2018. This renewal included “the first-ever” reduction in forces for AMISOM while transitioning security responsibilities to Somali authorities.

In 2013, the UN established UNSOM  [UNSCR 2102(2013)], a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) field mission. In late March 2018, The UN Security Council renewed the UNSOM mandate with UNSCR 2408(2018) until 31 March 2019. The decision to extend “underscored the importance of the Mission’s support to the Somali Government‑led political process as well as the importance of its support to the federal Government of Somalia on preparations for the delivery of inclusive, credible and transparent elections” and “requested continued support for the Government’s efforts to implement the country’s National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to prevent and counter terrorism.” UNSOM is responsible for the implementation of the UN Strategic Framework Somalia (2017-2020) as well as a specific policing mission.

Among other UN mandates with respect to Somalia are UNSCR 2383(2017) and UNSCR 2385(2017). In early November 2017, UNSCR 2383(2017) renewed authorization for international naval forces to combat piracy off Somali coast for another year. In summary, the UN Security Council:

…affirmed the primary responsibility of Somali authorities in the effort to combat piracy…(and)…renewed the call upon States and regional organizations that were able to do so to cooperate with those authorities and each other…(and)…commended the contributions of the European Union’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community, as well as individual States for naval counter‑piracy missions and protecting ships transiting through the region…(and)…reaffirmed that the authorizations renewed in the resolution applied only with respect to the situation in Somalia and did not affect rights, obligations and responsibilities of Member States under international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

On 14 November 2018, UNSCR 2444(2018) extended the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 November 2019, as well as providing: “authorization for maritime interdiction of illicit arms imports and charcoal exports, and the humanitarian exemption.”  It also decided to terminate the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) and replace it with a Panel of Experts to oversee sanctions.

Another UN mission operating in Somalia is the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). UNSOS was established by UNSCR 2245(2015). UNSOS is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM. UNSOS’ most recent mandate renewal was UNSCR 2372(2017) (30 August 2017). Its period of existence is characterized as “open.” 

From AMISOM website

Background by AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate.

AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006.IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Originally IGASOM was proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By May 2006, the situation was radically different, as the ICU had engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism or ARPCT and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. By June, they had established control of the capital.

Plans for IGASOM continued, though by July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiative as a western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement. Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued in December 2006.

On 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744(2007)13. The aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.

In October, 2014, the Security Council (Resolution 2182 (2014) gave a green light to the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30th November 2015. Furthermore the council authorized the African Union mission to take all measures, as appropriate, to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society.

In August 2017, the UN Security Council issued resolution 2372 enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia.

