As we approach the International Day of Peace on September 21st, our partner in peace, the US Institute for Peace, is mounting its annual Peace Day Challenge campaign with a focus on Profiles in Peacebuilding, highlighting the successes of everyday peacebuilders across the world. Learn more about this year’s campaign on the USIP Peace Day Challenge webpage https://www.usip.org/programs/peace-day-challenge and by visiting their user-friendly social media kit https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PeaceDayChallenge-Social-Media-Kit-2021.pdf
Photo Credit: U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Nicholes T. Holmes
Since pandemics are global by definition, the United States must choose where to intervene when national interests and strategic objectives are threatened. As the 28 April 2020 PKSOI paper, US Global Stabilization Strategy for the COVID 19 Pandemic avers, sharing the response burden with partner nations, international organizations, and NGOs is pragmatic. Burden-sharing is a time-honored tradition among great powers and makes good strategic sense.
Domestic security and rule of law are generally the greatest challenges for fragile states. The added stressor of a pandemic can trigger a collapse of both. Fragile states should receive the highest priority when considering where to intervene. If the United States must intervene in a country devastated by an epidemic, establishing security becomes imperative.
As a critical joint stability function, the ability to maintain security during an epidemic is a key indicator of a country’s resiliency. Aside from medical services, the police are the most vulnerable to epidemics because of their close association with the public. If the police services are incapacitated due to illness or death, law and order becomes paralyzed, and hence the fabric of society can quickly unravel.
Law and order is largely psychological stemming from the tacit consent of the populace to obey laws. Criminal elements are normally the first to exploit the breakdown in police authority, resulting in a spike in crime. Once disorder and panic become widespread, a state of anarchy occurs with general mayhem infecting the populace. Without basic law and order, comprehensive rule of law principles become meaningless. At this point, the police cannot regain control, and thus martial law under a military occupation is a normal recourse.
In the immediate onset of a pandemic, the reinforcement or establishment of security is a preventive measure to uphold the integrity of society. This paper addresses the essential activities to preserve security: 1) re-establishing the police; 2) securing critical facilities; 3) protecting emergency services; and 4) combatting detrimental tendencies. Hence, preserving the psychological component of law and order becomes the overriding objective.
Re-establishing the Police
As with any devastating disaster, people become paralyzed by fear and the enormity of the event. Afflicted governments normally mobilize the police and military forces in response. If they prove inadequate (or fall victim to the epidemic), an intervention with international police is the ideal choice to support the police. However, if the environment is non-permissive or access is limited, then US military forces would be the first responders. If available, expeditionary police (e.g., NATO carabinieri and gendarmerie) should accompany military forces. These police have a mandate to police civilians and are the best choice. However, in the absence of such deployable police, US military police would be the next best option.
As an organizational technique, small civil affairs (CA) and police teams (8 personnel) should accompany military tactical units into affected urban areas to establish transitional public security. Only those urban areas experiencing pronounced insecurity require a tactical sweep to establish immediate authority. Otherwise, the CA/police teams may enter alone.
Upon entering an urban area, the CA/police team immediately locates the political authorities and chief of police, or appoints new ones if needed. Since the authorities may be paralyzed by the chaos, the team’s initial task is to spur the community into restorative action. The guiding principle of the team is to govern indirectly, supervising the activities of established authorities.
The CA/police team distributes the joint commander’s proclamations and ordinances to the political authorities to disseminate to the populace (e.g., bulletin boards, all media, and town hall meetings). The proclamations inform the local populace of the reason and intent of the intervention, assuring them that existing laws, customs, and institutions shall remain unchanged. The ordinances serve to restore public order (e.g., curfews and prohibited areas). Generally, they include temporary prohibitions on movement and activities that may interfere with military operations. The establishment of martial law is a senior political decision and is used only in extreme circumstances.
The CA/police team directs the chief of police to recall all police, including retired police, for accountability and security assignments. If needed, the team authorizes the police chief to deputize responsible citizens as auxiliary police, providing the list of enrolled police for team review. Local militias, neighborhood watches, and private security for businesses are acknowledged as emergency security measures. The team may need to provide salaries for the police and auxiliary police, so the military chain of command must provide guidance or funds for this purpose. As an alternative, the team may use existing municipal funds at the bank for salaries, but due care is required to ensure financial accountability is strictly maintained.
Securing Critical Facilities
The police chief is directed to deploy the police immediately to secure: financial institutions, post offices, government facilities (e.g., city hall, courts, and revenue collection), jails/prisons, cultural centers, and key utilities. Critical facilities are the first places looted and destroyed, so they receive priority. In extreme cases, the teams may request the temporary deployment of tactical units to the urban area if situation warrants.
Financial institutions (e.g., banks, insurance, and depositories) should remain open but with increased security as a deterrent to robbery and burglary. Temporary closures may trigger a financial panic, which must be avoided at all costs. The prevention of looting signals that wanton behavior is not tolerated, thereby curbing disorder early. Clear rules of engagement are required to protect property with the minimum use of force.
