Hearts-and-Minds: A Strategy of Conciliation, Coercion, or Commitment?

This monograph presents an investigation of the concept’s colonial antecedents, inception at the onset of the Cold War, subsequent U.S. interpretation during Vietnam, and modern application to post 9/11 conflict in order to elucidate its true nature – one which can only properly be understood as commitment. By understanding this evolution over time, an enhanced appreciation of its applicability to future conflict as well as its place within the irregular warfare canon may be more properly apprehended.

Defining Command, Leadership, and Management Success Factors within Stability Operations

This monograph addresses the topic of Command-Leadership-Management (CLM) success attributes in Stability Operations and is intended to reach a wide audience of actors, including military and civilian deliverers of effect at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. It was developed from a dissertation and updated while the author was deployed in Iraq at a time of transition from Combat Operations (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) to fully declared Stability Operations (Operation NEW DAWN).

The Government Assistance Center: A Vehicle for Transitioning to the Host Government

This monograph The Government Assistance Center: A Vehicle for Transitioning to the Host Government proposes the establishment of a new unifying assistance and development organization to help fragile states and is divided into five sections. The first section briefly examines the challenges associated with Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches as well as with provincial reconstruction teams.

Lesson Report: March 2020 Consolidating Gains

April 2, 2020


This edition of the PKSOI Lessons Learned Report explores the challenges and complexities of Consolidating Gains, an Army strategic role that sets conditions for enduring political and strategic outcomes to military operations. (p. 3-5, ADP 3-0, Operations) Consolidating gains is integral to the conclusion of all military operations, and it requires deliberate planning, preparation, and resources to ensure sustainable success. This planning should ensure US forces operate in a way that actively facilitates achievement of the desired post-hostilities end state and transition of control to legitimate authorities.

Lesson Report: September 2019 – Strategic Planning for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations

September 2, 2019

This Strategic Planning for Peackeeping and Stability Operations (PSO) Lessons Learned Report supports the release of Army Doctrine Publication ADP 3-07, Stability in July, 2019. As stated in ADP 1 The Army “organizes, trains,and equips the force to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations . . .” (ADP 3-07, p. v) overseas as part of, unified land operations, the Army’s contribution to the conduct of joint operations, or Unified Action. “Stability is the set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable.” (ADP 3-07, p. 1-1)