Significant Events

  • 24 July 2019. The Mayor of Mogadishu is killed by a female suicide bomber who worked at the municipality.
  • 12 July 2019. Al-Shabaab claims responsibility for hotel bombing in Kismayo killing civil society leaders, elders, a candidate for regional elections, AU representative, and members of the electoral commission.
  • 31 May 2019. UN Renews AMISOM Mission Mandate UNSCR 2472(2019)
  • 15 March 2019. African Union and United Nations Joint Review of AMISOM
  • 01 January 2019. Somali government kicks out UN Representative Nicholas Haysom, saying it wants “Somalia leading international support, not international support leading Somalia.”
  • 14 November 2018. UNSCR 2444(2018) extended the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 November 2019 and established a Panel of Experts to oversee sanctions on Somalia.
  • 30 May 2018. Somalia Council of Ministers approves Sexual Offenses Bill
  • 16 May 2018. National Constitutional Convention meets to review updates to the Provisional Constitution
  • 30 April 2018. Somalia Transition Plan endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council
  • 27 March 2018. The UN Security Council renewed the UNSOM mandate with UNSCR 2408 until 31 March 2019. 
  • 23 February 2018. Mogadishu experienced two terrorist attacks.
  • 24 January 2018. Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission briefed the Council on the situation in Somalia and the Secretary-General’s 26 December 2017 report. 
  • 26 December 2017. The UN Secretary-General provided a report on Somalia.
  • 4-5 December 2017. The Somalia Security Conference and the inaugural Somalia Partnership Forum met in Mogadishu, Somalia. 
  • 14 November 2017. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2385(2017), on Somalia and Eritrea sanctions 
  • 7 November 2017. The UN Security Council adopted unanimously adopted UNSCR 2383(2017), which renewed authorization for international naval forces to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia 
  • 2 November 2017. The Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted its report.
  • 14 October 2017. Over 500 civilians were killed due to a truck bomb attack in Mogadishu, attributed to al-Shabaab.  According to one report:  “Some investigators believe that the trucks did not reach their intended target—the heavily defended compound where the UN, embassies and AU forces are based.”
  • 12-13 October 2017. The UN Secretary-General provided a report on piracy and armed robbery in Somalia; and the UN Security Council received the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG).
  • 13 September 2017. Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission conducted a briefing on the Secretary-General’s 5 September report on Somalia.
  • 30 August 2017. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2372(2017), which renewed AMISOM with a personnel reduction of 500 uniformed personnel by 31 December 2017 (to a maximum of 21,626 persons). 
  • 9 August 2017. The UN Security Council provided a presidential statement to express “grave concern about the threat of famine presently facing more than 20 million people in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and north-east Nigeria.” 
  • 13 July 2017. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on children and armed conflict in Somalia concluded its report.
  • 22 June 2017. The UN Security Council held a meeting on “preventing terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa: Enhancing partnership for regional efforts.”  
  • 16 June 2017. The UN Security Council held a meeting on the risk of famine in the conflict-affected areas of north-east Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.
  • 15 June 2017. The UN Security Council issued a press statement condemning the terrorist attack that targeted civilians in Mogadishu. 
  • 14 June 2017. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2358(2017) to renew the UNSOM mandate until 31 March 2018.
  • 11 May 2017. The London Conference on the future of Somalia resolves to support Somalia’s implementation of its National Security Architecture (endorsed 8 May 2017).

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Strength

KDF troops get ready to board a plane as their rotation in Kismayo, Somalia, ends on December 9. The troops have served in the southern city of Kismayo for over one year now, as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia. AMISOM Photo/Awil Abukar

AMISOM has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a humanitarian section.[i] Currently the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. According to AMISOM, these are the current force levels and areas of operation:

Force Levels 2020

Uganda         The Ugandan contingent remains the largest contingent in AMISOM with 6,223 troops based in Sector 1 which comprises Banadir (Mogadishu), Middle and Lower Shabelle regions.

Ethiopia         The Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) has provided 4,395 uniformed personnel located in Sector 3.

Burundi          The Burundi contingent is the second largest within AMISOM with 5,432 troops. Based in Baidoa, the contingent is primarily responsible for operations in Sector 3, which covers Bay and Bakool regions but also maintains troops in Sector 1 where they work closely with the Ugandan forces.

Kenya             There are 3,664 troops from Kenya located in Sector 2, which has its headquarters in the port city of Kismayo, which is comprised of Lower and Middle Juba.

Djibouti          The country has deployed a contingent of 960 troops into Somalia and they are based in Beletweyne which serves as Sector 4 headquarters which covers the Hiiran region.

Total           20,674

Source: AMISOM Military Component (accessed on September 21, 2020)

There were varying rationales for each country to contribute to the AMISOM mission. One study suggested: …there is no single or uniform explanation for why these six states joined AMISOM. Nevertheless, the most common official justifications based on assertions that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the TCCs and normative commitments to African solidarity were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. Specifically, a combination of institutional benefits (related to the armed forces), political advantages (concerning prestige and partnerships with key external actors), and economic support (for individual peacekeepers and the domestic security sector) was generally more important in understanding why these six states became AMISOM TCCs. Joining AMISOM did help alleviate some regional security concerns but more important were the tangible benefits the decision brought at home to both the troop-contributing governments and their militaries.

