All posts by COL L. Bortoluzzi Garcia

From MINUSMA website

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. 

Background

In recent years, Mali has been confronted by a profound crisis with serious political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights consequences. The crisis stems from long-standing structural conditions such as weak State institutions; ineffective governance; fragile social cohesion; deep-seated feelings among communities in the north of being neglected, marginalized and unfairly treated by the central Government; a weak and externally dependent, albeit vibrant, civil society; and the effects of environmental degradation, climate change and economic shocks. These conditions were exacerbated by more recent factors of instability, including corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, internal strife and deteriorating capacity of the national army.

2012 rebellion and coup d’état

In mid-January 2012, a Tuareg movement known as the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), in addition to deserters from the Malian armed forces, initiated a series of attacks against Government forces in the north of the country. The Tuareg rebellion was emboldened by the presence of well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of the regime there.

On 22 March, a mutiny by disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north resulted in a military coup d’état. A military junta, the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, took power, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Government institutions. The coup accelerated the collapse of the State in the north, allowing MNLA to easily overrun Government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and proclaim an independent State of Azawad on 6 April. Shortly thereafter, tensions emerged among the armed groups in the north and, by 18 November, Ansar Dine and MUJAO had driven MNLA out of the main towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Immediately after the coup, on 27 March, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appointed the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, to mediate in the crisis. On 6 April, the military junta and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement that led to the resignation of the then President, Amadou Toumani Touré, on 8 April and the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President on 12 April. The agreement provided for the establishment of a transitional Government, headed by a prime minister with executive powers. On 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra was appointed interim Prime Minister. On 20 August, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a Government of national unity.

Establishment of UNOM and AFISMA

Following the coup d’état, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, offered the support of the United Nations to the Malian authorities. As a result, the Mali interim authorities requested United Nations assistance to build the capacity of the Malian transitional authorities in the areas of political negotiation, elections, governance, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance.

Further consultations led to the deployment in mid-January 2013 of the United Nations Missions in Mali – a multidisciplinary United Nations presence which was authorized by Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 in order to provide coordinated and coherent support to (i) the on-going political process and (ii) the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali.

The deployment of AFISMA was authorized by the terms of the same Security Council’s resolution in order to contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process; support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups; transition to stabilization activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities; support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population; and support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

January 2013 crisis

The security situation in Mali underwent a serious deterioration in early January 2013, when elements of Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, with the support of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, advanced southwards. They clashed with the Malian army north of the town of Konna, some 680 kilometres from Bamako, forcing the soldiers to withdraw. Terrorist and other armed elements also advanced in the west, taking control of the town of Diabaly on 14 January.

The capture of Konna by extremist groups led the Malian transitional authorities to request the assistance of France to defend Mali’s sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity. In response, military operations against terrorist and associated elements were initiated on 11 January under “Operation Serval”, led by France, in support of the Malian defence and security forces. The deployment of AFISMA was accelerated following the military intervention, allowing some of the contingents to move into different parts of northern Mali in February.

As a result of the French and African military operations alongside the Malian army in northern areas, the security situation in Mali significantly improved. By the end of January, State control had been restored in most major northern towns, such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu. Most terrorist and associated forces withdrew northwards into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains while others, mainly local Malians, reportedly blended into local communities.

Despite these gains, serious security challenges remained, including continued terrorist activities and military operations in some areas. The need to restore the integrity of Mali’s territory and ensure the physical security of communities in the north continued to be a central priority. Even when full territorial integrity is regained, many serious security risks will remain, including terrorist attacks, weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and other related criminal activities, which are likely to continue to undermine governance and development in Mali for the foreseeable future.

