This edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Semi-Annual Lesson Report explores the challenges and complexities of Multinational Interoperability in the conduct of peace operations and stability activities. An April 2020 RAND Corporation report asserted “interoperability” can be “a buzzword” in military vernacular to denote a problem needing a solution. While that may be true in many respects, the US Army Regulation (AR) 34-1.2 “interoperability” definition is used here:
…interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives…[and]…Interoperability activities are any initiative, forum, agreement, or operation that improves the Army’s ability to operate effectively and efficiently as a component of the Joint Force, within an interorganizational environment, and as a member or leader of an alliance or coalition across the range of military operations (ROMO).
To read the full report please click on the link below or to download click on the button below.
Epidemics interrupt a country’s economy, causing temporary closures of businesses, industries, and agriculture. The labor force, which drives all economic activity, is impacted by sickness, death, and recovery from illness. Aside from the need to care for ill relatives, families suffer long term problems if the breadwinner dies.
As the 28 April 2020 PKSOI paper, US Global Stabilization Strategy for the COVID 19 Pandemic points out, the ability to regenerate the economy in the aftermath of a pandemic is an important joint stability function and has an enduring impact on the wealth of a country. Economic recovery requires prioritization through economic stabilization and repair of infrastructure. The level of infrastructure degradation is dependent on the length of the pandemic, impacts from neglected repairs, derelict projects and social destruction from rioting or other activities. Economic activities are a bottom-up process with the majority of attention focused on regenerating local economies.
This paper addresses the salient features of economic recovery: 1) Evaluation Local Economic Drivers; 2) Regenerating Local Economies; 3) Financial Wellbeing and perception; and 4) National Government Economic Incentives. As this paper avers, a little economic assistance at local levels provides the most effect boost for a country’s recovery.
Evaluation Local Economic Drivers
A pandemic not only devastates human life; it also interrupts economic activity throughout an afflicted country. The incapacitation of economic production inflicts direct and indirect shocks to the populace. The direct jolt is the immediate disruption of jobs, supplies, and monetary flow. The loss of employment and salaries causes people to stash rather than spend money. Even if supplies exist, the drop in demand decreases money flow and causes inflation. In this situation, people barter for goods, which fuels a black market. The indirect impact is a matter of public perceptions (i.e., hope and confidence) and psychological trauma, which leads to personal futility and desperation. Consequently, an even greater rate of mortality, through suicides and murder, adds to the toll of the pandemic. An increase in violence can be fueled by desperation.
In the aftermath of a pandemic, economic recovery should comprise two elements: supporting existing economic activities and regenerating activities. Prompt economic action at the local levels arrests the direct and indirect impacts of the pandemic. Every economy has its own unique drivers and essential activities, so US assistance must identify and restore them.
As with any disaster, economic stabilization requires a thorough assessment of existing economic and cultural activities that stimulate the economy. Understanding the specific economic drivers accelerates the recover from a pandemic. For instance, while most cultures have a critical reliance on their supply chains, some cultures may shorten logistical movement of goods and services resulting in a greater impact. Targeting the key drivers that are important for specific locales within a country has the greatest return on investment.
Regenerating Local Economies
Pandemics ironically do not cause immediate mass starvation. Higher than normal mortality rates mean fewer people to feed, and existing reserves of food, and essential items, are sufficient for the immediate period. Farmers, fishermen, and herders are relatively isolated from the rest of society, so they are less susceptible to pandemics. Supply chains may be more susceptible to pandemics, due to the greater integration with the population. This can lead to a slowdown in goods delivery causing a perceived shortage. Perceived scarcity of basic needs can obscure facts, and can lead to theft and wanton destruction from marauding bands.
Equipment repairs and livestock replacement this takes time and therefore a gap in the food supply suffice to regenerate agriculture, fishing, and herding quickly; agrarian impact will be subject to the time of year and the activities that are affected. Prioritizing essential resource generation and protection facilitates the recovery of the economy. Essential resource production will need to fulfil demand and inventory requirements in order to replace expended inventories.
Opening markets may involve repairing or replacing private and commercial transportation. Farmers and fishermen need wagons, trucks, and trains to transport goods to the market. Infrastructure repairs, if needed (e.g., storage, bridges, and marketplaces), which may impede commerce, must receive priority. Delays in opening markets can increase the perceived resource scarcity and increase black market and smuggling activities.