The protection of post offices ensures money orders and related financial documents remain safe. The preservation of government and legal documents is to prevent their destruction by criminal elements. As a public safety, preventing the release of incarcerated criminals or political prisoners staunches future instability. Safeguarding works of art, monuments, and similar national treasures thwarts illicit trading.
While wanton damage and ransacking of public utilities is a self-inflicting wound to the community, it happens so frequently that protection is a security necessity. Disruptions to electrical grids, power stations (e.g., nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, and wind), waterworks, and waste disposal quickly affect health, so security, repair, and maintenance are required. If local utility workers cannot repair damaged utilities, the CA/police team alerts the chain of command for the deployment of technical specialists.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Nicholes T. Holmes
Protecting Emergency Services
Fire and medical services are essential to rescue and health care. The police must protect fire equipment, medical facilities, and medicines from theft and damage. Stolen medicine quickly becomes a black market commodity, so securing medical storage units is both a medical and criminal prevention necessity. The prompt implementation of emergency services reassures the populace that their safety is foremost, thereby mitigating possible upheavals due to frustration, anger, and panic.
Since epidemics result in inordinate death rates, emergency services must visit all homes to recover bodies for burial. Teams may need to request assistance and equipment for mass burials from the chain of command. In the interim, the CA/police team may hire local labor for burial details. Similarly, medical services may become overwhelmed by mass casualties, so additional military medical support would be required.
Heightened police or neighborhood patrols serve to protect vulnerable houses and businesses from burglary or ransacking. An epidemic may so devastate the population, that several houses and businesses become vacant. Immediate response to even small criminal activities is necessary to maintain public confidence in law enforcement.
Local and supplemental medical services establish quarantine measures to isolate and care for infected people. Medical services advises the CA/police team on the most vulnerable groups for isolation. Those groups most resilient to the disease may continue daily activities to generate herd immunity. Additionally, the team must remain vigilant to outbreaks of other diseases. Virulent viruses often exhaust antibodies and cause weakened autoimmune systems. In such cases, people become susceptible to pneumonia because the body cannot combat the introduction of ordinary germs.
Combatting Detrimental Tendencies
Aside from looting, hoarding results in critical shortages of commodities and fuels the black market. Farmers and other food providers may resort to hoarding in order to raise the price of commodities. Police must actively seek information on hoarding activities and storage locations. Police raids and anticorruption operations are generally an immediate remedy.
The police chief should provide the CA/police team with information on local criminal bosses or warlords. The team should establish a polite but firm dialogue with them. The idea is not to ignore them but acknowledge their presence and come to a working understanding. Gaining their cooperation for security may not be possible, but talking with them reduces potential tensions.
Although militias are often instrumental in providing immediate security, over time they can become a public threat, preying upon the populace. The CA/police team must address any acts of drunkenness, theft, or intimidation with the militia leaders. Once the crisis subsides, the team may seek an informal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the militia, but this often takes a great deal of persuasion. DDR discussions may serve to identify potential candidates for recruitment in the police and military forces. Accordingly, the police chief and host nation military commanders may enlist qualified militiamen to replace losses.
Conclusions
Epidemics generally do not infect an entire country evenly. Some areas are impacted harder and faster than others. Logically, intervention forces deploy into the high-threat areas first and attend to the other areas later. The immediate objective of establishing immediate security in an urban area is to staunch disorder before it turns into widespread mayhem. Often, the presence of police suffices to deter criminal behavior and reassure the populace. The presence of corrupt and incompetent police is likely, but the exigencies of the crisis require their continued employment. CA/police teams should identify them in situation reports for host nation government awareness and action after the crisis.
Small CA/police teams are an appropriate instrument to prompt restorative action during an epidemic. Once security is restored in one community, a CA/police team may expand its area of responsibility by conducting maintenance visits to other nearby communities. This method frees up other CA/police teams for deployment to other communities showing signs of the epidemic.
Transitioning responsibility to international police, civilian organizations, or the host nation should occur from the lowest levels and then progress upwards. This approach enhances local capacities and ensures central government capacity is not overwhelmed by the enormity of the disaster. In line with global interests and strategy, the United States should optimize the use of stabilization partners for most affected countries. When US military intervention is necessary, the approach as outlined in this paper provides the requisite security for the prompt recovery of the afflicted country.
A team of researchers at PKSOI is looking to expand an annotated bibliography on Peace, Stability, and Irregular Warfare. We are focusing specifically on additions from 2010 or later, but are open to all submissions. All pieces of media (books, journal articles, movies, etc) are welcome. To submit Click Here. Any questions can be directed to ISPBibliography@gmail.com Thank you for supporting our project!
