DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION (DSS)
A GUIDE FOR STABILIZATION PRACTITIONERS

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

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PKSOI Development Team:
Samuel L. Russell, samuel.l.russell.civ@army.mil
Douglas R. Hurst, douglas.r.hurst4.ctr@army.mil
Lynne M. Schneider, lynne.m.schneider.ctr@army.mil
FORWARD

This framework, *Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS): A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners*, was developed over the past two years by PKSOI in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense—Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (OSD-CNSP), and in coordination with a wide-ranging planning team involving members from across the joint force and the interagency.

Created in fulfillment of Task 1.1.5 of the December 2020 Secretary of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan, this framework serves as a reference guide that outlines how the Department of Defense, in support of U.S. Government (USG) strategy and interagency partners, supports USG stabilization efforts, missions, and activities.

As this is a DoD framework, it begins by highlighting DoD policy for DSS outlined in DoD Directive 3000.05 *Stabilization*, before providing an overview of US strategy including the 2022 National Security Strategy, 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2020 Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and 2019 Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. Following a review of other pertinent policy and doctrine, this framework outlines how the US Government in general, and DoD in particular, is organized to achieve US stabilization goals. The framework then details how the USG implements, and DoD supports, stabilization efforts.

Two appendixes detail the law governing Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) and DoD implementation guidance for this important Security Cooperation program. Finally, there are twenty-three annexes of the U.S. strategies, policies, programs, and doctrine that comprise the USG and DoD framework for stabilization. There are two versions of this guide, a short version in which these annexes are provided as links to the actual documents, and a long version in which the documents are included in each annex. The file size of the short version is about 2MB and the long version about 18MB.

PKSOI, in coordination with OSD-CNSP, is committed to periodically updating this *DSS Guide for Stabilization Practitioners* as key strategies, policies, and doctrine are published.

Jay Liddick

Colonel, CA
Director
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
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1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this framework is to provide guidance and direction to stabilization practitioners that compiles United States Government (USG) strategy, Department of Defense (DoD) policy, Joint Forces Doctrine, and applicable Security Cooperation (SC) programs into a single, useful guide.

This guide compiles sections of relevant legislation, policies, and doctrine which define Stabilization; delineate responsibilities for effective planning, coordination, administration, and execution of stabilization activities; and provide guidance and procedures for the Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Program in order to mitigate the drivers of instability.

This framework was developed in compliance with Task 1.1.5 of the Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan for the National Defense Strategy: “Within National Defense Strategy constraints, develop a framework for defense support to stabilization (DSS) across the spectrum of conflict that includes competition, crisis, and armed conflict.”

2. APPLICABILITY

This DSS framework is applicable to practitioners of stabilization and peace operations within DoD to include regional desk officers, Combatant Command (CCMD) and Joint Task Force (JTF) staff planners, Theater-Civil Affairs Planning Team (T-CAPT) members, ministry of defense advisors, military attachés, civil affairs officers, foreign area officers, security force assistance advisors and additional DoD personnel who plan, coordinate, or conduct stabilization.

3. REFERENCES

There are several key documents listed in this framework covering the law, policy, regulations, and implementation. See Appendices and Annexes for a list of additional laws, regulations, policies and other documents, glossary (Appendix C) and definitions (Appendix D).

4. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

DoD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. DoD’s role in stabilization fits within the larger whole of government context of laws, regulations and policies pertaining to the National Security Strategy (NSS), U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (USPCPS), Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), and National Defense Strategy (NDS).

DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 Stabilization, December 2018 (Annex I of this framework). This issuance applies to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred
to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”). The following is extracted directly from DoDD 3000.05:

a. Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.

b. Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) is a process to synchronize missions, activities, and tasks that support or reinforce USG stabilization efforts and promote stability in designated fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the United States.

c. The Department of State remains the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; the U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance; and DoD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities.

d. Fragile and conflict-affected states serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism; transnational terrorism and organized crime; refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian emergencies; the spread of pandemic disease; and mass atrocities. Stabilization can prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners.

e. Stabilization must be incorporated into planning across all lines of effort for military operations as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions. (1) Stabilization is required to translate combat success into lasting strategic gains and achieve the ends for which the military operation was waged. (2) Stabilization is a necessary complement to joint combat power at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

f. It is DoD Policy that to the extent authorized by law, DoD will plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the range of military operations in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success.

g. DoD will emphasize small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization working by, with, and through indigenous and other external partners to achieve strategic objectives.

h. DoD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population.

i. DoD will establish a defense support to stabilization (DSS) process to identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies; convey them through strategic documents; organize to achieve them; and prioritize requisite defense resources.
(1) DoD designs, implements, monitors, and evaluates stabilization actions based on conflict assessments, operational requirements, and complementary foreign assistance.

(2) Consistent with available authorities, DoD prioritizes efforts to identify, train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany foreign security forces conducting stabilization actions independently or in conjunction with other USG efforts.

(3) When authorized and directed, DoD establishes secure operating conditions for civilian-led stabilization efforts.

(4) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and consistent with available authorities, DoD supports other USG departments and agencies with logistic support, supplies, and services and other enabling capabilities.

(5) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD reinforces and complements civilian-led stabilization efforts. Such efforts include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

5. BACKGROUND AND AUTHORITIES

a. National Security Strategy (NSS) 2022 (Annex F of this framework) The National Security Strategy lays out our plan to achieve a better future of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world. Our strategy is rooted in our national interests: to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. We can do none of this alone and we do not have to. Most nations around the world define their interests in ways that are compatible with ours. We will build the strongest and broadest possible coalition of nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a darker vision and thwarting their efforts to threaten our interests.

