AMISOM is led by a civilian Special Representative of the African Union who oversees the military and police divisions:

The United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated with establishing the Federal Government of Somalia. UNSOM leadership includes:

The UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing strategic logistics support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM. The Head of UNSOS is Assistant Secretary General (ASG) Lisa Filipetto, Head (Australia). 

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

The UN—and the United States (U.S.) by extension—has an inconsistent history in Somalia. Somalia collapsed into anarchy after the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. By 1992, the UN formed the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) [UNSCR 751(1992)] to provide humanitarian assistance. When the feuding clans compromised the delivery of the food, the U.S. authorized Operation Restore Hope, with U.S. forces dispatched to assist with the famine relief as part of the UN’s United Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF transitioned to UNOSOM II in March of 1993. After the tragic events of 3 October 1993 (the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somalis), the U.S. removed its troops. The UN withdrew all forces from Somalia by March 1995. 

For the next 15 years, Somalia endured frequent humanitarian crises, a short-lived Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mission (IGADSOM), an invasion by Ethiopia, and the eventual ascendancy of the Islamist group al-Shabaab, which seized Mogadishu in 2006. 

AMISOM was created by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007 and approved by the UN Security Council a month later. In 2010, AMISOM assumed the offensive against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM is largely credited with driving Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and major population centers. In August 2017, UNSCR 2372 (2017) renewed the AMISOM mandate until 31 May 2018. This renewal included “the first-ever” reduction in forces for AMISOM while transitioning security responsibilities to Somali authorities.

In 2013, the UN established UNSOM  [UNSCR 2102(2013)], a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) field mission. In late March 2018, The UN Security Council renewed the UNSOM mandate with UNSCR 2408(2018) until 31 March 2019. The decision to extend “underscored the importance of the Mission’s support to the Somali Government‑led political process as well as the importance of its support to the federal Government of Somalia on preparations for the delivery of inclusive, credible and transparent elections” and “requested continued support for the Government’s efforts to implement the country’s National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to prevent and counter terrorism.” UNSOM is responsible for the implementation of the UN Strategic Framework Somalia (2017-2020) as well as a specific policing mission.

Among other UN mandates with respect to Somalia are UNSCR 2383(2017) and UNSCR 2385(2017). In early November 2017, UNSCR 2383(2017) renewed authorization for international naval forces to combat piracy off Somali coast for another year. In summary, the UN Security Council:

…affirmed the primary responsibility of Somali authorities in the effort to combat piracy…(and)…renewed the call upon States and regional organizations that were able to do so to cooperate with those authorities and each other…(and)…commended the contributions of the European Union’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community, as well as individual States for naval counter‑piracy missions and protecting ships transiting through the region…(and)…reaffirmed that the authorizations renewed in the resolution applied only with respect to the situation in Somalia and did not affect rights, obligations and responsibilities of Member States under international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

On 14 November 2018, UNSCR 2444(2018) extended the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 November 2019, as well as providing: “authorization for maritime interdiction of illicit arms imports and charcoal exports, and the humanitarian exemption.”  It also decided to terminate the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) and replace it with a Panel of Experts to oversee sanctions.

Another UN mission operating in Somalia is the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). UNSOS was established by UNSCR 2245(2015). UNSOS is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM. UNSOS’ most recent mandate renewal was UNSCR 2372(2017) (30 August 2017). Its period of existence is characterized as “open.” 

From AMISOM website

Background by AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate.

AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006.IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Originally IGASOM was proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By May 2006, the situation was radically different, as the ICU had engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism or ARPCT and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. By June, they had established control of the capital.

Plans for IGASOM continued, though by July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiative as a western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement. Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued in December 2006.

On 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744(2007)13. The aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.

In October, 2014, the Security Council (Resolution 2182 (2014) gave a green light to the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30th November 2015. Furthermore the council authorized the African Union mission to take all measures, as appropriate, to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society.

In August 2017, the UN Security Council issued resolution 2372 enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a humanitarian section.[i] Currently the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. According to AMISOM, these are the current force levels and areas of operation:

Source: AMISOM Military Component (accessed on September 21, 2020)

There were varying rationales for each country to contribute to the AMISOM mission. One study suggested: …there is no single or uniform explanation for why these six states joined AMISOM. Nevertheless, the most common official justifications based on assertions that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the TCCs and normative commitments to African solidarity were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. Specifically, a combination of institutional benefits (related to the armed forces), political advantages (concerning prestige and partnerships with key external actors), and economic support (for individual peacekeepers and the domestic security sector) was generally more important in understanding why these six states became AMISOM TCCs. Joining AMISOM did help alleviate some regional security concerns but more important were the tangible benefits the decision brought at home to both the troop-contributing governments and their militaries.