Hoarding of food and other goods is prevalent during a crisis, so investigations of such practices serve to prevent black market, other illicit activities, and inflation. The police are often aware of illicit activities due to tips and experience. Since some policemen may be corrupt (i.e., taking payoffs to ignore illicit activities), assessments and investigations of the police are often needed during an intervention. However, the exigencies of the disaster require their retention for the nonce, so corrective action should wait until the crisis abates.
Financial Wellbeing and Perception
Financial services provide a unique psychological role during a pandemic. These institutions drive economic mechanisms and provide psychological stability to the population. Every effort should be made to keep financial institutions open and to show confidence in the financial system. Financial institutions should remain empowered to use digital payments and other resources, including setting their own daily withdrawal limits in order to manage cash levels.
Financial institutions are always at risk for corruption and illegal activity, which the pandemic compounds. These activities may already be present in the system or as a result of economic fluctuations. Economic assistance may provide opportunities to combat illicit activities. However, the goal should be to stabilize the financial system, and improvements should be secondary—if they do not negatively affect the recovery.
The postal system is another, often overlooked, economic driver. This system is especially vital during pandemics as it continues to move goods and drive the flow of money through the economy. Using proper precautions to prevent the spread of a virus, the postal system can provide needed items to a wide range of citizens. The postal system can also be used to augment the logistical systems.
Economies rely on the velocity of money to drive their economies, so invigorating the circulation of money is essential. During a pandemic, people instinctively hoard money or avoid spending money due to uncertainty. Paradoxically, lower demand can cause a collapse of normal markets, creating deficits in basic commodities. In turn, the price of goods rises which decreases spending power (i.e., inflation). People then resort to bartering and black market activities. To prevent this occurrence, economic assistance should target businesses to stimulate employment. Once people have assured incomes, they begin buying, thereby putting more money into circulation.
National Government Economic Incentives
Directly combating economic effects are done at the local level. At the national level the economic drivers are indirect and should be used to facilitate the local efforts. Understanding the existing national economic system facilitates the regeneration of the economy. Small adjustments at the national level serve to increase the effectiveness of local efforts. Expansive economic policies during or immediately after a pandemic are likely to stymy the recovery. While these policies may be desired, they should wait until immediate economic recovery occurs. If local efforts are proven ineffective and are not able to effectively target instabilities in the economy stimulus maybe required. Stimulus efforts should be used to supplement local level actions.
Understanding the country’s regulatory environment permits adjustments to facilitate recovery. Regulatory changes are dependent on the culture and effects of the pandemic. Boosting the private sector should receive priority since it is more susceptible to the shock of the pandemic. Public sectors, while still important in the economy, typically can withstand a loss in production better than private sectors. Public sectors also generate a lower velocity of money than private sectors, so the private sectors have a greater return on investment from the national point of view.
Improving market factors can facilitate economic stability, through better prices, products innovation, and inventories. Prices of products are likely to fluctuate due to supply changes and psychological perception during the pandemic. Improving public perceptions of resource security and utilizing economic drivers can ensure appropriate prices and production, which are unique to the economy. Perceived resource scarcity can lead to hoarding, price inflations, and illicit activities. The perceived scarcity can have a dramatic effect on inventory levels, and may create future problems as normal reserves are exhausted.
Fluctuations in the economy create opportunities for legitimate and illegitimate activates. Depending on the extent of the disaster and the level of economic degradation, illicit activities are likely to occur and expand if countermeasures are not implemented. Real or perceived scarcity of goods can increase smuggling and black market activates. These changes can lead to counterfeiting and illegal trafficking. Addressing these activities early can prevent them from spiraling out of control. Since illicit activities (i.e., human, arms, and drug trafficking) often have regional and global impacts, combating them is an international concern. Every country experiences illicit activities, so the main goal is to arrest their expansion rather than complete eradication.
Conclusions
Economic development differs among countries, so lesser developed countries are more susceptible to the effects of a pandemic. Economic assistance should not aim to transform a country beyond its level of development prior to the pandemic. The idea is to regenerate existing economic systems and avoid the temptation to remodel a country’s economy. Improvements can occur, but only after the country recovers from the pandemic.
Revitalizing an economy after a pandemic is a dynamic, multi-faceted challenge. An understanding of the afflicted country’s economy and prompt assistance can help avert the disaster of a pandemic from consigning a country to protracted poverty. While some public economic measures are needed to encourage money flow and confidence in the economy, immediate assistance should focus on the private sector, especially in local communities.