We will: 1) invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; 2) build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and 3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland.

b. Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas (SAR) 2018 (Annex A of this framework). The performance of U.S. stabilization efforts has consistently been limited by the lack of strategic clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort in how the USG approaches these missions. The SAR outlines how the United States can improve the outcomes of our stabilization efforts through more efficient and disciplined bureaucratic structures, processes, and engagement with international partners. The following highlights
are drawn directly from the SAR framework:

(1) The United States and our partners need a new and more disciplined approach for conducting stabilization in conflict-affected areas. This approach includes analyzing risks and focusing our efforts on what is absolutely necessary to achieve stability, rather than pursuing disparate agendas all at once. A critical first step toward more harmonized stabilization efforts is agreeing on the core tenets of the concept itself. Despite significant international experience over recent decades, the concept of stabilization remains ill-defined and poorly institutionalized across government and multilateral structures. This lack of standardization in definition and process leads to repeated mistakes, inefficient spending, and poor accountability for results.

(2) Policymakers want to be more selective and targeted about how we engage in stabilization environments to maximize the value of American and international taxpayer resources. The revitalized approach to stabilization outlined in the SAR can help target diplomatic engagement in these environments toward advancing a strategy connected to stabilization outcomes, enable greater sequencing and layering of assistance to support locally legitimate actors, achieve cost-saving efficiencies, and foster a better division of labor between the U.S. Government and international donors and institutions. With these lessons in mind, DoS, USAID, and DoD developed a refined definition of stabilization that can guide our efforts in this regard. We define stabilization as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization includes efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, delivers targeted basic services, and establishes a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

c. 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America (Annex G of this framework) The NDS sets out how the U.S. military will meet growing threats to vital U.S. national security interests and to a stable and open international system. It directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the Department’s pacing challenge. The strategy identifies four top-level defense priorities that the Department must pursue to strengthen deterrence:

(1) Defend the homeland.

(2) Deter strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners.

(3) Deter Aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary.

(4) Build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department advances our goals through three primary pillars: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.

(1) Integrated Deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum
effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

(2) Campaigning strengthens deterrence and enables the U.S. and our allies and partners to gain advantage against the full range of competitors’ coercive actions. Campaigning is the conduct and sequencing of the logically linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time.

(3) Building Enduring Advantage across the ecosystem—the Department of Defense, the industrial base, and the array of private sector and academic enterprises that create and sharpen the Joint Force’s technological edge. DoD will modernize the systems that design and build the Joint Force with a focus on innovation and rapid adjustment to new strategic demands.

d. **2020 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability** (Annex C of this framework) outlines a ten-year, whole-of-government effort to foster peace and long-term stability through integrated diplomacy, development, and security-sector engagement. The Strategy builds upon and strengthens the work done to implement the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, and ongoing efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. It will leverage and advance other priorities, such as to promote democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights; advance gender equality; counter corruption; reduce the risks of the climate crisis; and bring an end to the COVID-19 pandemic.

e. **United States Strategy on Women, Peace and Security** June 2019 (Annex D of this framework): The Secretary Defense, in coordination with Secretary State, shall incorporate participation by women into all security cooperation activities carried out under Title 10 and shall incorporate gender analysis and Women, Peace, and Security priorities into training and activities to be conducted under Section 333 and other authorized security assistance programs. Security Cooperation (SC) planners should note that the WPS requirements under section 1210E affect all Security Assistance (SA) and SC programs not just programs under 333.

f. DoD State Partnership Program (Annex W of this framework): A Joint DoD security cooperation program, with the National Guard Bureau as the program manager, and executed by the States. Each partnership is authorized by section 341, approved by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to “support the security cooperation objectives of the United States.” Codified into U.S. law, the State Partnership Program (SPP) allows the National Guard to interact with military, security forces, and emergency/disaster response organizations of friendly partner nations.

g. Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) Section 1210A of National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2020 and 1333 of NDAA 2022 Modification and Extension (Appendix A of this framework). The DSSA is an important SC program that enables the
Combatant Commands (CCMD) to support Whole of Government stabilization efforts. However, it is just one of many SC programs available to stabilization practitioners and should not be confused with the over-arching DSS policy. The 1210A DSSA states that:

(1) The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, may provide support to the other Federal agencies for the stabilization activities of such agencies.

(2) Overall, the elements of strategy for stabilization shall set forth the following (directly from 1210A language):

(a) The United States interests in conducting stabilization activities in one of the designated countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Somalia; and countries/regions identified in the Global Fragility Act (GFA): Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, and the Coastal West Africa region consisting of the countries of Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.

(b) The key foreign partners and actors in such country.

(c) The desired end states and objectives of the United States stabilization activities in such country.

(d) The Department of Defense support intended to be provided for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies.

(e) Any mechanism for civil-military coordination regarding support for stabilization activities.

(f) The mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of Department of Defense support for United States stabilization activities in the area.

h. DoDD 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (IW) (Annex J of this framework). It is DoD policy that:

(1) Personnel with IW and SFA capabilities remain a critical element of DoD’s ability to conduct the full range of military operations in support of U.S. policy.

(2) SFA is an activity of special interest as it supports a broad range of IW missions and activities as well as building the security capacity and capability of U.S. partners and allies.

(3) IW and SFA skills, training, education, and experience must be maintained; this necessitates the need for the means to effectively identify and organize forces and individuals that will allow the DoD Military Services and USCG to better meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) IW and SFA requirements.
(4) The Military Departments undertake actions and develop mechanisms to identify and track personnel who have demonstrated IW or SFA skills, have successfully completed IW or SFA training or education, or possess IW or SFA experience. Tracking of DoD civilian personnel will be in accordance with Volume 1100 of DoDI 1400.25.

i. The Stabilization Framework. Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Stabilization Activities, February 2022, (Annex O of this framework) Chapter 1 states that:

(1) The stabilization framework helps the Joint Force Commander conceptualize part of the Operational Environment (OE) of a nation that requires stabilization in support of U.S. national strategy and interests. The framework emphasizes the training and organization of forces prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. The framework helps organize stabilization efforts and scopes the stabilization activities to achieve their objectives, whether supporting combatant command campaign plans (CCP) and integrated country strategies (ICS) or in major contingency operations.