AFGHANISTAN 04.28.2020 Photo bySpc. Jeffery Harris 982nd Signal Company (Combat Camera) (Airborne)
June 2, 2020
By Anthony S. Lieto and the PKSOI Team
The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 titled Stabilization identifies that stabilization is an inherently political endeavor and requires aligning U.S Government efforts to create conditions to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. The Department of State is the overall lead for Governance and other stabilization efforts. The tasks and actions of the U.S. military in support of governance is to assist other U.S. governmental agencies, mainly the Department of State, to aid foreign nations and their people to share, access, and voice their opinion through non-violent processes and enjoy the collective benefits and services of their nation (JP 3-07). External and internal pressures placed on a nation in crisis can disrupt governance and cause unintended consequences. Disease, pandemics, or other medical disruptions to the balance within a nation, especially a fragile nation, can cause assistance by donor nations or international organizations, if not synchronized, to overwhelm the ability of the nation to absorb this assistance (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Publications 3-40). For example, the drought, death, and disease of the livestock in Somalia caused a famine which caused the governance structure within Somalia to collapse and the result was the rise of the warlords. International organizations and military support were not well synchronized or coordinated. The lack of a coordinated and synchronized relief effort caused the governance structure to collapse, warlords took control, and the result was a suffering population. The current ongoing conflict in Yemen with famine, diseases, like cholera, and malaria, has decimated the health care system and caused the disintegration and splintering of the Yemeni government (ICRC Report). Governance within Yemen has ceased to exist. Similarly, the ongoing COVID 19 virus has the potential to cause major disruptions in the governance in fragile nations.
The question exists, what is meant by Good Governance and what effect does Governance have on fragile states? The concept of governance is not new. Governance means the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented (UN-ESCAP). Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, identifies Governance as the nation’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behaviors by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (i.e., rule of law). The government of a nation is only one of the aspects of governance. In rural areas governance may include landlords or tribal leaders who establish rules and behaviors, manage resources, and exercise power, while governance within urban areas remains more complex. Currently, according to several views, good governance has eight major characteristics. These characteristics include participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable, and inclusive and follows the rule of law. JP 3-07 provides more guidance on stable governance which provides economic activity, a public sector strategy, a public sector management, a governmental structure, civil society participation and voice, and political accountability which is the foundation on which rule of law and economic activity can thrive and become drivers of security and stability.
So how does governance within a fragile nation deal with Pandemics? Pandemics are large-scale outbreaks of infectious disease that increase morbidity and mortality over a wide geographic area and cause significant economic, social, and political disruption to the balance of effective, efficient, inclusive, and responsive governance. History and recent events with Ebola, SARS, MERS, and COVID 19 suggest that the likelihood of other pandemics will occur because of increased global travel and integration, urbanization, changes in land use, and greater exploitation of the natural environment (African Risk Capacity 2016). These trends will continue and intensify causing governance in fragile nations to absorb the consequences and suffer the effects if not prepared. Fragile nation’s policy should focus on the characteristics of “good governance” and the need to identify and limit the damage pandemic outbreaks can cause to the governmental institutions, social structure, and to the security capability and capacity within the nation. Fragile nations should not assume donor nations or international organizations will provide timely, coordinated, and synchronized support and assistance.
Pandemic Social and Political Impacts to Governance
Epidemics and pandemics have significant social and political consequences, creating clashes between nations and citizens, eroding a nation’s capacity, driving population displacement, and heightening social tension and discrimination (ASPR, 2014). Historically, some significant social and political upheaval was associated with pandemics or diseases. The death rates and the resulting demographic shifts resulted in governance institutions collapsing. The introduction of smallpox, typhoid, malaria, and other diseases led to the collapse of governance, national institutions and weakened the societies within a nation’s military capacity and capability to provide security to the extent that the nations were vulnerable to conquest (Diamond 2009). With the improvements in medicines, preventions, cures, and care, recent diseases and pandemics did not result in such dramatic effects on governance institutions specifically political and social instability, because the potential population was informed, took precautions, and received international assistance.
Evidence and recent studies suggest that epidemics and pandemics can amplify existing political tensions and spark unrest, particularly in the governance of fragile states with legacies of violence and weak institutions. During the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic, steps taken to mitigate disease transmission, such as quarantines and curfews by security forces, were viewed with suspicion by segments of the public and opposition political leaders. This led directly to riots and violent clashes with security forces (McCoy 2014). In Liberia political tensions from warring factions reemerged early in the epidemic and were linked with threats to health care workers as well as attacks on governance institutions specifically public health personnel and facilities. The Ebola epidemic amplified political tensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, quarantine in opposition-dominated regions was delayed because of concerns that it would be seen as politically motivated (ICG 2015). Poor governance in countries with high levels of political polarization, recent civil wars, or weak government institutions, a sustained pandemic or outbreak can lead to overwhelming pressure and political tensions impacting the governance structure of the nation.
BAGRAM AIR FIELD, AFGHANISTAN 04.24.2020 Photo by Sgt. Briaira Tolbert 1st Armored Division Sustainment Brigade
Pandemics also can have longer-term impacts on a nation’s security capability and capacity. In the 1990s and early 2000s extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates among African militaries, led to increased absenteeism, decreased military capacity, and decreased readiness (Elbe 2002). Similar effects on security within the governance framework can reduce a nation’s capacity to manage stability, thereby increasing the risks of civil war and other forms of violent conflict.
Large-scale outbreaks of infectious disease have direct and consequential social impacts which can lead to rapid population migration. Sudden population movements have destabilizing effects on governance, and migrants face elevated health risks arising from poor sanitation, poor nutrition, and other stresses. Migration also poses the risk of further spreading an outbreak, one just has to look at the migrate issues facing southern Europe.