The police component is tasked “to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organization adhering to strict international standards.”[ii]AMISOM has several Formed Police Units (FPUs) from Uganda, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone which play a critical role in improving security in liberated areas through joint patrols with the SPF. Individual Police Officers (IPOs) come from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia. 

The civilian component of AMISOM is led by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), and is comprised of the following pillars:

(1) Mission Support

(2) Political Processes

(3) Stabilisation and Early Recovery

(4) Protection, Human Rights and Gender

(5) Security Sector Reform

The humanitarian component fulfills the mission mandate to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, assisting in the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. AMISOM has worked to secure transport routes including the seaport, airport, and roads around Mogadishu in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.


[i] AU Mission in Somalia website, http://amisom-au.org/#

[ii] Ibid, AU Mission in Somalia

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Mandate

From AMISOM webpage

On 31 May 2019, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2472 extending the mandate of AMISOM through 31 May 2020 and reducing troop levels by 1,000 to a maximum level of 19,626 by 28 February 2020, unless the Security Council decides to adjust the pace of the reduction according to the conditions in the Transition Plan, including the ability of Somalia to generate able, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground (S/RES/2472/2019). 

The new mandate emphasizes the need to consolidate a political agreement between the federal government and regional states, to delineate responsibilities of the security sector according to the Transition Plan, and to prepare for national elections in 2020 or 2021. It also emphasizes a comprehensive approach to security that is agreeable to federal and regional authorities as well as donors, partners and the international community. It specifically calls for increased collaboration between AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, the FGS and FMS at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) mechanism. 

The mandate specifies the following changes in troop levels:

Authorizes the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2020, including a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five Formed Police Units, and to reduce the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel by 1000 to a maximum level of 19,626, by 28 February 2020, in line with the Transition Plan, and the handover to Somali security forces, unless the Security Council decides to adjust the pace of the reduction taking into account conditions set out in the Transition Plan, including the ability of Somalia to generate able, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground.

As per the UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) AMISOM is mandated to pursue the following strategic objectives:

  1. Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia;
  2. Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
  3. Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia;

Under the same UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017), AMISOM is also authorized carry out the following priority tasks to achieve these objectives:

  1. Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritizing the main population centres;
  2. To assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peace building, and security for key infrastructure;
  3. To protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;
  4. To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;
  5. To conduct targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces;
  6. To mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture;
  7. To reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration through the Secretary-General;
  8. To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia;

MANDATE RENEWAL [2019] :   Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 848th meeting held on 9 May 2019 on the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the 5th AU-United Nations (UN) Joint Review of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and renewal of the mandate of AMISOM 

UPDATE [2019] :   Adopted by the Security Council at its 8537th meeting, on 31 May 2019 

UPDATE [2017] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 8035th meeting, on 30 August 2017

UPDATE [2016] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on 7 July 2016

UPDATE [2014] : Adopting Resolution 2182 (2014), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia for One Year, Amends Sanctions Regime – 7286th Meeting

UPDATE [2013] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 7061st meeting, on 18 November 2013

UPDATE [2012]: Resolution 2073 (2012) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6854th meeting, on 7 November 2012

UPDATE [2011]: Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia until 31 October 2012, Adopting Resolution 2010 (2011)

2006 -2007: Mandate

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM – Timeline

Chronology of Events

From BBC (link accessed on 02 September 2020)

The Horn of Africa has been home to Somalis since ancient times.

13th-17th centuries – Ajuran Sultanate dominates much of the Horn of Africa before collapsing into rival regional sultanates.

1875 – Egypt occupies towns on Somali coast and parts of the interior. 

1860s – France acquires foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti. 

1887 – Britain proclaims protectorate over Somaliland. 

1888 – Anglo-French agreement defines boundary between Somali possessions of the two countries. 

1889 – Italy sets up a protectorate in central Somalia, later consolidated with territory in the south ceded by the sultan of Zanzibar. 

1925 – Territory east of the Jubba river detached from Kenya to become the westernmost part of the Italian protectorate. 

1936 – Italian Somaliland combined with Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a province of Italian East Africa. 