(2) The stabilization framework is intended to encompass the process for which all activities across the competition continuum achieves stability. It guides the understanding of the USG efforts and commitment necessary to conduct stabilization activities across the competition continuum.

(3) Military forces may need to operate at any point in the fragile state. Achieving policy goals could also require the expeditious reduction in the level of violence. Maintaining security creates conditions permitting the safe introduction of other stabilization partners. Security is essential for stabilization; however, establishing security has direct implications both on localized conflict and the broader political landscape. Military operations focus on stabilizing the OE and supporting those working to transform economic, social, and political conditions toward stability. In a failed or failing state, conditions typically require more coercive actions to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions of the OE improve, the constructive capabilities of military forces can focus on building host nation (HN) civil-security capacity and enable sustained development through DoS, USAID, and other stabilization partners.

(a) The initial response stage generally reflects activities executed to stabilize an OE in a crisis state. During this stage, military forces perform stabilization activities in concert with other stabilization partners, during and immediately after a conflict or during a disaster. These activities may also be in support of stabilization partners. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) should avoid military actions that might impede civilian actions, which are often in progress prior to military intervention. In the case of a disaster, as directed, DoD supports USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), which is the lead in any international disaster relief effort. Activities during the initial response phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment, and they allow both the military and civilian personnel to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the HN population. Joint forces always seek to reduce the level of violence and
human suffering, while creating conditions that enable other stabilization partners to participate safely in ongoing efforts.

Figure 1. Strategic Framework for Stabilization from JP 3-07

(b) The **transformation stage** represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building tasks. Military forces perform these tasks in a relatively secure environment, free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. Forces often execute transformation phase tasks in either vulnerable or crisis states. These tasks aim to build HN capacity, to include support of other organizations. While establishing conditions that facilitate
broad unified action to rebuild the HN and its supporting institutions, these tasks facilitate the continued stability of the OE. Transformation in a stability context involves multiple types of transitions, which can occur concurrently.

(c) The **fostering sustainability stage** encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. In particular, military forces must work to develop institutional capacity in defense and security institutions. Effective and accountable HN institutions are critical to sustaining operational and tactical capacity in HN security forces. This stage also represents those stabilization activities undertaken to prevent instability and conflict. Military forces usually perform fostering sustainability tasks only when the OE is stable enough to support efforts. Such efforts implement long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and legitimacy of the HN. Often, military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.

6. **U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES**

U.S. government inter-agency and Department of Defense stabilization efforts are guided by the SAR. The following is extracted from the SAR:

Federal Departments and Agencies recommended steps to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas. Specifically, the interagency framework includes steps to: establish a U.S. Government wide definition of stabilization; develop and evaluate political strategies based on evidence and rigorous analysis; promote a fair, purposeful division of labor with national partners and international donors; clarify agency roles and responsibilities to improve performance and reduce duplication; improve the capacity of our civilian workforce to address stabilization needs in tandem with the U.S. military and partner forces; and sequence and target our assistance to conflict-affected areas in a more measured fashion.

As such, the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, and Joint Force have organized for stabilization:

a. **Department of State (DoS):**

(1) **Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)** anticipates, prevents, and responds to conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. CSO’s three lines of effort (LOEs) focus on different aspects of the conflict cycle: 1) strategic prevention; 2) conflict resolution; and 3) security sector stabilization. They implement their LOEs through three key functions; 1) deploying Stabilization Advisors; 2) harnessing data analytics; and 3) leading, informing, and implementing policy and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization.

(2) Chiefs of Mission in priority countries and regions will lead field-level planning,
decision-making, and coordination. Chiefs of Mission, with input from the USAID Mission Directors as appropriate, will designate a representative to be responsible for coordinating and integrating the full spectrum of Global Fragility Act activities across the Country Team and with the relevant Combatant Command and agency stakeholders. Chiefs of Mission or designee will lead bilateral engagement on security and justice sector reform to ensure United States support for such efforts is properly elevated to a central policy objective. They will be responsible for directing the planning and implementation of security and justice sector assistance resources to appropriately leverage political objectives.

(a) The principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense, is the Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT). The SDO/DATT is the Chief of Mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The SDO/DATT is considered the dual-hatted chief of both the security cooperation organization (SCO) and defense attaché office (DAO) in the embassy. This position was established by DoDD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies, December 21, 2007. The same document gives coordinating authority to the SDO/DATT for the purpose of ensuring that all DoD elements in a country are working in consonance with each other and under the guidance of the Chief of Mission.

(b) United States embassies and missions establish coordination mechanisms for engaging regularly with national government counterparts, local civil society, and other stakeholders. They review, align, and adapt plans and programs based on ongoing partner engagement and iterative conflict analysis, keeping other United States Government stakeholders periodically informed. As practical and appropriate, United States embassies and missions incorporate plans to implement the Strategy into State Integrated Country Strategies (ICS), USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), and DoD Campaign Plans, Operational Plans, and Regional Strategies.

(3) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) was created in 1978 to reduce drug trafficking into the United States from Latin America. INM’s mission soon expanded beyond combating drugs to supporting stabilization efforts in the Balkans, and to fighting corruption and transnational crime around the world. To reflect its expanded mission, INM was re-established as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in 1995. Today, INL uses a wide range of tools to counter crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad, including foreign assistance, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and reporting, sanctions, and rewards. INL has two complementary core competencies: helping partner governments assess, build, reform, and sustain competent and legitimate criminal justice systems, and developing and implementing the architecture necessary for international drug control and cross-border law enforcement.
cooperation. INL works with partner nations, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, U.S. federal, state, and local criminal justice entities to achieve its mission.

b. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): In the past several years, USAID has taken strides to improve its coordination with the DoD.