The majority of threats to governance originate in nation’s where the citizens do not see their government as legitimate, or where legitimate governments are unable to extend their lawful powers across their entire geographies (JP 3-07). The lack of legitimate governing institutions (governance) are an invitation for illicit forces. Terrorists find their greatest safe haven in countries where governments cannot or will not control their territory. Pandemic diseases which go undetected and untreated due to governments not properly addressing health care needs are an invitation for organized criminal groups to create networks when corrupt governments are complicit (corruption) or unable to take steps to mitigate the threats (inadequate security). The missing links in all of these cases are legitimate governing institutions that reflects the will of the people, responds to their needs, and extends their authority across the entire populace, in essence good governance.
Way Forward:
The United States will always take immediate action to address urgent dangers in order to mitigate major threats before they arise—and to sustain global support for the institutions of good governance. The following three steps are recommended for providing good governance and the rule of law fragile states, in cooperation with to partner nations whose stability is in the U.S. national interest. These steps are a composite outlined in JP3-07, FM 3-07 and UN publications. The U.S. military’s support to governance effort is listed below.
The United States must help strengthen the legitimacy of fragile states across the world and focus efforts in particular on supporting willing partner countries whose instability and fragility could pose direct threats to U.S. national security.The U.S. military uses its extensive security cooperation network and enterprise to assist nations with security force assistance.
States that cannot prevent threats from taking root within their borders must be supported by the United States in partnership with the rest of the world—with other donor nations, international organizations, and private sector entities. The U.S. military can provide coordination, synchronization, and C2 assets to assist.
Support the Rule of Law with nations that enjoy true legitimacy, internal support for the system of government expressed voluntarily by the people.Supporting these nations who have good governance characteristics would require channeling U.S. resources and diplomacy toward bolstering these fragile nations. The U.S. military support elements could include, legal support to a recognized justice and dispute resolution system perceived as fair (rule of law), engineer support to provide basic services for its citizens, medical and veterinary teams to mitigate disease, military training teams to assist local security forces, and ministerial advisors to governing security forces and their institutions.
Endnotes:
ARC (African Risk Capacity). 2016. “African Risk Capacity Strategic Framework 2016–2020.” Strategy and policy document, ARC, Johannesburg, South Africa.
ASPR (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response). 2014. “Public Health and Medical Situational Awareness Strategy.” Strategy document for situational awareness implementation plan U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC.
Diamond J. 2009. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton.
McCoy T. 2014. “Why the Brutal Murder of Several Ebola Workers May Hint at More Violence to Come.” Washington Post, September 19.
Elbe S. 2002. “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa.” International Security.
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2015. The Politics behind the Ebola Crisis. Crisis Group Africa Report 232, International Crisis Group, Brussels, October 28.
Ministry of Defence, 2010, Joint Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution, Shrivenham, UK.
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2012, ‘What is Good Governance,” Bangkok, Thailand.
Joint Publication 3-07, 2016, Stability, Washington DC.
DoD Directive 3000.5, Stabilization, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 13, 2018.
Death by a Thousand Cuts explores the application of national reconciliation programs to undermine insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national reconciliation programs. Such programs have received little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study provides insights of particular interest for US assistance to countries suffering from an insurgency.
The insurgency in Malaya served as a testbed for a national reconciliation program, providing astute observations on the character of the insurgency. In this case, the British and Malayan authorities studied insurgent motivations for surrendering and adapted information operations and the reconciliation program accordingly. In time, they incorporated the reconciliation program into the counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately proved efficacious. The allies employed the voluntary services of former insurgents in information operations, intelligence collection, and military operations, with great success. Of interest to enduring stability, reconciliation allowed former insurgents to atone for their misdeeds and reintegrate into society.
As most Americans are aware, the Vietnam conflict was an acute threat to South Vietnam’s sovereignty. Following the example and advice of British efforts in Malaya, US and South Vietnamese authorities adopted a national reconciliation program called Chieu Hoi (Open Arms). Also noting Viet Cong disaffection in the ranks, the allies designed information operations and the Chieu Hoi program to encourage surrenders. Moreover, the Republic of Vietnam government established scores of reintegration centers throughout the country, which provided care, education, and vocational skills for ralliers. As in Malaya, the allies employed former Viet Cong in extensive information operations, intelligence exploitation, military operations, and local security. While former Viet Cong successfully reintegrated into society, the long-term effects are unknown, in view of the North Vietnamese invasion and occupation of South Vietnam in 1975.
The insurgency in Iraq is relatively fresh in most American minds. Fortunately, a number of books and the official history of the conflict provide detailed observations of the conflict. From these sources, it appears that US officials initially focused on trying to avert an insurgency, which proved unavailing. Despite the lack of a formal national reconciliation program, Sunni insurgents (and some Shi’a) began making overtures to coalition commanders in 2005, which bore fruit in 2007. Of interest to this study, the use of reintegration programs in detention facilities provides insights for including reconciliation opportunities for incarcerated insurgents.