Taking steps to mitigate economic degradation before problems worsen can be effective. Managing public perception, availability of necessary resources and economic drivers can mitigate the negative economic effects of a pandemic. Targeting local economies allows for a direct approach to economic events, while managing the financial system and national government incentives can have an indirect approach. Prioritizing activities can create an economic resilience to survive future plagues/pandemics of the future.
As we approach the International Day of Peace on September 21st, our partner in peace, the US Institute for Peace, is mounting its annual Peace Day Challenge campaign with a focus on Profiles in Peacebuilding, highlighting the successes of everyday peacebuilders across the world. Learn more about this year’s campaign on the USIP Peace Day Challenge webpage https://www.usip.org/programs/peace-day-challenge and by visiting their user-friendly social media kit https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PeaceDayChallenge-Social-Media-Kit-2021.pdf
Delaware National Guard assembling COVID-19 Test Kits Photo by Sgt. Laura Michael
In the wake of the COVID 19 pandemic, the United States should continue to confirm its global leadership. As a global power and largest contributor of foreign aid ($47 billion to 212 countries), the United States possesses the international prestige and trust to provide direction in the aftermath of the pandemic. Accordingly, the United States must inspire worldwide action, provide strategic guidance for international responses, and coordinate the effort through various organizations, such as USAID.1 This paper, which is the second in a series focused on issues 0F surrounding COVID-19, addresses recommended US international messaging, planning considerations for global recovery, in order to utilize the core stability functions to engage the stabilization activities for countries impacted by the pandemic.
This PKSOI paper recommends that the US response to the pandemic, employing the existing integrated approach to stabilize areas most affected by COVID-19. As stated in Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, the five joint stability functions are security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions reflect the US whole of government approach and are easily adjusted from a traditional response to one that focuses on the destabilizing factors caused by the virus and its effects on fragile nations. In order to optimize the effectiveness of US global leadership and stimulate global action, international messaging is essential.
International Messaging
U.S. international messaging must make the case for global cooperation in the recovery. As a global leader, the United State must adhere to the facts, not conjectures, regarding the origins of the pandemic. Through the international community, the United States should stress Chinese government accountability for its mishandling of the epidemic, its lack of transparency in warning the world, and its attempts to deflect blame. Since honor is a cultural imperative to China, the Chinese government can save face by making amends for its behavior. As such, the UN should advise the Chinese government to provide humanitarian assistance, financial relief, and/or debt forgiveness to countries affected by the pandemic.
US international messaging should encompass senior administration officials conducting interviews, news conferences, speeches, and other media platforms to underscore the facts behind the pandemic. US messaging should recount the continuing stabilization efforts of the US government, agencies, and NGOs before and during this pandemic and previous epidemics in other countries. Nonetheless, US messaging should stress that recovery requires international engagement and should include a request for the assistance of partners and donors (e.g., specific countries, international organizations, regional organizations, and NGOs). The US president and secretary of state should personally address the UN General Assembly for Chinese government accountability and a US proposal for international cooperation through a UN resolution. The crux of the UN resolution is not censure or sanctions against China, but direct compensation for the global harm it has inflicted. Since countries affected by COVID 19 suffered economically and expended large sums of money in response to the pandemic, they must demand financial compensation and direct humanitarian assistance from China. If China does not respond appropriately, injured countries can unilaterally nullify their debts to China, citing the UN resolution as the legal right.
Planning Considerations for Global Recovery
UN Decontamination of Public Spaces in Mali. Photo by Harundune Dicko
The US stabilization strategy must be pragmatic, focused, and measured. Developed countries with resilient medical services, infrastructure, and government institutions can handle the epidemic with available resources. If extra assistance is required, regional organizations can provide it: EU/NATO, Organization of American States, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Association of Asian Pacific Community Health Organizations, African Union, etc. Nations should offer assistance to afflicted countries, with which they have historic relations (e.g., colonial or traditional). From a global stability perspective, the United States should focus its assistance to geostrategic-important countries hit by the pandemic. In order to minimize redundancies and untapped resources, the United States and global partners should address a division of responsibility concerning unique capabilities (e.g., logistics, medical, organizational, transportation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response). These actions should complement and strengthen extant UN resolutions and plans regarding the COVID 19 pandemic.
The United States should encourage charities, clubs, and associations to donate needed supplies, funds, and people, perhaps in coordination with USAID and other government agencies. These organizations may be of greater use after the emergency to help stricken communities recover. It is important to stress that continued charitable assistance is required after major government measures cease. Charitable donations and government assistance to NGOs working in debilitated countries are efficient ways to provide immediate and continued care to suffering people.