Road map

The most significant development in the political process during the first three months of 2013 was the adoption of a road map for the transition, which was unanimously approved by Parliament on 29 January. The road map highlighted two essential missions for the transitional Government: the restoration of territorial integrity and the organization of free and fair elections. The road map provided for further military operations alongside Operation Serval and AFISMA, aimed at recovering the areas occupied by armed groups and restoring the country’s territorial integrity; the full re-establishment of State authority in the north; the reform of the armed forces; dialogue with groups who renounce military struggle and adhere to the unitary nature of the Malian State and its Constitution; the return of refugees and displaced persons; inter-communal dialogue; and the fight against impunity.

The road map also outlined commitments in three areas related to the organization of elections, namely: reforming the legal and institutional framework; finalizing the revision of the voters’ list; and setting an electoral calendar, which envisaged legislative and presidential elections before the end of July 2013.

Request for UN peacekeeping operation

Further to the letter to the Secretary-General from the interim President of Mali, in which the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization and peacekeeping operation was envisaged, and the corresponding letter from the President of the Security Council, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, visited Mali from 10 to 16 March, together with a multidisciplinary delegation, to develop recommendations for the Council’s consideration on options for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mali.

On the basis of this mission’s findings, the UN Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report, outlining options for the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali.

Other source on Background of Conflict can be located on:

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

from BBC Mali Profile – Timeline

2007 August – Suspected Tuareg rebels abduct government soldiers in separate incidents near the Niger and Algerian borders.

2008 May – Tuareg rebels kill 17 soldiers in attack on an army post in the northeast, despite a ceasefire agreed a month earlier.

2008 December – At least 20 people are killed and several taken hostage in an attack by Tuareg rebels on a military base in northern Mali.

2009 February – Government says the army has taken control of all the bases of the most active Tuareg rebel group. A week later, 700 rebels surrender their weapons in ceremony marking their return to the peace process.

2009 May – Algeria begins sending military equipment to Mali in preparation for a joint operation against Islamic militants linked to al-Qaeda.

2009 August – New law boosts women’s rights, prompts some protests.

2010 January – Annual music event – Festival in the Desert – is moved from a desert oasis to Timbuktu because of security fears.

2010 April – Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Niger set up joint command to tackle threat of terrorism.

2012 January – Fears of new Tuareg rebellion following attacks on northern towns which prompt civilians to flee into Mauritania.

2012 March – Military officers depose President Toure ahead of the April presidential elections, accusing him of failing to deal effectively with the Tuareg rebellion. African Union suspends Mali.

2012 April – Tuareg rebels seize control of northern Mali, declare independence.

Military hands over to a civilian interim government, led by President Dioncounda Traore.

2012 May – Junta reasserts control after an alleged coup attempt by supporters of ousted President Toure in Bamako.

Pro-junta protesters storm presidential compound and beat Mr Traore unconscious.

The Tuareg MNLA and Islamist Ansar Dine rebel groups merge and declare northern Mali to be an Islamic state. Ansar Dine begins to impose Islamic law in Timbuktu. Al-Qaeda in North Africa endorses the deal.

2012 June-July – Ansar Dine and its Al-Qaeda ally turn on the MNLA and capture the main northern cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. They begin to destroy many Muslim shrines that offend their puritan views.

2012 August – Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra forms a new government of national unity in order to satisfy regional demands for a transition from military-dominated rule. The cabinet of 31 ministers includes five seen as close to coup leader Capt Amadou Sanogo.

2012 Autumn-Winter – Northern Islamist rebels consolidate their hold on the north. They seize strategically important town of Douentza in September, crossing into the central part of Mali and closer to the government-held south-west.

2012 November – The West African regional grouping Ecowas agrees a coordinated military expedition to recapture the north, with UN and African Union backing. Preparations are expected to take several months.

2012 December – Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra resigns, allegedly under pressure from army leaders who oppose plans for Ecowas military intervention. President Traore appoints a presidential official, Django Sissoko, to succeed him. The UN and US threaten sanctions.

2013 January – Islamist fighters capture the central town of Konna and plan to march on the capital. President Traore asks France for help. French troops rapidly capture Gao and Timbuktu and at the end of the month enter Kidal, the last major rebel-held town. European countries pledge to help retrain the Malian army.