As Dr. Millen reveals in this study, some telling observations from these case studies are worth noting. First, insurgent cohesion is more friable than assumed, so a reconciliation program must provide a way out for the insurgent’s predicament. Information operations and national reconciliation programs must be designed to inform insurgents of the program, help them surrender safely, assure them of good treatment, and provide opportunities to reenter society as a productive citizen.
Second, host government commitment to the reconciliation program is imperative. Since long-term legitimacy and credibility of reconciliation rests on the host government’s buy-in, allied patrons must devote considerable energy early to that end. Host nation management, resources, and linguistic/cultural acuity make the reconciliation program viable. While a counterinsurgency strategy without a reconciliation program is possible, long-term stability with such a program will not likely endure.
Third, a national reconciliation program requires time, resources, and funding. For counterinsurgency strategists, such an effort may appear inappropriate given the exigencies of the emergency. However, by their nature, insurgencies average ten years, so they are marathons, not sprints. In terms of potential military costs, casualties, and damage, the benefits of a national reconciliation program are worth the investment. The construction of reintegration centers during the insurgency can serve the same purpose for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the aftermath of conflict. Again, the value of the investment provides a variety of dividends.
Death by a Thousand Cuts provides a roadmap for assistance to countries embroiled in prolonged insurgencies. The Malayan and South Vietnam case studies provide practical details for the establishment and implementation of a national reconciliation program. The Iraqi case study adds to this knowledge with the use of reconciliation programs as part of detention operations. The defense community would find this PKSOI study profitable for extending global stability.
Scot N. Storey
Colonel, Civil Affairs Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 29 April 2020
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Photo credits: DVIDS, photo ids: 6137637, 6170623, 6151774, and 5163332
3 April 2020
By Dr. Raymond A. Millen and the PKSOI Team
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
Executive Summary
Since recorded history, disease has beleaguered mankind and at times precipitated epidemics and pandemics. As such, epidemics have ravaged dense population centers due to close communal association. Epidemics alone have never caused the demise of a great power, though disease did contribute to the failure of some military campaigns. While states have occasionally used disease to gain a tactical advantage, in no instance has any used epidemics as a grand strategy. In actuality, the international community of nations has frequently rendered assistance to countries afflicted by disease, epidemics and other disasters. From the late nineteenth century onwards, scientists and doctors have eradicated the great majority of diseases that once scourged mankind. Within the last fifty years, developed countries have established sophisticated medical services and public health sectors to withstand diseases and attenuate epidemics. Despite modern advances, disease and epidemics continue to cause calamity, so stabilization activities during such crises are imperative. To mitigate the effects of an epidemic, government authorities need to project optimism and confidence, as well as safeguarding the economy.
Introduction
While epidemics have been a recurring feature of civilization, the effects over time have lessened for developed countries. Throughout history the effects of plagues, famine, and war have weakened nations. In antiquity, great powers were hardest hit because their heavily populated urban centers were the most susceptible to epidemics. Over time, all countries with dense population centers also became susceptible to epidemics. Until the twentieth century, epidemics and endemic diseases diminished populations, disrupted essential services, undercut governance and civil control, and caused socio-economic change (e.g., accelerating the end of the feudal system in Europe). While epidemics certainly caused domestic adversity, the fate of great powers was decided by other factors, mostly strategic in nature. Minor attempts to exploit epidemics have likely occurred, but they were largely irrelevant. For example, at a recent press briefing, President Donald Trump warned of “malign actors” attempting to exploit Coronavirus epidemic for their own purposes, but he iterated that US vigilance remained undaunted. Historical footnotes are of little use to decision makers. This paper touches on the historical background of diseases/epidemics, the medical advances combating disease from the late nineteenth century onward, and stabilization actions a government should take during an epidemic.
Historical Background
The fate of the Roman Empire is instructive for modern states. Like Globalization, all roads led to Rome and along them came epidemics. Military campaigns, increased commerce, and imperial expansion exposed citizens to new diseases, many of which became epidemics. The most significant effect was on large population centers due to close communal association. Peripheral tribal societies lived in smaller, relatively isolated communities, so epidemics were less severe. However, whenever they mounted invasions against the Roman Empire, their massed armies were susceptible to disease and epidemics. Of note, Romans (as well as Greeks and Byzantines) practiced good personal hygiene and were keenly attentive to clean water, with the superb aqueduct system as a prime example. The early Romans had no medical profession in the modern sense. Instead, the patriarch was responsible for the care of ailing family members, using home remedies. While episodic epidemics wreaked havoc on population centers, the Romans always recovered—with the exception of malaria. From 1 BC to 400 AD, endemic malaria stunted population growth, diminished immunity systems, and created listlessness among the populace. More than any other disease, malaria weakened the Roman labor force, deprived the military of hale manpower, and fatally undermined the national will to resist invasions. The depletion of economic wealth, continual military campaigning and defeats, and unrelenting incursions of migratory tribes led to the collapse of the Roman Empire—but this took centuries. Incidentally, the destruction of the Roman aqueduct system in 541 AD dissociated the importance of clean water and personal hygiene with subsequent generations of Europeans, which led to centuries of squalor and impure water.