(1) The Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS) was formally launched in July 2020 as the U.S. Government’s technical and implementation lead on peace-building, state fragility, stabilization, conflict, violence prevention, and political transition in high-priority countries. CPS partners with USAID Missions and Embassies worldwide, working bilaterally or in conjunction with other Agency operating units (OUs) to make resources and expertise on such issues more accessible, more functionally aligned, more field-oriented, and more effective. For the first time, USAID has a bureau dedicated to preventing and resolving violent conflict, supporting Missions in conflict-prone environments, and responding to complex challenges related to violence, fragility, and political transition. CPS has three offices that contribute to whole-of-government stabilization efforts.

(a) The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) serves as USAID’s primary point of contact with the Department of Defense (DoD) and leverages the unique capabilities of each organization to achieve better humanitarian, stabilization, and development outcomes in pursuit of U.S. national security goals and national values. CMC development and humanitarian assistance advisors to the Special Operations Command and every Geographic Combatant Command except NORTHCOM.

(b) The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) supports U.S. foreign policy by seizing emerging windows of opportunity in the political landscape to promote stability, peace, and democracy by catalyzing local initiatives through adaptive and agile programming. OTI implements an average of 1,750 activities each year across all of its country programs. In 2020, OTI managed programs in 14 countries with a total annual budget of $92 million in Transition Initiatives funds.

(c) The Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention (CVP) strengthens USAID’s capacities and commitment to resolve conflict and prevent violence. The Center analyzes sources of conflict and fragility, and assists Missions through program interventions, as well as by integrating conflict-sensitive approaches into their programs and activities. Aside from OTI, CVP manages many of USAID’s other authorities and funds related to stabilization.

(2) Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) In 2020, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance was established to streamline USAID humanitarian responses, bringing together the vast expertise and resources of the former USAID Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP). BHA provides life-saving humanitarian assistance—including food, water, shelter, emergency healthcare, sanitation and hygiene, and critical nutrition services—to the world’s most vulnerable and hardest-
to-reach people. BHA is the lead federal coordinator for international disaster assistance, harnessing the expertise and unique capacities of other U.S. government entities to effectively respond to natural disasters and complex crises around the world. BHA takes a holistic look at humanitarian aid, providing assistance before, during and after a crisis—from readiness and response to relief and recovery. This includes non-emergency programming that is foundational to linking humanitarian assistance to long-term development. The humanitarian assistance advisors at combatant commands report to BHA’s Washington headquarters.

(3) USAID Missions: Development assistance is the mainstay of USAID’s global work, centered around the Agency’s overseas Missions in more than 80 countries. This form of international cooperation has broad, generational aims: to end poverty, improve governance, support quality education, mitigate and adapt to climate change, tackle global health challenges, and so on. USAID Missions are part of the persistent U.S. embassy team when one is present. Like the chief of mission and other diplomats, these development professionals will want to ensure that stabilization activities do not complicate or undermine their long-term goals in the country or region. OTI and BHA activities in a given country are not under the direct authority of the USAID Mission Director, but per USAID policy, they must coordinate with him/her. Additionally, every USAID overseas Mission has a Mission Civil-Military Coordinator (MC2) who serves as a point of entry for DOD personnel.

c. Department of Justice (DoJ):

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. ICITAP provides international development assistance that supports both national security and foreign policy objectives. Situated in the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, ICITAP works in close partnership with and receives funding for its programs from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of Defense. ICITAP programs are designed in partnership with the host countries, and program implementation methods include on-the-ground, pre-program assessments; program planning, management, and review; curriculum development; classroom training, seminars, and workshops; internships; equipment donations; donor coordination; and on-the-job training and mentoring provided by embedded long-term advisors.

d. Department of Defense (DoD):

According to Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Stabilization Activities, February 2022 (Annex O of this framework) stabilization activities are the various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability is the desired end state, and stabilization is the aggregation of activities to restore
the functions of the legitimate authorities. As such, the Department of Defense and Joint Force have organized for stabilization:

(1) **Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)** oversees and advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the Department of Defense to ensure these capabilities are resourced, ready, and properly employed in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. In this role, the ASD:

- Exercises authority, direction, and control of all special operations peculiar issues relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces.
- Is the Principal Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Official within the senior management of DoD.
- Sits in the chain-of-command above USSOCOM for special operations-peculiar administrative matters; provides civilian oversight of the SOF enterprise.
- Advises, Assists, and Supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on Special Operations and Irregular Warfare policy matters.

ASD SO/LIC serves as the Co-lead of the Irregular Warfare – Security Force Assistance (IW-SFA) Executive Steering Committee.

(a) **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism (IWCT)**. Co-lead office for execution of the Irregular Warfare – Security Force Assistance (IW-SFA) Executive Steering Committee and Working Group. Provides oversight of the NDS Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan and associated tasks. Leads development of DoD 3000.07 *Irregular Warfare*.

(b) **DASD for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (CNSP)** develops DoD counterdrug (CD) and counter-transnational organized crime (CTOC) policy. CNSP provides policy and intellectual leadership for stability operations to decision makers and within DoD and our partner organizations; identifies and bridges the gaps in stability operations capability, capacity, and compatibility within DoD and across the rest of the USG and civilian organizations; and leads efforts to institutionalize stability operations capabilities, capacity, and compatibility across DoD to ensure that DoD is organized, resourced and prepared to conduct stability operations with USG, civilian organizations and international partners. In this role, CNSP leads development of DoD 3000.05 *Stabilization* policy and provides oversight of the 1210A DSSA program.

(c) **DASD for Global Partnerships**. OSD-P Strategy, Plans and Capabilities (SPC) focal point for Security Cooperation and Building Partnership Capacity subject matter expertise, recognized as the DoD lead that prioritizes, integrates, and evaluates bilateral and multilateral security cooperation activities to strengthen U.S. and global security.