The police component is tasked “to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organization adhering to strict international standards.”^[ii]AMISOM has several Formed Police Units (FPUs) from Uganda, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone which play a critical role in improving security in liberated areas through joint patrols with the SPF. Individual Police Officers (IPOs) come from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia. 

The civilian component of AMISOM is led by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), and is comprised of the following pillars:

(1) Mission Support

(2) Political Processes

(3) Stabilisation and Early Recovery

(4) Protection, Human Rights and Gender

(5) Security Sector Reform

The humanitarian component fulfills the mission mandate to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, assisting in the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. AMISOM has worked to secure transport routes including the seaport, airport, and roads around Mogadishu in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

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^[i] AU Mission in Somalia website, http://amisom-au.org/#

^[ii] Ibid, AU Mission in Somalia

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From AMISOM webpage

On 31 May 2019, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2472 extending the mandate of AMISOM through 31 May 2020 and reducing troop levels by 1,000 to a maximum level of 19,626 by 28 February 2020, unless the Security Council decides to adjust the pace of the reduction according to the conditions in the Transition Plan, including the ability of Somalia to generate able, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground (S/RES/2472/2019). 

The new mandate emphasizes the need to consolidate a political agreement between the federal government and regional states, to delineate responsibilities of the security sector according to the Transition Plan, and to prepare for national elections in 2020 or 2021. It also emphasizes a comprehensive approach to security that is agreeable to federal and regional authorities as well as donors, partners and the international community. It specifically calls for increased collaboration between AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, the FGS and FMS at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) mechanism. 

The mandate specifies the following changes in troop levels:

Authorizes the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2020, including a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five Formed Police Units, and to reduce the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel by 1000 to a maximum level of 19,626, by 28 February 2020, in line with the Transition Plan, and the handover to Somali security forces, unless the Security Council decides to adjust the pace of the reduction taking into account conditions set out in the Transition Plan, including the ability of Somalia to generate able, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground.

As per the UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) AMISOM is mandated to pursue the following strategic objectives:

1. Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia;
2. Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
3. Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia;

Under the same UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017), AMISOM is also authorized carry out the following priority tasks to achieve these objectives:

1. Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritizing the main population centres;
2. To assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peace building, and security for key infrastructure;
3. To protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;
4. To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;
5. To conduct targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces;
6. To mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture;
7. To reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration through the Secretary-General;
8. To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia;

MANDATE RENEWAL [2019] :   Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 848th meeting held on 9 May 2019 on the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the 5th AU-United Nations (UN) Joint Review of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and renewal of the mandate of AMISOM 

UPDATE [2019] :   Adopted by the Security Council at its 8537th meeting, on 31 May 2019 

UPDATE [2017] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 8035th meeting, on 30 August 2017

UPDATE [2016] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on 7 July 2016

UPDATE [2014] : Adopting Resolution 2182 (2014), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia for One Year, Amends Sanctions Regime – 7286th Meeting

UPDATE [2013] : Adopted by the Security Council at its 7061st meeting, on 18 November 2013

UPDATE [2012]: Resolution 2073 (2012) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6854th meeting, on 7 November 2012

UPDATE [2011]: Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia until 31 October 2012, Adopting Resolution 2010 (2011)

2006 -2007: Mandate

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From BBC (link accessed on 02 September 2020)

The Horn of Africa has been home to Somalis since ancient times.

13th-17th centuries – Ajuran Sultanate dominates much of the Horn of Africa before collapsing into rival regional sultanates.

1875 – Egypt occupies towns on Somali coast and parts of the interior. 

1860s – France acquires foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti. 

1887 – Britain proclaims protectorate over Somaliland. 

1888 – Anglo-French agreement defines boundary between Somali possessions of the two countries. 

1889 – Italy sets up a protectorate in central Somalia, later consolidated with territory in the south ceded by the sultan of Zanzibar. 

1925 – Territory east of the Jubba river detached from Kenya to become the westernmost part of the Italian protectorate. 

1936 – Italian Somaliland combined with Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a province of Italian East Africa. 

1940 – Italians occupy British Somaliland. 

1941 – British occupy Italian Somalia. 

Independence 

1950 – Italian Somaliland becomes a UN trust territory under Italian control. 

1956 – Italian Somaliland renamed Somalia and granted internal autonomy. 

1960 – British and Italian parts of Somalia become independent, merge and form the United Republic of Somalia; Aden Abdullah Osman Daar elected president. 

1963 – Border dispute with Kenya; diplomatic relations with Britain broken until 1968. 

1964 – Border dispute with Ethiopia erupts into hostilities. 

1967 – Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke beats Aden Abdullah Osman Daar in elections for president. 

Drought and war 

1969 – Muhammad Siad Barre assumes power in coup after Shermarke is assassinated. 

1970 – Barre declares Somalia a socialist state and nationalises most of the economy. 

1974 – Somalia joins the Arab League. 

1974–75 – Severe drought causes widespread starvation. 