1940 – Italians occupy British Somaliland. 

1941 – British occupy Italian Somalia. 

Independence 

1950 – Italian Somaliland becomes a UN trust territory under Italian control. 

1956 – Italian Somaliland renamed Somalia and granted internal autonomy. 

1960 – British and Italian parts of Somalia become independent, merge and form the United Republic of Somalia; Aden Abdullah Osman Daar elected president. 

1963 – Border dispute with Kenya; diplomatic relations with Britain broken until 1968. 

1964 – Border dispute with Ethiopia erupts into hostilities. 

1967 – Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke beats Aden Abdullah Osman Daar in elections for president. 

Drought and war 

1969 – Muhammad Siad Barre assumes power in coup after Shermarke is assassinated. 

1970 – Barre declares Somalia a socialist state and nationalises most of the economy. 

1974 – Somalia joins the Arab League. 

197475 – Severe drought causes widespread starvation. 

1977 – Somalia invades the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia. 

1978 – Somali forces pushed out of Ogaden with the help of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops. Barre expels Soviet advisers and gains support of United States. 

1981 – Opposition to Barre’s regime begins to emerge after he excludes members of the Mijertyn and Isaq clans from government positions, which are filled with people from his own Marehan clan. 

1988 – Peace accord with Ethiopia. 

1991 – Mohamed Siad Barre is ousted. Power struggle between clan warlords kills or wounds thousands of civilians. 

Somaliland breaks away 

1991 – Former British protectorate of Somaliland declares unilateral independence. 

1992 – US Marines land near Mogadishu ahead of a UN peacekeeping force sent to restore order and safeguard relief supplies. 

1993 – US Army Rangers are killed when Somali militias shoot down two US helicopters in Mogadishu and a battle ensues. Hundreds of Somalis die. US mission formally ends in March 1994. 

1995 – UN peacekeepers leave, having failed to achieve their mission. 

1996 August – Warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed dies of wounds and is succeeded by his son, Hussein. 

Puntland autonomy 

1998 – Puntland region declares autonomy. 

2000 August – Clan leaders and senior figures meeting in Djibouti elect Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia. 

2000 October – Hassan and his newly-appointed prime minister, Ali Khalif Gelayadh, arrive in Mogadishu to heroes’ welcomes. Gelayadh announces his government, the first in the country since 1991. 

2001 April – Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, decline to support transitional administration. 

2004 August – In 14th attempt since 1991 to restore central government, a new transitional parliament inaugurated at ceremony in Kenya. In October the body elects Abdullahi Yusuf as president. 

2004 December – Tsunami off Indonesia displaces 10,000s on Somali coast. 

2005 February-June – Somali government begins returning home from exile in Kenya, but there are bitter divisions over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit. 

2005 November – Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi survives an assassination attempt in Mogadishu. 

Islamist advance 

2006 February – Transitional parliament meets in central town of Baidoa for the first time since it was formed in 2004. 

2006 March-May – Scores of people are killed and hundreds are injured during fierce fighting between rival militias in Mogadishu. Worst violence in almost decade. 

2006 June-July – Militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts take Mogadishu and other parts of south after defeating clan warlords. 

Ethiopian troops enter Somalia. 

2006 July-August – Mogadishu’s air and seaports are re-opened for the first time since 1995. 

2006 September – Transitional government and Islamic Courts begin peace talks in Khartoum. 

Somalia’s first known suicide bombing targets President Yusuf outside parliament in Baidoa. 

Islamists retreat 

2006 December – Ethiopian and transitional government put Islamists to flight, capturing Mogadishu. 

2007 January – Islamists abandon their last stronghold, the southern port of Kismayo. 

President Abdullahi Yusuf enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004. 

Air strikes in south against al-Qaeda figures are first direct US military intervention in Somalia since 1993. 

2007 March – African Union troops land in Mogadishu amid pitched battles between Islamist insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian troops, after UN Security Council authorised six-month peacekeeping mission.