Overview of Shifts in Stability Functions
Assisting countries and organizations should focus on specific stabilization activities for fragile countries affected by COVID 19. Deploying personnel must receive relevant immunizations and influenza tests prior to departure, as well as training on proper techniques to prevent viral spread. The United States and partner countries should make a collective effort to insure these items are available during preparation for overseas deployment. Deployed personnel must be tested before returning to their home countries and isolated for the entirety of the possible incubation period as well.
Assisting nations should conduct a stabilization assessment of each country (embassy country teams should provide the data) in order to tailor the response: security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. The priority and level of assistance for each stabilization task is predicated on the degree of damage to individual states and their economic development prior to the pandemic.
Joint Stability Function One
Establishing or maintaining security is imperative to prevent looting and immediate crime. Military forces and international police may need to support local police and military services devastated by the pandemic. For most emergencies, the host nation government may need to impose curfews and other restrictions. The host nation government should only impose martial law as the last resort. The local police must devote particular attention to the prevention of hoarding and the black market. Failure to do so not only undermines the rule of law, but also impedes economic recovery. The main focus is to minimize criminal activity and corruption (black market of need supplies).
Joint Stability Function Two
Task force medical conducts operations in responce to COVID-19. Photo by: Staff Sgt. Ryan Getsip
Resuming essential services requires a prioritized response, which can be accomplished through foreign humanitarian assistance. Medical assistance is the highest priority to prevent societal collapse. While support to existing hospitals and clinics is recommended, assisting countries should be prepared to establish field hospitals and testing sites in order to lighten the burden on host nation medical services. Assistance personnel need to organize body recovery, transportation, and burial details for victims. Since many victims often die in their homes, this activity will take time. In areas experiencing high numbers of deaths, mass burials may be required to prevent the spread of disease. Assistance personnel must test and purify water to prevent water borne diseases, such as cholera and dysentery. The resumption of waste disposal is required to prevent rodent infestation and vector diseases. The provision of food and shelter may be required, depending on the extent of breakdown to the local communities. The resumption of energy (e.g., electricity, gas, coal, and wood) is needed for the cooking of food and purification of water. Assistance personnel should optimize existing transportation, perhaps organizing transportation pools, to include POL points and maintenance, to assist in the resumption of essential services.
Joint Stability Function Three
Economic recovery requires prioritization as well, through economic stabilization and infrastructure. Assistance for food production may vary depending on the local circumstances. Farmers may need assistance with harvesting and transportation of products to the market. At times, host governments may order the killing of livestock, such as chickens and pigs, since they may be influenza carriers, so providing replacements and veterinary assistance will preserve that market. Fishermen may need assistance with fuel and equipment repairs (nets, engines, and boats). With these basic needs attended as well, economic recovery in other sectors will proceed in due course.
Joint Stability Functions Four and Five
Delaware National Guard supports COVID-19 testing. Photo by: Capt. Brenda Mackie
Advisory assistance to governance and civil control is indispensable. Advisors must work through the local officials to maintain their authority with the populace. While assistance personnel may need to provide funding and resources, the local authorities should dispense them. Indirect governing is the most effective way to interact with political, police, fire, medical, and other essential personnel. In order to preserve self-worth and dignity, assistance should never appear as charity. Hence, working through local government is paramount. This action provides legitimacy to the local, regional, and national government structures.
Conclusions
U.S. international prestige rests on encouraging international cooperation and direction as a global leader. The United States must demonstrate that even in a pandemic, it continues to display empathy to all inflicted countries and strong resolve in meeting this crisis. US actions speak louder than Chinese disinformation. Everyone matters, or no one matters. Shifting the five joint stability functions permits the United States to use existing infrastructure to empower desires end states: specifically, to achieve security, provide humanitarian assistance, ensure economic stabilization, promote rule of law, and encourage good governance and participation. This targeted systematic response to the pandemic not only allows the United States to use existing infrastructures but also to continue to be the global leader.
As a global leader in the pandemic recovery, the United States understands that concerted response bolsters global security. Global recovery ensures that US security cooperation activities continue unabated to ensure fragile states do not collapse from internal or external threats. The United States must ensure that both fragile states and trade partners recover quickly in order to maintain stability in critical regions and preserve the rights of states to freely transit the global commons (Preparing for the National Security Strategy 2020 and Beyond).
