From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 13, 2020)
Economy – overview:
Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country’s fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid.
Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali’s land area is desert or semi desert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country’s dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks.
Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali’s growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country’s 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond.
GDP (official exchange rate): $15.37 billion (2017 est.)
2019 Investment Climate Statements: Mali by US Department of State – Economic growth, Foreign Direct Investment, Financial sector, Corruption
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)
Military and security forces:
Malian Armed Forces (FAMa): Army (Armee de Terre), Republic of Mali Air Force (Force Aerienne de la Republique du Mali, FARM); National Gendarmerie; National Guard (Garde National du Mali) (2019) / note(s): the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared between the MDAC and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection.
The Gendarmerie’s primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas.
The National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; it has special units on camels (the Camel Corps) for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali.
Military expenditures:
2.7% of GDP (2019)
2.9% of GDP (2018)
3% of GDP (2017)
2.6% of GDP (2016)
2.4% of GDP (2015)
Military and security service personnel strengths: estimates for the size of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) vary; approximately 19,000 total troops (13,000 Army; 800 Air Force; 3,000 Gendarmerie; 2,000 National Guard)(2019 est.).
Military equipment inventories and acquisitions: the FAMa’s inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although in recent years it has received limited quantities of mostly second-hand armaments from a variety of countries; since 2010, the leading suppliers have been Brazil, Bulgaria, France, Russia, South Africa, Spain, and the United Arab Emirates (2019 est.).
Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age for selective compulsory and voluntary military service (men and women); 2-year conscript service obligation (2014)
Military – note: prior to the August 2020 coup, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants.
Since 2017, the FAMa, along with other government security and paramilitary forces, has conducted multiple major operations against militants in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the country; up to 4,000 troops reportedly have been deployed; the stated objectives for the most recent operation (Operation Maliko in early 2020) was to end terrorist activity and restore government authority in seven of the country’s 10 regions, including Mopti, Ségou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Taoudénit, and Timbuktu.
Mali is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane.
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission’s responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of March 2020, MINUSMA had around 15,500 military, police, and civilian personnel deployed.
The European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) also has operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; as of August 2020, the mission included more than 600 personnel from 28 European countries (2020).
The Malian Armed Forces consist of the National Defence, composed of the Air Force, the Army and the National Guard, alongside the National Gendarmerie, all of whom fall under the authority of the Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants (MoAF).
The President is the supreme commander of the armed forces, and the Prime Minister is responsible for the implementation of the national defence policy. The Armed Forces fall under the MoAF, and consist of 13,800 personnel. The armed forces are also used during peacetime as an auxiliary force to maintain public order. As of 2014, 7% of the army and 6% of the air force were composed of women.
There has always been tension between the civilian population and military forces because of Mali’s history of authoritarian rule. This relationship has been further damaged by the recent coup and continued influence of the ex-Junta leaders on the interim government. Furthermore, Mali’s military remains deeply divided, underpaid and unable to effectively defend the country from insurgent groups. Security forces have also been accused of violating basic human rights and attacking individuals who belong to specific ethnic groups thought to be in collusion with the insurgents.
b. Police and Internal Security
Internal security and public order are ensured by the National Police, the National Gendarmerie, and the National Guard, which report to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection (MSPC) for employment. The two last institutions remain attached to the Ministry of Defence and Veterans (MDAC) for their administrative and budgetary management. The 2015 Peace Agreement also allows for the creation of territorial police forces in the regions.
The National Police falls under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection (MoI). It is estimated to employ over 6,000 individuals, 700 of whom are women. The National Police’s mandate focuses primarily on the protection of people and property, identification and record of criminal offenses, gathering evidence, finding and arresting perpetrators, and gathering intelligence to inform government decision-making.
The Judicial Police, an integral part of the National Police, is tasked specifically with reporting violations of criminal law, gathering evidence, tracking down suspects and supporting investigating authorities once a case is opened.