Piracy concerns

2008 May – The UN Security Council allows countries to send warships to Somalia’s territorial waters to tackle pirates. 

2009 January – Ethiopia completes withdrawal of troops, announced the previous year, and Al-Shabab capture Baidoa, formerly a key government stronghold. 

Meeting in Djibouti, parliament elects moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed president, extends transitional government’s mandate for another two years. 

Al-Shabab highpoint

2009 May – Islamist insurgents launch onslaught on Mogadishu and advance in the south. 

2009 October – Al-Shabab recaptures the southern port of Kismayo after defeating the rival Hizbul-Islam militia. 

2010-12 – Famine kills almost 260,000, the UN says. 

2010 January – UN World Food Programme withdraws from Al-Shabab areas of southern Somalia after threats to lives of its staff.

2010 February – Al-Shabab formally declares alliance with al-Qaeda, begins to concentrate troops for a major offensive to capture the capital. 

2011 January – Pirate attacks on ships worldwide hit seven-year high in 2010, with Somali pirates accounting for 49 of 52 ships seized. 

2011 July – UN formally declares famine in three regions of Somalia. Al-Shabab partially lifts ban on foreign aid agencies in south, and UN airlifts its first aid consignment in five years to Mogadishu.

Al-Shabab pulls out of Mogadishu in what it calls “tactical move”.

Kenyan intervention

2011 October – Kenyan troops enter Somalia to attack rebels they accuse of being behind several kidnappings of foreigners on Kenyan soil.

American military begins flying drone aircraft from a base in Ethiopia, Ethiopian troops return to central town of Guriel. 

2012 February-May – Al-Shabab loses key towsn of Baidoa and Afgoye to Kenyan, African Union and Somali government forces.

New parliament, president

2012 August – Somalia’s first formal parliament in more than 20 years is sworn in at Mogadishu airport, ending eight-year transitional period. Pro-government forces capture the port of Merca south of Mogadishu from Al-Shabab.

2012 September – MPs in Mogadishu elect academic and civic activist Hassan Sheikh Mohamud president over the incumbent Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. First presidential election in Somalia since 1967.

2012 October – African Union and government forces recapture Kismayo, the last major city held by Al-Shabab and the country’s second-largest port, and the town of Wanla Weyn northwest of Mogadishu. 

2013 January – US recognises Somalia’s government for the first time since 1991. 

2013 June – Veteran Al-Shabab leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is taken into custody by government troops after he is ousted by more extreme Al-Shabab figure Ahmed Abdi Godane.

Spike in violence with various attacks by Al-Shabab, including on presidential palace and UN compound in Mogadishu. 

2013 September – International donors promise 2.4 billion dollars in reconstruction aid in three-year ”New Deal”. 

Shabab attacks Kenya 

2013 September – Al-Shabab seize shopping centre and kill 60 people in Kenyan capital Nairobi, saying it is retaliation for Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia.

2014 May – Al-Shabab says it carried out a bomb attack on a restaurant in Djibouti, saying the country is used as a launch pad to strike Muslims. 

2014 June – Al-Shabab claims two attacks on the Kenyan coast which kill more than 60, saying operations against Kenya would continue.

2014 September – Al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane killed in US drone strike. Government offers 2 million dollar bounty for his successor, Ahmad Omar.

2014 November – Government launches country’s first postal service in more than two decades. Mogadishu’s first ever cash withdrawal machine installed in a hotel.

2014 November-December – Al Shabab carry out mass killings in north-east Kenya, including on a bus and a camp of quarry workers. 

2015 April – Al-Shabab claim responsibility for killing 148 people, mainly Christian students, at Garissa University College in northern Kenya.Kenya carries out air raids on Al-Shabab bases in Somalia in retaliation.

2015 May – US Secretary of State John Kerry pays brief visit to Mogadishu, the first officeholder to do so, a few weeks after Al-Shabab raid government quarter of the city and kill 17 people.