Although the temptation exists to attribute epidemics as the cause of a great power’s demise, disease is just one factor and by no means the deciding one. Ancient Athens experienced a plague in 430 BC, but military blunders during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), such as the Sicilian Campaign, had a greater impact. The Byzantine Empire experienced Bubonic plague from 542 to 590 AD, but centuries more of warfare continued, with some spectacular military defeats, until the fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD. Hernando Cortez’s invasion of Mexico in 1518 introduced smallpox into the native population, but it took three additional years of fighting (and reinforcements) before Cortez conquered the Aztecs. Typhus fever ravaged Napoleon’s army during the invasion of Russia in 1812, but France recovered and fought for another two years against the Grand Alliance of powers. A more significant factor was the poor health of Napoleon, which left him lethargic and indisposed during the fateful battles of Borodino, Leipzig, and Waterloo. During the US Civil War, two-thirds of all deaths were attributed to disease and infections (around 450,000). However, a better strategy and hard fighting ultimately decided the Union victory.
There are a few instances of countries or armies making tactical use of pathogens against enemies during conflicts, but the results were inconclusive. Since endemic disease abounded already, it was difficult to determine whether such attacks triggered the intended epidemic or not. Imperial Japan, but not Nazi Germany, conducted research, testing, and some minor attacks with biological agents in China during World War II, but their use proved indecisive. The Soviet Union, and the United States did conduct extensive research, experimentation, and testing of biological weapons despite international conventions, but both discontinued the programs and entered into treaties. Nevertheless, if countries are determined to develop biological weapons programs, little can be done. Verifying such programs is difficult since disease prevention research and biological weapons research are practically indistinguishable.
Medical Advances
History reveals that warfare, trade, and exploration were responsible for the spread of disease, epidemics, and pandemics (i.e., global epidemics). Of interest, most epidemics died out with no apparent explanation. Viruses either mutated into a nonlethal form or became dormant, reemerging later in another, sometimes more virulent, form. Further, afflicted survivors became immune and checked the spread of the disease. The Black Death (1346-1361) and Black Plague (1665) are instructive examples. While doctors and scientists began experimenting with inoculations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was not until the late nineteenth century that they understood the link among pathogens, vectors, and disease. They became fervent disease detectives, using both inductive and deductive reasoning. Basic personal hygiene, clean water and food, the cleansing of wounds, and sterilization of surgical equipment were remarkable breakthroughs. But it was not until the twentieth century that the targeting of vectors (e.g., mosquitoes, lice, tsetse flies, and fleas) and the provision of vaccinations and inoculations eradicated most diseases that plagued mankind. By World War II, the US military practiced disease prevention and possessed robust medical services. Additionally, the US military prevented the spread of disease in occupied territories. By the end of the twentieth century, developed countries possessed sophisticated medical services, infrastructure, and research. Further, they have devoted significant resources to the monitoring and study of diseases, notably the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Lastly, the information age has increased awareness of outbreaks and preventative measures.
There is no historical instance of a state deliberately creating or exploiting an epidemic to weaken or attack another state prior to a conflict. Given the advances in medicine, research, and monitoring of diseases, potential aggressors would find little profit in such attempts. Disease does not recognize national borders, so starting an epidemic is akin to mutually assured destruction. Any attempt to wage biological warfare would require, beforehand, mass inoculations or immunizations, which are incredibly expensive, impossible to keep secret, and unlikely to immunize the entire domestic population. In view of UN prohibitions on biological weapons, any country using them would become a global pariah. Regardless, rational actors would balk at throwing the iron dice against a developed country with a robust health sector. However, underdeveloped countries remain vulnerable to epidemics and natural disasters. Aside from humanitarian reasons, the United States would need to assist affected countries which provide strategic resources or are of geostrategic value.
Minor attempts probably occurred, but their historical impact was negligible. For example, at his 1 April 2020 Coronavirus White House press briefing, President Trump mentioned that “cartels, criminals, terrorists and other malign actors will try to exploit the situation for their own gain, and we must not let that happen.” Since international and domestic criminal organizations never cease their activities (e.g., trafficking, cyberattacks, and smuggling), irrespective of disasters, the president was merely signaling US vigilance. Decision makers, like historians, must not be consumed by minor events when drawing on historical lessons learned.
Contrary to mankind’s affinity to warfare, epidemics and disasters (manmade or natural) bring out a humanity that transcends enmity. Global media swiftly alerts the world of disasters, and it is common for other nations and organizations to render humanitarian assistance and provide moral support to afflicted countries. A few examples underscore this point.
While Iran remains a demonstrable threat to the Middle East and is an intractable enemy to the United States, no country ever took advantage of the numerous earthquakes which have plagued Iran in the last thirty years: 1990 (50,000 killed), 2003 (26,000 killed), and 2017 (600 killed). In each instance, several countries (including the United States), international organizations, and NGOs dispatched aid personnel and humanitarian assistance. The 2020 COVID-19 epidemic is no exception, with the EU and international organizations dispatching medical experts, humanitarian assistance, and medical supplies to the stricken country.