Photo credits: DVIDS, photo ids: 6137637, 6170623, 6151774, and 5163332
3 April 2020
By Dr. Raymond A. Millen and the PKSOI Team
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
Executive Summary
Since recorded history, disease has beleaguered mankind and at times precipitated epidemics and pandemics. As such, epidemics have ravaged dense population centers due to close communal association. Epidemics alone have never caused the demise of a great power, though disease did contribute to the failure of some military campaigns. While states have occasionally used disease to gain a tactical advantage, in no instance has any used epidemics as a grand strategy. In actuality, the international community of nations has frequently rendered assistance to countries afflicted by disease, epidemics and other disasters. From the late nineteenth century onwards, scientists and doctors have eradicated the great majority of diseases that once scourged mankind. Within the last fifty years, developed countries have established sophisticated medical services and public health sectors to withstand diseases and attenuate epidemics. Despite modern advances, disease and epidemics continue to cause calamity, so stabilization activities during such crises are imperative. To mitigate the effects of an epidemic, government authorities need to project optimism and confidence, as well as safeguarding the economy.
Introduction
While epidemics have been a recurring feature of civilization, the effects over time have lessened for developed countries. Throughout history the effects of plagues, famine, and war have weakened nations. In antiquity, great powers were hardest hit because their heavily populated urban centers were the most susceptible to epidemics. Over time, all countries with dense population centers also became susceptible to epidemics. Until the twentieth century, epidemics and endemic diseases diminished populations, disrupted essential services, undercut governance and civil control, and caused socio-economic change (e.g., accelerating the end of the feudal system in Europe). While epidemics certainly caused domestic adversity, the fate of great powers was decided by other factors, mostly strategic in nature. Minor attempts to exploit epidemics have likely occurred, but they were largely irrelevant. For example, at a recent press briefing, President Donald Trump warned of “malign actors” attempting to exploit Coronavirus epidemic for their own purposes, but he iterated that US vigilance remained undaunted. Historical footnotes are of little use to decision makers. This paper touches on the historical background of diseases/epidemics, the medical advances combating disease from the late nineteenth century onward, and stabilization actions a government should take during an epidemic.
Historical Background
The fate of the Roman Empire is instructive for modern states. Like Globalization, all roads led to Rome and along them came epidemics. Military campaigns, increased commerce, and imperial expansion exposed citizens to new diseases, many of which became epidemics. The most significant effect was on large population centers due to close communal association. Peripheral tribal societies lived in smaller, relatively isolated communities, so epidemics were less severe. However, whenever they mounted invasions against the Roman Empire, their massed armies were susceptible to disease and epidemics. Of note, Romans (as well as Greeks and Byzantines) practiced good personal hygiene and were keenly attentive to clean water, with the superb aqueduct system as a prime example. The early Romans had no medical profession in the modern sense. Instead, the patriarch was responsible for the care of ailing family members, using home remedies. While episodic epidemics wreaked havoc on population centers, the Romans always recovered—with the exception of malaria. From 1 BC to 400 AD, endemic malaria stunted population growth, diminished immunity systems, and created listlessness among the populace. More than any other disease, malaria weakened the Roman labor force, deprived the military of hale manpower, and fatally undermined the national will to resist invasions. The depletion of economic wealth, continual military campaigning and defeats, and unrelenting incursions of migratory tribes led to the collapse of the Roman Empire—but this took centuries. Incidentally, the destruction of the Roman aqueduct system in 541 AD dissociated the importance of clean water and personal hygiene with subsequent generations of Europeans, which led to centuries of squalor and impure water.
Although the temptation exists to attribute epidemics as the cause of a great power’s demise, disease is just one factor and by no means the deciding one. Ancient Athens experienced a plague in 430 BC, but military blunders during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), such as the Sicilian Campaign, had a greater impact. The Byzantine Empire experienced Bubonic plague from 542 to 590 AD, but centuries more of warfare continued, with some spectacular military defeats, until the fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD. Hernando Cortez’s invasion of Mexico in 1518 introduced smallpox into the native population, but it took three additional years of fighting (and reinforcements) before Cortez conquered the Aztecs. Typhus fever ravaged Napoleon’s army during the invasion of Russia in 1812, but France recovered and fought for another two years against the Grand Alliance of powers. A more significant factor was the poor health of Napoleon, which left him lethargic and indisposed during the fateful battles of Borodino, Leipzig, and Waterloo. During the US Civil War, two-thirds of all deaths were attributed to disease and infections (around 450,000). However, a better strategy and hard fighting ultimately decided the Union victory.