1977 – Somalia invades the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia. 

1978 – Somali forces pushed out of Ogaden with the help of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops. Barre expels Soviet advisers and gains support of United States. 

1981 – Opposition to Barre’s regime begins to emerge after he excludes members of the Mijertyn and Isaq clans from government positions, which are filled with people from his own Marehan clan. 

1988 – Peace accord with Ethiopia. 

1991 – Mohamed Siad Barre is ousted. Power struggle between clan warlords kills or wounds thousands of civilians. 

Somaliland breaks away 

1991 – Former British protectorate of Somaliland declares unilateral independence. 

1992 – US Marines land near Mogadishu ahead of a UN peacekeeping force sent to restore order and safeguard relief supplies. 

1993 – US Army Rangers are killed when Somali militias shoot down two US helicopters in Mogadishu and a battle ensues. Hundreds of Somalis die. US mission formally ends in March 1994. 

1995 – UN peacekeepers leave, having failed to achieve their mission. 

1996 August – Warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed dies of wounds and is succeeded by his son, Hussein. 

Puntland autonomy 

1998 – Puntland region declares autonomy. 

2000 August – Clan leaders and senior figures meeting in Djibouti elect Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia. 

2000 October – Hassan and his newly-appointed prime minister, Ali Khalif Gelayadh, arrive in Mogadishu to heroes’ welcomes. Gelayadh announces his government, the first in the country since 1991. 

2001 April – Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, decline to support transitional administration. 

2004 August – In 14th attempt since 1991 to restore central government, a new transitional parliament inaugurated at ceremony in Kenya. In October the body elects Abdullahi Yusuf as president. 

2004 December – Tsunami off Indonesia displaces 10,000s on Somali coast. 

2005 February-June – Somali government begins returning home from exile in Kenya, but there are bitter divisions over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit. 

2005 November – Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi survives an assassination attempt in Mogadishu. 

Islamist advance 

2006 February – Transitional parliament meets in central town of Baidoa for the first time since it was formed in 2004. 

2006 March-May – Scores of people are killed and hundreds are injured during fierce fighting between rival militias in Mogadishu. Worst violence in almost decade. 

2006 June-July – Militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts take Mogadishu and other parts of south after defeating clan warlords. 

Ethiopian troops enter Somalia. 

2006 July-August – Mogadishu’s air and seaports are re-opened for the first time since 1995. 

2006 September – Transitional government and Islamic Courts begin peace talks in Khartoum. 

Somalia’s first known suicide bombing targets President Yusuf outside parliament in Baidoa. 

Islamists retreat 

2006 December – Ethiopian and transitional government put Islamists to flight, capturing Mogadishu. 

2007 January – Islamists abandon their last stronghold, the southern port of Kismayo. 

President Abdullahi Yusuf enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004. 

Air strikes in south against al-Qaeda figures are first direct US military intervention in Somalia since 1993. 

2007 March – African Union troops land in Mogadishu amid pitched battles between Islamist insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian troops, after UN Security Council authorised six-month peacekeeping mission.

Piracy concerns

2008 May – The UN Security Council allows countries to send warships to Somalia’s territorial waters to tackle pirates. 

2009 January – Ethiopia completes withdrawal of troops, announced the previous year, and Al-Shabab capture Baidoa, formerly a key government stronghold. 

Meeting in Djibouti, parliament elects moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed president, extends transitional government’s mandate for another two years. 

Al-Shabab highpoint

2009 May – Islamist insurgents launch onslaught on Mogadishu and advance in the south. 

2009 October – Al-Shabab recaptures the southern port of Kismayo after defeating the rival Hizbul-Islam militia. 

2010-12 – Famine kills almost 260,000, the UN says. 

2010 January – UN World Food Programme withdraws from Al-Shabab areas of southern Somalia after threats to lives of its staff.

2010 February – Al-Shabab formally declares alliance with al-Qaeda, begins to concentrate troops for a major offensive to capture the capital. 

2011 January – Pirate attacks on ships worldwide hit seven-year high in 2010, with Somali pirates accounting for 49 of 52 ships seized. 

2011 July – UN formally declares famine in three regions of Somalia. Al-Shabab partially lifts ban on foreign aid agencies in south, and UN airlifts its first aid consignment in five years to Mogadishu.

Al-Shabab pulls out of Mogadishu in what it calls “tactical move”.

Kenyan intervention

2011 October – Kenyan troops enter Somalia to attack rebels they accuse of being behind several kidnappings of foreigners on Kenyan soil.

American military begins flying drone aircraft from a base in Ethiopia, Ethiopian troops return to central town of Guriel. 

2012 February-May – Al-Shabab loses key towsn of Baidoa and Afgoye to Kenyan, African Union and Somali government forces.

