Category Lesson Reports & SOLLIMS Samplers

Information is necessary to make decisions. It is a logical assumption that more information leads to more successful outcomes. Therefore, decision-makers of all levels and professional fields seek more data. Yet, it is increasingly obvious that more data does not always result in an information advantage over competitors. The policymakers and practitioners engaged in peace and security efforts face the same information advantage challenges and opportunities as any other global societal entity. Big Data overwhelms everyone; picking the right data to call information is often the proverbial needle-in-a-haystack.

To address the data haystack, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General promotes the UN’s Data Strategy with “focus not on process, but on learning…to deliver data use cases that add value for stakeholders based on our vision, outcomes and principles” and it recognizes potential “shifts in people and culture, partnerships, data governance and technology.” Yet, despite an international entity’s published strategy, a group-effort information advantage conundrum—no matter the level or depth of an organization—is that the word information and all its related terms have distinct meanings. At the same time, the differences in meaning are often too dense or nuanced for the average person to find useful… Beyond the plethora of information-related terms and definitions to confound users, some terms are burdened by prejudice. A classic example of a prejudicial term is the word intelligence, for which many societal entities disdain. Yet intelligence is commonly understood as analyzed information. Or, as one source describes, intelligence is information “that is capable of being understood,” “with added value,” and “evaluated in context to its source and reliability.” Therefore, the contempt for the term seems irrational unless one understands the underlying principles for it.

The US Army’s updated doctrine, ADP 3-13, Information, publication pending, acknowledges the conundrum of terms and definitions. Referring to the draft document, one advocate notes that “Information means different things depending on context,” but the projected doctrine intends to “provide a foundation for thinking about information and the information dimension, as well as a framework for how Army forces, as part of a joint force, gain and maintain an information ad­vantage.”

Please click on links below to open or download the Semi-Annual Lesson Report:

The fighting in Ukraine, initiated a year ago by the Russian invasion, is a daily demonstration of any armed conflict’s impact on resident or neighboring populations. Russia’s war on Ukraine is certainly not the only ongoing armed conflict in the world at this time. However, its ubiquitous imagery promotes near real-time reflection of the nature of war—past, present, and future. That reflection includes a continuing review of the suitability of the laws, policies, and programs designed to protect civilians or, at the least, mitigate the harm to them.

This report (in two volumes) contains Lessons that address the physical integrity of a population. Yet it also includes Lessons connected to many—but not all—the other articulated POC/CHMR concerns regarding the what is protected? question. Volume II of this Lesson collection address other questions: Who is a civilian? and Who does the protecting and the mitigating?

The Russian war in Ukraine, among many other contemporary armed conflicts, challenges that simple definition of civilian. While theoreticians may assert that IHL/LOAC provides for every civilian status contingency, practitioners recognize that the reality of armed conflict—as demonstrated near-daily in Ukraine—complicates the matter.

This Lesson collection is not a comprehensive inventory of all topic areas included in the POC/CHMR discourse. Rather, it is intended to provide both overview and particular insights that may encourage further study. Consequently, the Lessons collected here encompass discussion points that both expand and narrow the discourse.

Click on the links below to read or download this lesson.

The fighting in Ukraine, initiated a year ago by the Russian invasion, is a daily demonstration of any armed conflict’s impact on resident or neighboring populations. Russia’s war on Ukraine is certainly not the only ongoing armed conflict in the world at this time. However, its ubiquitous imagery promotes near real-time reflection of the nature of war—past, present, and future. That reflection includes a continuing review of the suitability of the laws, policies, and programs designed to protect civilians or, at the least, mitigate the harm to them.

Physical integrity is the aspect of protection that most observers contemplate when considering protection of civilians (POC) and/or civilian harm mitigation and response (CHMR) policies and measures. Yet physical integrity, while of obvious vital importance to a population, is only one of many POC/CHMR concerns. This report (in two volumes) contains Lessons that address the physical integrity of a population. Yet it also includes Lessons connected to many—but not all—the other articulated POC/CHMR concerns regarding the what is protected? question. The Lessons in Volume I are categorized as follows: cultural identity; infrastructure and property; information and technology; and services.

This Lesson collection is not a comprehensive inventory of all topic areas included in the POC/CHMR discourse. Rather, it is intended to provide both overview and particular insights that may encourage further study. Consequently, the Lessons collected here encompass discussion points that both expand and narrow the discourse.

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The Global Fragility Act of 2019 outlined a US strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability in countries identified by the Department of State in partnership with other federal agencies. Among those agencies is the Department of Defense (DOD) with its relatively new interagency support authority, the Defense Support to Stabilization, or DSS.2 As Stephanie Hammond, then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, indicated
This new authority allows DOD to provide logistical support, supplies and services to other federal agencies conducting stabilization activities… [so that] … critical civilian expertise can get into hard-to-reach areas more quickly and efficiently and with more effective resources, creating a unity of effort that the agencies have lacked in the past.3

To read this Semi Annual Lesson Report: Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Volume II click on the link below:

The Global Fragility Act of 20191 outlined a US strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability in countries identified by the Department of State in partnership with other federal agencies. Among those agencies is the Department of Defense (DOD) with its relatively new interagency support authority, the Defense Support to Stabilization, or DSS.2 As Stephanie Hammond, then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, indicated
This new authority allows DOD to provide logistical support, supplies and services to other federal agencies conducting stabilization activities… [so that] … critical civilian expertise can get into hard-to-reach areas more quickly and efficiently and with more effective resources, creating a unity of effort that the agencies have lacked in the past.3
The intent of this lesson collection is to offer some insight into topics and concepts DOD should recognize or consider as it plans and programs itself to partner with other federal agencies across the stabilization spectrum.