(d) **Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)** — The mission of DSCA is to
advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by building the capacity of foreign security forces to respond to shared challenges. DSCA leads the broader U.S. security cooperation enterprise in its efforts to train, educate, advise, and equip foreign partners. DSCA administers security cooperation programs that support U.S. policy interests and objectives identified by the White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State. These objectives include developing specific partner capabilities, building alliances and partnerships, and facilitating U.S. access. DSCA integrates security cooperation activities in support of a whole-of-government approach; provides execution guidance to DoD entities that implement security cooperation programs; exercises financial and program management for the Foreign Military Sales system and many other security cooperation programs; and educates and provides for the long-term development of the security cooperation workforce.

(2) Joint Force:

(a) Joint Staff J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy, Deputy Directorate - Under the J-5, the Counter Threats and International Cooperation (CTIC) Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division (SHED) develops military advice for plans, policies, and strategies across the broad range of stabilization and humanitarian portfolios to provide informed participation and decisions by the Joint Staff during strategic engagements and interagency policy development. More specifically, SHED develops stability and humanitarian guidance and military advice on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); coordinates policy and guidance with combatant commands, services, combat support agencies, and other USG agencies on behalf of the CJCS; and coordinates and synchronizes with Joint Force with the U.S. whole of government efforts to meet national objectives regarding interagency stability and humanitarian activities. SHED is the link between Combatant Commanders and interagency support and activity to promote stability, democracy, and human security.


(c) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activity that serves as the DoD’s recognized expert on security force assistance (SFA). JCISFA serves as the Joint Force integrator for the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of SFA doctrine, standards, tactics, techniques, and procedures that enable the Joint Force to efficiently and effectively develop partner nation capability and capacity in support of U.S. national security objectives.

(d) USSOCOM J33 Civil Affairs Joint Proponent Office (CAJPO), executes Joint
Proponent for Civil Affairs (DoDD 2000.13 *Civil Affairs*).

- Assists the CJCS by leading the development of joint civil affairs doctrine.
- Leads the development of joint civil affairs training and education for individuals and units.
- Leads the identification of required joint civil affairs capabilities across all warfighting domains.
- Leads the development of joint civil affairs mission essential task lists.
- Leads the development of joint civil affairs strategy.
- Coordinates with the Military Services and Combatant Commands to develop standards ensuring interoperability of joint civil affairs forces and equipment.
- Coordinates with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Joint Staff to consult with other USG departments and agencies on civil affairs-related initiatives, strategies, concepts, plans, and policies.
- Assists the USD(P&R) in identifying critical civil affairs skills, training, and experience.

(e) **U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)** executes the Army’s responsibilities as Joint Proponent for Stabilization and Peace Operations. PKSOI is the Army and DoD’s economy of force, low-cost tool to maintain visibility and forward momentum within the stabilization and peace operations realms. PKSOI develops, integrates, and assesses joint, intergovernmental, and multinational peace and stability capabilities to achieve national objectives across the competition continuum. PKSOI ensures stabilization and peace operations are appropriately and accurately reflected in U.S. Military strategy, policy, doctrine, concepts, training, education, and leader development. PKSOI serves as a resource for practitioners who confront challenges in executing DSS by advising and connecting practitioners to the right entity or resource. PKSOI executes the Army’s Joint Proponent responsibilities for Stabilization and Peace Operations as designated by the Secretary of Defense:

- Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the development and implementation of stabilization-related elements of irregular warfare doctrine, organization, training, leadership, education, and policy for the Joint Force with an emphasis on DoD’s core stabilization responsibility.
- Identify and prioritize required skills for the Joint Force that enable security force assistance and defense institution building. These are essential Joint Force skills that are required to leverage the capability and capacity of foreign security forces to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives.
- Assist the CJCS with stabilization-related elements of the Chairman’s Annual Joint Irregular Warfare Assessment.
- Assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense with the Stabilization Assessment as it pertains to stabilization and peace operations.
- Advise the military services with stabilization and peace operations subject matter expertise to help them identify and track military personnel and civilians with the training, background, and experience necessary to plan and execute stabilization
and peace operations.

- Lead collaborative engagement with relevant joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national partners as well as public-private partners and academia, as it pertains to stabilization and peace operations.
- Lead the integration of joint lessons learned in stabilization and peace operations.

(f) Combatant Commands (CCMD). Stabilization activities can be conducted throughout the competition continuum. The nature of the OE may require U.S. forces to conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously. Stabilization activities are Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) nested under Theater Strategy (TS) and Combatant Commanders Campaign Plan Lines of Effort (LOEs) down to the Objective/Effect level. OAIs are planned under the Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG) framework targeting drivers of instability within the AOR to consolidate gains and engage in long term Strategic Competition.

Fragile and conflict affected states often serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism; trans-national terrorism and organized crime; refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian emergencies; the spread of pandemic disease; and mass atrocities. Combatant Commanders’ staffs will incorporate stabilization into planning and execution, as appropriate, across the ROMO to prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners. Stabilization considerations are included in all plans, orders, and exercises to consolidate gains and prevent future conflict. CCMD responsibilities for conducting Civil Affairs are outlined in DoDD 2000.13 Civil Affairs, Enclosure 2, paragraph 6, p. 8. (Annex H of this framework). CCMD responsibilities for stabilization are outlined in DoDD 3000.05 Stabilization, paragraph 2.13, page 13 (Annex I of this framework).

7. IMPLEMENTATION

a. The Department of State (DoS) (SAR Annex A of this framework) is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization policy, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security assistance, and the DoD is the supporting agency whose activities include providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities and resources. If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DoD will lead United States Government (USG) stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.

b. DoDD 3000.05 Stabilization (Annex I of this framework) establishes a policy that DoD plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the ROMO in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success. To effectively implement stabilization strategy, policy, and doctrine, Combatant Commanders should:

(1) Incorporate stabilization concepts into training, exercises, experimentation, and
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planning, including intelligence, campaign, and support plans.