New parliament, president

2012 August – Somalia’s first formal parliament in more than 20 years is sworn in at Mogadishu airport, ending eight-year transitional period. Pro-government forces capture the port of Merca south of Mogadishu from Al-Shabab.

2012 September – MPs in Mogadishu elect academic and civic activist Hassan Sheikh Mohamud president over the incumbent Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. First presidential election in Somalia since 1967.

2012 October – African Union and government forces recapture Kismayo, the last major city held by Al-Shabab and the country’s second-largest port, and the town of Wanla Weyn northwest of Mogadishu. 

2013 January – US recognises Somalia’s government for the first time since 1991. 

2013 June – Veteran Al-Shabab leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is taken into custody by government troops after he is ousted by more extreme Al-Shabab figure Ahmed Abdi Godane.

Spike in violence with various attacks by Al-Shabab, including on presidential palace and UN compound in Mogadishu. 

2013 September – International donors promise 2.4 billion dollars in reconstruction aid in three-year ”New Deal”. 

Shabab attacks Kenya 

2013 September – Al-Shabab seize shopping centre and kill 60 people in Kenyan capital Nairobi, saying it is retaliation for Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia.

2014 May – Al-Shabab says it carried out a bomb attack on a restaurant in Djibouti, saying the country is used as a launch pad to strike Muslims. 

2014 June – Al-Shabab claims two attacks on the Kenyan coast which kill more than 60, saying operations against Kenya would continue.

2014 September – Al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane killed in US drone strike. Government offers 2 million dollar bounty for his successor, Ahmad Omar.

2014 November – Government launches country’s first postal service in more than two decades. Mogadishu’s first ever cash withdrawal machine installed in a hotel.

2014 November-December – Al Shabab carry out mass killings in north-east Kenya, including on a bus and a camp of quarry workers. 

2015 April – Al-Shabab claim responsibility for killing 148 people, mainly Christian students, at Garissa University College in northern Kenya.Kenya carries out air raids on Al-Shabab bases in Somalia in retaliation.

2015 May – US Secretary of State John Kerry pays brief visit to Mogadishu, the first officeholder to do so, a few weeks after Al-Shabab raid government quarter of the city and kill 17 people.

2016 February – African Union leaders agree on need for more funding and support for their military presence in Somalia after weeks of increased Al-Shabab attacks on public spaces and pro-government troops. Government and African Union troops recapture southern port of Merca that Al-Shabab briefly seized. 

2016 November – Leaders of two Somali regions, Puntland and Galmudug, agree to respect a ceasefire in the disputed city of Galkayo. Fighting in the city reportedly displaced 90,000.

2017 February – Parliament elects former prime minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmajo, as president. Al-Shabab threatens to target anyone collaborating with him.

2017 March – Pirates seize tanker off coast of Puntland in the first hijacking of a large vessel in the region since 2012.

2017 May – President Mohamed at London conference calls for lifting of arms embargo to help defeat al-Shabab. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres says conditions are now in place in Somalia for it to become a success story.

2017 October – Double truck bombing kills 350 people in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is prime suspect.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From voanews.com

From Freedom House (accessed on 02 September 2020)

The government, which is not democratically elected, has little practical ability to implement its laws and policies even in parts of the country it controls. Its basic operations remain heavily dependent on international bodies and donor governments. Relations between the federal government and federal member states remain poor in 2019, more than a year after leaders from all five states formally suspended ties with the government in Mogadishu. Critics accuse President Farmaajo of seeking to centralize power.

Corruption is rampant in Somalia and state agencies tasked with combating it do not function effectively. Impunity is the norm for public officials accused of malfeasance.

In September 2019, President Farmaajo signed legislation that seeks to create state and national anti-corruption commissions. Meanwhile, in October, the country’s auditor general released a critical report accusing the government of bypassing the central bank to keep $18 million worth of donor funds in offshore accounts.

Government transparency is limited. Officials are not required to make public declarations of their income and assets, and oversight procedures for public contracts are not well enforced. There is no law guaranteeing public access to government information.

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From ecoi.net (accessed on 02 September 2020)

“The security situation remained volatile, with 288 incidents in May, 269 in June and 218 in July. Most of those incidents were crime-related killings and shootings and Al-Shabaab attacks, including those using improvised explosive devices. Levels of crime and armed conflict-related incidents have remained steady since January, with a slight decline in June and July. The number of terrorism-related incidents remained at an average of around 75 per month in May and June, with 53 incidents in July.” (UN Security Council, 13 August 2020, p. 3)

“The security situation in Somalia remained volatile during the reporting period [5 November 2019 to 4 February 2020], with security incidents increasing from 239 in November to 266 in December, followed by a slight decline to 235 in January. The increase in December was recorded mainly in Al-Shabaab hit-and-run attacks targeting security forces, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (two in December compared with none in November), improvised explosive device attacks, and hand grenade attacks, as well as incidents categorized under crime. A decline was recorded in terrorism-related incidents in January, compared with December, while incidents categorized under armed conflict remained the same” (UN Security Council, 13 February 2020, p. 3)

“The security situation remained volatile during the reporting period [from 5 May to 4 August 2019]. Al-Shabaab continued to perpetrate violence, including carrying out attacks targeting government facilities and personnel, security forces, international partners, and public places such as hotels and restaurants. A total of 228 incidents occurred during Ramadan, from 5 May to 3 June; higher than in Ramadan in 2017 and 2018. Some 35 percent of violent incidents occurred in the Banaadir region, with southern Somalia accounting for 34 percent, indicating that Al-Shabaab’s operational focus did not change during the reporting period. Overall, security incidents declined significantly in June and July. There was, however, an increase in incidents involving improvised explosive devices in July, when there were several high-profile terrorist attacks.” (UN Security Council, 15 August 2019, pp. 3-4)

“U.S.-backed security forces continued offensives against Al-Shabaab: notably, unclaimed airstrikes 11 July reportedly killed dozens of Al-Shabaab militants in Jilib, Middle Juba. In north, unidentified gunmen opened fire on vehicle in Galkayo, Puntland 11 July killing at least five civilians. U.S. airstrike 27 July killed one member of Islamic State (ISIS)-Somalia.” (ICG, August 2019)[i]

“Also in Sanaag, Somaliland forces clashed with those loyal to Colonel Arre, who defected from Somaliland to Puntland in 2018, near Dhoob 10 July leaving three Somaliland soldiers and one of Arre’s soldiers dead. After Arre’s forces 26 July took Karin village, clashes broke out there next day between them and Somaliland troops, reportedly leaving two Somaliland soldiers dead.” (ICG, August 2019)

“In south, security forces killed five Al-Shabaab fighters in Gedo region 3-9 June; Al-Shabaab ambush of Kenyan soldiers in African Union mission (AMISOM) in Burgavo, Lower Juba 24 June left nine militants dead; clashes between security forces and Al-Shabaab near Bur Eyle, Bay region 22 June left eleven soldiers and five militants dead; Al-Shabaab attack on military base in Bulo Marer, Lower Shabelle 27 June left three militants and two soldiers dead; clashes between security forces and Al-Shabaab 27 June left at least eight militants dead in Jamame, Lower Juba; three Al-Shabaab militants surrendered to security forces in Bay and Gedo regions 2-11 June. In north, Al-Shabaab fighters 8 June captured military base in Af-Urur in Puntland only for Puntland forces to retake it 11 June without a fight; […] Puntland and Somaliland forces 14 June reportedly clashed in Badhan town in Sanaag region, which both administrations claim, no casualties. U.S. claimed its airstrikes killed six Islamic State (ISIS) militants and four Al-Shabaab fighters 4-25 June.” (ICG, July 2019)

“The security situation remained volatile during the reporting period [from 14 December 2018 to 4 May 2019]. Al-Shabaab continued to be the main perpetrator of attacks against government facilities, government officials, and security forces, as well as popular restaurants and hotels. March and April witnessed a significant increase in attacks in Mogadishu, where incidents involving improvised explosive devices occurred almost every day. Incidents involving suicide vehicle-borne, under-vehicle, and remote-controlled improvised explosive devices, as well as mortar attacks and targeted assassinations, continued. In March alone, there were 77 attacks using improvised explosive devices across the country. That was the highest number in any single month since 2016. The majority of incidents were reported in Mogadishu and in the Shabelle Hoose, Juba Hoose, and Gedo regions. In Mogadishu, there were 28 incidents involving improvised explosive devices, including two attacks by suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, two attacks by other vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and one complex attack.” (UN Security Council, 15 May 2019, pp. 3-4) [ii]

[i] The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a transnational non-profit, non-governmental organization that carries out field research on violent conflict and advances policies to prevent, mitigate, or resolve conflict.

[ii] The UN Security Council is an organ of the United Nations, charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)

Location: Eastern Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, east of Ethiopia

Climate: principally desert; northeast monsoon (December to February), moderate temperatures in north and hot in south; southwest monsoon (May to October), torrid in the north and hot in the south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons

Terrain: mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north

Population distribution: distribution varies greatly throughout the country; least densely populated areas are in the northeast and central regions, as well as areas along the Kenyan border; most populated areas are in and around the cities of Mogadishu, Marka, Boorama, Hargeysa, and Baidoa as shown on this population distribution map

Natural hazards: recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; floods during the rainy season

Environment – current issues: water scarcity; contaminated water contributes to human health problems; improper waste disposal; deforestation; land degradation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 06, 2020)

Electricity – production: 339 million kWh (2016 est.)

Electricity – consumption: 315.3 million kWh (2016 est.)

Crude oil – proved reserves: 0 bbl (1 January 2018 est.)