Despite Cold War tensions, Europe and NATO did not take advantage of the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in April 1986, which affected around 7 million people. Instead, international organizations responded with humanitarian assistance and emergency response personnel, evacuating millions from the radiation zone.
Countries of little geostrategic value vis-à-vis great powers have also received humanitarian assistance/disaster response in the aftermath of natural disasters or epidemics. The 2004 tsunami which struck Indonesia killed over 200,000 people; the 2010 earthquake which devastated Haiti killed over 200,000 people; and the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa killed over 11,000 and threatened millions more. In each case, several countries, international organizations, and NGOs rendered immediate assistance, saving millions from starvation, incidental diseases, and the elements.
Stabilization Activities during Epidemics
During an epidemic, the government must safeguard government structures at all levels, essential services (i.e. energy, medical sanitation, water, and food), the economy, constitutional rule of law, police services, and the military. At the same time, the government must pay particular attention to psychological factors.
While the lethal impact of diseases and viruses today is demonstrably lower than historical antecedents, news and social media awareness is extraordinarily high. Increased awareness has a tendency to cause panic, which can cause instability. Fear of an epidemic can paralyze society, overwhelm medical services, and disrupt the economic vitality of a state. Accordingly, senior policy makers must analyze nascent epidemics/pandemics without succumbing to false analogies. Richard Neustadt’s Thinking in Time provides a practical analytical framework for assessing the similarities and differences between a current crisis and a past, analogous crisis, as well as conducting a trend analysis leading up to a current crisis. Of note, Neustadt discusses the Carter administration’s overreaction to the Swine Flu virus in 1977 due to faulty analysis of the 1919 Spanish Flu. Early analysis provides a plan of action before a crisis becomes acute.
National counter-epidemic plans should be measured and graduated. Authorities at all levels should have systems in place to prevent the paralysis of medical services and infrastructure. Accordingly, both federal and state governments should identify the most vulnerable people and advise them to self-quarantine. Local governments should establish several small inspection stations (e.g., clinics, shelters, and tents) to check people for viral symptoms. The issuance of self-testing kits will further ameliorate strains on medical services. Only those people testing positive should enter hospitals or other designated facilities for care and quarantine. Graduated military support (i.e., Reserves, National Guard, and Active Duty) should respond to most affected areas as back-up. As a general observation, people who are the least vulnerable to the virus should continue daily activities. Experience suggests that exposure to a virus creates immunity, thereby checking the spread of the disease.
Police services are the first responders for civil order. Community oriented policing strives to inform and calm local communities. The local government and police should remain vigilant to the hoarding of commodities in order to prevent black market activities. Anti-hoarding placards and policies at stores will deter most citizens, but information gleaned from community oriented policing will uncover hoarding, price gouging, and black market gangs. Governors and mayors should only implement curfews and more stringent measures in communities where the breakdown of civil order is imminent.
The US president’s use of the bully pulpit is a powerful instrument of power. Projecting optimism and confidence has a remarkable calming effect on a nation under stress. Reminding the country of robust medical capabilities, vaccine research and testing, and preventive measures sustains confidence. While a presidential administration should encourage similar assurances from congressional representatives, governors, and the media at large, the president’s use of departments/agency officials, news conferences, interviews, and public addresses is the most effective form of national communication. Nonetheless, government officials should avoid speculations on infection rates, particularly mortality, since such talk only heightens uncertainty. Lastly, encouraging the assistance of the private sector creates a sense of national community and innovative solutions to epidemics.
Since economic vitality is largely psychological, an administration must take measures to stimulate employment and wealth creation in the private sector. As President Dwight Eisenhower once observed, a bankrupt country is a defenseless country, so economic vitality and national security are intimately linked. A robust economy is fundamental to stability and hence national security. Without it, people lose hope in the political-economic system, and national will falters.
Federal and state governments must avoid the development of a siege mentality due to irrational fears of epidemics. National security should never equate to complete assurance against potential epidemics. Such an attempt will eventually erode democratic institutions, the free market economy, and the national spirit. The most damaging development is the creation of a police state in pursuit of absolute security. While a degree of social distancing may be necessary, the government must establish a definitive timeline for its termination. The preservation of civil rights and free enterprise is the principle mandate of a democracy. Without it, the national will to resist national security threats will erode.
Conclusion
Disease and epidemics are common occurrences and need no sinister actor to propagate. No historical evidence exists in which a state has used an epidemic to pursue a foreign policy objective. In reality, countries and aid organizations have not hesitated to render assistance to afflicted states, even when they are adversaries. Except in the realm of fiction, scientists and medical professionals have been successful in mitigating the deleterious effects of disease. Fear of the unknown can paralyze a country, and the media will always engage in speculation and rumors. Since democracies treasure freedom of expression among all others, government leaders can most effectively counter unwarranted fears with optimism and confidence. The greatest danger to stability is economic depression, with untold calamity. If economic vitality is eviscerated, an epidemic will be the least of a country’s woes.