(2) Emphasize small-footprint, partner stabilization that works by, with, and through indigenous and external partners.

(3) Support efforts of other USG agencies and international partners to develop stabilization plans in coordination with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

(4) Stabilization requires sustained civilian and military integration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve unity of effort. This includes:

(a) Actively solicit participation from mission-critical USG departments and agencies.

(b) Utilizing civil-military teams that can integrate key instruments of national power in a way that complements indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and private entities to achieve stabilization objectives.

(c) When appropriate, leverage DoD humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief activities to complement USG stabilization efforts.

(5) As appropriate and authorized, collaborate with and share essential intelligence and other information related to stabilization efforts with partners, including the USG interagency, foreign and multinational forces and organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and elements of academia and civil society.

(6) When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD will reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

To implement stabilization policy, Combatant Commanders in coordination with civilian mission partners should develop plans and operations in fragile or conflict-affected areas in their theater that will:

(1) Ensure appropriate stability efforts are enabled by direction and resources published in Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of Combatant Commanders numbered plans within DoDD 3000.05 Stabilization (Annex I of this framework).

(2) Consider the impact of operations and actions – including combat actions, partner selection, and security cooperation – on stabilization efforts, as well as indigenous political dynamics, including gender analysis and second and third order effects, mitigate
risk and support U.S. national interests.

(3) Detail how the Combatant Command, coalition, or partner military forces will transition from threat-focused combat/armed conflict operations to more population-focused stabilization actions to maintain gains and enable security and legitimacy of U.S. actions.

(4) Enable and encourage foreign partners to plan and conduct stabilization actions in ways that are acceptable locally and consistent with U.S. policy objectives and international norms.

(5) Convey the Commander’s Communication Strategy consistent with USG Strategic Communication guidance and policy objectives, that counters adversaries and affirms effective and legitimate local governance.

c. DoD will adhere to and support the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Annex D of this framework) as well as the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (HR 2116). Recognizing directly from the WPS Act that:

(1) Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflict and instability globally.

(2) Women’s participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years by 20 percent, and by 35 percent for durability of 15 years. It is critical to integrate gender analysis into understanding the OE, planning, OAlS, and assessments. Leverage and promote meaningful inclusion of women in preventing conflict and preparing for disasters, managing, mitigating, and resolving conflict and crisis, and post-conflict/crisis. Protect and promote the (human) rights of members of marginalized groups, including women and girls, religious and ethnic minority groups, and other communities at risk, including by increasing their participation in public life and protection; women and girls’ access to aid, and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation.

d. Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) is an important security cooperation program that enables the Combatant Commands to support Whole of Government stabilization efforts. 1210A of NDAA 2020 with 1333 Modifications and Extension from NDAA 2022 (Appendix A of this framework) authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, to provide reimbursable or non-reimbursable Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services (LSSS) to support the stabilization activities of other federal agencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, and the countries and regions identified in the Global Fragility Act: Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, and the Coastal West Africa region (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo). This authorization is referred to as Department of Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) in National Security Interests of the United States. DSSA is an authority available to Combatant Commands to plan and execute stabilization projects in support of other USG agencies.
(1) LSSS is defined in 10 U.S.C. § 2350(1) as “food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. LSSS also includes temporary use of general-purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.”

(2) When project nominations involve support to activities performed by personnel under Chief of Mission security responsibility, planners should coordinate early with regional security offices and include in the nomination any resources required to meet necessary security requirements. The approval process for projects is separate from the process for commanders to decide if/when to execute these projects based on other considerations such as local security conditions.

(3) DoD support under 1210A DSSA requires a two-step process:

   (a) Congressional notification, in the form of DoD submission to Congress, with DoS concurrence, of a report setting forth a stabilization strategy for each of the thirteen countries (including those designated under the GFA) at least 15 days before support begins.

   (b) Coordination with DoS and consultation with USAID on specific project nominations.

(4) Per DoDD 3000.05 (Annex I of this framework), approval for DSSA projects is delegated to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

(5) DSSA is funded from the Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide appropriation. When submitting a DSS project nomination, Combatant Commands identify funding from within the Combatant Command’s allocation, if any, of Operations and maintenance, Defense-wide funds, or may submit the project nomination as an unfunded requirement.

(6) Stabilization activities, including Section 1210A of NDAA 2020 (Appendix A of this framework) programs, must align with the applicable DoS integrated country strategy and the ten-year U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability. The DoS integrated country strategy for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria have additional stabilization annexes to be consulted.

(7) The internal review process and timeline template for DSSA projects are outlined in Appendix B of this framework. Generally, project nominations are generated from a federal agency outside the DoD and receive concurrence from the DoS prior to submission to the Combatant Commanders OPR for review and staffing. The OPR
should complete their review within 14 days from date of receipt to complete review ensuring project supports strategic goals, is executable and contains specific measures of performance and effectiveness.

(8) DSSA project nominations are approved by the DoS Chief of Mission. Large or complex Section 1210A projects may be grouped under an Umbrella Project. Umbrella Projects group two or more interdependent or interrelated Section 1210A efforts. Umbrella Projects may be used to secure approval for these efforts all at once, rather than requesting separate approvals for each individual subproject. When Umbrella Projects are approved, each sub-project included in the nomination is also approved. Umbrella Projects are used if the effort meets either of the below criteria:

(9) Multiple, distinct projects supporting a single effort. If several distinct projects are designed to support an overarching objective, they should be grouped under an Umbrella Project. For example, support required to reinforce and encourage good governance in a critical province (through key leader engagements, transportation of critical supplies, etc.) can all be packaged under one Umbrella Project.

(a) Multiple, substantially similar minimal-cost projects. Combatant Commanders can combine multiple minimal-cost efforts with substantially similar scopes into one approval request.