2016 February – African Union leaders agree on need for more funding and support for their military presence in Somalia after weeks of increased Al-Shabab attacks on public spaces and pro-government troops. Government and African Union troops recapture southern port of Merca that Al-Shabab briefly seized. 

2016 November – Leaders of two Somali regions, Puntland and Galmudug, agree to respect a ceasefire in the disputed city of Galkayo. Fighting in the city reportedly displaced 90,000.

2017 February – Parliament elects former prime minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmajo, as president. Al-Shabab threatens to target anyone collaborating with him.

2017 March – Pirates seize tanker off coast of Puntland in the first hijacking of a large vessel in the region since 2012.

2017 May – President Mohamed at London conference calls for lifting of arms embargo to help defeat al-Shabab. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres says conditions are now in place in Somalia for it to become a success story.

2017 October – Double truck bombing kills 350 people in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is prime suspect.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

Somalia – Current Political and Security Dynamics

From voanews.com

Somalis Worry About Potential US Troop Withdrawal From Their Fragile Country (By Mohamed Olad Hassan – November 19, 2020)(accessed on 20 November 2020)

WASHINGTON – Lawmakers and military officials in Somalia say the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country, as reportedly proposed by President Donald Trump, would be disastrous and could embolden al-Shabab and other terrorist groups.   
 
The secretary of Somalia’s Upper House Committee on defense, Senator Ahmd Hashi, said the proposal equates to the “United States under Trump turning its back on Somalis at a critical time.”  
 
“As the country is heading to elections and terrorists’ threat remains strong, it’s the most critical time we need the support of the United States,” Hashi told VOA’s Somali service. “For Somalia, a U.S. troop withdrawal means a setback and moral boost for terrorists.”  
 
Somalia’s parliamentary elections are scheduled for late December, with the presidential election tentatively scheduled for February. 
 
The New York Times reported this week that Trump is planning to withdraw nearly all of the 700 U.S. military personnel conducting training and counterterrorism missions in Somalia.  The report said Trump also plans to order sharp troop reductions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
 
Hashi, who is also a former senior Somali military official, said withdrawing troops from Somalia would be “a terrible blow to the Somali Army.”   
 
“They have been supporting the military operations and logistics of our elite commando forces, especially the Danab unit. Under their support, this unit has been building up and getting stronger day after day, but now, if they miss this significant support, it means a reverse and waste of all the efforts the United States has put into the rebuilding of the Somali National Army,” he said.  
 
“We have received the news about the order of the withdrawal of our partner troops, but I do not know if it was the final and will be coming soon,” a Somali military official said on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media about this matter.  
 
“What I know is that such decision would be a dangerous setback to our gains in the fight against terrorism and relief for terrorists,” the official said.

The United States also conducts frequent airstrikes against al-Shabab, which began during the administration of President Barack Obama, but which have increased since Trump took office in 2017.    

According to the Times report, the plan to remove U.S. troops from Somalia may not apply to U.S. forces stationed in nearby Kenya and Djibouti, where American drones that carry out airstrikes in Somalia are based.    

Ahmed Abdi Ali, a former member of the Security Committee of Hirshabelle State Parliament, said the drone operations are the most important form of U.S. support for Somalia.  

“The drones target the terrorist leaders in their hideouts and disrupt their operations and mobilization; therefore, they are very important for Somalia,” Ali said. “If the drone operations continue, I think U.S troops withdrawal won’t harm the general fight against the terrorists in Somalia.”  

Ali says rebuilding Somalia’s National Army is the only way to resolve the security challenges that have plagued Somalia for decades.  

“Our partners help us when we need them, but they cannot stay with us forever. It is the Somali National Army’s responsibility to take over their country’s security and the Somali friends should help them in rebuilding to an extent they can face al-Shabab threats,” Ali said.  

Abdisalam Yusuf Guled, former deputy head of the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, said a withdrawal of U.S troops from Somalia would allow al-Shabab to emerge from their hideouts in significant numbers and plan major attacks.  