Natural gas – proved reserves: 5.663 billion cu m (1 January 2018 est.)

Airports: 52 (2020)

Roadways: 15,000 km (2018)

Ports and terminals: Berbera, Kismaayo

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From Cia Facebook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)

Population: 11,757,124 (July 2020 est.) /note: this estimate was derived from an official census taken in 1975 by the Somali Government; population counting in Somalia is complicated by the large number of nomads and by refugee movements in response to famine and clan warfare

Nationality: Somali(s)

Ethnic groups: Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)

Languages: Somali (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Arabic (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English

Religions: Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)

Demographic profile:

Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.

A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.

During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.

As of 2016, more than 1.1 million Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while more than 1.1 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014.

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a. Rule of Law.  Respect for the Rule of Law at a national level in Somalia remains tenuous at best. While there are many codified ramifications for illegal behaviors, the FGS does not have the wherewithal—in either intent or practical reality—to enforce the laws. Despite several U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-facilitated peace forums, the judicial and detention systems remain broken and corrupt, with justice still served at local institutional levels only. However, a landmark ruling in Somalia’s Puntland state sentenced five men to prison for gang raping a teenage girl and badly beating up another. It is precedent-setting in a country where sexual violence is rarely prosecuted. In May 2018, the Somalia Council of Ministers approved a Sexual Offenses Bill to strengthen investigative procedures and prosecutions for sexual crimes

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^[i] Van Lehman, Daniel and Benstead, Lindsay. Protecting Somali Minorities is Good Military Strategy, Lobe Log, 19 June 2019. https://lobelog.com/protecting-somali-minorities-is-good-military-strategy/

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 09, 2020)

Military and security forces: Somali National Security Forces: Somali National Army (SNA), Somali National Police (SNP, includes a maritime unit), National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) (2019).

Military and security service personnel strengths: estimates of the size of Somali National Army (SNA) vary widely because of inconsistent and unreliable data, as well as the ongoing integration of various militias; as of January 2020, estimates ranged from approximately 10,500-20,000; note – in 2017, the Somali Government announced a plan for the SNA to eventually number 18,000 troops; the same plan called for 32,000 federal and regional police (2019 est.) /note: the US-trained Danab (“Lightning”) Brigade numbers about 850 personnel as of April 2020; the unit intends to eventually have as many as 3,000 soldiers.

Military equipment inventories and acquisitions: the SNA inventory includes a variety of older, second-hand equipment largely from Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the UK; since 2015, it has received limited quantities of second-hand equipment from China, France, Italy, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, usually as aid/donations (2019 est.).

Military service age and obligation: 18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service (2012).

Maritime threats: the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean as a region of significant risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; during 2018, two vessels were attacked compared with five in 2017; Operation Ocean Shield, the NATO naval task force established in 2009 to combat Somali piracy, concluded its operations in December 2016 as a result of the drop in reported incidents over the last few years; additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, have reduced piracy incidents in that body of water; Somali pirates tend to be heavily armed with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades; the use of “mother ships” from which skiffs can be launched to attack vessels allows these pirates to extend the range of their operations hundreds of nautical miles offshore.

Military – note: Somali military forces are heavily engaged in operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, including joint operations with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM has operated in the country with the approval of the United Nations (UN) since 2007; AMISOM’s peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; as of early 2020, AMISOM had about 19,000 military troops and about 1,000 police personnel from six African countries deployed in Somalia.  

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the Federal Government of Somalia to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community.

The UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM.

the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military.

The US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia (2020).

Other information on Somalia – Military / Security:

Despite some achievements, the security situation in Somalia remains tenuous, due largely to the limited capability of Somalia’s National Army and Police Force and the resulting inability to provide liberated areas with reliable security. As expressed in April 2018 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the UNSOM, “managing the politics of security is a prerequisite for success in building security institutions.” He further stated: 

Obstacles to be overcome include domestic Somali opposition particularly from those groups whose patronage and power will be negatively affected; an ongoing fractious political landscape with competition between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and emerging and existing FMS whereby the FGS insists that partners (both troop contributing countries as well as security donors) align their support to nationally agreed priorities and plans; urgent security timelines that deny real space and time for Somali politico-security negotiations; the dilemma emanating from restructuring security forces while actively fighting a war; and international approaches to security driven by domestic/homeland (rather than Somali) security priorities or by imperatives relating to other agendas and rivalries in the region.

1. State Armed Groups. 

Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), Somalia National Army (SNA), and Somalia Police Force (SPF). 18 is the minimum age for military service. While the armed forces also contain a small navy and air force, the bulk of the personnel serve in the army. 

The SNA operates in concert with AMISOM forces to dislodge al-Shabaab from safe havens. It is infantry-heavy but support- and logistics-light. Currently it is still clan-based within units and lightly armed. In April 2018, one official highlighted: 

…the SNA is much less combat-ready, despite the continued efforts of AMISOM, the US [sic], and other Western partners…It remains undermanned, poorly equipped, and ineffective. Officials tell stories of SNA forces training without firearms. SNA forces sometimes flee their positions at the first rumors of approaching Al Shabaab forces.