There are a few instances of countries or armies making tactical use of pathogens against enemies during conflicts, but the results were inconclusive. Since endemic disease abounded already, it was difficult to determine whether such attacks triggered the intended epidemic or not. Imperial Japan, but not Nazi Germany, conducted research, testing, and some minor attacks with biological agents in China during World War II, but their use proved indecisive. The Soviet Union, and the United States did conduct extensive research, experimentation, and testing of biological weapons despite international conventions, but both discontinued the programs and entered into treaties. Nevertheless, if countries are determined to develop biological weapons programs, little can be done. Verifying such programs is difficult since disease prevention research and biological weapons research are practically indistinguishable.
Medical Advances
History reveals that warfare, trade, and exploration were responsible for the spread of disease, epidemics, and pandemics (i.e., global epidemics). Of interest, most epidemics died out with no apparent explanation. Viruses either mutated into a nonlethal form or became dormant, reemerging later in another, sometimes more virulent, form. Further, afflicted survivors became immune and checked the spread of the disease. The Black Death (1346-1361) and Black Plague (1665) are instructive examples. While doctors and scientists began experimenting with inoculations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was not until the late nineteenth century that they understood the link among pathogens, vectors, and disease. They became fervent disease detectives, using both inductive and deductive reasoning. Basic personal hygiene, clean water and food, the cleansing of wounds, and sterilization of surgical equipment were remarkable breakthroughs. But it was not until the twentieth century that the targeting of vectors (e.g., mosquitoes, lice, tsetse flies, and fleas) and the provision of vaccinations and inoculations eradicated most diseases that plagued mankind. By World War II, the US military practiced disease prevention and possessed robust medical services. Additionally, the US military prevented the spread of disease in occupied territories. By the end of the twentieth century, developed countries possessed sophisticated medical services, infrastructure, and research. Further, they have devoted significant resources to the monitoring and study of diseases, notably the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Lastly, the information age has increased awareness of outbreaks and preventative measures.
There is no historical instance of a state deliberately creating or exploiting an epidemic to weaken or attack another state prior to a conflict. Given the advances in medicine, research, and monitoring of diseases, potential aggressors would find little profit in such attempts. Disease does not recognize national borders, so starting an epidemic is akin to mutually assured destruction. Any attempt to wage biological warfare would require, beforehand, mass inoculations or immunizations, which are incredibly expensive, impossible to keep secret, and unlikely to immunize the entire domestic population. In view of UN prohibitions on biological weapons, any country using them would become a global pariah. Regardless, rational actors would balk at throwing the iron dice against a developed country with a robust health sector. However, underdeveloped countries remain vulnerable to epidemics and natural disasters. Aside from humanitarian reasons, the United States would need to assist affected countries which provide strategic resources or are of geostrategic value.
Minor attempts probably occurred, but their historical impact was negligible. For example, at his 1 April 2020 Coronavirus White House press briefing, President Trump mentioned that “cartels, criminals, terrorists and other malign actors will try to exploit the situation for their own gain, and we must not let that happen.” Since international and domestic criminal organizations never cease their activities (e.g., trafficking, cyberattacks, and smuggling), irrespective of disasters, the president was merely signaling US vigilance. Decision makers, like historians, must not be consumed by minor events when drawing on historical lessons learned.
Contrary to mankind’s affinity to warfare, epidemics and disasters (manmade or natural) bring out a humanity that transcends enmity. Global media swiftly alerts the world of disasters, and it is common for other nations and organizations to render humanitarian assistance and provide moral support to afflicted countries. A few examples underscore this point.
While Iran remains a demonstrable threat to the Middle East and is an intractable enemy to the United States, no country ever took advantage of the numerous earthquakes which have plagued Iran in the last thirty years: 1990 (50,000 killed), 2003 (26,000 killed), and 2017 (600 killed). In each instance, several countries (including the United States), international organizations, and NGOs dispatched aid personnel and humanitarian assistance. The 2020 COVID-19 epidemic is no exception, with the EU and international organizations dispatching medical experts, humanitarian assistance, and medical supplies to the stricken country.
Despite Cold War tensions, Europe and NATO did not take advantage of the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in April 1986, which affected around 7 million people. Instead, international organizations responded with humanitarian assistance and emergency response personnel, evacuating millions from the radiation zone.