Recommended Reading
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/.
Foreign assistance in policing is not a new phenomenon, but often we fail to consider the past, while planning for the future. Since 1989, the role of the US in several stability operations has increased, such as: Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994, 2004), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Additionally, US military and civilian organizations have been used to rebuild military and police forces and to provide logistics to international forces (El Salvador, 1991; East Timor, 1999). With the intention of avoiding past mistakes in future stability activities, we have endeavored to capture the lessons from Vietnam policing development. The operational environment in Vietnam was similar to Afghanistan and Iraq, in that police development was initiated during the conflict, in a dangerous environment that was difficult for civilian development actors to work in, thus requiring a large military police advising contingent. Police advising in what was then RoV also incorporated USAID and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advisors, as well as those from other countries, but that is beyond the scope of this anthology of lessons learned. The lessons derived from the US intervention in Vietnam have important implications for foreign advising today and in the future.
The genesis of this project stemmed from a unique opportunity to connect with the highly respected Colonel (COL) Charles Nguyen Tan Cuon, a retired police administrator from Vietnam. COL Nguyen was born in 1925 in Saigon, the son of the former Vietnam Minister of Security. With public service and safety in mind, he quickly rose through the ranks of the police force, holding several highly esteemed positions throughout his career and commanding over 5,000 police.
COL Nguyen’s policing experiences are unique. First, COL Nguyen was a police leader during peace and war times. He commanded a police force during the Vietnam War, where police were the first line of defense against insurgents, fighting and collecting intelligence for the military in addition to their regular duties of keeping order and responding to crimes. Second, COL Nguyen engaged with multiple foreign entities who were either fighting the Viet Cong, offering police assistance, or both. While managing his police units, he also negotiated with Australian forces in his district and worked with police advisors from the US, among other nations providing service to South Vietnam, officially known as the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) at that time. COL Nguyen developed a close relationship with some of his advisors, including Mr. Frank Clark from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). When Saigon fell, COL Nguyen fled with his family to the US, settling in Rockville, Maryland.
With his breadth of experiences leading various aspects of a police force during peace and war times, COL Nguyen has much to contribute to our understanding of policing, especially foreign police advising. His wealth of knowledge is particularly applicable to US foreign police advising today, given the US contribution to rebuilding police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as service to policing agencies in various other countries. Thus, the US Army War College organized a series of interviews with COL Nguyen and his USAID advisor, Mr. Frank Clark. Their experiences are interwoven with academic literature in the chapters to follow.
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Members representing the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army (JAF), U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Embassy, Canadian Armed Forces and Jordan’s Directorate of Military Women’s Affairs gathered for a Gender Integration Working Group, hosted by the Civil Liaison Team-Jordan (CLT-J), Civil Affairs Support Detachment-U.S. Army Central (CASD-USARCENT), Jan. 23, 2020 at Joint Training Center-Jordan (JTC-J).
USAID/Jordan is preparing to develop a new Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for 2020–2025. To inform the new CDCS and future programming, USAID/Jordan commissioned Management Systems International (MSI) to contract a team of gender experts (the MSI Gender Team) to conduct a gender analysis and a gender assessment. This report documents the analysis and assessment findings and recommendations.
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WPS Congressional Caucus Launch. Representative Lois Frankel (D-Fla.) and Representative Michael Waltz (R-Fla.) officially launched the Women, Peace, and Security Congressional Caucus Monday, March 9th. The caucus, co-chaired by Rep. Frankel and Rep. Waltz, will work to support implementation of the WPS agenda and ensure that WPS goals are considered national security and foreign policy priorities for the United States. This caucus demonstrates Congressional commitment to WPS and will provide a great platform for educating Congress on WPS. The WPS team in OSD(P)/SHA and the Joint Staff J5/CTIC attended the launch of the caucus on the Hill, as did PDO ASD/SOLIC Thomas Alexander and OSD(P)/SHA’s new Acting DASD Stephanie Hammond. Rep. Frankel, Rep. Waltz, and Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Kelley Currie provided remarks at the event. Here’s a link to a press release on the caucus – https://waltz.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=291
This quarter’s SOLLIMS Lesson Learned Report theme is partnering. Partnering is a broad concept in peacekeeping and stability operations, ranging from informal cooperation between aiding organi-zations and local authorities, to the doctrinal concepts embodied in Joint Publication JP 3-20 Security Cooperation.
U.S. security cooperation encompasses all activities with foreign security forces and institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests. Gaining and maintaining access with partner nations to build their capacity in the support of U.S. goals is the centerpiece of security cooperation efforts. As U.S. national policy acknowledges, the nation will rarely conduct unilateral offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Partnering with allies, whether governmental or non-governmental, is foundational to achieving strategic objectives. (JP 3-20, pp. v-vii and p. I-2)
In addition to addressing lessons impacting security cooperation partnering, this report also informs strategic culture, economic development, civil affairs considerations and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). Relationships with allies and partner nations advances national security objectives, pro-motes stability, prevents conflicts, and reduces the risk of having to employ U.S. military forces in a conflict. (JP 3-20, p. I-1)
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