Category PKSOI Papers

In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) briefly held a mandate to lead post-war reconstruction efforts. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under L. Paul Bremer replaced ORHA before its plans could be implemented. Autopsies of replacing the ORHA and the consequences of the CPA’s subsequent handling of the Iraq mission abound, but they focused on the Iraq mission as a historical narrative. However, the United States (US) now faces a lengthening list of probable reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) missions in the near future. Rather than burying the autopsies, the contrast between ORHA’s plans and the CPA’s implementation offers instructive lessons for future R&S missions.

This stability operations case study project emerged from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to examine how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions teach operational planning for steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a series of professionally focused, historical case studies of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted and implemented this guidance during the conduct of joint operations.

As the United States winds down its stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development will face bureaucratic and political pressures to abandon their already modest reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) lines of effort in favor of more traditional diplomacy and development assistance priorities. This period of relative peace allow policy makers to reflect on past challenges to creating a “civilian surge” capacity and determining feasible, acceptable, and suitable ways and means to ensure robust civilian participation in future R&S operations.

This stability operations case study project emerged from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to examine how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions teach operational planning for steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a series of professionally focused, historical case studies of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted and implemented this guidance during the conduct of joint operations.

The following CA award winning issues papers clearly illustrate many of the impending challenges for the CA force, and we recognize their innovative concepts and insight.
• First Place: “Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human Networks for Effective Engagement,” by Maj. Arnel P. David.
• Second Place: “From Green to Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and International Police Engagement,” by Capt. Rob Kobol, and “Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict Prevention: A Case Study,” by Capt. Tammy Sloulin and Lt. Col. Steve Lewis.
• Third Place: “The Role of Civil Affairs in Counter-Unconventional Warfare,” by Maj. Shafi Saiduddin.
• Fourth Place: “Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National Guard, and State Partnership Program: Is There Room for Engagement?” by Maj. David E. Leiva and Maj. John Nonnemaker.

DoD’s Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have the imperative to assess their Theater Campaign Plans in response to DoD’s recent 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. As a ‘case-study’ relevant to all GCCs this paper Climate Change: Considerations for Geographic Combatant Commands analyzes the risks and opportunities facing U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in reviewing climate change impacts primarily in the Caribbean region of its Area of Operations.

In this study, Dr. Thomas Matyok dare us, as military planners and conflict analyst, to think more deeply about religion. Since religion can be a major driver of both peace and violence, Dr. Matyok argues that we need to do better at recognizing how religious factors play out in shaping human motivations and aspirations in conflict situations.

This monograph Finding the Balance: U.S. Military Operations examines the U.S. Military’s struggle to find the correct balance between conventional and counterinsurgency/stability approaches. The author uses history to remind us that at the end of wars, Armies often “throw the baby out with the bathwater” and revert to a default position for organization and doctrine instead of inculcating those lessons learned in the recent wars. History shows us that we do not maintain capabilities and capacity to conduct operations in complex environments.

This monograph A Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The “Politics” of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992-93) uses the UN Cambodian peacekeeping mission of 1992-93, considered a great success by many, to examine the complexities involved in UN peacekeeping missions and to illustrate the primacy of the political context in determining success.

This paper Lessons Learned from U.S. Government Law Enforcement in International Operations has been produced as a part of the Law Enforcement Capabilities Project (LECP). The LECP is an initiative of the Emerging Capabilities Division (ECD) within the Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).