Countries of little geostrategic value vis-à-vis great powers have also received humanitarian assistance/disaster response in the aftermath of natural disasters or epidemics. The 2004 tsunami which struck Indonesia killed over 200,000 people; the 2010 earthquake which devastated Haiti killed over 200,000 people; and the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa killed over 11,000 and threatened millions more. In each case, several countries, international organizations, and NGOs rendered immediate assistance, saving millions from starvation, incidental diseases, and the elements.
Stabilization Activities during Epidemics
During an epidemic, the government must safeguard government structures at all levels, essential services (i.e. energy, medical sanitation, water, and food), the economy, constitutional rule of law, police services, and the military. At the same time, the government must pay particular attention to psychological factors.
While the lethal impact of diseases and viruses today is demonstrably lower than historical antecedents, news and social media awareness is extraordinarily high. Increased awareness has a tendency to cause panic, which can cause instability. Fear of an epidemic can paralyze society, overwhelm medical services, and disrupt the economic vitality of a state. Accordingly, senior policy makers must analyze nascent epidemics/pandemics without succumbing to false analogies. Richard Neustadt’s Thinking in Time provides a practical analytical framework for assessing the similarities and differences between a current crisis and a past, analogous crisis, as well as conducting a trend analysis leading up to a current crisis. Of note, Neustadt discusses the Carter administration’s overreaction to the Swine Flu virus in 1977 due to faulty analysis of the 1919 Spanish Flu. Early analysis provides a plan of action before a crisis becomes acute.
National counter-epidemic plans should be measured and graduated. Authorities at all levels should have systems in place to prevent the paralysis of medical services and infrastructure. Accordingly, both federal and state governments should identify the most vulnerable people and advise them to self-quarantine. Local governments should establish several small inspection stations (e.g., clinics, shelters, and tents) to check people for viral symptoms. The issuance of self-testing kits will further ameliorate strains on medical services. Only those people testing positive should enter hospitals or other designated facilities for care and quarantine. Graduated military support (i.e., Reserves, National Guard, and Active Duty) should respond to most affected areas as back-up. As a general observation, people who are the least vulnerable to the virus should continue daily activities. Experience suggests that exposure to a virus creates immunity, thereby checking the spread of the disease.
Police services are the first responders for civil order. Community oriented policing strives to inform and calm local communities. The local government and police should remain vigilant to the hoarding of commodities in order to prevent black market activities. Anti-hoarding placards and policies at stores will deter most citizens, but information gleaned from community oriented policing will uncover hoarding, price gouging, and black market gangs. Governors and mayors should only implement curfews and more stringent measures in communities where the breakdown of civil order is imminent.
The US president’s use of the bully pulpit is a powerful instrument of power. Projecting optimism and confidence has a remarkable calming effect on a nation under stress. Reminding the country of robust medical capabilities, vaccine research and testing, and preventive measures sustains confidence. While a presidential administration should encourage similar assurances from congressional representatives, governors, and the media at large, the president’s use of departments/agency officials, news conferences, interviews, and public addresses is the most effective form of national communication. Nonetheless, government officials should avoid speculations on infection rates, particularly mortality, since such talk only heightens uncertainty. Lastly, encouraging the assistance of the private sector creates a sense of national community and innovative solutions to epidemics.
Since economic vitality is largely psychological, an administration must take measures to stimulate employment and wealth creation in the private sector. As President Dwight Eisenhower once observed, a bankrupt country is a defenseless country, so economic vitality and national security are intimately linked. A robust economy is fundamental to stability and hence national security. Without it, people lose hope in the political-economic system, and national will falters.
Federal and state governments must avoid the development of a siege mentality due to irrational fears of epidemics. National security should never equate to complete assurance against potential epidemics. Such an attempt will eventually erode democratic institutions, the free market economy, and the national spirit. The most damaging development is the creation of a police state in pursuit of absolute security. While a degree of social distancing may be necessary, the government must establish a definitive timeline for its termination. The preservation of civil rights and free enterprise is the principle mandate of a democracy. Without it, the national will to resist national security threats will erode.
Conclusion
Disease and epidemics are common occurrences and need no sinister actor to propagate. No historical evidence exists in which a state has used an epidemic to pursue a foreign policy objective. In reality, countries and aid organizations have not hesitated to render assistance to afflicted states, even when they are adversaries. Except in the realm of fiction, scientists and medical professionals have been successful in mitigating the deleterious effects of disease. Fear of the unknown can paralyze a country, and the media will always engage in speculation and rumors. Since democracies treasure freedom of expression among all others, government leaders can most effectively counter unwarranted fears with optimism and confidence. The greatest danger to stability is economic depression, with untold calamity. If economic vitality is eviscerated, an epidemic will be the least of a country’s woes.