“Now, the militants are only capable of carrying out an infantry guerrilla style hit-and-run attacks, suicide bombings, and assassinations because the U.S troop presence in Somalia, their drone operations, and the logistical support to Somalia’s most powerful military Unit ‘Danab’ denied them free movements. If the U.S troops withdraws, the militants will come out from the jungle and their hideouts—this time with machine gun mounted vehicles and anti-aircraft guns,” Guled said.    

Last month, Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo voiced support for keeping U.S. troops in the country. He said U.S. military support has enabled the country to combat al-Shabab, and he called for continuous security partnership and capacity-building support.

(Seynab Abuka contributed to this report from Mogadishu.)

VOANEWS – https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalis-worry-about-potential-us-troop-withdrawal-their-fragile-country?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2011.20.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief


From Freedom House (accessed on 02 September 2020)

The government, which is not democratically elected, has little practical ability to implement its laws and policies even in parts of the country it controls. Its basic operations remain heavily dependent on international bodies and donor governments. Relations between the federal government and federal member states remain poor in 2019, more than a year after leaders from all five states formally suspended ties with the government in Mogadishu. Critics accuse President Farmaajo of seeking to centralize power.

Corruption is rampant in Somalia and state agencies tasked with combating it do not function effectively. Impunity is the norm for public officials accused of malfeasance.

In September 2019, President Farmaajo signed legislation that seeks to create state and national anti-corruption commissions. Meanwhile, in October, the country’s auditor general released a critical report accusing the government of bypassing the central bank to keep $18 million worth of donor funds in offshore accounts.

Government transparency is limited. Officials are not required to make public declarations of their income and assets, and oversight procedures for public contracts are not well enforced. There is no law guaranteeing public access to government information.


From ecoi.net (accessed on 02 September 2020)

“The security situation remained volatile, with 288 incidents in May, 269 in June and 218 in July. Most of those incidents were crime-related killings and shootings and Al-Shabaab attacks, including those using improvised explosive devices. Levels of crime and armed conflict-related incidents have remained steady since January, with a slight decline in June and July. The number of terrorism-related incidents remained at an average of around 75 per month in May and June, with 53 incidents in July.” (UN Security Council, 13 August 2020, p. 3)

“The security situation in Somalia remained volatile during the reporting period [5 November 2019 to 4 February 2020], with security incidents increasing from 239 in November to 266 in December, followed by a slight decline to 235 in January. The increase in December was recorded mainly in Al-Shabaab hit-and-run attacks targeting security forces, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (two in December compared with none in November), improvised explosive device attacks, and hand grenade attacks, as well as incidents categorized under crime. A decline was recorded in terrorism-related incidents in January, compared with December, while incidents categorized under armed conflict remained the same” (UN Security Council, 13 February 2020, p. 3)

“The security situation remained volatile during the reporting period [from 5 May to 4 August 2019]. Al-Shabaab continued to perpetrate violence, including carrying out attacks targeting government facilities and personnel, security forces, international partners, and public places such as hotels and restaurants. A total of 228 incidents occurred during Ramadan, from 5 May to 3 June; higher than in Ramadan in 2017 and 2018. Some 35 percent of violent incidents occurred in the Banaadir region, with southern Somalia accounting for 34 percent, indicating that Al-Shabaab’s operational focus did not change during the reporting period. Overall, security incidents declined significantly in June and July. There was, however, an increase in incidents involving improvised explosive devices in July, when there were several high-profile terrorist attacks.” (UN Security Council, 15 August 2019, pp. 3-4)

“U.S.-backed security forces continued offensives against Al-Shabaab: notably, unclaimed airstrikes 11 July reportedly killed dozens of Al-Shabaab militants in Jilib, Middle Juba. In north, unidentified gunmen opened fire on vehicle in Galkayo, Puntland 11 July killing at least five civilians. U.S. airstrike 27 July killed one member of Islamic State (ISIS)-Somalia.” (ICG, August 2019)[i]