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This edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Semiannual Lesson Report examines facets of Multinational Interoperability (MNI) Command and Control (C2) and Transitions in peace operations and stability activities. This report builds on a 2020 report, PKSOI Semiannual Lesson Report, Multinational Interoperability for Peace and Stability, which provides a framework for the interoperability discourse in three aspects: procedural, human, and technical. This report focuses on the human aspect as it reflects in the military command and control environment. It uses the interoperability definition found in Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, because it relates to multinational commands and refers to relationships among multinational partners within a command environment.

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This edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Semi-Annual Lesson Report: Setting the Stage for Peace and Stability Operations explores the challenges and complexities of “setting the stage” for peace and stability operations and activities.

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The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) will sunset the Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System (SOLLIMS). The system will not be available after Friday, March 13, 2020. The lessons and resources archived in SOLLIMS have been moved to the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS serves as the system of record for all lessons learned across the joint force.

The decision to sunset SOLLIMS was made in coordination with the US Army Combined Arms Center, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Joint Staff J7 Joint Lessons Learned Division to eliminate the redundancy between the two systems.

Leveraging JLLIS, PKSOI will continue to serve as the integrator of joint lessons learned for P&SO in its role as the Army and TRADOC lead for Joint Proponent of Stabilization and Peace Operations.

Members of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (P&SO) community of practice/interest who possess a DoD Common Access Card (CAC) can now query the JLLIS system for P&SO related observations and document files previously archived in SOLLIMS. The website is https://www.jllis.mil.

Those members of the P&SO community who are not CAC holders can “Ask PKSOI” for assistance at the PKSOI website, http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/.

All members of the P&SO community can still submit lessons. CAC holders can contribute new P&SO lessons directly in JLLIS. All others can submit lessons directly to PKSOI by emailing usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@mail.mil. Lessons should be in Observations, Discussion, and Recommendation format, and if needed can also include Implications, Comments, and Event Description.

PKSOI will continue to produce a quarterly lessons report–formerly called SOLLIMS Sampler–with select lessons that are now resident in JLLIS. PKSOI posts all of its quarterly lessons reports on their website at http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/resources/pksoi-publications/pksoi-lesson-reports-sollims-samplers/.

PKSOI created SOLLIMS in 2009 as a web-enabled database to provide a repository for observations, insights and lessons pertaining to P&SO. SOLLIMS was an unclassified, open-source system available to a larger P&SO community that spanned joint, interagency, inter-governmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations. SOLLIMS has served that community for more than a decade holding over 750 P&SO lessons and more than 7,700 resources. All of those lessons and records were transferred to the JLLIS database on March 6, 2020, and PKSOI will continue to produce new lessons directly in JLLIS

Questions regarding the sunsetting of SOLLIMS can be directed to PKSOI by phone at (717) 245-3031 or by email at usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@mail.mil.

This edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Semi-Annual Lesson Report explores the challenges and complexities of Multinational Interoperability in the conduct of peace operations and stability activities. An April 2020 RAND Corporation report asserted “interoperability” can be “a buzzword” in military vernacular to denote a problem needing a solution. While that may be true in many respects, the US Army Regulation (AR) 34-1.2 “interoperability” definition is used here:

…interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives…[and]…Interoperability activities are any initiative, forum, agreement, or operation that improves the Army’s ability to operate effectively and efficiently as a component of the Joint Force, within an interorganizational environment, and as a member or leader of an alliance or coalition across the range of military operations (ROMO).

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This quarter’s SOLLIMS Lesson Learned Report theme is partnering.  Partnering is a broad concept in peacekeeping and stability operations, ranging from informal cooperation between aiding organi-zations and local authorities, to the doctrinal concepts embodied in Joint Publication JP 3-20 Security Cooperation. 

U.S. security cooperation encompasses all activities with foreign security forces and institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests.  Gaining and maintaining access with partner nations to build their capacity in the support of U.S. goals is the centerpiece of security cooperation efforts.  As U.S. national policy acknowledges, the nation will rarely conduct unilateral offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Partnering with allies, whether governmental or non-governmental, is foundational to achieving strategic objectives. (JP 3-20, pp. v-vii and p. I-2) 

In addition to addressing lessons impacting security cooperation partnering, this report also informs strategic culture, economic development, civil affairs considerations and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). Relationships with allies and partner nations advances national security objectives, pro-motes stability, prevents conflicts, and reduces the risk of having to employ U.S. military forces in a conflict.  (JP 3-20, p. I-1) 

To read or download the report please click on the link or download button below.