The National Gendarmerie shares a number of security-related responsibilities with the National Police and the National Guard, including maintaining public order, collecting intelligence, and protecting private property. Having military status, it is also entrusted with territorial defense. As of 2015, it is estimated that the gendarmerie counts 4,000 individuals, 100 of whom are women.
The National Guard is responsible for providing security to political and administrative institutions as well as contributing to the maintenance of public order and the territorial defense of Mali. The National Guard falls under the MoAF for administrative affairs and the MoI for deployment. As of 2015, it is estimated that the National Guard contains 3,000 individuals, 100 of whom are women.
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
From the CIA Factbook (Page last updated on October 13, 2020)
Population: 19,553,397 (July 2020 est.)
Nationality: Malian(s)
Ethnic groups: Bambara 33.3%, Fulani (Peuhl) 13.3%, Sarakole/Soninke/Marka 9.8%, Senufo/Manianka 9.6%, Malinke 8.8%, Dogon 8.7%, Sonrai 5.9%, Bobo 2.1%, Tuareg/Bella 1.7%, other Malian 6%, from members of Economic Community of West Africa .4%, other .3% (2018 est.)
Language: French (official), Bambara 46.3%, Peuhl/Foulfoulbe 9.4%, Dogon 7.2%, Maraka/Soninke 6.4%, Malinke 5.6%, Sonrhai/Djerma 5.6%, Minianka 4.3%, Tamacheq 3.5%, Senoufo 2.6%, Bobo 2.1%, unspecified 0.7%, other 6.3% (2009 est.) / note: Mali has 13 national languages in addition to its official language
Religion: Muslim 93.9%, Christian 2.8%, animist .7%, none 2.5% (2018 est.)
Demographic profile:
Mali’s total population is expected to double by 2035; its capital Bamako is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa. A young age structure, a declining mortality rate, and a sustained high total fertility rate of 6 children per woman – the third highest in the world – ensure continued rapid population growth for the foreseeable future. Significant outmigration only marginally tempers this growth. Despite decreases, Mali’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates remain among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of limited access to and adoption of family planning, early childbearing, short birth intervals, the prevalence of female genital cutting, infrequent use of skilled birth attendants, and a lack of emergency obstetrical and neonatal care.
Mali’s high total fertility rate has been virtually unchanged for decades, as a result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and empowerment, poverty, and extremely low contraceptive use. Slowing Mali’s population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy.
Mali has a long history of seasonal migration and emigration driven by poverty, conflict, demographic pressure, unemployment, food insecurity, and droughts. Many Malians from rural areas migrate during the dry period to nearby villages and towns to do odd jobs or to adjoining countries to work in agriculture or mining. Pastoralists and nomads move seasonally to southern Mali or nearby coastal states. Others migrate long term to Mali’s urban areas, Cote d’Ivoire, other neighboring countries, and in smaller numbers to France, Mali’s former colonial ruler. Since the early 1990s, Mali’s role has grown as a transit country for regional migration flows and illegal migration to Europe. Human smugglers and traffickers exploit the same regional routes used for moving contraband drugs, arms, and cigarettes.
Between early 2012 and 2013, renewed fighting in northern Mali between government forces and Tuareg secessionists and their Islamist allies, a French-led international military intervention, as well as chronic food shortages, caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malians. Most of those displaced domestically sought shelter in urban areas of southern Mali, except for pastoralist and nomadic groups, who abandoned their traditional routes, gave away or sold their livestock, and dispersed into the deserts of northern Mali or crossed into neighboring countries. Almost all Malians who took refuge abroad (mostly Tuareg and Maure pastoralists) stayed in the region, largely in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Cultural Property Protection in Mali – contributed by Ms. Sarah Petrin (PKSOI)
Mali, destruction of cultural property in Timbuktu by violent extremists resulted in the first CPP mandate within MINUSMA and the first precedent-setting ICC conviction for CPP as a war crime.