“Also in Sanaag, Somaliland forces clashed with those loyal to Colonel Arre, who defected from Somaliland to Puntland in 2018, near Dhoob 10 July leaving three Somaliland soldiers and one of Arre’s soldiers dead. After Arre’s forces 26 July took Karin village, clashes broke out there next day between them and Somaliland troops, reportedly leaving two Somaliland soldiers dead.” (ICG, August 2019)

“In south, security forces killed five Al-Shabaab fighters in Gedo region 3-9 June; Al-Shabaab ambush of Kenyan soldiers in African Union mission (AMISOM) in Burgavo, Lower Juba 24 June left nine militants dead; clashes between security forces and Al-Shabaab near Bur Eyle, Bay region 22 June left eleven soldiers and five militants dead; Al-Shabaab attack on military base in Bulo Marer, Lower Shabelle 27 June left three militants and two soldiers dead; clashes between security forces and Al-Shabaab 27 June left at least eight militants dead in Jamame, Lower Juba; three Al-Shabaab militants surrendered to security forces in Bay and Gedo regions 2-11 June. In north, Al-Shabaab fighters 8 June captured military base in Af-Urur in Puntland only for Puntland forces to retake it 11 June without a fight; […] Puntland and Somaliland forces 14 June reportedly clashed in Badhan town in Sanaag region, which both administrations claim, no casualties. U.S. claimed its airstrikes killed six Islamic State (ISIS) militants and four Al-Shabaab fighters 4-25 June.” (ICG, July 2019)

“The security situation remained volatile during the reporting period [from 14 December 2018 to 4 May 2019]. Al-Shabaab continued to be the main perpetrator of attacks against government facilities, government officials, and security forces, as well as popular restaurants and hotels. March and April witnessed a significant increase in attacks in Mogadishu, where incidents involving improvised explosive devices occurred almost every day. Incidents involving suicide vehicle-borne, under-vehicle, and remote-controlled improvised explosive devices, as well as mortar attacks and targeted assassinations, continued. In March alone, there were 77 attacks using improvised explosive devices across the country. That was the highest number in any single month since 2016. The majority of incidents were reported in Mogadishu and in the Shabelle Hoose, Juba Hoose, and Gedo regions. In Mogadishu, there were 28 incidents involving improvised explosive devices, including two attacks by suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, two attacks by other vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and one complex attack.” (UN Security Council, 15 May 2019, pp. 3-4[ii]

[i] The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a transnational non-profit, non-governmental organization that carries out field research on violent conflict and advances policies to prevent, mitigate, or resolve conflict.

[ii] The UN Security Council is an organ of the United Nations, charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

Somalia Country Profile – Geography

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)

Location: Eastern Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, east of Ethiopia

Area:

  • total: 637,657 sq km
  • land: 627,337 sq km
  • water: 10,320 sq km

Land boundaries:

  • total: 2,385 km
  • border countries (3): Djibouti 61 km, Ethiopia 1640 km, Kenya 684 km

Coastline: 3,025 km

Maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm

Climate: principally desert; northeast monsoon (December to February), moderate temperatures in north and hot in south; southwest monsoon (May to October), torrid in the north and hot in the south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons

Terrain: mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north

Elevation:

  • mean elevation: 410 m
  • lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m
  • highest point: Shimbiris 2,416 m

Natural resources: uranium and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, natural gas, likely oil reserves

Land use:

  • agricultural land: 70.3% (2011 est.) – arable land: 1.8% (2011 est.) / permanent crops: 0% (2011 est.) / permanent pasture: 68.5% (2011 est.)
  • forest: 10.6% (2011 est.)
  • other: 19.1% (2011 est.)
  • irrigated land: 2,000 sq km (2012)

Population distribution: distribution varies greatly throughout the country; least densely populated areas are in the northeast and central regions, as well as areas along the Kenyan border; most populated areas are in and around the cities of Mogadishu, Marka, Boorama, Hargeysa, and Baidoa as shown on this population distribution map

Natural hazards: recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; floods during the rainy season

Environment – current issues: water scarcity; contaminated water contributes to human health problems; improper waste disposal; deforestation; land degradation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.