(b) Minimal Cost Projects: Small scale Section 1210A projects may be created as minimal-cost projects. Minimal cost projects are nominations of $15,000 or less. Combatant Commanders have the authority to approve a minimal cost project if funds are allocated and available. Combatant Commanders notify the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy/Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy when conducting minimal-cost projects.

(c) Section 1210A projects above the minimal cost threshold are routed by OPR to the Secretary of the Joint Staff in Task Management Tool for further routing to Joint Staff J5 for review and approval by USD(P). Project nominations must first be cleared by Combatant Command’s Staff Judge Advocates.

8. PROPOSENENT

The proponent of this framework is the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Refer any recommended updates, comments, or suggested improvements directly to PKSOI at: usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@army.mil.
APPENDIX A: SECTION 1210A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES IN NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES FROM NDAA 2020, WITH SEC. 1333. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION FROM NDAA 2022

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, provide support to the other Federal agencies specified in subsection (c)(1) for the stabilization activities of such agencies.

(b) DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN AREAS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be provided pursuant to this section shall be available only for support for stabilization activities—

(A)(i) in a country specified in paragraph (2); and

(ii) that the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, has determined are in the national security interest of the United States; or

(B) in a country that--

(i)(I) has been selected as a priority country under section 505 of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9804) [Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and the Coastal West Africa sub-region, which encompasses Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo]; or

(II) is located in a region that has been selected as a priority region under section 505 of such Act; and

(ii) has Department of Defense resource or personnel presence to support such activities.

(2) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.—The countries specified in this paragraph are as follows:

(A) Iraq.

(B) Syria.

(C) Afghanistan.

(D) Somalia.

(c) SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Support under subsection (a) may be provided to the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, or other Federal agencies, on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. The authority to provide such support under this paragraph on a reimbursable basis is in addition to other authorities to provide support on such basis.

(2) TYPE OF SUPPORT.—Support under subsection (a) may consist of logistic support, supplies, and services.

(d) REQUIREMENT FOR A STABILIZATION STRATEGY.—

(1) LIMITATION.—With respect to any country specified in subsection (b)(2), no amount of support may be provided under subsection (a) until 15 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a detailed report setting forth a stabilization strategy for such country.

(2) ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY.—The stabilization strategy required by paragraph (1) shall set forth the following:

   (A) The United States interests in conducting stabilization activities in the country specified in subsection (b)(2).

   (B) The key foreign partners and actors in such country.

   (C) The desired end states and objectives of the United States stabilization activities in such country.

   (D) The Department of Defense support intended to be provided for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies under subsection (a).

   (E) Any mechanism for civil-military coordination regarding support for stabilization activities.

   (F) The mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of Department of Defense support for United States stabilization activities in the area.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE.—Support provided under subsection (a) shall be implemented in accordance with the guidance of the Department of Defense entitled “DoD Directive 3000.05 Stabilization”, dated December 13, 2018 (or successor guidance).

(f) REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress on an annual basis a report that includes the following:
(1) The identification of each foreign area within countries specified in subsection (b)(2) for which support to stabilization has occurred.

(2) The total amount spent by the Department of Defense, broken out by recipient Federal agency and activity.

(3) An assessment of the contribution of each activity toward greater stability.

(4) An articulation of any plans for continued Department of Defense support to stabilization in the specified foreign area in order to maintain or improve stability.

(5) Other matters as the Secretary of Defense considers to be appropriate.

(g) USE OF FUNDS.—

(1) SOURCE OF FUNDS.—Amounts for activities carried out under this section in a fiscal year shall be derived only from amounts authorized to be appropriated for such fiscal year for the Department of Defense for Operation and Maintenance.

(2) LIMITATION.—Not more than $18,000,000 in each fiscal year is authorized to be used to provide non-reimbursable support under this section.

(h) EXPIRATION.—The authority provided under this section may not be exercised after December 31, 2023.

(i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) LOGISTIC SUPPORT, SUPPLIES, AND SERVICES.—The term “logistic support, supplies, and services” has the meaning given the term in section 2350(1) of title 10, United States Code.
APPENDIX B: IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES
IMPLEMENTING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

1. Background

Section 1210A of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 (PL-116-92), “Department of Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in National Security Interest of the United States” authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to provide reimbursable or non-reimbursable logistic support, supplies, and services (LSSS) to support the stabilization activities of other federal agencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, and the countries/regions identified in the US Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability of Coastal West Africa (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo), Mozambique, Libya, Haiti, and Papua New Guinea, until December 31, 2023.

2. Introduction

This document provides guidance on the prioritization, design, planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of LSSS support authorized by Section 1210A.

DoD Directive 3000.05 Stabilization defines stabilization as a “political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” As provided in the U.S. Government’s Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), the Department of State (DoS) is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts, USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance, and the Department of Defense (DoD) is a supporting element that provides requisite security and reinforces civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities and resources.

DoD support for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies requires a three-step process: (1) the submission to Congress, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, of a detailed report with a stabilization strategy for each of the four countries at least 15 days before support is provided, (2) coordination with the Secretary of State and consultation with the Administrator of USAID on specific stabilization activity proposals, and (3) a determination from the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that the stabilization activities to be supported by DoD are in the national security interests of the United States.

Section 1210A is intended to enable stabilization efforts that are consistent with both DoD and interagency objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Syria. As stabilization is inherently an interagency activity, all Section 1210A proposals should be drafted with input from DoS, USAID, and DoD (along with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies as required). DoD support for stabilization activities of other federal agencies should be aligned under the respective Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and associated stabilization annex, if one exists. All Section
1210A proposals for DoD support for stabilization activities must be consistent with the SAR and the definitions, best practices, and other guidance in DoDD 3000.05.

3. Responsibilities

Specific roles and responsibilities pertaining to the management of 1210A activities are summarized below.