AMISOM and the Government of Somalia report that 20,000 forces are under federal control. However, a2017 World Bank/United Nations Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review suggested there are 40-45,000 total Somali armed personnel, with 17,000 of them serving in the SNA. Many soldiers allegedly sell their equipment and/or defect to clan-based armed groups or even to al-Shabaab. Some have turned to crime (e.g., extortion at illegal checkpoints, armed robberies). The FGS goal is to grow the SNA to 28,000-strong national army and the police force to 12,000. 

There are apparently still hostile divisions within the SNA, which were displayed during the fighting at the UAE Mogadishu training facility in April 2018. When the UAE and Somalia suddenly terminated their security cooperation agreement, the UAE personnel left the facility in the hands of some Somali forces in the midst of their training. Soon afterwards, other SNA forces attacked the base, possibly to loot the equipment. The two groups exchanged gunfire until the presidential guard secured the area. 

The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) conducts training for the SNA, with ambiguous results. The U.S. has also provided tens of millions of dollars towards equipment, training, and education of Somali military and police.

The Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) leads national counter-terrorism efforts, albeit with troubling issues with human rights. The Alpha Group (Gaashaan, or “lightning”), is a force of 600 security personnel based in Mogadishu. It was allegedly trained and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and U.S. Special Forces Command.   

Other government-funded forces include the following: Somaliland’s forces; Puntland’s forces; Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA); and Jubbaland forces. They are aligned with the specific states or semi-autonomous regions in Somalia and are not available for operations within other Somalia regions—except when arrayed against each other, such as in the recurrent violence between Galmudug and Puntland. 

b. Non-State Armed Groups. The distinction between state and non-state armed groups remains problematic: 

Non-state armed groups — especially clan paramilitaries — have successfully adapted to the re-establishment of the formal security sector by colonizing it. The multiple hatting of armed men in Mogadishu, as soldiers or police, private security guards, and members of clan paramilitaries is a good business model as long as external actors are willing to underwrite the formal security sector. But it makes for a weak and unreliable security sector that is not autonomous from more powerful communal groups.

While there are many small armed groups, generally for local or clan self-defense, the major non-state armed groups are:

Al-Shabaab. (AS). According to some sources, al-Shabaab controls about a fifth of Somalia and is considered the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia. The group emerged as the youth wing of Somalia’s previous Union of Islamic Courts. According to the Department of National Intelligence (DNI), the group’s members are mostly concerned with the fight against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and are not supportive of global jihad.^[i] However, some of the group’s leaders are affiliated with al-Qaeda. AS fighters do not always wear a uniform that is distinguishable. Yet, when conducting an attack, they frequently wear orange bandanas on their arms and foreheads.^[ii]

Al-Shabaab aggressively recruits new forces from the Bay and Bakol region, including children who are indoctrinated through local Islamic schools.^[iii] While the group has had reverses, it remains capable of targeting AMISOM, Somali security forces, and government officials with ambushes, IEDs, and small-level attacks throughout much of the country, including Mogadishu. AS has also targeted peace and democracy activists, civil society leaders, and humanitarian workers. The group is also responsible for numerous high-profile terrorist attacks in neighboring Kenya and Djibouti.

Perhaps the most significant distinction of al-Shabaab compared to the FGS is its ability to exert control and offer services to the population:

Al-Shabaab remains a viable local actor for the provision of basic services and, in particular, security and justice. To date, national security forces have focused on force alone and have neglected building political consensus and legitimacy within communities they serve. They are thus yet to demonstrate their comparative value to al-Shabaab in many areas. At present, al-Shabaab presents itself as providing Somalia’s only effective justice system.

Al-Shabaab also exerts regular taxes (zakawatt) upon the population, providing them with receipts for the payments. These receipts give the population some assurance that they won’t be repeatedly taxed. Payments are in the form of monetary compensation from road tolls and businesses, as well as livestock, valued at an estimated $27 million in annual revenue.^[iv]

Mu’min, a British citizen, fled the UK for Somalia, his native country, when he was sought for questioning regarding his role in radicalizing local Muslim youth. He is from the Ali Salebaan sub-clan of the Darod/Marjeteen, whose members inhabit the Bari region.In August 2016, the U.S. State Department declared Mu’min a “specially designated global terrorist” and placed him under financial sanctions.