2013 April – France begins withdrawal of troops. A regional African force helps the Malian army provide security.

2013 May – An international conference pledges $4bn to help rebuild Mali.

2013 June – Government signs peace deal with Tuareg nationalist rebels to pave way for elections. Rebels agree to hand over northern town of Kidal that they captured after French troops forced out Islamists in January.

2013 July-August – Ibrahim Boubacar Keita wins presidential elections, defeating Moussa Mara.

France formally hands over responsibility for security in the north to the Minusma UN force.

2013 September – President Keita appoint banking specialist Oumar Tatam Ly prime minister.

2013 September-November – Government relations with Tuareg separatists in the north steadily worsen, with occasional clashes.

2013 December – Parliamentary elections give President Keita’s RPM 115 out of 147 seats.

France announces 60% reduction in troops deployed in Mali to 1,000 by March 2014.

2014 April – President Keita appoints former rival Moussa Mara prime minister in a bid to curb instability in the north.

2014 May – Fragile truce with Tuareg MNLA separatists breaks down in north. Separatists seize control of Kidal city and the town of Menaka, Agelhok, Anefis and Tessalit.

2014 September – Government, separatists begin new round of talks in Algeria to try end conflict over northern Mali, or Azawad as the secessionists call it.

Separatist MNLA opens an ”Azawad embassy” in the Netherlands.

2014 October – Nine UN peacekeepers killed in the north-east – the deadliest attack so far on its mission in Mali.

2015 January – Mali’s health minister says the country is free of the Ebola virus, after 42 days without a new case of the disease since October.

2015 April – Upsurge in fighting as Coordination of Azawad Movements northern rebels clash with UN peacekeepers in Timbuktu and seize town of Lere, try to recapture Menaka from pro-government militia.

2015 May – French troops kill leading al-Qaeda commanders Amada Ag Hama and Ibrahim Ag Inawalen in northern raid. Both were suspected of kidnapping and killing French citizens.

A peace accord to end the conflict in the north of Mali is signed by the government and several militia and rebel factions.

2015 June – Government and ethnic Tuareg rebels sign peace deal aimed at ending decades of conflict. The government gives the Tuareg more regional autonomy and drops arrest warrants for their leaders.

2015 July – Craftsmen in Mali working for the United Nations rebuild the world-renowned mausoleums in Timbuktu which were destroyed by Islamists in 2012.

2015 August – Seventeen people killed in attack by suspected Islamist militants on a hotel in the central Malian town of Sevare

2015 November – Islamist gunmen attack the luxury Radisson Blu hotel in the capital Bamako, killing 22.

2016 August – Several attacks on foreign forces. More than 100 peacekeepers have died since the UN mission’s deployment in Mali in 2013, making it one of the deadliest places to serve for the UN.

A Malian jihadist is found guilty of ransacking the fabled desert city of Timbuktu. He expressed regret in the unprecedented trial before the International Criminal Court.

2017 January – At least 37 people are killed by a car bomb at a military camp in Gao housing government troops and former rebels brought together as part of a peace agreement.

2017 February – Malian soldiers and rival militia groups including Tuareg separatists take part in a joint patrol, a key part of a peace agreement reached in 2015.

2017 April – President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announces a new government, appointing close ally Abdoulaye Idrissa Maiga as prime minister.

2017 June – Al-Qaeda-aligned group Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen claims responsibility for an attack on an hotel popular with Westerners east of Bamako, killing two civilians.

2018 January – Some 14 soldiers are killed in a suspected Islamist attack on a military base at Soumpi. Elsewhere, 26 civilians die after their vehicle hits a landmine.

2018 June – Mali prepares for a presidential election amid Islamist violence and demonstrations pressing for the vote to be free and fair.

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

MINUSMA ON YOUTUBE: https://www.youtube.com/user/MINUSMA

MINUSMA ON FLICKR: https://www.flickr.com/photos/minusma

Tweets by UN_MINUSMA

MINUSMA ON INSTAGRAM: https://www.instagram.com/un_minusma/

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

Jihadists

JNIM

JNIM, an umbrella coalition of al-Qaeda-aligned groups, announced its existence in March 2017 in a video release featuring the leaders of its component parts – Ansar al-Din, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mourabitoun, and Katibat Macina. Headed by Tuareg militant leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM has since established an independent media arm and regularly claims responsibility for attacks throughout Mali. It took credit for the January 2019 attack that killed ten UN peacekeepers in Aguelhoc, recent devastating attacks on Malian army bases in Dioura and Guiré, and several attacks against security forces as well as other armed groups in Niger and Burkina Faso.

Broadly speaking, JNIM’s aim is to drive foreign (especially French and UN) forces out of Mali, and to impose its version of Islamic law. It maintains its allegiance to al-Qaeda and seeks to spread the reach of jihadist groups in the region. Although the components within JNIM act relatively autonomously, they have still consistently reaffirmed their membership in the umbrella group. Katibat Macina leader Amadou Kouffa in particular has consistently confirmed the centrality of Iyad Ag Ghali to the movement and to any potential negotiations with them. Despite heavy losses at the hands of French forces, JNIM continues to operate throughout Mali and into Burkina Faso and Niger, conducting complex attacks, assassinations, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on UN, Malian, and French forces.

“KATIBAT SÈRMA” AND KATIBAT AAA

According to local sources as well as international security observers, these groups are largely autonomous collections of fighters associated with JNIM. One was formerly headed by a Malian National Guard member and Imghad Tuareg Almansour Ag Alkassoum (whose initials constitute the “AAA”), and the group has continued to operate extensively between the Malian towns of Douentza, Boni, and Hombori. It is also believed to have conducted some operations in Burkina Faso in support of the Burkinabe jihadist group Ansarul Islam, though the group very rarely claims attacks. Despite Ag Alkassoum’s death during a French military operation in November 2018, the group remains active in conducting improvised explosive device (IED) and other attacks on Malian and UN forces. The area between Douentza, Boni, and Hombori remains one of the major areas of attacks recently against these forces, while also purportedly operating at times both with JNIM and groups close to JNIM like Ansarul Islam. The other represents a loose collection of fighters operating largely in the Sèrma forest near Burkina Faso, with the appellation “Katibat Sèrma” coined by the analyst Hèni Nsaibia.

ANSARUL ISLAM

This group began as a localised insurgency in the northern provinces of Burkina Faso, under the leadership of Malam Ibrahim Dicko. Dicko was a Peul commander linked to Ansar al-Din who was arrested by French forces in Mali in 2015 and then later released. The group’s first attack against Burkinabe forces was in December 2016, when they killed 12 gendarmes in Nassoumbou. The insurgency has quickly expanded since then. Today, Ansarul Islam is composed largely of Peul fighters and it conducts attacks across northern and eastern Burkina Faso, as well as operating on the other side of the Malian border. It is believed to be in close contact with members of Katibat Macina as well as Almansour Ag Alkassoum (before his death) and his fighters. It also operates increasingly along Burkina Faso’s border with Niger. When Malam Dicko died in 2017, he was replaced by his brother, Jafar Dicko, as leader.

THE ISLAMIC STATE IN THE GREATER SAHARA (ISGS)

This local branch of the Islamic State group (ISIS) was at first self-proclaimed, the outgrowth of a schism within MUJAO. The group’s leader, the former MUJAO commander Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, declared his adherence to the Islamic State in May 2015, although ISIS only recognised the pledge of allegiance (bay’a) to its leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016. ISGS began receiving regular attention from formal ISIS media outlets in spring 2019. The group operated first in western Niger and Ménaka, in north-eastern Mali, while also conducting several attacks in Burkina Faso near the border with Mali and an attack on a high-security prison near Niger’s capital Niamey in October 2016. ISGS fighters fought a battle in June 2015 with al-Mourabitoun fighters loyal to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, but subsequently the groups have avoided clashes. At times, ISGS has operated in proximity – and possibly even cooperation – with fighters from JNIM.

According to interviews with local observers as well as regional and international sources, ISGS has drawn many of its fighters from those native to the areas in which it operates, especially Nigerien Peul as well as Dawsahak fighters whose origins are in Ménaka and the Malian city of Gao. ISGS fighters were responsible for the deadly attack that killed four American soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers at Tongo Tongo in the province of Tillabéry, as well as dozens of attacks against Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe troops, militias like the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA), and Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA). It has in recent months expanded its territorial operations along the Niger-Burkina Faso border, as well as into the Gourma region south of Timbuktu in Mali.

Non-Jihadists

​​​​​​​CMA

CMA is one of the signatory groups of the Algiers Peace Accords signed in June 2015. It is composed of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), and part of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA-CMA). The CMA is ostensibly united around the formerly pro-independence movements in northern Mali, but it is really more an umbrella organisation that does not represent one unified ideology.

PLATEFORME

The Plateforme comprises several groups that favour Malian state authority, though it is also heavily implicated in local disputes and attempts at communal control. The Plateforme is the other signatory armed group of the 2015 Algiers Accords. The main groups that make up the Plateforme are: the Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), the MAA-Plateforme, and the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR-1).

MOUVEMENT POUR LE SALUT DE L’AZAWAD (MSA)

The MSA formed in September 2016 under the leadership of Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a young intellectual who was a founding member and political representative of the MNLA. However, as Gao- and Ménaka-based communities sought greater political representation and a larger role in local security with the planned implementation of the Algiers Accords, the MSA broke away from the CMA and especially from the MNLA. The MSA was at first a joint movement of largely Dawsahak as well as Chamanamass Tuareg communities, though the Chamanamass soon split away and constituted a separate MSA branch, referred to here as the MSA-C. The MSA-D is the component part of the alliance with GATIA (though not a part of the Plateforme), and continues to conduct security operations in the eastern part of the Gao region as well as in Ménaka. It has also often joined French forces in operations in the region. It has moved away from pushing for independence and now cooperates with the Malian government. These operations – described as counterterrorism operations largely against ISGS but also against JNIM – have prompted a series of attacks against its forces and assassinations of key MSA figures like the group’s former military commander Adam Ag Albachir in October 2017 and Hadama Ag Haynaha in April 2019. It has also conducted a number of local patrols meant to restore security and prevent theft of property and livestock, although it too has faced accusations of theft and abuses against civilians in the region.

COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS DE L’ENTENTE (CME)

The CME is a loose coalition of armed groups that are not formally part of the peace process in Mali, but advocate for their own inclusion in the process. These groups have largely localised power bases and split away either from the CMA (especially the MNLA) or the Plateforme. They include the MSA-C, the Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad based in Timbuktu and the Gourma, the Congrès Pour la Justice dans l’Azawad formed almost entirely of former MNLA members from the Kel Antessar Tuareg confederation based in and around Timbuktu, the Front Populaire de l’Azawad (FPA), and the Mouvement Populaire pour le Salut de l’Azawad, largely composed of Timbuktu-area Arab and some Tuareg populations, a portion of which recently announced that they had rejoined the MNLA. These groups participate in some parts of the peace process such as the Comité Technique de la Sécurité and the Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination (MOC), as well as the new accelerated DDR programme. But they are not participants in the Comité de Suivi des Accords meetings with the international community and cannot be full participants in the peace process without joining the CMA or the Plateforme.

DAN NA AMBASSAGOU

This group, whose name means “those who put their trust in God” in Dogon, operates in the central and eastern part of the Mopti region, in areas colloquially referred to as the “Pays Dogon”. In Mali, which is nearly 90 percent Muslim, the Dogon makes up a sizeable portion of the non-Muslim population, though there are also ethnic Dogon communities that are Muslim. Dan Na Ambassagou emerged in late 2016 from traditional hunters’ brotherhoods. They represent a loose coalition of largely Dogon self-defense militias that operate under the military authority of Youssouf Toloba. They are very present around Bankass, Bandiagara, Koro, and Mondoro, and are believed to have committed a series of massacres against Peul populations, including at Kolougon in January 2019 and Ogossagou in April 2019. They frequently attack Peul villages and encampments, alleging that jihadists affiliated with Katibat Macina take refuge there. They have also clashed with Peul self-defense groups, which they accuse of cooperating with jihadist fighters. Peul activists and NGO officials have also alleged that several former Malian military officers still in contact with the government are involved with Dan Na Ambassagou, and that their fighters have at times cooperated with Malian defense and security forces operating in their areas.

Other groups of local “hunters” sometimes referred to as Dozo – both Dogon communities and also Bambara speakers – exist in areas near Douentza, Djenné, and Segou. However, these groups are fluid and do not have the same kind of military organisation as a group like Dan Na Ambassagou, even as they have still been allegedly responsible for atrocities in these areas.

Foreign Actors

Operation Barkhane

The French-led Operation Barkhane succeeded Operation Serval in August 2014, but with a much wider geographic focus. The force, with approximately 4,500 soldiers, is spread out between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. While its headquarters is in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital, it also has fighter aircraft and bases for intelligence collection and operations in Niger’s capital Niamey, Agadez, Arlit, Tillabéry, and several other sites, as well as around 1,500 troops in northern Mali scattered between the large base at Gao, others at Kidal, Timbuktu, and Tessalit, and more recently a base at Gossi closer to central Mali as well as the border with Burkina Faso. France’s Special Operations Task Force for the region, Operation Sabre, is in Burkina Faso.

Operation Barkhane is France’s largest overseas operation, with a budget of nearly €600m per year. It engages in everything from combat patrols alongside Malian forces and partner militias to intelligence gathering and training to local development activities meant to fill the hole left by an absent government. Despite this range, French officials insist that Barkhane’s priority is counterterrorism and it has undertaken operations to kill important jihadist leaders, including two of the five founding leaders of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) as well as Almansour Ag Alkassoum and a number of others.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has two Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Mali and one in Niger. In Mali, these are the EU Training Mission (EUTM), which provides training for the Malian armed forces, and the EU Capacity and Assistance Programme (EUCAP) mission, which largely focuses on police and internal security forces. The EUCAP mission in Niger has since 2016 focused much more on migration, whereas the two missions in Mali remain focused on counterterrorism training, core military and police capacity building, and improving awareness of human rights. These missions do not deploy offensively or in the field in support of the forces they train, though they have faced attack at their base in Koulikoro as well as in Bamako. EUTM and EUCAP have expanded their operations to include trainings conducted in central and northern Mali, in part in response to concerns that they had overly focused their activities in southern Mali.

AFRICAN UNION (by DCAF)

– The political section aims to accompany the strenghtening of the benefits of peace and security; to promote the rule of Law and to contribute to the reinforcement of the democratic institutions in the Sahelian region, including the protection of Human Rights, capacity building for the national Human Rights institutions, the judicial sector and the organisations from the civil society. Through this project, the MISAHEL also works on humanitarian issues, especially in the Northern Region.

– The second section is dedicated to the security in the Sahelian Region. Its main objective is to oversee the efforts of the AU as regards the security challenges, and in particular conflicts, terrorism, and various organized crime networks.

– The last section focuses on the development and environmental issues in the region, such as the deterioration of the environment, and the consequences of underdevelopment. 

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

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from Mali Media Profile by BBC

The media environment in Bamako and the rest of the south is relatively open, but the presence of armed militant groups in the north poses dangers for media workers, says Freedom House.

Reporters Without Borders says there is a significant degree of media pluralism, but a lack of money means that outlets are susceptible to editorial influence from those who fund them.

Radio is the leading medium. There are hundreds of stations, operated by private and community broadcasters and by the state-run Office de Radiodiffusion-Television du Mali (ORTM).