Recommended Reading
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/.
This edition of the PKSOI Lessons Learned Report explores the challenges and complexities of Consolidating Gains, an Army strategic role that sets conditions for enduring political and strategic outcomes to military operations. (p. 3-5, ADP 3-0, Operations) Consolidating gains is integral to the conclusion of all military operations, and it requires deliberate planning, preparation, and resources to ensure sustainable success. This planning should ensure US forces operate in a way that actively facilitates achievement of the desired post-hostilities end state and transition of control to legitimate authorities.
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This quarter’s SOLLIMS Lesson Learned Report theme is partnering. Partnering is a broad concept in peacekeeping and stability operations, ranging from informal cooperation between aiding organi-zations and local authorities, to the doctrinal concepts embodied in Joint Publication JP 3-20 Security Cooperation.
U.S. security cooperation encompasses all activities with foreign security forces and institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests. Gaining and maintaining access with partner nations to build their capacity in the support of U.S. goals is the centerpiece of security cooperation efforts. As U.S. national policy acknowledges, the nation will rarely conduct unilateral offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Partnering with allies, whether governmental or non-governmental, is foundational to achieving strategic objectives. (JP 3-20, pp. v-vii and p. I-2)
In addition to addressing lessons impacting security cooperation partnering, this report also informs strategic culture, economic development, civil affairs considerations and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). Relationships with allies and partner nations advances national security objectives, pro-motes stability, prevents conflicts, and reduces the risk of having to employ U.S. military forces in a conflict. (JP 3-20, p. I-1)
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Officers participating in Exercise Regional Cooperation 2019 (RC19), collaborate on a mission plan in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August 13, 2019. RC19 promotes security and stability in the Central and South Asian region and includes participants from Mongolia, Tajikistan, United States and Uzbekistan and observers from Pakistan. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sgt. Jennifer Shick)
This Strategic Planning for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (PSO) Lessons Learned Report supports the release of Army Doctrine Publication ADP 3-07, Stability in July, 2019. As stated in ADP 1 The Army “organizes, trains, and equips the force to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations . . .” (ADP 3-07, p. v) overseas as part of, unified land operations, the Army’s contribution to the conduct of joint operations, or Unified Action. “Stability is the set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable.” (ADP 3-07, p. 1-1)
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U.S. Sen. Jeff Merkley, right, Oregon, speaks with Larry André, U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, and his wife Ouroukou Younoussi André during a visit to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, March 26, 2018. Merkley visited with service members at Camp Lemonnier before continuing his trip to other locations in East Africa. As a member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Merkley’s visit focused on the critical role that U.S. assistance plays as he examined famine-like conditions, severe food shortages, internally displaced persons and refugees in each location and how these factors affect counter-terrorism efforts within the CTJF-HOA area of responsibility. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Moore)
This Conflict Prevention Lessons Learned Report uses a unique organizational approach. Rather than a conventional chronological or topical style, we’ve opted to present a lead lesson based on a study by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) entitled “Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Ap-proach.” Supported by the analysis and recommendations presented in the study, a bipartisan group of Congress members recently introduced the Global Fragility Act of 2019 bill that requires the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense to coordinate on a global initiative aimed at stabilizing conflict affected areas and preventing the violence and fragility that allow terrorists, criminal networks, and war lords to take hold in the first place. It provides for Congressionally-mandated funding and executive branch organization to prevent conflict in much the same way 1986’s Goldwater-Nichols Act helped the Department of Defense focus its Joint warfighting capability. Thirty-three years after Goldwater-Nichols, the U.S. arguably possesses the most integrated, powerful military force in the world. The Global Fragility Act similarly promises to provide Congressional and Executive Branch support for a holistic approach based on the principle of unity of effort to stopping terrorist conflict before it even starts.
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“Stage-setting” and “right-sizing” are critical to the success of any major Stability operation. The U.S. Government needs to learn the right lessons, and the right lessons do not come from Iraq or Afghanistan. Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) was a total failure. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Resolute Support (RS) were likewise total failures. The U.S. Government would be wise to learn the right lessons – which come from Operation Joint Endeavor and the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995-1996. “Stage-setting” and “right-sizing” were done smartly; resultantly, the Stability operation was a resounding success. The U.S. Government needs to learn these lessons. To read this Lesson Report click on the link below to download the Lesson Report click on the Download button.