When northern Mali was occupied by violent extremists in 2012, militants vandalized and destroyed mosques, and burned thousands of ancient manuscripts in Timbuktu, a World Heritage Site. The displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from the north to the south also left these sites unprotected (UNESCO Mali Case Study, pg. 4).
During the occupation, the Malian Ministry of Culture worked with UNESCO to develop a booklet, Passeport pour le patrimoine, which contained descriptions, maps, photographs and geographical coordinates of protected historic structures and sites in northern Mali (UNESCO Military Manual, pg. 24). The passport was an essential tool for familiarizing military, police, customs and border officials in the north with the heritage sites. It was also used as an important public information tool to garner support from local populations for future safeguarding of the sites.
The town of Timbuktu was occupied until January 2013, when French forces recaptured the area and eventually handed it over to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In April 2013, MINUSMA became the first peacekeeping mission to receive a Cultural Property Protection mandate from the UN Security Council. The mandate stated that the mission was to “assist the transitional authorities of Mali in protecting from attack the cultural and historic sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO” (UNSCRes 2100, April 2013). The mandate further encouraged the mission to operate in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites. Since the initial mandate in 2013, all mandate renewals have included language on CPP (UNESCO Military Manual).
MINUSMA established an Environment and Culture Unit to operationalize this aspect of the mandate. The unit developed training for UN and Malian military and police forces on preserving heritage sites. The unit also drew up emergency security plans to prevent additional attacks and providing logistical and security support to UNESCO while repairs were made to damaged sites (UNESCO Mali case study, pg. 14).
In the aftermath of the occupation, UNESCO established an action plan for Mali with three main objectives; 1) rehabilitation of damaged cultural sites 2) implementing measures to protect ancient manuscripts remaining in the region, and 3) training to re-establish conditions for safeguarding heritage.
In 2015, UNECSCO helped rebuild 14 mausoleums that were destroyed in 2012-2013. Local stone masons helped rebuild the mausoleums that were shrines to the founding fathers of Timbuktu. A book was also written about efforts to save the ancient manuscripts, The Book Smugglers of Timbuktu, telling the story of how librarians smuggled manuscripts from the north to the capitol city of Bamako. However, during the occupation 4,203 ancient Islamic manuscripts were burned or stolen. To increase the likelihood of recovering stolen manuscripts, the International Council of Museums (ICOM) produced a red list of items at risk of being exported from Mali.
The destruction of cultural property in Mali was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), resulting in the conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for war crimes in September 2016. Al Mahdi was a member of the Ansar Eddine, a movement associated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb that destroyed religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu. He was sentenced to nine years imprisonment and is serving time in the United Kingdom. This was a precedent setting case as the destruction of cultural heritage had not previously, on its own merits, been considered a war crime.
UNESCO has gathered a number of lessons learned from the Mali case study. These include the importance of establishing early warning and crisis response mechanisms when cultural sites are under attack, having agreements in place with key partners in national governments and United Nations missions at the onset of an emergency, early mobilization of resources for cultural recovery, and the importance of continually building capacity and knowledge of cultural heritage protection (UNESCO Case Study, pgs. 17-18).
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
Natural gas – proved reserves: 0 cu m (1 January 2014 est.)
Airports: 25 (2013)
Airports – with paved runways:
total: 8 (2019)
over 3,047 m: 1
2,438 to 3,047 m: 4
1,524 to 2,437 m: 2
914 to 1,523 m: 1
Airports – with unpaved runways:
total: 17 (2013)
1,524 to 2,437 m: 3 (2013)
914 to 1,523 m: 9 (2013)
under 914 m: 5 (2013)
Heliports: 2 (2013)
Railways:
total: 593 km (2014)
narrow gauge: 593 km 1.000-m gauge (2014)
Roadways:total: 139,107 km (2018)
Waterways: 1,800 km (downstream of Koulikoro; low water levels on the River Niger cause problems in dry years; in the months before the rainy season the river is not navigable by commercial vessels) (2011)
Ports and terminals:river port(s): Koulikoro (Niger)
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
The current mandate (UN Security Council Resolution 2480 (2019)) designates the following points as their priority tasks.
Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; to support the the political and institutional reforms, notably to support the Government’s efforts for the effective restoration and extension of State authority and rule of law in northern Mali; to support, monitor and supervise the ceasefire; to support DDR; to support the establishment of a plan for the redeployment of Malian Defence Security Force (MDSF) in the North of Mali; to support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures; to support elections
Support to stabilization and restoration of State authority in the Centre; to support Malian authorities in reducing violence and intercommunal tensions; to support the redeployment of the MDSF in the Centre of Mali; to support Malian authorities in ensuring that those responsible for violations against human rights and IHL.
Protection of civilians; to protect civilians under threat of physical violence; to take active steps to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to threats to the civilian population, notably in the North and Center of Mali; to provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict
Good offices and reconciliation; to exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels; to support efforts to reduce intercommunal tensions; to support the holding of elections; to encourage and support the full implementation of the Agreement by signatory and relevant non-signatory actors
Promotion and protection of human rights; to assist the Malian authorities to promote and protect human rights, justice and reconciliation, bringing justice against serious violation of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity; to monitor, document, and help investigate on violations.
Humanitarian assistance; to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance
Other Tasks – Quick impact projects and Cooperation with Sanctions Committees
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
Special Representative of the Secretary-general (SRSG) and Head of MINUSMA – Mr. Mahamat Saleh Annadif
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-general (DSRSG), Political Affairs – Ms. Joanne Adamson
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-general (DSRSG), Humanitarian Affairs and UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP – Ms. Mbaranga Gasarabwe
Police Chief, UNPOL, and MINUSMA Police Commissioner – Issoufou YACOUBA
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
MINUSMA Peacekeepers, during Operation Military ‘FRELANA’ to protect civilians and their property in Gao, Mali, July 11-12, 2017 Photo by Harandane Dicko/CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
The UN admitted that MINUSMA is one of the toughest UN peacekeeping operations in the UN news article.
“The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA, is one of the toughest UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers stationed there have sustained severe and regular casualties from the activities of armed groups in the north of the country, and many civilians have borne the brunt of the instability, which includes deadly inter-ethnic clashes.”
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
MINUSMA’s official website describes their activity as follows;
Supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap.
By unanimously adopting resolution 2164 of 25 June 2014, the Council further decided that the Mission should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country.
The UN SCR resolution for MINUSMA describes the prioritized mandates. The latest mandate (UNSCR 2480(2019)) followings as their priority.
Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali
Support to stabilization and restoration of State authority in the Centre
Protection of civilians
Good offices and reconciliation
Promotion and protection of human rights
Humanitarian assistance
Those prioritized tasks varies from time to time in accordance with the political and stabilization process. In UNSCR 2423 (2018), one year prior to the current mandate, the prioritized task list was as follows;
Support the implementation of the Peace Agreement
Good offices
Protection of civilians
Promotion of Human Rights
Humanitarian assistance and QIP
Protection of the United Nations personnel
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013.
Background
In recent years, Mali has been confronted by a profound crisis with serious political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights consequences. The crisis stems from long-standing structural conditions such as weak State institutions; ineffective governance; fragile social cohesion; deep-seated feelings among communities in the north of being neglected, marginalized and unfairly treated by the central Government; a weak and externally dependent, albeit vibrant, civil society; and the effects of environmental degradation, climate change and economic shocks. These conditions were exacerbated by more recent factors of instability, including corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, internal strife and deteriorating capacity of the national army.
2012 rebellion and coup d’état
In mid-January 2012, a Tuareg movement known as the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), in addition to deserters from the Malian armed forces, initiated a series of attacks against Government forces in the north of the country. The Tuareg rebellion was emboldened by the presence of well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of the regime there.