3.1. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The USD(P) serves as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for all matters on the formulation of Section 1210A policy and oversight to further national security objectives. USD(P) is also responsible for the oversight and management of Section 1210A assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

3.2. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). ASD(SO/LIC), acting through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (DASD/CNSP) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of policy for Section 1210A activities; serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USD(P) and the SecDef for Stabilization policy (DoDD 3000.05). Coordinates Section 1210A operations and policies with DoS, USAID and other federal agencies.

3.3. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO). USD(C)/CFO develops and implements policies and procedures for Section 1210A activities involving financial management, accounting, audit readiness, budgeting for reimbursements to DoD appropriation accounts and revolving funds.

3.4. Combatant Commanders (CCMD). CCMDs maintain responsibility for all stabilization matters in their assigned areas of responsibility and provide guidance to, and oversight of, Section 1210A programs.

4. Types of support authorized

DoD may only use Section 1210A to provide LSSS support for stabilization activities of other Federal agencies. LSSS is defined in Section 2350(1) of Title 10, U.S. Code, as: “food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. Such term includes temporary use of general purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.” Possible types of support provided under Section 1210A could include, but are not limited to, transportation for USG civilians into and within an unstable area, life support and medical services for USG civilians on the ground, the billeting and the use of DoD facilities and
communications equipment for USG civilians, training services for USG civilians, the fueling, repair, and maintenance of USG civilian vehicles and equipment, or the movement of stabilization goods into priority areas. For more detail on specific categories and examples of LSSS, see Appendix A to Enclosure A of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2120.01D, issued May 21, 2015.

Section 1210A is not an authority for DoD to conduct stabilization activities directly – it is only a support authority. Section 1210A is not a new Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). DoD cannot, under Section 1210A, directly construct a prison, hospital, road, or school solely for its own stabilization purposes. DoD could, however, provide LSSS to support other USG departments or agencies constructing a prison, hospital, road, or school. Furthermore, DoD could utilize its logistics channels to transport construction materials and personnel to support said construction.

5. Country Strategies

Subsection 1210A(d) requires the submission of a detailed report to Congress setting forth a stabilization strategy for each specified country in subsection 1210A(b)(2), before DoD may provide support for the stabilization activities of other Federal agencies in each country. No support may be provided under Section 1210A in any specified country until 15 days after the date on which the country’s strategy is submitted. The SecDef, or others as delegated, must secure Secretary of State concurrence in the detailed report and strategies.

The Office of the USD(P) Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (OUSD(P)/CNSP), in coordination with the Joint Staff (JS) J-5 Counter-Threats and International Cooperation Division, and DoS, will draft the country strategies, and the combatant commands (CCMDs) will have a chance to review and comment on the strategies before submission to Congress. DoS will provide concurrence in the report, including all strategies, at the appropriate level (as delegated by the Secretary of State).

The appropriate DOS official, as delegated by the Secretary of State, will concur in proposals for the specific use of the authority, and DoD will consult with the appropriate USAID official, as delegated by the Administrator, and the relevant CCMDs, OUSD(P)/CNSP, and the JS (see the requirements section of this guidance).

6. Requirements

Specified CCMDs should work with the relevant Embassies, USAID Country Coordinators, and other relevant Federal agencies to identify specific support requirements and be prepared to provide specified support for the stabilization activities of those Federal agencies in an authorized country during Calendar Year (CY) 2022 and 2023.

Following appropriate coordination with the relevant Embassy and supported Federal agency, specified CCMDs should conduct joint planning and identify feasible support options.
The SecDef, or others so designated, is the final approving authority for all proposals. Considerations for project prioritization include national priorities, cost, timeliness, impact of support to stabilization goals, and commander recommendations.

CCMDs should submit Proposals utilizing the Proposal Routing Diagram (Appendix B1 of this Framework) and the Project Nomination Requirements (Appendix B2). Section 1210A proposals should follow the Routing Diagram and must be in accordance with the below criteria:

- The proposal is cleared by the relevant Ambassador or his/her designee, as delegated by the Secretary of State.
- USAID is consulted on the proposal at the appropriate level as delegated by the Administrator.
- The proposal is in support of DoS, USAID, or other Federal agency stabilization activities.
- The proposal is in support of those Federal agencies’ stabilization activities in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, or Somalia or the GFA countries/regions of Coastal West Africa (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo), Libya, Mozambique, Haiti, or Papua New Guinea.
- The proposal must be to provide LSSS in accordance with the definition in Section 2350 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
- CCMDs submit proposals to OSD/SOLIC/CNSP via the Joint Staff J-5. Proposals must be cleared by CCMD Staff Judge Advocate and have GO/FO/SES concurrence.
- The proposal must be implemented in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05, Stabilization, and the SAR.

7. Program Management

The Secretary of Defense (including the Deputy Secretary of Defense) is the approval authority for Section 1210A support activities. OUSD(P) will provide oversight and management of the program.

8. Security Considerations for Personnel under Secretary of State Security Responsibility

When proposals involve support to activities performed by personnel under Secretary of State/Chief of Mission (COM) security responsibility, planners should coordinate early with Regional Security Offices (RSO) and include in the proposal any resources required to meet necessary security requirements. The approval process for proposals outlined in this document is separate from the process for leaders to decide if and when to execute these proposals based on other considerations such as local security conditions.

To account for the changing security landscape in conflict areas where execution of this authority is needed, proposals may be routed before all security requirements are finalized. Proposals should not be delayed or dismissed while security requirements are determined and negotiated between DoD, DoS, and USAID. Section 1210A proposals should be submitted based upon identified stabilization needs on the ground, not predictions of what will eventually be approved by those DoD and/or DoS officials responsible for assessing whether missions or activities can
proceed based on security considerations. Similarly, approval for a proposal does not grant execution authority for the program. That authority lies with the local commander with the concurrence of the Chief of Mission.

Section 1210A is a DoD authority and does not affect the authorities and processes of DoS Diplomatic Security (DS), