

Earlier drafts of this document were previously marked **CUI**. OSD-CNSP, the office that created the implementation guidance originally marked **SBU/CUI**, which is included in this framework, has reviewed the material, and determined that it is no longer **SBU/CUI** because the guiding US Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability was signed by POTUS in 2020 and designated countries were announced on 1 April 2022, this document is now **Unclassified** and open source.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION (DSS) A GUIDE FOR STABILIZATION PRACTITIONERS



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

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FORWARD


This framework, *Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS): A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners*, was developed over the past two years by PKSOI in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense—Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (OSD-CNSP), and in coordination with a wide-ranging planning team involving members from across the joint force and the interagency.

Created in fulfillment of Task 1.1.5 of the December 2020 Secretary of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan, this framework serves as a reference guide that outlines how the Department of Defense, in support of U.S. Government (USG) strategy and interagency partners, supports USG stabilization efforts, missions, and activities.

As this is a DoD framework, it begins by highlighting DoD policy for DSS outlined in DoD Directive 3000.05 *Stabilization*, before providing an overview of US strategy including the 2022 National Security Strategy, 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2020 Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and 2019 Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. Following a review of other pertinent policy and doctrine, this framework outlines how the US Government in general, and DoD in particular, is organized to achieve US stabilization goals. The framework then details how the USG implements, and DoD supports, stabilization efforts.

Two appendixes detail the law governing Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) and DoD implementation guidance for this important Security Cooperation program. Finally, there are twenty-three annexes of the U.S. strategies, policies, programs, and doctrine that comprise the USG and DoD framework for stabilization. There are two versions of this guide, a short version in which these annexes are provided as links to the actual documents, and a long version in which the documents are included in each annex. The file size of the short version is about 2MB and the long version about 18MB.

PKSOI, in coordination with OSD-CNSP, is committed to periodically updating this *DSS Guide for Stabilization Practitioners* as key strategies, policies, and doctrine are published.



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1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this framework is to provide guidance and direction to stabilization practitioners that compiles United States Government (USG) strategy, Department of Defense (DoD) policy, Joint Forces Doctrine, and applicable Security Cooperation (SC) programs into a single, useful guide.

This guide compiles sections of relevant legislation, policies, and doctrine which define Stabilization; delineate responsibilities for effective planning, coordination, administration, and execution of stabilization activities; and provide guidance and procedures for the Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Program in order to mitigate the drivers of instability.

This framework was developed in compliance with Task 1.1.5 of the Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan for the National Defense Strategy: “Within National Defense Strategy constraints, develop a framework for defense support to stabilization (DSS) across the spectrum of conflict that includes competition, crisis, and armed conflict.”

2. APPLICABILITY

This DSS framework is applicable to practitioners of stabilization and peace operations within DoD to include regional desk officers, Combatant Command (CCMD) and Joint Task Force (JTF) staff planners, Theater-Civil Affairs Planning Team (T-CAPT) members, ministry of defense advisors, military attachés, civil affairs officers, foreign area officers, security force assistance advisors and additional DoD personnel who plan, coordinate, or conduct stabilization.

3. REFERENCES

There are several key documents listed in this framework covering the law, policy, regulations, and implementation. See Appendices and Annexes for a list of additional laws, regulations, policies and other documents, glossary (Appendix C) and definitions (Appendix D).

4. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

DoD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. DoD’s role in stabilization fits within the larger whole of government context of laws, regulations and policies pertaining to the National Security Strategy (NSS), U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (USPCPS), Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), and National Defense Strategy (NDS).

[DoD Directive \(DoDD\) 3000.05 Stabilization, December 2018](#) (Annex I of this framework).

This issuance applies to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred

to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”). The following is extracted directly from DoDD 3000.05:

- a. Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.
- b. Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) is a process to synchronize missions, activities, and tasks that support or reinforce USG stabilization efforts and promote stability in designated fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the United States.
- c. The Department of State remains the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; the U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance; and DoD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities.
- d. Fragile and conflict-affected states serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism; transnational terrorism and organized crime; refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian emergencies; the spread of pandemic disease; and mass atrocities. Stabilization can prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners.
- e. Stabilization must be incorporated into planning across all lines of effort for military operations as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions. (1) Stabilization is required to translate combat success into lasting strategic gains and achieve the ends for which the military operation was waged. (2) Stabilization is a necessary complement to joint combat power at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
- f. It is DoD Policy that to the extent authorized by law, DoD will plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the range of military operations in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success.
- g. DoD will emphasize small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization working by, with, and through indigenous and other external partners to achieve strategic objectives.
- h. DoD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population.
- i. DoD will establish a defense support to stabilization (DSS) process to identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies; convey them through strategic documents; organize to achieve them; and prioritize requisite defense resources.

- (1) DoD designs, implements, monitors, and evaluates stabilization actions based on conflict assessments, operational requirements, and complementary foreign assistance.
- (2) Consistent with available authorities, DoD prioritizes efforts to identify, train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany foreign security forces conducting stabilization actions independently or in conjunction with other USG efforts.
- (3) When authorized and directed, DoD establishes secure operating conditions for civilian-led stabilization efforts.
- (4) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and consistent with available authorities, DoD supports other USG departments and agencies with logistic support, supplies, and services and other enabling capabilities.
- (5) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD reinforces and complements civilian-led stabilization efforts. Such efforts include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

5. BACKGROUND AND AUTHORITIES

a. [National Security Strategy \(NSS\) 2022](#) (Annex F of this framework) The National Security Strategy lays out our plan to achieve a better future of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world. Our strategy is rooted in our national interests: to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. We can do none of this alone and we do not have to. Most nations around the world define their interests in ways that are compatible with ours. We will build the strongest and broadest possible coalition of nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a darker vision and thwarting their efforts to threaten our interests.

We will: 1) invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; 2) build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and 3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland.

b. [Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas \(SAR\) 2018](#) (Annex A of this framework). The performance of U.S. stabilization efforts has consistently been limited by the lack of strategic clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort in how the USG approaches these missions. The SAR outlines how the United States can improve the outcomes of our stabilization efforts through more efficient and disciplined bureaucratic structures, processes, and engagement with international partners. The following highlights

are drawn directly from the SAR framework:

(1) The United States and our partners need a new and more disciplined approach for conducting stabilization in conflict-affected areas. This approach includes analyzing risks and focusing our efforts on what is absolutely necessary to achieve stability, rather than pursuing disparate agendas all at once. A critical first step toward more harmonized stabilization efforts is agreeing on the core tenets of the concept itself. Despite significant international experience over recent decades, the concept of stabilization remains ill-defined and poorly institutionalized across government and multilateral structures. This lack of standardization in definition and process leads to repeated mistakes, inefficient spending, and poor accountability for results.

(2) Policymakers want to be more selective and targeted about how we engage in stabilization environments to maximize the value of American and international taxpayer resources. The revitalized approach to stabilization outlined in the SAR can help target diplomatic engagement in these environments toward advancing a strategy connected to stabilization outcomes, enable greater sequencing and layering of assistance to support locally legitimate actors, achieve cost-saving efficiencies, and foster a better division of labor between the U.S. Government and international donors and institutions. With these lessons in mind, DoS, USAID, and DoD developed a refined definition of stabilization that can guide our efforts in this regard. We define stabilization as *a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence*. Transitional in nature, stabilization includes efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, delivers targeted basic services, and establishes a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

c. [2022 National Defense Strategy \(NDS\) of the United States of America](#) (Annex G of this framework) The NDS sets out how the U.S. military will meet growing threats to vital U.S. national security interests and to a stable and open international system. It directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the Department's pacing challenge. The strategy identifies four top-level defense priorities that the Department must pursue to strengthen deterrence:

- (1) Defend the homeland.
- (2) Deter strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners.
- (3) Deter Aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary.
- (4) Build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department advances our goals through three primary pillars: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.

- (1) Integrated Deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum

effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

(2) Campaigning strengthens deterrence and enables the U.S. and our allies and partners to gain advantage against the full range of competitors' coercive actions. Campaigning is the conduct and sequencing of the logically linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time.

(3) Building Enduring Advantage across the ecosystem—the Department of Defense, the industrial base, and the array of private sector and academic enterprises that create and sharpen the Joint Force's technological edge. DoD will modernize the systems that design and build the Joint Force with a focus on innovation and rapid adjustment to new strategic demands.

d. [2020 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability](#) (Annex C of this framework) outlines a ten-year, whole-of-government effort to foster peace and long-term stability through integrated diplomacy, development, and security-sector engagement. The Strategy builds upon and strengthens the work done to implement the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, and ongoing efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. It will leverage and advance other priorities, such as to promote democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights; advance gender equality; counter corruption; reduce the risks of the climate crisis; and bring an end to the COVID-19 pandemic.

e. [United States Strategy on Women, Peace and Security](#) June 2019 (Annex D of this framework): The Secretary Defense, in coordination with Secretary State, shall incorporate participation by women into all security cooperation activities carried out under Title 10 and shall incorporate gender analysis and Women, Peace, and Security priorities into training and activities to be conducted under Section 333 and other authorized security assistance programs. Security Cooperation (SC) planners should note that the WPS requirements under section 1210E affect all Security Assistance (SA) and SC programs not just programs under 333.

f. DoD State Partnership Program (Annex W of this framework): A Joint DoD security cooperation program, with the National Guard Bureau as the program manager, and executed by the States. Each partnership is authorized by section 341, approved by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to “support the security cooperation objectives of the United States.” Codified into U.S. law, the State Partnership Program (SPP) allows the National Guard to interact with military, security forces, and emergency/disaster response organizations of friendly partner nations.

g. Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) Section 1210A of National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2020 and 1333 of NDAA 2022 Modification and Extension (Appendix A of this framework). The DSSA is an important SC program that enables the

Combatant Commands (CCMD) to support Whole of Government stabilization efforts. However, it is just one of many SC programs available to stabilization practitioners and should not be confused with the over-arching DSS policy. The 1210A DSSA states that:

- (1) The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, may provide support to the other Federal agencies for the stabilization activities of such agencies.
- (2) Overall, the elements of strategy for stabilization shall set forth the following (directly from 1210A language):
 - (a) The United States interests in conducting stabilization activities in one of the designated countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Somalia; and countries/regions identified in the Global Fragility Act (GFA): Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, and the Coastal West Africa region consisting of the countries of Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.
 - (b) The key foreign partners and actors in such country.
 - (c) The desired end states and objectives of the United States stabilization activities in such country.
 - (d) The Department of Defense support intended to be provided for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies.
 - (e) Any mechanism for civil-military coordination regarding support for stabilization activities.
 - (f) The mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of Department of Defense support for United States stabilization activities in the area.

h. [DoDD 3000.07 Irregular Warfare \(IW\)](#) (Annex J of this framework). It is DoD policy that:

- (1) Personnel with IW and SFA capabilities remain a critical element of DoD's ability to conduct the full range of military operations in support of U.S. policy.
- (2) SFA is an activity of special interest as it supports a broad range of IW missions and activities as well as building the security capacity and capability of U.S. partners and allies.
- (3) IW and SFA skills, training, education, and experience must be maintained; this necessitates the need for the means to effectively identify and organize forces and individuals that will allow the DoD Military Services and USCG to better meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) IW and SFA requirements.

(4) The Military Departments undertake actions and develop mechanisms to identify and track personnel who have demonstrated IW or SFA skills, have successfully completed IW or SFA training or education, or possess IW or SFA experience. Tracking of DoD civilian personnel will be in accordance with Volume 1100 of DoDI 1400.25.

i. The Stabilization Framework. Joint Publication 3-07 *Joint Stabilization Activities*, February 2022, (Annex O of this framework) Chapter 1 states that:

(1) The stabilization framework helps the Joint Force Commander conceptualize part of the Operational Environment (OE) of a nation that requires stabilization in support of U.S. national strategy and interests. The framework emphasizes the training and organization of forces prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. The framework helps organize stabilization efforts and scopes the stabilization activities to achieve their objectives, whether supporting combatant command campaign plans (CCP) and integrated country strategies (ICS) or in major contingency operations.

(2) The stabilization framework is intended to encompass the process for which all activities across the competition continuum achieves stability. It guides the understanding of the USG efforts and commitment necessary to conduct stabilization activities across the competition continuum.

(3) Military forces may need to operate at any point in the fragile state. Achieving policy goals could also require the expeditious reduction in the level of violence. Maintaining security creates conditions permitting the safe introduction of other stabilization partners. Security is essential for stabilization; however, establishing security has direct implications both on localized conflict and the broader political landscape. Military operations focus on stabilizing the OE and supporting those working to transform economic, social, and political conditions toward stability. In a failed or failing state, conditions typically require more coercive actions to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions of the OE improve, the constructive capabilities of military forces can focus on building host nation (HN) civil-security capacity and enable sustained development through DoS, USAID, and other stabilization partners.

(a) The **initial response stage** generally reflects activities executed to stabilize an OE in a crisis state. During this stage, military forces perform stabilization activities in concert with other stabilization partners, during and immediately after a conflict or during a disaster. These activities may also be in support of stabilization partners. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) should avoid military actions that might impede civilian actions, which are often in progress prior to military intervention. In the case of a disaster, as directed, DoD supports USAID's Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), which is the lead in any international disaster relief effort. Activities during the initial response phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment, and they allow both the military and civilian personnel to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the HN population. Joint forces always seek to reduce the level of violence and

human suffering, while creating conditions that enable other stabilization partners to participate safely in ongoing efforts.




Figure 1. Strategic Framework for Stabilization from JP 3-07

(b) The **transformation stage** represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building tasks. Military forces perform these tasks in a relatively secure environment, free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. Forces often execute transformation phase tasks in either vulnerable or crisis states. These tasks aim to build HN capacity, to include support of other organizations. While establishing conditions that facilitate

broad unified action to rebuild the HN and its supporting institutions, these tasks facilitate the continued stability of the OE. Transformation in a stability context involves multiple types of transitions, which can occur concurrently.

(c) The **fostering sustainability stage** encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. In particular, military forces must work to develop institutional capacity in defense and security institutions. Effective and accountable HN institutions are critical to sustaining operational and tactical capacity in HN security forces. This stage also represents those stabilization activities undertaken to prevent instability and conflict. Military forces usually perform fostering sustainability tasks only when the OE is stable enough to support efforts. Such efforts implement long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and legitimacy of the HN. Often, military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.

6. U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

U.S. government inter-agency and Department of Defense stabilization efforts are guided by the SAR. The following is extracted from the SAR:

Federal Departments and Agencies recommended steps to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas. Specifically, the interagency framework includes steps to: establish a U.S. Government wide definition of stabilization; develop and evaluate political strategies based on evidence and rigorous analysis; promote a fair, purposeful division of labor with national partners and international donors; clarify agency roles and responsibilities to improve performance and reduce duplication; improve the capacity of our civilian workforce to address stabilization needs in tandem with the U.S. military and partner forces; and sequence and target our assistance to conflict-affected areas in a more measured fashion.

As such, the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, and Joint Force have organized for stabilization:

a. [Department of State \(DoS\)](#):

(1) [Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations \(CSO\)](#) anticipates, prevents, and responds to conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. CSO's three lines of effort (LOEs) focus on different aspects of the conflict cycle: 1) strategic prevention; 2) conflict resolution; and 3) security sector stabilization. They implement their LOEs through three key functions; 1) deploying Stabilization Advisors; 2) harnessing data analytics; and 3) leading, informing, and implementing policy and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization.

(2) Chiefs of Mission in priority countries and regions will lead field-level planning,

decision-making, and coordination. Chiefs of Mission, with input from the USAID Mission Directors as appropriate, will designate a representative to be responsible for coordinating and integrating the full spectrum of Global Fragility Act activities across the Country Team and with the relevant Combatant Command and agency stakeholders. Chiefs of Mission or designee will lead bilateral engagement on security and justice sector reform to ensure United States support for such efforts is properly elevated to a central policy objective. They will be responsible for directing the planning and implementation of security and justice sector assistance resources to appropriately leverage political objectives.

- (a) The principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense, is the Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT). The SDO/DATT is the Chief of Mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The SDO/DATT is considered the dual-hatted chief of both the security cooperation organization (SCO) and defense attaché office (DAO) in the embassy. This position was established by DoDD 5105.75, *Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies*, December 21, 2007. The same document gives coordinating authority to the SDO/DATT for the purpose of ensuring that all DoD elements in a country are working in consonance with each other and under the guidance of the Chief of Mission.
- (b) United States embassies and missions establish coordination mechanisms for engaging regularly with national government counterparts, local civil society, and other stakeholders. They review, align, and adapt plans and programs based on ongoing partner engagement and iterative conflict analysis, keeping other United States Government stakeholders periodically informed. As practical and appropriate, United States embassies and missions incorporate plans to implement the Strategy into State Integrated Country Strategies (ICS), USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), and DoD Campaign Plans, Operational Plans, and Regional Strategies.
- (3) [Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement \(INL\)](#). The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) was created in 1978 to reduce drug trafficking into the United States from Latin America. INM's mission soon expanded beyond combating drugs to supporting stabilization efforts in the Balkans, and to fighting corruption and transnational crime around the world. To reflect its expanded mission, INM was re-established as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in 1995. Today, INL uses a wide range of tools to counter crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad, including foreign assistance, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and reporting, sanctions, and rewards. INL has two complementary core competencies: helping partner governments assess, build, reform, and sustain competent and legitimate criminal justice systems, and developing and implementing the architecture necessary for international drug control and cross-border law enforcement

cooperation. INL works with partner nations, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, U.S. federal, state, and local criminal justice entities to achieve its mission.

b. [U.S. Agency for International Development \(USAID\)](#): In the past several years, USAID has taken strides to improve its coordination with the DoD.

(1) The [Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization \(CPS\)](#) was formally launched in July 2020 as the U.S. Government's technical and implementation lead on peace-building, state fragility, stabilization, conflict, violence prevention, and political transition in high-priority countries. CPS partners with USAID Missions and Embassies worldwide, working bilaterally or in conjunction with other Agency operating units (OUs) to make resources and expertise on such issues more accessible, more functionally aligned, more field-oriented, and more effective. For the first time, USAID has a bureau dedicated to preventing and resolving violent conflict, supporting Missions in conflict-prone environments, and responding to complex challenges related to violence, fragility, and political transition. CPS has three offices that contribute to whole-of-government stabilization efforts.

(a) The [Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation \(CMC\)](#) serves as USAID's primary point of contact with the Department of Defense (DoD) and leverages the unique capabilities of each organization to achieve better humanitarian, stabilization, and development outcomes in pursuit of U.S. national security goals and national values. CMC development and humanitarian assistance advisors to the Special Operations Command and every Geographic Combatant Command except NORTHCOM.

(b) The [Office of Transition Initiatives \(OTI\)](#) supports U.S. foreign policy by seizing emerging windows of opportunity in the political landscape to promote stability, peace, and democracy by catalyzing local initiatives through adaptive and agile programming. OTI implements an average of 1,750 activities each year across all of its country programs. In 2020, OTI managed programs in 14 countries with a total annual budget of \$92 million in Transition Initiatives funds.

(c) The [Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention \(CVP\)](#) strengthens USAID's capacities and commitment to resolve conflict and prevent violence. The Center analyzes sources of conflict and fragility, and assists Missions through program interventions, as well as by integrating conflict-sensitive approaches into their programs and activities. Aside from OTI, CVP manages many of USAID's other authorities and funds related to stabilization.

(2) [Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance \(BHA\)](#) In 2020, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance was established to streamline USAID humanitarian responses, bringing together the vast expertise and resources of the former USAID Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP). BHA provides life-saving humanitarian assistance—including food, water, shelter, emergency healthcare, sanitation and hygiene, and critical nutrition services—to the world's most vulnerable and hardest-

to-reach people. BHA is the lead federal coordinator for international disaster assistance, harnessing the expertise and unique capacities of other U.S. government entities to effectively respond to natural disasters and complex crises around the world. BHA takes a holistic look at humanitarian aid, providing assistance before, during and after a crisis—from readiness and response to relief and recovery. This includes non-emergency programming that is foundational to linking humanitarian assistance to long-term development. The humanitarian assistance advisors at combatant commands report to BHA’s Washington headquarters.

(3) [USAID Missions](#): Development assistance is the mainstay of USAID’s global work, centered around the Agency’s overseas Missions in more than 80 countries. This form of international cooperation has broad, generational aims: to end poverty, improve governance, support quality education, mitigate and adapt to climate change, tackle global health challenges, and so on. USAID Missions are part of the persistent U.S. embassy team when one is present. Like the chief of mission and other diplomats, these development professionals will want to ensure that stabilization activities do not complicate or undermine their long-term goals in the country or region. OTI and BHA activities in a given country are not under the direct authority of the USAID Mission Director, but per USAID policy, they must coordinate with him/her. Additionally, every USAID overseas Mission has a Mission Civil-Military Coordinator (MC2) who serves as a point of entry for DOD personnel.

c. [Department of Justice \(DoJ\)](#):

The [International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program \(ICITAP\)](#) works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. ICITAP provides international development assistance that supports both national security and foreign policy objectives. Situated in the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, ICITAP works in close partnership with and receives funding for its programs from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of Defense. ICITAP programs are designed in partnership with the host countries, and program implementation methods include on-the-ground, pre-program assessments; program planning, management, and review; curriculum development; classroom training, seminars, and workshops; internships; equipment donations; donor coordination; and on-the-job training and mentoring provided by embedded long-term advisors.

d. [Department of Defense \(DoD\)](#):

According to Joint Publication 3-07 *Joint Stabilization Activities*, February 2022 (Annex O of this framework) stabilization activities are the various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability is the desired end state, and stabilization is the aggregation of activities to restore

the functions of the legitimate authorities. As such, the Department of Defense and Joint Force have organized for stabilization:

(1) [Assistant Secretary of Defense \(ASD\) for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict \(SO/LIC\)](#) oversees and advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the Department of Defense to ensure these capabilities are resourced, ready, and properly employed in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. In this role, the ASD:

- Exercises authority, direction, and control of all special operations peculiar issues relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces.
- Is the Principal Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Official within the senior management of DoD.
- Sits in the chain-of-command above USSOCOM for special operations-peculiar administrative matters; provides civilian oversight of the SOF enterprise.
- Advises, Assists, and Supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on Special Operations and Irregular Warfare policy matters.

ASD SO/LIC serves as the Co-lead of the Irregular Warfare – Security Force Assistance (IW-SFA) Executive Steering Committee.

(a) [Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense \(DASD\) for Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism \(IWCT\)](#). Co-lead office for execution of the Irregular Warfare – Security Force Assistance (IW-SFA) Executive Steering Committee and Working Group. Provides oversight of the NDS Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan and associated tasks. Leads development of DoDD 3000.07 *Irregular Warfare*.

(b) [DASD for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy \(CNSP\)](#) develops DoD counterdrug (CD) and counter-transnational organized crime (CTOC) policy. CNSP provides policy and intellectual leadership for stability operations to decision makers and within DoD and our partner organizations; identifies and bridges the gaps in stability operations capability, capacity, and compatibility within DoD and across the rest of the USG and civilian organizations; and leads efforts to institutionalize stability operations capabilities, capacity, and compatibility across DoD to ensure that DoD is organized, resourced and prepared to conduct stability operations with USG, civilian organizations and international partners. In this role, CNSP leads development of DoDD 3000.05 *Stabilization* policy and provides oversight of the 1210A DSSA program.

(c) [DASD for Global Partnerships](#). OSD-P Strategy, Plans and Capabilities (SPC) focal point for Security Cooperation and Building Partnership Capacity subject matter expertise, recognized as the DoD lead that prioritizes, integrates, and evaluates bilateral and multilateral security cooperation activities to strengthen U.S. and global security.

(d) [Defense Security Cooperation Agency \(DSCA\)](#) — The mission of DSCA is to

advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by building the capacity of foreign security forces to respond to shared challenges. DSCA leads the broader U.S. security cooperation enterprise in its efforts to train, educate, advise, and equip foreign partners. DSCA administers security cooperation programs that support U.S. policy interests and objectives identified by the White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State. These objectives include developing specific partner capabilities, building alliances and partnerships, and facilitating U.S. access. DSCA integrates security cooperation activities in support of a whole-of-government approach; provides execution guidance to DoD entities that implement security cooperation programs; exercises financial and program management for the Foreign Military Sales system and many other security cooperation programs; and educates and provides for the long-term development of the security cooperation workforce.

(2) Joint Force:

(a) [Joint Staff J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy, Deputy Directorate](#) - Under the J-5, the Counter Threats and International Cooperation (CTIC) Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division (SHED) develops military advice for plans, policies, and strategies across the broad range of stabilization and humanitarian portfolios to provide informed participation and decisions by the Joint Staff during strategic engagements and interagency policy development. More specifically, SHED develops stability and humanitarian guidance and military advice on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); coordinates policy and guidance with combatant commands, services, combat support agencies, and other USG agencies on behalf of the CJCS; and coordinates and synchronizes with Joint Force with the U.S. whole of government efforts to meet national objectives regarding interagency stability and humanitarian activities. SHED is the link between Combatant Commanders and interagency support and activity to promote stability, democracy, and human security.

(b) [Joint Staff J-7 Joint Force Development, Deputy Directorate](#) is responsible for the six functions of joint force development: Doctrine, Education, Concept Development & Experimentation, Training, Exercises and Lessons Learned. Under the J-7, the Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition (OIWC) serves as co-lead office for execution of the Irregular Warfare – Security Force Assistance (IW-SFA) Executive Steering Committee and Working Group. Provides oversight of the NDS Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan and associated tasks.

(c) [Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance \(JCISFA\)](#) is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activity that serves as the DoD's recognized expert on security force assistance (SFA). JCISFA serves as the Joint Force integrator for the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of SFA doctrine, standards, tactics, techniques, and procedures that enable the Joint Force to efficiently and effectively develop partner nation capability and capacity in support of U.S. national security objectives.

(d) USSOCOM J33 Civil Affairs Joint Proponent Office (CAJPO), executes Joint

Proponent for Civil Affairs (DoDD 2000.13 *Civil Affairs*).

- Assists the CJCS by leading the development of joint civil affairs doctrine.
- Leads the development of joint civil affairs training and education for individuals and units.
- Leads the identification of required joint civil affairs capabilities across all warfighting domains.
- Leads the development of joint civil affairs mission essential task lists.
- Leads the development of joint civil affairs strategy.
- Coordinates with the Military Services and Combatant Commands to develop standards ensuring interoperability of joint civil affairs forces and equipment.
- Coordinates with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Joint Staff to consult with other USG departments and agencies on civil affairs-related initiatives, strategies, concepts, plans, and policies.
- Assists the USD(P&R) in identifying critical civil affairs skills, training, and experience.

(e) [U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute \(PKSOI\)](#) executes the Army's responsibilities as Joint Proponent for Stabilization and Peace Operations. PKSOI is the Army and DoD's economy of force, low-cost tool to maintain visibility and forward momentum within the stabilization and peace operations realms. PKSOI develops, integrates, and assesses joint, intergovernmental, and multinational peace and stability capabilities to achieve national objectives across the competition continuum. PKSOI ensures stabilization and peace operations are appropriately and accurately reflected in U.S. Military strategy, policy, doctrine, concepts, training, education, and leader development. PKSOI serves as a resource for practitioners who confront challenges in executing DSS by advising and connecting practitioners to the right entity or resource. PKSOI executes the Army's Joint Proponent responsibilities for Stabilization and Peace Operations as designated by the Secretary of Defense:

- Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the development and implementation of stabilization-related elements of irregular warfare doctrine, organization, training, leadership, education, and policy for the Joint Force with an emphasis on DoD's core stabilization responsibility.
- Identify and prioritize required skills for the Joint Force that enable security force assistance and defense institution building. These are essential Joint Force skills that are required to leverage the capability and capacity of foreign security forces to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives.
- Assist the CJCS with stabilization-related elements of the Chairman's Annual Joint Irregular Warfare Assessment.
- Assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense with the Stabilization Assessment as it pertains to stabilization and peace operations.
- Advise the military services with stabilization and peace operations subject matter expertise to help them identify and track military personnel and civilians with the training, background, and experience necessary to plan and execute stabilization

- and peace operations.
- Lead collaborative engagement with relevant joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national partners as well as public-private partners and academia, as it pertains to stabilization and peace operations.
- Lead the integration of joint lessons learned in stabilization and peace operations.

(f) Combatant Commands (CCMD). Stabilization activities can be conducted throughout the competition continuum. The nature of the OE may require U.S. forces to conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously. Stabilization activities are Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI)s nested under Theater Strategy (TS) and Combatant Commanders Campaign Plan Lines of Effort (LOEs) down to the Objective/Effect level. OAI)s are planned under the Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG) framework targeting drivers of instability within the AOR to consolidate gains and engage in long term Strategic Competition.

Fragile and conflict affected states often serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism; trans-national terrorism and organized crime; refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian emergencies; the spread of pandemic disease; and mass atrocities. Combatant Commanders' staffs will incorporate stabilization into planning and execution, as appropriate, across the ROMO to prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners. Stabilization considerations are included in all plans, orders, and exercises to consolidate gains and prevent future conflict. CCMD responsibilities for conducting Civil Affairs are outlined in DoDD 2000.13 *Civil Affairs*, Enclosure 2, paragraph 6, p. 8. (Annex H of this framework). CCMD responsibilities for stabilization are outlined in DoDD 3000.05 *Stabilization*, paragraph 2.13, page 13 (Annex I of this framework).

7. IMPLEMENTATION

- a. The Department of State (DoS) (SAR Annex A of this framework) is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization policy, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security assistance, and the DoD is the supporting agency whose activities include providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities and resources. If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DoD will lead United States Government (USG) stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.
- b. DoDD 3000.05 *Stabilization* (Annex I of this framework) establishes a policy that DoD plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the ROMO in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success. To effectively implement stabilization strategy, policy, and doctrine, Combatant Commanders should:

- (1) Incorporate stabilization concepts into training, exercises, experimentation, and

planning, including intelligence, campaign, and support plans.

- (2) Emphasize small-footprint, partner stabilization that works by, with, and through indigenous and external partners.
- (3) Support efforts of other USG agencies and international partners to develop stabilization plans in coordination with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
- (4) Stabilization requires sustained civilian and military integration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve unity of effort. This includes:
 - (a) Actively solicit participation from mission-critical USG departments and agencies.
 - (b) Utilizing civil-military teams that can integrate key instruments of national power in a way that complements indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and private entities to achieve stabilization objectives.
 - (c) When appropriate, leverage DoD humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief activities to complement USG stabilization efforts.
- (5) As appropriate and authorized, collaborate with and share essential intelligence and other information related to stabilization efforts with partners, including the USG interagency, foreign and multinational forces and organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and elements of academia and civil society.
- (6) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD will reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

To implement stabilization policy, Combatant Commanders in coordination with civilian mission partners should develop plans and operations in fragile or conflict-affected areas in their theater that will:

- (1) Ensure appropriate stability efforts are enabled by direction and resources published in Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of Combatant Commanders numbered plans within DoDD 3000.05 *Stabilization* (Annex I of this framework).
- (2) Consider the impact of operations and actions – including combat actions, partner selection, and security cooperation – on stabilization efforts, as well as indigenous political dynamics, including gender analysis and second and third order effects, mitigate

risk and support U.S. national interests.

(3) Detail how the Combatant Command, coalition, or partner military forces will transition from threat-focused combat/armed conflict operations to more population-focused stabilization actions to maintain gains and enable security and legitimacy of U.S. actions.

(4) Enable and encourage foreign partners to plan and conduct stabilization actions in ways that are acceptable locally and consistent with U.S. policy objectives and international norms.

(5) Convey the Commander's Communication Strategy consistent with USG Strategic Communication guidance and policy objectives, that counters adversaries and affirms effective and legitimate local governance.

c. DoD will adhere to and support the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Annex D of this framework) as well as the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (HR 2116). Recognizing directly from the WPS Act that:

(1) Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflict and instability globally.

(2) Women's participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years by 20 percent, and by 35 percent for durability of 15 years. It is critical to integrate gender analysis into understanding the OE, planning, OAs, and assessments. Leverage and promote meaningful inclusion of women in preventing conflict and preparing for disasters, managing, mitigating, and resolving conflict and crisis, and post-conflict/crisis. Protect and promote the (human) rights of members of marginalized groups, including women and girls, religious and ethnic minority groups, and other communities at risk, including by increasing their participation in public life and protection; women and girls' access to aid, and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation.

d. Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) is an important security cooperation program that enables the Combatant Commands to support Whole of Government stabilization efforts. 1210A of NDAA 2020 with 1333 Modifications and Extension from NDAA 2022 (Appendix A of this framework) authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, to provide reimbursable or non-reimbursable Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services (LSSS) to support the stabilization activities of other federal agencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, and the countries and regions identified in the Global Fragility Act: Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, and the Coastal West Africa region (Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo). This authorization is referred to as Department of Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) in National Security Interests of the United States. DSSA is an authority available to Combatant Commands to plan and execute stabilization projects in support of other USG agencies.

(1) LSSS is defined in 10 U.S.C. § 2350(1) as “food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. LSSS also includes temporary use of general-purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.”

(2) When project nominations involve support to activities performed by personnel under Chief of Mission security responsibility, planners should coordinate early with regional security offices and include in the nomination any resources required to meet necessary security requirements. The approval process for projects is separate from the process for commanders to decide if/when to execute these projects based on other considerations such as local security conditions.

(3) DoD support under 1210A DSSA requires a two-step process:

(a) Congressional notification, in the form of DoD submission to Congress, with DoS concurrence, of a report setting forth a stabilization strategy for each of the thirteen countries (including those designated under the GFA) at least 15 days before support begins.

(b) Coordination with DoS and consultation with USAID on specific project nominations.

(4) Per DoDD 3000.05 (Annex I of this framework), approval for DSSA projects is delegated to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

(5) DSSA is funded from the Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide appropriation. When submitting a DSS project nomination, Combatant Commands identify funding from within the Combatant Command’s allocation, if any, of Operations and maintenance, Defense-wide funds, or may submit the project nomination as an unfunded requirement.

(6) Stabilization activities, including Section 1210A of NDAA 2020 (Appendix A of this framework) programs, must align with the applicable DoS integrated country strategy and the ten-year U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability. The DoS integrated country strategy for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria have additional stabilization annexes to be consulted.

(7) The internal review process and timeline template for DSSA projects are outlined in Appendix B of this framework. Generally, project nominations are generated from a federal agency outside the DoD and receive concurrence from the DoS prior to submission to the Combatant Commanders OPR for review and staffing. The OPR

should complete their review within 14 days from date of receipt to complete review ensuring project supports strategic goals, is executable and contains specific measures of performance and effectiveness.

(8) DSSA project nominations are approved by the DoS Chief of Mission. Large or complex Section 1210A projects may be grouped under an Umbrella Project. Umbrella Projects group two or more interdependent or interrelated Section 1210A efforts. Umbrella Projects may be used to secure approval for these efforts all at once, rather than requesting separate approvals for each individual subproject. When Umbrella Projects are approved, each sub-project included in the nomination is also approved. Umbrella Projects are used if the effort meets either of the below criteria:

(9) Multiple, distinct projects supporting a single effort. If several distinct projects are designed to support an overarching objective, they should be grouped under an Umbrella Project. For example, support required to reinforce and encourage good governance in a critical province (through key leader engagements, transportation of critical supplies, etc.) can all be packaged under one Umbrella Project.

(a) Multiple, substantially similar minimal-cost projects. Combatant Commanders can combine multiple minimal-cost efforts with substantially similar scopes into one approval request.

(b) Minimal Cost Projects: Small scale Section 1210A projects may be created as minimal-cost projects. Minimal cost projects are nominations of \$15,000 or less. Combatant Commanders have the authority to approve a minimal cost project if funds are allocated and available. Combatant Commanders notify the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy/Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy when conducting minimal-cost projects.

(c) Section 1210A projects above the minimal cost threshold are routed by OPR to the Secretary of the Joint Staff in Task Management Tool for further routing to Joint Staff J5 for review and approval by USD(P). Project nominations must first be cleared by Combatant Command's Staff Judge Advocates.

8. PROPONENT

The proponent of this framework is the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Refer any recommended updates, comments, or suggested improvements directly to PKSOI at: usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@army.mil.

**APPENDIX A: SECTION 1210A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR
STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES IN NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM NDAA 2020,
WITH SEC. 1333. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION FROM NDAA 2022**

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, provide support to the other Federal agencies specified in subsection (c)(1) for the stabilization activities of such agencies.

(b) DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN AREAS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be provided pursuant to this section shall be available only for support for stabilization activities—

(A)(i) in a country specified in paragraph (2); and

(ii) that the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, has determined are in the national security interest of the United States; or

(B) in a country that--

(i)(I) has been selected as a priority country under section 505 of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9804) [Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and the Coastal West Africa sub-region, which encompasses Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo]; or

(II) is located in a region that has been selected as a priority region under section 505 of such Act; and

(ii) has Department of Defense resource or personnel presence to support such activities.

(2) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.—The countries specified in this paragraph are as follows:

(A) Iraq.

(B) Syria.

(C) Afghanistan.

(D) Somalia.

(c) SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Support under subsection (a) may be provided to the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, or other Federal agencies, on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. The authority to provide such support under this paragraph on a reimbursable basis is in addition to other authorities to provide support on such basis.

(2) TYPE OF SUPPORT.—Support under subsection (a) may consist of logistic support, supplies, and services.

(d) REQUIREMENT FOR A STABILIZATION STRATEGY.—

(1) LIMITATION.—With respect to any country specified in subsection (b)(2), no amount of support may be provided under subsection (a) until 15 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a detailed report setting forth a stabilization strategy for such country.

(2) ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY.—The stabilization strategy required by paragraph (1) shall set forth the following:

(A) The United States interests in conducting stabilization activities in the country specified in subsection (b)(2).

(B) The key foreign partners and actors in such country.

(C) The desired end states and objectives of the United States stabilization activities in such country.

(D) The Department of Defense support intended to be provided for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies under subsection (a).

(E) Any mechanism for civil-military coordination regarding support for stabilization activities.

(F) The mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of Department of Defense support for United States stabilization activities in the area.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE.—Support provided under subsection (a) shall be implemented in accordance with the guidance of the Department of Defense entitled “DoD Directive 3000.05 Stabilization”, dated December 13, 2018 (or successor guidance).

(f) REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress on an annual basis a report that includes the following:

DSS: A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners, November 2022

(1) The identification of each foreign area within countries specified in subsection (b)(2) for which support to stabilization has occurred.

(2) The total amount spent by the Department of Defense, broken out by recipient Federal agency and activity.

(3) An assessment of the contribution of each activity toward greater stability.

(4) An articulation of any plans for continued Department of Defense support to stabilization in the specified foreign area in order to maintain or improve stability.

(5) Other matters as the Secretary of Defense considers to be appropriate.

(g) USE OF FUNDS.—

(1) SOURCE OF FUNDS.—Amounts for activities carried out under this section in a fiscal year shall be derived only from amounts authorized to be appropriated for such fiscal year for the Department of Defense for Operation and Maintenance.

(2) LIMITATION.—Not more than \$18,000,000 in each fiscal year is authorized to be used to provide non-reimbursable support under this section.

(h) EXPIRATION.—The authority provided under this section may not be exercised after December 31, 2023.

(i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) LOGISTIC SUPPORT, SUPPLIES, AND SERVICES.—The term “logistic support, supplies, and services” has the meaning given the term in section 2350(1) of title 10, United States Code.

**APPENDIX B: IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES
IMPLEMENTING POLICY AND PROCEDURES**

1. Background

Section 1210A of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 (PL-116-92), “Department of Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in National Security Interest of the United States” authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to provide reimbursable or non-reimbursable logistic support, supplies, and services (LSSS) to support the stabilization activities of other federal agencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, and the countries/regions identified in the US Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability of Coastal West Africa (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo), Mozambique, Libya, Haiti, and Papua New Guinea, until December 31, 2023.

2. Introduction

This document provides guidance on the prioritization, design, planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of LSSS support authorized by Section 1210A.

DoD Directive 3000.05 *Stabilization* defines stabilization as a “political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” As provided in the U.S. Government’s Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), the Department of State (DoS) is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts, USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance, and the Department of Defense (DoD) is a supporting element that provides requisite security and reinforces civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities and resources.

DoD support for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies requires a three-step process: (1) the submission to Congress, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, of a detailed report with a stabilization strategy for each of the four countries at least 15 days before support is provided, (2) coordination with the Secretary of State and consultation with the Administrator of USAID on specific stabilization activity proposals, and (3) a determination from the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that the stabilization activities to be supported by DoD are in the national security interests of the United States.

Section 1210A is intended to enable stabilization efforts that are consistent with both DoD and interagency objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Syria. As stabilization is inherently an interagency activity, all Section 1210A proposals should be drafted with input from DoS, USAID, and DoD (along with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies as required). DoD support for stabilization activities of other federal agencies should be aligned under the respective Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and associated stabilization annex, if one exists. All Section

1210A proposals for DoD support for stabilization activities must be consistent with the SAR and the definitions, best practices, and other guidance in DoDD 3000.05.

3. Responsibilities

Specific roles and responsibilities pertaining to the management of 1210A activities are summarized below.

3.1. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The USD(P) serves as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for all matters on the formulation of Section 1210A policy and oversight to further national security objectives. USD(P) is also responsible for the oversight and management of Section 1210A assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

3.2. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). ASD(SO/LIC), acting through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (DASD/CNSP) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of policy for Section 1210A activities; serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USD(P) and the SecDef for Stabilization policy (DoDD 3000.05). Coordinates Section 1210A operations and policies with DoS, USAID and other federal agencies.

3.3. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO. USD(C)/CFO develops and implements policies and procedures for Section 1210A activities involving financial management, accounting, audit readiness, budgeting for reimbursements to DoD appropriation accounts and revolving funds.

3.4. Combatant Commanders (CCMD). CCMDs maintain responsibility for all stabilization matters in their assigned areas of responsibility and provide guidance to, and oversight of, Section 1210A programs.

4. Types of support authorized

DoD may only use Section 1210A to provide LSSS support for stabilization activities of other Federal agencies. LSSS is defined in Section 2350(1) of Title 10, U.S. Code, as: “food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. Such term includes temporary use of general purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.” Possible types of support provided under Section 1210A could include, but are not limited to, transportation for USG civilians into and within an unstable area, life support and medical services for USG civilians on the ground, the billeting and the use of DoD facilities and

communications equipment for USG civilians, training services for USG civilians, the fueling, repair, and maintenance of USG civilian vehicles and equipment, or the movement of stabilization goods into priority areas. For more detail on specific categories and examples of LSSS, see Appendix A to Enclosure A of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2120.01D, issued May 21, 2015.

Section 1210A is not an authority for DoD to conduct stabilization activities directly – it is only a support authority. Section 1210A is not a new Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). DoD cannot, under Section 1210A, directly construct a prison, hospital, road, or school solely for its own stabilization purposes. DoD could, however, provide LSSS to support other USG departments or agencies constructing a prison, hospital, road, or school. Furthermore, DoD could utilize its logistics channels to transport construction materials and personnel to support said construction.

5. Country Strategies

Subsection 1210A(d) requires the submission of a detailed report to Congress setting forth a stabilization strategy for each specified country in subsection 1210A(b)(2), before DoD may provide support for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies in each country. No support may be provided under Section 1210A in any specified country until 15 days after the date on which the country's strategy is submitted. The SecDef, or others as delegated, must secure Secretary of State concurrence in the detailed report and strategies.

The Office of the USD(P) Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (OUSD(P)/CNSP), in coordination with the Joint Staff (JS) J-5 Counter-Threats and International Cooperation Division, and DoS, will draft the country strategies, and the combatant commands (CCMDs) will have a chance to review and comment on the strategies before submission to Congress. DoS will provide concurrence in the report, including all strategies, at the appropriate level (as delegated by the Secretary of State).

The appropriate DOS official, as delegated by the Secretary of State, will concur in proposals for the specific use of the authority, and DoD will consult with the appropriate USAID official, as delegated by the Administrator, and the relevant CCMDs, OUSD(P)/CNSP, and the JS (see the requirements section of this guidance).

6. Requirements

Specified CCMDs should work with the relevant Embassies, USAID Country Coordinators, and other relevant Federal agencies to identify specific support requirements and be prepared to provide specified support for the stabilization activities of those Federal agencies in an authorized country during Calendar Year (CY) 2022 and 2023.

Following appropriate coordination with the relevant Embassy and supported Federal agency, specified CCMDs should conduct joint planning and identify feasible support options.

The SecDef, or others so designated, is the final approving authority for all proposals. Considerations for project prioritization include national priorities, cost, timeliness, impact of support to stabilization goals, and commander recommendations.

CCMDs should submit Proposals utilizing the Proposal Routing Diagram (Appendix B1 of this Framework) and the Project Nomination Requirements (Appendix B2). Section 1210A proposals should follow the Routing Diagram and must be in accordance with the below criteria:

- The proposal is cleared by the relevant Ambassador or his/her designee, as delegated by the Secretary of State.
- USAID is consulted on the proposal at the appropriate level as delegated by the Administrator.
- The proposal is in support of DoS, USAID, or other Federal agency stabilization activities.
- The proposal is in support of those Federal agencies' stabilization activities in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, or Somalia or the GFA countries/regions of Coastal West Africa (Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo), Libya, Mozambique, Haiti, or Papua New Guinea.
- The proposal must be to provide LSSS in accordance with the definition in Section 2350 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
- CCMDs submit proposals to OSD/SOLIC/CNSP via the Joint Staff J-5. Proposals must be cleared by CCMD Staff Judge Advocate and have GO/FO/SES concurrence.
- The proposal must be implemented in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05, Stabilization, and the SAR.

7. Program Management

The Secretary of Defense (including the Deputy Secretary of Defense) is the approval authority for Section 1210A support activities. OUSD(P) will provide oversight and management of the program.

8. Security Considerations for Personnel under Secretary of State Security Responsibility

When proposals involve support to activities performed by personnel under Secretary of State/Chief of Mission (COM) security responsibility, planners should coordinate early with Regional Security Offices (RSO) and include in the proposal any resources required to meet necessary security requirements. The approval process for proposals outlined in this document is separate from the process for leaders to decide if and when to execute these proposals based on other considerations such as local security conditions.

To account for the changing security landscape in conflict areas where execution of this authority is needed, proposals may be routed before all security requirements are finalized. Proposals should not be delayed or dismissed while security requirements are determined and negotiated between DoD, DoS, and USAID. Section 1210A proposals should be submitted based upon identified stabilization needs on the ground, not predictions of what will eventually be approved by those DoD and/or DoS officials responsible for assessing whether missions or activities can

proceed based on security considerations. Similarly, approval for a proposal does not grant execution authority for the program. That authority lies with the local commander with the concurrence of the Chief of Mission.

Section 1210A is a DoD authority and does not affect the authorities and processes of DoS Diplomatic Security (DS), Regional Security Officers (RSOs), or other non-DoD personnel security offices.

9. Funding

Section 1210A can be utilized on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. Non-reimbursable Section 1210A support requests will be evaluated in accordance with the SECDEF's June 19, 2020, memorandum "Reimbursable Activities in Support of Other Entities." As appropriate, OSD(P)/SOLIC will seek an exception to policy.

Congress did not enact a specific appropriation to fund Section 1210A activities. Funding for non-reimbursable support may only be derived from Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide (O&M, DW) funds. Not more than \$18,000,000 of O&M, DW, is authorized to be used to provide non-reimbursable support under this section in each applicable FY (FY 2022 and FY 2023). Therefore, funding for Section 1210A proposals will be identified on a case-by-case basis. CCMDs submitting a Section 1210A proposal should seek to identify funding from within the O&M, DW appropriation, but may submit the proposal as an unfunded requirement (UFR).

For UFRs, the USD(P)/CNSP, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), will work to provide proposal funding.

10. Calendar Year 2022 and 2023 Proposals Timeline

Section 1210A proposals for reimbursable and non-reimbursable support may be submitted now. CCMDs are encouraged to communicate with OSD frequently as they formulate proposals to ensure situational awareness and share lessons learned.

OUSD(P)/CNSP and the Joint Staff will review proposals on a rolling basis and package for approval by the SecDef. A targeted timeline goal is as follows:

D: Cleared CCMD proposal received by OUSD(P)/CNSP
D+5: Initial feedback/RFIs provided. OUSD(P)/CNSP builds SECDEF package
D+10: Legal / Financial review complete
D+20: Formal Decision Memorandum to CCMD

11. Project Types.

Section 1210A requirements that are particularly small in scale may be created as minimal-cost projects, and Section 1210A requirements that are large or complex may be grouped under an Umbrella Project.

Minimal cost projects are Section 1210A efforts costing \$15,000 or less. CCMDs may approve a minimal cost project if funds are allocated and available at the CCMD level, and if project objectives can be effectively achieved at this cost, in accordance with Section 1210A legal and policy requirements. Minimal cost projects must meet the same legal, policy, coordination, and management criteria, and are subject to the same requirements for Monitoring and Evaluation of other Section 1210A funded efforts. CCMDs will notify OSD(P)/CNSP when conducting minimal-cost projects to ensure that the CCMD does not inadvertently usurp the SECDEF's authority to approve Section 1210A projects. CCMDs, through OSD(P) may in certain situations request from the SecDef an increase in the \$15,000 minimal cost limit.

Umbrella Projects group two or more interdependent or interrelated Section 1210A efforts. CCMDs may use Umbrella Projects to secure approval for these efforts all at once, rather than requesting separate approvals for each individual subproject. When SecDef, or others so designated, approves an Umbrella Project, each sub-project included in the proposal is also approved. CCMDs must obtain written approval from OSD(P)/CNSP to add subprojects to the Umbrella Project if not included in the original proposal. Umbrellas are used if the effort meets either of the below criteria:

- **Multiple, distinct projects supporting a single effort.** If several distinct projects are designed to support an overarching stabilization objective, they should be grouped under an Umbrella Project. For example, support required to reinforce and encourage good governance in a critical province (through key leader engagements, transportation of critical supplies, etc.) can all be packaged under one Umbrella Project.
- **Multiple, substantially similar minimal-cost projects.** To the extent practical, CCMDs will combine multiple minimal-cost efforts with substantially similar scopes into one approval request. Upon approval, subprojects can be funded at the CCMD, provided all legal and policy reviews are complete. If CCMDs require additional funding for subprojects, the CCMD may submit an unfunded requirement (UFR) to OSD(P)/CNSP which will work with OSD(C) to identify sufficient funds.

12. Further Guidance

This document provides guidance on Section 1210A. This guidance is designed to enable the CCMDs to begin liaising immediately with the respective Embassies and other Federal agencies and begin joint planning and drafting of Section 1210A proposals. Updates to Section 1210A guidance will be disseminated, as appropriate.

13. Points of Contact

Section 1210A is a new authority with a short timeline for execution. As such, all relevant personnel from DoS, USAID, and DoD are encouraged to email their Section 1210A POCs with recommendations, questions, or draft/pre-approved proposals.

- OUSD(P):
 - COL John McNamara, Deputy Director, Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy (SPKP), CNSP, john.h.mcnamara.mil@mail.mil

DSS: A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners, November 2022

- Mr. Ryan McCannell, Senior Policy Advisor, SPKP, CNSP, ryan.s.mccannell.civ@mail.mil
- OUSD(P) Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy Team: osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.list.spkp@mail.mil

Attachments:


Appendix B1 – Proposal Routing Diagram

Appendix B2 – Project Nomination Requirements

APPENDIX B1: 1210A DSSA PROPOSAL ROUTING DIAGRAM

Appendix B1: Proposal Routing Diagram

Defense Support for Stabilization Activities Process



POCs: COL John McNamara, john.h.mcnamara.mil@mail.mil
Mr. Ryan McCannell, ryan.s.mccannell.civ@mail.mil

APPENDIX B2: 1210A DSSA PROJECT NOMINATION REQUIREMENTS

DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES (DSSA) PROJECT NOMINATION REQUIREMENTS

1. Submitting Department or Agency:

(Insert name of department or agency nominating the project)

2. Project Name:

(Choose a project name. Name will be used for tracking purposes so should be appropriately descriptive)

3. Org POC:

(Insert points of contact for nominating department or agency clearly identifying the project lead)

4. POC contact info:

(Include both email and phone for nominating organization point of contact)

5. Project Location:

(Identify project location utilizing either local address, general location name, or Lat/Long coordinates. Location should be easily verifiable. Include satellite photo marking location if possible)

6. Project description: *(Detailed description of the project including as much information as available. Include pictures if possible)*

7. Estimated Cost:

(Insert projected cost of the project in U.S. dollars to include the way you determined the estimate, e.g., “\$250,000 based on historic cost data.” Identify whether support will be reimbursable or non-reimbursable.)

8. Issue being addressed and projected benefit:

(Clearly identify the problem being addressed and the benefit you expect from the project. This section will help prioritize projects within CCMDs or DoD)

10. How project supports U.S. Government (USG) stabilization objectives:

*(Insert paragraph describing how the project ties into the USG's stabilization objectives outlined in the Country's stabilization annexes. Project **must** support stabilization activities.)*

11. DOS plan supported:

(Clearly identify the overall plan or line of effort as identified in the Embassy's integrated country strategy.)

12. CCMD lines of effort or objectives supported:

(Coordinate with CCMD to identify the lines of effort supported within the CCMD. Paragraph should clearly identify DoD equities and benefits.)

13. USAID plan supported (If necessary):

(Clearly identify the USAID implementation plan goals that the project will support.)

14. Nominating department or agency's objectives supported (if necessary):

(Clearly identify the link to the nominating agencies overall objectives.)

15. Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness collection plan:

(Describe the measures of performance (MoP) and measures of effectiveness (MoE) and how they will be monitored)

16. Who will collect MoP/MoE data?:

(Describe who will be collecting the data, e.g., third party contractor, local embassy, implementing agency.

17. Civilian or military mechanism supporting project:

(Describe the mechanism for coordination between the nominating

department or agency, supporting CCMD, and project implementer).

18. Implementer of project: *(Identify the projected implementing department or agency, e.g., Contractor, NGO, Military unit)*

19. Timeline:
(Insert project timeline. Highlight “no later than” start dates and provide reason for chosen date)

20. Additional Comments:
(Insert any amplifying or clarifying comments here)

APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms. Pursuant to the *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, an abbreviation is a shortened form of a word or phrase pronounced as a word (e.g., SECDEF). An acronym is a shortened form of a phrase of words, where the letters of the acronym stand for the terms of its meaning and is also read as a word (e.g., ASAP [as soon as possible]). An initialism is a shortened form of a word or phrase that is not spoken as a word; each letter is spoken separately (e.g., DoD).

AOR	Area of Responsibility
B2C2WG	Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups
BHA	Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance, USAID
CCP	Command Campaign Plans
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategies, USAID
CNSP	Counter Narcotics and Stabilization Policy
CPS	Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, USAID
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, DoS
DIB	Defense Institution Building
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DSS	Defense Support to Stabilization
DSSA	Defense Support for Stabilization Activities
CC	Combatant Command
GFA	Global Fragility Act
HN	Host Nation
ICITAP	The International Criminal Investigative Training, DoJ Assistance Program
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
IW	Irregular Warfare
JTF	Joint Task Force
LOE	Line of Effort
LSSS	Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
OAI	Operations, Activities, and Investments
OE	Operational Environment
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
SAR	Stabilization Assistance Review
SC	Security Cooperation
SDO/DAAT	Senior Defense Official or Defense Attaché
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SPCPS	Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability
SPKP	Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy
TS	Theater Strategy
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USD(P)	Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

APPENDIX D. DEFINITIONS

Terms/Definitions. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definition are for the purpose of this document.

Authority: USG agencies and organizations draw their authority from the U.S. Code, Presidential directives and executive orders, decisions of the Federal courts and treaties. (*gpo.gov*) Power to influence thought, opinion or behavior – implies the power of winning devotion or allegiance or of compelling acceptance and belief – the right or power to command, rule or judge.

Campaign Plans (CP): A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign. Source: JP 5-0 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Development: The provision of aid and other assistance to regions that are less economically developed. The provision of assistance to developing countries. Sustained, concerted effort of policymakers and communities to promote a standard of living and economic health in a specific area. (DoS)

Diplomatic Actions: (DoD) Those international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad (*JP 1-02-see Public Diplomacy*). The diplomatic instrument of national power is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives.

Defense Institution Building: Security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation's defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. Also called DIB. Source: JP 3-20 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Defense Support to Stabilization: A process to synchronize missions, activities, and tasks that support or reinforce USG stabilization efforts and promote stability in designated fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the United States. (*DoDD 3000-05*)

Defense Support for Stabilization Activities: A program identified in public law under Section 1210A of the NDAA 2020 and modified under Section 1333 of the NDAA 2022 that authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, provide support to the other Federal Agencies for the stabilization activities of such agencies. DSSA is an important security cooperation program that enables the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) to support Whole of Government stabilization efforts. However, it is just one of many security cooperation programs available to stabilization practitioners and should not be confused with the over-arching DSS policy. (*NDAA 2020 and 2022*)

Foreign Disaster Relief: Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities, as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. Also called FDR. (*DoD Dictionary*)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (*DoD Dictionary*)

Foreign Military Sales: That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. Source: JP 3-20 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Gap: A capability gap is an inability to perform a task because of a lack of equipment, training, doctrine, authority or support. (Defense Acquisition University [DAU]) A gap can be thought of as the difference between needs and resources. They exist where no agencies have the capacity or authority to meet a requirement.

Governance: The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. Source: JP 3-24 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Host Nation: A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. Source: JP 3-57 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Assistance rendered to a country or population in an emergency or crisis context. This could include natural or manmade disaster response or complex humanitarian emergency. (USAID) (*3D Planning Guidance*).

Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Assistance: Assistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominantly United States forces in conjunction with military operations. Also called HCA. See also foreign humanitarian assistance. Source: JP 3-29 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Integrated Country Strategy: a multi-year plan that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. The ICS sets Mission Goals and Objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort among Department of State (State), USAID, and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies with programming in country. The primary audiences for the ICS are the Mission, Bureaus, and interagency partners. (*USAID Integrated Country Strategies Guidance &*

Instructions)

Interagency: Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. Source: JP 3-08 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Interagency Coordination: Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Source: JP 3-0 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Interagency Policy Committee: An appointed committee that is responsible for designated national security issues that cut across the responsibilities of Executive Branch departments and agencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy toward Iraq or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, or functional, such as arms control agreements with Russia or terrorism in South Asia (National Security Policy Process: *The National Security Council and Interagency System*).

Irregular Warfare: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. Source: JP 1 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Joint Task Force: A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. Source: JP 1 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Operational Environment: A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. Source: JP 3-0 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Security Cooperation: All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. See also security assistance. Source: JP 3-20 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Security Force Assistance: The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. Source: JP 3-20 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Stability Activities: Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Source: JP 3-0 (*DoD Dictionary*)

Stabilization: A political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. (*DoDD 3000.05*)

Stabilization Activities: Interagency missions, tasks, and activities, including various security cooperation programs, conducted outside the United States that involve an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. (*Derived from DoDD 3000.05 and JP 3-07*)

United States Code (USC): The codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States based on what is printed in the Statutes at Large. It is divided by broad subjects into 50 titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives. These titles describe the legal capabilities and limitations of the various agencies within all three branches of the USG.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION ANNEXES

ANNEX A – Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018

Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas

<https://www.state.gov/reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework-for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected-areas-2018/>

ANNEX B - 2022 Prologue to the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

The purpose of this prologue to the 2020 Strategy is to reflect emerging threats and opportunities and outline guiding principles to inform our whole-of-government work, in partnership with other countries, institutions and organizations, as we implement the Strategy and its four goals. These principles fall into three categories: (1) we will challenge the U.S. Government status quo, (2) we will pursue meaningful partnership at all levels, and (3) we will exploit synergies with other Administration priorities. In executing these principles, we aim to fulfill the intent of the Act in a way that meets the catalytic vision of the expert civil society coalition and members of Congress who championed the Act and counters the emergent, challenging and historic trends the United States and international partners confront today.

<https://www.state.gov/2022-prologue-to-the-united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/>

ANNEX C – United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, 2020

The United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability seeks to break the costly cycle of fragility and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. The United States will pursue a new approach that addresses the political drivers of fragility and supports locally driven solutions. The United States will engage selectively based on defined metrics, host country political will, respect for democracy and human rights, defined cost-sharing, and mechanisms that promote mutual accountability with national and local actors

<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-US-Strategy-to-Prevent-Conflict-and-Promote-Stabilit-508c-508.pdf>

ANNEX D – United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, June 2019

The WPS Strategy responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68-Oct. 6, 2017), which requires, within 1 year of the enactment of the Act, and again 4 years thereafter, the submission of a strategy to the appropriate Congressional Committees and its publication. The WPS Strategy supersedes the 2016 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; complements relevant laws, appropriations, and Executive Orders, including

the State and Foreign Operations Acts and the National Defense Authorization Act; and satisfies Executive Order 13595.

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WPS_Strategy_10_October2019.pdf

ANNEX E – Department of Defense Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan, June 2020

The WPS Act of 2017 identifies the Department of Defense as a relevant Federal department responsible for implementing WPS. To satisfy the requirements prescribed in the WPS Act of 2017, the Department developed a DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (SFIP). As required by law, the SFIP details the Department's roles and responsibilities for implementing the WPS Strategy and establishes WPS Defense Objectives to support the WPS LOEs. The SFIP also aims to organize and align the Department's implementation of the WPS Strategy within the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/11/2002314428/-1/-1/1/WOMEN_PEACE_SECURITY_STRATEGIC_FRAMEWORK_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.PDF

ANNEX F – National Security Strategy 2022 UNCLASSIFIED

Invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

ANNEX G – National Defense Strategy 2022

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) details the Department's path forward into that decisive decade—from helping to protect the American people, to promoting global security, to seizing new strategic opportunities, and to realizing and defending our democratic values.

<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF>

ANNEX H – DoDD 2000.13 Civil Affairs, incorporating Change 1, May 2017

This directive reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.13 (Reference (a)) to update established policy and assigned responsibilities for conducting DoD-wide civil affairs operations in

accordance with sections 167, 401, 404, and 2011 of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (b)), DoDD 5111.10 (Reference (c)), and DoDD 5100.01 (Reference (d)).

<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/200013p.pdf?ver=2019-02-11-124951-983>

ANNEX I – DoDD 3000.5 Stabilization, December 2018

This issuance:

- Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts.
- Provides guidance for the planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization.

<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300005p.pdf?ver=2018-12-13-145923-550>

ANNEX J – DoDD 3000.7 Irregular Warfare, incorporating Change 1, May 2017

IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.

<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300007p.pdf?ver=2019-02-04-124731-573>

ANNEX K – DoDD 5132.03 DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, December 2016

DoD will prioritize, plan, conduct, and align resources for security cooperation as an integral element of the DoD mission and a tool of national security and foreign policy. DoD security cooperation, which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs and international armaments cooperation, will be undertaken to achieve specific ends in support of defense and national security strategy, rather than serving as an end unto itself.

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/513203_dodd_2016.pdf

ANNEX L - DoDD 5205.82 Defense Institution Building, January 2016

DoD, in coordination with other appropriate U.S. departments and agencies and when authorized by law, will develop the capabilities and capacity of allied and partner nation defense institutions in support of defense strategy. Section 3 of this issuance lists legal authorities that may authorize DIB activities.

<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520582p.pdf?ver=2019-02-04-144847-587>

ANNEX M - DoDI 5132.14 Assessment, Monitoring, And Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, January 2017

M&E of security cooperation programs will: (1) Foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation and track, understand, and improve returns on DoD security cooperation investments. (2) Identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for security cooperation implementation to inform decisions about security cooperation policy, plans, programs, program management, resources, and the security cooperation workforce.

https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/documents/foreignasst/dodi_513214_on_am&e.pdf

ANNEX N - DoDI 5000.68 Security Force Assistance, October 2010

The Department of Defense shall develop and maintain the capability within DoD general purpose forces (GPF), special operations forces (SOF), and the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) to conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy and in coordination with the relevant U.S. Government (USG) departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “USG agencies”).

<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500068p.pdf>

ANNEX O – JP 3-07 Joint Stabilization Activities, February 2022

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess the military contribution to stabilization efforts across the competition continuum.

https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/jp3_07-2022.pdf

ANNEX P – (Omitted)

ANNEX Q – JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation, validated October 2017

This publication provides joint doctrine to coordinate military operations with other US Government departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_08.pdf?ver=CqudGqyJFga9GaACVxgaDQ%3d%3d

ANNEX R – JP 3-20 Security Cooperation, May 2017

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation activities.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf

ANNEX S – JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance May 2019

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf?ver=2019-05-21-150525-607

ANNEX T – JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations, July 2018

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess civil-military operations.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_57.pdf?ver=2018-09-13-134111-460

ANNEX U – Extracted DSS Security Cooperation Programs

ANNEX V – Security Cooperation Programs Handbook, 2022

<https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/security-cooperation-programs-handbook.pdf?id=86c86ec1-c7e8-4244-8d3e-f74d6e983e98>

ANNEX W – Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018 Securing the Nation One Partnership at a Time and State Partnership Program Fact Sheet

The SPP is an innovative and cost-effective security cooperation program that connects the National Guard with the militaries of partner nations around the globe. Guard units conduct military-to-military engagements with partner nations in support of defense security goals and also leverage societal relationships to build personal bonds and enduring trust. The SPP is not designed to make other militaries self-sustaining. Rather, the goal of the SPP is developing and maintaining important security relationships between the United States and other nations sharing a long-term view of common interests.

<https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/Securing-the-Nation-One-Partnership-at-a-Time.pdf>

[https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/State%20Partnership%20Program%20\(SPP\)%20Fact%20Sheet%2007082022.pdf?ver=DS1IK0wqtOy7CjumYEQyxA%3d%3d](https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/State%20Partnership%20Program%20(SPP)%20Fact%20Sheet%2007082022.pdf?ver=DS1IK0wqtOy7CjumYEQyxA%3d%3d)

ANNEX X – CENTCOM Command Policy Letter Number 117, Stabilization and Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in the National Security Interests of the United States

ANNEX A – Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018

Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S.
Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas

SAR

**STABILIZATION
ASSISTANCE REVIEW**

**A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO
STABILIZE CONFLICT-
AFFECTED AREAS**



2018





**A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO
STABILIZE CONFLICT-
AFFECTED AREAS**



FOREWORD FROM SECRETARY OF STATE, USAID ADMINISTRATOR, AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I ncreasing stability and reducing violence in conflict-affected areas are essential to realize America's national security goals and advance a world in which nations can embrace their sovereignty and citizens can realize their full potential. The United States and our allies face an increasingly complex and uncertain world in which many of our adversaries sow instability and benefit from it. Protracted conflicts provide fertile ground for violent extremists and criminals to expand their influence and threaten U.S. interests. These conflicts cause mass displacements and divert international resources that might otherwise be spent fostering economic growth and trade.

The U.S. Armed Forces and our allies and partners are defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist groups on battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, but we are entering a new phase in this struggle. We must consolidate security gains, reduce levels of local instability, and work with local partners to peaceably manage change and provide legitimate and responsive governance. Our national experience over the past two decades has taught us that it is not enough to win the battle; we must help our local partners secure the peace by using every instrument of our national power.

At the same time, we must resist the temptation to throw more money at these complex problems. American taxpayers are right to demand tough scrutiny of such investments. Transitioning too quickly to large-scale reconstruction and longer term development efforts can backfire without a clear strategic and political approach. Our organizations must more rigorously define stabilization missions based on national security interests and undertake institutional reforms based on hard-learned lessons. We must press our international partners to share the costs for these efforts, and hold our local partners accountable for demonstrating sustained leadership and progress.

To meet these imperatives, our Departments and Agency are recommending steps to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas. This report outlines a framework to systematically apply lessons from the past; to strategically and selectively direct our resources; to increase burden-sharing with key international partners; and to improve the efficiency and impact of our efforts.

We have approved this report as the first step in a process to position the U.S. Government's defense, diplomatic, and development capabilities to meet strategic stabilization requirements. We are committed to advancing this process together. Reducing armed conflict is a perennial challenge, and there are many factors that are outside of our national control. By refining our respective organizational roles and capabilities and institutionalizing discipline and learning in our approach, we will increase our likelihood of success and improve accountability to the American taxpayer.

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“We will give priority to strengthening states where state weaknesses or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland...Political problems are at the root of most state fragility.”

—*National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017)*

ABOUT THE REVIEW

The Stabilization Assistance Review was led by the Department of State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) and the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO); the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), and Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (SHA), and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).

The Review was conducted through several research methods, including:

1. Literature review of more than 300 articles and reports;
2. Analysis of eight cases of current or past U.S. engagements in conflict-affected areas;*
3. Interviews of more than 250 experts inside and outside of government, including key international partners;
4. Qualitative questionnaire completed by six DoD combatant commands;
5. Quantitative survey of more than 125 U.S. Government experts; and
6. Quantitative analysis of U.S. foreign assistance spending in conflict-affected areas from Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to FY 2017.

*Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States has strong national security and economic interests in reducing levels of violence and promoting stability in areas affected by armed conflict, especially to consolidate security gains against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other non-state armed groups. At the same time, there is no appetite to repeat large-scale reconstruction efforts, and therefore our engagements must be more measured in scope and adaptable in execution. The United States must be more selective and targeted about how we define stabilization missions, deploy our limited resources, burden-share with local and international partners, and ultimately produce more tangible, long-term outcomes for our taxpaying public.

Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—toward supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. Stabilization requires adaptive and targeted engagement at subnational and national levels. More important than dollars spent is having a singular, agreed-upon, strategic approach to unify efforts in support of a consolidated local impact executed through sequenced and contextual assistance.

Over the past year, the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DoD) have reviewed the significant lessons learned from past stabilization efforts. The principles for effective stabilization have been widely studied, but they have not been systematically applied and institutionalized. The review has shown that the performance of U.S. stabilization efforts has consistently been limited by the lack of strategic clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort in how we approach these missions.

In response, this report outlines how the United States can improve

- ◆ Promote a fair, purposeful division of labor with national partners and international donors.
- ◆ Clarify agency roles and responsibilities to improve performance and reduce duplication.
- ◆ Improve the capacity of our civilian workforce to address stabilization needs in tandem with the U.S. military and partner forces; and
- ◆ Sequence and target our assistance to conflict-affected areas in a more measured fashion.

Now is the moment to focus and revitalize how the United States approaches stabilization. Stabilization is a critical part of how

“This report defines stabilization as a political endeavor to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict...”


the outcomes of our stabilization efforts through more efficient and disciplined bureaucratic structures, processes and engagement with international partners. Specifically, our proposed framework includes steps to:

- ◆ Establish a U.S.-Government wide definition of stabilization.
- ◆ Develop and evaluate political strategies based on evidence and rigorous analysis.

the United States seeks to address conflict-affected states, as part of a spectrum that also includes both conflict prevention and longer term peacebuilding and reconciliation. Through these reforms and sustained leadership, the United States can avoid mistakes of the past and better advance America's national security interests in conflict-affected environments.

INTRODUCTION

Despite global gains in prosperity, armed conflicts in many parts of the world remain as complex and intractable as ever. Continued gains are by no means guaranteed. An increasing trend in internationalized and non-state conflicts (reflected in Figure 1) has resulted in crises that are more protracted, violent, and difficult to solve. According to data from the Uppsala Conflict Database, unresolved grievances and often a failure to address political reform mean that more than one-half of



armed conflicts that achieve peace lapse back into violence—at a median of seven years—often introducing new grievances and actors to perpetuate bloodshed. More recently, the conflict landscape is increasingly exacerbated by the rise of ISIS and competing networks of non-state armed and extremist groups.

These armed conflicts have dire consequences for the people residing in affected countries and impose a significant security and financial burden on American and international taxpayers as well as the global economy. Over the past decade, the U.S. Government has consistently provided more than one-third of its foreign assistance to countries with ongoing violent conflicts [see Figure 2]. Similarly, these same countries account for the vast majority of the peacekeeping budget of the United Nations (UN).

These persistent armed conflicts directly affect the security interests of the United States and our allies by creating instability that terrorist and criminal organizations and competitors exploit. Recognizing this threat, the United States and our Coalition partners are actively working in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, and elsewhere around the world to defeat ISIS and other transnational terrorist groups. As the Coalition makes security progress against ISIS, it is essential to consolidate operational gains through strategic political engagement and targeted assistance to establish basic security and restore responsive, legitimate governance.

At the same time, there is no public appetite to repeat the large-scale reconstruction efforts of the past. The United States and other countries are scrutinizing and reducing the

resources spent outside our borders. Our taxpaying public is demanding greater accountability of our resources and their impact. Moving forward, our stabilization efforts must be better prioritized and measured and our partners must carry their fair share of the burden. New ways of thinking and operating are needed to reduce dependencies on U.S. Government assistance, increase cost-sharing, and scope realistic outcomes for stabilization efforts. We cannot continue to employ the same approaches or tools in these endeavors and expect different results.

To this end, the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DoD) have reviewed past stabilization efforts in conflict-affected areas and identified steps to more effectively




Figure 2: Map of select countries with more than 1000 battle-related deaths over the last five years (Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Project) where internationally-supported “stabilization” efforts have been active.

leverage the U.S. Government’s diplomatic, defense, and foreign assistance resources in these difficult environments. The Stabilization Assistance Review (“the Review”) built on many of the findings from the “2016 Department of Defense Biennial Assessment of Stability Operations Capabilities.” The Review was also coordinated

with related ongoing processes at the UN and World Bank.

This report outlines findings from the Review and presents consolidated approaches to maximize the impact of U.S. engagement as well as reduce inefficiencies and wasteful spending. The first section outlines why a narrowed, revitalized approach to stabilization is

essential for addressing today’s challenges and advancing U.S. national security. The second section describes the core principles and lessons learned for the U.S. Government’s stabilization. The third and final section outlines a proposed framework for the U.S. Government’s efforts to advance stabilization in conflict-affected areas.

“We will work to consolidate military gains against ISIS, al Qa’ida, and other terrorist organizations and stabilize liberated areas by supporting local partners that can reestablish the rule of law, manage conflict, and restore basic services.”

—State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022

THE IMPERATIVE FOR A REVITALIZED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

The United States and our partners need a new and more disciplined approach for conducting stabilization in conflict-affected areas. This approach includes analyzing risks and focusing our efforts on what is absolutely necessary to achieve stability, rather than pursuing disparate agendas all at once. A critical first step toward more harmonized stabilization efforts is agreeing on the core tenets of the concept itself. Despite significant international experience over recent decades, the concept of stabilization remains ill-defined and poorly institutionalized across government and multilateral structures. This lack of standardization in definition and process leads to repeated mistakes, inefficient spending, and poor accountability for results.

Now is the moment to refocus and revitalize the U.S. Government's approach to stabilization. There is a clear imperative from policymakers to consolidate security gains in ISIS-affected areas through stabilization. At the same time, policymakers want to be more

selective and targeted about how we engage in stabilization environments to maximize the value of American and international taxpayer resources. The revitalized approach to stabilization outlined here can help target diplomatic engagement in these environments toward advancing a strategy connected to stabilization outcomes, enable greater sequencing and layering of assistance to support locally legitimate actors, achieve cost-saving efficiencies, and foster a better division of labor between the U.S. Government and international donors and institutions.

With these lessons in mind, State, USAID, and DoD have developed a refined definition of stabilization that can guide our efforts in this regard. We define stabilization as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security, provide

access to dispute resolution, deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer term development.

Stabilization is distinct from humanitarian assistance, which the U.S. Government provides impartially on the basis of need, from longer term reconstruction and development activities. Although context-dependent, stabilization is intended to be short-term in nature (typically between one and five years). Without first achieving legitimate political stability, longer term development efforts are unlikely to take root and can even exacerbate lingering conflict dynamics. Stabilization starts to set the conditions for building legitimate societal and governing institutions. USAID defines these as institutions that are inclusive, responsive, and accountable to all groups, including minority and marginalized populations. The nature of relations among identity groups, the capacity of civil society to engage government, and the extent of economic opportunity all affect the legitimacy of state-society relations.

We define stabilization as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, and deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer term development.



U.S. Army civil affairs forces provide veterinarian assistance to Iraqi communities following successful operations against ISIS. *Photo: USASOC*

In the past, there has been a rush to initiate high-cost, sectoral programming before there is a foundation of inclusive political systems, basic security, and a reliable and legitimate partner government at the national level. A deliberate approach focusing planning and operations on stabilization outcomes can ensure the right conditions are in place for broader development resources to be well-spent. At the same time,

it is imperative that stabilization efforts incorporate transition plans to economic growth,

private sector vibrancy, and responsive governance, with an end state of self-sufficiency, lest any progress achieved by those activities is not sustained and lost.




Figure 3: The State/USAID “Country Data Analytics” index average scores for the 16 conflict-affected countries identified in the previous map over the past 10 years. This figure shows a measurable decrease in peace and security scores, while health and education have improved.



USAID is helping to bring community leaders together in northeastern Nigeria to build trust and restore stability in areas affected by Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Photo: USAID

LESSONS FOR EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION

Designing and pursuing stabilization are complex tasks involving many context-specific factors that are outside of a single actor's control. Our approach must be flexible and adjust as non-state armed groups adapt, and address the political challenges of possible spoilers to stabilization. Yet even as we remain agile, we must apply evidence-based lessons to increase the chances of success. The Review identified the following set of core principles that undergird effective stabilization efforts.

Set realistic, analytically-backed political goals

Stabilization is inherently political, which means it must focus on local, national, and/or regional societal and governing dynamics, agents, and systems that lead populations toward inclusive, non-violent settlement and agreement. Its success depends on having a goal-oriented political strategy that aligns with local interests. Through analysis and deliberate iterative planning, stabilization requires decisions

about which specific legitimate political systems and actors we will support, why and how, and associated tradeoffs. This strategy should be based on a clearly articulated and achievable political end state. It should include a realistic assessment of the level of commitment and risk tolerance required to implement the strategy. With a clear political strategy and defined end state, we can delineate a phased approach to target and sequence our engagement and assistance programs—as well as those of others—in a unified fashion.

Establish a division of labor and burden-sharing among international donors and local actors that optimizes the strengths of each

There needs to be a clear understanding at the outset of a stabilization effort of what the partner nation government is willing and expected to deliver in terms of political and financial commitments. There should also be a clear division of labor among international donors, based on analysis that accounts for each

donor's comparative advantage. Multilateral approaches to stabilization, particularly by the UN and World Bank, can mobilize contributions by other bilateral partners. Multilateral partners bring different strengths and weaknesses, and the U.S. Government should engage when they have a comparative advantage. For example, the World Bank has mobilized funds for Yemen, but turned to the UN for implementation.

Use data and evaluation systems to assess strategic progress and hold partners accountable

Although stabilization requires flexible and adaptive mechanisms, teams should identify clear strategic-level political objectives at the outset to track and analyze impact on an iterative basis. This approach should comprise metrics to ensure that the host-nation partner is following through on commitments and fully embracing mandated anti-corruption and transparency efforts. Tying diplomatic engagement and assistance to local qualitative impacts rather than solely quantitative

activity outputs and using strategic level analysis will enable senior policymakers to consider whether policy adjustments are required to achieve objectives. The Review's case study in Afghanistan found that using consistent data tied to specific political objectives—and sharing relevant information across U.S. Government Departments and Agencies—would have enabled better review and analysis by policymakers.

Forward deploy U.S. Government and partnered civilians and establish local mechanisms that enable continuous engagement,

negotiation, targeted assistance, and monitoring

Deploying civilian stabilization experts on the ground to work with and alongside deployed military elements is essential to success because it enables a unified approach and helps ensure the overarching political strategy is driving all mission components. The “2016 DoD Biennial Assessment of Stability Operations Capabilities” cited as a critical shortfall the lack of institutionalized DoD mechanisms to enable regular collaboration with interagency and international partners. It is imperative to have civilians with the appropriate knowledge and skill sets on the ground and able to engage with citizen groups, analyze local dynamics, identify the right local partners to advance the political strategy, and routinely monitor and adjust




Figure 4: State/USAID foreign assistance to the 16 conflict-affected countries identified in the previous map from Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to FY 2016, by designated program goals/areas. Analysis of spending trends in case-study countries reinforced the need for greater flexibility, sequencing and/or integration of non-humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas.

programs and strategy to keep pace with the evolving political dynamic. For example, the Review's case study analysis showed that State and USAID have worked closely with the UN and third-party contractors in Somalia and Syria to improve our monitoring of local dynamics that informs and connects programming to overall political objectives. Still, significant security limitations on U.S. Government civilian presence in conflict and post-conflict areas impede our ability to identify and respond to emergent political opportunities and quickly adapt our programs.

Start with small, short-term assistance projects and scale up cautiously

According to multiple studies, targeted and smaller programs are better at the outset to

achieve local outcomes and build momentum. Smaller projects driven by host-government and communities in support of a unified political strategy and diplomatic engagement are best suited to achieve short-term stabilization objectives and to set the stage for eventual management, financing, and ownership by national governments or regional administrations. For example, the Review's case study showed that in northeastern Nigeria, the U.S. Government has worked effectively at the community level to develop a nuanced village-by-village understanding of stabilization challenges and political dynamics fueling violent extremists. Such a focused understanding enables the United States to target assistance to support stability and diminish the appeal

“If we are to achieve our strategic objectives in a conflict, American policymakers must accept that the political dimension is indispensable across the spectrum of conflict.”

—Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (2017)

of extremists. Operating within and in cooperation with local communities allows increased local support and the ability to build legitimacy from the bottom up by strengthening local political and social systems. This approach is true not only of bilateral funding, but multi-donor efforts as well. Large-scale projects run a higher risk of creating perverse incentives, distorting the local economy, and being manipulated by corrupt actors who benefit from the conflict. Often a country's absorptive capacity after conflict remains low and realistic expectations are needed about the time it will take to strengthen local and/or national ownership.

Prioritize, layer, and sequence foreign assistance to advance stabilization goals

If stabilization is a top goal for international engagement in a country, then the full range of non-humanitarian assistance the U.S. Government allocates to that country should be considered in terms of how it can advance the established political and diplomatic strategy without creating dependency. Stabilization assistance is not an entitlement, and continued U.S. Government assistance should depend on results. Program planning and design

of development and security sector assistance should be considered through that lens. In some cases, certain types of assistance should be delayed or sequenced if they cannot be accountable or implemented successfully without adequate stability. This process includes being deliberate and precise about how and when we seek to promote private sector investment, taking into account the risks and challenges. Greater consideration of the exact role of the private sector as well as the appropriate ratio for immediate versus long-term funding needs (including international donors) is necessary. If engaged effectively, the result would be cost-savings in the short-term and enable better overall development outcomes in the long run. Unfortunately, in many cases, this lack of prioritization has resulted in disparate and competing assistance efforts that made engagement ineffective.

Link subnational engagements with national diplomacy to advance stabilization

Both national and subnational engagements are needed to advance stabilization, and need to be eventually nested together to achieve optimal effect. For example, our Review's case

study of Mali showed that failure to achieve a durable political settlement at the national level can undermine local stabilization efforts. Assistance targeted at the subnational level is most effective when it is informed by national-level policy reforms. However, in other cases such as Syria today, subnational engagement will need to begin first, while national-level dynamics are still being resolved. This process requires a flexible approach, recognizing that subnational dynamics can vary radically from one geographic region to another.

Reinforce pockets of citizen security and purposefully engage with security actors

Stabilization is most likely to be successful where there is basic security on the ground. Basic security is defined as minimum conditions where U.S. assistance partners can operate and monitor activities, access appropriate local stakeholders, and where security actors can engage in building trust with local communities. Furthermore, focusing on precise subnational areas where there are pockets of security is more likely to succeed because there will be an ability to work consistently with local actors, including local security forces.

Stability gains are not sustainable without citizen-responsive governance. Early transition work lays the foundation for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting local economies, supporting emerging independent media, and fostering lasting peace and democracy through innovative programming and evidence-based approaches.

—USAID Administrator Mark Green, speaking to the House Appropriations Committee, November 1, 2017



Young activists attend a peace rally in Ansongo in northern Mali where local actors demanded rebels to sign the Algiers Peace Deal. *Photo: USAID*

The Review's case study of Afghanistan showed that most experts, including the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, concluded that prioritizing U.S. stabilization programs in areas without local-level commitments to reduce violence and increase physical security negatively affected overall momentum toward stability. Alternatively, tailored place-based assistance strategies that marry violence-reduction and citizen security efforts with targeted law enforcement have proven successful in stabilizing some of the most at-risk locales in Central America.

Seek unity of purpose across all lines of effort

One of the greatest challenges to stabilization is that different U.S. Departments and Agencies have different priorities, and regional and international actors often have other agendas that work at competing purposes. Counterterrorism operations are prioritized in many conflict environments today, but some

operations may have destabilizing effects. Stabilization cannot be an afterthought. Rather, it needs to be fully integrated and elevated across lines of effort. It should be incorporated into campaign planning as early as possible to help shape operational design and strategic decisions. The "2016 DoD Biennial Assessment Operations Capabilities" recommended that civil-military annexes be drafted for all Combatant Command concept plans and operations plans, with interagency input. Close civilian-military planning and coordination has been a key determinant in effective stabilization outcomes across all cases examined. For example, in Pakistan, close synchronization of stabilization programming with security operations facilitated targeted, impactful programming.

Employ strategic patience and plan beyond stabilization for self-reliance

There is no single set time frame for stabilization that is

generalizable to all cases, but in no case should it be open-ended. While stabilization efforts are intended to create targeted short-term effects, it usually requires time to achieve durable and legitimate political settlements at local and national levels. Strategic and resource planners should take this reality into account to build realistic, flexible, and achievable milestones and enable consistent funding. Effective stabilization efforts also intentionally incorporate linkages to longer term development efforts into planning. Multilateral development banks, other donors, and the private sector should be part of the process as early as possible, while being realistic about the challenges and risks in post-conflict investment climates. Stabilization should also include strategic communication strategies that emphasize host-nation ownership from the outset to avoid creating dependencies or local resentment.

LOOKING AHEAD: A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. STABILIZATION

A revitalized approach to how the United States works to stabilize relevant conflict-affected areas—an approach that takes into account the current imperatives and past lessons—needs organizational structures, budgets, processes, capabilities, and personnel that are fit for this purpose. Most of the above findings are not new, but they have not been systematically applied or institutionalized in how we approach stabilization in conflict-affected areas. State, USAID, and DoD have identified the following areas to improve how our Departments and Agency work individually and together to advance stabilization goals.

Establish Strategic Engagement Criteria and Priorities to Guide Stabilization

The U.S. Government should institutionalize a process by which we identify conflict-affected countries/regions that warrant increased attention, assess the U.S. interests and priorities for advancing stabilization in these countries/

regions, and then conduct deliberate strategic planning to contend with stabilization challenges. Key criteria for determining whether, when, and how to pursue a stabilization mission should include the assessed U.S. national interest; national and local partner ownership; risks, constraints and opportunities in the operating environment; the level of risk we are willing to assume; and the level of sustained resources we are willing to commit.

As noted above, successful stabilization begins with developing an outcome-based political strategy that outlines our core assumptions and achievable end states and guides all lines of effort—diplomatic engagement, defense, foreign assistance, and private sector engagement where appropriate—to ensure unity of purpose within the U.S. Government. In those places of highest priority for stabilization, State, USAID, and DoD should work with the relevant U.S. Embassy, regional bureau, Combatant Commands, and other stakeholders to develop

89%

of surveyed USG experts

Support development of a defined interagency strategy and implementation plan for places where U.S. policymakers determine that the U.S. has a vital national interest in pursuing stabilization.

a political strategy for the stabilization mission.

Key elements to address in the political strategy include: partner nation goals and capacity; the defined U.S. Government interests and areas in which interests may compete; mapping key actors; desired political end states and objectives; the interests and goals of partners; anticipated resource requirements; the role of different U.S. Government actors and international donors; mechanisms for civil-military coordination; assessment of risks; and strategic analytics to track over time and measure progress. The strategy must then be institutionalized into Department and Agency plans and reviewed

“A wise approach to reform [of stabilization and reconstruction operations] would aim at producing a unified system that plans and executes operations integratively, averts significant waste, increases the likelihood of tactical success, and better protects U.S. national security interests.”

—Final Report of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Learning from Iraq, March 2013

on a regular basis to assess its effectiveness and make adjustments as needed.

Pursue a More Purposeful Division of Labor and Burden-Sharing with Multilateral Bodies, While Mobilizing Other Bilateral Donors on Stabilization

Engaging in stabilization missions means the U.S. Government must advocate that our partners co-invest with purpose in line with mutually agreed strategic outcomes. Developing coordinated donor approaches toward fragile and post-conflict contexts based on lessons learned has increased significantly over the past decade and spurred new international frameworks such as the New Deal for Engagements in Fragile States, but these efforts have not yet resulted in standardized or efficient approaches adaptable across conflicts. Effective donor coordination includes pressing donor partners to develop systematic approaches and share the burdens and risks of stabilization.

At a policy level, State and USAID should seek dedicated dialogues with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UN, World Bank, and other regional and international organizations to press for coordinated reforms in how they approach and invest in conflict-affected areas. The U.S. Government should encourage the UN to adopt a single common approach to stabilization that can integrate efforts across its peacekeeping and political

missions. Similarly, the United States should actively engage with the World Bank and the regional development banks as it considers significant expansions in its engagement and funding in conflict-affected areas.

At an operational level, we should continue to engage pooled donor mechanisms in some cases to mobilize other partner resources. We should press that donor coordination bodies approach these pooled financing mechanisms strategically, building on best practices for risk-mitigation, local government support, accountability and monitoring, as well as flexible structures. We should also actively engage with these pooled funding mechanisms to ensure they reinforce our political objectives, and mobilize donors to take on greater costs. The U.S. Government and international community should be clear on our expectations of the financial and political responsibilities of each partner-nation government. Financing mechanisms should reflect the capacity level at the outset with clear guidance on measuring progress over time.

In some cases, other donors could want to build on our implementation mechanism. Through targeted agreements bilateral donor funding can flow through existing U.S. Government procurement mechanisms. One example is the United Kingdom's recent contributions to a USAID-led stabilization program in Libya.

Define Department and Agency Roles and Responsibilities for Stabilization to Improve Performance

Clear lines of authority between and within U.S. Government departments and agencies would improve effectiveness, reduce duplication and confusion, enable greater accountability, and fully operationalize a whole-of-government approach. The U.S. Government should formally define lead agency roles for stabilization missions, with State as the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance; and, DoD as a supporting element, to include providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate. DoD is refining its stabilization policy to incorporate the concept of "Defense Support to Stabilization." Other Departments and Agencies, including members of the Intelligence Community, can also play critical supporting roles.

With clear roles, State, USAID, and DoD should then ensure that we each have the appropriate structures and staff in place to perform these roles in

86%

of surveyed USG experts

Are not clear which U.S. Government agencies have lead responsibility for different elements of stabilization.

an efficient, coordinated fashion. For example, State should institutionalize a structure that can lead and coordinate inter-agency stabilization analysis, policy formulation, and strategic planning as well as diplomatic engagement. At the same time, USAID should designate and empower an entity to serve as its technical lead for stabilization to engage with the interagency and support relevant regional bureaus and Missions in coordinating, planning, implementing, and monitoring non-security stabilization assistance in conflict-affected environments. This process would help ensure coherent management and implementation of this type of U.S. assistance. DoD should assign stabilization planners throughout the Department, especially at the Geographic Combatant Commands, and ensure professional military education prepares future leaders to operate effectively with civilian partners at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Recognizing the interlinkages between our organizations, these respective entities must be prepared to train, exercise, and work closely together to advance integrated stabilization efforts before a contingency occurs.

Build the Capacity of a U.S. Expeditionary Civilian Workforce to Meet Stabilization Objectives and Establish Policies to Allow for Co-Deployment

To advance stabilization success, the United States requires a mechanism to rapidly deploy civilian-led stabilization teams into conflict-affected areas to assess local conditions, engage local authorities, and direct and monitor programs. We have faced delays in the past in deploying civilian experts alongside U.S. military elements—despite overwhelming policy consensus—because of a lack of standing authorities and structures, missing critical opportunities to address overlapping civilian and security objectives. State, USAID, and DoD should work together to develop a framework for Stabilization, Transition, and Response Teams (START) that can support Chiefs of Mission and Combatant Commands to coordinate, plan, and implement a U.S. Government stabilization response in conflict areas. This approach would build on lessons from, and address shortcomings of, the previous Civilian Response Corps, by setting up a much smaller and dedicated set of stabilization specialists who can rapidly

deploy and have the support systems to do so.

Specifically, the START framework for both Washington and abroad should streamline roles and procedures; establish an enduring human resources, training, and operational support platform; provide expanded authorities to deploy civilians with and alongside DoD operational and tactical elements; and, when necessary, recruit and deploy further qualified surge personnel. The teams can be tailored to specific planning and implementation objectives based on the directive and needs of the relevant Chief of Mission.

Establishing interoperable, co-deployable capabilities depends on instituting more flexible security and risk-management standards and making strategic investments in human resources and training. State and USAID should review and adapt existing risk-management standards and processes to provide leaders and employees with accepted approaches to defining and making decisions in the face of challenging, fluid, and unclear circumstances. These mechanisms must take into account the central issue of Departments' and Agencies' unique authorities

“If you take good people and good ideas and you match them with bad processes, the bad processes will win nine out of ten times.”

—General James N. Mattis USMC (ret.) interview with Peter Robinson at the Hoover Institution, March 6, 2015



U.S. Special Operations Forces engage in Shura discussion with Afghan elders about security and governance. *Photo: DoD*

and regulations governing security responsibility.

At the same time, State, USAID, and DoD should pre-identify and prepare a pool of civilians with requisite experience who can deploy on short notice to support joint stabilization missions, drawing heavily from existing State staff with experience working in conflict environments and incorporating lessons from their experience. State and USAID will need to maximize and expand agile hiring mechanisms of non-tenured staff to fill critical gaps that can incentivize expeditionary missions and enhance retention. State, USAID, and DoD should reinforce and formalize existing joint training efforts to meet minimum and prerequisite deployment standards. To

bolster these efforts, DoD is reviewing whether to request new authorities to support the deployment of civilian advisors for stabilization on a non-reimbursable basis.

Leverage Flexible Funding to Enable Sequenced, Targeted Approaches to Assistance

Stabilization does not require extremely high funding levels; rather, stabilization depends on consistent, flexible funding accounts unencumbered by Congressionally-directed earmarks, that can enable agile, targeted, and sequenced approaches to stabilization programming. Existing funding accounts, such as “Peacekeeping Operations” and “Transition Initiatives,” provide critical authorities for

State and USAID to assess and respond to emergent stabilization requirements, while bilateral and regional funds can provide consistency over time. The new Counter-ISIS Relief and Recovery Fund provided by Congress is another good example of the kind of flexible funding that is useful. The U.S. Government should continue to engage with Congress to build confidence and support for this goal to increase our flexibility to respond quickly to stabilization needs.

State and USAID should also engage with other donors to better coordinate their dedicated funds for stabilization and associated efforts in conflict-affected areas. The UN Peacebuilding Fund and World Bank’s State and Peacebuilding



USAID is supporting communities in the wake of Colombia's civil war to solidify the peace process and promote reconciliation PHOTO. Photo: Juan Carlos Sierra/USAID

Fund as well as the United Kingdom's Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund are important models for operational reform in support of stabilization. We should seek to promote greater alignment and rationalization of how these funds are deployed along with the relevant U.S. accounts, based on their respective strengths and limitations.

At the same time, State, USAID, and DoD need to put in place appropriate structures and mechanisms to better use our existing flexibilities and resources. We should be more disciplined in assessing the risks of prematurely providing certain types of assistance in conflict-affected environments before there is a foundation of legitimate political order, basic security, and appropriate anti-corruption controls. Flexible and adaptive procurement mechanisms are also crucial to

function in challenging environments. Where we are pursuing stabilization programming in conflict-affected areas, State and USAID should work to adapt and align procurement tools for security and non-security assistance and delegate authorities closer to the field.

Promote Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Justice and Security Sector Assistance

The U.S. Government and other donors need to carefully tailor all assistance and training programs in conflict-affected environments to ensure they mutually advance stability and do not inadvertently exacerbate conflict dynamics. Over the past decade, USAID has developed important guidelines for conflict-sensitive democracy and governance, education, and economic growth programming in conflict-affected areas, which the Agency should streamline

throughout all efforts. A similar effort is needed to align and adapt justice and security sector assistance programs in these environments. In support of counterterrorism objectives, the international community is providing high volumes of security sector training and assistance to many conflict-affected countries, but our programs are largely disconnected from a political strategy writ large, and do not address the civilian-military aspects required for transitional public and citizen security. More focus needs to be placed on helping security forces to secure population centers and restore trust with local communities. This approach is true not only for U.S. programs, but also for other donor efforts.

In addition, more efforts and resources need to be tailored to address trauma and psychosocial well-being within conflict-affected communities, promote local justice and the rule of law, and address local grievances related to access to justice and corruption concerns. The ability of the state to re-establish order, security and the rule of law will greatly influence the extent of popular support for stabilization and longer term reform. USAID experience in conflict-affected environments suggests that three areas are paramount for immediate engagement: access to justice, particularly for marginalized populations; mechanisms that promote peaceful, fair, and transparent

management of disputes; and transitional justice.

Justice sector programming in conflict-affected areas often focuses heavily on promoting formal national and criminal justice-focused institutions based on Western domestic experiences, missing opportunities to advance local and civil solutions in more fluid environments. It is critical to build the legitimacy of formal institutions over time, but in many conflict-affected areas, much of the population looks to local, tribal, religious, or other non-government justice institutions to resolve disputes and assert legal rights. We should work with international partners to deepen our understanding of local needs in these environments and consider local precedent regarding administration of justice, particularly with respect to reconciliation

and accountability. Likewise, we should take a balanced approach in our reaction to and willingness to work with informal and formal systems. The U.S. Government should expand and strengthen its institutional capabilities to undertake this critical local rule of law programming where needed and ensure longer term rule of law and justice programming is coordinated and aligned with stabilization efforts.

Institutionalize Learning, Evaluation, and Accountability in Our Approach

Finally, to be successful, stabilization requires a regular feedback loop that involves experimentation, learning, adaptation, and accountability. This approach is critical at both the program and strategic levels. We should identify indicators to measure changes in

the conflict environment and track them consistently over time, while also allowing for flexibility to adjust indicators based on what we are learning. This process can facilitate more rigorous reviews by policymakers to determine whether adjustments are needed in our political strategy and objectives. As part of this effort, we should use evidence and analytics to rigorously assess our political strategy and the political interests of our national and local partners. If they are not living up to their commitments, we should be prepared to change course. If our political objectives are infeasible due to misalignment with local political interests, we must be willing to adjust political objectives. Accordingly, stabilization will ultimately not be successful if our partners are not fully invested in a collective undertaking.

CONCLUSION

Advancing the United States' top foreign policy priorities requires a revitalized approach to how we work to stabilize conflict-affected areas. We cannot continue to take the same approach and expect different results. We need a disciplined approach to how we set our strategic goals, maintain priorities, engage with local, national,

and international partners to achieve a fair division of labor and burden-sharing, and promote conditions to maximize our assistance resources and promote long-term self-sufficiency. This approach is not easy to get right, but our Review has affirmed that there is tremendous talent, expertise and willingness to succeed across the U.S. Government in this

area. The challenge today is to apply that experience, talent, and learning in a systematic fashion. With sustained leadership and dedicated, efficient organizational structures and frameworks, we can achieve that and thereby avoid costly mistakes, increase our likely dividends, and do right by our taxpaying public.

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The image features a dark blue background with a gold-colored border. The border is composed of two parallel lines, one slightly offset from the other, creating a 3D effect. The border follows the top and bottom edges of the page, forming a V-shape at the top and bottom. The text is centered in the white space between the blue sections.

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ANNEX B - 2022 Prologue to the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

The purpose of this prologue to the 2020 Strategy is to reflect emerging threats and opportunities and outline guiding principles to inform our whole-of-government work, in partnership with other countries, institutions and organizations, as we implement the Strategy and its four goals. These principles fall into three categories: (1) we will challenge the U.S. Government status quo, (2) we will pursue meaningful partnership at all levels, and (3) we will exploit synergies with other Administration priorities. In executing these principles, we aim to fulfill the intent of the Act in a way that meets the catalytic vision of the expert civil society coalition and members of Congress who championed the Act and counters the emergent, challenging and historic trends the United States and international partners confront today.

This 2022 Prologue is provided to complement the 2020 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, submitted to Congress in line with Section 504(a) of the Global Fragility Act of 2019.

INTRODUCTION

The landmark 2019 Global Fragility Act (“the Act”) presents a new and necessary opportunity for the U.S. Government to prioritize conflict prevention and transform how it partners with countries affected by fragility and conflict to foster a more peaceful and stable world. Learning from the United States’ decades-long stabilization experiences conflict-affected settings such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and consistent with the Act, the 2020 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (“the Strategy”) conceives an integrated, evidence-based, prevention-focused, coherent and field-driven approach to address drivers of fragility that can threaten U.S. national security and ultimately cost millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

The purpose of this prologue to the 2020 Strategy is to reflect emerging threats and opportunities and outline guiding principles to inform our whole-of-government work, in partnership with other countries, institutions and organizations, as we implement the Strategy and its four goals. These principles fall into three categories: (1) we will challenge the U.S. Government status quo, (2) we will pursue meaningful partnership at all levels, and (3) we will exploit synergies with other Administration priorities. In executing these principles, we aim to fulfill the intent of the Act in a way that meets the catalytic vision of the expert civil society coalition and members of Congress who championed the Act and counters the emergent, challenging and historic trends the United States and international partners confront today.

THE COLLECTIVE CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME


Every country, including the United States, has experienced fragility. The international community is grappling with challenges that cross borders and cut across societies, ways of life and economies. Democracy is increasingly under threat in many parts of the world: authoritarians are growing stronger; corruption is rotting democracy from the inside; the rule of law is under assault; civic space is shrinking; independent media is under attack; disinformation is proliferating; and human rights are under threat. Conflict is also worsening globally, placing civilians in the cross-fire, which only perpetuates cycles of conflict and violence. The global economic downturn; the alarming urgency of the changing global climate; and persistent gender, racial, ethnic, among other forms of social and political inequality, have further cleaved some communities, governments and nations. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have expanded far beyond the global health arena to touch off economic, social, and political crises around the world. These challenges can divide people, nations and regions and lead us to retreat into isolation and fear, or they can galvanize us toward collective action.

OUR VISION

This complex set of trends provides us with a stark reminder of the paramount importance of preventing or mitigating the impact of future crises in a more strategic, unified and locally-led

fashion. The U.S. Government's approach to the GFA seeks to realize a framework in which the United States works creatively with our global partners to anticipate and prevent violent conflict and promote stability rather than reacting and responding to crises.

The world needs cooperation and investments in peacebuilding and prevention more than ever to respond to these negative trends, build peace across divided communities, leverage and enable societal resiliencies and prevent and reduce the heavy human and financial costs of protracted and recurrent crises that threaten global peace and security. The 10-year lifespan of the Global Fragility Act will endure across Administrations. As stewards in these nascent and formative years of the Act, we aim to provide a blueprint, forged by experts inside and outside of government that will stand the test of time and promote global peace and stability.



The map above highlights our areas of geographic focus. Those areas include Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and Coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo)

OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES

We will implement the Strategy by abiding by the following principles and commitments with humility, perseverance and creativity.

We will reform U.S. Government foreign policy structures and processes.

We will transform the way U.S. Government agencies do business by better integrating learning and planning, allowing for greater flexibility and adaptability based on local context, and improving interagency links and coordination to multiply the force of each other's work.

Learn from the past and “play the long game”:

Central to our implementation of the Strategy is a commitment to learn from our work, not only to adapt approaches in partner countries, but also to inform efforts within the United States in collaboration with our country partners. We will anchor interventions in communities, informed

by the insights of expert practitioners and academics. We will build feedback loops into our policy-making and planning processes and make strategic adjustments based on analysis, research, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness. Our projects should not solely be measured by deliverables and performance targets, but also consider the longer term impact of our interventions and strategic goals. It is also against our long-term strategic interests to sacrifice long-term gains for short-term wins. The 10-year time horizon of the strategy allows us to look beyond the “urgent” crises and near-term needs and focus on the “important” work of taking the necessary steps now to position the U.S. Government for success over the long term.

Drive Change in Bureaucratic Behavior:

The U.S. Government is a large, and at times unwieldy bureaucracy composed of a collection of Departments and Agencies focused on executing their missions in accordance with their internal procedures, policies, budgets and cultures. Sometimes, despite leveraging internal comparative advantages, these can work at odds with the larger mission. Every Administration has faced this challenge in rallying the apparatus of government around a common cause. To foster maximum effectiveness in implementing the Act, we will adapt, evolve, and overcome structural impediments to innovation and collaboration. We will pursue budgetary, procurement, legal and staffing mandates that are fit for purpose for today’s dynamic challenges and promote the necessary conditions for us to maximize resources and results. Our proposal is to purposefully convert our bureaucratic architecture over time to facilitate the adaptive and flexible management and implementation needed to strengthen and enable prevention and stabilization within dynamic conditions. This will require strong leadership, strategic patience, and a constructive relationship with Congress and the American people.

Pursue Whole of Government Alignment:

There are numerous, related initiatives and legislative mandates under way that leverage diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance with defense activities to guide U.S. operations in conflict-affected and fragile states, including the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocity Prevention Act, the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Act, and the National Counterterrorism Review. Each Department and Agency also endeavors to implement its own slate of policy guidance for its activities. And then at the country level, the U.S. Government adds layers of country-level or regional strategies and plans. Together these strata provide a patchwork of guidance and directives. In order to ensure increased alignment across these important related mandates, we will situate the GFA as an “umbrella” that can provide an overarching conflict prevention and stabilization frame- work to integrate these whole-of-government approaches. To this end, we will establish a new, high-level National Security Council-led Steering Committee, composed of senior U.S. Government officials, and engaging externally with civil society and other stakeholders, to ensure the alignment of policy, resource and tools across the U.S. Government for planning and implementation that are feasible, ground- ed in evidence, and locally-led.

We will pursue partnership at all levels.

We will work with our priority countries and societies, regional neighbors and myriad other stakeholders as true mutual partners and commit to multilateral solutions as the most effective way to marshal innovative ideas, requisite resources, and lasting change.

Shift the Narrative:

We seek to shift the stigma of “fragility” to an affirmative agenda for the GFA founded on compact-like partnerships for peace and resilience. Grounded in local knowledge and emphasizing mutual ownership and accountability, these partnerships can offer clear benefits to partner countries, so they are not seen merely as recipients of assistance but active agents of change. We will partner to leverage the presence of key resilience factors such as international connections, adaptive business and governance environments, and agile technocrats, to help countries withstand the instability risks while advancing U.S. interests. We will implement the Strategy with humility and creativity, and through collaboration, ensure a keen awareness of the governance challenges that contribute to instability in fragile contexts. Central to the Strategy is a commitment to learn from our work, not only to adapt approaches overseas, but also to inform efforts within the United States.

Commit to Multilateralism:

Much like the pandemic proved the world’s interdependence and the need for solidarity in approaches, we will invest in multilateral cooperation to enhance peace and address fragility. The U.S. Government has pledged to reengage in inter- national systems and standards and a shared vision for long-term stability. Our strength and impact are multiplied when we combine efforts with allies. Many allies have advanced individual peace and fragility agendas, and we will seek to partner with them to reinforce our common vision for preventing and addressing drivers of fragility. This also includes a commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), many of which align with GFA objectives.

Engage in active consultation:

Our strength is multiplied when we combine efforts with willing partners to address common challenges, share costs, and widen the circle of cooperation. There are many stakeholders in this 10-year endeavor. In implementing the Strategy, we will seek to be the partner of choice — bringing a more affirmative and committed partnership-based agenda to the table than our geostrategic competitors, building on a foundation of mutual respect.

- **Focus regions and countries:** Ultimately, no U.S. or international intervention will be successful without the buy-in and mutual ownership of trusted regional, national and local partners. Local actors will be primary partners in country and regional planning and implementation, in order to ensure knowledge and local ownership, support capacity building, create greater mutual accountability and transparency, and establish a foundation for long-term success. We will engage not only national level ministries and other government institutions in partner countries but also local authorities, civil society organizations, businesses, and communities. This engagement will take place with particular emphasis on traditionally marginalized and under-represented population, to

identify local priorities, establish regular dialogue, create an enabling environment, and galvanize progress.

- **International Partners:** We will renew our engagement with the UN and other multilateral organizations, many of whom are actively engaged in important work to support fragile states. We will also reinvest in partnerships with like-minded countries who are also committed to addressing drivers of conflict around the world.
- **Congress:** We will continue to provide regular briefings to Congress to share progress on the implementation of the Strategy and the prioritization of countries and regions as mandated by the Global Fragility Act.
- **The American People:** We will identify opportunities to engage the U.S. public, civil society and the private sector on implementation of the Strategy. We will engage with government, civil society, and private sector partners who demonstrate commitment and capacity to prevent conflict and promote stability at local, national, and regional levels.

We will implement integrated policy responses that advance multiple Administration priorities.

Global crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have laid bare that the world is irreversibly interconnected. The fates of people, the spread of disease, the effects of climate change, growing inequality, the corrosive effects of corruption, the human and societal toll of conflict, and the democratic backsliding across the globe affect every one of us in our own countries. The GFA framework aims to change the way we implement our efforts in a cohesive way in fragile contexts. We will integrate policy approaches in multiple priority areas – from democratic support and climate change to diversity and gender equity – within the GFA framework, and vice versa and leverage our economic development toolkit.

Elevate Democracy, Human Rights and Governance:

Our efforts through the Global Fragility Act will advance the President's call to action to revitalize democracy globally and to demonstrate that democratic governance and respect for human rights deliver for all people; that this approach is the best way to reduce fragility, advance sustainable development, and mitigate risks of violent conflict and instability. Ineffective governance, authoritarianism and repression, widespread corruption, human rights abuses and violations, weak rule of law and lack of accountability, unaddressed past atrocities, transnational criminal organizations, and weak and inequitable justice systems create and perpetuate fragility and conflict. We will therefore work with partner governments and communities to foster legitimate, inclusive, transparent, and accountable political systems that reduce fragility. Addressing issues of political, economic and social exclusion, corruption and human rights violations and abuses at early stages will reduce the need for reactive and costly security responses to crises, as well as serve as a bulwark against transnational organized crime, and violent conflict.

Mitigate Climate Change and Strengthen Environmental Security:

Climate and environmental crises or hazards are reshaping our world. The Earth's climate is now changing faster than at any point in the history of modern civilization and will exacerbate most physical, social, economic, and/or preexisting environmental vulnerabilities. Secondary effects of environmental degradation, vulnerabilities to natural weather and geologic disasters, and climate change include displacement, loss of livelihoods, weakened governments, and in some cases political instability and conflict. We will consider and address the risks posed by the impacts of climate change and other environmental security risks and test new ways of building climate resilience and deepen our understanding of the connections between fragility, peacebuilding and the environment.

Pursue equity and equality based on gender and other factors:

Research demonstrates that countries that advance gender equality and empower women, girls, and other gender-diverse persons and marginalized populations to participate in public life produce more inclusive and effective policy outcomes, are more peaceful, have higher economic growth, and are more stable as societies. The larger the gender gap, the larger likelihood for violent conflict. Other factors such as race, class, sexual orientation, gender expression, sex characteristics, disability, and immigrant status can further perpetuate these inequalities. Our approach to the GFA's implementation will center around the needs of the local community and elevate the participation of marginalized populations, including the right to participate in civic life free from violence, harassment and abuse. We will promote respect for the human rights and agency of women, girls and gender diverse persons and elevate their voices as a force for democratic resilience, economic growth, and peace and security. The prism of equity and diversity has also informed our country prioritization process, which has resulted in the selection of four countries and one sub-region—each with differing vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for resilience and multilateral alliances—across four continents to prioritize stabilization and prevention approaches.

Promote security sector governance:

The security sector often plays a decisive role in the political trajectory of countries experiencing fragility. When working with a committed partner, security sector reform is a powerful tool that can enhance trust between citizens, governments, and the military, law enforcement, and criminal justice institutions that serve them. As we work with partners to assist these institutions, we will focus on strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms and internal cultures of restraint, transparency, and respect for human rights, civilian authority, and the rule of law. We will emphasize the importance of including women in the security sector and peace processes in furtherance of our shared goals under Women, Peace and Security.

Manage rival powers:

Countries experiencing fragility have become a stage for competition between the United States and rivals; Russia and China's influence has exploited fissures, aggravated weak governance and targeted it. We will consider how U.S. engagement in fragile states can affect and is affected by our broader geopolitical interests.

ANNEX C – U. S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, 2020

The United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability seeks to break the costly cycle of fragility and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. The United States will pursue a new approach that addresses the political drivers of fragility and supports locally driven solutions. The United States will engage selectively based on defined metrics, host country political will, respect for democracy and human rights, defined cost-sharing, and mechanisms that promote mutual accountability with national and local actors



2020

United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability





2020

United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

This Strategy was submitted to Congress in line with Section 504(a) of the Global Fragility Act of 2019, which requires development of a ten-year Global Fragility Strategy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) affirms that the United States will work to strengthen fragile states “where state weakness or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland” and “empower reform-minded governments, people, and civil society” in these places. The President affirmed this commitment when he signed the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title V of Div. J, P.L. 116-94) (GFA) into law in December 2019. This Strategy meets the law’s requirement for a “Global Fragility Strategy.”

The United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability seeks to break the costly cycle of fragility and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. The United States will pursue a new approach that addresses the political drivers of fragility and supports locally driven solutions. The United States will engage selectively based on defined metrics, host country political will, respect for democracy and human rights, defined cost-sharing, and mechanisms that promote mutual accountability with national and local actors.

This Strategy outlines four goals to guide United States efforts across priority countries and regions:

Prevention: The United States will establish and support capabilities to engage in peacebuilding and anticipate and prevent violent conflict before it erupts;

Stabilization: The United States will support inclusive political processes to resolve ongoing violent conflicts, emphasizing meaningful participation of youth, women, and members of faith-based communities and marginalized groups, respect for human rights and environmental sustainability;

Partnerships: The United States will promote burden-sharing and encourage and work with partners to create conditions for long-term regional stability and foster private sector-led growth; and

Management: The United States will maximize U.S. taxpayer dollars and realize more effective outcomes through better prioritization, integration, and focus on efficiency across the U.S. government and with partners.

The United States will achieve these goals by aligning U.S. Government operations, setting clear priorities, and integrating all tools of U.S. foreign policy: diplomacy; foreign assistance; defense support and security cooperation; trade and investment; sanctions and other financial pressure tools; intelligence and analysis; and strategic communications. The United States will recruit and train staff to work more effectively in fragile environments. The United States cannot and should not pursue these efforts alone. Accordingly, this Strategy outlines a commitment to forge new partnerships with civil society, the private sector, regional partners, and bilateral and multilateral contributors who can provide expertise and share the financial burden.

This Strategy prioritizes learning, data-driven analysis, diplomacy, and information-sharing to understand local dynamics, target interventions, and hold actors accountable. It lays out a clear process to systematically monitor policy outcomes, not just program outputs. If changing dynamics require alterations in approach, if programs are not showing results, or if partners are not living up to their commitments, the United States will change course. The success of this Strategy will require discipline and commitment by the whole U.S. government and our partner governments, the creation of dynamic and forward-leaning country-level strategies, and flexibly and timely resources to power change. Through this new approach, the United States will seek to avoid past mistakes and better advance America's national security interests in fragile environments.

INTRODUCTION

This Strategy aims to strengthen United States efforts to break the costly cycle of fragility¹ and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. It advances the aims of the 2017 National Security Strategy, which affirms that the United States will work to strengthen fragile states “where state weakness or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland” and “empower reform-minded governments, people, and civil society” in these places.

The President affirmed this commitment when he signed the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title V of Div. J, P.L. 116-94) (GFA) into law in December 2019. The GFA calls for the United States Government to create a unified U.S. strategy that is intentional, cross-cutting and measurable, and harnesses the full spectrum of United States diplomacy, assistance, and engagement over a 10-year horizon. The goal is to help countries move from fragility to stability and from conflict to peace. This Strategy builds upon reforms initiated by the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018 Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and 2019 U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security.

Through this Strategy, the United States will pursue a different approach from previous efforts. Rather than externally driven nation-building, the United States will support locally driven political solutions that align with United States’ national security interests. Rather than fragmented and broad-based efforts, the United States will target the political factors that drive fragility. Rather than diffuse and open-ended efforts, the United States will engage selectively based on national interests, host-nation political progress, and defined metrics. Rather than implementing a disparate set of activities, the United States will strategically integrate its policy, diplomatic, and programmatic response.

The United States government will pursue reforms to use taxpayer dollars judiciously and achieve measurable results. This Strategy prioritizes data-driven analysis, diplomacy, and information-sharing to understand local dynamics, target interventions, and hold actors accountable. It requires rigorous monitoring and evaluation and periodic reviews to assess policy outcomes, not just program outputs. The Strategy also requires greater insistence on host-nation political will, defining burden-sharing, leveraging a broader range of financing tools, and holding actors accountable. The United States will modify or end programs that are not producing sufficient results or where partners are not fulfilling their commitments.

The United States should not address these challenges alone. The United States is committed to partnerships and burden-sharing with other nations and partners, including civil society and the private sector, to support local ownership and deliver cost-effective outcomes. In developing this Strategy, the United States Government has consulted with more than 200 civil society experts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and bilateral partners and multilateral organizations to date. The United States Government will continue to consult stakeholders, including the Congress, as it implements this Strategy.

¹ Fragility refers to a country’s or region’s vulnerability to armed conflict, large-scale violence, or other instability, including an inability to manage transnational threats or other significant shocks. Fragility results from ineffective or unaccountable governance, weak social cohesion, and/or corrupt institutions or leaders who lack respect for human rights.



SECTION 1: STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

The world faces growing risks from conflict, violence, and instability. International armed conflict and state instability, in particular, pose threats to the American people, United States interests at home and abroad, and United States allies and partners. Amid this instability, adversaries and malign actors can prey on weak governments, exploit their populations, build influence, and advance their own narrow interests or extremist ideologies.

For decades, the United States has helped partner countries—including those recovering from or at risk of conflict—become more self-reliant and democratic. Many of those countries now rank among the most prosperous economies in the world and are important economic and security partners for the United States. They are essential in helping to address shared challenges.

Many other countries experiencing high levels of fragility have not achieved these gains. Highly fragile countries and regions struggle with a

combination of ineffective and unaccountable governance, weak social cohesion, and/or corrupt institutions or leaders who lack respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as due process and freedom of religion or belief. Fragile countries and regions are vulnerable to armed conflicts, large-scale violence, or other instability, including an inability to manage transnational threats or other significant shocks.

Fragility poses threats to the United States and United States interests, and allies, and partners. Specifically:

- Fragility provides fertile ground for violent extremists and criminal organizations that threaten the security of Americans and U.S. allies. Terrorists continue to operate and find safe havens in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, despite reductions in global deaths from terrorism. Transnational organized criminals use fragility to advance their operations, including illicit drug trading, environmental exploitation, and human and wildlife trafficking.

- Fragility undermines economic prosperity and trade. Fragile countries and regions have the potential to become sizable future markets and future trading partners for the United States, but trade and investment are stymied by violence and corruption. In 2017, the estimated economic impact of violence was \$14.76 trillion, the equivalent to 12.4 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) lost. Further, research shows that investment in highly corrupt countries is substantially less than in countries that are relatively corruption-free.
- Fragility erodes international peace and destabilizes partner countries and regions. A rising number of countries are experiencing protracted violent conflict and/or high levels of organized violence, including violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure. The average internal armed conflict now lasts more than 20 years. More than one-half of armed conflicts that achieve peace lapse back into violence within 7 years and too often result in costly long-term peacekeeping operations. Humanitarian needs, driven primarily by more complex and longer-lasting conflicts, have reached historic levels, outpacing available resources by billions of dollars annually. At the same time, armed conflict obstructs humanitarian assistance and directly harms humanitarian personnel. In addition, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are further stressing global humanitarian assistance.
- Fragility can enable authoritarianism, external exploitation, and increase the influence of the United States' competitors in both physical and digital realms. Weak states are much more susceptible to Russian and Chinese coercion. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has saddled many states with unsustainable debt, environmental degradation, increased long-term

dependencies, and perpetuated fragility. China concertedly markets and promotes surveillance technology to client states and undermines democratic values of privacy, freedom, and equality.

Fragile countries typically struggle to assure basic security, territorial sovereignty, and the rule of law, lacking a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Fragility may manifest in the state's relative inability to control violence, and/or the illegitimate or excessive use of force against civilians. Weak institutions may instead serve the narrow political ends of elite coalitions and factions, whose interests are served by structural weaknesses in governance, oversight, and accountability.

Fragility increases when citizen-responsive governance breaks down. It is exacerbated by institutions that are unable or unwilling to respond to periodic stresses or crises and protect their populations in a legitimate, inclusive, and effective manner. Over the long-run, fragile countries tend to see slower, uneven, and unsustainable development. They may become reliant on external actors to prop up governance systems, provide security, and deliver essential services to their population.

The United States and other international contributors have allocated substantial assistance to conflict-affected and fragile countries and regions, achieving mixed results. Health, education, food security, humanitarian, and justice and security sector assistance save lives and disrupts threats. U.S. support, however, has not sufficiently addressed the political causes of fragility or ended costly cycles of recurrent crisis. Externally driven nation-building undermines local responsibility and distorts local economies. In some conflict areas, corrupt officials exploit external assistance to gain advantage and exacerbate conflicts.



SECTION 2: STRATEGIC APPROACH AND GOALS

This Strategy outlines a new framework for the United States response to global fragility. It elevates prevention, addresses the political drivers of fragility, and supports locally driven solutions. The United States, through this Strategy, will focus on the most vulnerable countries and regions that meet a clear set of conditions, consistent with the National Security Strategy. Namely, this Strategy applies to those states and regions in which fragility poses or magnifies a threat to the United States, United States interests, and United States allies and partners. The United States will focus efforts and resources at a sufficient scale to achieve the Strategy's goals and avoid dissipating effort across too many countries.

The Strategy emphasizes selective United States engagement based on defined outcomes, host country political will, respect for democratic norms and human rights, mutual accountability, and cost-sharing, including through compact-style partnerships with key stakeholders. The United States will create windows of opportunity, where possible and if needed, and engage with credible local partners committed to inclusive political solutions, meaningful reforms, and lasting peace.

To implement this new approach, the United States will recognize the complexity of each fragile environment, be nimble and adaptive, and prioritize building resilience,² and ultimately building toward peace, across interventions. Patterns of conflict, large-scale violence, and instability are often cyclical; they fluctuate geographically and over time; and each has a unique context.

² Resilience is the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and wider systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability, facilitates inclusive growth, and ends cycles of recurrent crisis.

Given this complexity, the United States will adopt a multi-pronged, multi-sectoral approach to strengthen the resilience of partner nations. Fragile countries face an array of often compounding shocks and stresses that can include civil unrest, complex humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, and economic volatility. The United States will align diplomacy (including public engagement), assistance, investment, defense engagement, and other tools to help partners end protracted or recurrent crises and absorb, adapt to, and recover from such shocks and stresses.

The United States will also incorporate peacebuilding approaches to address the drivers of conflict, violence, and instability, such as, *inter alia*, exclusionary politics, entrenched corruption, impunity, or capacity deficits. The United States will support partners to build durable mechanisms to resolve conflicts, undertake difficult reforms where needed, enhance social cohesion, build critical institutions, deliver crucial services such as energy, create inclusive political coalitions, and mobilize domestic resources that can enable lasting peace, stability, and ultimately prosperity. This support will include advancing women's leadership and participation in all aspects of conflict prevention, stabilization, and peacebuilding.

Ultimately, U.S. intervention to address fragility will not be successful without the active engagement of critical local partners. Breaking the costly cycle of fragility and promoting peaceful self-reliant nations must be secured through the action and agency of host-country leaders, organizations, and communities. This effort cannot be imposed from the outside. The United States' role is to support those local partners committed to positive change.

Goals and Objectives of the Strategy

This Strategy has the following goals and subordinate objectives, which will inform subsequent country and regional implementation plans.

Goal 1: Prevention³ – Anticipate and Prevent Violent Conflict and Large-Scale Violence

Strategic investments in prevention can save billions of U.S. dollars and achieve better outcomes over the long run. The United States efforts will establish and support capabilities to anticipate and prevent instability and large-scale violence before it erupts, and engage in peacebuilding. The United States will invest in both short-term efforts to mitigate escalating conflict risks and longer-term efforts to address underlying vulnerabilities of violent conflict and other large-scale violence. The United States will ensure its assistance is sensitive to conflict dynamics and reinforces inclusive, participatory, and legitimate governance. This may include critical efforts to improve the protection and promotion of human rights; mitigate health, education, economic, and environmental, and food security dimensions of conflict; strengthen oversight, accountability, and administration in the security and justice sectors; and monitor and mitigate the impacts of disinformation, propaganda, and incitement to violence.

Objectives:

- Develop and/or reinforce local, national, and regional early warning systems and early action plans, backed by preventative diplomacy.
- Address vulnerabilities and structural risk factors that fuel violence and conflict and undermine civilian security by enhancing partner nation prevention, peacebuilding, and related counterterrorism efforts.

³ Prevention refers to deliberate efforts to reduce fragility, strengthen institutions, and increase cohesion in states and regions to disrupt likely pathways to violent conflict, instability, or political subversion. Strategic Prevention can include efforts related to atrocity early warning and prevention, conflict prevention, and countering violent extremism.

- Promote meaningful reforms of governance, essential services, natural resources management, and security and justice sector institutions to increase legitimacy and reduce corruption and meaningfully engage women and youth in decision-making.
- Protect and promote the rights of members of marginalized groups, including women and girls, religious and ethnic minority groups, and other communities at risk, including by increasing their participation in public life and protection.
- Strengthen local civil society and private sector networks, inclusive of women, youth and members of faith-based communities and marginalized groups, in order to meaningfully participate in conflict prevention, governmental reform, and peace building efforts.
- Bolster the capacities of public and private organizations and institutions monitoring, countering, and mitigating the impact of disinformation and propaganda by actors who threaten peace and stability.

**Goal 2: Stabilization⁴ –
Achieve Locally-Driven Political
Solutions to Violent Conflicts and
Large-Scale Violence**

Stabilizing conflict-affected areas is an inherently *political* endeavor. The United States will support inclusive political processes to resolve ongoing violent conflicts, emphasizing meaningful participation of women, youth, and members of faith-based and marginalized groups, respect for democracy and human rights; compliance with international law, including humanitarian law and principles; institutional transparency and accountability; and environmental sustainability. The United States will integrate and sequence diplomatic, development, and military-related efforts, understanding their potential political

impact. The United States will support efforts by legitimate local authorities to reduce violence, establish stability, and peaceably manage conflict.

Objectives:

- Assist national and local actors, including, *inter alia*, civil society and women leaders, to broker and implement durable and inclusive peace agreements or ceasefires and related transitional justice and accountability provisions.
- Secure support from local, national, and regional partners to bolster peace processes and stabilize conflict-affected areas.
- Expand civilian security in conflict- and violence-affected areas by building legitimate, rights-respecting justice and security institutions capable of countering the full range of threats to stability (e.g., terrorist groups).
- Promote the meaningful inclusion of women and girls in brokering and implementing peace agreements.
- Augment media, communications, and outreach efforts to engender public support for peace and stabilization processes.
- Promote inclusive post-conflict economic recovery and reforms, including equitable management of natural resources, to reinforce stabilization and peace.
- Reduce the destabilizing impact of non-state armed actors.

⁴ Stabilization is a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.

**Goal 3: Partnership –
Promote Burden-Sharing, Coordination,
and Mutual Accountability**

National and regional leadership are essential to achieve sustainable solutions to fragility and conflict. The United States will encourage and assist partners to create conditions for long-term regional stability and foster private sector-led growth. The United States can achieve better outcomes by marshalling contributions from other public and private donors.

Objectives:

- Establish compact-style partnerships with national and local partner governments that promote mutual accountability and advance agreed-upon reforms to reduce fragility.
- Secure commitments from regional, bilateral, and multilateral partners to advance necessary governance, essential services, security, justice, humanitarian, and economic reforms and build resilience to shocks.
- Mobilize private sector activity in high-risk areas to help improve the investment climate, advance transparency, build capacity to manage natural resources effectively, and combat corruption.
- Enlist the international private sector to promote conflict-sensitive and environmentally sustainable investments in fragile states and increase the number of beneficial public-private partnerships.
- Address cross-border security threats, disinformation, and propaganda efforts by malign actors, and regional challenges by developing and/or enhancing regional mechanisms for economic, security, information transparency, humanitarian, and/or justice cooperation.

**Goal 4: Management –
Enable an Effective, Integrated U.S.
Government Response**

Creating alignment within and across United States departments and agencies to tackle global fragility is a difficult task, but one that will be crucial to the success of this Strategy. Working with Congress, the executive branch will achieve better results in fragile states and regions by improving how the United States Government conducts operations. The United States will improve prioritization, integration, and efficiency in all planning, diplomatic, foreign assistance, defense engagement, and other operations in fragile states and regions, both across the department and agency, and with partners. The United States will pursue integrated civil-military resourcing and planning to advance shared objectives, collaboration, and information-sharing. The United States will create and pursue a learning agenda, capitalize on lessons learned in implementing adaptive management techniques, and assure that analysis and reporting are linked to desired policy outcomes.

Objectives:

- Institutionalize joint U.S. department and agency research, analysis, planning, messaging, prioritization of funding, and execution of activities toward prevention and stabilization.
- Streamline and expedite funding processes to enable more adaptive, integrated, and agile implementation and informed risk management in fragile environments.
- Recruit, train, and retain diverse staff, including U.S. military veterans, with relevant skills for fragile environments, and deploy diplomats and development professionals alongside U.S. military operational and tactical elements where needed and where security conditions permit.

- Improve field-level rigorous monitoring and evaluation, risk assessments, and feedback loops to assess progress, adapt strategic approaches, or shift diplomatic, security, and assistance efforts where appropriate and consistent with Secretary of State and Chief of Mission authorities and responsibilities.
- Strengthen coherence among humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities to meet emergency needs while breaking cycles of crisis.
- Mainstream conflict-sensitivity standards for all U.S. diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to fragile areas to reinforce political and social cohesion, while upholding humanitarian principles.
- Align and continuously adapt development, security, and justice sector assistance to stabilization and peace process implementation by using data driven analysis and adaptive strategic approaches.



SECTION 3:

ADVANCING THE STRATEGY

The United States will realize better outcomes by improving the ways in which departments and agencies address fragility, in line with the above management goal. This Strategy defines roles and responsibilities, department and agency integration and coordination mechanisms, and priority-setting processes. The United States will also review and pursue additional or different authorities, staff, and resources as needed to achieve this Strategy's goals and objectives.

Department and Agency Roles and Responsibilities

The executive branch has established clear roles and responsibilities for advancing this Strategy, specifically:

- The **Department of State (State)** is the lead Federal agency for executing this Strategy and overseeing and implementing United States foreign policy under direction of the

President to advance diplomatic and political efforts with local partners, relevant bilateral parties, and multilateral bodies. State oversees the planning and implementation of targeted justice sector, law enforcement, and other security sector assistance to stabilize conflict-affected areas, and prevent violence and fragility globally.

- The **U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)** serves as the lead implementing agency for international development, disaster, and non-security prevention and stabilization assistance and program policy in support of United States policy objectives under this Strategy. USAID works to strengthen coherence among development, humanitarian, and other non-security assistance in fragile countries and regions.
- The **Department of Defense (DoD)** serves in a supporting role to manage and prevent conflict and address global fragility through specialized activities including Civil Affairs, psychological operations,

information operations engagements, institutional capacity-building, and security cooperation. DoD utilizes the defense support to stabilization (DSS) process to identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other United States departments and agencies; convey them through strategic documents; organize to achieve them; and prioritize requisite defense resources. DoD also provides requisite security and reinforces civilian efforts, where appropriate and consistent with available authorities.

Other Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Department of Justice, Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Energy, and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), support United States efforts to prevent violence and fragility globally and stabilize conflict-affected areas, as appropriate and authorized, based on their unique mandates, capabilities, and relationships.

Department and Agency Decision-Making and Coordination

The GFA makes clear that prevention and stabilization requires a joint, integrated approach across State, USAID, DoD, and other federal departments and agencies. A senior-level GFA Steering Committee, convened by the National Security Council (NSC) or its designee, comprising State, USAID, DoD, Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), will meet quarterly to review GFA implementation progress and conduct oversight. Other departments and agencies will participate as relevant and as appropriate.

State will chair a working-level secretariat,⁵ inclusive of other departments and agencies, coordinate execution of the Strategy, and update the Steering Committee as needed.

Departments and agencies will implement the strategy and secretariat's tasks through an inclusive, collaborative process with other vested stakeholders. USAID and DoD will lead aspects of the secretariat's work in line with their respective agency and department roles and responsibilities. The secretariat will work together to address inevitable challenges that will arise in implementing the new approach outlined in this Strategy.

Chiefs of Mission in priority countries and regions will lead field-level planning, decision-making, and coordination. Chiefs of Mission, with input from the USAID Mission Directors as appropriate, will designate a representative to be responsible for coordinating and integrating the full spectrum of GFA activities across the Country Team and with the relevant Combatant Command and agency stakeholders. Chiefs of Mission or designee will lead bilateral engagement on security and justice sector reform to ensure United States support for such efforts is properly elevated to a central policy objective. They will be responsible for directing the planning and implementation of security and justice sector assistance resources to appropriately leverage political objectives.

United States embassies and missions will establish coordination mechanisms for engaging regularly with national government counterparts, local civil society, and other stakeholders. They will review, align, and adapt plans and programs based on ongoing partner engagement and iterative conflict analysis, keeping other United States Government stakeholders periodically informed. As practical and appropriate, U.S. embassies and missions will incorporate plans to implement the Strategy into State Integrated Country Strategies (ICSSs), USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs),

⁵ The Secretariat will provide administrative functions for department and agency activities to advance the Strategy, under the guidance of the GFA Steering Committee. Specific roles, actions, and outputs will be formalized in a Secretariat Terms of Reference, approved by the Steering Committee and updated as needed.

and DoD Campaign Plans, Operational Plans, and Regional Strategies.

United States departments and agencies will develop internal communications plans and ensure this Strategy informs and is incorporated into other relevant strategies, plans, and initiatives in priority countries and regions. They will integrate this Strategy's goals and objectives with other United States policies to combat malign foreign influence, win the great power competition, counter authoritarianism, and promote a democratic, rules-based international order as the basis for global peace and security.

Country and Regional Prioritization and Planning

The United States will prioritize countries and/or regions to implement this Strategy over a ten-year time horizon, starting with no less than five countries and regions. These countries and/or regions will be assessed, through the senior-level Steering Committee, based on objective criteria, consistent with the factors identified in Section 505 of the GFA. These factors include: assessed levels and risks of fragility, violent conflict and associated national resilience, political will and capacity for partnerships, opportunity for United States impact, other international commitments and resources, and United States national security and economic interests.

As part of consultations, United States departments and agencies will weigh options for regional approaches to address identified challenges and maximize resources. Given the central importance of security and justice sectors to long-term stability, prospects for security and justice sector reform will be a primary criterion for selecting priority countries.

Wherever feasible, United States departments and agencies will include third-party data sources and indicators to help inform selection of priority countries and/or regions and monitor overall progress. These will include the Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project, Fragile States Index, Freedom House's Freedom in the World

Index, Legatum Institute's Prosperity Index, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's Early Warning Project, Varieties of Democracy Project, UNDP's Gender Inequality Index, World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, and World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.

Following consultation with Congress, the United States Government will finalize and transmit to the relevant congressional committees the list of priority countries and regions and update as needed. The Steering Committee will meet periodically, not less than once per year, to review the list of priority countries and regions, commitment of host countries, availability of resources, and status of burden-sharing efforts. The Steering Committee will assess whether new countries or regions meet the established criteria and should be added to the list. The Steering Committee will review implementation progress in priority countries and regions and will consult with other stakeholders as needed.

Once priority countries and regions are selected, the United States will engage national and local government and civil society partners and develop and implement multi-year implementation plans. The United States will explore new mechanisms to solicit stakeholder input into those plans to ensure mutual accountability. The United States will align and sequence all relevant U.S. tools and resources to advance agreed objectives. Time horizons for each country implementation plan will be set based on the best available risk analysis, contextual information, and a reasonable estimate of when measurable outcomes can be achieved.

Compact-Style Country and Regional Partnerships

Another innovative component of this Strategy is the development of new models for compact-style partnerships. The United States will promote mutual accountability with national and local actors by applying international best practices and defining roles and responsibilities, resource contributions, and intended outcomes in collaboration.

These partnerships will be based on specific metrics that ensure adequate institutional progress and political commitment. Metrics will focus on demonstrated political progress to advance peace processes, inclusive and accountable governance, access to essential services, economic reforms, justice and security sector reforms, media independence, respect for democratic norms and human rights, and defined cost-sharing.

The United States will reinforce these compact-style partnerships by facilitating policy dialogue among national and local leaders and other international partners, planning for scenarios in which milestones are not met, and managing change. Through these partnerships, the United States will incentivize government partners to institute transparent and accountable governance systems and address corruption. If partners fail to meet their commitments, the United States will shift resources and increase diplomatic and economic pressure.

International Cooperation and Public-Private Partnerships

The United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral partnerships to implement this Strategy. The United States will work with other donors to share and track information on respective programs, avoid duplication, and optimize assistance toward shared objectives. This includes greater coordination within the Group of Seven, Group of Twenty, World Bank, United Nations, Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development, and other bilateral and multilateral official contributors and private-sector partners. The United States will also coordinate with official bilateral and multilateral contributing partners to ensure consistent messaging to host-nation partners and efforts to confront malign actors and spoilers.

The United States is also developing approaches for related multilateral pooled funding mechanisms, which could potentially include the Global Fragility Fund authorized by the GFA. Multilateral funds can be effective mechanisms for leveraging additional financial and technical support for activities from likeminded official and private partners and achieving economies of scale. As these funds may have limited host-nation inclusion in decision-making, the United States is assessing ways to maximize success of such funds in fragile environments. Multilateral funding mechanisms must be structured appropriately to incentivize effectiveness and accountability and used in the context of a diplomatic and outreach strategy.

The United States will work with the private sector to achieve greater scale, sustainability, and effectiveness of development and humanitarian outcomes. Domestic and international firms can prove powerful development partners where they share common cause, values, and development objectives. The United States can leverage its expertise and tools, including development finance, to promote such alignment, de-risk, and accelerate economic activity, and promote transparency and adherence to international standards. Strategic United States investment—if coordinated with broader United States and partner efforts and pursued in a conflict-sensitive manner—can unleash significantly greater and more sustainable resources to address challenges driving fragility and promote durable peace and recovery. The potential for such investments can also be leveraged to incentivize and build a domestic constituency for critical government reforms.

The United States will pursue new and more effective partnerships with private sector entities, including philanthropies and corporate social responsibility entities. The United States will seek to integrate those entities into planning efforts to better understand and incorporate the private sector's interests and capabilities and mobilize associated resources. The United States will employ novel financing arrangements such as open innovation or challenge models where appropriate. Public-private partnerships will employ conflict-sensitive standards to ensure they contribute directly to this Strategy's goals and objectives.

Authorities, Staffing, and Resources

The United States Government will review authorities, staffing, and resources that enable the United States Government ability to respond quickly to complex fragile and unstable environments. The United States Government will incorporate this Strategy into future budget requests to Congress and seek more flexible authorities and staffing as needed.

While existing bilateral and regional funding accounts and activities can provide consistency over time, foreign assistance funding directives, earmarks, and other requirements can be constraints in dynamic, complex, and fragile contexts. The United States Government will work with Congress to advance the United States Government ability to assess and respond to emergent stabilization requirements and the flexibility to align policy and programmatic interventions for implementing this Strategy across development, stabilization, and security sectors, consistent with the purposes described in section 509(a)(3) of the GFA regarding the Prevention and Stabilization Fund.

The United States Government will also work with Congress to ensure DoD has authorities and funding to implement this Strategy in concert with United States national security objectives. Security conditions dictate that State and USAID stabilization efforts are often constrained or delayed in less-permissive operating

environments, leading to a significant gap in the United States Government's ability to execute stabilization activities.

During Strategy implementation, the executive branch will rigorously monitor, in real time, the bureaucratic, legislative, and other constraints facing Chiefs of Mission as they adapt. The executive branch will work with Congress to make any necessary reforms to existing statutory authorities and requirements. This effort will include a review of procurement processes, budget limitations, and programming authorities.

The United States will review existing processes and make changes as needed to achieve this Strategy's goals and objectives. In line with their roles and responsibilities, United States departments and agencies will review their current staffing, skills, capabilities, research, and data analytics requirements to ensure they are positioned to implement this Strategy. United States embassies and missions have highlighted the need for additional diverse staff skilled in working on prevention and stabilization. The United States will develop short- and long-term staffing options to support U.S. embassies and missions in GFA priority countries and regions.

The United States will continue to invest in the expeditionary capacity of its civilian workforce to advance this Strategy within priority countries and regions. In accordance with Secretary of State security responsibility and Chief of Mission authorities, the United States will assess options to deploy civilian-led teams into fragile and conflict-affected areas to assess local conditions, engage local authorities, and direct and monitor programs. Options include deploying civilians with DoD operational and tactical elements to achieve United States national security objectives. State, USAID, and DoD will seek to integrate and streamline relevant human resources, training, knowledge management, and operational support platforms where possible.



SECTION 4: STRATEGIC INTEGRATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TOOLS AND POLICY INITIATIVES

Tools

The executive branch will marshal all available tools to advance this Strategy's goals and objectives. Specifically:

Diplomacy

Diplomatic engagement fosters unity of purpose and galvanizes collective action, which is essential to help broker and support political solutions to violent conflicts. State will invest in preventative diplomatic efforts that promote dialogue, mediation, reconciliation, respect for human rights, and conflict resolution. Embassies will target diplomatic efforts based on data-driven analytics, coordinate external messaging, and

provide a platform for collaboration across United States Government departments and agencies. This platform will help understand the complex, local, national, and regional political dynamics in fragile states and regions, including windows of opportunity and emerging risks.

The United States will upgrade its diplomatic capabilities to address risks of violent conflict, violence, and fragility. This effort includes engaging proactively with partner nations, regional leaders, allies and partners to prevent violent conflict by strengthening early warning and response efforts. The United States will also work with like-minded partner nations to focus on common approaches and enhance burden sharing, including by bolstering existing mechanisms such as the Stabilization Leaders Forum. The United States will expand training and tools for U.S. diplomats engaging in fragile countries and regions.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance—including humanitarian, development, and security sector assistance—is a critical tool to address fragility, respond to and mitigate conflict and crises, and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In fragile contexts, needs are often most acute, but so too are the impediments to effectively delivering assistance.

The United States will enhance specific foreign assistance programs that address fragility directly, including those that seek to strengthen social cohesion, combat corruption, protect human rights, promote reconciliation, mobilize investment and engage private-sector actors in peacebuilding, and reinforce critical governance reforms. More broadly, the United States will mainstream and implement guidelines to ensure the conflict-sensitivity of all foreign assistance programs in fragile areas. The United States will empower Country Teams to strategically use foreign assistance to address fragility, inclusive of both field- and Washington-managed activities. United States development professionals on the ground will use their convening power, strategic communications, technical expertise, and local relationships to support prevention and stabilization objectives. State and USAID, including through the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council, a senior-level mechanism launched by the Secretary of State, will continue to advance important reforms to strengthen coherence and collaboration to align with the “humanitarian-development-peace nexus,” with a new focus on Relief, Response, and Resilience (R3).

To ensure sustainable, impactful assistance programs in fragile contexts, State, USAID, DoD, and other assistance agencies, as relevant, will jointly establish planning, implementation, monitoring, and coordination mechanisms that deliberately layer, sequence, and integrate complementary types of assistance; promote close and constant coordination with diplomacy and

other capabilities; employ data-driven decision-making, adaptive management, and complexity-aware monitoring; and implement a clear-eyed approach to partnership, placing a premium on engaging and empowering local government, civil-society, and private-sector actors who demonstrate agency and ownership, shared values, a commitment to mutual accountability, and who can effect meaningful change.

Defense Support and Security Cooperation

Basic security is essential for broader stabilization and strategic prevention gains. Defense support provides security for civilian, diplomatic, development, and humanitarian efforts, particularly in conflict-prone regions. In certain settings, the United States military can play a critical role in facilitating basic public order, responding to immediate needs of the population, and building the capacity of foreign security forces. These efforts contribute to longer-term stability in concert with United States national security objectives.

The United States military will enhance its ability to support this Strategy through small-footprint, coordinated, partner-focused activities in line with DoD Policy Directive 3000.05 “Stabilization” and United States national security objectives. Section 1210A of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA (“Department of Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in National Security Interest of the United States”), as well as the SAR, has greatly increased department and agency communication and synchronization at relevant Combatant Commands and Embassies.

State and DoD will develop security assistance and related programs and initiatives to improve governance of the security sector, build partners’ institutional capacity, professionalize partner-nation security forces, and build long-term relationships with key host nation security officials consistent with U.S. national security and economic interests. The United States will align

security sector assistance activities in priority countries and regions with political objectives and non-security assistance to address fragility and conflict where applicable. The United States will incorporate good governance and respect for democratic norms and human rights in security cooperation and capacity-building efforts, in line with the 2019-2020 *Guidelines for Effective Justice and Security Sector Assistance in Conflict-Affected Areas*. The United States will continue to restrict assistance to foreign security forces that engage in gross violations of human rights, in accordance with United States law.

Beyond traditional forms of defense capacity building (e.g., technical assistance, military education, training, and equipment), United States support for the security sector will include fostering relationships with reform champions within security institutions, empowering civil society to serve as a source of public oversight, and elevating security governance

Trade, Investment, and Commercial Diplomacy

The United States promotes a development model based on free market principles, fair and reciprocal trade, private sector activity, and rule of law. A robust private sector and attractive investment climate help to: create jobs and economic opportunity, detracting from the need to turn to armed groups and illicit avenues or other malign actors for income; increase government resources and revenue available for service delivery, including through tax receipts; and improve stability and transparency by diffusing economic power and empowering individuals when conducted in a conflict-sensitive fashion. Additionally, broad-based private sector growth creates a virtuous circle by signaling stability to other firms and encouraging new investment.

The United States will work with governments, multilateral development banks, and other organizations to improve economic policies and the investment climate and identify investment opportunities. The DFC aims to invest 60 percent of its portfolio in low income,

lower-middle income, and fragile states. The DFC aims to invest more than \$25 billion and mobilize an additional \$50 billion by the end of 2025 across priority sectors. The DFC will catalyze investment through debt and equity financing, political risk insurance, blended finance approaches, technical assistance, and feasibility studies. DFC's Portfolio for Impact and Innovation (PI2) will support early-stage firms who may operate in fragile contexts who lack the track record or scale of traditional finance partners.

Additionally, the United States will implement export controls to prevent persons involved with or enabling human rights abuses from access to United States items to further such malign objectives. The DOC will support this Strategy, through for example, technology and entity-based controls, led by the Bureau of Industry and Security.

Sanctions and Other Financial Pressure Tools

The United States will use targeted sanctions and other financial measures to advance stability and impose costs on actors that fuel conflict and instability. Financial transparency and regulatory reform measures can increase accountability and adherence to the rule of law, and reduce the risks that human rights abusers and corrupt officials can exploit United States financial systems. Treasury engages with foreign counterparts to strengthen anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing regimes, and to address corruption vulnerabilities through regulatory reform and financial transparency efforts.

Treasury implements a range of authorities to impose financial consequences on those who pillage the wealth and resources of their people, generate ill-gotten profits from corruption, cronyism, and other criminal activity, and engage in human rights abuses. These tools include imposing sanctions on corrupt actors, serious human rights abusers around the world, and corrupt senior foreign political figures; and issuing related advisories to financial institutions. A number of United States sanctions programs

include criteria related to terrorism, human rights, and/or corruption, such as sanctions under Executive Order 13818, which implements and builds upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. These programs enable the United States Government to designate persons and entities and block their United States-based property and interests or property in the possession or control of any United States person. Such designations bring human rights abuse to global attention, cut off the perpetrators from the United States' financial system, and often lead foreign financial institutions to stop processing transactions or offering financial services to the designated individuals or entities. The United States continues to enhance its use of such sanctions where appropriate to disrupt and deter the behavior of malign actors, including those who contribute to fragility.

State will continue to implement visa restriction authorities to deny entry to foreign officials involved, directly or indirectly, in significant corruption or gross violations of human rights.

Additionally, the United States will continue to ensure United States financial institutions meet related due diligence and reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), which underpins the United States Government's effective anti-money laundering/counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework. Compliance with the BSA is essential to detecting, investigating, deterring, and disrupting criminal activity, including the designated categories of offenses: corruption, environmental crime; migrant smuggling; organized crime; and human rights abuses such as human trafficking.

The United States will continue to restrict assistance to foreign security forces that engage in gross violations of human rights, in accordance with United States law. Gross violations of human rights by state security forces, including the recruitment and use of child soldiers, as well as violations of international humanitarian law and principles, erode legitimacy and contribute to fragility. Restrictions on assistance and other

financial pressure tools will be accompanied by active United States diplomatic engagement, including on the UN Security Council where obligatory international sanctions regimes reinforce and advance the United States foreign policy objectives. The United States will engage with government and civil society partners to promote full implementation of these sanctions and restrictions, investigate alleged violations, promote accountability, and incentivize respect for the rule of law and human rights by right-respecting security forces.

Intelligence and Analysis

The United States Intelligence Community (IC) will tailor intelligence collection and analysis to inform appropriate strategies to address fragility and political instability, in particular in the selected priority countries or regions. The IC will continue to assess conflict and mass atrocity trends and risks, drawing on quantitative and qualitative analytic methods. The United States will deepen partnerships with academic, think tank, private sector, and civil society experts who can contribute to these assessments.

Strategic Communications

The United States will partner with local media in fragile environments using media development and strategic communications tools. The United States will advance partner capacities to refute disinformation and mitigate incitement to violence and malign propaganda through digital and conventional media. The United States will highlight that the United States is a force for good, while reinforcing the voices of local, national, and global partners to promote peace, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. The United States will monitor and seek to counter transnational influence and messaging operations that promote violence or division or otherwise destabilize priority countries.

Laws and Initiatives

This Strategy provides an overarching strategic prevention and stabilization approach that will

integrate with relevant existing State, USAID, DoD, and Treasury department and agency strategies. This Strategy builds upon reforms initiated by the *2019 U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security*, the *Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocity Prevention Act of 2018*, the *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review*, and the *2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism*.

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)

The United States Women, Peace, and Security Strategy, released in June 2019, focuses on improving the effectiveness of conflict prevention and peacebuilding by proactively integrating the needs and perspectives of women and empowering women to contribute their talents and energies to international peace, security, and prosperity. It endeavors to rectify the disproportionate adverse impacts of armed conflict on women and girls. In line with the WPS Strategy, the United States will encourage partner governments to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions. The United States will promote the protection of women and girls' human rights and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation. The United States will continue to expand its capacity to use relevant analysis and indicators, including the collection of sex-disaggregated data, to identify and address barriers to women's meaningful participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict. The United States will institutionalize new standards for applying gender analysis of quantitative and qualitative information to identify, understand, and explain gaps between men and women to inform the design and targeting of United States interventions in conflict-affected areas, including defense support and security. WPS principles will be incorporated into all elements of this Strategy's country and regional planning processes.

Atrocity Early Warning

Preventing, mitigating, and responding to atrocities, as well as assisting in recovery efforts following mass atrocities, helps reduce fragility.

The executive branch leads this effort through the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force (the Task Force), a White House-led department and agency body established to help further the Elie Wiesel Global and Atrocity Prevention Act. The Task Force informs policymakers of countries at risk of or experiencing mass atrocities, and coordinates Administration response efforts. The Task Force regularly engages with civil society stakeholders to inform Administration analysis and policy development. The Task Force's work will be integrated into this Strategy's country and regional plans where appropriate.

Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR)

The SAR framework, approved in 2018, solidified a new framework for how State, USAID, and DoD work together to advance stabilization efforts. State, USAID, and DoD have developed new tools to operationalize SAR principles, including to craft political strategies, partner with other international donors, target and sequence stabilization assistance resources, and monitor and evaluate strategic outcomes. United States embassy teams in certain countries have, with assistance from relevant Combatant Commands, developed integrated stabilization plans and modalities to apply SAR principles. This Strategy will build upon and further these important efforts.

National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT)

The 2018 NSCT emphasizes the importance of preventing and countering terrorist and violent extremist recruitment and radicalization. State, USAID, and DoD are developing and institutionalizing the "prevention architecture" called for in the NSCT, in addition to other ongoing counter-radicalization and recruitment efforts. This architecture includes efforts to promote disengagement and reintegration of former terrorist fighters and affiliated persons from violent extremist organizations. This Strategy will incorporate and amplify those targeted efforts.



SECTION 5: MEASURING SUCCESS

The United States will measure progress of this Strategy to demonstrate accountability to the American taxpayer and ensure impact. Departments and agencies will use a data-driven approach to rigorously assess the progress and impact of United States engagement and the demonstrated progress of regional, national, and local partners toward stated benchmarks and goals. Findings will inform decision making and re-targeting as needed. Departments and agencies must make necessary adjustments and apply learning on a recurring basis to overcome inevitable challenges in implementing this Strategy.

State, USAID, and DoD will jointly develop a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Implementation Plan for this Strategy. United States embassies and missions will also develop MEL plans for priority countries and regions. Plans will include a logic model that articulates what

success looks like, maps clear pathways toward reducing risks and achieving policy objectives, and align actions and inputs accordingly. Stakeholders will identify relevant and specific commitments they will take to achieve the mid-term and long-term impact of the plans and propose appropriate metrics to measure progress accordingly. MEL plans will also assess effectiveness, capture learning on department and agency coordination, innovative structures and approaches, engage non-traditional partners, use other tools alongside assistance, and assess how departments and agencies are “doing business differently” in fragile contexts. The United States will regularly revisit the plans to ensure they are in sync with changing conditions on the ground.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The United States will monitor, assess, and evaluate progress toward reducing fragility in complex and rapidly changing environments. Initially, the United States will conduct baseline assessments for those priority countries and/

or regions to enable subsequent measurement of changes. Embassies and relevant bureaus will gather data and routinely analyze progress towards defined strategic outcomes. The United States Government will structure monitoring around a framework that allows for systematic assessments of both quantitative and qualitative information, benchmarked against multiple levels of contextually defined policy and programmatic progress.

The GFA secretariat will conduct periodic department and agency reviews based on clear metrics to determine progress on country and regional plans toward the Strategy. The review process will systematically analyze comparable information across priority countries and regions, recognizing differences across contexts. Reviews will also monitor the potential risks that United States programs, policies, or resources could empower or abet repressive local actors or be exploited by malign actors.

As part of the reviews, department and agency stakeholders will report on their actions and review collective strategic outcomes. Senior leaders will use review findings to inform policy considerations, determine course corrections, and identify areas for increased attention and staff resource allocations.

Departments and agencies will streamline reviews and reporting efforts with other required reporting to reduce the burden on posts. To mainstream this Strategy and prevent duplicative MEL systems, departments and agencies will use existing indicators, where possible and feasible, and will create new indicators for tracking Strategy impacts as needed.

The United States will provide sufficient expertise and training for embassies to conduct required monitoring and evaluation.

Consultation, Learning, and Adaptation

The United States will implement the 10-year Strategy on an iterative basis, building on a cycle of assessment, monitoring, evaluation, learning, and adaptation. As departments and agencies implement the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (The Evidence Act), the United States will institutionalize the use of data analytics, information-sharing, and rapid feedback loops. State and USAID will lead development and management of an integrated learning agenda on breaking the cycle of fragility and conflict. Ongoing learning will allow for course-correction and inform policy discussions and the use of adaptive management good practices. State, USAID, and DoD will incorporate lessons into agency training curricula and use information to address knowledge gaps. Headquarters will work with field-based partners, embassies, and missions to share information and learning across global fragility efforts.

The United States will also develop a robust evidence base to address the long-term causes of conflict and fragility. This base will: examine external and internal long-term causes of fragility and violent conflict; determine the effectiveness of policies and interventions across contexts, conditions, and stakeholders groups; establish responsiveness to local systems and locally-defined priorities; examine multi-sectoral approaches to reduce fragility and the causes of violence; and ensure that approaches are conflict-sensitive and do no harm across multiple stakeholder and beneficiary groups. This evidence base will be hosted on a web-based application that will be available to United States departments and agencies. Departments and agencies will share best practices among each other and across multilateral partners to enhance a common and improved understanding of proven tactics and approaches.

United States departments and agencies will continue to engage the Congress, non-governmental and private sector partners, international partner and donor nations, and host-nation and local partners throughout the implementation of this Strategy. Those partnerships are essential for successful learning and adaptation. United States departments and agencies will convene biannual “multi-stakeholder consultations” to provide updates on the progress of the Strategy, discuss challenges and lessons learned, and solicit new research and data-sharing on best practices. ■



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ANNEX D – U. S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, June 2020

The WPS Strategy responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68-Oct. 6, 2017), which requires, within 1 year of the enactment of the Act, and again 4 years thereafter, the submission of a strategy to the appropriate Congressional Committees and its publication. The WPS Strategy supersedes the 2016 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; complements relevant laws, appropriations, and Executive Orders, including the State and Foreign Operations Acts and the National Defense Authorization Act; and satisfies Executive Order 13595.



UNITED STATES STRATEGY ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

JUNE 2019





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Introduction

The United States is unapologetic in championing the principles upon which our country was founded: individual liberty, free enterprise, equal justice under the law, and the dignity of every human life. The President’s *National Security Strategy* (NSS) highlighted that these principles form the foundation of our most enduring alliances, since governments that respect citizens’ rights “remain the best vehicle for prosperity, human happiness, and peace.” Further, the NSS also noted that “governments that fail to treat women equally do not allow their societies to reach their potential [while] societies that empower women to participate fully in civic and economic life are more prosperous and peaceful.”

The Trump Administration is committed to advancing women’s equality, seeking to protect the rights of women and girls, and promoting women and youth empowerment programs. The United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS Strategy) responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which President Donald J. Trump signed into law on October 6, 2017.¹ This is the first legislation of its kind globally, which makes the United States the first country in the world with a comprehensive law on WPS, and *de facto*, the first with a whole-of-government strategy that responds to such a domestic law. The WPS Strategy recognizes the diverse roles women play as agents of change in preventing and resolving conflict, countering terrorism and

violent extremism, and building post conflict peace and stability. The WPS Strategy seeks to increase women’s meaningful leadership in political and civic life by helping to ensure they are empowered to lead and contribute, equipped with the necessary skills and support to succeed, and supported to participate through access to opportunities and resources.

Key departments and agencies that will implement the WPS Strategy include, but are not limited to, the Departments of State, Defense (DOD), and Homeland Security (DHS); and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This Administration will capitalize on the opportunity to link our new,

¹ The WPS Strategy responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68-Oct. 6, 2017), which requires, within 1 year of the enactment of the Act, and again 4 years thereafter, the submission of a strategy to the appropriate Congressional Committees and its publication. The WPS Strategy supersedes the 2016 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; complements relevant laws, appropriations, and Executive Orders, including the State and Foreign Operations Acts and the National Defense Authorization Act; and satisfies Executive Order 13595.

strategic approach to women, peace, and security to the NSS and other national strategic guidance on matters of peace and security, including the 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism; the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS); State, DOD, and USAID 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review; the 2018 Strategy to Support Women and Girls at Risk from Violent Extremism and Conflict; efforts to counter trafficking consistent with the NSS, including pursuant to the Trafficking Victims

Protection Act (TVPA); and National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 16: Promoting Women's Global Development and Prosperity, which the President signed in February 2019, establishing the Women's Global Development and Prosperity (W-GDP) Initiative. In line with the NSS, the W-GDP Initiative seeks to empower women economically around the world, and in so doing, create conditions for increased stability, security, and prosperity for all.



The Strategic Challenge

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round the world, conflict and disasters adversely and disproportionately affect women and girls, yet women remain under-represented in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, and in post-conflict peace-building or recovery efforts. Research has shown that peace negotiations are more likely to succeed, and result in lasting stability, when women participate.² The barriers to women's meaningful participation are numerous, and include under-representation in political leadership, pervasive violence against women and girls, and persistent inequality in many societies.

Despite advancements in women's social, political, and economic rights, women still enjoy fewer freedoms and opportunities than men worldwide. Instability and conflict magnify these challenges in places where malign actors frequently exploit individual, community, and societal vulnerabilities for their own gain. In these instances, women and girls are often targeted for various forms of violence, exploitation, and abuse. Oftentimes, their physical vulnerability can be directly traced back to their politically and socially disadvantaged place in society.³

The United States recognizes the linkage

between women's empowerment and global peace and security. Social and political marginalization of women strongly correlates with the likelihood that a country will experience conflict. One metric indicates that 14 of the 17 lowest-scoring countries in the Index for Gender Discrimination of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development have experienced armed conflict in the last two decades. Global insecurity also affects the national security of the United States, as regions of conflict often provide safe haven for terrorists and other illicit actors; become proxies for broader wars between nation-states; and lead to massive population displacement, migration, and further regional instability.

This Strategy promotes the meaningful inclusion of women in processes to prevent, mediate, resolve, and recover from deadly conflict or disaster. While the United States maintains a deep commitment to promoting women's equality, we recognize that fully achieving that goal globally has proven elusive. Much remains to be done, both to enhance the equality of women and girls, and to secure the meaningful inclusion of women in preventing and resolving conflict, and in post-conflict peace building and recovery.

² Valerie Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett, *Sex and World Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

³ Report of the *United Nations Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, March 23, 2018, S/2018/250, Section 11, p. 4



The Theory of Change: A National Strategy on Women, Peace and Security

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he WPS Strategy acknowledges a tremendous amount of untapped potential among the world's women and girls to identify, recommend, and implement effective solutions to conflict. At its core, the WPS Strategy recognizes the benefits derived from creating opportunities for women and girls to serve as agents of peace via political, economic, and social empowerment. The WPS Strategy therefore aims to make meaningful progress around the world to empower women in preventing conflict and building peace, while endeavoring to rectify the disproportionate, adverse impacts of armed conflict on women and girls.⁴ The United States embraces these concepts and recognizes the powerful role that women can play as peace-makers and political agents in societies that are transitioning out of conflict and toward peace. It is therefore crucial that ongoing United States efforts to engage in preventing and mitigating conflict around the world strategically factor in the participation, perspectives, and interests of women, including those from under-represented groups.

This Strategy defines women's political empowerment and equality as the end state whereby **women can meaningfully participate in**

preventing, mediating, and resolving conflict and countering terrorism, in ways that promote stable and lasting peace, including in conflict-affected areas.

To work toward this end state, the WPS Strategy identifies three separate, yet interrelated, strategic objectives that must be achieved. These strategic objectives aim to make demonstrable progress (defined below) by 2023:

- Women are **more prepared and increasingly able** to participate in efforts that promote stable and lasting peace;
- Women and girls are **safer, better protected, and have equal access** to government and private assistance programs, including from the United States, international partners, and host nations; and
- United States and partner governments have **improved institutionalization and capacity** to ensure WPS efforts are sustainable and long-lasting.

The WPS Strategy also identifies four lines

⁴ Security Council Resolution 1325, October 31, 2000, S/RES/1325

of effort, which are the separate-yet-interrelated ways to synchronize and prioritize United States actions to achieve the strategic objectives. Importantly, actions (tasks) completed within each of the lines of effort will focus on improving women's empowerment and equality in one or more of the conflict phases: preventing conflict and preparing for disasters; managing, mitigating, and resolving conflict and crisis; and post-conflict and post-crisis efforts in relief and recovery.

LINE OF EFFORT 1: Seek and support the preparation and meaningful participation of women around the world in decision-making processes related to conflict and crises;

LINE OF EFFORT 2: Promote the protection of women and girls' human rights; access to humanitarian assistance; and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation around the world;

LINE OF EFFORT 3: Adjust United States international programs to improve outcomes in equality for, and the empowerment of, women; and

LINE OF EFFORT 4: Encourage partner governments to adopt policies, plans, and capacity to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions.

Further, we acknowledge that we will likely not be able to advance WPS principles in every corner of the globe. As with all matters of national security, the United States will continue to engage selectively, and in ways that advance America's national interests. The United States Government will also serve as responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars, seeking to optimize

investments and ensure accountability. When and where the United States does choose to engage, the WPS Strategy will help inform how the United States approaches and prioritizes its involvement, including in coordination with like-minded partners, to secure more effective and lasting gains.

Line of Effort 1:

Support the preparation and meaningful participation of women around the world in informal and formal decision-making processes related to conflict and crisis.

The Goal

Increase women's meaningful participation in political, civic, and military processes to prevent and resolve conflicts, prepare for disasters, and set conditions for stability during post conflict and post-crisis efforts.

The Problem

In spite of the growing evidence of a direct correlation between the equality and empowerment of women and a nation's stability, women remain critically under-represented in conflict prevention, conflict-resolution, and post-conflict peace building efforts. The voices and concerns of women affected by violence during conflict — those who will carry much of the burden for healing and rebuilding their communities in peacetime — are routinely absent from, or overlooked at, the negotiating table. Despite numerous examples of women who have provided leadership to prevent and resolve

conflict at local, national, and regional levels, persistent inequality and marginalization often prevents women from realizing their full potential and influence as negotiators, mediators, and decision makers. The United Nations (UN) reports that between 1992 and 2011, women made up just 2 percent of mediators, 4 percent of witnesses and signatories, and 9 percent of negotiators in formal post-conflict peace talks.⁵

The first step in advancing WPS principles requires that we empower women and girls with the tools and capabilities they need to engage meaningfully in conflict and crisis situations, whether before, during, or after these events, and then encourage their meaningful participation in efforts to promote stable and lasting peace. Increasing women's capacity to participate meaningfully in peace and political processes provides them with the distinct advantage to be prepared to contribute to a range of formal and informal peace processes, dialogues, and negotiations that determine the fates of their families and communities.

The factors that preclude women's meaningful participation vary from one country to the next. Legal, structural, and other barriers also often interact with deeply entrenched social norms to undermine women's influence and representation. For the United States to be successful in its efforts, it is critical that we understand local barriers before setting out a program to overcome them. The design of efforts must go hand-in-hand with research, and implementers must seek the continuous input of the women they are trying to serve.

The WPS Strategy Approach

Departments and agencies will tailor their engagements and programs in ways that help women around the world be more prepared for, and able to participate in, decision-making processes related to conflict and crisis.

Illustrative activities in support of the above goal could include (and noting primarily in which conflict or crisis phase(s) the activities would be focused):

ALL PHASES:

- Encourage the increased, meaningful participation of women in security-sector initiatives funded by the United States Government, including programs that provide training to foreign nationals regarding law enforcement, the rule of law, and professional military education. United States courses that historically attract only male international students from certain countries or regions should consider ways to incentivize the inclusion of female students as well.
- Integrate women's perspectives and interests into conflict prevention, conflict-resolution, and post conflict peace-building activities and strategies, including women from under-represented groups, via consultation with local women leaders in the design, implementation, and evaluation of United States initiatives;
- Encourage the inclusion of women leaders and women's organizations in the prevention and resolution of conflict, and in post-conflict

⁵ UN Women, "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence," (October 2012) p. 3.

peace-building efforts. Where appropriate, United States diplomatic, military, and development interventions will lead by example through inclusion of American women in such efforts, and will engage local women leaders as vital partners, including through support that advances their meaningful political participation and empowerment, capacity, credibility, and professional development; and

- Use relevant analysis and indicators, including the collection of sex-disaggregated data, to identify and address barriers to women's meaningful participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict, and in post-conflict peace-building efforts and programs, including early warning systems related to conflict and violence.

PREVENTING CONFLICT AND PREPARING FOR DISASTERS: Provide, as appropriate, technical assistance and training to female negotiators, mediators, peace-builders, and stakeholders.

MANAGING, MITIGATING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT AND CRISIS: Provide, as appropriate, logistical support to female negotiators, mediators, peace-builders, and stakeholders, particularly during democratic transitions, which is critical to sustaining democratic institutions, creating more inclusive democratic societies, and contributing to long-term stability.

POST-CONFLICT AND POST-CRISIS RELIEF AND RECOVERY: Support, as appropriate, local women's peace-building organizations.

Line of Effort 2:

Promote the protection of women and girls' human rights, access to aid, and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation around the world.

The Goal

Women and girls' security, human rights, and needs are protected – by their governments, augmented as appropriate with regional or other security sector forces – so they can meaningfully contribute locally, nationally, and globally.

The Problem

Women and girls bear unique, and sometimes disproportionate, impacts of armed conflict.⁶ In many conflict-affected and fragile settings around the world, malign actors deliberately target and attack women and girls, often with impunity, for various forms of violence, including, but not limited to, physical and sexual violence, torture, mutilation, trafficking, and slavery. While women and girls sometimes voluntarily join terrorist organizations, some may be coerced or manipulated into becoming terrorists or foreign terrorist fighters themselves. Post-conflict, women and girls continue to experience high levels of violence and insecurity. Most survivors never receive justice, and, instead, face considerable challenges in gaining access to the medical, psychosocial, legal, and economic support that is necessary to help them heal, recover, and rebuild their lives. These patterns have been shown to have devastating

⁶ Security Council Resolution 2106, S/RES/2106, 24 June 2016

effects on societies, and lead to continued cycles of insecurity and instability.⁷

Breakdowns in the rule of law and forced displacement from conflict and disaster expose refugees and internally displaced persons, particularly women and girls, to additional risks of violence and exploitation. Women cannot fully participate in the prevention or resolution of conflict or participate in recovery efforts if they themselves are victims of violence or intimidation, and pervasive violence against women and girls undermines the recovery of entire communities and countries affected by violence or disaster.

In situations of conflict and crisis, during which populations rely on humanitarian assistance and other aid to meet their basic needs and begin the challenging process of recovery, the United States Government must design our efforts to address the distinct needs of women and girls, including women's economic security, safety and dignity. Women cannot participate in the prevention or resolution of conflict or recovery from disaster if they cannot meet their basic needs or provide for their children.

Data also indicates that the consequences of terrorism and terrorism-related violence in conflict uniquely affect women and girls. Women are often the first targets of terrorism and violent extremist ideologies, which restrict their rights and can lead to increases in violence against them. Terrorists often advocate for, and carry out, the enslavement of women and girls. Tactics such as human trafficking, sexual

slavery, and recruiting women to become terrorists themselves have become a hallmark of terrorist groups, trapping thousands of women and girls in cycles of repression and violence. Ongoing efforts to address the adverse impact of terrorism and violent extremism are therefore more effective and sustainable when we empower women and girls to be active participants and leaders in preventing and responding to terrorism and political violence.

The WPS Strategy Approach

Departments and agencies will support countries' local and regional efforts to seek to ensure women and girls are protected from all forms of violence, and benefit equally from governmental and non-governmental assistance and development programs.

Illustrative activities in support of the above goal could include the following:

ALL PHASES: Address security-related barriers to the protection of women. This includes the following:

- Identify and reduce obstacles or barriers not codified in formal rules or regulations but that nonetheless reflect sex-based discrimination, sex-based bias, or lack of recognition for women's rights;
- Address the use of violence, intimidation, or harassment to prevent women from participating in decision-making or related political, diplomatic or military processes;

⁷ According to the UN Secretary General's 2018 *Report on Conflict-related Sexual Violence*, the accumulation of unresolved crimes fuels new cycles of violence, vengeance and vigilantism, which are inimical to reconciliation. *Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, Sec. 20 p. 7, S/2018/250 (March 23, 2018).

- Champion efforts to prevent and respond to sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers and relief workers; and
- Encourage countries' local law-enforcement and judicial systems to appropriately address gender-based violence against women and girls, especially as part of transitional justice processes and initiatives.

PREVENTING CONFLICT AND PREPARING FOR DISASTERS:

- In coordination with broader United States efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, ensure women and girls have safe and equal access to humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, and health security targeted at saving lives. This includes efforts to increase access to humanitarian assistance in line with the United States Government's interpretation of the laws of armed conflict and International Human Rights Law;
- Support solutions to prevent and respond to violence against women and girls. This includes collecting and analyzing sex-disaggregated data for the purpose of developing and enhancing early warning systems of conflict and violence; supporting multi-lateral efforts, including at the UN, to address violence in conflict, including sexual violence, human trafficking, and slavery; and integrating efforts to combat drivers of violence against women and girls into conflict and efforts to prevent atrocities; and
- Empower women as partners in preventing terrorism and countering radicalization and

recruitment. This includes promoting voices of pluralism and tolerance, undermining the power of terrorist ideologies; undercutting terrorist recruiting; and raising awareness of radicalization and recruitment dynamics via outreach, training, and international exchanges.

POST-CONFLICT AND POST-CRISIS RELIEF AND RECOVERY:

- Design United States diplomatic, military, and development interventions in conflict- and disaster-affected areas to maximize protection for women and girls, and seek to ensure women and girls receive equal access to justice, humanitarian assistance, appropriate medical care, and psycho-social support for survivors of violence, exploitation, and abuse, including for their children; and
- Design humanitarian-assistance programs to reduce risks faced by women and girls in crisis and conflict, and to meet the specific needs of women and girls who have experienced or are at risk of violence, exploitation, and abuse.

Line of Effort 3:

Adjust United States international programs to improve outcomes in equality for, and the empowerment of, women.

The Goal

The United States maintains its role as a leader on the world stage in promoting the meaningful participation of women in preventing, managing, and resolving conflict, and efforts in post-conflict relief and recovery.

The Problem

The United States has long proven its commitment to address injustice against women and girls in conflict areas, alongside our broader commitment to help those in need and those trying to build a better future for their families. Through engagements with partners and at multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the United States has won recognition from friends and competitors alike as a champion of women's empowerment across the phases of conflict and crisis resolution.

As noted in the NSS, the competitions, rivalries, and challenges that face the United States are real and ongoing. As the United States responds to growing political, economic, and military competitions around the world, we must also ensure we mitigate conflict at its source – including the role that systemic inequality faced by women and girls serves as a known driver of conflict.⁸ Just as the United States Government is modernizing and integrating our tools to counter terrorism and protect the homeland, we will also update our policies, training, and approaches to emphasize the relationship between women and security, helping ensure our WPS efforts are sustainable and long-lasting. This will include giving consideration to the unique security requirements of both females and males, while finding opportunities to promote the equal rights and opportunities of women and girls.

The WPS Strategy Approach

The United States Government must equip and empower its diplomatic, military, and devel-

opment personnel to advance the goals of this strategy through an ongoing process of training, education, and professional development in partnership with specialists who can provide insight and understanding to this challenging field.

Illustrative activities in support of the above goal could include the following:

ALL PHASES:

- Train United States diplomatic, military, and development personnel, as appropriate, on the needs and perspectives of women in preventing, mediating, and resolving conflict, including women from under-represented groups; on protecting civilians from violence, exploitation, and trafficking in persons; and, in accordance with the United States Government's understanding, on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law;
- Support research into, and the evaluation of, effective strategies and the development and sharing of best practices for ensuring the meaningful participation by women, to include exchanges with international partners;
- Expand and apply gender analysis, as appropriate, to improve the design and targeting of United States Government programs;⁹
- Conduct assessments of new initiatives, including perspectives from affected women, including women from under-represented groups;

⁸ See Mary Caprioli, "Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, No. 2 (2005): 161–178.

⁹ The WPS Strategy incorporates the definition of "gender analysis" outlined in the Women's Economic Empowerment and

Entrepreneurship Act, namely, to undertake analysis of “quantitative and qualitative information to identify, understand, and explain gaps between men and women.”

- Develop public-private partnerships; leverage non-Federal entities such as non-governmental organizations, faith based organizations, and businesses; and foster relationships between non-Federal partners and partner governments to increase burden-sharing and ensure the sustainability of programs;
- Target assistance strategically, by identifying a limited set of cases in which United States Government WPS programs have a significant opportunity for measurable impact and avoiding duplication, reduced impact, and wasted resources; and
- Demonstrate and quantify the tangible outcomes and impact of its assistance under the WPS.

Line of Effort 4:

Encourage partner governments to adopt policies, plans, and capacity to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions.

The Goal

Partner governments are reforming policies, programs, and plans to increase women's meaningful participation in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions.

The Problem

Around the world, a wide range of factors prevent women from participating meaningfully in efforts that promote stable and lasting peace. Some of these factors stem from biases based on normative perceptions about the roles of women and men. However, others are consequences of legal, regulatory, and structural barriers designed to prevent women from having a formal say in how issues related to peace and security are brokered in their societies. These barriers are often supported by imbalanced or corrupt systems of power and influence that neglect and exploit women at the cost of effective governance and lasting peace.

Research indicates that when women are involved in peace negotiations, they are more likely to raise social issues that help societies reconcile and recover. Furthermore, studies suggest that when women meaningfully participate in peace negotiations, the likelihood that the resulting peace plan will last more than 2 years increases by 20 percent, and the likelihood that it will last more than 15 years increases by 35 percent.¹⁰ Considering that more than half of all peace agreements fail within 5 years, the inclusion of women in conflict resolution arguably saves lives and limits the devastating economic costs of war.

Experience further indicates that when women participate in security sector roles, they achieve substantive and lasting gains in peace and security. For example, female peacekeepers are more likely to gain admission to geographic and

¹⁰ Laurel Stone, "Annex II: Quantitative Analysis of Women's participation in Peace Processes," *Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015) (study of 156 peace agreements, controlling for other variables).

population sectors traditionally closed to their male counterparts, which gives them unique access to information about the local security environment and potential risks. Women peacekeepers are also more likely to enjoy the trust and confidence from the communities they serve, and more likely to empower women to join security sector ranks, including the military and law enforcement.¹¹

The WPS Strategy offers a foundation for long-lasting change. However, sustainability will require the support of the global community, including non governmental entities, such as civil society and faith-based organizations, and private businesses, which have a long-term presence in country and often play a role in helping to rebuild post-conflict and fragile states.

The WPS Strategy Approach

Departments and agencies will aim to reduce barriers and enhance protections in partner countries' policies, laws, regulations and practices that impede women's ability to engage or participate in preventing conflict and preparing for disasters; managing, mitigating, and resolving conflict and crisis; and post-conflict and post-crisis relief and recovery.

Illustrative activities in support of the above goal could include the following:

ALL PHASES:

- Address host-nation barriers that discriminate against the meaningful participation of

women. This includes encouraging partner governments to revise formal laws, rules, and regulations that disadvantage women as equal participants in all phases of conflict and crisis resolution; support the effective implementation of laws, rules, and regulations that promote women as equal participants in all phases of resolving and responding to conflict and crisis; and adopt plans to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions;

- Assist partner governments to increase the opportunity for women to serve in security sector forces, including peacekeeping, military, and law enforcement organizations. This includes developing women's technical and professional competencies so they can better compete for security sector roles, and seeking to cultivate and promote qualified women in peace operations, peacekeeping missions, and national administrations, including at senior leadership levels across all relevant areas, including political, diplomatic, development and military sectors, on par with their male counterparts. This also includes encouraging partner governments to foster professional growth for women as security sector professionals via career counseling, networking, targeted recruitment, and mentoring programs;
- Support, and coordinate with, other countries in their efforts to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security, conflict-pre-

¹¹ UN Women Policy Brief, *Exploratory Options On Using Financial Incentives to Increase the Percentage of Military Women in UN Peacekeeping Missions* (UN Women, 2015), <http://wps.unwomen.org/resources/briefs/financial.pdf>.

vention, peace-building, transitional justice, and decision-making institutions;

- Confer with host governments and non-governmental organizations to reduce barriers to and enhance the meaningful participation of women in economic, political, and security spheres, including the engagement of men and boys in support of women's equality; and
- Promote the American values of individual liberty, religious freedom, and equal treatment under the law in our engagement with other nations to implement the WPS Strategy.

PREVENTING CONFLICT AND PREPARING FOR DISASTERS: Support partner countries' training, education, and mobilization of men and

boys as partners in support of the meaningful participation of women in society.

MANAGING, MITIGATING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT AND CRISIS: Encourage the development of transitional justice and accountability mechanisms that are inclusive of the experiences and perspectives of women and girls, including women from under-represented groups. Work with willing partners to strengthen their national frameworks for justice and accountability with the goal of ending impunity for all types of crimes and atrocities, including gender-based violence in conflict. This includes supporting survivors of violence by providing access to healing and recovery programs, combating norms that exacerbate violence in conflict, and seeking timely justice and accountability for crimes committed.



Metrics and Targets

To track progress toward women's ability to participate meaningfully in and contribute to preventing, mediating, and resolving conflict and countering terrorism, the Administration will commit to rigorously track and report on metrics across the interagency on an annual basis, and will seek meaningful change in all three strategic objectives by 2023. This will include reporting on training requirements for applicable United States Government personnel, as well as a summary and evaluation of this strategy's implementation by departments and agencies; applicable interagency coordination completed; and the monitoring and evaluation tools, mechanisms, and common indicators to assess progress made within this strategy's lines of efforts and to achieve the strategic objectives by 2023. Departments and agencies will coordinate this reporting with the reporting requirements of NSPM 16: *Promoting Women's Global Development and Prosperity*, to ensure data tracking for the two efforts is complementary and non-duplicative. To the extent common metrics are reported and counted towards both efforts, departments and agencies will clearly indicate where that is the case.

The WPS Strategy understands "meaningful" as having a measurable, enduring impact on one or all of the identified strategic objectives, and in one or all phases of conflict or crisis prevention and resolution. "Meaningful" participation is not defined by a set proportion of women's participation in every context. Instead, we will take relevant circumstantial factors into account, and, where necessary, apply lessons learned from the past, analytic rigor, and evidence-based research to inform targeted and effective policies and programming going forward. We will develop context-specific markers by which to measure progress on our efforts.

To fulfill our responsibility to be good stewards of national resources, programs carried out in furtherance of the WPS Strategy must measurably accomplish their goals. Departments and agencies must modify or reassess programs that fail to do so, and must harness learning to inform future planning and implementation. To ensure accountability, departments and agencies will provide measurable goals, benchmarks, and timetables for their proposed WPS initiatives as part of their implementation plans, in addition to estimating resource requirements.



Resourcing and Reporting

No later than 90 days after this Strategy goes into effect, departments and agencies will nominate criteria to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) for inclusion in a United States Government-wide WPS framework for monitoring and evaluating programs. Nominated criteria must include proposed measures of effectiveness in furthering each of the Strategy's articulated goals. After the approval of the WPS monitoring-and-evaluation framework, relevant departments and agencies will use it to assess and report on progress and results under the WPS Strategy.

Within 120 days of the approval of this WPS Strategy, State, DOD, DHS, and USAID shall each develop, in coordination with the APNSA and Office of Management and Budget, and provide to the Congress a detailed, consolidated implementation plan that provides the following information with respect to their WPS Strategy implementation plan:

- 1) The anticipated technical, financial, and in-kind contribution of each department or agency;
- 2) Roles and responsibilities across the department or agency;
- 3) Processes required to support the WPS Strategy, such as new policy or doctrine, or capabilities assessments;

- 4) Corresponding timelines and milestones, with clear benchmarks and deliverables for each necessary action; and
- 5) Approved measures of effectiveness and associated methods of assessment that, at minimum, measure involvement both pre- and post intervention, to ensure the policies and initiatives are effective at achieving strategic goals.

Not later than 1 year after submission of this strategy, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of USAID, shall brief the appropriate Congressional Committees on existing, enhanced, or newly established training for relevant United States personnel on the participation of women in conflict-prevention and peace building.

Not later than 2 years after submission of this strategy, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of USAID shall submit to the APNSA, and be prepared to brief the appropriate Congressional Committees on, a report that summarizes and evaluates departments' and agencies' implementation plans; describes the nature and extent of interagency coordination on implementation; outlines the monitoring and evaluation on policy objectives; and describes existing, enhanced, or newly established training. ■



ANNEX E – DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan, June 2020

The WPS Act of 2017 identifies the Department of Defense as a relevant Federal department responsible for implementing WPS. To satisfy the requirements prescribed in the WPS Act of 2017, the Department developed a DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (SFIP). As required by law, the SFIP details the Department's roles and responsibilities for implementing the WPS Strategy and establishes WPS Defense Objectives to support the WPS LOEs. The SFIP also aims to organize and align the Department's implementation of the WPS Strategy within the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

Department of Defense



WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

June 2020





United States Department of Defense

Women, Peace, and Security
Strategic Framework
and Implementation Plan

June 2020

The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately \$228,000 in Fiscal Years 2019 - 2020. This includes \$187,000 in expenses and \$41,000 in DoD labor.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2011, the United States published the first U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, in accordance with Executive Order 13595.¹ On October 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed into law the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68), making this the first legislation of its kind globally. In June 2019, the U.S. Government released the *United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS Strategy)*, making the United States the first country in the world with both a comprehensive law and whole-of-government strategy on WPS.

To achieve the end-state detailed in the *WPS Strategy*, the U.S. Government must make demonstrable progress on these four Lines of Effort (LOEs): (1) seek and support the preparation and meaningful participation of women around the world in decision-making processes related to conflict and crises; (2) promote the protection of women and girls' human rights; access to humanitarian assistance; and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation around the world; (3) adjust U.S. international programs to improve outcomes in equality for, and the empowerment of, women; and (4) encourage partner governments to adopt policies, plans, and capacity to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions.

The WPS Act of 2017 identifies the Department of Defense as a relevant Federal department responsible for implementing WPS. To satisfy the requirements prescribed in the WPS Act of 2017, the Department developed a *DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (SFIP)*. As required by law, the *SFIP* details the Department's roles and responsibilities for implementing the *WPS Strategy* and establishes WPS Defense Objectives to support the WPS LOEs. The *SFIP* also aims to organize and align the Department's implementation of the *WPS Strategy* within the *National Security Strategy (NSS)* and the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*. These overarching, long-term Defense Objectives are as follows:

- ▶ Defense Objective 1. The Department of Defense exemplifies a diverse organization that allows for women's meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force.
- ▶ Defense Objective 2. Women in partner nations meaningfully participate² and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors.
- ▶ Defense Objective 3. Partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis.

¹ The 2011 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security was revised in 2016, and was superseded by the June 2019 U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. Executive Order 13595 requires the executive branch of the United States to have a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. The June 2019 U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security satisfies the Executive Order 13595 requirement.

² Defined as both critical mass and decision-making power throughout an organization's structure.

These WPS Defense Objectives provide the Department with long-term end states to guide the Department's implementation of the *WPS Strategy* over time. The supporting Intermediate Defense Objectives identified in the *SFIP* reflect the Department's priorities for advancing WPS implementation. The *SFIP* strengthens U.S. leadership on WPS by continuing the Department's role as a global model for diversity and inclusivity while working with partner nations to support women's meaningful participation within the defense and security sectors.



U.S. Navy Lt. j.g. Kaylin Deppe, left, and Lt. Christina Bailo on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN74) in the Indian Ocean during Women's History Month, March 13, 2019 (U.S. Navy photo illustration by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Erika L. Kugler)



Coast Guard Ens. Katherine Haerr with Nanik Dwi Suryani, an Indonesia Navy (TNI-AL) member, Aug. 1, 2019, during the Women's Leadership Symposium at Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Indonesia 2019. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jasmine Mieszala)



Staff Sgt. Amanda Kelley became the first enlisted woman to graduate from the Army's Ranger School, August 26, 2019 (Photo by Patrick Albright, Maneuver Center of Excellence)

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY PRINCIPLES

The Department will leverage the Women, Peace, and Security principles, national Lines of Effort (LOEs), and DoD equities identified in Figure 1 to support the implementation of the *SFIP*. The WPS Principles column reflects the foundational principles underpinning the U.S. WPS Act and Strategy and based on twenty years of research, study, and practice globally by allies and partners, international and non-governmental organizations, and civil society. The national *WPS Strategy* LOEs column distills the broad WPS principles into specific actions and activities that contribute to accomplishing the objectives outlined in the *WPS Strategy*. The DoD Equities Supporting WPS Principles column reflects specific Department efforts where years of implementing WPS has revealed programs, topics, and best practices wherein WPS can have the strongest effect.



Figure 1

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

The WPS strategic framework nests within the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, which specifically outlines that societies are more peaceful and prosperous when women and men enjoy the same rights, liberties, dignities, and access to resources. Additionally, in support of the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, this framework helps the Department to:

- ▶ Build a more lethal force by providing the tools necessary to reduce operational risk in a multi-domain environment, and recruit and fully leverage a diverse and innovative fighting force;
- ▶ Strengthen alliances and attract new partners by demonstrating U.S. commitment to human rights and women's empowerment, making the United States the partner of choice; and
- ▶ Reform the Department for greater performance and affordability by developing more effective strategies to mitigate risks and optimize mission success.

To fulfill the Department's requirements in the WPS Act of 2017 and the *WPS Strategy, the DoD WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (SFIP)* identifies three overarching, long-term Defense Objectives (DOs) to set the strategic direction for Joint Force implementation of WPS. The Defense Objectives set the Department on a path to deliver performance, organize for innovation, and align Department action in support of the *WPS Strategy* Lines of Effort (LOEs) (See Figure 2). Each Defense Objective includes Intermediate Defense Objectives (IDOs), which represent discrete, measurable, and achievable goals the Department will work to achieve.









	WPS LOE 1: Support women's participation	WPS LOE 2: Promote women and girls' human rights, safety, and access	WPS LOE 3: Adjust U.S. programming	WPS LOE 4: Encourage partner nations to support WPS
Defense Objective 1: Model & Employ WPS				
Defense Objective 2: Promote partner nation women's participation				
Defense Objective 3: Promote protection of partner nation civilians				

Figure 2

The Department will leverage its tools and resources to help ensure women can meaningfully participate in preventing, mediating, and resolving conflict and countering terrorism. The Department will support the intent of the *WPS Strategy* through attention to the composition of its personnel and the development of its policies, plans, doctrine, training, education, operations, and exercises. The Department will encourage partner nations to do the same, thereby increasing interoperability and better preparing forces to face the complex challenges of the modern battlefield.



A U.S. Navy engineering project manager assigned to Camp Lemonnier with Djiboutian citizens before the Ali Oune Medical Clinic ribbon cutting ceremony in Ali Oune, Djibouti, January 31, 2019 (Photo by Sgt. Shawn Nickel)

DEFENSE OBJECTIVE 1

The Department of Defense exemplifies a diverse organization that allows for women's meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force.



Army Chief Warrant Officer 4 Raquel Patrick, a member of Cultural Support Team-2, speaks with an Afghan child, Nov. 24, 2015 (Air Force photo)

Defense Objective 1 support to WPS Strategy. Defense Objective 1 supports *WPS Strategy* LOEs 1, 2, and 3, which focus on women's preparation for and meaningful participation in decision-making; the protection of women and girls' human rights and safety; and adjustments in U.S. international programs to support women's empowerment efforts. There is an inherent relationship between the Department's ability to implement the *WPS Strategy* and how the Department organizes, trains, and equips its forces. To remain credible and build influence abroad, the Department should model and implement the WPS principles it encourages other partner nations to uphold. Where the Department supports women's meaningful participation in partner nation militaries, it must continue modeling and advocate for the meaningful participation of women in its own workforce. Where the Department encourages partner nations to address gender-based violence within the security sector and during deployments, it must continue to uphold the WPS principles currently reflected in its workforce. This will require coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) to ensure the Department continues serving as a global model for how national defense institutions can advance women's meaningful participation in security.

To implement the *WPS Strategy* and its LOEs, the Department will identify and adjust policies, programs, and processes. This may include ensuring relevant personnel receive training, as appropriate.

DEFENSE OBJECTIVE 2

Women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors.



U.S. Army Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander, U.S. Africa Command, and Djiboutian Lt. Gen. Zakaria Cheikh Ibrahim, chief of staff of the Djiboutian Armed Forces, conduct a pass and review of Djiboutian Armed Forces in Djibouti City, Djibouti, August 8, 2019 (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Senior Master Sgt. Janeen Miller)

Defense Objective 2 support to WPS Strategy. Defense Objective 2 supports *WPS Strategy* LOEs 1, 3, and 4, which focus on women’s preparation for and meaningful participation in decision-making; adjustments in U.S. international programs to support women’s empowerment efforts; and engagements with partner nations to improve women’s meaningful participation. The Department’s goal is to support women’s meaningful participation through engagements and relationships with partner nations’ defense and security sectors around the world. The Department prides itself on working by, with, and through U.S. allies and partners to uphold the rules-based international order. The Department will identify policies and processes to adjust its international programs, as appropriate, specifically security cooperation, to work with partner nations to recruit, employ, develop, retain, and promote women in their defense and security workforce.

DEFENSE OBJECTIVE 3

Partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis.



Sgt. 1st Class Norma Estrella, Company B, 91st Civil Affairs, coordinates a medical civilian action plan (MEDCAP) in Gofat, Niger, Feb. 27, 2014, during Exercise Flintlock 2014 (U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Timothy Clegg)

Defense Objective 3 support to WPS Strategy. Defense Objective 3 supports *WPS Strategy* LOEs 2 and 4, which focus on the protection of women and girls' human rights and safety, as well as the encouragement of partner nations to improve women's meaningful participation. Violations of human rights - particularly by defense and security forces - undermine long-term security and stability. Where partner nation defense and security forces operate professionally and uphold human rights, their mission and activities are more legitimate and their effects longer lasting. The Department will implement the *WPS Strategy* through security cooperation with partner nation defense and security sectors, as appropriate, to facilitate their ability to ensure the security and safety of their civilians - especially women and girls. This effort is consistent with U.S. core values and integral to overall mission success.

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN



1. Purpose. The *DoD WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (SFIP)* fulfills the Department's legal requirements under the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017. The *SFIP* establishes defense objectives (DOs), intermediate defense objectives (IDOs), and associated effects, which the Department will use to measure its progress towards achieving the Lines of Effort (LOEs) in the *WPS Strategy*.
2. Superseded/Cancellation. The *SFIP* supersedes the "September 2013 Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security."
3. Applicability. The *SFIP* applies to the entire Department of Defense.
4. Coordinating Instructions. Execution of the *SFIP* will require a unity of effort to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize WPS activities across the Department. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) is responsible for the Department's implementation of the *WPS Strategy*. Implementation will require the following:
 - a. *Continuous Coordination with Interagency Partners*. The *SFIP* outlines the Department's responsibilities for implementing the whole-of-government *WPS Strategy*. Efforts must be coordinated by, with, and through interagency partners, in particular, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Homeland Security.
 - b. *Engagement with Civil Society Organizations*. A core tenet of the WPS Act and the *WPS Strategy* is engagement and consultation with host nation women's civil society organizations as a conduit for accessing the perspectives of host nation women and girls affected by conflict and instability.
5. Anticipated Technical, Financial, and In-Kind Contributions of the Department. To ensure appropriate implementation of the *WPS Strategy*, the Department will continue to utilize its WPS subject matter experts. The Department will also continue to utilize the resources appropriated by Congress for the implementation of the WPS Act.
6. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E). The Department is committed to continually assessing, monitoring, and evaluating its progress toward the IDOs in the DoD Implementation Plan, in close coordination with interagency partners. The Department will draw upon the milestones and metrics, in Appendix A, as appropriate and approved by the Secretary of Defense, to assess progress on the *SFIP*. As a learning organization, the Department will work to refine this framework over each year of implementation as needed. The Department will take a phased approach to the AM&E process, and will develop an approach that will allow for quality input while adding minimal additional burden.



U.S. Sailors assigned to the U.S. Navy Ceremonial Guard wait to parade the colors during a Concert on the Avenue at the U.S. Navy Memorial in Washington, D.C., June 11, 2019 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Paul L. Archer)

Defense Objective 1 – The Department of Defense exemplifies a diverse organization that allows for women’s meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force.

Intermediate Defense Objective 1.1 – DoD recruitment, employment, development, retention, and promotion efforts are informed by WPS initiatives, to ensure a diverse and inclusive fighting force.

Effect 1.1.1 – The WPS Community of Interest (COI) and Personnel and Readiness (P&R) offices are synchronized in their efforts to promote WPS principles.

Effect 1.1.2 – The Department is a model for increasing gender diversity and inclusion.

Intermediate Defense Objective 1.2 – WPS principles are appropriately reflected in relevant DoD policies, plans, doctrine, training, education, operations, resource planning, and exercises.

Effect 1.2.1 – The Department has increased awareness of WPS principles and is better equipped to integrate them into its mission areas.

Effect 1.2.2 – The Department has established policy, doctrine, and training, as appropriate, to enable implementation of the *WPS Strategy*.

Defense Objective 2 – Women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors.

Intermediate Defense Objective 2.1 – DoD supports women’s meaningful participation within partner nation defense and security sectors.

Effect 2.1.1 – Partner nation women have increased access to and participation in U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs, resources, training, and education opportunities.

Effect 2.1.2 – Partner nation defense and security institutions have increased understanding of how to advance women’s meaningful participation in their defense and security sectors.

Defense Objective 3 – Partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis.

Intermediate Defense Objective 3.1 – DoD works with partner nation defense and security sectors to help strengthen their understanding of and commitment to international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).

Effect 3.1.1 – Partner nation defense and security sectors have increased knowledge of IHL and IHRL.



U.S. Airmen conduct a training scenario during exercise Patriot Warrior 2019 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, Aug. 16, 2019 (U.S. Air Force Photo by Tech. Sgt. Gregory Brook)

ACRONYMS

AM&E	Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
COI	Community of Interest
CTIP	Combatting Trafficking in Persons
DO	Defense Objective
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
FY	Fiscal year
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GO/FO	General Officer/Flag Officer
ICW	In Coordination With
IDO	Intermediate Defense Objective
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
JS	Joint Staff
LOE	Line of Effort
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OUSD	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
OUSD&R	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
POC	Protection of Civilians
SAPRO	Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
SES	Senior Executive Service
SFIP	Department of Defense Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

APPENDIX A – INTERAGENCY METRICS AND MILESTONES



(A.1) Milestone: The National Security Council staff (NSC) will coordinate at least three senior-level department and agency meetings a year to discuss progress and revisit metrics related to the WPS Strategy. One of these meetings will include a cross-over discussion with W-GDP.

(A.2) Milestone: Departments and agencies will coordinate two public consultations with U.S. based civil society organizations a year.

(A.3) Milestone: Departments and agencies will collectively compile an annual review of the U.S. implementation of WPS Strategy objectives, including the preparation of a public report.

Line of Effort 1: Seek and support the preparation and meaningful participation of women around the world in decision-making processes related to conflicts and crises.

(1.1) Metric: Number of engagements by key USG leaders focused on increasing women's meaningful participation and leadership.

(1.2) Metric: Number of local women who participate in substantive roles or positions influencing peace efforts, both formal and informal, in which the United States is involved.

(1.3) Metric: Number of women who participate in U.S.-funded training for foreign nationals.

Line of Effort 2: Promote the protection of women and girls' human rights; access to humanitarian assistance; and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation around the world.

(2.1) Metric: The USG will review, revise, and adopt safeguarding standards that guide the conduct of implementers' of USG funded programs.

(2.2) Metric: Number of USG key leader engagements focused on women's safety and prevention of gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict, crisis, and disaster contexts.

(2.3) Metric: Number of people who benefit from U.S.-funded support to GBV survivors.

(2.4) Metric: Percentage of USG funded projects with non-governmental and international organizations that include activities to prevent and/or respond to GBV in humanitarian emergencies.

Line of Effort 3: Adjust United States international programs to improve equality for, and the empowerment of, women.

(3.1) Metric: Departments and agencies designate one or more senior official to be the lead for Women, Peace, and Security.

(3.2) Metric: Number of USG trainings that integrate WPS principles.

(3.3) Metric: Departments and agencies establish internal WPS coordination structures and mechanisms.

(3.4) Metric: Total funding of activities aligned with WPS Strategy objectives.

(3.5) Metric: Number of key USG strategies that explicitly integrate WPS principles.

(3.6) Metric: Number of U.S. strategies, policies, and programs are informed by a gender analysis.

Line of Effort 4: Encourage partner governments to adopt policies, plans, and capacity to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions.

(4.1) Metric: Number of engagements by key U.S. leaders that lead to formal partnerships on WPS with partner nations.

(4.2) Metric: Number of high-level commitments on WPS introduced or led by the USG in multilateral fora.

(4.3) Metric: Number of partner nation legal instruments and policies drafted –including national-level frameworks on WPS and GBV response -- that are developed or implemented with assistance or encouragement from USG actors.

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ANNEX F – National Security Strategy 2022 UNCLASSIED

Invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

OCTOBER 2022



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 12, 2022

From the earliest days of my Presidency, I have argued that our world is at an inflection point. How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the American people for generations to come. The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my Administration will seize this decisive decade to advance America's vital interests, position the United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical competitors, tackle shared challenges, and set our world firmly on a path toward a brighter and more hopeful tomorrow.

Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order. Meanwhile, shared challenges that impact people everywhere demand increased global cooperation and nations stepping up to their responsibilities at a moment when this has become more difficult. In response, the United States will lead with our values, and we will work in lockstep with our allies and partners and with all those who share our interests. We will not leave our future vulnerable to the whims of those who do not share our vision for a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure. As the world continues to navigate the lingering impacts of the pandemic and global economic uncertainty, there is no nation better positioned to lead with strength and purpose than the United States of America.

From the moment I took the oath of office, my Administration has focused on investing in America's core strategic advantages. Our economy has added 10 million jobs and unemployment rates have reached near record lows. Manufacturing jobs have come racing back to the United States. We're rebuilding our economy from the bottom up and the middle out. We've made a generational investment to upgrade our Nation's infrastructure and historic investments in innovation to sharpen our competitive edge for the future. Around the world, nations are seeing once again why it's never a good bet to bet against the United States of America.

We have also reinvigorated America's unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability, prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years. We have deepened our core alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. NATO is stronger and more united than it has ever been, as we look to welcome two capable new allies in Finland and Sweden. We are doing more to connect our partners and strategies across regions through initiatives like our security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). And we are forging creative new ways to work in common cause with partners around issues of shared interest, as we are with the European Union, the Indo-Pacific Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.

These partnerships amplify our capacity to respond to shared challenges and take on the issues that directly impact billions of people's lives. If parents cannot feed their children, nothing else matters. When countries are repeatedly ravaged by climate disasters, entire futures are wiped out. And as we have all experienced, when pandemic diseases proliferate and spread, they can worsen inequities and bring the entire world to a standstill. The United States will continue to prioritize leading the international response to these transnational challenges, together with our partners, even as we face down concerted efforts to remake the ways in which nations relate to one another.

In the contest for the future of our world, my Administration is clear-eyed about the scope and seriousness of this challenge. The People's Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing the competition between our countries responsibly. Russia's brutal and unprovoked war on its neighbor Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and impacted stability everywhere, and its reckless nuclear threats endanger the global non-proliferation regime. Autocrats are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.

These competitors mistakenly believe democracy is weaker than autocracy because they fail to understand that a nation's power springs from its people. The United States is strong abroad because we are strong at home. Our economy is dynamic. Our people are resilient and creative. Our military remains unmatched—and we will keep it that way. And it is our democracy that enables us to continually reimagine ourselves and renew our strength.

So, the United States will continue to defend democracy around the world, even as we continue to do the work at home to better live up to the idea of America enshrined in our founding documents. We will continue to invest in boosting American competitiveness globally, drawing dreamers and strivers from around the world. We will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity. And we will continue to demonstrate how America's enduring leadership to address the challenges of today and tomorrow, with vision and clarity, is the best way to deliver for the American people.

This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the world as it is today, laying out the future we seek, and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it. None of this will be easy or without setbacks. But I am more confident than ever that the United States has everything we need to win the competition for the 21st century. We emerge stronger from every crisis. There is nothing beyond our capacity. We can do this—for our future and for the world.


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joe Biden", with a long, sweeping diagonal line extending from the bottom left of the signature.



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PART I: THE COMPETITION FOR WHAT COMES NEXT

“The world is changing. We’re at a significant inflection point in world history. And our country and the world—the United States of America has always been able to chart the future in times of great change. We’ve been able to constantly renew ourselves. And time and again, we’ve proven there’s not a single thing we cannot do as a nation when we do it together—and I mean that—not a single solitary thing.”

PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR

United States Coast Guard Academy's 140th Commencement Exercises

Our Enduring Vision

We are now in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world. The terms of geopolitical competition between the major powers will be set. The window of opportunity to deal with shared threats, like climate change, will narrow drastically. The actions we take now will shape whether this period is known as an age of conflict and discord or the beginning of a more stable and prosperous future.

We face two strategic challenges. The first is that the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next. No nation is better positioned to succeed in this competition than the United States, as long as we work in common cause with those who share our vision of a world that is free, open, secure, and prosperous. This means that the foundational principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, countries must be free to determine their own foreign policy choices, information must be allowed to flow freely, universal human rights must be upheld, and the global economy must operate on a level playing field and provide opportunity for all.

The second is that while this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food insecurity, communicable diseases, terrorism, energy shortages, or inflation. These shared challenges are not marginal issues that are secondary to geopolitics. They are at the very core of national and international security and must be treated as such. By their very nature, these challenges require governments to cooperate if they are to solve them. But we must be clear-eyed that we will have to tackle these challenges within a competitive international environment where heightening geopolitical competition, nationalism and populism render this cooperation even more difficult and will require us to think and act in new ways.



This National Security Strategy lays out our plan to achieve a better future of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world. Our strategy is rooted in our national interests: to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. We can do none of this alone and we do not have to. Most nations around the world define their interests in ways that are compatible with ours. We will build the strongest and broadest possible coalition of nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a darker vision and thwarting their efforts to threaten our interests.

Our Enduring Role

The need for a strong and purposeful American role in the world has never been greater. The world is becoming more divided and unstable. Global increases in inflation since the COVID-19 pandemic began have made life more difficult for many. The basic laws and principles governing relations among nations, including the United Nations Charter and the protection it affords all states from being invaded by their neighbors or having their borders redrawn by force, are under attack. The risk of conflict between major powers is increasing. Democracies and autocracies are engaged in a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and the world. Competition to develop and deploy foundational technologies that will transform our security and economy is intensifying. Global cooperation on shared interests has frayed, even as the need for that cooperation takes on existential importance. The scale of these changes grows with each passing year, as do the risks of inaction.

Although the international environment has become more contested, the United States remains the world's leading power. Our economy, our population, our innovation, and our military power continue to grow, often outpacing those of other large countries. Our inherent national strengths—the ingenuity, creativity, resilience, and determination of the American people; our values, diversity, and democratic institutions; our technological leadership and economic dynamism; and our diplomatic corps, development professionals, intelligence community, and our military—remain unparalleled. We are experienced in using and applying our power in combination with our allies and partners who add significantly to our own strengths. We have learned lessons from our failures as well as our successes. The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at home and deepening abroad.

The United States is a large and diverse democracy, encompassing people from every corner of the world, every walk of life, every system of belief. This means that our politics are not always smooth—in fact, they're often the opposite. We live at a moment of passionate political intensities and ferment that sometimes tears at the fabric of the nation. But we don't shy away from that fact or use it as an excuse to retreat from the wider world. We will continue to reckon openly and humbly with our divisions and we will work through our politics transparently and democratically. We know that for all of the effort that it takes, our democracy is worth it. It is the only way to ensure that people are truly able to live lives of dignity and freedom. This American project will never be complete—democracy is always a work in progress—but that will not stop us from defending our values and continuing to pursue our national security interests in the world. The quality of our democracy at home affects the strength and credibility of our leadership abroad—just as the character of the world we inhabit affects our ability to enjoy security, prosperity, and freedom at home.



Our rivals' challenges are profound and mounting. Their problems, at both home and abroad, are associated with the pathologies inherent in highly personalized autocracies and are less easily remedied than ours. Conversely, the United States has a tradition of transforming both domestic and foreign challenges into opportunities to spur reform and rejuvenation at home. This is one reason that prophecies of American decline have repeatedly been disproven in the past—and why it has never been a good bet to bet against America. We have always succeeded when we embrace an affirmative vision for the world that addresses shared challenges and combine it with the dynamism of our democracy and the determination to out-compete our rivals.

The Nature of the Competition Between Democracies and Autocracies

The range of nations that supports our vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure world is broad and powerful. It includes our democratic allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific as well as key democratic partners around the world that share much of our vision for regional and international order even if they do not agree with us on all issues, and countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and support a rules-based international system.

Americans will support universal human rights and stand in solidarity with those beyond our shores who seek freedom and dignity, just as we continue the critical work of ensuring equity and equal treatment under law at home. We will work to strengthen democracy around the world because democratic governance consistently outperforms authoritarianism in protecting human dignity, leads to more prosperous and resilient societies, creates stronger and more reliable economic and security partners for the United States, and encourages a peaceful world order. In particular, we will take steps to show that democracies deliver—not only by ensuring the United States and its democratic partners lead on the hardest challenges of our time, but by working with other democratic governments and the private sector to help emerging democracies show tangible benefits to their own populations. We do not, however, believe that governments and societies everywhere must be remade in America's image for us to be secure.

The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to international peace and stability—especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order. Many non-democracies join the world's democracies in forswearing these behaviors. Unfortunately, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) do not.

Russia and the PRC pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.

Just as the United States and countries around the world benefited greatly from the post-Cold War international order, so too did the PRC and Russia. The PRC's economy and geopolitical influence grew rapidly. Russia joined the G8 and G20 and recovered economically in the 2000s. And yet, they concluded that the success of a free and open rules-based international order posed a threat to their regimes and stifled their ambitions. In their own ways, they now seek to remake



the international order to create a world conducive to their highly personalized and repressive type of autocracy.

Their pursuit of this vision is complicated by several factors. The PRC's assertive behavior has caused other countries to push back and defend their sovereignty, for their own, legitimate reasons. The PRC also retains common interests with other countries, including the United States, because of various interdependencies on climate, economics, and public health. Russia's strategic limitations have been exposed following its war of aggression against Ukraine. Moscow also has some interest in cooperation with countries that do not share its vision, especially in the global south. As a result, the United States and our allies and partners have an opportunity to shape the PRC and Russia's external environment in a way that influences their behavior even as we compete with them.

Some parts of the world are uneasy with the competition between the United States and the world's largest autocracies. We understand these concerns. We also want to avoid a world in which competition escalates into a world of rigid blocs. We do not seek conflict or a new Cold War. Rather, we are trying to support every country, regardless of size or strength, in exercising the freedom to make choices that serve their interests. This is a critical difference between our vision, which aims to preserve the autonomy and rights of less powerful states, and that of our rivals, which does not.

Cooperating to Address Shared Challenges in an Era of Competition

Heightened competition between democracies and autocracies is just one of two critical trends we face. The other is shared challenges—or what some call transnational challenges—that do not respect borders and affect all nations. These two trends affect each other—geopolitical competition changes, and often complicates, the context in which shared challenges can be addressed while those problems often exacerbate geopolitical competition, as we saw with the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic when the PRC was unwilling to cooperate with the international community. We cannot succeed in our competition with the major powers who offer a different vision for the world if we do not have a plan to work with other nations to deal with shared challenges and we will not be able to do that unless we understand how a more competitive world affects cooperation and how the need for cooperation affects competition. We need a strategy that not only deals with both but recognizes the relationship between them and adjusts accordingly.

Of all of the shared problems we face, climate change is the greatest and potentially existential for all nations. Without immediate global action during this crucial decade, global temperatures will cross the critical warming threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius after which scientists have warned some of the most catastrophic climate impacts will be irreversible. Climate effects and humanitarian emergencies will only worsen in the years ahead—from more powerful wildfires and hurricanes in the United States to flooding in Europe, rising sea levels in Oceania, water scarcity in the Middle East, melting ice in the Arctic, and drought and deadly temperatures in sub-Saharan Africa. Tensions will further intensify as countries compete for resources and energy advantage—increasing humanitarian need, food insecurity and health threats, as well as the potential for instability, conflict, and mass migration. The necessity to protect forests globally, electrify the transportation sector, redirect financial flows and create an energy revolution to head off the climate crisis is reinforced by the geopolitical imperative to reduce our collective dependence on states like Russia that seek to weaponize energy for coercion.



It is not just climate change. COVID-19 has shown that transnational challenges can hit with the destructive force of major wars. COVID-19 has killed millions of people and damaged the livelihoods of hundreds of millions, if not more. It exposed the insufficiency of our global health architecture and supply chains, widened inequality, and wiped out many years of development progress. It also weakened food systems, brought humanitarian need to record levels, and reinforced the need to redouble our efforts to reduce poverty and hunger and expand access to education in order to get back on track to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Meanwhile, communicable diseases like Ebola continue to reemerge and can only be dealt with if we act early and with other nations. The pandemic has made clear the need for international leadership and action to create stronger, more equitable, and more resilient health systems—so that we can prevent or prepare for the next pandemic or health emergency before it starts.

The global economic challenges resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic have been extended and deepened globally as uneven, recovering demand has outpaced suppliers and put strains on supply chains. Consumers and policymakers the world over have also struggled with surging energy prices and mounting food insecurity, which sharpen security challenges like migration and corruption. Moreover, autocratic governments often abuse the global economic order by weaponizing its interconnectivity and its strengths. They can arbitrarily raise costs by withholding the movement of key goods. They leverage access to their markets and control of global digital infrastructure for coercive purposes. They launder and hide their wealth, often the proceeds of foreign corrupt practices, in major economies through shell and front companies. Nefarious actors—some state sponsored, some not—are exploiting the digital economy to raise and move funds to support illicit weapons programs, terrorist attacks, fuel conflict, and to extort everyday citizens targeted by ransomware or cyber-attacks on national health systems, financial institutions and critical infrastructure. These various factors constrain our policy options, and those of our allies and partners, to advance our security interests and meet the basic needs of our citizens.

We have also experienced a global energy crisis driven by Russia's weaponization of the oil and gas supplies it controls, exacerbated by OPEC's management of its own supply. This circumstance underscores the need for an accelerated, just, and responsible global energy transition. That's why — even as we continue to explore all opportunities with our allies and partners to stabilize energy markets and get supplies to those who need it — we are also focused on implementing the most significant piece of climate legislation in our nation's history, to bring innovative energy technologies to scale as quickly as possible.

We must work with other nations to address shared challenges to improve the lives of the American people and those of people around the world. We recognize that we will undertake such effort within a competitive environment where major powers will be actively working to advance a different vision. We will use the impulses released by an era of competition to create a race to the top and make progress on shared challenges, whether it is by making investments at home or by deepening cooperation with other countries that share our vision.

Overview of Our Strategic Approach

Our goal is clear—we want a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order. We seek an order that is free in that it allows people to enjoy their basic, universal rights and freedoms. It is open in that it provides all nations that sign up to these principles an opportunity to participate in,



and have a role in shaping, the rules. It is prosperous in that it empowers all nations to continually raise the standard of living for their citizens. And secure, in that it is free from aggression, coercion and intimidation.

Achieving this goal requires three lines of effort. We will: 1) invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; 2) build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and 3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland. This is covered in Part II of this strategy.

We will use these capabilities to outcompete our strategic competitors, galvanize collective action on global challenges, and shape the rules of the road for technology, cybersecurity, and trade and economics. This is covered in Part III. Our approach encompasses all elements of national power—diplomacy, development cooperation, industrial strategy, economic statecraft, intelligence, and defense—and is built on several key pillars.

First, we have broken down the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic policy. We understand that if the United States is to succeed abroad, we must invest in our innovation and industrial strength, and build our resilience, at home. Likewise, to advance shared prosperity domestically and to uphold the rights of all Americans, we must proactively shape the international order in line with our interests and values. In a competitive world, where other powers engage in coercive or unfair practices to gain an edge over the United States and our allies, this takes on a special importance. We must complement the innovative power of the private sector with a modern industrial strategy that makes strategic public investments in America's workforce, and in strategic sectors and supply chains, especially critical and emerging technologies, such as microelectronics, advanced computing, biotechnologies, clean energy technologies, and advanced telecommunications.

Second, our alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability. A strong and unified NATO, our alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and our traditional security partnerships elsewhere do not only deter aggression; they provide a platform for mutually beneficial cooperation that strengthens the international order. We place a premium on growing the connective tissue—on technology, trade and security—between our democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe because we recognize that they are mutually reinforcing and the fates of the two regions are intertwined. The United States is a global power with global interests. We are stronger in each region because of our affirmative engagement in the others. If one region descends into chaos or is dominated by a hostile power, it will detrimentally impact our interests in the others.

Third, this strategy recognizes that the PRC presents America's most consequential geopolitical challenge. Although the Indo-Pacific is where its outcomes will be most acutely shaped, there are significant global dimensions to this challenge. Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of the PRC. We also recognize that other smaller autocratic powers are also acting in aggressive and destabilizing ways. Most notably, Iran interferes in the internal affairs of neighbors, proliferates missiles and drones through proxies, is plotting to harm Americans, including former officials, and is advancing a nuclear program



beyond any credible civilian need. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to expand its illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs.

Fourth, we will avoid the temptation to see the world solely through the prism of strategic competition and will continue to engage countries on their own terms. We will pursue an affirmative agenda to advance peace and security and to promote prosperity in every region. A more integrated Middle East that empowers our allies and partners will advance regional peace and prosperity, while reducing the resource demands the region makes on the United States over the long term. In Africa, the dynamism, innovation, and demographic growth of the region render it central to addressing complex global problems. The Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region so we will continue to revive and deepen our partnerships there to advance economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security.

Fifth, we recognize that globalization has delivered immense benefits for the United States and the world but an adjustment is now required to cope with dramatic global changes such as widening inequality within and among countries, the PRC's emergence as both our most consequential competitor and one of our largest trading partners, and emerging technologies that fall outside the bounds of existing rules and regulations. We have an affirmative agenda for the global economy to seize the full range of economic benefits of the 21st century while advancing the interests of American workers. Recognizing we have to move beyond traditional Free Trade Agreements, we are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagement with our partners, like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF); a global minimum tax that ensures corporations pay their fair share of tax wherever they are based in the world; the Partnership for Global Investment and Infrastructure (PGII) to help low- and middle-income countries secure high-standard investment for critical infrastructure; updated rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics; and ensuring the transition to clean energy unlocks economic opportunities and good jobs around the world.

Finally, the community of nations that shares our vision for the future of international order is broad and includes countries on every continent. We share in common a desire for relations among nations to be governed by the UN Charter; for the universal rights of all individuals—political, civil, economic, social and cultural—to be upheld; for our environment, air, oceans, space, cyberspace and arteries of international commerce to be protected and accessible for all; and for international institutions, including the United Nations, to be modernized and strengthened to better address global challenges and deliver more tangible benefits for our citizens. The order we seek builds on what came before, but addresses serious shortcomings, new realities, and the attempts by some states to advance a much less free and open model. To preserve and increase international cooperation in an age of competition, we will pursue a dual-track approach. On one track, we will cooperate with any country, including our geopolitical rivals, that is willing to work constructively with us to address shared challenges. We will also fully engage with, and work to strengthen, international institutions. On the other track, we will deepen our cooperation with democracies and other like-minded states. From the Indo-Pacific Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) to the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, from AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) to I2-U2 (India, Israel, UAE, United States), we are creating a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.

The world is now at an inflection point. This decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our competition with the PRC, managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in our efforts to deal



with shared challenges, particularly climate change, pandemics, and economic turbulence. If we do not act with urgency and creativity, our window of opportunity to shape the future of international order and tackle shared challenges will close. Those actions must begin with developing the means to execute our strategy, by making renewed investments at home and abroad.



PART II: INVESTING IN OUR STRENGTH

“As we look ahead, we will lead. We will lead on all the greatest challenges of our time—from COVID to climate, peace and security, human dignity and human rights. But we will not go it alone. We will lead together with our Allies and partners and in cooperation with all those who believe, as we do, that this is within our power to meet these challenges, to build a future that lifts all of our people and preserves this planet. But none of this is inevitable; it’s a choice. And I can tell you where America stands: We will choose to build a better future.”

PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR

76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Investing in Our National Power to Maintain a Competitive Edge

To outcompete our rivals and tackle shared challenges, America will need to maintain and refine its competitive edge by making critical domestic investments. In an interconnected world, there is no bright line between foreign and domestic policy. The future of America’s success in the world depends upon our strength and resilience at home—and especially the strength of our middle class, which is critical to our national security as an engine of economic growth and a key source of democratic vibrance and cohesion. The reverse is also true. Our success at home requires robust and strategic engagement in the world in line with our interests and values to make life better, safer, and fairer for the American people. That is why we must make far-reaching investments in the sources of our natural strength while building our resilience.

Implementing a Modern Industrial and Innovation Strategy

The private sector and open markets have been, and continue to be, a vital source of our national strength and a key driver of innovation. However, markets alone cannot respond to the rapid pace of technological change, global supply disruptions, nonmarket abuses by the PRC and other actors, or the deepening climate crisis. Strategic public investment is the backbone of a strong industrial and innovation base in the 21st century global economy.

That is why the United States is pursuing a modern industrial and innovation strategy. We are identifying and investing in key areas where private industry, on its own, has not mobilized to protect our core economic and national security interests, including bolstering our national resilience. We are securing our critical infrastructure, advancing foundational cybersecurity for critical sectors from pipelines to water, and working with the private sector to improve security defenses in technology products. We are securing our supply chains, including through new forms of public-private collaboration, and using public procurement in critical markets to stimulate demand for innovation. In 2021, we boosted our competitiveness by enacting the largest investment in physical infrastructure in nearly a century, including historic investments in



transportation, broadband, clean water, and energy infrastructure that will increase economic growth for decades to come. We recognize the importance of the semiconductor supply chain to our competitiveness and our national security, and we are seeking to reinvigorate the semiconductor industry in the United States. The CHIPS and Science Act authorizes \$280 billion for civilian investment in research and development, especially in critical sectors such as semiconductors and advanced computing, next-generation communications, clean energy technologies, and biotechnologies. Through the National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative, we are investing more than \$2 billion to harness the full potential of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, create jobs at home, strengthen supply chains, and reduce carbon emissions.

In 2022, we enacted the Inflation Reduction Act which will invest in domestic energy production and manufacturing, and reduce carbon emissions by roughly 40 percent by 2030. Combatting the climate crisis, bolstering our energy security, and hastening the clean energy transition is integral to our industrial strategy, economic growth, and security. We are incubating and deploying new technologies and solutions, allowing us to lead the world while creating new markets and scalable approaches. Together, these investments will keep the United States at the leading edge, increase economic capacity, and support millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in economic activity over the next decade. Across these efforts, we are mobilizing the talent, grit, and innovation of American workers, who can out-compete anyone. We are also prioritizing equity and investing in regional economic development to ensure the future is made across all of America, by all Americans.

As we do this work, we are also protecting our investments and bolstering their resilience through tracking, attributing, and defending against the activities of malicious actors in cyberspace. And we are countering intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, and other attempts to degrade our technological advantages by enhancing investment screening, export controls, and counterintelligence resources. Just as we seek to pool technical expertise and complementary industrial capacity with our allies and partners, we are also enhancing our collective capacity to withstand attempts to degrade our shared technology advantages, including through investment screening and export controls, and the development of new regimes where gaps persist.

Investing In Our People

We are focused on strengthening the economy by building from the bottom up and the middle out. To that end, we know the most impactful public investments are the ones we make in our people. We seek to increase equitable access to affordable health care and child care; career-long training and skill building; and high-quality education and training, including science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), especially for women and girls. These investments will boost our economic capacity by ensuring our workforce is better educated, healthier, and more productive. This stronger workforce will also build enduring advantages that bolster our strength and resilience. We are also supporting workers by promoting union organizing and collective bargaining, and improving workers' job quality.

As we create the conditions for our people to thrive, we will also continue to make America the destination of choice for talent around the world. Since the founding of our Nation, America has been strengthened and renewed by immigrants seeking opportunity and refuge on our shores—a unique strategic advantage. We will continue working with Congress and taking executive action to ensure our immigration and refugee systems are fair, orderly, humane, easier to navigate, and



consistent with our values and the law. And we will take further measures to ensure the United States remains the world's top destination for talent.

Strengthening Our Democracy

Our democracy is at the core of who we are, and America's democratic experiment has long been a source of inspiration for people around the world. Our system of government enshrines the rule of law and strives to protect the equality and dignity of all individuals. Deliberation and informed debate propel us to correct our mistakes, better meet public needs, and expand the circle of opportunity. We have not always lived up to our ideals and in recent years our democracy has been challenged from within. But we have never walked away from our ideals and in each challenging moment, citizens have stepped forward to uphold them. In times of crisis or lapses in judgment, we look to more democracy—not less—to forge the path forward. Our democracy is a work in progress—and by reckoning with and remedying our own shortcomings, we can inspire others around the world to do the same.

As Americans, we must all agree that the people's verdict, as expressed in elections, must be respected and protected. We also believe that critical reforms continue to be needed to strengthen our system of governance. This is why we have taken executive action and urged essential legislation to protect and promote voting rights and expand democratic participation, and why we are building on the work of generations of activists to advance equity and root out systemic disparities in our laws, policies, and institutions. Indeed, pluralism, inclusion, and diversity are a source of national strength in a rapidly changing world. We are reaffirming the rights to free speech, a free press, peaceful assembly, and other core civil liberties. And at the same time, we are standing up to threats to our democracy such as domestic terrorism by implementing our nation's first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism and tackling head-on global forces like weaponized corruption, information manipulation operations, political interference, and attacks on the rule of law, including in elections. America will not tolerate foreign interference in our elections. We will act decisively to defend, and deter disruptions to our democratic processes, and we will respond to future interference using all appropriate tools of national power.

Using Diplomacy to Build the Strongest Possible Coalitions

The United States' unrivaled network of allies and partners protects and advances our interests around the world—and is the envy of our adversaries. Building on this network, we will assemble the strongest possible coalitions to advance and defend a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure. These coalitions will include all nations that share these objectives. At the heart of this coalition, to ensure it is as transformative as possible, are democratic nations who share our interests and values. To make our coalitions as inclusive as possible, we will also work with any country that supports a rules-based order while we continue to press all partners to respect and advance democracy and human rights.

Transformative Cooperation

To solve the toughest problems the world faces, we need to produce dramatically greater levels of cooperation. The key to doing this is to recognize that the core of our inclusive coalition are those partners who most closely share our interests. America's treaty alliances with other



democratic countries are foundational to our strategy and central to almost everything we do to make the world more peaceful and prosperous. Our NATO and bilateral treaty allies should never doubt our will and capacity to stand with them against aggression and intimidation. As we modernize our military and work to strengthen our democracy at home, we will call on our allies to do the same, including by investing in the type of capabilities and undertaking the planning necessary to bolster deterrence in an increasingly confrontational world.

America's alliances and partnerships have played a critical role in our national security policy for eight decades, and must be deepened and modernized to do so into the future. NATO has responded with unity and strength to deter further Russian aggression in Europe, even as NATO also adopted a broad new agenda at the 2022 Madrid Summit to address systemic challenges from the PRC and other security risks from cyber to climate, as well as agreeing to Finland and Sweden's application to join the alliance. The newly established U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council is coordinating approaches to setting the rules of the road on global technology, economic, and trade issues based on shared democratic values. Our AUKUS security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom promotes stability in the Indo-Pacific while deepening defense and technology integration. We continue to deepen cooperation with the Five Eyes (with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The revitalized Quad, which brings the United States together with Japan, India, and Australia, addresses regional challenges and has demonstrated its ability to deliver for the Indo-Pacific, combating COVID-19 and climate change, to deepening cybersecurity partnerships and promoting high standards for infrastructure and health security. Our intelligence relationships with our allies are a strategic asset that will increasingly factor in to our competition with our rivals, especially in technological competition.

We will continue to prioritize seeking out new ways to integrate our alliances in the Indo-Pacific and Europe and develop new and deeper means of cooperation. We have revitalized the G7 as the steering committee of the world's advanced industrial democracies and believe it has a critical role to play in supporting our shared vision for the international order. The G7 is at its strongest when it also formally engages other countries with aligned goals, such as at the 2022 summit where Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and Ukraine also participated. U.S. interests are best served when our European allies and partners play an active role in the Indo-Pacific, including in supporting freedom of navigation and maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Similarly, we want our Indo-Pacific allies to be engaged cooperatively with our European allies on shaping the order to which we all aspire, and by standing up to Russia and cooperating with the European Union and United Kingdom on our competition with the PRC. This is not a favor to the United States. Our allies recognize that a collapse of the international order in one region will ultimately endanger it in others.

These democratic allies and partners are also essential to supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Actions to bolster democracy and defend human rights are critical to the United States not only because doing so is consistent with our values, but also because respect for democracy and support for human rights promotes global peace, security, and prosperity. Global threats to accountable and transparent governance also threaten our own democratic system. We will continually update our range of tools to advance democracy and counter authoritarianism. The Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal qualitatively increases our ability to combat defining challenges of the 2020s, like grand corruption, digital repression, and attacks on elections and independent media. By the same token, we are responding to the ever-evolving ways in which authoritarians seek to subvert the global order, notably by weaponizing



information to undermine democracies and polarize societies. We are doing so by working with governments, civil society, independent media, and the private sector to prevent credible information from being crowded out, exposing disinformation campaigns, and strengthening the integrity of the media environment - a bedrock of thriving democracies. Together with our allies and partners, we are also holding states accountable for violations and abuses of human rights, including against ethnic and religious minorities, treating the fight against corruption as the core national security interest it is, countering transnational repression, and standing with people around the world on the front lines of the fight for dignity, equality and justice. We reaffirm our commitment to work with the international community to achieve sustainable, long-term solutions to what is the most severe refugee crisis since World War Two—including through resettlement. We raised our annual refugee admissions cap to 125,000 and are rebuilding and improving the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program to enable us to achieve that goal.

An Inclusive World

The vast majority of countries want a stable and open rules-based order that respects their sovereignty and territorial integrity, provides a fair means of economic exchange with others and promotes shared prosperity, and enables cooperation on shared challenges. They strongly disapprove of aggression, coercion, and external interference. They have no interest in overturning longstanding rules and norms to make the world safe for aggression and repression.

We will help construct and preserve coalitions that engage all of these countries and leverage their collective strengths. We recognize that some may harbor reservations about American power and our foreign policy. Others may not be democratic but nevertheless depend upon a rules-based international system. Yet what we share in common, and the prospect of a freer and more open world, makes such a broad coalition necessary and worthwhile. We will listen to and consider ideas that our partners suggest about how to do this.

Building this inclusive coalition requires reinforcing the multilateral system to uphold the founding principles of the United Nations, including respect for international law. 141 countries expressed support at the United Nations General Assembly for a resolution condemning Russia's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. We continue to demonstrate this approach by engaging all regions across all issues, not in terms of what we are against but what we are for. This year, we partnered with ASEAN to advance clean energy infrastructure and maritime security in the region. We kickstarted the Prosper Africa Build Together Campaign to fuel economic growth across the continent and bolster trade and investment in the clean energy, health, and digital technology sectors. We are working to develop a partnership with countries on the Atlantic Ocean to establish and carry out a shared approach to advancing our joint development, economic, environmental, scientific, and maritime governance goals. We galvanized regional action to address the core challenges facing the Western Hemisphere by spearheading the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity to drive economic recovery and by mobilizing the region behind a bold and unprecedented approach to migration through the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection. In the Middle East, we have worked to enhance deterrence toward Iran, de-escalate regional conflicts, deepen integration among a diverse set of partners in the region, and bolster energy stability.

A prime example of an inclusive coalition is IPEF, which we launched alongside a dozen regional partners that represent 40 percent of the world's GDP. This framework's four pillars—trade and the digital economy, supply chains and resilience, clean energy and decarbonization,



and tax and anticorruption—will allow this partnership to determine the rules of the road for an economically vital region, and therefore the global economy.

The United States, alongside our G7 partners, launched PGII to meet the enormous infrastructure need in low- and middle-income countries. PGII is catalyzing public and private finance to advance climate and energy security, health and health security, digital connectivity, and gender equality—all while creating opportunities for American businesses. We secured over \$3 billion in commitments from the Gulf Cooperation Council for projects that align with PGII goals. We have taken a similar approach in a number of other development initiatives, also built around multi-stakeholder coalitions that can mobilize a wide array of resources to show in various ways that “democracy delivers,” including the longstanding President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Global Fund. We are rallying the world to take bold action and raise our collective ambition to reach the Global Fund’s \$18 billion target to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria over the next three years, and requested \$2 billion in our FY 2023 budget to anchor a \$6 billion three-year pledge from the United States. This investment will strengthen health systems, accelerate progress to achieve universal health coverage, and expand the global health workforce.

The United States will work pragmatically with any partner willing to join us in constructive problem-solving, reinforcing and building new ties based on shared interests. This includes not just nation states, but also civil society groups, private companies, philanthropies, and sub-national governments at home and around the world. Through proven initiatives like Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; new platforms that meet the moment, such as COVAX, and new historic efforts to improve global health security financing, including the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response, we will forge fit-for-purpose coalitions and public-private alliances to take on the world’s toughest challenges.

A Prosperous World

We also will build new ways to work with allies and partners on development and the expansion of human dignity because we recognize they are integral to the security and prosperity of all Americans. Infectious diseases, terrorism, violent extremism, irregular migration, and other threats often emerge or accelerate due to deeper development challenges, and once they do, they do not recognize national borders. Transnational threats, in turn, undermine development, fuel poverty and human suffering, and feed a vicious circle.

The COVID-19 pandemic has eroded development gains and illuminated persistent inequities. Protracted conflicts, growing fragility, a resurgence of authoritarianism, and ever-more frequent climate shocks threaten people’s lives and livelihoods and global stability. Russia’s war against Ukraine has only aggravated these threats, contributing to a surge in food and energy prices, exacerbating poverty and eroding food security worldwide.

We will work to confront these shared challenges and recommit to advancing the Sustainable Development Goals by pursuing more inclusive development partnerships, especially by putting local partners in the driver’s seat, and by deploying a more expansive set of tools, including catalytic financing and integrated humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actions. We are already applying this approach to helping vulnerable nations build resilience to the devastating impacts of the climate crisis through the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and



Resilience (PREPARE) and in support of democratic renewal through the Partnerships for Democratic Development (PDD). We are also implementing this development approach to advance global health security and systems and to take principled humanitarian action while addressing the root causes of fragility, conflict, and crisis, including through the Global Fragility Act. We will use our humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding tools more cohesively. And we will invest in women and girls, be responsive to the voices and focus on the needs of the most marginalized, including the LGBTQI+ community; and advance inclusive development broadly.

Across our development work, we will continue to employ best practices that distinguish the United States and our partners from our competitors: transparency and accountability; high environmental, social, labor, and inclusion standards; respect for human rights; and local partnerships supported by foreign assistance and sound, sustainable financing. The international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are also a force multiplier for our values and interests. Stronger, more stable growth abroad means a stronger economy here at home. As other economies prosper, demand for U.S. exports of goods and services increases, creating U.S. jobs. We will work to enhance the responsiveness of these institutions to U.S. priorities, including how to better support developing countries as they weather the pandemic and now the spillovers of the Russian war on Ukraine.

Modernizing and Strengthening Our Military

The American military is the strongest fighting force the world has ever known. America will not hesitate to use force when necessary to defend our national interests. But we will do so as the last resort and only when the objectives and mission are clear and achievable, consistent with our values and laws, alongside non-military tools, and the mission is undertaken with the informed consent of the American people.

Our approach to national defense is described in detail in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Our starting premise is that a powerful U.S. military helps advance and safeguard vital U.S. national interests by backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggression, deterring conflict, projecting strength, and protecting the American people and their economic interests. Amid intensifying competition, the military's role is to maintain and gain warfighting advantages while limiting those of our competitors. The military will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as its pacing challenge. We will make disciplined choices regarding our national defense and focus our attention on the military's primary responsibilities: to defend the homeland, and deter attacks and aggression against the United States, our allies and partners, while being prepared to fight and win the Nation's wars should diplomacy and deterrence fail. To do so, we will combine our strengths to achieve maximum effect in deterring acts of aggression—an approach we refer to as integrated deterrence (see text box on page 22). We will operate our military using a campaigning mindset—sequencing logically linked military activities to advance strategy-aligned priorities. And, we will build a resilient force and defense ecosystem to ensure we can perform these functions for decades to come. We ended America's longest war in Afghanistan, and with it an era of major military operations to remake other societies, even as we have maintained the capacity to address terrorist threats to the American people as they emerge.



A combat-credible military is the foundation of deterrence and America's ability to prevail in conflict. We will modernize the joint force to be lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive, prioritizing operational concepts and updated warfighting capabilities. The war in Ukraine highlights the criticality of a vibrant Defense Industrial Base for the United States and its allies and partners. It must not only be capable of rapidly manufacturing proven capabilities needed to defend against adversary aggression, but also empowered to innovate and creatively design solutions as battlefield conditions evolve. As emerging technologies transform warfare and pose novel threats to the United States and our allies and partners, we are investing in a range of advanced technologies including applications in the cyber and space domains, missile defeat capabilities, trusted artificial intelligence, and quantum systems, while deploying new capabilities to the battlefield in a timely manner. Incorporating allies and partners at every stage of defense planning is crucial to meaningful collaboration. We also seek to remove barriers to deeper collaboration with allies and partners, to include issues related to joint capability development and production to safeguard our shared military-technological edge.

Nuclear deterrence remains a top priority for the Nation and foundational to integrated deterrence. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force undergirds our defense priorities by deterring strategic attacks, assuring allies and partners, and allowing us to achieve our objectives if deterrence fails. Our competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. By the 2030s, the United States for the first time will need to deter two major nuclear powers, each of whom will field modern and diverse global and regional nuclear forces. To ensure our nuclear deterrent remains responsive to the threats we face, we are modernizing the nuclear Triad, nuclear command, control, and communications, and our nuclear weapons infrastructure, as well as strengthening our extended deterrence commitments to our Allies. We remain equally committed to reducing the risks of nuclear war. This includes taking further steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and pursuing realistic goals for mutual, verifiable arms control, which contribute to our deterrence strategy and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

The most important investments are those made in the extraordinary All-Volunteer Force of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, Coast Guard—together with our Department of Defense civilian workforce. Our service members are the backbone of America's national defense and we are committed to their wellbeing and their families while in service and beyond. We will maintain our foundational principle of civilian control of the military, recognizing that healthy civil-military relations rooted in mutual respect are essential to military effectiveness. We will strengthen the effectiveness of the force by promoting diversity and inclusion; intensifying our suicide prevention efforts; eliminating the scourges of sexual assault, harassment, and other forms of violence, abuse, and discrimination; and rooting out violent extremism. We will also uphold our Nation's sacred obligation to care for veterans and their families when our troops return home.



Integrated Deterrence

The United States has a vital interest in deterring aggression by the PRC, Russia, and other states. More capable competitors and new strategies of threatening behavior below and above the traditional threshold of conflict mean we cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence. Our defense strategy must sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as our pacing challenge.

Our National Defense Strategy relies on integrated deterrence: the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits. It entails:

- **Integration across domains**, recognizing that our competitors' strategies operate across military (land, air, maritime, cyber, and space) and non-military (economic, technological, and information) domains—and we must too.
- **Integration across regions**, understanding that our competitors combine expansive ambitions with growing capabilities to threaten U.S. interests in key regions and in the homeland.
- **Integration across the spectrum of conflict** to prevent competitors from altering the status quo in ways that harm our vital interests while hovering below the threshold of armed conflict.
- **Integration across the U.S. Government** to leverage the full array of American advantages, from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions.
- **Integration with allies and partners** through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches.

Integrated deterrence requires us to more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate so that any competitor thinking about pressing for advantage in one domain understands that we can respond in many others as well. This augments the traditional backstop of combat-credible conventional and strategic capabilities, allowing us to better shape adversary perceptions of risks and costs of action against core U.S. interests, at any time and across any domain.



PART III: OUR GLOBAL PRIORITIES

“[T]he challenges we face today are great indeed, but our capacity is greater. Our commitment must be greater still. So let’s stand together to again declare the unmistakable resolve that nations of the world are united still, that we stand for the values of the U.N. Charter, that we still believe by working together we can bend the arc of history toward a freer and more just world for all our children, although none of us have fully achieved it. We’re not passive witnesses to history; we are the authors of history. We can do this—we have to do it—for ourselves and for our future, for humankind.”

PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR

77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

The steps outlined in the previous section—building our strength at home to maintain a competitive edge; using our diplomatic power to build the strongest possible coalition to support a world that is open, free, prosperous, and secure; and modernizing and strengthening our military will position the United States to strengthen an international order that has delivered broad benefits for the American people for decades and to outcompete our rivals who offer a different vision. The breadth and complexity of our global interests mean that we need to use that power strategically. Three interlinked lines of effort are of paramount importance—dealing with the challenges to the international order posed by our strategic competitors, addressing shared global challenges, and shaping the rules of the road for technology, cybersecurity, and trade and economics.

Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia

The PRC and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other but the challenges they pose are, in important ways, distinct. We will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over the PRC while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia.

China

The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries. It benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world. The PRC is



also investing in a military that is rapidly modernizing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength and reach globally – all while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the region and around the world.

At the same time, the PRC is also central to the global economy and has a significant impact on shared challenges, particularly climate change and global public health. It is possible for the United States and the PRC to coexist peacefully, and share in and contribute to human progress together.

Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. The first two elements— invest and align— are described in the previous section and are essential to out-competing the PRC in the technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains.

Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, but it is also increasingly global. Around the world, the contest to write the rules of the road and shape the relationships that govern global affairs is playing out in every region and across economics, technology, diplomacy, development, security, and global governance.

In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the decisive decade. We stand now at the inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future.

Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the frontlines of the PRC's coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity. We will support their ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their interests and values, free from external pressure, and work to provide high-standard and scaled investment, development assistance, and markets. Our strategy will require us to partner with, support, and meet the economic and development needs of partner countries, not for the sake of competition, but for their own sake. We will act in common purpose to address a range of issues – from untrusted digital infrastructure and forced labor in supply chains and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. We will hold Beijing accountable for abuses – genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms – even as it seeks to pressure countries and communities into silence. We will continue prioritizing investments in a combat credible military that deters aggression against our allies and partners in the region, and can help those allies and partners defend themselves.

We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence. We remain committed to our one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan's self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.



Though allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC, our diplomatic approach, and the PRC's own behavior, has produced significant and growing opportunities to align approaches and deliver results. Across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, countries are clear-eyed about the nature of the challenges that the PRC poses. Governments want sustainable public finances. Workers want to be treated with dignity and respect. Innovators want to be rewarded for their ingenuity, risk-taking, and persistent efforts. And enterprising businesses want open and free waters through which their products can be traded.

While we compete vigorously, we will manage the competition responsibly. We will seek greater strategic stability through measures that reduce the risk of unintended military escalation, enhance crisis communications, build mutual transparency, and ultimately engage Beijing on more formal arms control efforts. We will always be willing to work with the PRC where our interests align. We can't let the disagreements that divide us stop us from moving forward on the priorities that demand that we work together, for the good of our people and for the good of the world. That includes on climate, pandemic threats, nonproliferation, countering illicit and illegal narcotics, the global food crisis, and macroeconomic issues. In short, we'll engage constructively with the PRC wherever we can, not as a favor to us or anyone else, and never in exchange for walking away from our principles, but because working together to solve great challenges is what the world expects from great powers, and because it's directly in our interest. No country should withhold progress on existential transnational issues like the climate crisis because of bilateral differences.

While we have profound differences with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government, those differences are between governments and systems – not between our people. Ties of family and friendship continue to connect the American and the Chinese people. We deeply respect their achievements, their history, and their culture. Racism and hate have no place in a nation built by generations of immigrants to fulfill the promise of opportunity for all. And we intend to work together to solve issues that matter most to the people of both countries.

Russia

Over the past decade, the Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. This culminated in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to topple its government and bring it under Russian control. But, this attack did not come out of the blue; it was preceded by Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, its military intervention in Syria, its longstanding efforts to destabilize its neighbors using intelligence and cyber capabilities, and its blatant attempts to undermine internal democratic processes in countries across Europe, Central Asia, and around the world. Russia has also interfered brazenly in U.S. politics and worked to sow divisions among the American people. And Russia's destabilizing actions are not limited to the international arena. Domestically, the Russian government under President Putin violates its citizens' human rights, suppresses its opposition, and shuts independent media. Russia now has a stagnant political system that is unresponsive to the needs of its people.

The United States, under successive administrations, made considerable efforts at multiple points to reach out to Russia to limit our rivalry and identify pragmatic areas of cooperation. President Putin spurned these efforts and it is now clear he will not change. Russia now poses an immediate and persistent threat to international peace and stability. This is not about a struggle between the West and Russia. It is about the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, which



Russia is a party to, particularly respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition against acquiring territory through war.

We are leading a united, principled, and resolute response to Russia's invasion and we have rallied the world to support the Ukrainian people as they bravely defend their country. Working with a broad and durable international coalition, we have marshalled near-record levels of security assistance to ensure Ukraine has the means to defend itself. We have provided humanitarian, economic and development assistance to strengthen Ukraine's sovereign, elected government and help the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes. We will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine as they fight back against Russia's naked aggression. And we will rally the world to hold Russia accountable for the atrocities they have unleashed across Ukraine.

Alongside our allies and partners, America is helping to make Russia's war on Ukraine a strategic failure. Across Europe, NATO and the European Union are united in standing up to Russia and defending shared values. We are constraining Russia's strategic economic sectors, including defense and aerospace, and we will continue to counter Russia's attempts to weaken and destabilize sovereign nations and undermine multilateral institutions. Together with our NATO Allies, we are strengthening our defense and deterrence, particularly on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve our security and capabilities. And we are renewing our focus on bolstering our collective resilience against shared threats from Russia, including asymmetric threats. More broadly, Putin's war has profoundly diminished Russia's status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. Moscow's soft power and diplomatic influence have waned, while its efforts to weaponize energy have backfired. The historic global response to Russia's war against Ukraine sends a resounding message that countries cannot enjoy the benefits of global integration while trampling on the core tenets of the UN Charter.

While some aspects of our approach will depend on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, a number of elements are already clear. First, the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its fight for its freedom, we will help Ukraine recover economically, and we will encourage its regional integration with the European Union. Second, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory and will continue to build and deepen a coalition with allies and partners to prevent Russia from causing further harm to European security, democracy, and institutions. Third, the United States will deter and, as necessary, respond to Russian actions that threaten core U.S. interests, including Russian attacks on our infrastructure and our democracy. Fourth, Russia's conventional military will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow's reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning. The United States will not allow Russia, or any power, to achieve its objectives through using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. America retains an interest in preserving strategic stability and developing a more expansive, transparent, and verifiable arms control infrastructure to succeed New START and in rebuilding European security arrangements which, due to Russia's actions, have fallen in to disrepair. Finally, the United States will sustain and develop pragmatic modes of interaction to handle issues on which dealing with Russia can be mutually beneficial.

The United States respects the Russian people and their contributions to science, culture and constructive bilateral relations over many decades. Notwithstanding the Russian government's strategic miscalculation in attacking Ukraine, it is the Russian people who will determine Russia's future as a major power capable of once more playing a constructive role in



international affairs. The United States will welcome such a future, and in the meantime, will continue to push back against the aggression perpetrated by the Russian government.

Cooperating on Shared Challenges

The United States must maintain and increase international cooperation on shared challenges even in an age of greater inter-state competition. In an ideal world, governments would compete responsibly where their interests diverge and cooperate where they converge—but things have not always worked out this way in practice. The United States, for example, has made clear that we will not support the linkage of issues in a way that conditions cooperation on shared challenges, but some in Beijing have been equally clear that the PRC should expect concessions on unrelated issues as a prerequisite to cooperation on shared challenges, such as climate change. We have also seen how the PRC chose not to cooperate adequately with the World Health Organization and the international community on the global response to COVID-19, including on the investigation into its origins. It also continues to endanger the world with inadequate action on climate change domestically, particularly regarding massive coal power use and build up.

Our strategy to tackle the shared challenges that require global cooperation involves two simultaneous tracks: on one track, we will fully engage all countries and institutions to cooperate on shared threats, including by pressing for reforms where institutional responses have proven inadequate. At the same time, we will also redouble our efforts to deepen our cooperation with like-minded partners. Across both tracks, we will also seek to harness the positive effects of competition, promoting a race to the top, to increase international efforts on these challenges.

Climate and Energy Security

The climate crisis is the existential challenge of our time. A warming planet endangers Americans and people around the world—risking food and water supplies, public health, and infrastructure and our national security. Without immediate global action to reduce emissions, scientists tell us we will soon exceed 1.5 degrees of warming, locking in further extreme heat and weather, rising sea levels, and catastrophic biodiversity loss.

Global action begins at home, where we are making unprecedented generational investments in the clean energy transition through the IRA, simultaneously creating millions of good paying jobs and strengthening American industries. We are enhancing Federal, state, and local preparedness against and resilience to growing extreme weather threats, and we're integrating climate change into our national security planning and policies. This domestic work is key to our international credibility, and to getting other countries to up their own ambition and action.

The United States is galvanizing the world and incentivizing further action. Building on the Leaders' Summit on Climate, Major Economies Forum, and Paris Agreement process, we are helping countries meet and strengthen their nationally determined contributions, reduce emissions, tackle methane and other super pollutants, promote carbon dioxide removals, adapt to the most severe impacts of climate change, and end deforestation over the next decade. We're also using our economic heft to drive decarbonization. Our steel agreement with the EU, the first-ever arrangement on steel and aluminum to address both carbon intensity and global overcapacity, is a model for future climate-focused trade mechanisms. And we are ending public



finance for unabated coal power, and mobilizing financing to speed investments in adaptation and the energy transition.

Events like Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine have made clear the urgent need to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. We know that long-term energy security depends on clean energy. Recognizing this transition will not happen overnight, we will work with partners and allies to ensure energy security and affordability, secure access to critical mineral supply chains, and create a just transition for impacted workers. Through collaborative work in the International Energy Agency, the U.S.-EU Task Force on European Energy Security, the Clean Energy Ministerial and Mission Innovation, Power Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation, and other critical fora, we will drive concrete action to achieve an energy secure future.

Many low-income and lower-middle income countries need assistance, especially for mitigation and adaptation efforts. That is why we are aiming to provide over \$11 billion in annual climate funding, and are pressing partners to increase their own contributions. We are embedding climate change into the investment strategies of our development finance institutions, including through PGII, and working with international organizations like the World Bank and regional development banks to do the same.

Pandemics and Biodefense

COVID-19 has killed nearly 6.5 million people around the world, including more than 1 million Americans, but the next pandemic could be much worse—as contagious but more lethal. We have a narrow window of opportunity to take steps nationally and internationally to prepare for the next pandemic and to strengthen our biodefense.

In the United States, that requires preparing for catastrophic biological risks, including by improving early warning and disease surveillance, data sharing and forecasting; speeding development, domestic manufacturing, and delivery of medical countermeasures; advancing safe biotechnology development and manufacturing; and overcoming inequities in care quality and access.

Internationally, it requires action on multiple fronts. The United States has recommitted to COVAX, to which we are the largest donor, the World Health Organization, and a cooperative approach toward global health security. We recognize that no one is safe until everyone is safe, which is why we have donated more vaccines internationally than any other country, with no political strings attached. We are working with allies and partners, including philanthropic organizations and the private sector, to boost sustainable vaccine manufacturing in Africa and South Asia.

We recognize that we must engage with all countries on global public health, including those with whom we disagree, because pandemics know no borders. We also acknowledge that some of our international institutions have fallen short in the past and need to be reformed. While we believe that many of these reforms can be agreed upon and implemented over the lifetime of this administration, we also recognize that ultimately some may fall short because other countries do not share our belief in greater transparency and sharing critical data with the international community. Therefore, as we engage globally and through international institutions, we will also deepen our cooperation with like-minded states to push for reforms on pandemic preparedness and if necessary to work more closely together to set higher standards that others can emulate.



We will also tackle the increasing risk posed by deliberate and accidental biological risks, including through our ability to rapidly detect, identify, and attribute agents, and to develop medical countermeasures. Working with partners and allies, we will strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention to deter state biological warfare capabilities; prevent terrorist acquisition or use of biological weapons; and reinforce international norms against biological weapons' development and use. We will also reduce biological risks associated with advancements in technologies and dual-use research and development, including by establishing and strengthening international biosafety and biosecurity norms and practices.

Food Insecurity

Global food systems today are under threat from a variety of sources, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate events, and protracted conflicts—all of which threaten to push 75-95 million more people into extreme poverty in 2022 than were expected before the pandemic. The food insecurity crisis has become particularly dangerous because of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which took much of Ukraine's grain off the market and exacerbated an already worsening global food insecurity problem. To address the needs of the hundreds of millions of people now suffering as a result, the United States is providing more humanitarian assistance than ever before. We remain the largest contributor to the World Food Programme and the leading donor in nearly every country experiencing a humanitarian food crisis.

Over the longer term, we are rallying the world to find ways to deal with the broad set of challenges for the world's food supply achieving sustained global food security demands constant vigilance and action by all governments, in partnership with multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations. Working together with our partners, we launched the Roadmap for Global Food Security: A Call to Action which urges the more than 100 signatory states to take several actions including keeping food and agricultural markets open, increasing fertilizer production, and investing in climate-resilient agriculture. The United States is also implementing the Global Food Security Strategy, which focuses on reducing global poverty, hunger, and malnutrition by supporting inclusive and sustainable agriculture-led economic growth; strengthening resilience among people and food systems; and supporting well-nourished healthy populations, especially among women and children. This requires working across entire food systems to consider every step from cultivation to consumption, and to integrate these efforts within larger climate, health, conflict mitigation, and peacebuilding work. To ensure these efforts are durable and sustainable requires centering equity and inclusion, and partnering both with local partners and international bodies. Going forward, the United States must continue to address both acute needs and work collaboratively to build sustained food security for the long term.

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation is a vitally important and enduring global challenge, requiring sustained collaboration to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and fissile material, their means of delivery, and enabling technologies. The United States will work with allies and partners, civil society, and international organizations to strengthen arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms, especially during times of conflict when escalation risks are greater. We will address the existential threat posed by the proliferation



of nuclear weapons through renewed arms control and nonproliferation leadership. We will continue to seek pragmatic engagement with competitors about strategic stability and risk reduction. Our approach will emphasize measures that head off costly arms races, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, and complement U.S. and allied deterrence strategies.

We will lead bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts and strengthen existing regimes, frameworks, and institutions, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, and other United Nations bodies, to extend the more than seven-decade record of nuclear non-use. We will support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention and reinforce norms against the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons. We will continue to lead the world in coordinated efforts to lock down nuclear and radiological materials and prevent terrorist acquisition. And we will ensure multilateral export control regimes are equipped to address destabilizing emerging technologies and to align export policies in likeminded states toward countries of concern.

Terrorism

Today's terrorist threat is more ideologically diverse and geographically diffuse than that of two decades ago. Al-Qa'ida, ISIS, and associated forces have expanded from Afghanistan and the Middle East into Africa and Southeast Asia.

Syria, Yemen, and Somalia remain terrorist sanctuaries; local affiliates have become entrenched actors in regional conflicts. Many of these groups still intend to carry out or inspire others to attack the United States and our interests abroad, even as years of sustained counterterrorism and law enforcement pressure have constrained their capabilities, and enhanced security measures and information sharing have improved our defenses. Meanwhile, we face sharply increased threats from a range of domestic violent extremists here in the United States.

America remains steadfast in protecting our country and our people and facilities overseas from the full spectrum of terrorism threats that we face in the 21st century. As the threat evolves, so too must our counterterrorism approach. To that end, last year, we ended America's longest war, in Afghanistan, having long ago achieved our objective of delivering justice to Osama Bin Laden and other key leadership of al-Qa'ida. We are confident in our ability to maintain the fight against al-Qa'ida, ISIS, and associated forces from over the horizon, as we demonstrated with the operation to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri. We will ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorist attacks on the United States or our allies and we will hold the Taliban accountable for its public commitments on counterterrorism.

Around the world, we will increase cooperation and support to trusted partners, shifting from a strategy that is "U.S.-led, partner-enabled" to one that is "partner-led, U.S.-enabled." That requires building or expanding systems to prevent, detect, and respond to threats as they develop—including by strengthening partners' law enforcement and judicial systems, improving threat information sharing, enhancing border security, countering terrorist financing, targeting terrorist prevention and extremist disengagement programming, and preventing online and offline terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence. It also necessitates addressing the root causes of radicalization by leveraging U.S. and partner efforts to support effective governance, promote stabilization and economic development, and resolve ongoing conflicts.



Where necessary, we will use force to disrupt and degrade terrorist groups that are plotting attacks against the United States, our people, or our diplomatic and military facilities abroad. We will do so consistent with domestic and international law and in a manner that minimizes civilian casualties, while promoting greater transparency and accountability. We are committed to continuing to work with the Congress to replace outdated authorizations for the use of military force with a narrow and specific framework appropriate to ensure that we can continue to protect Americans from terrorist threats. Here at home, we will continue to work with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners and the private sector to share information and disrupt terrorist plots that threaten our citizens.

We face an increased and significant threat within the United States from a range of domestic violent extremists, including those motivated by racial or ethnic prejudice, as well as anti-government or anti-authority sentiment. Continuing to implement our first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism will enable us to better understand and share information regarding the domestic terrorist threat, prevent recruitment and mobilization to violence, and disrupt and deter domestic terrorist activity and any transnational linkages—all while reinforcing respect for civil rights and civil liberties. Already, we are providing more and better information on domestic violent extremist threats to state, local, territorial, and tribal partners, and using new mechanisms, such as smartphone-based applications, to do so in real time. We are investing millions of dollars in data-driven violence prevention efforts, including through grant programs available to Federal, state, territorial, tribal, and nonprofit partners, as well as to houses of worship as they face increased threats. We are working with like-minded governments, civil society, and the technology sector to address terrorist and violent extremist content online, including through innovative research collaborations. And we are confronting the long-term contributors to domestic violent extremist threats, including working with Congress to advance commonsense gun laws and policies, and addressing the crisis of disinformation and misinformation, often channeled through social and other media platforms, that can fuel extreme polarization and lead some individuals to violence.



Combatting Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational organized crime impacts a growing number of victims while amplifying other consequential global challenges, from migration to cyber-attacks. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are involved in activities such as the trafficking of drugs and other illicit goods, money laundering, theft, human smuggling and trafficking, cybercrime, fraud, corruption, and illegal fishing and mining. These activities feed violence in our communities, endanger public safety and health, and contribute to tens of thousands of drug-overdose deaths in the United States each year. They degrade the security and stability of our neighbors and partners by undermining the rule of law, fostering corruption, acting as proxies for hostile state activities, and exploiting and endangering vulnerable populations. We will accelerate our efforts to curb the threat posed by transnational organized crime, integrating the vital work of law enforcement with diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and other tools, and in coordination with foreign partners. As part of this effort, we will work to reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States, especially the growing scourge of fentanyl and methamphetamines, by bringing all the tools of government to bear to interdict drugs and disrupt TCO's supply chains and the financial networks that enable their corrosive activities. Recognizing that this is a problem with global reach we will work closely with our international partners to stop TCOs from getting precursor chemicals and work closely with private industry to increase vigilance and prevent the diversion of chemicals for illicit fentanyl production.

Shaping the Rules of the Road

Since 1945, the United States has led the creation of institutions, norms, and standards to govern international trade and investment, economic policy, and technology. These mechanisms advanced America's economic and geopolitical aims and benefited people around the world by shaping how governments and economies interacted—and did so in ways that aligned with U.S. interests and values. These mechanisms have not kept pace with economic or technological changes, and today risk being irrelevant, or in certain cases, actively harmful to solving the challenges we now face—from insecure supply chains to widening inequality to the abuses of the PRC's nonmarket economic actions. We are endeavoring to strengthen and update the UN system and multilateral institutions generally. Nowhere is this need more acute than in updating the rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics.

By doing so in close coordination with our allies and partners, we will establish fair rules while also sustaining our economic and technological edge and shape a future defined by fair competition—because when American workers and companies compete on a level playing field, they win.

Technology

Technology is central to today's geopolitical competition and to the future of our national security, economy and democracy. U.S. and allied leadership in technology and innovation has long underpinned our economic prosperity and military strength. In the next decade, critical and emerging technologies are poised to retool economies, transform militaries, and reshape the



world. The United States is committed to a future where these technologies increase the security, prosperity, and values of the American people and like-minded democracies. Our technology strategy will enable the United States and like-minded democracies to work together to pioneer new medicines that can cure diseases, increase the production of healthy foods that are sustainably grown, diversify and strengthen our manufacturing supply chains, and secure energy without reliance on fossil fuels, all while delivering new jobs and security for the American people and our allies and partners. With bipartisan support, we have launched a modern industrial strategy and already secured historic investments in clean energy, microelectronics manufacturing, research, and development, and biotechnology, and we will work with Congress to fully fund historic new authorizations for research and development. We also are doubling down on our longstanding and asymmetric strategic advantage: attracting and retaining the world's best talent. Attracting a higher volume of global STEM talent is a priority for our national security and supply chain security, so we will aggressively implement recent visa actions and work with Congress to do more.

These investments will enable the United States to anchor an allied techno-industrial base that will safeguard our shared security, prosperity and values. This means working with allies and partners to harness and scale new technologies, and promote the foundational technologies of the 21st century, especially microelectronics, advanced computing and quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, advanced telecommunications, and clean energy technologies. We also will partner with like-minded nations to co-develop and deploy technologies in a way that benefits all, not only the powerful, and build robust and durable supply chains so that countries cannot use economic warfare to coerce others.

We are already rallying like-minded actors to advance an international technology ecosystem that protects the integrity of international standards development and promotes the free flow of data and ideas with trust, while protecting our security, privacy, and human rights, and enhancing our competitiveness. That includes work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council to foster transatlantic coordination on semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains, trustworthy artificial intelligence, disinformation, the misuse of technology threatening security and human rights, export controls, and investment screening, as well as through the Indo-Pacific Quad on critical and emerging technologies, open, next-generation digital infrastructure, and people-to-people exchanges. Across this work, we seek to bolster U.S. and allied technology leadership, advance inclusive and responsible technology development, close regulatory and legal gaps, strengthen supply chain security, and enhance cooperation on privacy, data sharing, and digital trade.

We must ensure strategic competitors cannot exploit foundational American and allied technologies, know-how, or data to undermine American and allied security. We are therefore modernizing and strengthening our export control and investment screening mechanisms, and also pursuing targeted new approaches, such as screening of outbound investment, to prevent strategic competitors from exploiting investments and expertise in ways that threaten our national security, while also protecting the integrity of allied technological ecosystems and markets. We will also work to counter the exploitation of American's sensitive data and illegitimate use of technology, including commercial spyware and surveillance technology, and we will stand against digital authoritarianism.

To achieve these goals, the digital backbones of the modern economy must be open, trusted, interoperable, reliable, and secure. That requires working with a broad range of partners to



advance network infrastructure resilience in 5G and other advanced communication technologies, including by promoting vendor diversity and securing supply chains. These investments cannot just be made in wealthy countries; we must also focus on providing high-quality digital infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries, bridging digital divides by emphasizing access among marginalized groups. To ensure these investments support positive technological outcomes, we will partner with industry and governments in shaping technological standards that ensure quality, consumer safety, and global interoperability, and to advance the open and transparent standards process that has enabled innovation, growth, and interconnectivity for decades. And in all that we do we will strive to ensure that technology supports, and does not undermine, democracy, and is developed, deployed, and governed in accordance with human rights.

Securing Cyberspace

Our societies, and the critical infrastructure that supports them, from power to pipelines, is increasingly digital and vulnerable to disruption or destruction via cyber attacks. Such attacks have been used by countries, such as Russia, to undermine countries' ability to deliver services to citizens and coerce populations. We are working closely with allies and partners, such as the Quad, to define standards for critical infrastructure to rapidly improve our cyber resilience, and building collective capabilities to rapidly respond to attacks. In the face of disruptive cyber attacks from criminals, we have launched innovative partnerships, to expand law enforcement cooperation, deny sanctuary to cyber criminals and counter illicit use of cryptocurrency to launder the proceeds of cybercrime. As an open society, the United States has a clear interest in strengthening norms that mitigate cyber threats and enhance stability in cyberspace. We aim to deter cyber attacks from state and non state actors and will respond decisively with all appropriate tools of national power to hostile acts in cyberspace, including those that disrupt or degrade vital national functions or critical infrastructure. We will continue to promote adherence to the UN General Assembly-endorsed framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which recognizes that international law applies online, just as it does offline.

Trade and Economics

America's prosperity also relies on a fair and open trade and international economic system. The United States has long benefited from international trade's ability to promote global economic growth, lower consumer prices, and access to foreign markets to promote U.S. exports and jobs. At the same time, the longstanding rules that govern trade and other means of economic exchange have been violated by non-market actors, like the PRC; were designed to privilege corporate mobility over workers and the environment, thereby exacerbating inequality and the climate crisis; and fail to cover the frontiers of the modern economy, including digital trade. The United States must once again rally partners around rules for creating a level playing field that will enable American workers and businesses—and those of partners and allies around the world—to thrive.

As our recent work to create IPEF and the Americas Prosperity for Economic Prosperity show, we are working to update the current trading system to promote equitable and resilient growth—encouraging robust trade, countering anticompetitive practices, bringing worker voices to the decision-making table, and ensuring high labor and environmental standards. We will seek new export opportunities that benefit American workers and companies, especially small- and



medium-sized enterprises, push back on abuses by non-market economies, and enforce rules against unfair trade and labor practices, including intellectual property theft, discriminatory regulations, forced labor, the denial of the right to organize, and other forms of labor repression. We will also use trade tools to advance climate priorities, as we are doing with the landmark steel and aluminum agreement with the EU. These arrangements will be accompanied by real adjustment assistance, ensuring all Americans have a dignified place in our shared future. Taken together, these efforts will create growth and innovation that benefits not only Americans, but people around the world.

Beyond trade, we are working to build an international economic system fit for contemporary realities. We will tackle the harms caused to U.S. workers, consumers, and businesses by currency manipulation; counter corruption and illicit finance; and end the race to the bottom for corporate taxation through promotion of the OECD's Global Minimum Tax. We will partner with countries on sustainable development, including by responding to global debt challenges and financing quality infrastructure through PGII. We will explore the merits and responsibly lead development of digital assets, including a digital dollar, with high standards and protections for stability, privacy, and security to benefit a strong and inclusive U.S. financial system and reinforce its global primacy. And we will address growth-stymying legal, structural, and cultural barriers that undermine labor force participation for women and marginalized groups. We will also support efforts by the international financial institutions will also need to continue to evolve to meet the challenges of our times. Many of the biggest challenges in our world today—such as pandemics and health, climate change, fragility, migration and refugee flows—cross borders and disproportionately affect the poorest, most vulnerable populations. Bolstering these institutions is also critical to tackling serious long-term challenges to the international order, such as those posed by the PRC.

Hostages and Wrongful Detainees

Using human beings as pawns is antithetical to American values and to the global order to which we aspire. Yet, that is what governments, regimes, and non-state actors do when they hold Americans against their will as hostages and wrongful detainees. We are working with our partners to deter and thwart those inhumane tactics. That includes our issuance in July 2022 of an executive order implementing a recent U.S. law called the Levinson Act and unlocking new tools for punishing those who wrongfully kidnap or detain Americans abroad. And it includes working with key international partners to promote and implement the Canadian-launched Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations so as to turn the tide against this inhumane practice and forge international norms against it.



Countering Corruption

Corruption poses a fundamental threat to the rule of law. When government officials abuse public power for private gain, it degrades the business environment, subverts economic opportunity, and exacerbates inequality. Corruption also contributes to reduced public trust in state institutions, which in turn can add to the appeal of illiberal actors who exploit popular grievances for political advantage. In today's globalized world, international financial systems are used to stash illicit wealth abroad and to send bribes across borders. The United States Strategy on Countering Corruption recognizes the unique threat corruption poses to our national security and places a special emphasis on recognizing the ways in which corrupt actors have used the U.S. financial system and other rule-of-law based systems to launder their ill-gotten gains. In response to Russia's continued invasion of Ukraine, the United States ramped up its kleptocracy initiatives aimed at recovering corruption proceeds as well as both identifying and repatriating the laundered proceeds of crime. Finally, the United States will elevate and expand the scale of diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance, including by enhancing partner governments' capacities to fight corruption in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement authorities and bolstering the prevention and oversight capacities of willing governments.



PART IV: OUR STRATEGY BY REGION

“There’s a fundamental truth of the 21st century within each of our own countries and as a global community that our own success is bound up with others succeeding as well. To deliver for our own people, we must also engage deeply with the rest of the world. To ensure that our own future, we must work together with other partners—our partners—toward a shared future. Our security, our prosperity, and our very freedoms are interconnected, in my view, as never before. And so, I believe we must work together as never before.”

PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

The United States can meet the challenges of this decisive decade only by partnering with countries and people around the world. Americans rely on and benefit from our broad and deep relationships in every region; invest in and trade with nearly every country; and study, work, and live on every continent. Our future and the world’s are interlinked. That is why our strategy is global.

Promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific fuels much of the world’s economic growth and will be the epicenter of 21st century geopolitics. As an Indo-Pacific power, the United States has a vital interest in realizing a region that is open, interconnected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.

The United States will work with other regional states to keep the Indo-Pacific open and accessible and ensure that nations are free to make their own choices, consistent with obligations under international law. We support open societies through investments in democratic institutions, free press, and civil society and are cooperating with partners to counter information manipulation and corruption. And we will affirm freedom of the seas and build shared regional support for open access to the South China Sea—a thoroughway for nearly two-thirds of global maritime trade and a quarter of all global trade.

A free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity. We are deepening our five regional treaty alliances and closest partnerships. We affirm the centrality of ASEAN, and seek deeper bonds with Southeast Asian partners. We will expand our regional diplomatic, development, and economic engagement, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. As we work with South Asian regional partners to address climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the PRC’s coercive behavior, we will promote prosperity and economic connectivity across the Indian Ocean region. The Quad and AUKUS will also be critical to addressing regional challenges, and we will further reinforce our collective strength by weaving our allies and partners closer together—including by encouraging tighter linkages between likeminded Indo-Pacific and European countries.



The prosperity of everyday Americans is linked to the Indo-Pacific and the United States has long been a regional trade and investment leader. With our regional partners, we are developing IPEF to drive inclusive, broad-based prosperity and advance our shared interests in resilient, fair, digital, and low-carbon economies. Leadership through Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) will complement these efforts.

For 75 years, the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence and will continue to meaningfully contribute to the region's stability and peace. We reaffirm our iron-clad commitments to our Indo-Pacific treaty allies—Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand—and we will continue to modernize these alliances. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under our mutual security treaty, which covers the Senkaku Islands. As India is the world's largest democracy and a Major Defense Partner, the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. We will seek sustained diplomacy with North Korea to make tangible progress toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while strengthening extended deterrence in the face of North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. The brutal military coup in Burma has undermined regional stability, and we will continue working closely with allies and partners, including ASEAN, to help restore Burma's democratic transition.

We will also work to enhance partners' resilience to transnational challenges, including climate and biological threats. The Indo-Pacific is the epicenter of the climate crisis but is also essential to climate solutions, and our shared responses to the climate crisis are a political imperative and an economic opportunity. We are also partnering to help the region build resilience to pandemic disease and to strengthen their health systems, drive investments in global health security, and expand the region's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to emergencies.

We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us since the Second World War. No region will be of more significance to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific. We are ambitious because we know that we and our allies and partners hold a common vision for its future.

Deepen Our Alliance with Europe

With a relationship rooted in shared democratic values, common interests, and historic ties, the transatlantic relationship is a vital platform on which many other elements of our foreign policy are built. Europe has been, and will continue to be, our foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond—strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with our European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins our security, prosperity, and values.

Today, Europe stands at the front lines of the fight to defend the principles of freedom, sovereignty, and non-aggression, and we will continue to work in lockstep to ensure that freedom prevails. America remains unequivocally committed to collective defense as enshrined in NATO's Article 5 and will work alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend against, and build resilience to aggression and coercion in all its forms. As we step up our own sizable



contributions to NATO capabilities and readiness—including by strengthening defensive forces and capabilities, and upholding our long-standing commitment to extended deterrence—we will count on our Allies to continue assuming greater responsibility by increasing their spending, capabilities, and contributions. European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring our shared security at this time of intensifying competition. We stand behind NATO’s continued adaptation to modern security challenges, including its emphasis on defense in cyberspace, climate security, and the growing security risks presented by the PRC’s policies and actions.

America maintains our fundamental commitment to the pursuit of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine poses a grave threat to this vision, which is why we are determined to support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity while imposing severe costs on Moscow for its aggression. We have supported Ukraine with security, humanitarian, and financial assistance. We have joined with allies and partners in Europe and around the globe to impose sanctions and export controls that will degrade Russia’s ability to wage future wars of aggression. We have partnered with the European Commission on an ambitious plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, strengthen European energy security, and advance shared climate goals. Across these efforts, the EU—an integrated market of over 450 million people—is an indispensable partner, and we support efforts to foster EU unity. We also encourage close cooperation on matters of mutual interest between the EU and the United Kingdom. In addition, we underscore our support for the Good Friday Agreement which is the bedrock of peace, stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.

As we support Ukraine, we will also work to enhance the stability and resilience of other democracies. We will support the European aspirations of Georgia and Moldova and their commitment to important institutional reforms. We will assist partners in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and economic development in the Western Balkans. We will back diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict in the South Caucasus. We will continue to engage with Turkey to reinforce its strategic, political, economic, and institutional ties to the West. We will work with allies and partners to manage the refugee crisis created by Russia’s war in Ukraine. And, we will work to forestall terrorist threats to Europe. Elsewhere in Eurasia, we will continue to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asia. We will foster efforts to enhance resilience and democratic development in the five countries in this region. We will continue to work through the C5+1 diplomatic platform (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the United States) to advance climate adaptation, improve regional energy and food security, enhance integration within the region, and build greater connectivity to global markets.

Though rooted in transatlantic strength and stability, our agenda with European allies and partners is global. We will work with the EU to strengthen trade, investment, and technological cooperation grounded in shared democratic values—promoting an open and inclusive global economy, setting high standards for trade, ensuring fair competition, supporting labor rights, driving decarbonization, fighting corruption, and protecting our innovations from uses that run counter to our interests and values. Through the G7, we will work with France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to galvanize international cooperation on the world’s most pressing challenges. We will jointly defend human rights, whether in Belarus or Xinjiang. To enact this ambitious agenda, we will deepen our strategic alignment—consulting regularly, sharing information and intelligence, and acting together.



Foster Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Western Hemisphere

No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere. With \$1.9 trillion in annual trade, shared values and democratic traditions, and familial bonds, nations of the Western Hemisphere, especially in North America, are key contributors to U.S. prosperity and resilience. But the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing recession have exacerbated longstanding structural challenges, fueled political and social unrest, undermining faith in democracy's ability to deliver, and spurred unprecedented levels of irregular migration to the United States and throughout the region. Recognizing the direct link between the region's prosperity and security and that of our own, it is vital for the United States to revitalize our partnerships to build and preserve economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security within the hemisphere. We will advance these efforts through regular interactions, multilateral and institutional collaboration, and regional initiatives, and by implementing the commitments made at the Ninth Summit of the Americas.

The movement of people throughout the Americas, including over six million Venezuelans forced to leave their homes since 2015, affects all of Latin America and the Caribbean and reinforces the need for regional action. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection complements U.S. efforts at home to modernize its border infrastructure and build a fair, orderly, and humane immigration system with a bold hemisphere-wide partnership centered on the principle of responsibility-sharing, stability and assistance for affected communities, the expansion of legal pathways, humane migration management, and a coordinated emergency response. The United States is also leading the charge to expand legal pathways for migration and to combat illicit human smuggling and trafficking that prey on vulnerable migrants. These efforts combined aim to stabilize migrant populations and replace irregular migration with orderly flows that can fuel economic growth in the United States and across the region. We will pursue these collaborative efforts while ensuring a fundamentally fair, orderly, and humane approach to migration management that bolster border security and protects our nation.

Ending and mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and advancing health security are imperative for the wellbeing of the entire hemisphere. In addition to donating over 72 million vaccines, through the Action Plan on Health and Resilience in the Americas we are partnering with the region to prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemic threats and other public health emergencies while also expanding the equitable delivery of healthcare and public services to remote, vulnerable, and marginalized populations. In addition to supporting countries, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, in reaching a 70 percent COVID-19 vaccination rate, associated partnerships are boosting increased vaccine manufacturing capability and helping train 500,000 public health and medical professionals by 2027 through the Americas Health Corps.

Together with regional partners we are deepening economic cooperation to ensure durable and inclusive economic growth that delivers for our working people. Our priority is to work with Canada and Mexico to advance a North American vision for the future that draws on our shared strengths and bolsters U.S. global competitiveness. Similarly, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity will guide our regional economic engagement by focusing on the largest drivers of bottom-up and middle-out growth, updating tools for the new and complex challenges facing us today and in the decades to come with a focus on reinvigorating regional economic



institutions, securing supply chains, creating clean energy jobs and promoting decarbonization, ensuring sustainable and inclusive trade, and making game-changing investments that increase the effectiveness of public administration.

Tackling the climate crisis and harnessing the dynamism of the region will be central to our approach, and we will use mitigation and adaptation efforts to fuel a sustainable economic recovery and protect forest ecosystems, including by promoting trade and investment in clean energy to achieve a collective target of 70 percent installed capacity for renewable energy generation in the region's electricity sector by 2030 and mobilizing financing and other forms of support to promote conservation of the Amazon. The United States and the Caribbean Community also launched the Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 to expand access to project financing, attract private investment in clean energy infrastructure and climate adaptation projects, and enhance local capacity to assess, plan for, predict, mitigate, and respond to extreme weather events and related risks in a changing climate.

The United States derives security and economic benefits from the region's democratic stability and institutions, as our shared values provide a basis for collaboration and peaceful dispute resolution. To help preserve and enhance these traditions, we will support partners striving to build transparent, inclusive, and accountable institutions. Together, we will support effective democratic governance responsive to citizen needs, defend human rights and combat gender-based violence, tackle corruption, and protect against external interference or coercion, including from the PRC, Russia, or Iran. Through reinvigorated and representative Inter-American institutions, and in partnership with civil society and other governments, we will support democratic self-determination for the people of Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and any country where the popular will is suppressed. In Haiti, which suffers from an extended humanitarian, political, and economic crisis, we will mobilize the international community to help restore security, rebuild governing institutions, and support a foundation of prosperity by which the Haitian people can determine their own future.

We will also assist partners in facing security threats. These challenges may be internal—including from local gangs, or transnational, including from criminal organizations that traffic drugs and humans and undertake other illegal operations—or external, as malign actors seek to gain military or intelligence footholds in the region. These threats impact security throughout the Americas, including here at home, and we will therefore promote collaboration to help assist civilian police and, strengthen justice systems in the Americas, and expand information sharing with our partners.

These priorities—expanding economic opportunities, strengthening democracy, and building security—are mutually reinforcing and contribute to national, regional, and global stability. We have an overriding strategic interest in pursuing and strengthening collaboration through intensified diplomatic engagement with hemispheric partners and institutions based on the premise that advance a vision of a region that is secure, middle class, and democratic is fundamentally in the national security interest of the United States. The challenge and the stakes of this undertaking are accentuated by the backdrop of increased geopolitical and geoeconomics volatility, the interrelated challenges posed by phenomena like climate change, global pandemics, and mass migration, and the recognition that the security and prosperity of the United States hinges on that of our neighbors.



Support De-Escalation and Integration in the Middle East

Over the past two decades, U.S. foreign policy has focused predominantly on threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. We have too often defaulted to military-centric policies underpinned by an unrealistic faith in force and regime change to deliver sustainable outcomes, while failing to adequately account for opportunity costs to competing global priorities or unintended consequences. It is time to eschew grand designs in favor of more practical steps that can advance U.S. interests and help regional partners lay the foundation for greater stability, prosperity, and opportunity for the people of the Middle East and for the American people.

The United States has set forth a new framework for U.S. policy in the region based on America's unparalleled comparative advantage in building partnerships, coalitions, and alliances to strengthen deterrence, while using diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, reduce risks of new conflicts, and set a long-term foundation for stability.

This framework has five principles. First, the United States will support and strengthen partnerships with countries that subscribe to the rules-based international order, and we will make sure those countries can defend themselves against foreign threats. Second, the United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation through the Middle East's waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another—or the region—through military buildups, incursions, or threats. Third, even as the United States works to deter threats to regional stability, we will work to reduce tensions, de-escalate, and end conflicts wherever possible through diplomacy. Fourth, the United States will promote regional integration by building political, economic, and security connections between and among U.S. partners, including through integrated air and maritime defense structures, while respecting each country's sovereignty and independent choices. Fifth, the United States will always promote human rights and the values enshrined in the UN Charter.

This new framework builds on the recent progress regional states have made to bridge their enduring divides. We will continue to work with allies and partners to enhance their capabilities to deter and counter Iran's destabilizing activities. We will pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail. Iran's threats against U.S. personnel as well as current and former U.S. officials will not be tolerated, and as we have demonstrated, we will respond when our people and interests are attacked. As we do so, we will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied them by the regime in Tehran.

More broadly we will combine diplomacy, economic aid, and security assistance to local partners to alleviate suffering, reduce instability, and prevent the export of terrorism or mass migration from Yemen, Syria, and Libya, while working with regional governments to manage the broader impact of these challenges. We will seek to extend and deepen Israel's growing ties to its neighbors and other Arab states, including through the Abraham Accords, while maintaining our ironclad commitment to its security. We will also continue to promote a viable two state solution that preserves Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state while meeting Palestinian aspirations for a secure and viable state of their own. As President Biden stated during his visit to the West Bank in July 2022, "Two States along the 1967 lines, with mutually agreed swaps, remain the best way to achieve equal measure of security, prosperity, freedom, and democracy for Palestinians as well as Israelis."



This new framework relies on a sustainable and effective military posture focused on deterrence, strengthening partner capacity, enabling regional security integration, countering terrorist threats, and ensuring the free flow of global commerce. In conjunction with the use of other instruments of national power, these military activities also help counter external actors' military expansion in the region. We will not use our military to change regimes or remake societies, but instead limit the use of force to circumstances where it is necessary to protect our national security interests and consistent with international law, while enabling our partners to defend their territory from external and terrorist threats.

We will encourage economic and political reforms that help unlock the region's potential, including by fostering greater economic integration to drive growth and create jobs. We will encourage energy producers to use their resources to stabilize global energy markets, while also preparing for a clean energy future and protecting American consumers. We will also continue to support our democratic partners and demand accountability for violations of human rights, recognizing that while true reform can only come from within, the United States still has an important role to play. The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance and a longstanding champion for principled, needs-based humanitarian action. We will sustain our leadership on humanitarian assistance and manage long-term refugee and displacement crises, which help realize human dignity and bolster stability. And we will accelerate our support to regional partners to help them build greater resilience, as the future of the Middle East will be defined as much by climate, technological, and demographic changes as by traditional security matters.

Build 21st Century U.S.-Africa Partnerships

Africa's governments, institutions, and people are a major geopolitical force, one that will play a crucial role in solving global challenges in the coming decade. Africa is more youthful, mobile, educated, and connected than ever before. African countries comprise one of the largest regional voting groups at the UN and their citizens lead major international institutions. The continent's booming population, vital natural resources, and vibrant entrepreneurship, coupled with the African Continental Free Trade Area, have the potential to drive transformative economic growth. Our partnerships with African states over the past three decades helped lay the groundwork for this growth. To accelerate it, U.S.-Africa partnerships must adapt to reflect the important geopolitical role that African nations play globally.

Advancing America's national interests will hinge in part on working more closely, not only with African nations, but also with regional bodies, such as the African Union, subnational governments, civil society, and private sector and diaspora communities. We will continue to invest in the region's largest states, such as Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, while also deepening our ties to medium and small states. We will engage African countries as equal partners to achieve our shared priorities from health and pandemic preparedness to climate change. We will also press partners about human rights, corruption, or authoritarian behavior, and deepen partnerships with countries that make progress toward more open and democratic governance. In coordination with international partners and regional bodies, we will counter democratic backsliding by imposing costs for coups and pressing for progress on civilian transitions. And we will listen to African leaders and people as they articulate their vision for



their foreign partnerships, including expectations for transparency, accountability, fairness, inclusion, and equity.

Enhancing Africa's peace and prosperity will bolster Africa's ability to solve regional and global problems. The region's commitment and capacity to renew democracy, as well as anticipate, prevent, and address emerging and long running conflicts can lead to favorable outcomes for Africans and Americans. We will support African-led efforts to work toward political solutions to costly conflicts, increasing terrorist activity, and humanitarian crises, such as those in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sahel, and invest in local and international peacebuilding and peacekeeping to prevent new conflicts from emerging. Consistent with our broader counterterrorism approach, we will disrupt and degrade terrorist threats against the United States while supporting partners to prevent terrorist expansion. We will work with our African and international partners to tackle the root causes of terrorism, including by countering corruption, strengthening accountability and justice, investing in inclusive economic development, and advancing human rights, including women's rights, and also push back on the destabilizing impact of the Russia-backed Wagner Group.

We will support accelerating growth through private sector investment, help Africa unlock its digital economy, double down on tackling food insecurity, and expand clean energy infrastructure through the Prosper Africa, Feed the Future, and Power Africa initiatives. We will support climate adaptation, conservation, and a just energy transition, as sub-Saharan African countries are already experiencing severe climate impacts, compounding land use, migration challenges, and rising food and commodity prices, made worse by Russia's further invasion of Ukraine. Quality healthcare systems are essential to economic growth, and we will build on our decades-long partnerships to invest in health security and health systems infrastructure, and the ongoing COVID-19 response. We will also work with African governments to create the business environments and make the investments in human capital and capacity development to attract investors, grow businesses, and create good jobs across sectors—and to bolster U.S.-Africa trade and create new opportunities for U.S. businesses. We will seek to offer opportunities that reflect America's competitive advantages, promoting inclusive growth, respecting workers' rights, and protecting the region's resources for future generations.

Maintain a Peaceful Arctic

The United States seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative. Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible than ever, threatening Arctic communities and vital ecosystems, creating new potential economic opportunities. and intensifying competition to shape the region's future. Russia has invested significantly in its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, modernizing its military infrastructure and increasing the pace of exercises and training operations. Its aggressive behavior has raised geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, creating new risks of unintended conflict and hindering cooperation. The PRC has also sought to increase its influence in the Arctic by rapidly increased its Arctic investments, pursuing new scientific activities, and using these scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications.

We will uphold U.S. security in the region by improving our maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity to prepare for increased international activity in the region. We will exercise U.S. Government presence in the region as



required, while reducing risk and preventing unnecessary escalation. Arctic nations have the primary responsibility for addressing regional challenges, and we will deepen our cooperation with our Arctic allies and partners and work with them to sustain the Arctic Council and other Arctic institutions despite the challenges to Arctic cooperation posed by Russia's war in Ukraine. We will continue to protect freedom of navigation and determine the U.S. extended continental shelf in accordance with international rules. We must build resilience to and mitigate climate change in the region, including through agreements to reduce emissions and more cross-Arctic research collaboration. As economic activity in the Arctic increases, we will invest in infrastructure, improve livelihoods, and encourage responsible private sector investment by the United States, our allies, and our partners, including in critical minerals, and improve investment screening for national security purposes. Across these efforts, we will uphold our commitment to honor Tribal sovereignty and self-governance through regular, meaningful, and robust consultation and collaboration with Alaska Native communities.

Protect Sea, Air, and Space

People around the world depend on the sea, air, and space for their security and prosperity. The world's interconnected oceans, lands, waterways, and other ecosystems generate economic opportunity and enable critical commercial and military activity. They contain biodiversity vital to food security, clean air and water, a stable climate, and health and wellbeing. Threats to these systems—including excessive maritime and airspace claims, pollution and unregulated deforestation, and wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing—impact governments' abilities to meet basic human needs and contribute to political, economic, and social instability. We will stand up for freedom of navigation and overflight, support environmental protection, and oppose destructive distant water fishing practices by upholding international laws and norms, including the customary international law rules in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. And we will promote Antarctica's status as a continent reserved for peace and science in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.

Space exploration and use benefits humanity, from creating economic opportunities to developing new technologies and enabling climate surveillance. America will maintain our position as the world's leader in space and work alongside the international community to ensure the domain's sustainability, safety, stability, and security. We must lead in updating outer space governance, establishing a space traffic coordination system and charting a path for future space norms and arms control. Working with allies and partners, we will develop policies and regulations that enable the burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector to compete internationally. We will enhance the resilience of U.S. space systems that we rely on for critical national and homeland security functions. These efforts aim to protect U.S. interests in space, avoid destabilizing arms races, and responsibly steward the space environment.



Sharpen Our Tools of Statecraft

Our national security institutions and workforce underpin America's global leadership and the security, prosperity, and freedoms of the American people. To achieve our ambitious aims, we must modernize and adapt our tools of statecraft for today's challenges. For example, we are:

- Strengthening American diplomacy by modernizing the Department of State, including through the recent creation of a new bureau for cyberspace and digital policy and special envoy for critical and emerging technologies.
- Adapting the Intelligence Community (IC), including by aligning our organizations to better address competition, embracing new data tools, and enhancing integration of open source material.
- Enhancing U.S. and global early warning and forecasting for infectious disease threats and pandemics by increasing support for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Center for Outbreak, Forecasting, and Analytics and foreign assistance for global health security.
- Reorganizing the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to sharpen its focus on emerging technologies and elevate senior leader attention to critical regions. Bolstering the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Cybersecurity Service by reimagining how DHS hires, develops, and retains top-tier and diverse cyber talent.
- Making development assistance more accessible and equitable by increasing engagement with and shifting 25 percent of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to local partners, and double USAID's work on empowering women and girls.
- Expanding our engagement with stakeholders and build our capacity to partner with the private sector, philanthropy, diaspora communities, and civil society.
- Prioritizing technology's role in national security by elevating the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to a cabinet-level agency and full member of the National Security Council.

The success of these efforts and our foreign policy will require strengthening the national security workforce by recruiting and retaining diverse, high-caliber talent. We are:

- Prioritizing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility to ensure national security institutions reflect the American public they represent.
- Creating more effective and efficient hiring, recruitment, retention, and talent development practices, particularly in STEM fields, economics, critical languages, and regional affairs.
- Supporting professional development opportunities—for both leadership and technical skills—at all levels of the workforce.
- Opening opportunities for the national security workforce to move among institutions, both within and outside government, and carry the skills they develop back to their home agencies.
- Equipping the workforce with cutting-edge technology and better integrate data and analytic tools to support decision-making.
- Prioritizing human resources capabilities and personnel, who will drive and steward all of these initiatives.



The health of our national security institutions and workforce relies on faith in the apolitical nature of Federal law enforcement agencies, the IC, our diplomats, civil servants, Federally funded research and development institutions, and military as we work together in national service.



PART V: CONCLUSION

We are confident that the United States, alongside our allies and partners, is positioned to succeed in our pursuit of a free, open, prosperous, and secure global order. With the key elements outlined in this strategy, we will tackle the twin challenges of our time: out-competing our rivals to shape the international order while tackling shared challenges, including climate change, pandemic preparedness, and food security, that will define the next stage of human history. We will strengthen democracy across the world, and multilateral institutions, as we look to the future to chart new and fair rules of the road for emerging technology, cybersecurity, and trade and economics. And we will do all this and more by leveraging our considerable advantages and our unparalleled coalition of allies and partners.

As we implement this strategy, we will continually assess and reassess our approach to ensure we are best serving the American people. We will be guided by the indisputable fact that the strength and quality of the American project at home is inextricably linked with our leadership in the world and our ability to shape the terms of the world order. This National Security Strategy will be evaluated by an overriding metric: whether it makes life better, safer, and fairer for the people of the United States, and whether it lifts up the countries and people around the world who share our vision for the future.

We are motivated by a clear vision of what success looks like at the end of this decisive decade.

By enhancing our industrial capacity, investing in our people, and strengthening our democracy, we will have strengthened the foundation of our economy, bolstered our national resilience, enhanced our credibility on the world stage, and ensured our competitive advantages.

By deepening and expanding our diplomatic relationships not only with our democratic allies but with all states who share our vision for a better future, we will have developed terms of competition with our strategic rivals that are favorable to our interests and values and laid the foundation to increase cooperation on shared challenges.

By modernizing our military, pursuing advanced technologies, and investing in our defense workforce, we will have strengthened deterrence in an era of increasing geopolitical confrontation, and positioned America to defend our homeland, our allies, partners, and interests overseas, and our values across the globe.

By leveraging our national strengths and rallying a broad coalition of allies and partners, we will advance our vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure world, outmaneuvering our competitors, and making meaningful progress on issues like climate change, global health, and food security to improve the lives not just of Americans but of people around the world.

This is what we must achieve in this decisive decade. As we have done throughout our history, America will seize this moment and rise to the challenge. There is no time to waste.

ANNEX G – National Defense Strategy 2022

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) details the Department's path forward into that decisive decade—from helping to protect the American people, to promoting global security, to seizing new strategic opportunities, and to realizing and defending our democratic values.



U.S. Department *of* Defense

2022

**National Defense
Strategy**

of
The United States of America

Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review





2022

National Defense Strategy



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

October 27, 2022

President Biden has stated that we are living in a “decisive decade,” one stamped by dramatic changes in geopolitics, technology, economics, and our environment. The defense strategy that the United States pursues will set the Department’s course for decades to come. The Department of Defense owes it to our All-Volunteer Force and the American people to provide a clear picture of the challenges we expect to face in the crucial years ahead—and we owe them a clear and rigorous strategy for advancing our defense and security goals.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) details the Department’s path forward into that decisive decade—from helping to protect the American people, to promoting global security, to seizing new strategic opportunities, and to realizing and defending our democratic values. For the first time, the Department conducted its strategic reviews—the NDS, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR)—in an integrated way, ensuring tight linkages between our strategy and our resources. The NDS directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge for the Department. The NDS further explains how we will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression while mitigating and protecting against threats from North Korea, Iran, violent extremist organizations, and transboundary challenges such as climate change.

The PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades. I have reached this conclusion based on the PRC’s increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences, alongside a keen awareness of the PRC’s clearly stated intentions and the rapid modernization and expansion of its military. As President Biden’s National Security Strategy notes, the PRC is “the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order, and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.”

Meanwhile, Russia’s unprovoked, unjust, and reckless invasion of Ukraine underscores its irresponsible behavior. Efforts to respond to Russia’s assault on Ukraine also dramatically highlight the importance of a strategy that leverages the power of our values and our military might with that of our Allies and partners. Together, we have marshalled a strong, unified response to Russia’s attack and proven the strength of NATO unity.

In these times, business as usual at the Department is not acceptable. The 2022 NDS lays out our vision for focusing the Defense Department around our pacing challenge, even as we manage the other threats of our swiftly changing world. It builds on my 2021 *Message to the Force*, which stressed as core values defending the nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork.


Our central charge is to develop, combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect. This is the core of integrated deterrence, a centerpiece of the 2022 NDS. Integrated deterrence means using every tool at the Department's disposal, in close collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with Allies and partners, to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression. The Department will align policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence—tailored to specific competitors and challenges and coordinated and synchronized inside and outside the Department.

The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors' coercion, and complicate our competitors' military preparations. Campaigning is not business as usual—it is the deliberate effort to synchronize the Department's activities and investments to aggregate focus and resources to shift conditions in our favor. Through campaigning, the Department will focus on the most consequential competitor activities that, if left unaddressed, would endanger our military advantages now and in the future.

Even as we take these steps, we will act with urgency to build enduring advantages for the future Joint Force, undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.

America has never been afraid of competition, and we do not shy away from tough challenges, especially when it comes to securing our national interests and defending our national values. To meet this moment, we will tap into our core strengths: our dynamic, diverse, and innovative society; our unmatched network of Allies and partners; and the tremendous men and women of our armed forces.

We live in turbulent times. Yet, I am confident that the Department, along with our counterparts throughout the U.S. Government and our Allies and partners around the world, is well positioned to meet the challenges of this decisive decade.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. F. O'Hara", with a stylized flourish at the end.



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I. INTRODUCTION

For more than seven decades, the vision and leadership of the United States have undergirded international peace and prosperity. A strong, principled, and adaptive U.S. military is a central pillar for U.S. leadership, particularly in the face of challenges arising from dramatic geopolitical, technological, economic, and environmental change. The Department of Defense stands ready to meet these challenges and seize opportunities with the confidence, creativity, and commitment that have long characterized our military and the democracy that it serves.

The Department will focus on safeguarding and advancing vital U.S. national interests. We will work alongside other agencies and departments to:

- ▶ Protect the security of the American people;
- ▶ Expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and
- ▶ Realize and defend the values at the heart of American way of life.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) sets forth how the U.S. military will meet growing threats to vital U.S. national security interests and to a stable and open international system. It directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the Department's pacing challenge.

The strategy identifies four top-level defense priorities that the Department must pursue to strengthen deterrence. First, we will defend the homeland. Second, we will deter strategic attacks against the United States, our Allies, and our partners. Third, we will deter aggression and be prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary. Fourth, to ensure our future military advantage, we will build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department will advance our priorities through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages. *Integrated deterrence* entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power, and our network of Alliances and partnerships. Tailored to specific circumstances, it applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors' perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces prepared to fight and win, as needed, and backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

Day after day, the Department will strengthen deterrence and gain advantage against competitors' most consequential coercive measures by *campaigning* – the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time. The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power to counter forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners.

To shore up the foundations for integrated deterrence and campaigning, we will act urgently to *build enduring advantages* across the defense ecosystem – the Department of Defense, the defense industrial base, and the array of private sector and academic enterprises that create and sharpen the Joint Force’s technological edge. We will modernize the systems that design and build the Joint Force, with a focus on innovation and rapid adjustment to new strategic demands. We will make our supporting systems more resilient and agile in the face of threats that range from competitors to the effects of climate change. And we will cultivate our talents, recruiting and training a workforce with the skills, abilities, and diversity we need to creatively solve national security challenges in a complex global environment.

The 2022 NDS advances a strategy focused on the PRC and on collaboration with our growing network of Allies and partners on common objectives. It seeks to prevent the PRC’s dominance of key regions while protecting the U.S. homeland and reinforcing a stable and open international system. Consistent with the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), a key objective of the NDS is to dissuade the PRC from considering aggression as a viable means of advancing goals that threaten vital U.S. national interests. Conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable nor desirable. The Department’s priorities support broader whole-of-government efforts to develop terms of interaction with the PRC that are favorable to our interests and values, while managing strategic competition and enabling the pursuit of cooperation on common challenges.

Even as we focus on the PRC as our pacing challenge, the NDS also accounts for the acute threat posed by Russia, demonstrated most recently by Russia’s unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine. The Department will support robust deterrence of Russian aggression against vital U.S. national interests, including our treaty Allies. We will work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and our partners to provide U.S. leadership, develop key enabling capabilities, and deepen interoperability. In service of our strategic priorities, we will accept measured risk but remain vigilant in the face of other persistent threats, including those posed by North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). We will also build resilience in the face of destabilizing and potentially catastrophic transboundary challenges such as climate change and pandemics, which increasingly strain the Joint Force.

We cannot meet these complex and interconnected challenges alone. Mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage – and they are a center of gravity for this strategy. We will strengthen major regional security architectures with our Allies and partners based on complementary contributions; combined, collaborative operations and force planning; increased intelligence and information sharing; new operational concepts; and our ability to draw on the Joint Force worldwide.

We cannot delay. The NSS describes the United States’ agenda for renewal in the coming “decisive decade,” a ten-year window for leadership to tackle our era’s defining challenges. In full accord with the urgency conveyed by the NSS and in support of its broader goals, the Department will move immediately to implement the changes detailed in this NDS, the Secretary of Defense’s preeminent guidance document.

The challenges we face are formidable, but the United States possesses strengths that our competitors cannot match. Our democratic values, our open society, our diversity, our base of innovation, our culture of ingenuity, our combat experience, our globe-spanning network of Alliances and partnerships, and above all our extraordinary All Volunteer Force – these together provide firm foundations for a defense strategy that will keep America secure, prosperous, and free.

II. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Now and over the next two decades, we face strategic challenges stemming from complex interactions between a rapidly changing global balance of military capabilities; emerging technologies; competitor doctrines that pose new threats to the U.S. homeland and to strategic stability; an escalation of competitors' coercive and malign activities in the "gray zone"; and transboundary challenges that impose new demands on the Joint Force and the defense enterprise.

These developments and the threats they present are interconnected – in part because our competitors deliberately link them to erode deterrence, exert economic coercion, and endanger the political autonomy of states. Competitor strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war, including by creating anti-access/area-denial environments; developing conventional capabilities to undertake rapid interventions; posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military's ability to project power and counter regional aggression; and using the cyber and space domains to gain operational, logistical, and information advantages. At the same time, our competitors are building larger and more diverse nuclear arsenals and working to distract and divide the United States and our Allies and partners.

Strategic Competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests. The PRC's increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control. The PRC has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the PLA, with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.

In addition to expanding its conventional forces, the PLA is rapidly advancing and integrating its space, counterspace, cyber, electronic, and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare. The PLA seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our Allies in a crisis or conflict. The PRC is also expanding the PLA's global footprint and working to establish a more robust overseas and basing infrastructure to allow it to project military power at greater distances. In parallel, the PRC is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities. The United States and its Allies and partners will increasingly face the challenge of deterring two major powers with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities – the PRC and Russia – creating new stresses on strategic stability.

Russia as an Acute Threat. Even as the PRC poses the Department's pacing challenge, recent events underscore the acute threat posed by Russia. Contemptuous of its neighbors' independence, Russia's government seeks to use force to impose border changes and to reimpose an imperial sphere of influence. Its extensive track record of territorial aggression includes the escalation of its brutal, unprovoked war against Ukraine. Although its leaders' political and military actions intended to fracture NATO have backfired dramatically, the goal remains. Russia presents serious, continuing risks in key areas. These include nuclear threats to the homeland and U.S. Allies and partners; long-range cruise missile threats; cyber and information operations; counterspace threats; chemical and biological weapons (CBW); undersea warfare; and extensive gray zone campaigns targeted against democracies in particular. Russia has incorporated these capabilities and methods into an overall strategy that, like the PRC's, seeks to exploit advantages in geography and time backed by a mix of threats to the U.S. homeland and to our Allies and partners.

Although diverging interests and historical mistrust may limit the depth of their political and military cooperation, the PRC and Russia relationship continues to increase in breadth. Either state could seek to create dilemmas globally for the Joint Force in the event of U.S. engagement in a crisis or a conflict with the other.

Threats to the U.S. Homeland. The scope and scale of threats to the homeland have fundamentally changed. The PRC and Russia now pose more dangerous challenges to safety and security at home, even as terrorist threats persist. Both states are already using non-kinetic means against our defense industrial base and mobilization systems, as well as deploying counterspace capabilities that can target our Global Positioning System and other space-based capabilities that support military power and daily civilian life. The PRC or Russia could use a wide array of tools in an attempt to hinder U.S. military preparation and response in a conflict, including actions aimed at undermining the will of the U.S. public, and to target our critical infrastructure and other systems. These threats, along with the toll taken by climate change, pandemics, and other transborder challenges will increase demands on Department resources, federal civil authorities, and the public and private sectors.

Other Persistent Threats – North Korea, Iran, and VEOs. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the U.S. homeland, deployed U.S. forces, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, while seeking to drive wedges between the United States-ROK and United States-Japan Alliances. Iran is taking actions that would improve its ability to produce a nuclear weapon should it make the decision to do so, even as it builds and exports extensive missile forces, uncrewed aircraft systems, and advanced maritime capabilities that threaten chokepoints for the free flow of energy resources and international commerce. Iran further undermines Middle East stability by supporting terrorist groups and military proxies, employing its own paramilitary forces, engaging in military provocations, and conducting malicious cyber and information operations. Global terrorist groups – including al-Qa'ida, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their affiliates – have had their capabilities degraded, but some may be able to

reconstitute them in short order, which will require monitoring indications and warning against the VEO threat.

Complex Escalation Dynamics: Rapidly Evolving Domains and Technologies. A wide range of new or fast-evolving technologies and applications are complicating escalation dynamics and creating new challenges for strategic stability. These include counterspace weapons, hypersonic weapons, advanced CBW, and new and emerging payload and delivery systems for both conventional and non-strategic nuclear weapons. In the cyber and space domains, the risk of inadvertent escalation is particularly high due to unclear norms of behavior and escalation thresholds, complex domain interactions, and new capabilities. New applications of artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential not just to change kinetic conflict, but also to disrupt day-to-day U.S. supply chain and logistics operations.

Competitors' Gray Zone Activities. Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods – coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the U.S. Government. The PRC employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its Allies and partners. Russia employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and our Allies and partners, and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries. Other state actors, particularly North Korea and Iran, use similar if currently more limited means. The proliferation of advanced missiles, uncrewed aircraft systems, and cyber tools to military proxies allows competitors to threaten U.S. forces, Allies, and partners, in indirect and deniable ways.

Climate Change and other Transboundary Challenges. Beyond state and non-state actors, changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats are already transforming the context in which the Department operates. Increasing temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, rising sea levels, and more frequent extreme weather conditions will affect basing and access while degrading readiness, installations, and capabilities. Climate change is creating new corridors of strategic interaction, particularly in the Arctic region. It will increase demands, including on the Joint Force, for disaster response and defense support of civil authorities, and affect security relationships with some Allies and partners. Insecurity and instability related to climate change may tax governance capacity in some countries while heightening tensions between others, risking new armed conflicts and increasing demands for stabilization activities.

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to impact societies, global supply chains, and the U.S. defense industrial base. It has required substantial commitment of Department resources for support of civil authorities and support to international partners. COVID-19 also spotlights the costs and risks of future biological threats, whether natural or human-made, for the Department and the Joint Force.

III. DEFENSE PRIORITIES

Together, these rapidly evolving features of the security environment threaten to erode the United States' ability to deter aggression and to help maintain favorable balances of power in critical regions. The PRC presents the most consequential and systemic challenge, while Russia poses acute threats – both to vital U.S. national interests abroad and to the homeland. Other features of the security environment, including climate change and other transboundary threats, will increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force and the systems that support it.

In this context, and in support of a stable and open international system and our defense commitments, the Department's priorities are:

- ▶ Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC;
- ▶ Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners;
- ▶ Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary – prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe; and,
- ▶ Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

IV. INTEGRATED DETERRENCE

Our competitors, particularly the PRC, are pursuing holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundations of a stable and open international system.

Meeting the challenge requires a holistic response: integrated deterrence. In the past, the Department's approach to deterrence has too often been hindered by competing priorities; lack of clarity regarding the specific competitor actions we seek to deter; an emphasis on deterring behaviors in instances where Department authorities and tools are ill-suited; and stovepiping. Integrated deterrence is how we will align the Department's policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence – tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department.

How We Will Deter. Deterrence is strengthened by actions that reduce a competitor's perception of the benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Effective deterrence requires the Department to consider how competitors perceive U.S., Ally, and partner stakes, commitment, and combat credibility; their perception of their own ability to control escalation risks; and their view of how the status quo will evolve – in part as a result of U.S., Ally, and partner actions – if they do not use force. Actions aimed at strengthening deterrence work by different logics: denial, resilience, and cost imposition. Optimal combinations need to be tailored to specific settings and deterrence objectives in an integrated deterrence approach.

Deterrence by Denial. To deter aggression, especially where potential adversaries could act to rapidly seize territory, the Department will develop asymmetric approaches and optimize our posture for *denial*. In the near-term, we will continue to develop innovative operational concepts and supplement current capabilities and posture through investments in mature, high-value assets. Over the mid- to long-term, we will develop new capabilities, including in long-range strike, undersea, hypersonic, and autonomous systems, and improve information sharing and the integration of non-kinetic tools.

Deterrence by Resilience. Denying the benefits of aggression also requires *resilience* – the ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption. The Department will improve its ability to operate in the face of multi-domain attacks on a growing surface of vital networks and critical infrastructure, both in the homeland and in collaboration with Allies and partners at risk. Because the cyber and space domains empower the entire Joint Force, we will prioritize building resilience in these areas. Cyber resilience will be enhanced by, for example, modern encryption and a zero-trust architecture. In the space domain, the Department will reduce adversary incentives for early attack by fielding diverse, resilient, and redundant satellite constellations. We will bolster our ability to fight through disruption by improving defensive capabilities and increasing options for reconstitution. We will assist Allies and partners in doing the same.

Deterrence by Direct and Collective Cost Imposition. Denial and resilience strategies are necessary but not always sufficient. Effective deterrence may also hinge on our ability to impose costs in excess to the perceived benefits of aggression. The Department will continue to modernize our nuclear forces, the ultimate backstop to deter attacks on the homeland and our Allies and partners who rely on U.S. extended deterrence. Direct cost imposition approaches also include a broad range of other means, including conventional long-range fires, offensive cyber, irregular warfare, support for foreign internal defense, and interagency instruments, such as economic sanctions, export controls, and diplomatic measures.

Collective cost imposition approaches increase the expectation that aggression will be met with a collective response. Through close collaboration with U.S. Government departments and agencies and with our Allies and partners, we will diversify our posture and broaden the scope of cooperation, adding complexity to competitors' military planning and execution. U.S. leadership in shaping norms for appropriate conduct in the cyber, space, and other emerging technology domains will reinforce deterrence by increasing international consensus on what constitutes malign and aggressive behavior, thereby increasing the prospect of collective attribution and response when these norms are violated.

Role of Information in Deterrence. Deterrence depends in part on competitors' understanding of U.S. intent and capabilities. The Department must seek to avoid unknowingly driving competition to aggression. To strengthen deterrence while managing escalation risks, the Department will enhance its ability to operate in the information domain – for example, by working to ensure that messages are conveyed effectively. We will work in collaboration with other U.S. Federal departments and agencies along with Allies and partners.

Tailored Deterrence Approaches. Coordinating and applying deterrence logics to maximum effect requires tailoring for specific problems, competitors, and settings.

Deterring Attacks against the Homeland. The Department will take steps to raise potential attackers' direct and indirect costs while reducing their expected benefits for aggressive action against the homeland, particularly by increasing resilience. We will ensure that hostile operations – including those conducted early in a crisis or conflict – will not advance adversary objectives or severely limit U.S. response options. Our work will prioritize closer coordination with U.S. interagency, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as with the private sector, starting with the defense industrial base.

Deterring Strategic Attacks. Any adversary use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, create the potential for uncontrolled escalation, and have strategic effects. To maintain credible and effective deterrence of both large-scale and limited nuclear attacks from a range of adversaries, the Department will modernize nuclear forces, nuclear command, control, and communications, and the nuclear weapon production enterprise, and strengthen extended deterrence. We will bolster regional nuclear deterrence by enhanced consultations with Allies and partners and by better synchronizing conventional and nuclear

aspects of planning – including by improving conventional forces’ ability to operate in the face of limited nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks so as to deny adversaries benefit from possessing and employing such weapons. The Department will employ an integrated deterrence approach that draws on tailored combinations of conventional, cyber, space, and information capabilities, together with the unique deterrent effects of nuclear weapons.

Deterring PRC Attacks. The Department will bolster deterrence by leveraging existing and emergent force capabilities, posture, and activities to enhance denial, and by enhancing the resilience of U.S. systems the PRC may seek to target. We will develop new operational concepts and enhanced future warfighting capabilities against potential PRC aggression. Collaboration with Allies and partners will cement joint capability with the aid of multilateral exercises, co-development of technologies, greater intelligence and information sharing, and combined planning for shared deterrence challenges. We will also build enduring advantages, undertaking foundational improvements and enhancements to ensure our technological edge and Joint Force combat credibility.

Deterring Russian Attacks. The Department will focus on deterring Russian attacks on the United States, NATO members, and other Allies, reinforcing our iron-clad treaty commitments, to include conventional aggression that has the potential to escalate to nuclear employment of any scale. We will work together with our Allies and partners to modernize denial capabilities, increase interoperability, improve resilience against attack and coercion, share intelligence, and strengthen extended nuclear deterrence. Over time, the Department will focus on enhancing denial capabilities and key enablers in NATO’s force planning, while NATO Allies seek to bolster their conventional warfighting capabilities. For Ally and partner countries that border Russia, the Department will support efforts to build out response options that enable cost imposition.

Deterring North Korean Attacks. The Department will continue to deter attacks through forward posture; integrated air and missile defense; close coordination and interoperability with our ROK Ally; nuclear deterrence; resilience initiatives; and the potential for direct cost imposition approaches that come from globally deployable Joint Forces.

Deterring Iranian Attacks. To deter large-scale Iranian attacks on vital national security interests and partners in the region, the Department will work to increase partner capability and resilience, particularly in air and missile defense, while collaborating with partners to expose Iranian gray zone operations. The Department will continue to support U.S. interagency and international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Escalation Management. Changes in the security environment – particularly in the space and cyber domains – are likely to increase opacity during a crisis or conflict, threatening strategic stability. The Department will develop tailored approaches to assess and manage escalation risk in both crises and conflicts, including conducting analysis of escalation pathways and thresholds, and planning for situations with decreased domain awareness and impaired communications. We will strengthen strategic stability through dialogue with competitors, unilateral measures that make command, control, and communications more robust, and by developing defenses and architectural

resilience to maintain operational capabilities in cyberspace and space during conflict. Establishing and practicing crisis communications with Allies and partners, as well as with competitors, is an essential tool to reduce mutual misperceptions and to help manage escalation.

V. CAMPAIGNING

The Department strengthens deterrence and gains military advantages not only by building Joint Force capabilities, but also by campaigning – the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military activities to achieve strategy-aligned objectives over time. Campaigning initiatives change the environment to the benefit of the United States and our Allies and partners, while limiting, frustrating, and disrupting competitor activities that seriously impinge on our interests, especially those carried out in the gray zone.

Campaigning requires discipline. It targets the most consequential competitor activities – those that, if left unaddressed, would endanger our military advantages and vital national interests now and in the future. Successful campaigning begins with focused planning that specifies how an initiative supports our defense priorities, establishes clear connections with the Department’s ways and means, and incorporates feedback loops. In service of strategic prioritization, we will focus day-to-day force employment on a more narrow set of tasks than we do currently.

Campaigning to Gain Military Advantage, Enhance Deterrence, and Address Gray Zone Challenges. The Department will actively campaign across domains and the spectrum of conflict. Campaigning initiatives will improve our baseline understanding of the operating environment and seek to shape perceptions, including by sowing doubt in our competitors that they can achieve their objectives or conduct unattributed coercive actions. They will disrupt competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own, and enhance interoperability and access. Working with Allies and partners, we will build and exercise force elements needed in crisis or conflict, such as infrastructure, logistics, command and control, dispersal and relocation, and mobilization.

Competitors increasingly engage in gray zone operations at odds with international norms and below the threshold of a credible military response. Emerging technologies and applications are making these activities more effective at building competitors’ military and non-military advantages which, if left unaddressed, could endanger U.S. military effectiveness now and in the future.

The Department will be judicious in its use of defense resources and efforts to counter competitors’ coercive behaviors in gray zone operations, as traditional military tools may not always be the most appropriate response. In many cases, intelligence sharing, economic measures, diplomatic actions, and activities in the information domain conducted by other U.S. departments and agencies may prove more effective. Nevertheless, there can be an important role for campaigning to disrupt competitors’ attempts to advance their objectives through gray zone tactics, especially when integrated for maximum impact with the actions of Allies, partners, and other U.S. departments and agencies. Campaigning initiatives will provide a range of options to oppose select, acute forms of coercion carried out by competitors. We will conduct cyberspace operations to degrade competitors’ malicious cyber activity and to prepare cyber capabilities to be used in crisis

or conflict. Tailored information operations can be used to support and in some instances lead the Department's response. In campaigning, the Department will carefully evaluate and manage escalation risks.

Campaigning and Our Global Posture. Our force posture will focus on the access and warfighting requirements that enable our efforts to deter potential PRC and Russian aggression against vital U.S. national interests, and to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails. The Department will conduct campaigning activities from this posture against a clear set of objectives, to include deterring adversary attacks, supporting rapid crisis response with survivable forces, and conducting operations to reinforce internationally-agreed-upon norms. In the Indo-Pacific, we will continue key infrastructure investments and coordinate with the Department of State to expand access in the region. In Europe, our posture will focus on command and control, fires, and key enablers that complement our NATO Allies' capabilities and strengthen deterrence by increasing combat credibility. For other major threats, we will leverage security cooperation and capacity building with partners, backed by a monitor-and-respond approach that takes advantage of the deterrent value of the Department's ability to deploy forces globally at the time and place of our choosing. Robust intelligence collection, in concert with the work of other departments and agencies, will seek to provide early indication and warning to help manage risk.

VI. ANCHORING OUR STRATEGY IN ALLIES AND PARTNERS AND ADVANCING REGIONAL GOALS

Countries around the world have a vital interest in a free and open international system. Close collaboration with Allies and partners is foundational for U.S. national security interests and for our collective ability to address the challenges that the PRC and Russia present, while responsibly managing the array of other threats we face.

We strive to be a trusted defense partner. We respect the sovereignty of all states, and we know that the decisions that our Allies and partners face are rarely binary. We recognize that when it comes to our security relationships, the Department cannot rely on rhetoric. Early and continuous consideration, engagement, and, where possible, collaboration with Allies and partners in planning is essential for advancing our shared interests. The 2022 National Defense Strategy is a call to action for the defense enterprise to incorporate Allies and partners at every stage of defense planning.

To strengthen and sustain deterrence, the Department will prioritize interoperability and enable coalitions with enhanced capabilities, new operating concepts, and combined, collaborative force planning. We will consult and coordinate with Allies and partners as we modernize our nuclear forces, reinforcing our extended deterrence commitments. The Department will seek to improve denial capability, including resilience, particularly for those most exposed to military coercion. And we will support regional partners' ability to respond to regional contingencies, provide strategic indicators and warning, and reduce competitors' ability to hold key geographic and logistical chokepoints at risk. By joining with Allies and partners in efforts to enhance resilience to climate change, we will both strengthen defense relationships and reduce the need for the force to respond to instability and humanitarian emergencies. Overall, the Department will work across the interagency system and in concert with Allies and partners to advance regional security goals that implement the higher-level aims of integrated deterrence, while accounting for the cross-regional and global dimensions of potential conflict.

To succeed in these objectives, the Department will reduce institutional barriers, including those that inhibit collective research and development, planning, interoperability, intelligence and information sharing, and export of key capabilities. We will work across the U.S. Government to upgrade technology and information release processes, expand release authorizations, and redefine dissemination controls to facilitate information exchange for mutual benefit.

The Indo-Pacific Region. The Department will reinforce and build out a resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region in order to sustain a free and open regional order, and deter attempts to resolve disputes by force. We will modernize our Alliance with Japan and strengthen combined capabilities by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a more integrated manner; deepen our Alliance with Australia through investments in posture, interoperability, and expansion of multilateral cooperation; and foster advantage through advanced technology cooperation with

partnerships like AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific Quad. The Department will advance our Major Defense Partnership with India to enhance its ability to deter PRC aggression and ensure free and open access to the Indian Ocean region. The Department will support Taiwan's asymmetric self-defense commensurate with the evolving PRC threat and consistent with our one China policy. We will work with the ROK to continue to improve its defense capability to lead the Alliance combined defense, with U.S. forces augmenting those of the ROK. We will invigorate multilateral approaches to security challenges in the region, to include by promoting the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in addressing regional security issues. The Department will work with Allies and partners to ensure power projection in a contested environment. The Department will also support Ally and partner efforts, in accordance with U.S. policy and international law, to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRC's campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders such as with India. At the same time, the Department will continue to prioritize maintaining open lines of communication with the PLA and managing competition responsibly.

Europe. The Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion. As we continue contributing to NATO capabilities and readiness – including through improvements to our posture in Europe and our extended nuclear deterrence commitments – the Department will work with Allies bilaterally and through NATO's established processes to better focus NATO capability development and military modernization to address Russia's military threat. The approach will emphasize ready, interoperable combat power in contested environments across NATO forces, particularly air forces and other joint precision strike capabilities, and critical enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare platforms. The Department will collaborate with Allies and partners to build capacity along Europe's eastern flank, strengthening defensive anti-area/access-denial capabilities and indications and warning; expanding readiness, training, and exercises; and promoting resilience, including against hybrid and cyber actions.

The Middle East. As the Department continues to right-size its forward military presence in the Middle East following the mission transition in Afghanistan and continuing our “by, with, and through” approach in Iraq and Syria, we will address major security challenges in the region in effective and sustainable ways. The Joint Force will retain the ability to deny Iran a nuclear weapon; to identify and support action against Iranian and Iranian-backed threats; and to disrupt top-tier VEO threats that endanger the homeland and vital U.S. national interests. The Department will prioritize cooperation with our regional and global partners that results in their increased ability to deter and defend against potential aggression from Iran, for example by working to advance integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, and irregular warfare capabilities. Working in concert with global and interagency partners, the Department will redouble efforts to support regional security coalitions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and among states in the region to ensure maritime security and improve collective intelligence and warning.

Western Hemisphere. The United States derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful, and democratic Western Hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland. To prevent distant threats from becoming a challenge at home, the Department will continue to partner with countries in the region to build capability and promote security and stability. We will maintain the ability to respond to crises and seek to strengthen regional roles and capabilities for humanitarian assistance, climate resilience, and disaster response efforts. As in all regions, the Department will work collaboratively, seeking to understand our partners' security needs and areas of mutual concern.

Africa. In Africa, the Department will prioritize disrupting VEO threats against the U.S. homeland and vital U.S. national interests, working "by, with, and through" our African partners to build states' capability to degrade terrorist organizations and contribute broadly to regional security and stability. We will orient our approach on the continent towards security cooperation; increase coordination with Allies, multilateral organizations, and regional bodies that share these objectives; and support U.S. interagency initiatives in the region, including efforts to disrupt malign PRC and Russian activities on the continent.

The Arctic. The United States seeks a stable Arctic region characterized by adherence to internationally-agreed upon rules and norms. The Department will deter threats to the U.S. homeland from and through the Arctic region by improving early warning and ISR capabilities, partnering with Canada to enhance North American Aerospace Defense Command capabilities, and working with Allies and partners to increase shared maritime domain awareness. U.S. activities and posture in the Arctic should be calibrated, as the Department preserves its focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

VII. FORCE PLANNING

Sustaining and strengthening deterrence requires that the Department design, develop, and manage a combat-credible U.S. military fit for advancing our highest defense priorities.

Building on the 2018 NDS, the *2022 NDS Force Planning Construct* sizes and shapes the Joint Force to simultaneously defend the homeland; maintain strategic deterrence; and deter and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. To deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, while the United States is involved in an all-domain conflict, the Department will employ a range of risk mitigation efforts rooted in integrated deterrence. These include coordination with and contributions of Allies and partners, deterrent effects of U.S. nuclear posture, and leveraging posture and capabilities not solely engaged in the primary warfight – for example, cyber and space. Additionally, the Joint Force will be shaped to ensure the ability to respond to small-scale, short-duration crises without substantially impairing high-end warfighting readiness, and to conduct campaigning activities that improve our position and reinforce deterrence while limiting or disrupting competitor activities that seriously affect U.S. interests.

Our approach to force planning aims to build strength and capability in key operational areas. To maintain information advantage, the Department will improve our ability to integrate, defend, and reconstitute our surveillance and decision systems to achieve warfighting objectives, particularly in the space domain, and despite adversaries' means of interference or deception. To preserve command, control, and communications in a fast-paced battlefield, we will make our network architectures more resilient against system-level exploitation and disruption so as to ensure effective coordination of distributed forces. To enhance our ability to deny aggression, we will improve the speed and accuracy of detection and targeting. To mitigate adversary anti-access/area-denial capability, the Department will develop concepts and capabilities that improve our ability to reliably hold at risk those military forces and assets that are essential to adversary operational success, while managing escalation. For logistics and sustainment, we will reinforce our capability to quickly mobilize and deploy forces and to sustain high-intensity joint denial operations despite kinetic and non-kinetic attack and disruption.

Achieving success in these operational areas requires tightly linking our concepts and capabilities for operating forces. The Department will continue to develop operational concepts that realistically expand U.S. options and constrain those of potential adversaries. The Department will explore force employment concepts and capabilities that degrade adversary power projection while weighing crisis stability and escalation risk; integrate new technologies; experiment with creative applications of existing capabilities; and selectively share the most effective asymmetric capabilities with threatened Allies and partners.

The Department's force development and design program will integrate new operational concepts with the force attributes required to strengthen and sustain deterrence, and to prevail in conflict if necessary. The Department will prioritize a future force that is:

- ▶ *Lethal*: Possesses anti-access/area-denial-insensitive strike capabilities that can penetrate adversary defenses at range.
- ▶ *Sustainable*: Securely and effectively provides logistics and sustainment to continue operations in a contested and degraded environment, despite adversary disruption.
- ▶ *Resilient*: Maintains information and decision advantage, preserves command, control, and communications systems, and ensures critical detection and targeting operations.
- ▶ *Survivable*: Continues generating combat power to support strike capabilities and enablers for logistics and sustainment, despite adversary attacks.
- ▶ *Agile and Responsive*: Rapidly mobilizes forces, generates combat power, and provides logistics and sustainment, even given adversary regional advantages and climate change impacts.

The Joint Force will remain prepared to employ combat-ready forces on short notice to address aggression or crisis, an ability critical to strengthening deterrence. At the same time, the Department will make sure that day-to-day requirements to deploy and operate forces do not erode readiness for future missions, or bias investments towards extant but increasingly less effective capabilities at the expense of building capability and proficiency for advanced threats.

The Department is establishing a new framework for strategic readiness, enabling a more comprehensive, data-driven assessment and reporting of readiness to ensure greater alignment with NDS priorities. To give the future Joint Force effective advocates today, current availability benchmarks and demands will be assessed against long-term force readiness, sustainability, recapitalization, and modernization objectives, in addition to priority threats and missions. Strategic readiness planning will take climate change impacts into account.

VIII. BUILDING ENDURING ADVANTAGES

Building the future Joint Force that we need to advance the goals of this strategy requires broad and deep change in how we produce and manage military capability. U.S. competitors increasingly hold at risk our defense ecosystem – the Department, the defense industrial base, and the landscape of private sector and academic enterprises that innovate and support the systems on which the Joint Force depends. To construct an enduring foundation for our future military advantage, the Department – working in concert with other U.S. Federal departments and agencies, Congress, the private sector, and Allies and partners – will take swift action to affect change in five ways.

On each dimension, the Department can and will leverage asymmetric American advantages: our entrepreneurial spirit; our diversity and pluralistic system of ideas and technology generation that drive unparalleled creativity, innovation, and adaptation; and our military's combined-arms ethos and years of combat-tested operational and coalition experience.

Transform the Foundation of the Future Force. Building the Joint Force called for by this strategy requires overhauling the Department's force development, design, and business management practices. Our current system is too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not designed to address the most critical challenges we now face. This orientation leaves little incentive to design open systems that can rapidly incorporate cutting-edge technologies, creating longer-term challenges with obsolescence, interoperability, and cost effectiveness. The Department will instead reward rapid experimentation, acquisition, and fielding. We will better align requirements, resourcing, and acquisition, and undertake a campaign of learning to identify the most promising concepts, incorporating emerging technologies in the commercial and military sectors for solving our key operational challenges. We will design transition pathways to divest from systems that are less relevant to advancing the force planning guidance, and partner to equip the defense industrial base to support more relevant modernization efforts.

Make the Right Technology Investments. The United States' technological edge has long been a foundation of our military advantage. The Department will support the innovation ecosystem, both at home and in expanded partnerships with our Allies and partners. We will fuel research and development for advanced capabilities, including in directed energy, hypersonics, integrated sensing, and cyber. We will seed opportunities in biotechnology, quantum science, advanced materials, and clean-energy technology. We will be a fast-follower where market forces are driving commercialization of militarily-relevant capabilities in trusted artificial intelligence and autonomy, integrated network system-of-systems, microelectronics, space, renewable energy generation and storage, and human-machine interfaces. Because Joint Force operations increasingly rely on data-driven technologies and integration of diverse data sources, the Department will implement institutional reforms that integrate our data, software, and artificial intelligence efforts and speed their delivery to the warfighter.

Adapt and Fortify Our Defense Ecosystem. The Department will strengthen our defense industrial base to ensure that we produce and sustain the full range of capabilities needed to give U.S., allied, and partners forces a competitive advantage. We will bolster support for our unparalleled network of research institutions, both university-affiliated and federally-funded research and development centers, as well as small businesses and innovative technology firms. The Department will act urgently to better support advanced manufacturing processes (e.g., aircraft and ship building, preferred munition production) to increase our ability to reconstitute the Joint Force in a major conflict. We will work closely with Congress on reforms needed to accelerate these transitions. We will increase collaboration with the private sector in priority areas, especially with the commercial space industry, leveraging its technological advancements and entrepreneurial spirit to enable new capabilities. We will prioritize joint efforts with the full range of domestic and international partners in the defense ecosystem to fortify the defense industrial base, our logistical systems, and relevant global supply chains against subversion, compromise, and theft.

Strengthen Resilience and Adaptability. Building enduring advantages also means having the elasticity and readiness in the defense ecosystem to adapt to emerging threats such as climate change. We will strengthen the Department's ability to withstand and recover quickly from climate events. We will continue to analyze climate change impacts on the Joint Force, and will integrate climate change into threat assessments. We will increase resilience of military installations and at affected access and basing locations vital for deterrence and warfighting objectives. We will take climate extremes into account in decisions related to training and equipping the force. We will make reducing energy demand a priority, and seek to adopt more efficient and clean-energy technologies that reduce logistics requirements in contested or austere environments.

Cultivate the Workforce We Need. People execute the strategy. To recruit and retain the most talented Americans, we must change our institutional culture and reform how we do business. The Department will attract, train, and promote a workforce with the skills and abilities we need to creatively solve national security challenges in a complex global environment.

We will streamline and simplify hiring practices for both applicants and managers. We will offer competitive incentives, flexible work environments, and rotational assignments to better compete with the private sector. We will aggressively seek to fill specific technology gaps, including in cyber, data, and artificial intelligence specializations, and work with colleges and universities to help build our future workforce. The Department will encourage personnel to gain deep expertise not only about key technologies but also about our competitors and the future of warfare. In part by refocusing the curricula of Professional Military Education institutions, we will foster critical thinking and analytical skills, fluency in critical languages, and integration of insights from the social and behavioral sciences. We will increase the availability of fellowships, internships, and rotational assignments – including in the private sector – to grow the skills of our workforce, provide a broad range of experiences, create collaboration opportunities, and carry best practices back to the Department.

We will lead with our values. We will broaden our recruitment pool to reflect all of the United States, including traditionally marginalized communities and promoting a diversity of backgrounds and experiences to drive innovative solutions across the enterprise. And we will take care of our people, never sparing support for the health, safety, and welfare of service members and their families, as well as our civilian employees.

Our efforts will ultimately fail if we allow problems in our own ranks to undermine our cohesion, performance, and ability to advance our mission. The Department will continue to take tangible steps to counter sexual assault and harassment across our Armed Forces. We will continue to work with Congress as critical changes are made, informed by the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, to increase accountability; ensure we have a culture of zero tolerance for harassment and assault; enable active prevention, and support those who come forward. Finally, the Department will seek to eradicate all forms of extremism in our ranks.

IX. RISK MANAGEMENT

No strategy will perfectly anticipate the threats we may face, and we will doubtless confront challenges in execution. This strategy shifts focus and resources toward the Department's highest priorities, which will inevitably affect risk profiles in other areas. An NDS that is clear-eyed about this reality will help ensure that the Department effectively implements the strategy and assesses its impact over time.

Foresight Risks. In developing this strategy, the Department considered the risks stemming from inaccurate predictions, including unforeseen shocks in the security environment. Chief among these: The rate at which a competitor modernizes its military, and the conditions under which competitor aggression manifests, could be different than anticipated. Our threat assessments may prove to be either over- or underestimated. We might fail to anticipate which technologies and capabilities may be employed and change our relative military advantage. A new pandemic or the impacts of climate change could impair operations or readiness.

Foresight risks can be hedged and of course must be managed when they arise. Hedging options include continuing to exercise the Joint Force against multiple contingencies and developing new, more resource-efficient concepts of operation, in light of continuously updated intelligence and security assessments.

Implementation Risks. This strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy's level of ambition; if we do not effectively incorporate new technologies and identify, recruit, and leverage new talent; and if we are unsuccessful in reducing the barriers that limit collaboration with Allies and partners. We aim to mitigate these and other risks through ruthless prioritization. For example, we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to preparedness for our highest strategic priorities. Implementation risks will be forestalled by leadership focus and discipline, as well as consistent attention to monitoring implementation in line with clear metrics to enable assessment and course correction.

X. CONCLUSION

The United States is endowed with remarkable qualities that confer great advantages, including in the realm of national security. We are a free people devoted to democracy and the rule of law. Our combination of diversity, free minds, and free enterprise drives extraordinary innovation and adaptability. We are a member of an unparalleled and unprecedented network of alliances and partnerships. Together, we share many common values and a common interest in defending the stable and open international system, the basis for the most peaceful and prosperous epoch in modern history.

We must not lose sight of these qualities and advantages. Our generational challenge is to combine and integrate them, developing our capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners to sustain and strengthen an international system under threat.

This NDS has outlined the courses of action the Department of Defense will take to help meet this challenge. We are confident in success. Our country has faced and prevailed in multi-year competitions with major powers threatening or using force to subjugate others on more than one occasion in the past. Working in service of the American people, and in collaboration with our partners around the world, the men and women of our superbly capable Joint Force stand ready to do so again.



ANNEX H – DoDD 2000.13 W/C1 Civil Affairs

This directive reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.13 (Reference (a)) to update established policy and assigned responsibilities for conducting DoD-wide civil affairs operations in accordance with sections 167, 401, 404, and 2011 of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (b)), DoDD 5111.10 (Reference (c)), and DoDD 5100.01 (Reference (d)).



Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 2000.13

March 11, 2014

Incorporating Change 1, May 15, 2017

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This directive reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.13 (Reference (a)) to update established policy and assigned responsibilities for conducting DoD-wide civil affairs operations in accordance with sections 167, 401, 404, and 2011 of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (b)), DoDD 5111.10 (Reference (c)), and DoDD 5100.01 (Reference (d)).

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components").

3. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. The DoD must maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs operations necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in the operational environment across the range of military operations. Civil affairs operations include, but are not limited to, DoD actions that:

(1) Coordinate military activities with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other governments, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, and non-governmental organizations.

(2) Support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.

(3) Provide assistance outside the range of military operations, when directed, to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.

(4) Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DoD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.

(5) Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.

b. Civil affairs operations are used to help fulfill DoD responsibilities to civilian populations under applicable U.S. and international law by minimizing, to the extent feasible, civilian interference with military operations and the unintended harmful effects of military operations on the civilian population.

c. Civil affairs operations enable an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DoD Components to non-DoD authorities.

d. Civil affairs operations may be conducted to support national policies and interests as part of an interagency, bilateral, or multinational military or political-military operation, in accordance with law and consistent with applicable DoD policy and issuances.

(1) DoD Components may make DoD civil affairs capabilities available to other U.S. Government agencies for such operations in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1000.17 (Reference (e)), DoDI 4000.19 (Reference (f)), DoDD S-5210.36 (Reference (g)), and Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Reference (h)).

(2) By mutual agreement, resources from non-DoD departments and agencies may be used to augment DoD civil affairs capabilities in accordance with Reference (f).

e. Before civil affairs operations are conducted, decision makers consider the long-term effect on current U.S. security policy goals and objectives in general, and on the host country in particular.

f. Military commanders are responsible for integrating civil affairs into military operations, programs, and activities.

g. Military forces must not undertake civilian sector rehabilitation activities, in accordance with paragraph 3a(4) of this section, and military government activities, in accordance with paragraph 3a(5) of this section, unless directed by the Secretary of Defense. However, this prohibition does not prevent the DoD Component heads from planning for such missions. Nor does it prohibit the use of military forces to support approved:

(1) Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations.

(2) Exercises in accordance with DoDI 2205.02 (Reference (i)).

(3) Disaster relief operations conducted in accordance with DoDD 5100.46 (Reference (j)).

(4) Humanitarian actions that provide for the immediate response to prevent the loss of life, property, and needless suffering.

(5) Stability operations in accordance with DoDI 3000.05 (Reference (k)).

h. DoD civil affairs capabilities may be used to assist in domestic emergencies and to provide other support to domestic civil authorities consistent with law and in accordance with DoDD 3025.18 (Reference (l)), DoDI 3025.21 (Reference (m)), other DoD issuances, and supporting plans.


i. Joint force commanders integrate civil affairs forces with other military forces (e.g., maneuver, health service, military police or security, engineering, transportation, and special operations forces) to work alongside host-nation agencies, military, and security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police) and to support unified action by interacting and consulting with other government agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, host nations, foreign nations, and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful civil military operations.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

5. RELEASABILITY. **Cleared for public release**. This directive is available on the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

6. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 1. The changes to this issuance are administrative and update organizational titles and references for accuracy.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. This directive is effective March 11, 2014.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Christine H. Fox', is positioned above the printed name and title.

Christine H. Fox
Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures

1. References

2. Responsibilities

Glossary

ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

- (a) DoD Directive 2000.13, "Civil Affairs," June 27, 1994 (hereby cancelled)
- (b) Title 10, United States Code
- (c) DoD Directive 5111.10, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))," March 22, 1995, as amended
- (d) DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," December 21, 2010
- (e) DoD Instruction 1000.17, "Detail of DoD Personnel to Duty Outside the Department of Defense," October 30, 2013
- (f) DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013
- (g) DoD Directive S-5210.36, "Provision of DoD Sensitive Support to DoD Components and Other Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government (U)," November 6, 2008
- (h) Presidential Policy Directive 23, "Security Sector Assistance," April 5, 2013
- (i) DoD Instruction 2205.02, "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities," June 23, 2014
- (j) DoD Directive 5100.46, "Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)," July 6, 2012
- (k) DoD Instruction 3000.05, "Stability Operations," September 16, 2009
- (l) DoD Directive 3025.18, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)," December 29, 2010, as amended
- (m) DoD Instruction 3025.21, "Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," February 27, 2013
- (n) DoD Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force," October 29, 2008
- (o) DoD Instruction 1235.12, "Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)," June 7, 2016, as amended
- (p) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as Joint Proponent for Civil Affairs (CA)," April 27, 2009

ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD(SO/LIC)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the ASD(SO/LIC):

- a. Acts as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on the policy and planning for DoD civil affairs operations.
- b. Translates national security policy objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable through civil affairs operations.
- c. Formulates DoD civil affairs policies and programs for plans, resources, and implementation of civil affairs operations.
- d. Oversees the implementation of DoD civil affairs policies and programs.
- e. Provides policy advice and assistance to and coordinates with other Principal Staff Assistants about civil affairs operations and the use of civil affairs capabilities for their assigned regional or functional responsibilities and in support of stability operations activities, in accordance with Reference (k) and DoDD 1200.17 (Reference (n)).
- f. Acts as the OSD point of contact for DoD civil affairs operations that relate to the activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Monitors interagency use of DoD forces for civil affairs operations, and reports to the Secretary of Defense whenever it appears that questions may arise with respect to the legality or propriety of such use.
- g. Reviews program recommendations and budget proposals from the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and provides recommendations on them to the Secretary of Defense.
- h. In coordination with the DoD Executive Secretary, coordinates the detail of civil affairs personnel to duty with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and other non-DoD organizations, in accordance with Reference (e).

2. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments:

- a. Develop and maintain programs necessary to plan, conduct, and support civil affairs operations to meet their Military Service and Combatant Command requirements.

b. Provide for civil affairs personnel in their force structures. The Secretaries of the Military Departments with civil affairs units and personnel in their Reserve Components must provide for the timely mobilization and activation of such units and personnel as required to perform civil affairs operations in accordance with DoD Instruction 1235.12 (Reference (o)).

c. Assume DoD-wide responsibilities for specific civil affairs missions when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

d. In coordination with the Commander, USSOCOM, conduct specialized civil affairs education and individual training for assigned officers and noncommissioned officers and non-assigned DoD and non-DoD personnel.

3. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. In addition to the responsibilities in section 3 of this enclosure, the Secretary of the Army:

a. In coordination with the Commander, USSOCOM, recruits, organizes, trains, equips, mobilizes, and sustains Army civil affairs forces.

b. In coordination with the CJCS and the Commander, USSOCOM, provides for civil affairs personnel and units in the Army military force structure that are capable of providing functional expertise in civilian sector disciplines necessary for civil assistance and military government missions.

c. In accordance with the CJCS-validated requirements and Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (p)), provides for the timely activation and mobilization of Army Reserve civil affairs units or personnel required to perform civil affairs operations in the accomplishment of Combatant Command missions.

d. Provides U.S. Army personnel qualified in civil affairs to the other Military Departments, at their request and under a mutually approved and signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), in coordination with the CJCS.

4. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. In addition to the responsibilities in section 3 of this enclosure, the Secretary of the Navy:

a. In coordination with the Commander, USSOCOM, recruits, organizes, trains, equips, mobilizes, and sustains Navy and Marine Corps civil affairs forces.

b. In coordination with the CJCS and the Commander, USSOCOM, provides for civil affairs personnel and units in the Navy and Marine Corps military force structure.

c. In accordance with the CJCS-validated requirements and Reference (n), provides for the timely activation and mobilization of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve civil affairs units or

personnel required to perform civil affairs operations in the accomplishment of Combatant Command missions.

d. Provides Navy and Marine Corps personnel qualified in civil affairs to the other Military Departments, at their request and under a mutually approved and signed MOU or MOA, in coordination with the CJCS.

5. CJCS. The CJCS:

a. As the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, provides advice on civil affairs operations.

b. Provides guidance to the Combatant Commanders for the preparation and review of civil affairs plans.

c. Develops, establishes, and distributes joint civil affairs strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

d. Formulates policies for coordinating joint training in civil affairs operations.

6. COMBATANT COMMANDERS. The Combatant Commanders:

a. Plan, support, and conduct civil affairs operations in their areas of responsibility. These operations must:

(1) Support the missions and objectives of the supported Combatant Commanders.

(2) Support the goals and programs of other U.S. Government departments and agencies related to civil affairs consistent with those authorities governing DoD involvement.

(3) Provide for training of U.S. civil affairs forces within their areas of responsibility. Coordinate the training with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Commander, USSOCOM, for assigned civil affairs units and personnel.

(4) Coordinate and liaise with other U.S. Government departments and agencies operating in their areas of responsibility.

b. Ensure the integration of civil affairs operations into military plans.

c. Designate a staff element with responsibility for coordinating civil affairs operations.

7. COMMANDER, USSOCOM. In addition to the responsibilities in section 6 of this enclosure, the Commander, USSOCOM:

a. Acts as the joint proponent for civil affairs with coordinating authority in accordance with Reference (p). These responsibilities include:

- (1) Assisting the CJCS by leading the development of joint civil affairs doctrine.
- (2) Leading the development of joint civil affairs training and education for individuals and units.
- (3) Leading the identification of required joint civil affairs capabilities across all warfighting domains.
- (4) Leading the development of joint civil affairs mission essential task lists.
- (5) Leading the development of joint civil affairs strategy.
- (6) Coordinating with the Military Services and Combatant Commands to develop standards ensuring interoperability of joint civil affairs forces and equipment.
- (7) Coordinating with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Joint Staff to consult with other U.S. Government departments and agencies on civil affairs-related initiatives, strategies, concepts, plans, and policies.
- (8) Assisting the USD(P&R) in identifying critical civil affairs skills, training, and experience.

b. Provides, from USSOCOM-assigned forces, other Combatant Commanders with civil affairs forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to plan and conduct civil affairs operations in support of their missions.

c. Trains and organizes assigned civil affairs forces, and monitors their preparedness to carry out assigned missions of special operation forces.

d. Prepares and submits to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces' unique activities and equipment for assigned forces.

e. Exercises authority, direction, and control over spending funds for special operations forces' unique activities and equipment for assigned civil affairs forces.

f. Under the direction of the CJCS, assists in developing joint civil affairs strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

g. Conducts specialized joint civil affairs professional education and individual training for assigned officer and noncommissioned officers and non-assigned DoD and non-DoD personnel.

h. Establishes standards to ensure interoperability of civil affairs equipment and forces.

GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DoDI	Department of Defense instruction
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command

PART II. DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this directive.

civil affairs forces. Designated active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.

civil affairs capabilities. Civil affairs forces and other DoD units and organizations that are capable of planning, conducting, or otherwise assisting in civil affairs operations.

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; require interaction and consultation with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They

may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.

defense support of civil authorities. Defined in Reference (1).

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by section 401 of Reference (b) and funded under separate authorities.

military government. The form of administration by which a military commander exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over foreign territory, such as occupied territory of the enemy or allied territory recovered from enemy occupation.

ANNEX I – DoDD 3000.5 Stabilization

This issuance:

- Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts.
- Provides guidance for the planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization.



DoD DIRECTIVE 3000.05

STABILIZATION

Originating Component:	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Effective:	December 13, 2018
Releasability:	Cleared for public release. Available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/ .
Reissues and Cancels:	DoD Instruction 3000.05, "Stability Operations," September 12, 2009
Approved by:	Patrick M. Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Purpose: This issuance:

- İ Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts.
- İ Provides guidance for the planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization.

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SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION

1.1. APPLICABILITY. This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”).

1.2. CONTEXT.

a. Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government (USG) efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.

b. The Department of State is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; the U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance; and DoD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities.

c. Fragile and conflict-affected states often serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism; transnational terrorism and organized crime; refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian emergencies; the spread of pandemic disease; and mass atrocities. Stabilization can prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners.

d. Stabilization must be incorporated into planning across all lines of effort for military operations as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions.

(1) Stabilization is required to translate combat success into lasting strategic gains and achieve the ends for which the military operation was waged.

(2) Stabilization is a necessary complement to joint combat power at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

e. Because drivers of instability vary widely and are based on the unique political landscape of the host nation, stabilization requires:

(1) Thorough cultural understanding and conflict assessment, including intelligence collection and related activities to improve understanding of and ability to influence stability.

(2) A strategy to coopt, coerce, or defeat determined destabilizing actors, and a strategy to support key actors that enable stabilization.

(3) An integrated interagency and international unity of purpose with common objectives.

(4) Sustained commitment and sufficient support to mitigate destabilizing elements while reinforcing stabilizing elements.

1.3. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. To the extent authorized by law, DoD will plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the range of military operations in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success.

b. DoD will emphasize small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization that works by, with, and through indigenous and other external partners to achieve strategic objectives.

c. DoD's core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population.

d. DoD will establish a defense support to stabilization (DSS) process to identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies; convey them through strategic documents; organize to achieve them; and prioritize requisite defense resources.

(1) DoD will design, implement, monitor, and evaluate stabilization actions based on conflict assessments, operational requirements, and complementary foreign assistance.

(2) Consistent with available authorities, DoD will prioritize efforts to identify, train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany foreign security forces conducting stabilization actions independently or in conjunction with other USG efforts.

(3) When authorized and directed, DoD will establish secure operating conditions for civilian-led stabilization efforts.

(4) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and consistent with available authorities, DoD will support other USG departments and agencies with logistic support, supplies, and services and other enabling capabilities.

(5) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD will reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts. Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

e. If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DoD will lead USG stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.

f. Although stabilization is distinct from humanitarian assistance, DoD humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief activities may complement USG stabilization efforts.

g. Stabilization requires sustained civilian and military integration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve unity of effort.

(1) In the interest of advancing integrated USG stabilization efforts, DoD will actively solicit participation from mission-critical USG departments and agencies to plan, exercise, and utilize war games in the stabilization aspects of military plans.

(2) DoD will optimize civil-military teams that can integrate key instruments of national power in a way that complements indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and private entities to achieve stabilization objectives.

(3) DoD will ensure Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) are fully developed and integrated in Global Campaign Plans, Concept Plans, and Operation Plans, in accordance with Joint Publication 5-0.

h. DoD will consider the following stabilization questions when operating in fragile or conflict-affected areas outside the United States:

(1) How do DoD operations and actions – including combat actions, partner selection, and security cooperation – impact stabilization efforts as well as indigenous political dynamics at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels?

(2) How will U.S. or partner military forces transition from threat-focused combat operations to more population-focused stabilization actions?

(3) How can U.S. military and civilian personnel influence foreign partners to plan and conduct stabilization actions in ways that are acceptable locally and consistent with U.S. policy objectives?

(4) How can U.S. or partner military forces promulgate a coherent narrative consistent with USG objectives that counters adversaries and affirms effective and legitimate local governance?

i. DoD Components will incorporate stabilization into professional military education and unit training as appropriate, to enable military planners and leaders to plan for and operate effectively in complex stabilization environments.

j. DoD Components will prioritize, train, and retain individuals with stabilization skills, including but not limited to:

(1) Interagency experience.

- (2) Foreign language proficiency.
- (3) Advisory expertise.
- (4) Regional area expertise.
- (5) Foreign government engagement.
- (6) International and multinational organizations experience.

k. DoD will, consistent with legal and policy requirements, collaborate with and share essential intelligence and other information related to stabilization efforts with:

- (1) USG departments and agencies.
- (2) States participating in the National Guard State Partnership Program.
- (3) Foreign governments and security forces.
- (4) International and multinational organizations.
- (5) Nongovernmental organizations.
- (6) Academia and members of civil society.
- (7) Members of the private sector.

l. DoD will address and integrate stabilization-related concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, applicable exercises, and strategies and plans.

SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The USD(P):

- a. Serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for stabilization. The USD(P) recommends priorities for stabilization policy, concepts, analysis, capabilities, and investment strategies to the Secretary of Defense.
- b. Represents the DoD in interagency, international, coalition, and partner discussions on stabilization policy development, while establishing guidance that requires and enables DoD stabilization collaboration with other military and non-military stabilization partners.
- c. Integrates DoD guidance on stabilization into strategic documents to disseminate the Secretary of Defense's stabilization goals and priorities to ensure DoD stabilization efforts align with other USG departments' and agencies' stabilization efforts.
- d. Ensures stabilization guidance is integrated into Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) contingency and operation plans; ensures plans are informed by other USG departments and agencies; and ensures senior leaders reinforce stabilization guidance during formal in-progress reviews of directed plans.
- e. Facilitates the development of civilian-military teams to enhance stabilization collaboration across the USG. Provides guidance within strategic documents that enables the collaboration and sharing of planning efforts with mission critical partners. Develops policy that enables responsive and agile DoD support to appropriate stabilization requirements.
- f. Provides guidance to ensure the joint force retains the capability, capacity, and readiness to conduct stabilization efforts, and that those capabilities are compatible with those of other USG departments and agencies.
- g. Conducts biennial assessments of:
 - (1) DoD capability and capacity to conduct stabilization efforts.
 - (2) Interoperability and integration of DoD stabilization capabilities and efforts with other USG departments and agencies.

2.2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD(SO/LIC)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(SO/LIC):

- a. Serves as the principal civilian advisor to the USD(P) for implementing DoD policy for stabilization as described in Paragraph 1.2. and supports the USD(P) in fulfilling those responsibilities identified in Paragraph 2.1.

b. Represents the USD(P) within DoD, the interagency, international bodies, and other organizations for stabilization policy and efforts.

c. Coordinates through the Secretary of the Army to engage the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to establish requirements and priorities relating to the U.S. Army's role as the Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations.

d. Develops a DSS process to establish defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies, conveys them through strategic documents, organizes to achieve them, and prioritizes requisite defense resources.

2.3. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I):

a. Ensures the DoD intelligence community maintains the capabilities to analyze the relevant aspects of the operational environment as they relate to stabilization efforts, in coordination with relevant USG intelligence entities and DoD Components.

b. Provides oversight for DoD intelligence indications and warning related to foreign instability, and reviews recommendations to mitigate associated risks.

c. Formulates policies and procedures to integrate and synchronize national-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities with the DoD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in support of GCC stabilization requirements.

d. Formulates policies and procedures to integrate and synchronize national-level counterintelligence and security (CI&S) efforts with DoD CI&S, to include engagement on such related efforts conducted with foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners.

e. In coordination with the USD(P) and the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and while adequately protecting classified information, controlled unclassified information, and intelligence sources and methods, develops policies and systems for sharing classified and unclassified information, as authorized, with:

- (1) DoD Components.
- (2) Mission-critical USG departments and agencies.
- (3) Foreign governments and security forces.
- (4) International organizations.
- (5) Nongovernmental organizations.
- (6) Members of the private sector.

2.4. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)). The USD(P&R):

a. Establishes policy for, and oversees, joint, combined, interagency, and other training with non-DoD partners to generate and sustain stabilization capabilities required by the Combatant Commands.

b. Develops policies and procedures to ensure DoD civilian requirements for stabilization are included in the Global Force Management allocation process as prescribed by Directive-type Memorandum 17-004. This includes recommending changes to civilian personnel laws, authorities, regulations, and strategic goals as necessary to maximize the effectiveness of DoD civilian support to stabilization.

c. Develops policy and opportunities for personnel from other USG agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to participate, as appropriate and authorized, in DoD stabilization education and training.

d. In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC), the USD(I), and the CJCS, develops policies and programs to maintain the appropriate levels of language proficiency and regional cultural understanding among DoD civilian and military personnel. Oversees integration of foreign language and regional cultural proficiency into joint and combined stabilization training and exercise policy.

e. Establishes and maintains policy and procedures to be used by DoD Components to determine the total force mix (i.e., military, DoD civilian, and contractor support) necessary for conducting or supporting stabilization.

f. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments:

(1) Establishes policy to define skills and experience related to stabilization.

(2) Implements policy that establishes the identification and tracking of personnel with those skills and experience.

2.5. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment:

a. Identifies any unique logistics requirements needed to support stabilization and ensures logistics planning efforts reflect those requirements.

b. In coordination with the CJCS and consistent with available authorities, develops policies that will enable the sharing of logistics capabilities, in order to partner with other USG agencies and foreign government and security forces.

c. Oversees stabilization contracting and rapid contract support for U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries.

2.6. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering:

- a. Coordinates with the USD(P); Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE); and the CJCS to require that DoD analytical tools, including models and simulations, adequately address stabilization efforts and capabilities. This includes developing policies for the research, development, developmental testing activities and programs, and procurement of materiel solutions for stabilization efforts prioritized in strategic guidance.
- b. Ensures stabilization-related capabilities are a key focus of the defense, science, and technology planning, programming, and budgeting process, including the capabilities to identify pre-conflict indicators of instability and collect information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic, and political relationships.
- c. Identifies technologies available through the DoD, the USG, and off-the-shelf private sector programs that could bolster stabilization efforts, and directs them into rapid demonstration, experimentation, and fielding.

2.7. DOD CIO. The DoD CIO:

- a. In coordination with the CJCS and the Combatant Commanders, helps other USG agencies identify and develop strategies for the use of information and communications technology capabilities to enable civil-military interaction during stabilization.
- b. In coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(I), and while adequately protecting classified information and intelligence sources and methods, develops policies and establishes a system for sharing classified, controlled unclassified information, and unclassified information, as authorized, with:
 - (1) DoD Components.
 - (2) Mission critical USG departments and agencies.
 - (3) Foreign governments and security forces.
 - (4) International organizations.
 - (5) Nongovernmental organizations.
 - (6) Members of the private sector.

2.8. ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:

- a. In coordination with the USD(P), develops a strategy to partner public affairs officials with foreign counterparts in order to improve civilian-military messaging in priority stabilization countries and regions.

b. In coordination with the USD(P), CJCS, Combatant Commanders, and interagency partners, advances the development and implementation of public affairs messages that address DoD contributions to stabilization.

c. In coordination with the USD(P) and the Secretary of State, develops regionally tailored and focused strategic messages, and synchronizes them throughout the DoD to support USG stabilization efforts.

2.9. DCAPE. The DCAPE:

a. Coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense and the ASD(SO/LIC) to assess the sufficiency of resources related to stabilization within the Future Years Defense Program.

b. Incorporates stabilization in DoD strategic analysis and war gaming where appropriate.

2.10. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments:

a. Organize, train, and equip forces capable of conducting DoD's core stabilization responsibility described in Paragraphs 1.3.c of this issuance. This may include the establishment of transitional public security to protect civilian populations when respect for and enforcement of the rule of law is degraded.

b. In accordance with the Global Force Management Process, organize, train, and equip forces capable of conducting the DSS responsibilities described in Paragraphs 1.3.d of this issuance. The Military Departments will:

(1) Maintain the capability and scalable capacity to reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts.

(2) Prioritize skills that enable security force assistance and defense institution building. These are essential skills required to leverage the capability and capacity of host nations or other partner forces to achieve stabilization objectives.

(3) Ensure military leaders and planners are able to collaborate with intergovernmental, international, multinational, nongovernmental, and other stabilization stakeholders.

c. Provide input to the biennial stabilization assessment.

d. Prepare to conduct DoD's core stabilization responsibility described in Paragraph 1.3.c. of this issuance.

(1) Maintain doctrine and concepts for stabilization.

(2) Identify mission-essential tasks and capabilities with a focus on transitional public security.

(3) Conduct analyses to determine readiness for stabilization.

(4) Design and maintain curricula to prepare personnel for stabilization actions, in coordination with the USD(P&R) and the CJCS.

2.11. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10, the Secretary of the Army will execute his or her duties as the Joint Proponent for Peace and Stabilization Operations in accordance with the June 11, 2013, Secretary of Defense Memorandum.

2.12. CJCS. The CJCS:

- a. Serves as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for stabilization.
- b. Ensures that DoD joint concept development and experimentation addresses stabilization actions and capabilities, including DSS. In coordination with the Combatant Commanders, establishes priorities for the development of scalable stabilization capabilities for the U.S. military.
- c. Formalizes a civilian-military team within the Joint Staff to enhance collaboration on plans and operations from the tactical to strategic level.
- d. Integrates stabilization requirements into the Chairman's Exercise Program.
- e. Requires deliberate stabilization review of GCC contingency and operation plans, including Annex G and Annex V, to reinforce stabilization planning and civilian-military integration.
- f. Evaluates DoD progress in stabilization training in coordination with the USD(P&R).
- g. Coordinates and prioritizes interagency participation in DoD training and DoD participation in USG training for stabilization efforts.
- h. Assesses Military Department or Military Service capability and capacity to conduct or support stabilization required by Combatant Command plans and strategies in the Chairman's Risk Assessment. Recommends priorities to mitigate moderate and high risk.
- i. Coordinates with the Combatant Commanders and other DoD Component heads to establish capabilities for stabilization and oversees inclusion of validated stabilization requirements in other programs of record and in rapid acquisition efforts.
- j. Maintains joint stabilization doctrine for the Military Services.
- k. Develops annual guidance in coordination with the USD(P&R) to support stabilization training and evaluates DoD progress in that training.

l. In coordination with the USD(P), the USD(P&R), and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, promotes attendance of other USG agencies at DoD training courses or joint professional military education institutions to receive or provide instruction on stabilization, while encouraging the participation of DoD personnel at schools in other USG agencies that provide courses of instruction on stabilization.

m. Provides DoD oversight to stabilization lessons learned in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

2.13. GCC. The GCCs:

a. Designate a civilian-military capability to oversee effective integration of stabilization efforts into operational plans and operations.

b. Identify stabilization requirements.

c. Incorporate stabilization concepts into training, exercises, experimentation, and planning, including intelligence, campaign, and support plans.

d. Identify stabilization capability, capacity, or compatibility shortfalls. Ensure that recommendations to the CJCS for the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment include stabilization shortfalls, as appropriate. Ensure that inputs to the CJCS for the Integrated Priorities List include stabilization priorities, as appropriate.

e. Support efforts of other USG agencies and international partners to develop stabilization plans in coordination with the USD(P).

f. Gather lessons learned from stabilization and disseminate them to the other DoD Components and USG agencies as appropriate.

g. Consistent with available authorities, identify and validate requirements for materiel and equipment that are appropriate for direct transfer to the control of foreign partners at the conclusion of defense support to stabilization and transitional public security.

h. Provide recommendations to the CJCS for incorporating GCC roles and responsibilities into the Unified Command Plan based on stabilization tasks and responsibilities.

i. Ensure the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers provide tailored all-source intelligence products that support planning for and execution of stabilization actions.

(1) These products will incorporate information from traditional intelligence sources as well as information from social science knowledge, including from sociological, anthropological, cultural, economic, political science, and historical sources within the public and private sector.

(2) Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers will conduct joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment in support of stability operations

conducted by the Combatant Commands, Service Component Commands, or other subordinate elements.

2.14. COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND. The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command:

- a. Serves as the joint proponent for military information support operations (MISO) and civil affairs (CA) and represents MISO and CA equities in stabilization policy, concepts, analysis, capabilities, and investment strategies.
- b. Represents the special operations, MISO, and CA communities of interest in interagency, international, coalition, and partner discussions on stabilization policy development.
- c. Integrates DoD guidance into doctrine and training for special operations, MISO, and CA disciplines in order to support the Secretary of Defense's stabilization goals and priorities. This includes advocating for joint special operations, MISO, and CA interests with other USG departments' and agencies' stabilization efforts.
- d. Provides oversight and review of military plans to ensure special operations, MISO, and CA are appropriately integrated into military planning and with other USG departments and agencies.
- e. Supports development of doctrine and training for special operations forces in civilian-military teams to enhance stabilization collaboration across the USG and maintains joint special operations equities in policy for special operations forces in support of appropriate stabilization actions.
- f. Provides guidance and assesses the special operations force to maintain the capability, capacity, and readiness to conduct or support stabilization.
- g. Supports DoD assessments of special operations capability, capacity, and interoperability to conduct or support stabilization with the conventional force.

GLOSSARY

G.1. ACRONYMS.

ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
CA	civil affairs
CI&S	counterintelligence and security
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DCAPE	Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
DoD CIO	DoD Chief Information Officer
DSS	defense support to stabilization
GCC	geographic Combatant Command
MISO	military information support operations
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USG	U.S. Government

G.2. DEFINITIONS.

These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.

DSS. A process to synchronize missions, activities, and tasks that support or reinforce USG stabilization efforts and promote stability in designated fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the United States.

stabilization. A political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.

transitional public security. A joint military effort to promote, restore, and maintain public order in the post-conflict environment, during which public administration and control is transitioned from military authority to legitimate civilian authority.

REFERENCES

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept, “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0,” August 2005
- Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense, “Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas,” March 2018
- Directive-type Memorandum 17-004, “Department of Defense Expeditionary Civilian Workforce,” January 25, 2017
- DoD Directive 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” December 21, 2010
- DoD Directive 5100.46, “Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR),” July 6, 2012, as amended
- Joint Publication 3-07, “Stability,” August 2016
- Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Planning,” June 16, 2017
- Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Designation of the United States Army as Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations,” June 11, 2013
- United States Code, Title 10

ANNEX J – DoDD 3000.7 Irregular Warfare

IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.



Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 3000.07

August 28, 2014

Incorporating Change 1, May 12, 2017

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Irregular Warfare (IW)

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This directive:

a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.07 (Reference (a)) to establish policy and assign responsibilities for DoD conduct of IW and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges or threats to national security in accordance with DoDD 5100.01 (Reference (b)).

b. Requires that any conflicting issuances be identified to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Director of Administration.

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components").

3. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.

b. DoD will be proficient in IW.

c. IW is conducted independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.

(1) IW can include any relevant DoD activity and operation such as counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations

that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory.

(2) While these activities, whether undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form, may occur across the full range of military operations, the balance or primary focus of operations gives a campaign its predominant character.

(3) Before, during, and after IW and traditional warfare, various programs, missions, and activities can occur that shape the environment and serve to deter or prevent war. These may include military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence activities, cyberspace operations, military information support operations (MISO), strategic communication, and civil military operations.

d. Concepts and capabilities relevant to IW will be incorporated across all DoD activities, including:

(1) Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities, policy (DOTMLPF-P).

(2) Assessments.

(3) Analysis.

(4) Exercises.

(5) Experiments.

(6) Applicable strategies and plans.

e. When directed, DoD is able to:

(1) Identify and prevent, contain, or defeat irregular challenges or threats from state and non-state actors across operational areas and environments.

(2) Extend U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through foreign forces or entities.

(3) Train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere, in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.68 (Reference (c)).

(4) Support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries.

(5) Create a secure environment in fragile states.

(6) Meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) objectives by conducting other related activities abroad, which can include: civil-military, intelligence, counterintelligence, space, cyber-space, counter threat finance, MISO, strategic communication, and providing support to foreign governance and law enforcement entities.

f. DoD policy and programs will increase DoD effectiveness in operating with and through foreign security partners.

g. Manpower authorizations, personnel policies, foreign language and cultural capabilities, and organizational structures will provide sufficient capacity and expertise in both the DoD civilian workforce and Military Services to conduct activities in support of IW.

h. Appropriate DoD IW-related activities will be integrated with the efforts of other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, foreign security partners, and selected international organizations by supporting:

(1) Combined policies, plans, and procedures, including collaborative training, education, and exercises that promote interoperability.

(2) Integrated civilian-military teams.

(3) Information strategies and operations to neutralize adversary propaganda and promote U.S. strategic interests.

(4) Efforts to enhance information sharing, as appropriate, to synchronize planning, execution, and transition of IW activities and maintain the shared understanding of the operational environment required to counter irregular challenges or threats.

(5) Integration of collective requirements and capabilities into unified planning efforts to optimize development and employment of capabilities.

(6) Provision of essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief, if directed.


i. Investment strategy guidance addresses capability and capacity for IW-related activities and operations.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

5. RELEASABILITY. **Cleared for public release.** This directive is available on the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

6. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 1. The changes to this issuance are administrative and update references for accuracy.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. This directive is effective August 28, 2014.



Robert O. Work
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures

1. References
2. Responsibilities

Glossary

ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

- (a) DoD Directive 3000.07, "Irregular Warfare (IW)," December 1, 2008 (hereby cancelled)
- (b) DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," December 21, 2010
- (c) DoD Instruction 5000.68, "Security Force Assistance (SFA)," October 27, 2010
- (d) DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," January 13, 2009
- (e) DoD Directive 5160.41E, "Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program," August 21, 2015, as amended
- (f) DoD Instruction 5160.70, "Management of the Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program," December 30, 2016

ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. USD(P). The USD(P):

a. In conjunction with the CJCS, incorporates IW-relevant concepts into strategic planning documents. Recommends to the Secretary of Defense priorities for policy, concepts, analysis, capabilities, and investment strategies relevant to IW.

b. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and the CJCS, incorporates knowledge from social and behavioral science disciplines into the development of DoD strategies, plans, and capabilities.

c. Ensures that broader DoD efforts are synchronized with other USG agencies by advancing the development and implementation of IW strategies across the elements of national power, and oversees DoD contributions to those efforts. In coordination with the CJCS, CCDRs, and interagency partners, develops:

(1) Organizational concepts to employ civilian-military teams, including their command and control relationships, composition, resourcing, and interoperability.

(2) Policies and plans to promote a secure environment overseas, improve interoperability, and build the capability and capacity of partners to address irregular challenges or threats.

(3) Policies, procedures, and capabilities to ensure transition with civilian agencies are addressed during planning and execution.

d. In coordination with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the CJCS, CCDRs, and interagency partners, advances the development and implementation of information strategies to counter adversary propaganda and advance U.S. strategic interests.

e. In coordination with the CJCS and CCDRs, develops policy guidance and priorities for DoD capabilities and programs tailored to train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD(SO/LIC)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(SO/LIC):

- a. Serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IW. In conjunction with the CJCS, provides overall policy oversight to ensure that DoD maintains capabilities and capacity to be as effective in IW as in traditional warfare.
- b. In coordination with the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE) and the CJCS, assesses the Military Department IW capability and capacity across the range of IW requirements to identify gaps, risks, and alternatives.
- c. In coordination with the CJCS, establishes and chairs an executive steering committee to oversee DoD implementation of this directive.

3. USD(I). The USD(I):

- a. Maintains standards and guides the development of capabilities and capacity for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and assessment of operational areas and environments that may serve as safe havens for irregular adversaries.
- b. Advances intelligence and information partnerships with interagency and international partners, as appropriate, to identify and prevent or defeat irregular challenges or threats across operational areas and environments.
- c. In accordance with strategic guidance documents, improves all-source collection and analysis to identify irregular challenges or threats from state and non-state actors. Ensures timely information dissemination from the strategic to the tactical level, recognizing that IW places particular reliance on releasable products to facilitate working with foreign security partners.
- d. Manages the development and integration of appropriate analytical intelligence training, models, tools, and data to provide intelligence support to the Military Services for IW.
- e. Incorporates into intelligence products information derived from social and behavioral science sources in the public and private sectors.
- f. Projects activity patterns on a regional and global scale for analyzing both friendly and adversary human networks through modeling and simulation capabilities.
- g. In conjunction with the CCDRs, prioritizes capabilities to identify, locate, track, and target adversary networks, cells, and individuals in order to neutralize their influence and operational capacity.
- h. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), promotes intelligence and counterintelligence career paths that attract and retain the quantity and quality of personnel with IW-relevant skills.

i. In coordination with the CJCS, the CCDRs, the USD(P), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO), develops policy and capabilities to support information and intelligence sharing with diverse mission partners, to include irregular forces, emerging governments, and non-governmental and international organizations. Develops capabilities to help irregular and traditional warfare mission partners develop appropriate and interoperable traditional ISR capabilities

4. USD(P&R). The USD(P&R):

a. Establishes policies and provides oversight to enable DoD-wide training, education, and tracking of military and civilian personnel with skills and experience relevant to IW. Those include foreign language, regional expertise, cultural knowledge and understanding, and experience or expertise in training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces and institutions.

b. Establishes policies for joint and combined training and exercises that meet CCDR IW-related requirements and promotes interoperability with relevant U.S. departments and agencies and multinational civilian and military organizations in accordance with DoDD 1322.18 (Reference (d)).

c. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, recommends incentive programs such as focused recruitment, bonuses, specialty pays, promotion incentives, and quality of life programs to attract and retain personnel with IW-related skills and experience.

d. In coordination with the USD(P), the CJCS, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, coordinates opportunities for DoD military and civilian personnel to contribute or develop knowledge, skills, and experience relevant to IW by:

(1) Undertaking rotational assignments or exchange tours of duty with USG agencies, foreign security partners, and selected international organizations.

(2) Participating in non-DoD education and training programs.

e. In coordination with the USD(I), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), creates opportunities for DoD personnel to develop foreign language proficiency and cultural knowledge commensurate with the Intelligence Community's assessment of current and emerging threats to national security in accordance with DoDD 5160.41E (Reference (e)).

5. USD(AT&L). In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, CCDRs, CJCS, USD(I), and USD(P), the USD(AT&L) includes validated IW-related requirements in the acquisition programs of record and rapid acquisition efforts, to include procurement, transition, and sustainment of non-standard materiel capabilities.

6. DoD CIO. In coordination with the CJCS, USD(AT&L), and the CCDRs, the DoD CIO annually sets priorities for enhancing DoD-wide command, control, and communication architectures. These priorities could inform provisions that:

- a. Support IW-related activities.
- b. Facilitate interoperability with interagency, nongovernmental, and foreign partners.

7. DCAPE. The DCAPE analyzes and evaluates IW programs in relation to U.S. defense objectives, projected threats, allied contributions, non-DoD organizations' contributions, estimated costs, and resource constraints.

8. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments:

- a. Maintain military capabilities and track the capacity and proficiency of the Military Services to meet CCDR IW-related requirements in accordance with strategic guidance documents. Ensure IW-training of deploying individuals and units is accomplished for operational conditions as established by CCDRs.

- b. Maintain scalable organizations capable of meeting CCDR requirements to assess, train, advise, assist, and equip foreign security forces and security institutions (unilaterally or as part of civilian-military teams).

- c. When directed and until indigenous, international, or U.S. civilian personnel can do so, maintain the capability to:

- (1) Provide civil security.
- (2) Restore essential government function.
- (3) Restore essential services.
- (4) Repair key infrastructure necessary to government function and to sustain human life.
- (5) Reform or rebuild indigenous security institutions.

- d. Ensure curriculums in individual and unit training programs and Military Department schools prepare personnel for IW. Ensure all Service schools develop appropriate education and training programs and courses, reflecting joint and Military Department IW-relevant concepts, doctrine, and processes.

e. Establish a representative, through designation at the Department or Service level as appropriate, who is accountable for discharging the responsibilities delineated in this directive. This representative should have the ability to describe service IW capability and the associated manpower and funding.

f. Biennially, help the CJCS assess the capability and capacity of the Military Services to conduct activities necessary to implement CCDR campaign and contingency plans related to IW.

9. CJCS. The CJCS:

a. Serves as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IW and assists ASD(SO/LIC) oversight of Service training to ensure that the Military Services maintain the capabilities and capacity so that they are equally effective in irregular and traditional warfare.

b. Leads the collaborative development of joint standards for IW-relevant training and readiness for the Military Services.

c. Directs joint education and training, exercises, and concept development to ensure the Military Services are prepared to plan, conduct, and sustain missions involving IW.

d. Identifies and validates IW-related DOTMLPF-P capability gaps and coordinates with appropriate capability developers to mitigate shortfalls.

e. In conjunction with the CCDRs and the Secretaries of the Military Departments:

(1) Maintains universal joint tasks for mission-essential tasks that support IW-related activities and operations.

(2) Facilitates incorporation of proven IW-related concepts and lessons learned into joint doctrine.

f. Biennially, in coordination USD(P), assesses Service capability and capacity to conduct activities necessary to implement CCDR campaign and contingency plans related to IW. Ensure appropriate non-DoD organizations capacity is planned for and incorporated into applicable Annexes to OPLANs. Incorporates the assessment into the annual risk assessment.

g. In coordination with the DoD CIO, USD(AT&L), and USD(I), develops architectures and standards to support interoperability with irregular and traditional warfare mission partners.

10. CCDRs. The CCDRs:

a. Identify IW-related requirements.

b. Incorporate IW-related concepts and lessons learned into military training, exercises, and planning.

c. Advise the ASD(SO/LIC) and CJCS on capacity and capability requirements to implement theater campaign and contingency plans relevant to IW.

d. Recommend DOTMLPF-P changes to the CJCS, CDRUSSOCOM, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to implement best practices across the Military Services.

e. Help the CJCS:

(1) Collaboratively develop joint standards for relevant IW Service training and readiness.

(2) Collaboratively develop IW-relevant joint doctrine.

(3) Biennially assess Service capability and capacity to conduct activities necessary to implement CCDR campaign and contingency plans related to IW.

(4) Assess the availability and capacity of non-DoD organizations capability to meet CCDR campaign and contingency plans.

f. Identify training requirements for forces deploying into an IW environment. Ensure deployment orders address mission essential IW training requirements.

g. Develop CCMD specific training as required and ensure consistency with joint standards.

h. Identify language, regional expertise, and culture capability requirements in accordance with DoDI 5160.70 (Reference (f)).

11. CDRUSSOCOM. In addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, the CDRUSSOCOM:

a. Assists the CJCS by coordinating the further development of those aspects of special operations forces (SOF) doctrine relevant to IW. Contributes to the integration and interdependence of SOF and conventional forces in relevant IW doctrine with the CJCS and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

b. Leads the development of SOF IW-relevant training and education standards for individuals and units with the USD(P&R), the CJCS, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

c. Maintains and advances SOF capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through foreign forces or by conducting low-visibility operations.

d. In coordination with the CCDRs, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the CJCS, leads the identification of joint IW-relevant capabilities and recommend priorities for capability development to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

12. COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND (CDRUSSTRATCOM). In addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, the CDRUSSTRATCOM advises and assists the CJCS and the USD(I) concerning the development of ISR, space, and cyber capabilities to counter irregular challenges or threats.

GLOSSARYPART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM	Commander, United States Strategic Command
DCAPE	Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
DoD CIO	DoD Chief Information Officer
DoDD	DoD Directive
DoDI	DoD Instruction
DOTMLPF-P	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW	irregular warfare
MISO	military information support operations
SOF	special operations forces
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USG	U.S. Government

PART II. DEFINITIONS

These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this directive.

civilian-military teams. Temporary organizations of civilian and military personnel specifically task-organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific operational and planning tasks, or to achieve objectives at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. Civilian-military teams may conduct both overt and clandestine operations.

counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.

counterterrorism. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

irregular. Characterization used to describe a deviation from the traditional form of warfare where actors may use non-traditional methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency for control of relevant populations.

irregular force. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

IW. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).

security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state.

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

traditional warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.

unconventional warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

ANNEX K – DoDD 5132.03 DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation

DoD will prioritize, plan, conduct, and align resources for security cooperation as an integral element of the DoD mission and a tool of national security and foreign policy. DoD security cooperation, which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs and international armaments cooperation, will be undertaken to achieve specific ends in support of defense and national security strategy, rather than serving as an end unto itself.



DoD DIRECTIVE 5132.03

DoD POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO SECURITY COOPERATION

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Approved by:	Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Purpose: Pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, provisions in various National Defense Authorization Acts, and administrative practices relevant to certain security assistance authorities administered on behalf of the Department of State, this issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the administration of security cooperation to encourage and enable allied and partner nations to apply their military capabilities and capacities, consistent with U.S. strategy, priorities, and defense objectives.

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SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION

1.1. APPLICABILITY. This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments and Services, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”).

1.2. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. DoD will prioritize, plan, conduct, and align resources for security cooperation as an integral element of the DoD mission and a tool of national security and foreign policy. DoD security cooperation, which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs and international armaments cooperation, will be undertaken to achieve specific ends in support of defense and national security strategy, rather than serving as an end unto itself. It will be used to:

- (1) Develop allied and partner defense and security capabilities and capacity for self-defense and multinational operations.
- (2) Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.
- (3) Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- (4) Take other actions in support of U.S. objectives.

b. Geographic Combatant Command theater campaign plans, developed in accordance with DoD strategic guidance and the requirements in Section 3 of this issuance, serve as the primary vehicle for the development and articulation of integrated DoD security cooperation plans. Such security cooperation plans will articulate how security cooperation activities and resources are aligned to achieve strategic campaign objectives in support of defense strategy.

c. Theater campaign plan country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and should inform and be informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies. Each country-specific security cooperation section will identify specific lines of effort that:

- (1) Represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country.
- (2) Articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives.

d. Consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 23, security cooperation plans will support the integration of DoD security cooperation activities with broader national security goals and

articulate how such activities are synchronized and implemented through a whole-of-government process toward common objectives.

e. Security cooperation planning is a requirement-driven, risk- and resource-informed process that will be undertaken through a holistic approach that identifies and addresses capability requirements across a comprehensive spectrum of materiel and non-materiel inputs. Such planning approaches will ensure adequate consideration of feasibility of success, including allied and partner nation security sector governance challenges, absorptive capacity, and strategic alignment with U.S. national security goals.

f. DoD will maintain a robust program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation to provide policymakers, planners, program managers, and implementers the information necessary to evaluate outcomes, identify challenges, make appropriate corrections, and maximize effectiveness of future security cooperation activities.

g. DoD personnel will not, without appropriate authorization, make commitments involving future U.S. Government programs, performance, or the availability of U.S. Government resources.

h. The selection of U.S. DoD personnel engaged in security cooperation activities, particularly those to be assigned as senior defense officials/defense attachés and to security cooperation organizations (SCOs), must be in accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 5205.75, DoD Instruction 5132.13, and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Manual 5105.38-M. Such personnel in the field should draw upon support from relevant subject matter experts throughout the DoD to ensure effective planning, execution, and evaluation.

i. The classification, disclosure, and safeguarding of security cooperation information must be consistent with DoD Manual 5200.01, DoDD 5230.11, and National Disclosure Policy-1.

SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The USD(P):

- a. Serves as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of security cooperation policy and oversight to further national security objectives.
- b. Oversees and advises the DoD Components by issuing guidance on priorities for security cooperation, reviewing Combatant Command-integrated security cooperation plans, and providing guidance on the transfer of defense articles, including prioritization of delivery and diversion.
- c. Recommends funding levels and budget programming adjustments for DoD security cooperation and, as appropriate, security assistance under Chapters 32 and 39 of Title 22, United States Code, also known and referred to in this issuance as the “Foreign Assistance Act of 1961” and the “Arms Export Control Act of 1976,” respectively. Such recommendations include allocations of security cooperation resources.
- d. Represents DoD, as directed, in matters involving foreign governments and other U.S. Government departments and agencies, to establish security cooperation priorities and enable a whole-of-government approach to engagements with allied and partner nations.
- e. Establishes policy guidance for and provides oversight of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation activities.
- f. Oversees development and maintenance of a global theater security cooperation information management system (G-TSCMIS) to support security cooperation planning and monitoring, and to facilitate a worldwide common operating picture of security cooperation activities. Where he or she has lead planning responsibilities, ensures that security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
- g. Develops and leads processes to identify and address gaps and adjudicate discrepancies in security cooperation authorities, resources, U.S. military capabilities, and DoD Component execution.
- h. In coordination with the geographic Combatant Commands and other stakeholders, as appropriate, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues international agreements to facilitate access to allied and partner nations to conduct security cooperation activities, information sharing, and reciprocal logistics supplies and services (other than Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, which are managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L))).
- i. Establishes DoD policy for international technology transfers. Implements National Disclosure Policy-1 and directs the operation of the National Disclosure Policy Committee, in accordance with DoDD 5230.11.

j. In coordination with the USD(AT&L), leads the development of policies and procedures for transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations, and co-chairs the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, in accordance with DoDD 5111.21, to ensure such policies and procedures comply with national laws and regulations, including technology security and foreign disclosure requirements.

k. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) and the USD(AT&L), advises DoD Components on security cooperation workforce issues to ensure that the workforce is appropriately sized and possesses the requisite education, skills, and tools necessary to plan, implement, and assess DoD security cooperation, as outlined in DoD Instruction 5132.13.

2.2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS AND CAPABILITIES (ASD(SPC)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(SPC):

a. Develops policies and methodologies for prioritizing, integrating, and evaluating global security cooperation activities and resources. Develops recommendations, with input from regional and functional offices and other OSD organizations, for adjudicating unresolved differences in planning and resource allocations among DoD Components.

b. In coordination with the CJCS, develops and manages a process to address impediments to campaign plan execution that the Combatant Commands identify. Informs the appropriate DoD Components of the impediments and develops recommendations for resolution, as appropriate. These impediments may include shortfalls in security cooperation authorities, resources, or joint capabilities.

c. In cooperation with regional and functional offices, ensures that global force management is sufficiently aligned to support effective implementation of security cooperation priorities.

2.3. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (ASD(ISA)) AND ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS (ASD(APSA)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(ISA) and ASD(APSA):

a. Develop strategy, policy, guidance, and priorities to translate regional and functional goals into regional and bilateral security cooperation guidance and plans, specific to their respective areas of assigned responsibility.

b. Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policies and recommendations concerning security cooperation, within their respective areas of assigned responsibility, to promote effective and efficient implementation of security cooperation programs, aligned with policy goals.

c. Participate in processes allocating security cooperation resources to ensure appropriate alignment of resources with policy goals, within their respective areas of assigned responsibility.

d. Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations on security cooperation issues, specific to their respective areas of assigned responsibility.

2.4. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY (ASD(HD&GS)) AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD(SO/LIC)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(HD&GS) and ASD(SO/LIC):

a. Develop security cooperation strategy, policy, and guidance specific to functional areas of assigned responsibility, and coordinate the integration of such functional areas into regional and bilateral strategy, policies, and guidance.

b. In coordination with regional offices and other OSD offices, oversee the implementation of policies and activities concerning security cooperation, within areas of assigned responsibility, to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of security cooperation programs, aligned with policy goals.

c. Participate in processes allocating security cooperation resources to ensure appropriate alignment of resources with policy goals, within their respective areas of assigned responsibility.

d. Represent the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations on security cooperation issues specific to the programs and mission areas within their respective assigned areas of responsibilities.

e. In coordination with the ASD(SPC) and other OSD offices, develop recommendations for effective implementation of security cooperation programs in fragile states and stability operations.

2.5. DIRECTOR, DSCA. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DSCA:

a. Provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions for the execution of DoD security cooperation programs.

b. Supports DoD Components on planning and execution of security cooperation and the appropriate use, integration, and execution of security cooperation programs to develop comprehensive, sustainable approaches to building allied and partner nation defense and security capabilities and capacity, and to achieve other defense policy goals.

c. Manages and administers those Title 10 and 22, United States Code, programs for which DSCA has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.

d. Communicates directly with the heads of the DoD Components on security cooperation matters over which DSCA has responsibility.

e. In coordination with the DoD Component heads, ensures the security cooperation workforce is appropriately sized, selected, trained, and deployed to support security cooperation priorities.

f. Approves, in coordination with the CJCS, SCO joint manpower programs involving the establishment of new SCOs or changes in manpower authorizations or organizational structure, in accordance with DoDD 5205.75.

g. Manages the development and operation of G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities, and enters those activities into the database as appropriate.

h. Acts as the Executive Agent for DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies, in accordance with DoDD 5200.41E.

i. In coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L), as appropriate, supports the development of foreign disclosure and sales policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems.

2.6. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (DTSA).

Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DTSA:

a. Develops DoD technology security policies related to foreign transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies.

b. Builds technology security capabilities of U.S. allied and partner nations to increase interoperability and protect critical technology and information.

c. In coordination with DoD Component heads, provides the security cooperation enterprise with information on allied and partner nations' willingness and ability to protect sensitive U.S. information and technologies and how that may affect DoD security cooperation efforts.

d. In coordination with Director, International Cooperation, Office of the USD(AT&L), prioritizes and pursues policies and defense agreements required to facilitate transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations, including development of DoD anticipatory policies to support accelerated timelines to transfer such items to support security cooperation priorities.

2.7. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L):

a. Establishes and maintains policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs, including international armaments cooperation (e.g., collaboration in science and technology; research, development, test, and evaluation; and acquisition, in-service, and logistics support (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements)), to support security cooperation goals.

b. In coordination with the USD(P), leads the development of policies and procedures for the transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to foreign countries, and co-chairs the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, to ensure such policies and procedures comply with national laws and regulations, including technology security and foreign disclosure requirements.

c. In coordination with the USD(P) and the Department of State, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense acquisition-related agreements required to facilitate the cooperative development, acquisition, and transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations.

d. Engages with industry to provide DoD priorities for allied and partner nation capability investments.

e. Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.

f. Manages and administers those Title 10, United States Code, programs for which the USD(AT&L) has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.

g. Coordinates on security cooperation policy guidance and theater campaign plans.

2.8. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (USD(C)/CFO). The USD(C)/CFO:

a. Develops and implements policies and procedures for security cooperation activities involving financial management, accounting, audit readiness, budgeting for reimbursements to DoD appropriation accounts and revolving funds, and international payments.

b. Coordinates with the USD(P) on budget levels, program adjustments, and allocations that support security cooperation activities.

2.9. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I):

a. In coordination with the USD(P), provides guidance for, and oversight of, intelligence-related security cooperation, including programs and resources, to build allied and partner nation intelligence information-sharing capabilities and intelligence capacity in support of security cooperation priorities.

b. Ensures defense intelligence collection and analysis efforts are sufficient to support security cooperation planning, execution, and assessment, monitoring, and evaluation efforts.

c. Reviews Combatant Command campaign plans, orders, country security cooperation sections, strategies, defense agreements, and other security cooperation documents, as appropriate, to ensure that they:

(1) Integrate USD(I) policies, priorities, procedures, and guidance.

(2) Plan, program, budget, and execute those intelligence-related activities to support cooperation objectives.

d. In coordination with the USD(P) and the Department of State, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense agreements required to facilitate intelligence information-sharing with allied and partner nations.

e. Where he or she has lead planning responsibilities, ensures that security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.

f. Works with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate and de-conflict security cooperation activities with the intelligence foreign partner engagement and capacity building activities of the intelligence community.

2.10. USD(P&R). The USD(P&R):

a. In coordination with the USD(P), advises DoD Component heads on security cooperation workforce issues to ensure that the workforce is appropriately sized and possesses the requisite education, skills, and tools necessary to execute DoD security cooperation priorities.

b. Directs, administers, and provides guidance over security cooperation resources and programs for which USD(P&R) has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.

c. Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.

2.11. DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION (CAPE). In coordination with the USD(P), the Director, CAPE, analyzes data provided through G-TSCMIS and evaluations of security cooperation initiatives to recommend budget levels, program adjustments, and allocations for security cooperation resources.

2.12. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB). The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chief, NGB:

a. Support geographic Combatant Command security cooperation assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring through plans, policies, doctrine, guidance, and implementation. Ensure the integration of their security cooperation planning and activities into geographic Combatant Command theater campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve objectives.

b. Ensure Service- and NGB-specific security cooperation policies, respectively, are consistent with DoD-wide security cooperation policies.

- c. Provide qualified military and civilian personnel to carry out security cooperation assignments according to approved tables of distribution and other authorizations, directives, and requests.
- d. Conduct international armaments cooperation with eligible allied and partner nations and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(AT&L).
- e. Conduct military education and training and sales of defense articles and defense services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA.
- f. Ensure conformance with technology transfer, classified military information release, and disclosure policies for their respective areas of responsibility while conducting security cooperation activities.
- g. Designate Service proponents for security cooperation to ensure that U.S. forces have the requisite skills, training, resources, and capabilities to support security cooperation priorities.
- h. Align policies and procedures related to cooperative development, acquisition, and foreign transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to security cooperation priorities established by USD(P) anticipatory policies to support accelerated timelines to transfer such items to priority partners.
- i. Ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to plan and monitor security cooperation activities.

2.13. CJCS. The CJCS:

- a. Provides military advice to the Secretary of Defense concerning security cooperation.
- b. Identifies where security cooperation activities may be able to mitigate risk from shortfalls in joint force capabilities or presence overseas.
- c. Directs, administers, and provides guidance over security cooperation resources and programs for which he or she has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.
- d. Designates a joint proponent for security cooperation to lead the collaborative development and integration of joint capability to support security cooperation priorities. Develops and maintains joint security cooperation doctrine, education, training, lessons learned, and concepts.
- e. Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
- f. In coordination with the USD(P), develops and manages a process to address obstacles to campaign plan execution that the Combatant Commands identify.

g. Reviews, in coordination with the USD(P), Combatant Command-integrated security cooperation plans.

h. Ensures that global force management processes and procedures account for force requirements for security cooperation.

2.14. GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS (GCCs). In addition to the responsibilities in Section 3 of this issuance, the GCCs, through the CJCS:

a. Maintain responsibility for all security cooperation matters in their assigned areas of responsibility. In accordance with Policy-issued guidance on priorities and objectives, develop country-specific security cooperation sections in support of theater campaign plans, integrating inputs from DoD stakeholders and interagency partners.

b. Provide guidance to, and oversight of, senior defense officials/defense attachés and chiefs of SCOs to direct the planning and execution of security cooperation activities in alignment with DoD policies and priorities.

c. Assess a foreign partner's security environment and political will, willingness, and ability to protect sensitive information and technologies, and its ability to absorb and sustain assistance to determine how best to apply resources.

d. Assess foreign partner defense and security capabilities, identifying capability requirements to support of U.S. objectives and develop comprehensive approaches to building partner capabilities across the full spectrum of required inputs.

e. Coordinate security cooperation plans with other U.S. Government security sector assistance plans and activities and, where possible, with security cooperation activities of allies and partner nations. Provide DoD input to Integrated Country Strategies and Joint Regional Strategies, in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 23.

f. Coordinate with relevant GCCs where security cooperation efforts cross geographic Combatant Command boundaries.

g. Monitor and evaluate ongoing security cooperation activities to gauge effectiveness, determine whether corrections are needed, and capture lessons learned.

h. Ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to plan and monitor security cooperation activities.

i. Inform the CJCS and the USD(P) of obstacles to execution of plans, including shortfalls in security cooperation authorities or resources, joint capability shortfalls, or shortfalls in partners' capabilities.

2.15. FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDERS (FCCs). The FCCs, through the CJCS:

- a. Where appropriate, develop functional security cooperation strategies and plans to support policy priorities and objectives.
- b. Ensure the integration of functional security cooperation planning and priorities into GCC theater campaign plans.
- c. Inform the CJCS and the USD(P) of obstacles to execution of plans, including shortfalls in security cooperation authorities, resources, or joint capabilities.
- d. Ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to plan and monitor security cooperation activities.

SECTION 3: THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

3.1. In accordance with Paragraph 1.2.b., the GCCs are responsible for theater campaign plans, which serve as the primary vehicle for the development of integrated DoD security cooperation plans based on DoD strategic guidance. The GCCs will seek input from the FCCs, Military Departments, OSD, the Joint Staff, NGB, relevant field agencies, and interagency partners.

3.2. In these plans, the GCCs will include country-specific security cooperation sections for each allied or partner nation where the GCCs intend to apply significant time and resources. These country-specific security cooperation sections should serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and should inform and be informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.

3.3. Each country-specific security cooperation section will identify specific lines of effort that represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country, and will articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives. These lines of effort will prioritize, integrate, and sequence security cooperation activities, and will identify critical gaps or impediments to execution, such as inadequate authorities or resources, or shortfalls in an allied or partner nation's ability to absorb or sustain security assistance.

a. In accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 23, security cooperation plans will seek to situate DoD security cooperation activities within a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government approach to ensure alignment of activities and resources with common national security objectives. Where possible, U.S. security cooperation planning will also consider security cooperation activities of allied and partner nations, as well as international organizations.

b. The application of security cooperation resources and activities will be informed by ongoing analyses of the security environment, political will, willingness and ability to protect sensitive information and technologies, and absorptive capacity of allied and partner nations, as well as by policy and legal constraints. Except in cases of overriding security considerations, efforts to build allied and partner nation defense and security capabilities will only be pursued when the foreign country is able to, or is working toward being able to, absorb, sustain, and responsibly deploy such capabilities in support of U.S. security objectives.

c. Proposed materiel solutions must be integrated with non-materiel solutions and with other security cooperation activities (e.g., combined exercises, military education and training, defense institution building) to maximize the allied or partner nation's ability and willingness to employ and sustain the capability. Comprehensive approaches to building allied and partner nation defense and security capabilities will consider the full spectrum of capability development

through the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy Framework, as referenced in CJCS Instruction 3170.01I.

d. In accordance with relevant DoD-wide policies and standards, significant security cooperation initiatives will be monitored and evaluated on a regular basis to gauge effectiveness, determine whether corrections are needed, and capture lessons learned. Planning for security cooperation activities and resources must incorporate, and be informed by, assessment, monitoring, and evaluation elements.

GLOSSARY

G.1. ACRONYMS.

ASD(APSA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
ASD(HD&GS)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
ASD(SPC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities
CAPE	Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoDD	DoD Directive
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DTSA	Defense Technology Security Administration
FCC	Functional Combatant Commander
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
G-TSCMIS	global theater security cooperation management information system
NGB	National Guard Bureau
SCO	security cooperation organization
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(C)/CFO	Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.

country-specific security cooperation section. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.

Integrated Country Strategy. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

international agreements. Agreements binding under international law that facilitate defense and security cooperation with allied and partner nations and international organizations.

defense institution building. Defined in DoDD 5205.82.

SCOs. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. SCOs may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation, designated to perform security cooperation functions. SCOs do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams, or operational units.

senior defense official/defense attaché. The chief of mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, or the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The senior defense official/defense attaché in the U.S. Mission can be the defense attaché or the chief of the SCO, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.

security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

security sector assistance. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

REFERENCES

SECURITY COOPERATION AUTHORITIES

The following are referred to collectively in this issuance as “Security Cooperation Authorities:”¹

United States Code, Title 10²

United States Code, Title 22³

United States Code, Title 50⁴

Public Laws, including Public Law 113-291, “Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,” December 19, 2014, and similar previous and annually recurring provisions, if enacted, in subsequent years⁵

OTHER REFERENCES

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS),” January 23, 2015

Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” April 30, 2012

DoD Directive 5111.21, “Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group and Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Office,” October 14, 2014

DoD Directive 5200.41E, “DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies,” June 30, 2016

DoD Directive 5205.75, “DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies,” December 4, 2013

DoD Directive 5205.82, “Defense Institution Building,” January 27, 2016

DoD Directive 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,” June 16, 1992

DoD Instruction 5132.13, “Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel,” January 9, 2009

DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 2, “DoD Information Security Program,” February 24, 2012, as amended

¹ Security cooperation authorities are primarily legislated in Title 10 and Title 22, United States Code, and annual National Defense Authorization Acts. Such authorities historically change on an annual basis and therefore relevant statutes should be consulted for a definitive list of up to date authorities.

² Relevant sections of Title 10, United States Code, including all sections specifically designated as security cooperation provisions and, as of the date of this issuance, including Sections 127, 127d, 153, 164, 166a, 168, 182, 184, 401, 402, 404, 407, 408, 409, 421, 443, 1050, 1050a, 1051, 1051a, 1051b, 1051c, 2010, 2011, 2166, 2249c, 2249d, 2282, 2341-50, 2350a-d, 2350m, 2358, 2557, 2561, 2805, 4344, 4345, 4345a, 6957, 6957a, 6957b, 7046, 9344, 9345, 9345a, 9381, 9415.

³ Chapter 32 is also known as “The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA),” as amended, and Chapter 39 is also known as “The Arms Export Control Act (AECA),” as amended.

⁴ Relevant sections including Sections 2333, 2334, 2911, 2912, and 2922, and Chapter 48 (Sections 3701 through 3751).

⁵ Relevant sections of annual National Defense Authorization Acts including Public Laws 111-84, 111-383, 112-81, 112-239, 113-66, and 113-291.

National Disclosure Policy-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,” October 2, 2000⁶

Presidential Policy Directive 23, “Security Sector Assistance,” April 5, 2013⁷

Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Guidance for the Employment of the Force,” current edition⁸

⁶ U.S. Government personnel may review NDP-1 by contacting the DTSA.

⁷ U.S. Government personnel may review PPD-23 by contacting the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation.

⁸ Distribution is limited by the Office of the USD(P).

ANNEX L - DODD 5205.82 Defense Institution Building, Jan 2016

DoD, in coordination with other appropriate U.S. departments and agencies and when authorized by law, will develop the capabilities and capacity of allied and partner nation defense institutions in support of defense strategy. Section 3 of this issuance lists legal authorities that may authorize DIB activities.



DoD DIRECTIVE 5205.82

DEFENSE INSTITUTION BUILDING (DIB)

Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Effective: January 27, 2016

Change 1 Effective: May 3, 2017

Releasability: Cleared for public release. Available on the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

Approved by: Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Change 1 Approved by: Michael L. Rhodes, Director of Administration, Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense

Purpose: This issuance:

¶ Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides direction regarding the planning, management, and conduct of DIB by DoD, in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1; the November 30, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum; DoDD 5132.03; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.68; and Titles 10 and 22, United States Code (U.S.C.).

¶ Establishes the DIB Coordination Board.

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SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION

1.1. APPLICABILITY. This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the “DoD Components”).

1.2. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. DoD, in coordination with other appropriate U.S. departments and agencies and when authorized by law, will develop the capabilities and capacity of allied and partner nation defense institutions in support of defense strategy. Section 3 of this issuance lists legal authorities that may authorize DIB activities.

b. In accordance with DoDD 5132.03, DoD will conduct DIB activities as an integral part of DoD security cooperation, including U.S. security assistance efforts.

c. In support of defense strategy and policy priorities, including Combatant Command (CCMD) campaign plans, DIB will be conducted, when authorized by law, to:

(1) Promote principles vital to the establishment of defense institutions that are effective, accountable, transparent, and responsive to national political systems, especially regarding good governance, oversight of security forces, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. DIB should contribute to the establishment or strengthening of democratic governance of defense and security forces.

(2) Support and complement broader U.S. national security and security sector assistance objectives.

(3) Enhance allied and partner capability and capacity to manage and sustain armed forces consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law.

(4) Increase a partner nation’s ability to organize, administer, and oversee its defense institutions to meet its security needs and contribute to regional and international security more effectively.

(5) Improve the sustainability, effect, and value of other U.S. security cooperation investments and activities.

(6) Promote security sector reform as a means to prevent or lessen instability, conflict, corruption, and other systemic risks to effective security-sector governance.

(7) Contribute to broader security-sector reform initiatives, including in fragile, transitioning, or post-conflict venues.

(8) Respond to institutional challenges resulting from or contributing to emerging DoD priorities, including conflict situations, major changes in partners' governments, and humanitarian crises.

(9) Enable recipients to conduct or support unilateral, combined, or coalition operations that advance U.S. national security interests.

(10) Develop or increase a partner nation military's capacity to support and work in coordination with civilian agencies responsible for disaster management and response.

d. DIB activities will assist allies and partners with:

(1) Establishing, building, improving, reforming, and assessing defense institutions.

(2) Aligning the defense sector within government-wide systems (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, where such exist) and fostering synchronization across government sectors (particularly the security, justice, and financial sectors).

(3) Incorporating principles of accountability, transparency, participation, inclusiveness, and responsiveness, and establishing regulations, procedures, and processes that define their implementation.

(4) Prescribing the roles, missions, functions, and relationships within the defense sector, including subordinate armed forces.

(5) Enhancing the professionalism of defense personnel, both civilian and military.

(6) Creating or improving the principal functions and duties of effective defense institutions, including:

(a) Strategy, planning, and policy.

(b) Oversight of policy implementation.

(c) Resource management (including budgeting and finance).

(d) Human-resource management.

(e) Logistics and acquisition.

(f) Administration, information management, audit, and inspector general.

(g) Intelligence policy, organization, and professionalization.

(h) Defense education.

(i) Other authorities and systems necessary to the effective functioning of the defense sector and its operations.

(7) Promoting institutional interoperability with allied and coalition forces and institutions.

e. Within a country's defense sector, DIB generally will be conducted at the ministerial, joint or general staff, or service headquarters levels.

f. On a case-by-case basis and when authorized by law, DIB activities may:

(1) In coordination with appropriate U.S. departments and agencies, support the national legislative or non-defense executive branch organizations of allies and partners that oversee or influence the defense sector.

(2) Support multi-national or regional organizations that have defense or military offices or security missions.

g. DoD will conduct DIB activities to broaden the effect and increase the sustainability of other DoD security cooperation, including security assistance programs.

(1) DIB requirements should be considered when planning operational- and tactical-level security cooperation activities, including training and equipping of military forces.

(2) Education, training, and other security cooperation activities should be synchronized with DIB engagements so that they have mutually reinforcing effects.

h. DoD will develop, establish, maintain, and, when authorized by law, exercise the capability to conduct expert-led DIB activities, including the ability to respond to near-term emergent requirements.

i. The DIB Coordination Board oversees implementation of this directive, assesses and promotes initiatives, evaluates ongoing efforts, and shares lessons learned among DoD Components.

j. DIB will be used in:

(1) DoD efforts to support allied and partner nation security-sector reform.

(2) DoD planning and implementation of U.S. Government-wide security-sector assistance efforts. DIB planning and implementation will be coordinated with interagency partners through existing security cooperation mechanisms and with international partners, when feasible.

1.3. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 1. The changes to this issuance are administrative and update references for accuracy

SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The USD(P):

- a. Establishes policy for all DIB activities in consultation with OSD and DoD Component heads, as appropriate.
- b. Ensures that DIB activities are aligned with and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives and are aligned with other U.S. Government programs in country.
- c. Oversees the integration of DIB with other DoD security cooperation activities and programs.

2.2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES (ASD(SPC)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(SPC):

- a. Serves as the principal advisor to the USD(P) on DIB matters, provides policy oversight of DIB activities, and ensures that DIB is integrated into planning for other security cooperation activities.
- b. Identifies and defines future U.S. capabilities required to conduct DIB activities, and incorporates guidance into appropriate strategic documents.
- c. Issues guidance regarding DIB activities and engagement priorities for the employment of DoD assets and DoD Components engaged in DIB.
- d. Leads DoD efforts, in cooperation with other U.S. departments and agencies, to develop guidance for assessing the DIB needs of allied and partner nations. Develops guidance on measures of effectiveness to monitor and evaluate DIB activities.
- e. Serves as the Chair of the DIB Coordination Board.

2.3. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (ASD(ISA)) AND ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS (ASD(APSA)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(ISA) and ASD(APSA):

- a. In coordination with the relevant CCMD, identify, prescribe, and prioritize current and future requirements for DIB activities within regional areas of responsibility (AORs).
- b. Ensure that DIB policy, approaches, and activities inform the planning and implementation of security cooperation, including security assistance, for allies and partner nations and are coordinated with other security cooperation efforts.

c. Support periodic assessments of ongoing DIB activities, especially in the context of ongoing contingency or stability operations, to ensure coherence of DIB and other security cooperation activities being conducted during such operations and alignment with overall DoD goals and objectives for the country.

d. Provide representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

2.4. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY (DSCA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DSCA:

a. Provides and administers guidance, in accordance with DoDD 5105.65, to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions for the implementation of DSCA-funded and -managed DIB activities.

b. Ensures that the DoD security cooperation workforce possesses the skills required to manage security cooperation programs that support DIB activities, in accordance with DoDI 5132.13.

c. Ensures that the security cooperation officer training curriculum prepares personnel to:

(1) Manage security cooperation programs that support DIB activities, in accordance with DoDI 5132.13.

(2) Synchronize DIB activities into other security cooperation activities, including foreign military sales and foreign military financing defense trade and arms transfer, humanitarian assistance, and international education and training.

d. Communicates directly with the DoD Component heads on DIB-related activities, including identification of appropriate legal authorities and funding sources and execution matters, in accordance with DoDD 5205.75.

e. Provides representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

2.5. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)). In accordance with DoDD 1404.10, the USD(P&R):

a. Develops policy and implements procedural guidance for utilization of DoD civilians for expeditionary assignments, including DIB activities.

b. Authorizes voluntary use of DoD civilian employees to meet validated DIB requirements outside a designated DoD civilian employee's employing DoD Component.

2.6. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I):

- a. Provides policy guidance for, and oversees implementation of, DoD intelligence security cooperation efforts supporting DIB activities in coordination with USD(P) and DoD Component heads, as appropriate.
- b. Ensures that DIB intelligence-related activities are consistent with DoD intelligence policy and are aligned with and advance DoD intelligence security cooperation and foreign partner engagement objectives.
- c. Provides representation to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

2.7. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)). The USD(AT&L):

- a. Develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the capabilities of USD(AT&L) personnel to provide staffing and expertise for DoD DIB activities.
- b. Provides pre-deployment training for all military and civilian personnel assigned or mobilized to support DIB activities, as required and when resourced.
- c. Supports the integration of DIB into security cooperation plans and activities that he or she oversees and executes.
- d. Provides representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working group.

2.8. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of Defense Agencies:

- a. Utilize and maintain institutional capabilities of Service members and civilian personnel to provide staffing and expertise for DIB activities, including in contested environments.
- b. Provide pre-deployment training for all military and civilian personnel assigned or mobilized to support DIB activities, as required and when resourced.
- c. Incorporate DIB into Service Campaign Support Plans, as applicable, as delineated in DoDD 5132.03.
- d. Support the integration of DIB into security cooperation plans and activities.
- e. Provide representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

2.9. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS). The CJCS:

- a. With support from Combatant Commanders and the ASD(SPC), coordinates, plans, and provides experts for DIB activities at the joint, service, or general staff level, when available and appropriately funded.
- b. Provides representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

2.10. COMBATANT COMMANDERS. Through the CJCS, as appropriate, and in coordination with the chiefs of mission and country teams in their respective geographic AORs and the heads of their Military Service components, the Combatant Commanders:

- a. Incorporate DIB into theater plans, in the context of campaign and contingency plans and operational activities, as delineated in DoDI 5132.13.
- b. Designate a dedicated DIB point-of-contact to coordinate and integrate DIB activities in their AORs.
- c. Ensure all DIB activities in their AORs are recorded in the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System.
- d. Provide representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups and provide input to the ASD(SPC) on all DIB requirements and priorities.

2.11. CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU. The Chief, National Guard Bureau will:

- a. Ensure that DIB policy, approaches, and activities inform the planning and implementation of National Guard and security cooperation events with partner nations.
- b. Develop, maintain, and institutionalize the capabilities of Air National Guard and Army National Guard members and civilian personnel to provide staffing and expertise for DIB activities.
- c. Provide representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

2.12. HEADS OF COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCIES (CSA). The CSA heads will:

- a. Support DIB activities in accordance with policy, authorities, and CSA missions.
- b. Provide representatives to the DIB Coordination Board and any required working groups.

SECTION 3: AUTHORITIES FOR DIB ACTIVITIES

Figure 1 contains a list of some current legal authorities that may appropriately support individual DIB activities.

Figure 1. Legal Authorities to Support Individual DIB Programs

Asia-Pacific Regional Initiatives, Section 8087 of the DoD Appropriations for FY 2015
Global Security Contingency Fund, Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81), as amended
Authority to Build the Capacity of Security Forces, 10 U.S.C. 2282
Latin American Cooperation, 10 U.S.C. 1050
African Cooperation, 10 U.S.C. 1050a
Authority for Assignment of Civilian Employees of the Department of Defense as Advisors to Foreign Ministries of Defense and Regional Organizations, Section 1081 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81), as amended
Multilateral, Bilateral, or Regional Cooperation Programs: Payment of Personnel Expenses, 10 U.S.C. 1051
Regional Centers for Security Studies, 10 U.S.C. 184
Training of General Purpose Forces of the United States Armed Forces with Military and Other Security Forces of Friendly Foreign Countries, Section 1203 of the NDAA for FY 2014 (P.L. 113-66)
Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, 10 U.S.C. 166a
State Partnership Program, Section 1205 of Public Law 113-66
Developing Country Combined Exercise Program, 10 U.S.C. 2010
Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities, 10 U.S.C. 168
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements, Section 2350a of Public Law 114-19
Research and Development Projects, Section 2358 of Public Law 114-19
Authority of the President to Enter into Cooperative Projects with Friendly Foreign Countries, 22 U.S.C., 2767, Chapter 39, Subchapter II

SECTION 4: DIB COORDINATION BOARD

4.1. MEMBERSHIP. The DIB Coordination Board consists of:

- a. ASD(SPC) (Chair).
- b. DASD Security Cooperation, from the Office of ASD(SPC) (Executive Secretary).
- c. Representatives from:
 - (1) Office of the ASD(ISA).
 - (2) Office of the ASD(APSA).
 - (3) DSCA.
 - (4) Office of the USD(AT&L).
 - (5) Office of the USD(I).
 - (6) Military Departments.
 - (7) Defense Agencies.
 - (8) Joint Staff.
 - (9) CCMDs.
 - (10) National Guard Bureau.
 - (11) CSAs.

4.2. DIB COORDINATION BOARD PROCESS. The DIB Coordination Board:

- a. Oversees implementation of this directive, assesses and promotes initiatives, evaluates ongoing efforts, and shares lessons learned among DoD Components.
- b. Clarifies and publishes processes and procedures to identify and address DIB challenges in partner nations and to ensure unity of effort in planning and conducting DIB capacity-building efforts.
- c. Coordinates DoD policy on collaboration with donors and providers in the international community that have demonstrated willingness to conduct or participate in defense institution capacity-building activities.

d. Considers and provides policy recommendations on DIB aspects of various security challenges regarding systemic security cooperation planning, implementation, and emerging challenges such as stability operations.

e. Considers and provides policy recommendations to ensure maintenance of a sufficiently sized and appropriately trained DIB workforce.

f. Establishes working groups, as appropriate, to support activities specified in Paragraphs 4.2.a.-e.

(1) The ASD(SPC) will designate a chair for the working groups.

(2) The working groups will consist of representatives from:

(a) Offices of the USD(AT&L), ASD(SPC), ASD(ISA), and ASD(APSA).

(b) Military Departments.

(c) Defense Agencies, including DSCA.

(d) CCMDs.

(e) Joint Staff.

(f) Office of the USD(I) when intelligence equities are involved.

(g) Other DoD Components, as appropriate and depending upon the task.

g. Adjudicates DIB prioritization and approves annual plan of activities.

GLOSSARY

G.1. ACRONYMS.

AOR	area of responsibility
ASD(APSA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASD(SPC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
CCMD	Combatant Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CSA	Combat Support Agency
DIB	Defense Institution Building
DoDD	DoD directive
DoDI	DoD instruction
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.

Defense institutions. The people, organizations, rules, norms, values, and behaviors that enable oversight, governance, management, and functioning of the defense enterprise.

DIB. Security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control. DIB improves defense governance, increases the sustainability of other DoD security cooperation programs, and is carried out in cooperation with partner nations pursuant to appropriate and available legal authority. It is typically conducted at the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities.

Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System. A secure, internet-based information system providing DoD with a transparent, global view of all security cooperation activities across the enterprise and, ultimately, across the U.S. Government. This capability provides DoD with the tools to examine and assess effectively the ways in which the security cooperation community builds the capacity of, or partners with, foreign security forces by linking resources, plans, and events to national defense and security strategies and objectives.

REFERENCES

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Delegations of Authority,” November 30, 2006
DoD Directive 1404.10, “DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” January 23, 2009
DoD Directive 5105.65, “Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA),” October 26, 2012
DoD Directive 5111.1, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)),” December 8, 1999
DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,”
December 29, 2016
DoD Directive 5205.75, “DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies,” December 4, 2013
DoD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010
DoD Instruction 5132.13, “Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the
Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel,” January 9, 2009
United States Code, Title 10
United States Code, Title 22

ANNEX M - DODI 5132.14 Assessment, Monitoring, And Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise

M&E of security cooperation programs will:

(1) Foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation and track, understand, and improve returns on DoD security cooperation investments.

(2) Identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for security cooperation implementation to inform decisions about security cooperation policy, plans, programs, program management, resources, and the security cooperation workforce.



DoD INSTRUCTION 5132.14

ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION POLICY FOR THE SECURITY COOPERATION ENTERPRISE

Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Effective: January 13, 2017

Releasability: Cleared for public release. Available from the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

Approved by: Brian P. McKeon, Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5111.1 and the November 30, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, this issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for conducting assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of security cooperation plans, programs, and activities consistent with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Guidance of August 29, 2016, DoD Directive 5132.03, Section 1202 of Public Law 114-92, Public Law 111-352, Presidential Policy Directive 23, and other relevant statutory authorities under Titles 10, 22, and 50 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).

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SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION

1.1. APPLICABILITY. This issuance:

a. Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”).

b. Does not apply to any DoD effort to provide emergency foreign disaster assistance pursuant to a commander’s immediate response authority, as established in Section 404 or 2561 of Title 10, U.S.C.

c. Does not apply to programs administered by DoD pursuant to Title 22, U.S.C.

1.2. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. AM&E of security cooperation programs will:

(1) Foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation and track, understand, and improve returns on DoD security cooperation investments.

(2) Identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for security cooperation implementation to inform decisions about security cooperation policy, plans, programs, program management, resources, and the security cooperation workforce.

b. DoD will maintain a robust AM&E program in support of DoD security cooperation efforts, including:

(1) Conducting initial assessments to inform initiative design and establish a baseline against which to track progress in advance of all significant security cooperation initiatives.

(2) Developing an initiative design document (IDD) with applicable elements, to guide all significant security cooperation initiatives.

(3) Monitoring progress of significant security cooperation initiatives toward desired outcomes by tracking inputs (e.g., funding, manpower, and expertise), then determining whether programmatic milestones are achieved within anticipated timeframes, budgets, and outcomes, including whether desired results or effects are occurring within the timeframe anticipated.

(4) Conducting centralized independent and rigorous evaluations of significant security cooperation initiatives to examine their relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.

c. AM&E will be integrated into security cooperation planning at all stages.

d. Lessons learned derived from evaluations across DoD will be developed and disseminated to inform future security cooperation planning and resource decisions.

e. Collaborative evaluations across DoD Components as well as with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners should facilitate mutual learning and reduce costs.

f. AM&E practices will conform with applicable laws and Presidential directives.

g. Based on resources allocated for security cooperation programs and activities, DoD will ensure sufficient funds are made available in accordance with DoD strategy, administration policy, and international best practices, to support:

(1) The conduct of centralized independent evaluations and dissemination of lessons learned.

(2) Training and technical assistance to the security cooperation workforce for conducting and supporting AM&E functions.

(3) AM&E policy implementation by DoD Components.

h. Unclassified summaries of the evaluation of DoD security cooperation activities will be made publically available, unless it is determined that disclosure of the summary information could be expected to cause foreseeable harm to the United States or a partner nation.

i. These practices are applied to all appropriate security cooperation activities in line with guidance and standards identified in this issuance.

SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The USD(P) is responsible for the oversight and management of the security cooperation AM&E enterprise. In this capacity, the USD(P):

a. Formulates policies and processes to standardize and synchronize DoD Component AM&E efforts.

b. Maintains and oversees a centralized evaluation office to coordinate and facilitate the conduct of independent evaluations of significant security cooperation initiatives and to provide DoD-wide guidance, tools, and templates on all aspects of AM&E, by:

(1) Serving as a resource to all DoD Components for technical assistance and subject matter expertise.

(2) Facilitating the timely tracking, follow-up, and reporting of evaluations.

(3) Storing and disseminating, across DoD Components, lessons learned derived from evaluations, including briefings of evaluation findings, best practices, and recommendations to relevant DoD Components, before program planning for the following fiscal year.

c. Annually determines priorities for independent evaluations and, in consultation with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA); the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense, sets the budget and resource allocations for AM&E functions. Allocations will support:

(1) The conduct of independent evaluations for priority security cooperation initiatives and dissemination of lessons learned.

(2) Training and technical assistance to the security cooperation workforce for conducting and supporting AM&E functions.

(3) Additional resources, as needed, to support DoD Component AM&E policy implementation.

d. Reviews individual evaluation summaries and the comprehensive set of summaries for potential public release on the DoD website and determines if the summary information could be expected to cause foreseeable harm to the United States or an allied or partner nation.

e. Represents DoD security cooperation AM&E goals, policies, and priorities to external audiences, including interagency and international partners.

f. Ensures that security cooperation activities implemented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a global theater security cooperation information

management system (G-TSCMIS). Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions, and ensures such evaluations are in compliance with standards identified in Paragraph 3.5.

g. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

h. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) in the development of assessments and IDD for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.2. DIRECTOR, DSCA. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DSCA:

a. Establishes standards for AM&E training within the security cooperation workforce.

b. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, and other DoD Components, as appropriate, ensures resource allocations are sufficient to support a security cooperation workforce that is appropriately sized, properly assigned, and possesses the requisite skills, training, and resources to implement DoD's AM&E policy.

c. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDD for significant security cooperation initiatives.

d. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

e. Develops and maintains data management capabilities for AM&E, including collection, retention, and appropriate dissemination of initial assessments, IDD, and evaluation reports from all DoD Components.

f. Manages the development and operation of a G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities, and enters appropriate data into the system.

g. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

2.3. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:

a. Ensures that security cooperation activities implemented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (e.g., collaboration in science and technology, research, development, test, and evaluation, acquisition, in-service, and logistics support (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements) are appropriately assessed and

monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

b. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

c. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

d. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.4. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense:

a. Coordinates with the USD(P) on budget levels, program adjustments, and allocations to ensure the availability of sufficient resources to support security cooperation AM&E efforts.

b. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

c. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

d. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

2.5. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

a. Ensures that defense intelligence collection and analysis is sufficient to support security cooperation AM&E, particularly for significant security cooperation initiatives.

b. Ensures security cooperation activities implemented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions, in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

c. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

- d. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDD for significant security cooperation initiatives.
- e. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

2.6. DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation:

- a. Provides input to the USD(P) on annual priorities for centralized, independent evaluation.
- b. Utilizes the assessments, evaluations, and DoD Components' program and budget submissions to inform deliberations and programmatic alternatives regarding security cooperation during program review.
- c. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDD for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.7. DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The Deputy Chief management Officer of the Department of Defense maintains the open.defense.gov Website and ensures that unclassified summaries of centralized evaluations, approved for public release by the USD(P), are posted to the website and available within 90 days of completion.

2.8. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies:

- a. Ensure that security cooperation workforce personnel under their authority have the requisite skills and training to implement AM&E policies, in consultation with the Director, DSCA.
- b. Implement resource decisions, in coordination with the Director, DSCA, and other DoD Components, as appropriate, to ensure the security cooperation workforce is appropriately sized, properly assigned, and possess the requisite skills, training, and resources to implement AM&E policies.
- c. Ensure DoD-wide policies on AM&E are incorporated into DoD Component security cooperation plans, policies, doctrine, and guidance and reflected in DoD Component requirements and resourcing.
- d. Make available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDD for significant security cooperation initiatives.

e. Ensure security cooperation activities implemented by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies are assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conduct evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

f. Incorporate relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and apply lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

g. Make relevant source documents available and participate, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

2.9. CJCS. The CJCS:

a. Develops and maintains joint security cooperation doctrine consistent with DoD's AM&E policy.

b. Provides input to the USD(P) on annual priorities for centralized, independent evaluation.

c. Based on input from the GCCs, identifies shortfalls in mission execution, gaps in preparation and training, and other key personnel issues that may hinder the implementation of DoD's AM&E policy and provides to the Director, DSCA, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments recommended mitigations to address shortfalls.

d. Ensures security cooperation activities implemented by the Joint Staff are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

e. Stores and disseminates lessons learned derived from evaluations through the joint lessons learned information system portal.

f. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

g. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

h. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support the GCCs in the development of assessments and IDD for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.10. GCCS. The GCCs:

- a. Identify significant security cooperation initiatives for the purposes of assessment, monitoring, and independent evaluation in country-specific security cooperation sections of the theater campaign plan.
- b. For all significant security cooperation initiatives, ensure assessments and monitoring are undertaken in support of IDD execution. This includes:
 - (1) Leading initial assessment efforts.
 - (2) Facilitating participation of relevant subject matter experts and other appropriate participants in assessing, developing IDDs, and monitoring implementation.
 - (3) Developing the formulation of IDDs for all significant initiatives as outlined in Paragraph 3.3.
 - (4) Monitoring of all significant initiatives as outlined in Paragraph 3.4.
 - (5) Submitting to the Director, DSCA, all initial assessments and IDDs for new security cooperation initiatives, and retaining such materials for three years after completion of the security cooperation initiative.
- c. Identify shortfalls in the size, preparation, training, and staffing of personnel assigned to the Combatant Command with AM&E responsibilities and recommend mitigations to the CJCS.
- d. Ensure security cooperation initiatives are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conduct and support evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.
- e. Incorporate relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and apply lessons learned and best practices to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.
- f. Make relevant source documents available and participate, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).
- g. Direct the security cooperation offices of U.S. Embassies to support AM&E functions and activities, as appropriate.

2.11. FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDERS. The functional Combatant Commanders:

- a. Make available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

b. Ensure security cooperation activities implemented by functional Combatant Commands are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conduct evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

c. Incorporate relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and apply lessons learned and best practices to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.


d. Make relevant source documents available and participate, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

SECTION 3: AM&E FRAMEWORK AND STANDARDS

3.1 GENERAL FRAMEWORK.

- a. DoD AM&E will be consistent with U.S. Government and international standards and best practices.
- b. DoD will maintain a hybrid approach to management of AM&E efforts, whereby, in general, assessment and monitoring will be a decentralized effort based on the principles and guidelines established in this instruction and other directives, policies, and law; and evaluations at the strategic level will be centralized and overseen by the USD(P).
- c. When possible, DoD should align its AM&E efforts with those of host nation counterparts, other donors, and implementing partners. This should lessen the overall data-collection burden and help promote security cooperation effectiveness.
- d. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation each serve a separate function at distinct points in the security cooperation planning and implementation cycle (see Figure 1).
- e. AM&E is required for all significant security cooperation initiatives. Such initiatives are generally led by the GCCs and are often articulated as specific lines of effort in the country-specific security cooperation sections of a theater campaign plan. Significant security cooperation initiatives involve the application of multiple security cooperation tools and programs, which may be overseen and managed by various DoD Components and the Department of State, over multiple years to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective (e.g., maritime security or counterterrorism).
- f. Initiatives specifically designated as pilot programs (i.e., testing new concepts and approaches to security cooperation to assess their effectiveness and applicability to broader requirements) should be appropriately planned, designed, monitored, and evaluated before being replicated or expanded.
- g. Accountability and learning are the primary purposes of AM&E and will shape efforts to leverage security cooperation more effectively in support of defense objectives in the near, medium, and long terms. AM&E indicates returns on investment, allows policymakers to identify and improve or eliminate ineffective initiatives, and provides credible information in support of policy and legislation. AM&E will help DoD understand what security cooperation methods work and why, and apply lessons learned and best practices to inform security cooperation resources and policy decisions.

Figure 1. AM&E Framework



3.2. INITIAL ASSESSMENT STANDARDS. Initial assessments are required before all significant security cooperation initiatives to inform IDD, and are encouraged before all security cooperation activities. The initial assessment provides an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform security cooperation planning and implementation. Assessments identify potential risks to initiative success to help planners develop risk-mitigation strategies.

a. Initial assessments describe host nation willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, improve institutional capacity, and build capabilities in the context of country or other relevant objectives, and to identify requirements, gaps, and potential risks.

b. Analysis derived from an initial assessment should directly inform an IDD and related country plans in appropriate sections. Initial assessments should include the following elements:

(1) The extent to which an allied or partner nation shares relevant strategic objectives with the United States, as well as a partner's current ability to contribute to missions to address

such shared objectives, based on detailed holistic analysis of relevant partner capabilities such as through application of the doctrine, organizational structure, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy framework referenced in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, as established by CJCS Instruction 3170.01I.

(2) Analysis of potential risks, including assumptions and possible consequences of implementing and not implementing the initiative, program, or activity.

(3) Information to inform initiative design, including available contextual data, baselines, suggested objectives, indicators and milestones, as well as recommendations on what can be achieved within a given timeframe with anticipated resources.

(4) Analysis of relevant environmental, economic, political, sociological, cultural, and other conditions that may directly impact the implementation of the initiative in a specific country.

(5) The feasibility of achieving successful outcomes based on a partner's political willingness to pursue the desired outcome; its absorptive capacity, including the extent to which a partner can support, employ, and sustain assistance independently; its political stability; and its respect for rule of law and human rights.

(6) Analysis of other related U.S. Government, non-governmental, and international government organizations, and other stakeholder efforts that are underway or planned, including how the security cooperation initiative may complement or compete with other programs or activities.

(7) Other relevant information, assessments, completed evaluations and related documents that provide context for the initial assessment process.

3.3. SECURITY COOPERATION IDD STANDARDS. An IDD is required of all significant security cooperation initiatives. The IDD should be developed through a deliberate and inclusive process, informed by the opportunities and risks identified in the initial assessment, to create a comprehensive document. In many cases, consulting the host nation can be helpful in the development of the IDD.

a. The IDD should increase the likelihood that security cooperation investments are targeted, measurable, and effectively implemented. To that end, it provides an overview of the activities and authorities to be applied in a synchronized manner to achieve the planned security cooperation outcome. Specifically, IDDs should include:

(1) Clear linkage to goals or objectives in the theater campaign plan or other higher-level guidance.

(2) Problem statement, derived from the initial assessment, which is a clear description of the issue or challenge the initiative seeks to address. Also known as the rationale, the problem statement provides the basis and reasons for implementing a security cooperation initiative.

(3) A comprehensive performance management section that includes:

(a) A logic framework for the initiative that maps goals and specific, measurable, achievable, relevant/results-oriented, and time-bound objectives to the activities necessary to achieve desired changes. The logic framework visually describes activities and the planned process of contributing to initiative goals and achieving objectives.

(b) Indicators and milestones, ideally with baselines and targets, tied to the specific, measureable, achievable, relevant/results-oriented, and time-bound objectives that quantitatively or qualitatively measure the outputs and outcomes of the security cooperation initiative toward achieving stated objectives.

(c) A theory of change, intended to make implicit assumptions more explicit, which describes why certain actions will produce a desired change in a given context, and clearly states what the intended outcome of the initiative will be and how it will be achieved.

(4) Guidance to relevant stakeholders on how their security cooperation tools and activities should contribute to the security cooperation initiative and expectations regarding their role in supporting AM&E efforts. It should also include data-collection details, parameters, frequency, and responsibility; how results will be used and communicated; and recommendations on when to evaluate the program.

b. IDD should be updated as circumstances change, maintained and retained by the relevant DoD Component, and shared among initiative and AM&E stakeholders.

3.4. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING STANDARDS.

Performance monitoring for security cooperation will vary depending on the initiative or activity. Parameters and expectations for monitoring of indicators or milestones at pre-determined intervals throughout implementation should be clearly outlined in the performance management section of the IDD.

a. Monitoring may be focused at different levels, such as:

(1) Output monitoring at the implementation level of specific deliverables such as goods and services to document progress during initiative implementation (e.g., number of training events delivered). Output monitoring may be particularly useful to program managers and implementers.

(2) Outcome monitoring at the leadership or management level of the results of security cooperation initiatives (e.g., was capacity built based on our training? Did the partner nation successfully employ the DoD-provided system in support of the intended mission?). Outcome monitoring may be particularly useful to GCCs and organizations with policy, oversight, and management responsibilities.

b. DoD will rely on existing data collection processes managed by DSCA, the GCCs, and other DoD Components for all security cooperation activities. Data collected for each indicator should be organized in a systematic way to facilitate analysis and tracking trends to support

program-management decisions. Although data should be reported at planned intervals, it may be modified to reflect the situation on the ground.

c. Monitoring, which also may include site visits, should also review and identify any changes in the operational and strategic environment since the initial assessment and identify any unforeseen challenges that impact initiative execution and implementation.

3.5. EVALUATION STANDARDS.

a. The USD(P) will maintain an office responsible for leading a centralized effort for independent evaluations to measure the effectiveness and impact of significant security cooperation initiatives toward meeting expected outcomes. Evaluations will be primarily conducted at the strategic level using the appropriate methodology based on context, available resources, and data. Standards for evaluations will be based on the American Evaluation Association and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The four principles in Paragraphs 3.5.a. (1) through (4) should be incorporated into all evaluations conducted by DoD.

(1) **Usefulness:** The information, ideas, and recommendations generated by evaluations should serve a need or answer specific strategic questions for DoD.

(2) **Independence:** Evaluators should be able to gather and analyze data and information freely and follow rigorous and scientifically valid methodologies. All evaluations should be free from any interference from the commissioning unit or management.

(3) **Methodological and Analytical Rigor:** Evaluations should be evidence-based, relying on verifiable data and information gathered using the standards of professional evaluation organizations. Both quantitative and qualitative methods can be rigorous and are usually required to answer evaluation questions.

(4) **Cost Effectiveness:** The expected benefits from a security cooperation evaluation should be a value greater than, or equal to, the resources expended on the evaluation. Cost effectiveness should also be weighed in determining how the evaluation will be used.

b. Evaluations of other security cooperation activities may be commissioned by DoD Components and other stakeholders to improve performance or answer key management questions. These evaluations should generally follow the standards identified within this section.

c. Joint or collaborative evaluations are strongly encouraged when they:

(1) Facilitate mutual learning or reduce costs.

(2) Are preceded by a memorandum of understanding that outlines costs, expectations, roles, and responsibilities.

d. Security cooperation evaluations will follow the internationally and U.S. Government-recognized ethical standards in dealing with stakeholders and other informants, including:

(1) **Rights of Human Subjects:** Evaluations will comply with 32 CFR Part 219 and DoDI 3216.02 to the extent those provisions apply.

(2) **Sensitivity:** Evaluators should be sensitive to the gender, beliefs, manners, and customs of people as well as organizational structures and hierarchies as they conduct their research in culturally appropriate fashion.

(3) **Privacy and Confidentiality of Information:** The privacy and confidentiality of information should be maintained. If sensitive information is involved, the identity of the informants must be protected in accordance with the Privacy Act and DoD information policies as applicable.

(4) **Conflict of Interest:** Evaluators should strive to eliminate biases or vested interest in the evaluation outcomes. Evaluators or contracted firms should recuse themselves from an evaluation if they played any role in planning or supporting the execution of the program or could be perceived to benefit from the program being evaluated.

e. Final evaluation reports should be clear and concise. The reports should be readable and, as far as possible, the language should be simple, active, familiar, and culturally and politically sensitive. In accordance with U.S. Government best practices, reports should:

(1) Include data, findings, conclusions, and recommendations: Such information can be collected by the evaluators or collected during monitoring. Findings represent the interpretation of data. Conclusions are the judgments that evaluators make about the initiative's performance, outcomes, and impacts based on findings. Recommendations for how future performance could be improved follow from the findings and conclusions.

(2) Be organized around evaluation questions, with findings, conclusions, and recommendations addressing each of the major questions. Reports should include these elements:

- (a) Executive summary of evaluation.
- (b) Introduction and background.
- (c) Description of program or activity (e.g., including budget, beginning and end dates).
- (d) Purpose of evaluation.
- (e) Evaluation questions.
- (f) Description of the evaluation design, including data collection methods used, scope, and methodology.
- (g) A statement about the time period of the evaluation work performance, time spent in the field, who did the work, and the composition of the team.

(h) Strengths and limitations of the collected data.

(i) Conclusions: The overall conclusions synthesize findings from the questions asked and should be logical inferences based on findings of each question.

(j) Recommendations: Findings that require corrective action will need a recommendation directed at management officials who have the authority to act on it. Recommendations should state what needs to be corrected or achieved without being prescriptive. They should flow naturally from the findings and conclusions.

(k) Appendices for additional documents, including evaluation scope of work/terms of reference.

(3) Be accompanied by a briefing by the evaluators with key stakeholders to review results and debrief on evaluation process and procedures.

f. To promote transparency of DoD's security cooperation programs, completed evaluations by the centralized evaluation office will include a separate summary for posting on DoD's public website (www.open.defense.gov) unless the USD(P), in consultation with other DoD Components, determines that disclosure of the summary information could be expected to cause foreseeable harm to the United States or a partner nation. The summary of the evaluation should generally be no more than 2-4 pages and should include:

(1) The title of the evaluation and a brief overview of the programs or activities involved and relevant context.

(2) The purpose of the evaluation and questions addressed.

(3) The methodology used and its scope and limitation.

(4) Key findings generally organized by evaluation questions.

(5) Conclusions and, if appropriate, recommendations.

g. Consistent with AM&E best practices and to promote accountability and the usefulness of evaluation results, within 30 days of finalizing an evaluation report the relevant stakeholders should prepare a memorandum responding to the evaluation to the USD(P), indicating:

(1) Concurrence or non-concurrence in evaluation recommendations (e.g., do the relevant management officials agree with recommendations outlined in the report and, if not, why?).

(2) A plan for compliance with the recommendations (e.g., how will management implement or act on recommendations from the report? What changes will be made?).

(3) A timeframe for compliance (e.g., when does management expect the recommendations to be implemented fully?).

(4) A point of contact for implementing recommendations (e.g., who will be in charge of implementation?).

GLOSSARY

G.1. ACRONYMS

AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
G-TSCMIS	Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
IDD	initiative design document
U.S.C.	United States Code
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.

accountability. Obligation to demonstrate, deliver on, and report on what has been achieved in compliance with agreed rules, policies, and standards.

assessment. Systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform security cooperation planning and implementation. Assessments are generally conducted in advance of security cooperation activities, but may be repeated to update analysis and identify mid-course corrections of security cooperation activities.

country-specific security cooperation section. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding integrated country strategies. Each country-specific security cooperation section identifies specific lines of effort that:

Represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country.

Articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives.

effectiveness. The extent to which a security cooperation initiative has attained its objectives or intended results.

efficiency. A measure of how economically resources (e.g., funds, expertise, time) are used to achieve results.

evaluation. A systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed initiative, and its design, implementation, and results. Evaluations determine relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as a basis for improving effectiveness and to inform decision makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities. Evaluation, distinct from assessment and monitoring, focuses on documenting the achievement of outcomes and results and in some cases the value of continuing the investment.

evaluation recommendations. Proposals based on evaluation findings and conclusions that are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, quality, or processes of a security cooperation program or activity.

indicator. Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the anticipated changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a security cooperation actor. Two types of indicators are relevant for security cooperation AM&E efforts:

Output - good or service delivered.

Outcome - condition achieved as a result of outputs.

initial assessment. Information collected before or at the start of an initiative that provides a basis for planning, monitoring, or evaluating subsequent progress or impact.

IDD. A comprehensive document that specifies the specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives, theory of change, and performance management plan for a security cooperation initiative.

joint evaluations. Joint or collaborative evaluations are evaluations undertaken by two or more stakeholders involved in a security cooperation initiative, either within DoD or between DoD and other U.S. Government departments, agencies, or other stakeholders, including the host nation.

milestone. A scheduled event that indicates the completion of a major task of a program. Milestones are observable and enable the measurement of the progress of a program.

monitoring. A continuous process designed to provide regular feedback on the extent to which expected outputs and outcomes are being achieved to inform decisions or corrective actions. In general, results measured in monitoring are the direct and near-term consequences of initiative activities that provide opportunities to validate the theory of change throughout implementation and an early indication of the likelihood that expected results will be attained.

objective. A statement of a desired result that meets the criteria of being specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound.

output. The direct, tangible results of initiatives. A deliverable or product, good, or service directly resulting from a security cooperation initiative or activity, such as the number of training events and the number of unit members trained. These early work products often serve as documentation of progress during implementation and monitoring.

outcome. The results achieved by initiatives. Some outcomes of interest for security cooperation are whether partner capability is being built to meet standards, to what extent, and whether it is achieved within a desired time frame. Three types of outcomes include:

Short-term. Immediate effects of the initiative or activities often focused on the knowledge and attitudes of the intended audience.

Intermediate. Intermediate effects on behavior or normative or policy changes.

Long-term (also impact). Long-term, cumulative effects of interventions over time on what they ultimately aim to change (e.g., capabilities, security conditions).

performance management plan. A specific plan to manage the process of monitoring, evaluating, and analyzing progress toward achieving results over the life of a program.

pilot program. An innovative program conducted on a small scale to examine its model, implementation, effects, and outcomes to determine whether it should be replicated on a larger scale or expanded in a different environment.

security cooperation offices. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Security cooperation offices may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation designated to perform security cooperation functions. They do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams or operational units.

security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

security cooperation funding. Allocated funds, including both base and overseas contingency operations appropriations, to any program or activity that is intended primarily for the purpose of security cooperation. This category includes programs and activities used to train and equip partners; provide technical, educational, financial, or humanitarian assistance; conduct military-to-military or defense civilian contacts, engagements, or exchanges; provide support to operations conducted by partner nations; and conduct other relevant bilateral and multilateral activities.

Security cooperation funding does not include programs or activities with a primary purpose other than security cooperation, even where there are secondary security cooperation benefits, such as combined exercises or combined training primarily intended to improve U.S. military readiness. Covered funding is limited to those funds used for incremental execution costs and program management costs, and do not include costs associated with manning, training, and equipping force elements used to implement such activities.

significant security cooperation initiative. The series of activities, projects, and programs planned as a unified, multi-year effort to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes. Such initiatives are generally planned by the geographic Combatant Commands and involve the application of multiple security cooperation tools over multiple years to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective as articulated in the country-specific security cooperation sections of a theater campaign plan.

sustainability. The partner country's ability to maintain capability, capacity, or other results of a security cooperation intervention at the desired level of effectiveness and efficiency.

theory of change. A statement of expectations regarding the process by which planned activities will lead to stated objectives. It articulates assumptions and plans about how and why a set of activities and actions are expected to evolve in the future, including causal linkages through which early and intermediate outcomes will lead to long-term results.

REFERENCES

- American Evaluation Association, “Guiding Principles for Evaluators,” July 2004
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS),” January 23, 2015
- Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Part 219
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Guidance, “DoD Guidance for Security Coordination,” August 29, 2016
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Delegations of Authority,” November 30, 2006
- DoD Directive 5111.1, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)),” December 8, 1999
- DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” December 29, 2016
- DoD Instruction 3216.02, Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research, November 8, 2011
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Principles for Evaluating Development Assistance,” December 1991
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Quality Standards for Development Evaluation,” February 2010
- Presidential Policy Directive-23, “Security Sector Assistance,” April 5, 2013¹
- Public Law 87-195, “United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,” September 1961 (as amended)
- Public Law 111-352, “Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010,” January 2011
- Public Law 114-92, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,” November 2015
- United States Agency for International Development, “How To Note: Preparing Evaluation Reports,” November 2012
- United States Code, Title 10
- United States Code, Title 22
- United States Code, Title 32
- United States Code, Title 50

¹ U.S. Government personnel may review by contacting the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation.

ANNEX N - DODI 5000.68 Security Force Assistance, Oct 2010

The Department of Defense shall develop and maintain the capability within DoD general purpose forces (GPF), special operations forces (SOF), and the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) to conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy and in coordination with the relevant U.S. Government (USG) departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “USG agencies”).



Department of Defense

INSTRUCTION

NUMBER 5000.68

October 27, 2010

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Security Force Assistance (SFA)

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This Instruction establishes policy and assigns responsibilities regarding the preparation of DoD personnel and operational planning for, as well as the conduct of, SFA across the Department of Defense in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 (Reference (a)); Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (b)); titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (References (c) and (d)), the guidance in Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (e)), and DoDDs 5132.03 and 3000.07 (References (f) and (g)) as they pertain to SFA (see Glossary for definitions).
2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.
4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:
 - a. The Department of Defense shall develop and maintain the capability within DoD general purpose forces (GPF), special operations forces (SOF), and the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) to conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy and in coordination with the relevant U.S. Government (USG) departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "USG agencies").

b. SFA shall encompass DoD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict as well as during all phases of military operations. These efforts shall be conducted with, through, and by foreign security forces.

c. SFA activities shall be conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the Department of Defense may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions.

d. SFA activities must directly increase the capacity or capability of a foreign security force or their supporting institutions. The term "directly" is context-specific and serves to emphasize that the clear and express intent of a SFA activity is the improvement of the capacity or capability of a foreign security force or its supporting institutions.

e. SFA contributes to the DoD role in USG security sector reform (SSR) initiatives.

f. SFA is a subset of DoD overall security cooperation (SC) initiatives. Other SC activities, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities dedicated to the non-security sector, provide valuable engagement opportunities between the United States and its partners, but fall outside the scope of SFA.

g. Security assistance programs are critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities, which contribute to a host country's defense.

h. The portion of SFA oriented towards supporting a host country's efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, is a subset of foreign internal defense.

i. SFA activities shall be prioritized using factors such as U.S. interests in the region, the willingness and ability of partner nations to absorb U.S. assistance, and the level of risk for partner nations to achieve their goals without U.S. assistance.

j. The Department of Defense shall develop and maintain capabilities to:

(1) Organize, train, equip, and advise foreign military forces.

(2) Support the development of the capability and capacity of host-country defense institutions and ministries.

(3) Conduct SFA across all domains – air, land, maritime, and cyberspace – in both permissive and contested environments, under steady-state or surge conditions.

k. If required to support the development of the capability and capacity of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions, and to the extent authorized by law, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to apply the requisite task-organized capabilities to:

(1) Support and coordinate with other USG agencies that are leading USG efforts to support the development of the capability and capacity of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.

(2) Advise and support the training of foreign paramilitary security forces – such as border and coastal control forces, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitary or special police forces – at all levels, in conjunction with other USG agencies.

(3) Support the training of host-country civil police in individual and collective tasks in contested environments when other USG-agencies' trainers and advisors are unable to do so. Coordinate the transition of responsibilities for such training and advisory duties to other USG agencies as the security environment allows.

l. The Department of Defense shall conduct SFA activities with the appropriate combinations of SOF, GPF, CEW personnel (in accordance with DoDD 1404.10 (Reference (h))), and contract personnel that are collectively capable of executing all missions and activities required under these conditions:

(1) Politically sensitive environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host-country government.


(2) Environments where a limited, overt U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government.

(3) Environments where a large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

6. RELEASABILITY. UNLIMITED. This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Instruction is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances Website.


Michèle Flournoy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Enclosures

1. References
 2. Responsibilities
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ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

- (a) DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), December 8, 1999
- (b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegations of Authority," November 30, 2006
- (c) Title 10, United States Code
- (d) Title 22, United States Code
- (e) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Security Force Assistance," September 9, 2008
- (f) DoD Directive 5132.03, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," October 24, 2008
- (g) DoD Directive 3000.07, "Irregular Warfare (IW)," December 1, 2008
- (h) DoD Directive 1404.10, "DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce," January 23, 2009
- (i) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance for Employment of the Force," April 21, 2008
- (j) DoD Directive 5105.65, "Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)," October 31, 2000
- (k) DoD Instruction 5132.13 "Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel," January 9, 2009
- (l) DoD Directive 5105.75, "Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies," December 21, 2007
- (m) DoD Instruction C-5105.81, "Implementing Instructions for DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies (U)," November 6, 2008
- (n) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, "Rapid Validation and Resourcing of the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JOUNS) in the Year of Execution," July 15, 2005
- (o) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)," January 7, 2010
- (p) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)," March 4, 2010
- (q) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Charter," April 4, 2006
- (r) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126.01, "Language and Regional Expertise Planning," January 23, 2006

ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

a. Establish policy on all SFA efforts in consultation with the Heads of the OSD and DoD Components as appropriate.

b. Establish SFA guidance on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and ensure that SFA activities are aligned with DoD policy.

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)). The ASD(SO/LIC&IC), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall:

a. Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for SFA policy, capability development, and operational employment of DoD forces and DoD Components engaged in SFA across all domains. Provide overall policy oversight to DoD SFA capability-development efforts, including the prioritization of those efforts.

b. Review, in support of capability-oversight responsibilities, the geographic Combatant Commander (CCDR) annual forecast of SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure) and provide the forecast to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)); the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE); and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces (DUSD(SPF)) to ensure the Department of Defense is able to meet the projected requirements adequately.

c. Lead DoD efforts, in cooperation with other USG agencies, to develop guidance for assessing the SFA needs of foreign security forces and supporting institutions.

d. Lead DoD capability-development efforts and policy oversight for SFA activities dedicated to the development of foreign defense ministries in accordance with Reference (h).

e. Lead DoD efforts to collaborate with other USG agencies to develop SFA-related policy, doctrine, and operating concepts.

f. Co-lead, with the DCAPE and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the assessment of Military Department capacities and capabilities for a range of campaign and contingency scenarios involving SFA, including the geographic CCDR forecast of SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure), in accordance with Reference (g).

g. Propose legislative changes as necessary to the Secretary of Defense to ensure appropriate authorities exist to support SFA activities in accordance with DoD SFA objectives and goals.

h. Coordinate the integration of DoD SFA capability-development efforts with similar activities of relevant USG agencies and selected international partners.

i. Provide oversight of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in its role as the joint proponent for SFA.

3. DUSD(SPF). The DUSD(SPF), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall:

a. Prioritize DoD planning for SFA activities in accordance with Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (i)) and other relevant Secretary of Defense-approved documents.

b. Identify and define future capabilities required for SFA activities and incorporate guidance into appropriate strategic documents.

c. Lead the development of comprehensive criteria and methodologies for assessing CCDR progress in developing host-country security forces and supporting institutions as well as international and regional security organizations.

d. Ensure SFA is adequately addressed in the development of relevant defense planning scenarios and force sufficiency studies in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DCAPE.

4. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY (DSCA). The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall:

a. Direct, administer, and provide DoD-wide program execution guidance, in accordance with DoDD 5105.65 (Reference (j)), to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions for the implementation of programs involving SFA activities that DSCA has been assigned to fund and direct the execution of.

b. Identify requirements, criteria, and procedures for the selection and training of security cooperation organization (SCO) personnel and others who manage DSCA SFA-related programs consistent with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5132.13 (Reference (k)).

c. Ensure that the SCO training curriculum fully prepares personnel to manage security cooperation programs that support SFA activities, in accordance with Reference (g).

d. Communicate directly with the Heads of the DoD Components on SFA-related program matters, in accordance with DoDD 5105.75 (Reference (l)).

e. Support the USD(P) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) in developing sales policies and procedures for SFA-related defense information, technology, and systems, as appropriate.

f. In coordination with the Combatant Commands, establish appropriate agreements and procedures for SCOs to provide guidance and oversight to SFA-related programs in accordance with Reference (l) and DoDI C-5105.81 (Reference (m)).

g. Establish and maintain a process to provide guidance and prioritization to the Military Departments in the Foreign Military Sales case-execution phase of procurement of U.S. military goods and services to ensure that urgent and emerging priorities for equipping and training foreign security forces are addressed in a timely and fiscally responsible manner.

5. USD(P&R). The USD(P&R) shall:

a. In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC); the Commander, USSOCOM (CDRUSSOCOM); the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM); and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and in collaboration with the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), establish policy and provide oversight for the training and education of military and DoD civilian personnel to conduct SFA.

b. In accordance with the guidance in Reference (g), establish policies to enable DoD-wide tracking and managing of personnel with SFA-related skills, training, and experience, including policies that support military and DoD civilian personnel in obtaining regional expertise and provide for incentives for them to develop critical language and cultural skills.

c. In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the DCAPE, and in collaboration with the Commandant, USCG, assess the readiness of military and DoD civilian personnel to conduct SFA in support of the geographic CCDR annual forecast of SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure).

d. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CDRUSSOCOM, the CDRUSJFCOM, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and in accordance with Reference (g), assess the impact of sourcing SFA requirements on the overall readiness of SOF and GPF to conduct non-SFA missions and propose personnel policies to mitigate any adverse effects identified.

e. In accordance with Reference (h), establish policies and procedures to govern and facilitate the training and employment of DoD SFA civilian trainers and advisors, whether civil-service or contractor personnel.

6. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L) shall:

a. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other relevant DoD Component Heads, include in Defense Acquisition Management or Joint Urgent Operational Need acquisition programs of record, as well as in rapid acquisition and technology-development efforts, SFA capabilities that are validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and in compliance with the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System and CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01 (Reference (n)).

b. Establish policies and procedures for the research, development, procurement, and sustainment of materiel solutions for SFA activities and tasks identified in strategic guidance.

c. Identify sustainable technologies available through the Department of Defense, the USG, and off-the-shelf private-sector programs that could bolster DoD SFA activities with host countries, and direct them into an appropriate regimen of rapid procurement, demonstration, experimentation, testing, and fielding.

d. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other relevant DoD Component Heads, support SFA activities by ensuring that standard and non-standard equipment needed by partner forces can be promptly made available when appropriate.

7. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I) shall:

a. Establish policies and procedures for SFA activities involving intelligence and information partnerships.

b. Support assessment of the future SFA demand by providing appropriate intelligence forecasts in support of national and regional strategies and campaign plans generated in accordance with Reference (i).

8. DCAPE. The DCAPE, shall:

a. Co-lead, with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the assessment of Military Department capacity and capability for a range of campaign and contingency scenarios involving SFA, including assessment of the geographic CCDR annual forecast of SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure), in accordance with Reference (g).

b. Manage, in conjunction with the USD(AT&L), the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the development and use of appropriate analytical models, tools, and data to support analysis of SFA requirements.

9. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

a. Develop, maintain, and institutionalize the capabilities of Service members and CEW personnel to support DoD efforts to organize, train, equip, and advise foreign military forces and relevant supporting institutions, including during periods of armed conflict, up to the host-country military-department level in order to meet the geographic CCDR-forecasted annual SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure).

(1) Support DoD efforts to build the capacity and capability of ministries of defense.

(2) Enhance, if required, the capability and capacity of partner countries' non-defense ministry security forces, in support of USG agencies.

(3) Provide scalable capabilities to meet the requirements of all three conditions under which SFA activities are conducted as described in paragraph 4.1. above the signature in this Instruction.

b. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, support the identification of required joint SFA capabilities across all domains (e.g., air, land, maritime, and cyberspace) and acquire both standard and non-standard equipment required to conduct SFA-related activities on the tactical and operational levels.

c. In coordination with the USD(P&R), establish personnel, training, education, and reporting requirements for military and DoD civilian personnel to conduct SFA-related activities; develop incentives for military and DoD civilian personnel to obtain critical language and cultural skills appropriate to operations in key regions in support of Reference (g).

(1) In conjunction with the irregular warfare (IW) annual assessment required by Reference (g), report the readiness of military and civilian personnel with SFA-related skills, training, education, and experience to meet requirements identified in DoD policy guidance and CCDR theater strategies.

(2) Identify and track individuals who have completed SFA-related training, education, or experience in the Defense Readiness Reporting System with a relevant skill-designator indicating their SFA qualifications.

d. In coordination with the USD(AT&L), include geographic CCDR-validated U.S. military SFA capability requirements in acquisition programs.

e. Develop Military Department, Service-specific strategy, doctrine, training, education, and proficiency standards for SFA capabilities.

f. In coordination with the geographic CCDRs; the Director, DSCA; and the USD(P&R), expand, standardize, and mandate training for SCO personnel.

g. Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CDRUSSOCOM, and the CDRUSJFCOM in their efforts to develop global joint sourcing solutions that recommend the most appropriate forces for validated SFA requirements to the Global Force Management Board.

h. In support of Reference (h), provide pre-deployment training for all CEW personnel mobilized to support SFA missions as required and when resourced.

10. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

a. Serve as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for SFA capability development and operational employment of DoD forces and components engaged in SFA activities. In conjunction with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), provide oversight of DoD SFA capability-development and employment efforts.

b. In support of capability oversight responsibilities, review the geographic CCDR annual forecast of SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure) and provide the forecast to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, to ensure the Military Services are able to meet the forecasted requirements adequately.

c. Direct joint exercises, concept development, and experimentation to ensure the Military Services and Combatant Commands are prepared to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns involving SFA activities.

d. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CDRUSSOCOM, the CDRUSJFCOM, and the Director, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), develop joint doctrine and future operating concepts for SFA and incorporate SFA-related concepts into joint doctrine.

e. In accordance with Secretary of Defense Memorandums (References (o) and (p)), approve, through the Global Force Management Board process, global joint-sourcing solutions recommended by the joint force providers for geographic CCDR-validated SFA requirements; forward to the Secretary of Defense for approval as part of the Global Force Management Allocation Plan.

f. Incorporate an assessment of Military Service proficiency and readiness to conduct SFA activities into the annual assessments of proficiency and readiness for IW as required by Reference (g).

g. Co-lead, with the DCAPE and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), the assessment of Military Department capacities and capabilities for a range of campaign and contingency scenarios involving SFA, including the geographic CCDR annual forecast of SFA requirements (see paragraph 11.b. of this enclosure), in accordance with Reference (g).

h. In coordination with the USD(P&R), include SCO tours on the Joint Duty Assignment List to incentivize tour assignments and build proficiency in SFA.

i. In coordination with the Director, DSCA, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop joint publications on SFA for incorporation into the joint professional military education system.

j. In conjunction with the DCAPE and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), manage the development and use of appropriate analytical models, tools, and data to support analysis of SFA.

k. Lead the identification of required joint SFA capabilities across all domains (e.g., air, land, maritime, and cyberspace).

l. Provide continued oversight of JCISFA as a CJCS-controlled activity in accordance with Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (q)).

m. In coordination with the Secretary of the Army, the CDRUSSOCOM, the CDRUSJFCOM, and the Director, JCISFA, establish and maintain processes and procedures to maintain effective relationships between JCISFA and key DoD SFA stakeholders to support the institutionalization of SFA.

11. GEOGRAPHIC CCDRs. The geographic CCDRs, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate, shall:

a. In coordination with the chiefs of mission and country teams in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs) and the other Heads of the DoD Components:

(1) Assess and prioritize the needs of foreign security forces and supporting institutions in coordination with interagency partners and in accordance with Reference (i).

(2) Incorporate SFA into theater plans, both in the context of campaign and contingency plans and operational activities as delineated in Reference (i).

(3) Conduct SFA within their AORs.

b. Annually forecast and report to the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) SFA requirements for the following year and to the end of the Future Years Defense Program. Include in such forecasts training, language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness requirements for personnel, including SCO personnel, who are executing and supporting SFA activities in their respective AORs, in accordance with CJCSI 3126.01 (Reference (r)).

c. Incorporate assessment of SFA activities, capabilities, and requirements, as appropriate, into responses to current assessment taskings (e.g., comprehensive joint assessment) to facilitate the preparation of SFA-related reports and assessments.

d. Record in the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System all subordinate commands and DoD entities conducting SFA activities in their respective AORs.

e. Integrate staff and unit collective training for SFA activities into training programs. In accordance with References (g) and (k), ensure that training requirements for personnel assigned to SCOs fully prepare SCO personnel with the skills needed to facilitate and conduct SFA activities.

12. CDRUSSOCOM. The CDRUSSOCOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate, shall:

a. Serve as the joint proponent for SFA, and in this capacity shall:

(1) In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the CDRUSJFCOM, assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by serving as lead for the development of joint doctrine, training, and education relevant to SFA activities conducted within a host country from the individual to the Service-level.

(2) Lead the development of Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks for SFA and the mapping of those tasks to approved joint capability areas.

(3) Collaborate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CDRUSJFCOM, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the geographic CCDRs, to develop global joint-sourcing solutions that recommend to the Global Force Management Board the most appropriate forces for meeting geographic CCDR-validated SFA requirements under the conditions in paragraph 4.1. above the signature of this Instruction.

(4) Assist USD(P&R) efforts to identify and establish guidelines for skills, experience, rank, training, education, and levels of expertise for Service members and career DoD civilian and contractor personnel to conduct SFA activities.

(5) Upon request from the geographic CCDRs, serve as a source of SFA expertise to joint task forces or Combatant Command joint force headquarters.

b. Support the CDRUSJFCOM, in coordination with the Director, JCISFA, to collect best practices to support future concept and doctrine development.

c. Incorporate an assessment of SOF proficiency and readiness to conduct SFA activities into the annual assessments of SOF proficiency and readiness for IW as required by Reference (g).

d. In coordination with the CDRUSJFCOM, identify and explore new SFA concepts and capabilities and integrate them into the joint concept development and experimentation program.

13. CDRUSJFCOM. The CDRUSJFCOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate, shall:

a. Explore new SFA concepts and capabilities and integrate them into the joint concept development and experimentation program, in coordination with the USD(AT&L), the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CDRUSSOCOM. Recommend potential solutions, including planning and assessments, to address SFA capability and capacity gaps and process issues identified by the geographic CCDRs during concept development and experimentation.

b. In conjunction with the CDRUSSOCOM and the geographic CCDRs, through the ASD SO/LIC&IC, identify potential solutions for enhancing interagency collaboration in SFA activities and training.

c. In conjunction with the CDRUSSOCOM and the geographic CCDRs, and in collaboration with the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, identify potential solutions for enhancing multinational proficiency in SFA activities and training.

d. Collaborate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CDRUSSOCOM, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the geographic CCDRs, to develop global joint-sourcing solutions that recommend to the Global Force Management Board the most appropriate forces for meeting geographic CCDR-validated SFA requirements under the conditions in paragraph 4.1. above the signature of this Instruction.

e. In coordination with the CDRUSSOCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and in collaboration with the Commandant, USCG:

(1) Recommend, for Joint Requirements Oversight Council approval, changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to improve joint SFA capabilities.

(2) Identify and disseminate DoD, interagency, and multinational SFA lessons learned and best practices across the Department of Defense.

f. Identify and recommend to the CDRUSSOCOM UJTL tasks for SFA.

g. Support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the identification of required joint SFA capabilities across all domains (e.g., air, land, maritime, and cyberspace).

h. Support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CDRUSSOCOM in the development of joint SFA doctrine and joint SFA training and education standards for individuals and units.

i. Support the integration of individual and collective SFA training activities into joint mission rehearsals, Combatant Command training programs, senior leader education and, as required, Military Service training programs.

- j. Provide modeling and simulation support to SFA exercises and experiments.
- k. In support of Reference (g), include an annual assessment of GPF proficiency and readiness to conduct SFA in the annual assessment of Military Service GPF proficiency and readiness for IW to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform and support the development of the Chairman's Annual Risk Assessment.

GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOR	area of responsibility
ASD(SO/LIC&IC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CDRUSJFCOM	Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CEW	civilian expeditionary workforce
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	CJCS Instruction
DCAPE	Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
DoDD	DoD Directive
DoDI	DoD Instruction
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DUSD(SPF)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces
GPF	general purpose forces
IW	irregular warfare
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
SCO	security cooperation organization
SFA	security force assistance
SOF	special operations forces
SSR	security sector reform
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USG	U.S. Government

PART II. DEFINITIONS

These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction.

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

joint proponent. A Service, Combatant Command, or Joint Staff directorate assigned coordinating authority to lead the collaborative development and integration of a joint capability with specific responsibilities designated by the Secretary of Defense.

security assistance. A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

security cooperation. Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that:

Build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities.

Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

Provide Service members with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a government.

SFA. DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.

SSR. The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; or reduction of armed violence. The DoD

primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum.

with, through, and by. Describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces that initially involves training and assisting (interacting “with” the forces). The next step in the process is advising, which may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the forces). The final phase is achieved when foreign security forces operate independently (act “by” themselves).

ANNEX O – JP 3-07 *Stabilization*, 11 February 2022

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess the military contribution to stabilization efforts across the competition continuum.

https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/jp3_07-2022.pdf

ANNEX P – (Omitted)

ANNEX Q – JP 3-08 *Interorganizational Cooperation*, validated 18 October 2017

This publication provides joint doctrine to coordinate military operations with other US Government departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_08.pdf?ver=CqudGqyJFga9GaACVxgaDQ%3d%3d

ANNEX R – JP 3-20 *Security Cooperation*, 26 May 2017

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation activities.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf

ANNEX S – JP 3-29 *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 14 May 2019

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf?ver=2019-05-21-150525-607

ANNEX T – JP 3-57 *Civil-Military Operations*, 9 July 2018

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess civil-military operations.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_57.pdf?ver=2018-09-13-134111-460

ANNEX U – Extracted DSS Security Cooperation Programs

1210A, Support for Stabilization Activities in National Security Interests of the U.S.

Description:	Support for stabilization activities of other Federal agencies working in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia
Purpose:	Logistics, supplies, and service support to other Federal agencies specified in subsection (c) (1) for the stabilization activities of such agencies on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis
Authorization:	Section 1210A, NDAA, FY 2020, as amended, P.L. 116-92, 20 December 2019, as amended by P.L. 177-81, 27 Dec 2021.
Appropriation:	Not more than \$18M per fiscal year
Guidance:	Support provided under this authority shall be implemented in accordance with the guidance of the Department of Defense entitled DOD Directive 3000.05,” dated 13 December 2018. Support may be provided only after SecDef (with the Concurrence of SEC State) has determined that stabilization efforts in the designated country is in the U.S.’s national security interest.
Countries Eligible:	Iraq, Syria, and Somalia
Value of Program:	\$18M
Restrictions:	Authority expires 31 Dec 2023
Key Players:	DoS, DOD, and USAID

Execution:

- i Support may be provided with SecState concurrence and deemed in the national security interests of the US.
- ii No amount of support may be provided until 15 days after the date on which the SecDef with concurrence of SecState submits report on stabilization strategy for country to Congress.

1202, Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare

Description:	Allows SecDef, along with concurrence of Chief of Mission, to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting irregular warfare operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF).
Purpose:	To enable foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals engaged or facilitating ongoing irregular warfare operations by U.S. SOF support
Authorization:	Sec 1202, NDAA FY18, P.L. 115-91, 12 Dec 2017, as amended by P.L. 117-81, 27 December 2021.
Appropriation:	May expend up to \$10M per year from DOD O&M funds; Authority extended through FY 2025.
Guidance:	The authority to make funds available may not be delegated below SecDef
Countries Eligible:	As requested by USSOCOM and approved by SecDef
Value of Program:	Variable
Restrictions:	Authority is not given to conduct covert action, the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces within meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, for provision of support not otherwise prohibited by law, to support activities directly or indirectly inconsistent with the laws of armed conflict. Requires biannual reports to the Congressional Defense Committees of the support provided under this section.
Key Players:	Theater SOCCOM CDR, USSOCOM, CCMDs, COM, and ASD (SO-LIC)
Execution:	SecDef shall establish procedures that, at minimum, will give policy guidance for the execution of and constraints, process through which activities are to be developed, validated and coordinated with relevant USG agencies, and process through which legal reviews and determinations are made to comply with authority.

1209, Authority to Provide Assistance to the Vetted Syrian Groups and Individuals

Description:	Authorized assistance by DOD to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals.
Purpose:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Provide equipment, supplies, training, stipends, construction and repair of training and associated facilities, and sustainment for following purposes:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and securing territory formerly controlled by the Syrian opposition◇ Protecting the U.S. and its partners and allies from threats posed by terrorists in Syria
Authorization:	Section 1209, NDAA, FY 2015, P.L.113-291, 19 Dec 2014, as extended and modified by P.L. 117-81. 27 December 2021.
Appropriation:	From already funded DOD programs authorized for this type of assistance.
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï SecDef, in coordination with SecState, shall provide a plan for such assistance to Congress not later than 15 days prior the provision of any assistance.ï The President shall submit a report to Congress describing how such assistance fits within a larger regional strategy.ï A quarterly report to Congress is required describing assistance provided, appropriately vetted recipients receiving such assistance, plan effectiveness, and any misuse or loss of provided training and equipment.ï SecDef may receive any contributions from other countries for assistance authorized by this authority.ï SecDef may also provide assistance to third countries for the purposes of this authorized assistance program.ï SecDef must certify to the appropriate committees that no U.S. forces will be or have been used to extract, transfer, or sell oil from Syria.ï This assistance is authorized through 31 December 2022.
Countries Eligible:	None

report on U.S. strategy in Syria or 30 days after the SecDef unclassified report on the efforts of USG to train and equip appropriately vetted Syrian opposition forces

Key Players:

USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, DoS and DOD, USDP/ASD-SOLIC/DSCA, and Implementing Agencies

Example:

A few Syrian rebels have been trained, and some supplies have air-dropped into northern Syria.

1210A, Support for Stabilization Activities in National Security Interests of the U.S.

Description:	Support for stabilization activities of other Federal agencies working in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia
Purpose:	Logistics, supplies, and service support to other Federal agencies specified in subsection (c) (1) for the stabilization activities of such agencies on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis
Authorization:	Section 1210A, NDAA, FY 2020, as amended, P.L. 116-92, 20 December 2019, as amended by P.L. 177-81, 27 Dec 2021.
Appropriation:	Not more than \$18M per fiscal year
Guidance:	Support provided under this authority shall be implemented in accordance with the guidance of the Department of Defense entitled DOD Directive 3000.05,” dated 13 December 2018. Support may be provided only after SecDef (with the Concurrence of SEC State) has determined that stabilization efforts in the designated country is in the U.S.’s national security interest.
Countries Eligible:	Iraq, Syria, and Somalia
Value of Program:	\$18M
Restrictions:	Authority expires 31 Dec 2023
Key Players:	DoS, DOD, and USAID
Execution:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Support may be provided with SecState concurrence and deemed in the national security interests of the US.ï No amount of support may be provided until 15 days after the date on which the SecDef with concurrence of SecState submits report on stabilization strategy for country to Congress.

1226, Support to Certain Governments for Border Security Operations

Description:	This used to be called “1226, Support to the Government of Jordan and Lebanon for Border Security” but was renamed by the FY17 NDAA. This program provides assistance for the Government of Jordan and Lebanon for Border Security Operations. Note that P.L. 116-260 added Tunisia and Oman.
Purpose:	To provide support on a reimbursement basis for the governments of Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Oman, and Pakistan to improve their security and to sustain increased border security along their borders
Authorization:	Section 1226, FY16, NDAA, P.L. 114-92, 25 Nov 2015, as amended
Appropriation:	Amounts to provide support from this section may be derived only from amounts authorized and appropriated from operations and maintenance defense-wide.
Guidance:	Support under this program may be provided on a quarterly basis. Not later than 15 days before providing support, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report setting forth a full description of the support to be provided, including the amount, timeline, and recipient.
Countries Eligible:	Jordan, Tunisia, Oman, and Lebanon
Value of Program:	Variable
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï This assistance may not be provided after 31 Dec 2023.ï Support provided under this program to the Government of Lebanon may be used only for the armed forces of Lebanon and may not be used for or to reimburse Hezbollah or any forces other than the armed forces of Lebanon.ï The Secretary of Defense may not provide such support to the above countries if the Secretary determines that the government of said country fails to increase security and sustain increased security along their borders with Syria and Iraq.ï No reimbursement to Pakistan allowed without SecDef certification that certain conditions have been met to Congress.
Key Players:	Country team (SCO), CCMDs, DOD, DoS, and Implementing Agencies

1233, Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

Description:	DOD reimbursement of certain countries to provide supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift) and other logistical support to allied forces participating in a combined operation with the armed forces of the United States and coalition forces supporting military and stability operations to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP) is also funded through this program.
Purpose:	Use of DOD funds to reimburse key countries in Southwest Asia
Authorization:	Section 1233, NDAA, FY 2008, as amended, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008, as amended by P.L. 117-81, 27 December 2021.
Appropriation:	\$350M authorized, NDAA FY 2019, P.L. 115-91
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Payments are to be made in such amounts as SecDef, with the concurrence of Sec State, and in consultation with the Director, OMB.ii Congress is to be notified 15 days prior to reimbursement.ii These funds may also be used for the purpose of providing specialized training and procuring supplies and specialized equipment and providing such supplies and loaning such equipment on a non-reimbursable basis to coalition forces supporting U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. The provision of equipment, supplies, and training under this authority is referred to and managed by DSCA as the Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP) and implemented using the pseudo LOA process.ii The CRSP process requires a 15-day advance congressional notification.
Countries Eligible:	As determined by SecDef, in concurrence with SecState
Value of Program:	FY19—\$350M; FY20—\$450M; FY21—\$180M; FY 22—\$60M
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Authority extends through 31 Dec 2021.
Key Players:	In-theater CENTCOM Cdrs with country team (including SCOs), USCENTCOM, SecDef (USDP and USDC), SecState, and OMB
Execution:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii In-theater CENTCOM Cdr initiates reimbursement recommendation.ii Country team (SCOs) provides any required detail of equipment and training if the CSRP is to be used.ii USCENTCOM endorses.ii OSD (USDP and USDC) provides recommendation to SecDef.ii SecState provides concurrence.

- i OMB is consulted.
- ii Congress is notified prior to any reimbursement or obligation.
- i DSCA coordinates with applicable implementing agencies for CRSP pseudo FMS reimbursement.

Example:

U.S. reimbursement of certain countries supporting U.S. forces in SWA; i.e., reimbursement to Azerbaijan for fuel used by U.S. forces in support of operations in Afghanistan.

331, Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to Provide Support for Conduct of Operations

Description:	The following program has been transferred and recoded into Section 331: “Logistic Support for Allied Forces in Combined Operations.” The following program has been repealed and replaced with Section 331: “1207, Support to National Military Forces of Allied Countries for Counterterrorism Operations in Africa.”
Purpose:	Codified into permanent U.S. law Section 331 that provides support (logistics, supplies, and services) to forces of a friendly foreign country participating in an operation with the armed forces of the DOD, military/stability operation that benefits U.S. national security interests, and/or solely for the purpose of enhancing interoperability of military forces in a combined operation.
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 331
Appropriation:	Up to \$450M in DOD O&M has been earmarked per fiscal year
Guidance:	This logistics, supply, and services assistance can be provided if the SecDef determines that it is in the national security interest and critical to the timely and effective participation of such forces to do so. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense can provide this support to operations in which the United States is not participating if the Secretary of Defense and State jointly certify to Congress that the operation is in U.S. national security interests and the appropriate report is filed. Finally, this support also includes the procurement of equipment for the purpose of loaning such equipment to the military forces of a friendly foreign country participating in a U.S.-supported coalition or combined operation. This support also includes specialized training in connection with such an operation and small-scale construction.
Countries Eligible:	Allied countries
Value of Program:	\$450M
Restrictions:	Logistics, supplies, and services for non-military agencies supporting a foreign partner military for such operations, and funds used solely for the enhancement of interoperability, may not exceed \$5M per year. The aggregate value of all logistic support, supplies, and services provided in any fiscal year may not exceed \$450M
Key Players:	Country team (SCO), CCMDs, DOD, DoS, and Implementing Agencies
Execution:	
Example:	U.S. in-theater logistics support to coalition partner forces deployed in support of the combined operation (i.e., DOD logistics support to NATO forces during operations in Libya).

332, Friendly Foreign Countries; International and Regional Organizations: Defense Institution Capacity Building

Description:	Codifies the following two programs into the new Section 332, Chapter 16 of Title 10 U.S.C.: “Assignment of DOD civpers as MoD Advisors (MODA)” and “Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI).” (See related “Legal ICB Initiative” p.137).
Purpose:	Codification into permanent U.S. law the program that allows SMEs, civilian advisors, and other experts in helping a respective country’s MoDs and/or various security agencies with Defense Institution Building (DIB). DIB is the development of effective and accountable foreign defense establishments
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 332
Appropriation:	DOD O&M
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Until new guidance is issued, the following is the existing guidance:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ Provide institutional, ministerial-level advice and other training to personnel of the ministry or regional organization to which assigned to support of stabilization or post-conflict activities.◇ Assist such ministry in building core institutional capacity, competences, and capabilities to manage defense-related processes.◇ DepSecDef Memo of 7 Aug 2013 emphasizes the value of the program and strongly encourages all DOD components to support the MODA program.◇ Members of armed services can serve as advisors or trainers.
Countries Eligible:	As determined by SecDef with the concurrence of SecState
Value of Program:	Varies
Restrictions:	This is for advisor duties only
Key Players:	Partner nation MoD, SecDef, GCCs, and SecState. ASD(SOLIC) provides program policy oversight within USDP with day-to-day funding, management, training, and other support to be provided by DSCA. The MODA program office is at DSCA-MODA@DSCA.mil. Per DSCA program recruiting memo of 19 Aug 2013, perspective MODAs will undergo pre-deployment training and report to the SDO/DATT during the assignment.
Execution:	Much of this process is described in DODD 5205.JB “Defense Institution Building”
Example:	Up to fifteen new MODA partners have been nominated by OSD, State, or CCMDs to include Montenegro, Kosovo, Yemen, and others. The Montenegro

(logistics) and Kosovo (Security Sector Reform) U.S. MODAs are on-station.

333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity

Description:	Section 333 replaces the following four programs: “1204, Authority to Conduct Activities to Enhance the Capability of Foreign Countries to Respond to Incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,” “2282, Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces,” “1033, DOD Assistance for C/N Activities by Certain Countries,” and “Assistance to the Government of Jordan for Border Security Operations.”
Purpose:	Codification into permanent U.S. law of a program that allows the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment, services, and training to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity to do one or more of the following operations: counterterrorism, counter-weapons of mass destruction, counter-illicit drug trafficking, counter-transnational organized crime, maritime/border security, military intelligence, air domain awareness operations and cybersecurity operations, or activities that contribute to an international coalition operations.
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 333, as amended by NDAA 2021, P.L. 116-283 02 Jan 2021.
Appropriation:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Funding for programs carried out may be derived from amounts authorized for such purposes from DOD O&M, Defense-wide, and that available for DSCA for such purposes.ï Amounts available in a fiscal year to carry out the authority in subsection may be used for programs under that authority that begin in such fiscal year and end not later than the end of the second fiscal year thereafter.ï Available until 30 Sep 2022—\$753,603,000
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï In developing and planning a program to build the capacity of the national security forces of a foreign country under this program, the SecDef and SecState should jointly consider political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical factors, if any, of the foreign country that may impact the effectiveness of the program.<ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ SAMM, C15 (undergoing revision)◇ For interim guidance, see DSCA Policy Memo 18-38 dated 5 Sep 2018ï Legislative guidance as follows:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ National Security Forces under the program will undertake, or have undertaken, training that includes a comprehensive curriculum on the law of armed conflict, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and that enhances the capacity to exercise civilian control of the military.◇ Prior to the initiation of the program that the Department of Defense or another department or agency is already undertaking, or will undertake as part of the security sector assistance provided to the foreign country concerned, a program of institutional capacity building with appropriate

institutions of such foreign country to enhance the capacity of such foreign country to organize, administer, employ, manage, maintain, sustain, or oversee the national security forces of such foreign country.

- ◇ Per Section 1210E of P.L. 116-283, 01 Jan 2021, the SecDef, in coordination with SecState, shall incorporate participation by women into all security cooperation activities carried out under Title 10 and shall incorporate gender analysis and Women, Peace, and Security priorities into training and activities to be conducted under Section 333 and other authorized security assistance programs. SC planners should note that the WPS requirements under section 1210(e) affect all SA and SC programs not just programs under 333..

Countries Eligible: Countries determined by the SecDef, with concurrence of the SecState, to be appropriate recipients

Value of Program: Variable

Restrictions:

- ii Along with existing restrictions, the FY17 NDAA mention specific restrictions for 333; those are marked as such:
 - ◇ Authorized assistance may include the provision of equipment, supplies, training, defense services, and small-scale military construction.
 - ◇ Along with various reporting requirements Section 333 prohibits assistance to units that have committed gross violations of human rights.
 - ◇ Sustainment support may not be provided for equipment under a new program or to programs previously provided by the Department of Defense under any authority available to the Secretary during fiscal year 2015 or 2016, for a period in excess of five years unless a written justification is given of how it will enhance security interests of the US, and to the extent a plan to transition such sustainment support from funding through the Department to funding through another security sector assistance program of the United States Government or funding through partner nations.
 - ◇ Assistance not applicable for countries not otherwise eligible by law for military exports.
 - ◇ Assistance requires congressional notification.
 - ◇ SecDef shall submit annual reports to the appropriate committees of Congress on DOD's implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 P.L. 115-68, 131, Stat1202.

Key Players:

Country team (SCO), CCMDs, USDP (DSCA and ASD/SOLIC), USDC, and Implementing Agencies

Execution:

The SecDef and the SecState shall coordinate the implementation and each designate an individual responsible for program coordination at the lowest possible appropriate level concerned.

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Description:	Provision of minor U.S. logistics support to foreign military forces generally on a reciprocal basis
Purpose:	By international agreement, authorizes the mutual support of each other's military units when U.S. commercial sources are not reasonably available
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 2341-2350 as amended (with significant additional oversight reporting requirements) per Section 881, NDAA 2021, P.L. 116-283, 01 Jan 2021
Appropriation:	DOD O&M, to conducted a reimbursable basis with cash, assistance-in-kind, or supplies and services of equal value
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï DODD 2010.9, CJCSI 2120.01, and International Cooperation in AT&L hand-book, Section 5.3.2ï Congressional notification required prior to entering agreement.
Countries Eligible:	Originally authorized for NATO countries, later extended to other allied/friendly countries, to include now to over 100 different countries
Value of Program:	
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï The pseudo LOA process is not used for implementation.ï Advance notification and approvals are required before CCMDs enter into ACSA agreements.ï Significant military equipment (SME) is not to be transferred via ACSAs.ï SecDef may not use an agreement with any government or organization to facilitate the transfer of logistic support, supplies, and services to any country without an ACSA.
Key Players:	CCMD, Joint Staff, SecDef (USDP), and SecState
Execution:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï CCMD proposes the agreement.ï SecDef, Joint Staff, and SecState concur.
Example:	Routine fuel, minor repair parts and services, beddown, and port services for visit- ing forces during exercises or operations. Further defined within 10 U.S.C. 2350.

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP)

Description:	Assistance for African peacekeeping (APRRP is funded under the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative [GPOI])
Purpose:	Build international peacekeeping capacity and promote regional security operations so that African partner nations can execute their own internal security responsibilities and provide support for African Union/United Nations sponsored peace operations in Africa.
Authorization:	Peacekeeping Capacity Building Assistance program established in FY 2015 under the Title 22 authority
Appropriation:	At least \$110M per year
Guidance:	The focus for this program is creating the ability for African countries to support peace operations and possibly enhancing their capability to respond to various humanitarian and disaster crises. The type of assistance usually provided is logistics, lift, medical, engineering, interoperability, and training/deployment centers. There are also several Congressional notification requirements.
Countries Eligible:	Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
Value of Program:	Variable
Restrictions:	Funds under this authority may not be granted to the Philippine National Police for counternarcotics efforts unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with international human rights standards.
Key Players:	Country team (SCO), AFRICOM, DOD, and DoS
Execution:	In general, the appropriate African SCOs need to develop implementation timelines, country-level objectives, and the respective focus areas and milestones to support those country-level objectives. Once these are in the respective Country Cooperation Plan and coordinated with the respective resource requests, they will be inserted into the AFRICOM program Sync Matrices for AFRICOM consideration. While there are no current plans to allocate additional funds for APREP, existing cases/projects are still being executed using prior year APREP dollars.

Asia Reassurance Initiative

Description:	To improve defense capacity, build counterterrorism capacity, and increase maritime domain awareness
Purpose:	To advance United States foreign policy interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance of U.S. strategy; to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against security threats, including through foreign military financing and international military education and training programs; to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral engagements, particularly with the United States' most highly capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges.
Authorization:	Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, P.L. 115-409, 31 Dec 2018, authorizes up to \$1.5B for each FY from 2019 through 2023
Appropriation:	FY 2023—\$1.5B
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Can be used to accomplish the following:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ Advance U.S. interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region◇ Improve the defense capacity and resiliency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against security threats◇ Conduct regular bilateral and multilateral engagements◇ Build new counterterrorism partnership programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations◇ Help partner countries strengthen their democratic systems, with a focus on good governance◇ Ensure that the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption (as amended by the NDAA 2021 P.L. 116-283, 01 Jan 2021, Sec 1260A, which contains additional Asia Reassurance Initiative Act requirements specific to Taiwan).◇ Encourage responsible natural resource management in partner countries, which is closely associated with economic growth◇ Increase maritime domain awareness programs in South Asia and Southeast Asia
Countries Eligible:	Indo-Pacific Region
Value of Program:	Up to \$1.5B per year; authority sunsets 31 Dec 2026
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Excepting drug demand reduction and maritime interdiction, none of the amounts appropriated, pursuant to subsection (b), may be made available for counternar-

cotics assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with international human rights standards.

- ii Not to be used for Cambodia unless specific certifications under section 7043(b) (1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law 115-141) have been met.
- ii None of the amounts appropriated may be made available for International Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of Burma.
- ii SecState shall provide annual briefings to SFRC and HFRC regarding efforts to implement this Act by providing regular transfers to Taiwan of defense articles tailored to meet anticipated threats from the PRC.

Key Players:

DoS, USAID, Country Team, DOD, and GCC

Execution:

Funding should be made in consultation with appropriate congressional committees

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA)

Description:	Provide and facilitate education, training, and research in civil-military operations, particularly operations that require international disaster management and humanitarian assistance and operations that require coordination between DOD and other agencies
Purpose:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Host and participate in courses and seminars conducted both in-country with in-residence focusing on the delivery of knowledge and sharing of information between humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) practitioners.ï Provide support to military exercise planner staffs.ï Provide subject matter expertise (SME) in HADR operations and exercises.ï Provide expertise during HADR response operations. The Center of Excellence (COE) is not an operational first responder organization.
Authorization:	10 U.S.C.182
Appropriation:	DOD O&M, with additional funds provided by participating countries, USG agencies, international organizations, and NGOs
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Initially authorized in 1997 as a Center for Excellence (CFE).ï Directly reports to USPACOM and is located at Camp Smith, Hawaii.ï Generally in support of HADR activities in the PACOM AOR but is expanding to global activity support.ï Section 8093, DOD Appropriations Act, 2003, P.L.107-248, 23 Oct 2002, authorizes the use of CFE funds to pay the expenses of providing or facilitating COE training and education for appropriate military and civilian personnel of foreign countries.
Countries Eligible:	As determined by SecDef (ASD/SO-LIC) and USPACOM
Value of Program:	
Restrictions:	While HADR subject-matter experts in support of operational commanders or organizations, not a “first responder”
Key Players:	
Execution:	View website at http://www.coe-dmha.org or email frontoffice@coe-dmha.org , or phone 1-808-433-7035 for additional organization information to include references, best practices repository, or events such as ongoing or future HADR courses, workshops, and conferences.

Example:

- ï CFE-DMHA recently co-hosted with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) a senior multilateral capstone pandemic influenza conference in Jakarta. Also recently conducted humanitarian assistance response training (HART) to USG military and civilian, NGO, and partner nation personnel on board USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) while en route to its medical and humanitarian civic action mission in Southeast Asia.
- ï Has developed and published online country disaster response handbooks for Bangladesh, Vietnam, Nepal, Indonesia, and Thailand.

Countering Chinese Influence Fund

Description:	To counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China globally
Purpose:	Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China globally with congressional notification
Authorization:	Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, Sec 7043(c)2, P.L. 116-94, 20 Dec 2019
Appropriation:	Up to \$300M from “Development Assistance,” “Economic Support Fund,” “International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement,” “Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs,” and “Foreign Military Financing Program.” There is no additional money for these activities; projects must be funded out of existing Title 22 programs.
Guidance:	Subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations
Countries Eligible:	Countries otherwise eligible as determined by DoS
Value of Program:	Not less than \$300M available until 30 September 2023
Restrictions:	<p>None of the funds may be made available for any project or activity that directly supports or promotes any of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)◇ The use of technology, including biotechnology, digital, telecommunications, and cyber, developed by the People’s Republic of China unless DoS advises doing such does not adversely impact the national security of the United States
Key Players:	DoS, Country Team, and USAID
Execution:	Funds are earmarked from various Title 22 Security Assistance programs for Countering Chinese Influence

Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

Description:	To provide congressional review and to counter aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation
Purpose:	The purpose of this authority is to counter the influence of the Russian Federation in various countries as determined by the SecState by providing security assistance.
Authorization:	22 U.S.C. 9541-9548 as authorized by P.L. 115-44, 2 Aug 2017 as amended by P.L. 1178-81, 27 Dec 2021.
Appropriation:	\$295M is available annually for FYs 2022 through 2023, as amended by FY 2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2471, March 15, 2022).
Guidance:	<p>Funds shall be used to effectively implement activities in order to meet the following goals, prioritized in the following order:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanism from cyberattacks in countries vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation that lack economic capability to respond◇ To combat corruption, improve rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors◇ To respond to humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and the Ukraine by the Russian Federation◇ To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency, and competition and compliance with international obligations◇ To build the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organization countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation◇ To assist the SECSTATE in executing section 1287(b) of NDAA FY17 (Global Engagement Center Activities)
Countries Eligible:	As determined by SecState
Value of Program:	FYs 2022 through 2023 annually—\$295M
Restrictions:	Authorization expires 2 Aug 2026
Key Players:	DoS, USAID, Global Engagement Center of the DoS, U.S. Embassy, and DOD
Execution:	Request for funding made through regional proposals to DoS (PM) and other DoS entities
Example:	EUCOM used to fund security cooperation activities of various countries along the Black Sea under Black Sea Maritime Awareness

Economic Support Fund (ESF)

Description: Economic and development support funding for countries or international organizations for non-military purposes.

Purpose: Promote economic or political stability

Under special economic, political, or security conditions, the national interests of the U.S. may require economic support for countries or international or regional organizations.

Authorization: Sections 531-534, FAA [22 U.S.C. 2346]

Appropriation:

- ï FY 2022—\$4.099B
- ï FY 2020—\$3.05B

Guidance: Multiple earmarks apply to ESF funds—see Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022 (H.R. 2471, 15 March, 2022) for details.

Countries Eligible: As determined and justified by SecState in cooperation with the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Value of Program: FY 2022—\$4,099,000,000 available until 30 Sep 2023

Restrictions: No military or paramilitary assistance by this program

Key Players:

- ï SecState
- ï Administrator, USAID
- ï Country team USAID attaché

Execution: By the Admin, USAID and any assigned in-country USAID organization or representative

Example: Per P.L. 117-2471, an additional amount of the Economic Support Fund of \$674M shall remain available until Sep 30, 2024, for assistance for Ukraine and countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine, including for direct financial support.

Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)

Description:	The international humanitarian system calls for the delivery of life-saving aid in the most effective manner, which may, at times, justify the involvement of foreign military assets. As part of its responsibilities as lead federal coordinator of FDR, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) may request unique capabilities from DOD based on validated humanitarian needs. This typically comes in the form of logistics support, transportation, and technical expertise (e.g., air traffic control).
Purpose:	Support for USG FDR is led by USAID's Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The U.S. will continue to lead the world in humanitarian assistance. Even as we expect others to share responsibility, the U.S. will continue to catalyze international responses to man-made and natural disasters and provide our expertise and capabilities to those in need. Alleviating human suffering is an important expression of humanitarian concern and a tradition of the American people.
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 404
Appropriation:	Per the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-220) \$147M is available to 30 Sep 2022 subject to limitations listed in Title 10 USC 407 (C) (3). OHDA-CA
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï DODD 5100.46, 6 Jul 12, as amended by Change 1, 28 July 2017ï Assistance is only provided when requested by both the PN and the COM and is validated by USAID/OFDA to address the immediate humanitarian needs of foreign civilian disaster victimsï DOD FDR may be provided on a non-reimbursable basis (OHDACA) or on a reimbursable basisï Requires SecDef approval
Value of Program:	NDAA 2021 (P.L. 116-283) lists \$109.9M (see Appropriation above).
Restrictions:	IAW 10 U.S.C, 404, Congress is to be notified NLT 48 hours after commencement of FDR activities
Key Players:	Partner Nation, COM, USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) Department of State, OSD SO/LIC, DSCA (HDM), and CJCS
Execution:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï PN (Head of State or MOFA) requests U.S. disaster assistance, generally to the COM.ï USAID validates humanitarian need and in the USG interest to support; COM issues a disaster declaration.ï USAID-Washington DC validates humanitarian disaster requirements and, as appropriate, begins providing assistance. If DOD assistance is required, USAID

or State Executive Secretary will send a formal request to the DOD Executive Secretary, after socializing with ASD SO/LIC.

- ï ASD SO/LIC, in coordination with CJCS, DOD Office of General Council, DOD Comptroller, and DSCA, makes a recommendation to SecDef regarding military support.
 - ï If approved, SecDef will notify GCC of approved mission pursuant to authorities and available funding. DOD support will be based on validated OFDA humanitarian requirements. GCC will be required provide timely cost accounting to OSD Comptroller, ASD SO-LIC and DSCA.
-
- ï Example: At the request of the Indonesian government following a major earthquake and validated by USAID, DOD provided logistics support (C-130J airlift and aerial port services).
 - ï DOD provided technical support/expertise to assist the Kingdom of Thailand with the search and rescue of a youth soccer team trapped in a cave.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)

Description:	G-8 countries (other donors have later joined) initiative beginning in 2005 to train and equip 75,000 international PKO troops within five years (achieved)
Purpose:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Have a qualified, ready-to-go, mil-civ PKO force from non-G-8 countriesii Having exceeded the initial force goal, Phase II (FYs2010-14) emphasis is now sustainment and continued training to include self-sustainment and indigenous training. The goal is 318K troops from 61 countriesii NSC has endorsed continuing GPOI after FY 2014 with capacity building being the priority.ii Establish and support the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza IT
Authorization:	A component of FAA-authorized PKO
Appropriation:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Allocated from appropriated PKO account. Budget of \$1.3B from FYs 2005-2020ii FY 2020 earmark \$71M, P.L. 116-94, 20 Dec 2019ii FY 2021 P.L. 116-260, 27 Dec 2020.ii Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs, H.R. 4373 requested \$71M for GPOI for FY 2022, but at press time, the bill had not passed and State was funding operations under a continuing resolution.
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii All GPOI program activities and funding must be approved by the GPOI Coordinating Committee (GCC) co-chaired by DoS/PM and DOD/USDP.ii Any PKO funding of GPOI is to be notified to Congress prior to obligation.ii GPOI Implementation Guide—DoS/DOD annual document available at GPOI-eResource@state.gov using USG-only SharePoint website.
Countries Eligible:	Mostly from AFRICOM, but all CCMDs are participating
Value of Program:	About \$100M annually
Restrictions:	No support for training or operations that include child soldiers
Key Players:	Same as for PKO
Execution:	Same as for PKO, IAW SAMM, C15.1.4.8, if via pseudo LOA
Example:	GPOI was launched in 2005, as the U.S. contribution to the G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations and is managed by the DoS's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. GPOI is focused on strengthening

the effectiveness of United Nations and African Union peace operations. Since FY 2005, the GPOI program implemented nearly \$1.3 billion in peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds with 55 current partner countries around the world. Program resources are applied to accomplish the following objectives: build self-sufficient peace operations training capacity in partner countries; support partner countries' development and employment of critical enabling capabilities; enhance partner country operational readiness and sustainment capabilities; strengthen partner country rapid deployment capabilities; expand the role of women and enhance gender integration; and build UN and regional organization capabilities.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)

Description:	Providing operational readiness training to U.S. armed forces in conjunction with an authorized military operation, exercise, or deployment for training. The by-product of the training is humanitarian in nature for partner nation civilians. Typically, basic health, veterinary, or engineering projects. Global manager: Joint Staff J-5; Oversight: ASD SO/LIC (SHA). NOTE: This is NOT the same humanitarian and civic assistance program as described in CJCSI 7401.01F/10 U.S.C. 166a for Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF) or for USSOCOM “deminimus” projects.
Purpose:	<p>Promote, as determined by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Military Department:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ Security and foreign policy interests of the United States◇ Security and foreign policy interests of the country in which the activities are to be performed◇ Specific operational readiness skills of the Service members who participate in HCA activities
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 401
Appropriation:	O&M provided to the combatant command from their combatant command support agent (applicable military department) as noted in DODD 5100.03, “Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands,” Enclosure 3.
Guidance:	DODI 2205.02, “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities”, 22 May 17, per the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (P.L. 116-220) section 8011. Certain U.S. Army medical services in Hawaii and transportation there may, in some circumstances, be made available to civilian patients from American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Guam.
Value of Program:	Average annual global HCA expenditure is \$5M-\$8M.
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Not provided directly or indirectly to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity. HCA is not for building PN military capacity/capabilitiesii Expenses not authorized to be paid with HCA funds include costs associated with the military operation or exercise (e.g., transportation; billeting; personnel expenses; fuel; repair of equipment). These costs are covered by funds designated for the operation or exercise. HCA funds cannot pay salaries and per diem of U.S. or PN participants.ii Authorized expenses include direct costs of consumable materials, supplies, and services reasonably necessary to provide the HCA activity.

Key Players:

ODC/SCO; U.S. Chief of Mission/DCM; USAID; Combatant Command (and Component) staff; Military Departments (Services); Joint Staff; State Department (Main State); DSCA (OHASIS support); ASD SO/LIC (SHA)

Execution:

- ii See DODI 2205.02. Enclosure 3
- ii Some combatant commands/components may have additional AOR-specific SOPs.
- ii Restricted to rudimentary construction and/or repair activities and basic health and veterinary services. Do not drastically exceed the standards of local care or PN capacity to maintain facilities/equipment
- ii Project narratives should clearly identify the specific operational readiness skills being trained via the HCA activity. Look to the UJTL/Service/Unit task lists for objectives.
- ii All projects must be entered into the OHASIS database.
- ii All projects must be coordinated with USAID and have approval from both the PN and U.S. COM/DCM. No exceptions.
- ii Projects estimated to cost \$15K or less are “Command-approved” or “Min-cost” projects. These are approved at the combatant command. All other requirements still apply.
- ii Projects estimated to cost more than \$15K are forwarded from the combatant command to the Joint Staff for additional staffing and approval. Approval may take an additional 4-5 weeks. Incomplete, poorly prepared/reviewed narratives returned for correction.
- ii 30-day After Action Reports are required to be completed in OHASIS.

Example:

- ii Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided by Army units during Exercise Western Accord in Senegal in rural or underserved areas of a country to include education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
- ii Engineering project repairs/upgrades a rural school’s bathroom and kitchen food preparation area to reduce spread of disease. Provides training for U.S. military plumbers, electricians, masons, and more.
- ii Veterinary project assists PN efforts to vaccinate livestock from various diseases. Trains U.S. military veterinarians, civil affairs personnel.
- ii Dental project to provide basic dental care to an under-served population. Trains dentists, oral surgeons, nurses, and more.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

Description:	The DOD conducts steady-state HA to relieve or reduce endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, and privation particularly in regions where humanitarian needs may pose major challenges to stability, prosperity, and respect for universal human values. HA activities may also bolster a PN's capacity to reduce the risk of, prepare for, or respond to humanitarian disasters, thereby reducing reliance on foreign disaster relief.
Purpose:	HA activities provide a valuable resource for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) to support DOD HA program goals; theater campaign plan objectives, including security cooperation; and U.S. interests. Steady-state HA projects are collaborative DOD engagements with PN government authorities to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. HA projects are commonly developed jointly with PN ministerial-level authorities and include activities such as the construction, training, and equipment to address health services, education, and disaster preparedness requirements.
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 2561, 10 U.S.C. 401, 10 U.S.C. 402, 10 U.S.C. 404, 10 U.S.C. 407, and 10 U.S.C. 2557
Appropriation:	Multiple sources, including the Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI); however, the primary source is the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation.
Appropriation:	Per Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021, P.L. 116-260 Dec 27 2020, \$160,051,000 available until 30 Sep 2023.
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Policy Guidance for DOD Humanitarian Assistance Programs, SecDef, Washington, D.C., 101458Z Aug 16ii SAMM Chapter 12
Countries Eligible:	As determined by the SecDef
Value of Program:	\$160,051,000 until 30 September 2023
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii Must benefit the civilian population on an objective assessment of humanitarian needs—not on ethnic, racial, gender, or religious considerationsii May supplement or complement, but not duplicate or replace, the efforts of other USG agencies that have primary responsibility for providing foreign assistanceii Shall address basic humanitarian needs, including (1) disaster preparedness; (2) health-related projects and activities; (3) primary education support; and (4) basic infrastructureii Shall not benefit foreign militaries or paramilitary groups unless the ultimate beneficiary is the civilian populace and the military/paramilitary group has an official

role in providing humanitarian services directly to the public

Key Players:

- ii May not be used for reconstruction and long-term development
Partner nations, COM, SCO, U.S. Agency for International Development, OSD/
SO-LIC), DSCA, and GCCs

Execution:

- ii DOD HA projects will be coordinated with appropriate partner USG agencies and PN ministries as well as applicable intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. Coordination serves to 1) identify PN gaps, 2) design projects to address those gaps, 3) synchronize and integrate efforts, 4) improve efficiency, 5) identify opportunities for cooperation on projects, and 5) promote long-term project sustainability.
- ii HA projects involving NGOs or non-military PN entities should be closely coordinated with the USG agency that works most closely with such entities. GCCs are also encouraged to discuss disaster preparedness projects with the regionally and GCC-based representatives from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
- ii DOD country team representatives will seek coordination on project nominations from the USAID Mission Director or his/her designee prior to submission of the nomination to the Chief of Mission (or designee) for coordination.

Example:

The SCO identifies a medical clinic in need of renovation, confirms that the school is government property, and submits a project request via OHASIS to the CCMD. Once submitted by the CCMD as a priority to DSCA, DSCA places the project into oversight review, coordinating the project through Legal and OSD if necessary. Once coordination is complete, DSCA approves the project in OHASIS, and the CCMD may then fund the project for execution.

Humanitarian Assistance Excess Property (HA-EP) Program

Description:	Under the DOD HA-EP program, DOD may donate non-lethal excess DOD supplies and property for humanitarian assistance purposes. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2557, non-lethal supplies and property includes items that are not weapons, ammunition, or other equipment or materiel designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death. EP provided for humanitarian assistance shall be transferred to the DoS, typically via the U.S. Embassy, to be distributed to the intended PN government recipient.
Purpose:	DOD provides refurbished excess non-lethal equipment and supplies for humanitarian purposes
Authorization:	10 U.S.C. 2557
Appropriation:	OHDACA
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï SAMM, C12ï The Humanitarian Assistance Program—Excess Property (HAP-EP) has three staging locations to collect, refurbish, store, and arrange for transportation when directed—all with the use of OHDACA funding:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◇ Marines Corps Logistics Base, Albany GA◇ Leghorn Army Depot, Livorno, Italy◇ Camp Kinser, Okinawa, Japan
Countries Eligible:	As determined by SecDef and SecState
Value of Program:	Variable
Restrictions:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Any provided property must primarily benefit recipient country civiliansï The property is donated without warranties or guaranteesï The property cannot be sold by the recipient governmentï The property can be donated to the military if the ultimate beneficiary of the project is the civilian populace and the military has an official role in providing humanitarian services directly to the public.
Key Players:	Country team, CCMD, DSCA, SCO, and ASD/SO-LIC
Execution:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ï Country team submits request to the CCMD via OHASIS for validation and collation.ï CCMD forwards request to DSCA for staffing.ï DSCA provides approval to the CCMD for implementation; transportation is sup-

ported with OHDACA funds allocated at DSCA's HQ.

Example:

Excess DOD furniture or technical equipment for recipient country use in schools, orphanages, clinics, etc. Excess construction equipment, generators, shelters, and emergency vehicles for developing countries.

Humanitarian Assistance Transportation Program (HATP)

Description: Humanitarian Assistance Transportation Program to ship humanitarian assistance donations for non-profit NGOs and private volunteers

Purpose: For the DOD to gain access and influence in PNs by funding transportation of humanitarian assistance donations provided by NGOs using Defense Transportation System contracted commercial carriers. This program provides DOD access and influence in partner nations by shipping U.S. donations and covering the cost.

Authorization: 10 U.S.C. 2561; 10 U.S.C. 402

Appropriation: OHDACA

Guidance:

- ï SAMM, C12
- ï Cargo must be humanitarian in nature and not include hazardous, political, or religious material.
- ï Minimum cargo is required to fill a 20-foot container at about 15,000 pounds or 1,200 cubic feet.
- ï Funded transportation is intended to begin in the United States as the place of origin to the recipient country.
- ï The donor requests transportation using the Humanitarian Assistance Transportation Programs website at <http://hatransportation.ohasis.org>.
- ï DSCA will coordinate with DoS for review of the request.

Countries Eligible: As determined by SecDef and SecState

Value of Program: Variable

Restrictions:

- ï Cargo cannot be sent to military or paramilitary organization unless the organization provides a specific service to the civilian population.
- ï Normally delivered “door-to-door.” Door-to-port is by exception normally reserved for urgent, critical DOD support

Key Players: NGO/PV, DSCA/HDM, DoS, USTRANSCOM, and contracted commercial carriers

Execution:

- ï Donor submits detailed request using the HA Transportation website to DSCA HDM: <https://hatransportation.ohasis.org/>.
- ï After review, DSCA HDM submits request to DoS for coordination.
- ï DSCA HDM provides approval to the donor.
- ï DSCA HDM coordinates the transportation with USTRANSCOM and funds the

transportation.

- i DSCA HDM provides assistance to the donor, contracted carrier, and DoS throughout the transportation process.

Example:

Medical equipment and supplies, foodstuffs, and other quality of life items from a donor for transport to a developing African country undergoing extreme drought and/or poverty.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Description:	Funding assistance for peacekeeping operations
Purpose:	Provide funding for articles, services, and training for countries and organizations conducting international peacekeeping
Authorization:	Sections 551-553, FAA [22 U.S.C. 2348] as amended by P.L. 117-81, 27 December 2021.
Appropriations:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii FY 2022—\$455,000,000 per Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022 (H.R. 2471, 15 March 2022), of which \$227,500,000 may remain available until 30 Sep 2023.
Guidance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ii FY 2022 earmarks include \$24,000,000 for the United States' contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers' Mission in the Sinai.ii PKO funding may be used to enhance capacity of foreign civilian security forces.ii Fifteen days prior to obligation of funds, Congress requires (per P.L. 117-81, 27 December 2021) a detailed report describing the countries to receive the assistance, the planned uses, and an assessment of their capacity to absorb the assistance.
Countries Eligible:	Those countries or international organizations the President determines eligible for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out to further U.S. national security interests
Value of Program:	FY 2021, \$818,542,000 available until 30 Sep 2022.
Restrictions:	No S/FOAA funding should be used to support any military training or operations that include children soldiers.
Key Players:	SecState, DoS/PM, CCMD and SCO if defense articles and services are to be provided to partner nation, and DSCA, if defense articles and services are provided via pseudo LOA IAW SAMM, C15.1.4
Execution:	Normally planned and executed by DoS/PM

Example:

- i During FY 2014—\$212.35M for Somalia PKO [African Union Mission], \$36M for MFO, \$33M for Sudan PKO

ANNEX V – Security Cooperation Programs Handbook, 2022

<https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/security-cooperation-programs-handbook.pdf?id=86c86ec1-c7e8-4244-8d3e-f74d6e983e98>

ANNEX W – Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018 Securing the Nation One Partnership at a Time and State Partnership Program Fact Sheet

The SPP is an innovative and cost-effective security cooperation program that connects the National Guard with the militaries of partner nations around the globe. Guard units conduct military-to-military engagements with partner nations in support of defense security goals and also leverage societal relationships to build personal bonds and enduring trust. The SPP is not designed to make other militaries self-sustaining. Rather, the goal of the SPP is developing and maintaining important security relationships between the United States and other nations sharing a long-term view of common interests.

Securing the Nation One Partnership at a Time

America's alliances and partnerships around the globe give the United States an unmatched advantage over our competitors. Maintaining and nurturing those relationships does not happen overnight but is a product of an enduring effort to build trust and confidence between nations. Twenty eighteen marks the 25th anniversary of the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP), and it is worth reflecting on the important contributions the SPP makes in enabling the US and its allies and partners to provide security and stability around the world.

The SPP is an innovative and cost-effective security cooperation program that connects the National Guard with the militaries of partner nations around the globe. Guard units conduct military-to-military engagements with partner nations in support of defense security goals and also leverage societal relationships to build personal bonds and enduring trust. The SPP is not designed to make other militaries self-sustaining. Rather, the goal of the SPP is developing and maintaining important security relationships between the United States and other nations sharing a long-term view of common interests.

As outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), strengthening and evolving our alliances and partnerships is a secretary of defense priority as we look to meet shared challenges and potential threats. The National Guard is playing an integral role in this effort. At the request of US ambassadors in foreign countries, the National Guard forges its unique SPP relationships by integrating its activities with the strategic goals of combatant commands and chiefs of US missions. With the recent announcement of the partnership between Brazil and New York, the SPP currently partners with 81 nations and is a scalable and adaptable program preserving critical partnerships as well as developing new ones with nations that are ready to partner for a more secure future.

A Volatile Security Environment

Geopolitical changes in the last decade have brought greater concern over strategic competition. The United States is still the most capable military in the world, but our adversaries seek gaps and seams to exploit weaknesses, some through non-kinetic means, including the so-called

gray zones of warfare. We are seeing strategies that use all instruments of national power to compete within every aspect of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spheres. China is now a dominant player in the global economy, which has allowed it to increase spending for the People's Liberation Army and assert territorial claims in the South China Sea. Russia seeks to revise the international order and change longstanding universal norms through force and unconventional means that combine military action, coercive economic tools, diplomacy, and disinformation campaigns. Iran and its Revolutionary Guard Corps are attempting to dominate the Middle East through support of rogue organizations and their own military operations. Despite recent developments, security on the Korean Peninsula remains an international concern. Nonstate actors throughout the world with more sophisticated capabilities present new dangers abroad and in the homeland. All of these threats differ in geography and scale, making unilateral action a risky proposition that would stretch the capabilities of the US and its military. Without allies and partners, these threats become more difficult to deal with. In a competitive world with diverse threats, the US must attract and work with allies as a means of achieving a competitive advantage and decisive edge.

Standing Together: The Value of Alliances

Like-minded nations committed to collective defense provide a number of critical benefits—particularly strong economies so essential to security. When putting an economic value on our partnerships and alliances, the aggregate GDP for the US and our European and Pacific allies is \$44.4 trillion, two and a half times the US GDP alone. Additionally, 13 of the top 20 militaries in the world are close US allies with a total of \$1 trillion in defense spending and approximately four million personnel. Beyond direct military and economic power, allies offer additional perspectives on courses of action, provide diplomatic and political support in international forums, contribute essential logistical and transit hubs, and, as a collective group, add legitimacy to the use of military force. This level of political, economic, and military might is underwriting the ability of our alliances to share the burdens of promoting global peace and security.

Allies and partners are force multipliers in terms of manpower, capabilities, and resources. Ultimately, in any armed conflict, allies and

partners training together regularly substantially increase their combat capability. However, working with others is not always easy. While states may share common interests, they don't always have identical values or views. Nonetheless, the benefits of engaging allies and partners far outweigh the cost or occasional disagreement. Successful alliances share burdens and invest time and effort in creating enduring relationships. They are built on cultural understanding and a respect for each other's sovereignty. Alliances based on such characteristics are far more effective than those that are transactional, coercive, or intimidating. The SPP promotes healthy, enduring partnerships committed for the long term, beyond the completion of initial objectives. East-Central Europe after the fall of communism serves as a great example.

Founding of the State Partnership Program

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a number of states chose a path toward democratization and integration when Eastern Europe broke free of authoritarian rule. The US sought to assist these states in reforming their militaries as a means to institutionalize democratic processes, promote respect for the rule of law, and reinforce healthy civil-military relations. The best way to create a Europe whole and free was to ensure new democracies built the institutions and capabilities that would support their individual reform efforts.

In 1992, US European Command initiated military-to-military engagements to assist in reforming the militaries of former Soviet-controlled republics and Warsaw Pact countries through an initiative called the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The National Guard played a central role in these engagements. Each country desired to form reserve-based forces to promote democratization through civilian control of the military while also appearing less threatening to Russia. The National Guard had the additional advantage of being well suited to cooperate on issues such as disaster management, search and rescue, military education, and civil-military relations, areas of particular interest to the emerging democracies. The SPP, an outgrowth of the JCTP, signed its first partnerships in April 1993 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania partnering with Maryland, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, respectively.

In forming these new relationships, economic, demographic, and military size were some of the factors considered so the partnerships would

be advantageous for both sides. Small states such as Maryland partnered with Estonia. Later, Illinois, with its large Polish-American community, matched up with Poland. Oil states such as Oklahoma and Azerbaijan were aligned together, while the state of Georgia teamed up with the country of Georgia. In the case of Iowa's partnership with Kosovo, increased ties spawned the opening of Kosovo's first foreign consulate in Iowa, which helps foster economic and business ties.

In each of these partnerships, the SPP went well beyond military aspects benefitting both partners in other sectors of society. The SPP currently has nine partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region that focus on broad and diverse engagements such as peacekeeping training, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue exchanges, noncommissioned officer development, and medical exchanges. State partnerships have also flourished in Latin America, with 24 nations participating in the program. Currently, the SPP has relationships throughout the world with nations such as Togo, Belize, Tonga, and Kyrgyzstan, creating opportunities for future engagement and mutual assistance.

The Broader DOD Strategy

The US National Defense Strategy provides three key elements in its efforts to strengthen alliances: uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability; expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning; and deepen interoperability. The Department of Defense has multiple tools to achieve these objectives, including security assistance; security cooperation; military-to-military leader and staff engagement; promotion of regional cooperation; participation in multinational exercises; and agreements on facilities, basing, and transit of forces. The operational National Guard is fully integrated with the National Defense Strategy through these activities as a part of the joint force and adds a unique contribution through the SPP. At a time when resources are being shifted and readiness is essential for strategic competition, the SPP provides DOD with a scalable and tailored approach to security cooperation and partner enhancement.

Regardless of geographic location, the National Guard consults and coordinates with combatant commanders, US country teams, and the host nations to understand the full range of issues affecting the partner nation. SPP events are led by the respective state adjutants general, who seek maximum impact of the SPP engagements by developing a

program that is in the interest of both countries. In addition, the majority of SPP partner nations have National Guard Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAO) living in the partner nation, participating in the development of an embassy's engagement plan, and ensuring SPP events that are conducted by combatant commands are consistent with the ambassador's intent.

One strategic benefit resulting from the SPP is many of our partners who began as security consumers evolved into global security providers. Seventy-nine times, our partners have co-deployed with the National Guard in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, the Illinois and Poland partnership is one of the most robust and successful security cooperation partnerships in Europe. Poland and Illinois signed their partnership in 1993 with the goal of professionalizing Polish forces, bringing their forces up to NATO standards, and providing peacekeeping training. Poland was accepted as a member of NATO in 1999, and since the beginning days of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Poland has co-deployed with the Illinois National Guard multiple times and contributed thousands of troops. Today Polish forces along with the Illinois National Guard are at the forefront of US deterrence and assurance activities in East-Central Europe.

Beyond the number of exercises, deployments, and military-to-military events, another striking feature of the SPP is how it cultivates personal relationships that enhance, influence, and promote access. Nowhere was this more evident than when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and fomented an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Chiefs of defense from Ukraine and other states bordering Russia were quick to engage with their partner adjutants general, providing invaluable information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and informing the US response.

The Future State Partnership Program

The SPP is future focused and adaptive to geopolitical changes. As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the SPP, we have seen the program evolve from assisting nations in developing more modern and professional militaries functioning under civilian control to partnerships that look to deepen interoperability with complementary capabilities and forces. Beyond the military benefits, we have witnessed the fruits of these relationships as they help the United States maintain and grow its alliances across the globe through enduring and personal relationships. What began as a program of 10 partnerships in Eastern Europe has

spread across five continents and currently encompasses approximately one-third of the nations in the world.

The National Defense Strategy's priorities include expanding Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships, fortifying the trans-Atlantic NATO alliances, forming enduring coalitions in the Middle East, sustaining advantages in the Western Hemisphere, and supporting relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa. Our state partnerships are located in all of these strategic regions as a part of the "long game." For instance, the Indo-Pacific region will continue to play an important role in the global security environment. Encompassing three of the most populous nations in the world (China, India, and Indonesia), two of the three largest economies in the world (China and Japan), and home to several of the largest militaries in the world, this vast area and its partnerships and alliances will be paramount in ensuring a stable and peaceful region. The African continent with its vast population and resources is also a potential area for future partnership growth.

As the security environment continues to change, the State Partnership Program will adjust and develop accordingly. In a recent example from the evolving cyber domain, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania worked with their National Guard partners in Maryland, Michigan, and Pennsylvania respectively in a USEUCO-hosted cyber defense exercise preparing for a cyber incident that requires a multinational response. In working with partners that can assist in other regions of the world, Serbia and its partner, the Ohio National Guard, travelled to Angola to conduct a trilateral medical exchange. These are just a few compelling examples that show the SPP serves as a cost-effective strategy that enhances security capabilities while promoting essential pillars of a free and democratic society.

In its initial stages, the SPP forged relationships in Europe that still exist today and are stronger than ever. In our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, our partner nations co-deployed with their partner states leveraging forces and capabilities where the sum was greater than its individual parts. The SPP will preserve the building blocks of its foundational partnerships while continuing to forge partnerships that are every bit as important as developing next-generation weapons. The importance of allies and partners that share common values and interests was succinctly described by Defense Secretary James Mattis when he stated, "nations with strong allies thrive, while those without stagnate and wither." The National

Guard has a unique role in this process through the SPP, one that provides a high return on investment. We work with our partners not only as one military to another but also as American citizens to partner citizens. When we establish partnerships this way, employing the full range of skills resident in the National Guard, we are preparing ourselves, our allies, and our partners to confront the full range of threats and in turn create a more secure future in the twenty-first century **SSQ**

Gen Joseph L. Lengyel, USAF
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Disclaimer

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NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM FACT SHEET

PARTNERSHIP

“Building Relationships that Enhance Global Security, Understanding, and Cooperation”

The National Guard has forged enduring partnerships through the State Partnership Program (SPP) for almost 30 years while helping to build U.S. and partner capacity to meet 21st century security challenges.

THE PROGRAM

Beginning as a program to assist countries emerging from behind the Iron Curtain, the SPP now involves more than 45% of the world’s countries paired with the National Guard of every U.S. state and territory. Most of the earliest SPP partner countries in Europe have gone on to become U.S. allies in NATO, and many of them credit the SPP, and their National Guard state partners, with helping make that possible. This cost-effective, small footprint program delivers a significant return on investment by broadening the pool of foreign security partners.

MISSION

The SPP supports the security cooperation objectives of the United States and the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) by developing enduring relationships with partner countries and carrying out activities to build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and enhance U.S. access and influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner forces to meet emerging challenges.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The SPP is strategically important to our national defense. National Guard service members’ efforts make vital contributions to the Joint Force, executing national defense strategy by advancing multinational understanding and support. The SPP helps the United States react effectively to anticipated or unanticipated global scenarios as they emerge.



CODIFIED IN LAW

In Section 341 of Title 10, United States Code, Congress authorized the secretary of defense to establish a program of activities “to support the Security Cooperation objectives of the United States, between members of the National Guard of a State or territory and any of the following: a) the military forces of a foreign country, b) the security forces of a foreign country, c) governmental organizations of a foreign country whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response.”

The SPP is a Department of Defense security cooperation program, managed and administered by the chief, National Guard Bureau, executed by the GCCs, and sourced by the National Guard of the states and territories. The SPP supports the security cooperation objectives of the appropriate GCC and U.S. chief of mission.

**\$40M Annual
Budget**

**85
Partnerships**

**1,000+
Events Annually**

ANNEX X – USCENTCOM Central Command Regulation 525-47 (CCR 525-47), 28 July 2022, Stabilization

This regulation was created to conform to current United States Central Command and higher strategy, policy, and program guidance for conducting stabilization activities in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility. This regulation rescinds Command Policy Letter #117, Stabilization and Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in the National Security Interests of the United States. This regulation should be read in its entirety.

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BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER



Central Command Regulation 525-47
(CCR 525-47), 28 July 2022

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621

Military Operations
STABILIZATION

This is a new regulation
Expiration: 28 July 2027

Pages: 11
OPR: CCJ3-CAOD

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This is a new regulation. This regulation was created to conform to current United States Central Command and higher strategy, policy, and program guidance for conducting stabilization activities in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility. This regulation rescinds Command Policy Letter #117, Stabilization and Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in the National Security Interests of the United States. This regulation should be read in its entirety.

1. PURPOSE

This regulation defines Stabilization and Stabilization Methodology, delineates responsibilities for effective planning, coordination, administration, and execution of stabilization activities and provides guidance and procedures for the Command's Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Program in order to target drivers of instability degrading peace and security within the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

2. APPLICABILITY

This regulation applies to HQ USCENTCOM, USCENTCOM Service Component Commands, USCENTCOM Joint Task Forces, and other subordinate activities.

3. REFERENCES

See Appendix B for a list of references.

4. POLICY

Stabilization activities are Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) nested under Theater Strategy (TS) and USCENTCOM Campaign Plan Lines of Effort (LOE) down to the Objective/Effect level. OAIs are planned under the Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and

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Working Groups (B2C2WG) framework targeting drivers of instability within the AOR to consolidate gains and engage in long term Strategic Competition (SC). Fragile and conflict-affected states often serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism, trans-national terrorism and organized crime, refugees and internally displaced persons, humanitarian emergencies, the spread of pandemic disease, and mass atrocities. USCENTCOM staff will incorporate stabilization into planning and execution, as appropriate, across the range of military operations to prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners. Stabilization considerations are included in all plans, orders, and exercises to consolidate gains and prevent future conflict.

a. Reference (l) states USCENTCOM strengthens allies and partnerships by enhancing security cooperation, assuring allies and partners, building partner capacity, and optimizing coalition and interagency efforts. The stabilization program described in this policy memo supports and reinforces these efforts.

b. Reference (m) states, on page 1 paragraph 1, that Commander, USCENTCOM envisions a region where stability between and within states is ubiquitous. It further states USCENTCOM will maintain a favorable balance of power enhancing ally and partner capacity against regional and global threats. This document establishes policies and standards to support and achieve those objectives.

c. Reference (c) defines stabilization as a “political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.”

d. The Department of State (DoS) is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization policy, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security assistance, and the DoD is the supporting agency whose activities include providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities and resources. If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DoD will lead United States Government (USG) stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.

e. Reference (d) establishes a policy that DoD plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the range of military operations in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success. Pursuant to Reference (c), USCENTCOM will:

(1) Incorporate stabilization concepts into training, exercises, experimentation, and planning, including intelligence, campaign, and support plans.

(2) Emphasize small-footprint, partner stabilization that works by, with, and through indigenous and external partners.

(3) Support efforts of other USG agencies and international partners to develop stabilization plans in coordination with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

(4) Stabilization requires sustained civilian and military integration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve unity of effort. This includes:

- (a) Actively solicit participation from mission-critical USG departments and agencies.
- (b) Utilizing civil-military teams that can integrate key instruments of national power in a way that complements indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and private entities to achieve stabilization objectives.
- (c) When appropriate, leverage DoD humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief activities to complement USG stabilization efforts.

(5) As appropriate and authorized, collaborate with and share essential intelligence and other information related to stabilization efforts with partners, including the USG interagency, foreign and multinational forces and organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and elements of academia and civil-society.

(6) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD will reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

f. To implement Reference (d) USCENTCOM plans and operations in fragile or conflict-affected areas in the theater will:

(1) Ensure appropriate stability efforts are enabled by direction and resources published in Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of USCENTCOM numbered plans.

(2) Consider the impact of operations and actions – including combat actions, partner selection, and security cooperation – on stabilization efforts, as well as indigenous political, and armed actor dynamics, including gender analysis and second and third order effects, mitigate risk and support U.S. national interests.

(3) Detailing how USCENTCOM, coalition, or partner military forces will transition from threat-focused combat/armed conflict operations to more population-focused stabilization actions to maintain gains and enable security and legitimacy of U.S. actions.

(4) Enable and encourage foreign partners to plan and conduct stabilization actions in ways that are acceptable locally and consistent with U.S. policy objectives and international norms.

(5) Convey the Commander's Communication Strategy consistent with USG Strategic Communication guidance and policy objectives, that counters adversaries and affirms effective and legitimate local governance.

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g. USCENTCOM will adhere to and support the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 and Reference (f), as well as the Global Fragility Act of 2019, and Reference (a). Recognizing that:

(1) Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflict and instability globally, and in the USCENTCOM AOR.

(2) Women's participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years by 20 percent, and by 35 percent for durability of 15 years. Integrate gender analysis into understanding the Operational Environment (OE), planning, OAs, and assessments. Pursuant to Reference (f), leverage and promote meaningful inclusion of women in preventing conflict and preparing for disasters, managing, mitigating, and resolving conflict and crisis, and post-conflict/crisis. Pursuant to References (a) and (f), protect and promote the (human) rights of members of marginalized groups, including women and girls, religious and ethnic minority groups, and other communities at risk, including by increasing their participation in public life and protection; women and girls' access to aid, and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation.

h. Reference (h) emphasizes that combat and stabilization are neither sequential nor binary alternatives; the joint force commander integrates and synchronizes stabilization activities with offensive and defensive activities throughout a joint operation and may be conducted across the conflict continuum.

i. Reference (c) authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, to provide reimbursable or non-reimbursable Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services (LSSS) to support the stabilization activities of other federal agencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, in countries and regions identified as priorities in the Global Fragility Act. This authorization is referred to as Department of Defense Support (DSS) for Stabilization Activities in National Security Interests of the United States. DSS is an authority available to USCENTCOM to plan and execute stabilization projects in support of other USG agencies.

(1) LSSS is defined in 10 U.S.C. § 2350(1) as "food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. LSSS also includes temporary use of general-purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act."

(2) When project nominations involve support to activities performed by personnel under Chief of Mission security responsibility, planners shall coordinate early with regional security offices and include in the nomination any resources required to meet necessary security requirements. The approval process for projects is separate from the process for commanders to decide if and when to execute these projects based on other considerations such as local security conditions.

(3) DoD support under Reference (c) requires a two-step process:

(a) Congressional notification, in the form of DoD submission to Congress, with DoS concurrence, of a report setting forth a stabilization strategy for each of the four countries at least 15 days before support begins.

(b) Coordination with DoS and consultation with USAID on specific project nominations.

(4) Per Reference (j), approval for DSS projects is delegated to the USD(P).

(5) DSS is funded from the Operations and Maintenance, Service-wide appropriation. When submitting a DSS project nomination, USCENTCOM identifies funding from within the Combatant Command's allocation, if any, of operations and maintenance, Service-wide funds, but may submit the project nomination as an unfunded requirement.

j. Under DSS implementing guidance, Commander, USCENTCOM maintains responsibility for all DoD stabilization matters in the USCENTCOM AOR and provides guidance to, and oversight of, Section 1210A programs. Commander, USCENTCOM assigns overall Section 1210A program management responsibilities to pertinent headquarters elements. Per Chief of Staff memo, dated 26 February 2020, USCENTCOM Operations Directorate Interagency Action Group (CCJ3-IAG) is designated the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for Stabilization and has delegated stabilization oversight to USCENTCOM Operations Directorate Civil Affairs Operations Division (CCJ3-CAO). OPR will incorporate stabilization into B2C2WG framework, especially the Joint Effects Working Group, Influence and Effects Working Group, Line of Effort Working Group, and the Planning and Resources Alignment Conference.

(1) Stabilization activities, including Section 1210A programs, must align with the applicable DoS integrated country strategy and any additional stabilization annexes as applicable.

(2) The USCENTCOM DSS project internal review process and timeline is outlined in Tab A of this policy memo. Generally, project nominations are generated from a federal agency outside the DoD and receive concurrence from the DoS prior to submission to the USCENTCOM OPR for review and staffing. The OPR has 14 days from date of receipt to complete review ensuring project supports strategic goals, is executable and contains specific measures of performance and effectiveness.

(3) Prior to submission to USCENTCOM OPR, DSS project nominations are approved by the DoS Chief of Mission and submitted to CCJ3-CAO for review and staffing. Projects above the minimal cost threshold described below are reviewed and routed to Joint Staff's Staff Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) for further submission to USD(P) for approval within 14 days of the date of receipt. Staffing occurs in Task Management Tool (TMT) at General Officer/Flag Officer level with a 10-day suspense. Final review for submission to Joint Staff J5 at USCENTCOM is the Stabilization OPR.

(4) Umbrella Projects: Large or complex Section 1210A projects may be grouped under an Umbrella Project. Umbrella Projects group two or more interdependent or interrelated

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Section 1210A efforts. Umbrella Projects may be used to secure approval for these efforts all at once, rather than requesting separate approvals for each individual subproject. When Umbrella Projects are approved, each sub-project included in the nomination is also approved. Umbrella Projects are used if the effort meets either of the below criteria:

(a) Multiple, distinct projects supporting a single effort. If several distinct projects are designed to support an overarching objective, they should be grouped under an Umbrella Project. For example, support required to reinforce and encourage good governance in a critical province (through key leader engagements, transportation of critical supplies, etc.) can all be packaged under one Umbrella Project.

(b) Multiple, substantially similar minimal-cost projects. USCENTCOM combines multiple minimal-cost efforts with substantially similar scopes into one approval request.

(5) Minimal Cost Projects: Small-scale Section 1210A projects may be created as minimal-cost projects. Minimal cost projects are nominations of \$15,000 or less. USCENTCOM has the authority to approve a minimal cost project if funds are allocated and available. USCENTCOM notifies the Office of the USD(P)/Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy when conducting minimal-cost projects.

(6) Section 1210A projects above the minimal cost threshold are routed by OPR to USCENTCOM Secretary of Joint Staff in TMT for further routing to Joint Staff J5 for review and approval by USD(P) (Reference paragraph 5 and Tab A). Project nominations should be reviewed by USCENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate, USCENTCOM Resources and Analysis Directorate (CCJ8), and other staff sections determined to have equities by the OPR.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES (DERIVED FROM DODD 3000.05)

a. USCENTCOM Intelligence Directorate (CCJ2)

(1) Provide intelligence support to stabilization and DSS activities.

(2) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) provide tailored all-source intelligence products that support planning for and execution of stabilization actions.

(a) Incorporate information from traditional intelligence sources as well as information from social science knowledge, including from sociological, anthropological, cultural, economic, political science, and historical sources within the public and private sector.

(b) The JIOC will conduct joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment in support of stabilization operations conduct by USCENTCOM, Service Component Commands, or other subordinate elements.

b. USCENTCOM Operations Directorate (CCJ3)

(1) Designate CCJ3-CAOD as the office of primary responsibility to oversee effective integration of stabilization efforts into plans and operations.

(2) Oversee effective integration of stabilization efforts into operational plans and operations as required by Reference (d).

(3) Develop, maintain, and approve plans, in coordination with the USCENTCOM Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (CCJ5), and orders including:

(a) The Stabilization Appendix to the Operations Annex (Annex C) of the USCENTCOM Campaign Plan.

(b) Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) in applicable contingency plans.

(4) In coordination with CCJ5, support efforts of other USG agencies and international partners to develop stabilization plans.

(5) In conjunction with USCENTCOM Logistics and Engineering Directorate (CCJ4) and CCJ5, and consistent with available authorities, identify requirements for materiel and equipment that are appropriate for direct transfer to the control of foreign and interagency partners for submission and validation through the appropriate staff.

(6) Ensure USCENTCOM and components identify stabilization capability, capacity, or compatibility shortfalls. Approves stabilization shortfalls, as appropriate, for inclusion in CCJ5 staffing of USCENTCOM recommendations for the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment.

(7) CCJ3-CAOD is the Command OPR for Stabilization per Chief of Staff Memo dated 27 August 2021. OPR Shall:

(a) Oversee effective integration of stabilization efforts into operational plans and operations as required by Reference (d).

(b) Lead staff in the development, review, and leadership approval of Stabilization-related planning documents and orders, including Appendix to the Operations Annex (Annex C) of the USCENTCOM Campaign Plan, Annex G (Civil-Military Operations), and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) in applicable contingency plans.

(c) Manage the Section DSS program and report collected measures of performance and measures of effectiveness from completed projects in accordance with OSD and Congressional reporting requirements.

(d) Package approved but unfunded DSS projects into formal unfunded requirements to compete for end of year funds.

(e) Utilize the TMT as the medium to coordinate staff input and package all Stabilization related reports, assessments and reviews for USCENTCOM B2C2WG and DoD requirements and processes.

(f) Support DoD Biennial Stabilization Assessment Report process, Section 1210A Congressional reporting requirements, and DoS Biennial Stabilization Assessment Review

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process with lessons learned from stabilization activities including measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

(g) Collect stabilization observations from USCENTCOM and component stabilization OAIs. Provide to USCENTCOM Exercises and Training Directorate (CCJ7) for inclusion into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).

(8) USCENTCOM Information Operations (CCJ39) is the USCENTCOM OPR for the integrated employment of information related capabilities.

(a) Support and reinforce USG and USCENTCOM efforts, including OAIs to counter subversion, prevent and mitigate conflict, mitigate destabilizing actors and events, and consolidate military gains, consistent with authorities, policy, and guidance.

(b) Support stabilization activities and Section 1210A projects as appropriate.

(c) Support collecting measures of effectiveness following stabilization activities, as appropriate.

c. USCENTCOM Logistics and Engineering Directorate (CCJ4)

(1) Support stabilization planning efforts with the Joint Logistics Enterprise, including environmental, engineering, sustainment, logistics, and resource considerations.

(2) Support direct transfer of materiel and equipment, identified and validated by the CCJ3 and CCJ5, to the control of foreign and interagency partners.

(3) Support the development of DSS projects when those projects utilize DoD logistics or DoD facilities in the AOR.

d. USCENTCOM Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (CCJ5)

(1) Incorporate stabilization consideration into plans, including campaign and support plans and security cooperation country plans as appropriate.

(2) Incorporate stabilization into Command Assessments (AJA, TCA, LOE 1-3, CMCP, CASA, etc.) and the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment as appropriate.

(3) Consistent with available authorities, identify and validate requirements for materiel and equipment that are appropriate for direct transfer to the control of foreign partners at the conclusion of defense support to stabilization and transitional public security.

e. USCENTCOM Exercises and Training Directorate (CCJ7)

(1) Support CCJ3-CAOD observation collection by assisting in the development of observation collection products such as the observation collection plan and collection templates.

(2) Receive observations and lessons learned from CCJ3-CAOD, incorporate into the JLLIS and disseminate to the other DoD Components and USG agencies as appropriate.

- f. USCENTCOM Resources and Analysis Directorate (CCJ8)
- g. Review funding packages for minimal cost DSS projects, and assist Directorate and Special Staff Resource advisors as necessary in the execution of DSS projects.
- h. Subordinate Commands should incorporate stabilization concepts into training, exercises, experimentation, plans, and orders as appropriate.

6. PROPONENT

The proponent of this regulation is the HQ USCENTCOM J3-CAOD. Units are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements directly to HQ USCENTCOM ATTN: CCJ3-CAOD, 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill AFB FL 33621-5101.

7. ACCESSIBILITY

Publications and Forms are available on the USCENTCOM SIPRNet Releasable (REL) Publications Information Portal at the following link:
https://ccj6.rel.centcom.smil.mil/R_DIV/RD/RDP/SitePages/Home.aspx.


8. RELEASABILITY

There are no releasability restrictions on this instruction within the U.S. Federal Government. Contact the USCENTCOM Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office if requested for public release pursuant to the FOIA.

9. EXPIRATION

This regulation will expire in five years pursuant to USCENTCOM CCR 25-30, *Preparation of Administrative Publications*, unless revised or rescinded.

OFFICIAL:


DAVID S. DOYLE
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

APPENDICES

- Appendix A: Glossary
- Appendix B: References

APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms. Pursuant to the *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, an abbreviation is a shortened form of a word or phrase pronounced as a word (e.g., SecDef). An acronym is a shortened form of a phrase of words, where the letters of the acronym stand for the terms of its meaning and is also read as a word (e.g., ASAP [as soon as possible]). An initialism is a shortened form of a word or phrase that is not spoken as a word; each letter is spoken separately (e.g., DoD).

AOR	Area of Responsibility
B2C2WG	Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups
CCJ2	United States Central Command Intelligence Directorate
CCJ3	United States Central Command Operations Directorate
CCJ39	United States Central Command Operations Directorate Information Operations
CCJ3-CAO	United States Central Command Operations Directorate Civil Affairs Operations Division
CCJ3-IAG	United States Central Command Operations Directorate Interagency Action Group
CCJ4	United States Central Command Logistics and Engineering Directorate
CCJ5	United States Central Command Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate
CCJ7	United States Central Command Exercises and Training Directorate
CCJ8	United States Central Command Resources and Analysis Directorate
DoS	Department of State
DSS	Defense Support Stabilization
JIOC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
LOE	Line of Effort
LSSS	Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services
OAI	Operations, Activities, and Investments
OE	Operational Environment
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
SC	Strategic Competition
TMT	Task Management Tool
TS	Theater Strategy
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USD(P)	Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government

APPENDIX B: REFERENCES

- a. *United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability*, 18 December 2020
- b. *United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security*, 1 June 2019
- c. 2022 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1210A, 7 December 2021
- d. DoD Directive 3000.05, *Stabilization*, 13 December 2018
- e. DoS Integrated Country Strategy – Iraq, Stabilization Annex, 2 December 2019
- f. DoS Integrated Country Strategy – Afghanistan, Stabilization Annex, 6 July 2019
- g. DoS Integrated Country Strategy – Yemen, Stabilization Annex, 3 August 2020
- h. Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities*, 11 February 2022
- i. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum*, 3 June 2019
- j. SecDef Defense Support for Stabilization Delegation Memo, 26 April 2021
- k. Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), 1 January 2018
- l. USCENTCOM Theater Strategy (TS), 22 November 2016
- m. USCENTCOM Campaign Plan (CCP) 1000-21 (Change 1), 22 December, 2021