On 22 March, a mutiny by disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north resulted in a military coup d’état. A military junta, the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, took power, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Government institutions. The coup accelerated the collapse of the State in the north, allowing MNLA to easily overrun Government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and proclaim an independent State of Azawad on 6 April. Shortly thereafter, tensions emerged among the armed groups in the north and, by 18 November, Ansar Dine and MUJAO had driven MNLA out of the main towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.
Immediately after the coup, on 27 March, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appointed the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, to mediate in the crisis. On 6 April, the military junta and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement that led to the resignation of the then President, Amadou Toumani Touré, on 8 April and the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President on 12 April. The agreement provided for the establishment of a transitional Government, headed by a prime minister with executive powers. On 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra was appointed interim Prime Minister. On 20 August, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a Government of national unity.
Establishment of UNOM and AFISMA
Following the coup d’état, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, offered the support of the United Nations to the Malian authorities. As a result, the Mali interim authorities requested United Nations assistance to build the capacity of the Malian transitional authorities in the areas of political negotiation, elections, governance, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance.
Further consultations led to the deployment in mid-January 2013 of the United Nations Missions in Mali – a multidisciplinary United Nations presence which was authorized by Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 in order to provide coordinated and coherent support to (i) the on-going political process and (ii) the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali.
The deployment of AFISMA was authorized by the terms of the same Security Council’s resolution in order to contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process; support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups; transition to stabilization activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities; support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population; and support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
January 2013 crisis
The security situation in Mali underwent a serious deterioration in early January 2013, when elements of Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, with the support of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, advanced southwards. They clashed with the Malian army north of the town of Konna, some 680 kilometres from Bamako, forcing the soldiers to withdraw. Terrorist and other armed elements also advanced in the west, taking control of the town of Diabaly on 14 January.
The capture of Konna by extremist groups led the Malian transitional authorities to request the assistance of France to defend Mali’s sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity. In response, military operations against terrorist and associated elements were initiated on 11 January under “Operation Serval”, led by France, in support of the Malian defence and security forces. The deployment of AFISMA was accelerated following the military intervention, allowing some of the contingents to move into different parts of northern Mali in February.
As a result of the French and African military operations alongside the Malian army in northern areas, the security situation in Mali significantly improved. By the end of January, State control had been restored in most major northern towns, such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu. Most terrorist and associated forces withdrew northwards into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains while others, mainly local Malians, reportedly blended into local communities.
Despite these gains, serious security challenges remained, including continued terrorist activities and military operations in some areas. The need to restore the integrity of Mali’s territory and ensure the physical security of communities in the north continued to be a central priority. Even when full territorial integrity is regained, many serious security risks will remain, including terrorist attacks, weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and other related criminal activities, which are likely to continue to undermine governance and development in Mali for the foreseeable future.
Road map
The most significant development in the political process during the first three months of 2013 was the adoption of a road map for the transition, which was unanimously approved by Parliament on 29 January. The road map highlighted two essential missions for the transitional Government: the restoration of territorial integrity and the organization of free and fair elections. The road map provided for further military operations alongside Operation Serval and AFISMA, aimed at recovering the areas occupied by armed groups and restoring the country’s territorial integrity; the full re-establishment of State authority in the north; the reform of the armed forces; dialogue with groups who renounce military struggle and adhere to the unitary nature of the Malian State and its Constitution; the return of refugees and displaced persons; inter-communal dialogue; and the fight against impunity.
The road map also outlined commitments in three areas related to the organization of elections, namely: reforming the legal and institutional framework; finalizing the revision of the voters’ list; and setting an electoral calendar, which envisaged legislative and presidential elections before the end of July 2013.
Request for UN peacekeeping operation
Further to the letter to the Secretary-General from the interim President of Mali, in which the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization and peacekeeping operation was envisaged, and the corresponding letter from the President of the Security Council, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, visited Mali from 10 to 16 March, together with a multidisciplinary delegation, to develop recommendations for the Council’s consideration on options for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mali.
On the basis of this mission’s findings, the UN Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report, outlining options for the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali.
Other source on Background of Conflict can be located on:
Destabilization on Mali
These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