The TV sector is much smaller.

Almost all daily and weekly newspapers publish from Bamako. Circulation figures are low. L’Essor is the leading title.

The BBC broadcasts in Bamako (88.9 FM) and Radio France Internationale (RFI) is widely available on FM.

By mid-2019, 12.5 million Malians were online – around 63% of the population (InternetWorldStats.com).

Social media use is concentrated in the cities and among young people. Facebook is the top platform, followed by Instagram.

The authorities have sometimes restricted access to social media to obstruct attempts to mobilise protesters, and blocked internet access in 2018 ahead of a presidential run-off vote.

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

From Cia Factbook (Page last updated on October 13, 2020)

Location: interior Western Africa, southwest of Algeria, north of Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, west of Niger

Coastline: 0 km (landlocked)

Climate: subtropical to arid; hot and dry (February to June); rainy, humid, and mild (June to November); cool and dry (November to February)

Natural resources: gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, uranium, gypsum, granite, hydropower, note, bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and copper deposits are known but not exploited

Population distribution: the overwhelming majority of the population lives in the southern half of the country, with greater density along the border with Burkina Faso.

Natural hazards: hot, dust-laden harmattan haze common during dry seasons; recurring droughts; occasional Niger River flooding

Environment – current issues: deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; loss of pasture land; inadequate supplies of potable water

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission sites at https://minusma.unmissions.org/en or https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

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These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

AMISOM has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a humanitarian section.^[i]

The Military Component is the biggest of the three components of the AU Mission in the country. The component is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the Mission to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation.

Headed by the AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant Gen. Jim Beesigye Owoyesigire, the component also provides protection to the country’s Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia’s key infrastructure including its airports and seaports.

Currently, the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. According to AMISOM, these are the current force levels and areas of operation:

First deployed in March 2007, the AMISOM military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National Security Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, out of much of southern Somalia including most major towns and cities. It has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to begin establish accountable local governance institutions that can begin to deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government.

Mogadishu is today transformed. The local economy is booming and the effects are far from confined to Mogadishu. Securing the capital allowed AMISOM to move into the second phase of its original concept of operations, deploying across the country and expanding the authority of the state.

The humanitarian component fulfills the mission mandate to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, assisting in the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. AMISOM has worked to secure transport routes including the seaport, airport, and roads around Mogadishu in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

^[i] Ibid, AU Mission in Somalia

^[i] AU Mission in Somalia website, http://amisom-au.org/#

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

From AMISOM News (linked accessed on 02 September 2020)

AMISOM and Civil Society Organizations meet to prepare for 2020/21 elections

Mogadishu, 22 November—A technical preparatory meeting organized by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on Thursday in Mogadishu brought together AMISOM and Somali Civil Society Organizations (CSO) to develop a work plan ahead of the 2020/21 elections.

Convened by AMISOM’s Political Unit and the Protection, Human Rights, and Protection Group (PHRG) the meeting also discussed activities undertaken by AMISOM’s military, police, and civilian components in the areas of early recovery, stabilization, political reconciliation, human rights, gender, and protection.

AMISOM maintains a close working relationship with CSOs in Somalia through monthly technical meetings as well as quarterly strategic events involving senior officials of the mission. The civilian component of AMISOM actively works with civil society organizations in the protection of human rights and vulnerable groups, promoting inclusive politics, preventing and countering violent extremism, stabilization, and early recovery as well as rehabilitation of disengaged combatants.

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.

It is difficult to determine AMISOM losses because, unlike most UN-managed missions, AMISOM does not publicly acknowledge casualties. In addition, its record-keeping is inexact and family compensation is irregular. Therefore, most AMISOM casualty figures estimates are determined by extrapolation from media reports.

Information on AMISOM casualties can be found at:

These products are the results of academic research and intended for general information and awareness only. They include the best information publicly available at the time of publication. Routine efforts are made to update the materials; however, readers are encouraged to check the specific mission site at https://amisom-au.org.