Daesh. Heavily-armed Somali Islamic State (IS) fighters operate in Somalia’s Puntland overlooking the Gulf of Aden. Their leader, Sheikh Abdulqadir Mu’min, defected from al-Shabaab. In 2015, Mu’min video-taped a pledge of allegiance (bay’a) to Daesh. While the defection failed to split al-Shabaab, it did challenge its ideological cohesion and allegiances within the Somali clans. It is alleged that Mu’min recruits through kidnapping of children. In early 2017, Daesh elements moved away from the urban areas of Puntland and into the mountains, but continued its attacks in the urban areas. In November 2017, U.S. airstrikes targeted the area where Mu’min was allegedly located, but did not find him there. 

Clan Militias: Perhaps the most complicated challenge for the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) is Somalia’s multitude of militias, many of which are “clan-based self-protection forces,” who put clan loyalty above federal government loyalty. 

Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational): Pervasive and violent crime is an extension of the general state of insecurity in Somalia. Crimes are often brutal—sometimes fatal—and include kidnapping. Organized crime in Somalia exists at all levels of society and in many forms, the most prevalent being piracy. Al-Shabaab is allegedly financed through a diverse portfolio of criminal racketeering, illicit trafficking, extortion, and corruption as part of a larger transnational criminal enterprise.

c. Other International Actors. In the past decade, Somalia began reintegrating into the international community by establishing and developing stronger ties with the United States and the European Union among others.

Regional Neighbors. The political turmoil in Burundi is dangerous to Somalia for at least two reasons: the “spill over” of instability (due to refugees and other related discord) continues to have significant regional impact in general, and the Burundi government may choose to withdraw its forces from AMISOM earlier than currently planned. 

The Ethiopian government essentially consists of Tigrayan ethnic minority members. Protests in 2016-17 revolved around perceptions of partiality in the job market and public policy. The government allegedly detained some 25,000 people and killed several hundred others.

Ethiopia has generations of influence and conflict with Somalia. In the more recent decades, Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia has been “invited” by Somali authorities or as a participant in AMISOM. However, many in Somalia regard the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia’s security affairs with great suspicion as a strategic ploy to annex more Somali land. Ethiopia recently began the withdrawal of their troops from AMISOM early, allowing the militant groups to claim significant areas without opposition. While many experts believe the force reduction is due to unrest in Ethiopia, the government cited the “financial burden” and “lack of support” as the influential factors.

Kenya has a significant number of Somalia minority in its population. It also has a long history of intervening or sending its security forces in Somalia. In 2011, Kenya launched an offensive operation against al-Shabaab in Somalia codenamed “Operation Linda Nchi” (Operation Protect the Nation). While it was given as a reaction to a series of kidnappings, the scale of the operation indicates that plans for such an offensive had been underway for some time. In more recent years, Kenya’s security agents in the northeastern country of Mandera began working with the Somalia administration in Bula Hawo to help curb cross-border incursions by the Islamist militants. In October 2016, the Kenyan government commenced the building of a 30-kilometer security wall “to ward off infiltration by al-Shabaab militants,” but suspended construction in March 2018 due to protests on the Somali side of the border.

Other Countries. Turkey is the second largest donor of humanitarian aid in Somalia. Sometimes referred to as the Turkish model, Turkey provided Somalia almost USD$122 for infrastructure and water projects, hospitals, schools, and mosques, as well as its largest overseas military training camp. Turkey appears to be competing against the UAE, which established a base in Somaliland and a presence in Puntland. 

China spends a great deal of money in Somalia between AMISOM contributions and business agreements (notably, a separate agreement with Puntland to conduct oil and gas exploration, both inland and off-coast). Russia may also have an interest in Somalia as part of its “Pivot to Africa.” For example, according to unconfirmed reports, Russia is building a military base in Somaliland in exchange for international recognition as a sovereign state and military training for Somaliland’s own “army.” North Korea has a history of several decades of Somali military engagement, from the 1970s technical assistance to Somali against Ethiopia, continuing to 2017’s alleged sale of arms to all parties of the Somali conflict.

While the U.S. and European countries provided Somalia more money—if not direct aid—than Turkey has to date, “Turkey has cemented its place in the hearts of the Somali people.” One observer explained this fidelity: Muslim organizations…operate on trust. They are based in-country. They focus on development and switch to emergency when necessary. They buy food-aid locally. They are pragmatic, quick to respond. They deal with people directly. And with much money flowing in direct from the faithful – obligatory charitable giving is one of the five pillars of Islam – they don’t waste time and resources on paperwork.In contrast…Western NGOs focus on ticking boxes. They operate out of Nairobi. They compete for funding for specific projects, which is not necessarily what people need. They usually import food. They do less on development. They are slow to respond to emergency situations. They concentrate most on proposal writing to capture more market share.

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^[i] U.S. Department of National Intelligence, Terrorist Groups: Al Shabaabhttps://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/al_shabaab.html

^[ii] Interview with AMISOM staff.

^[iii] Al-Shabaab Military Machine, Hiraal Institute, December 2018. 

^[iv] Al-Shabaab Finance System, Hiraal Institute, July 2018.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.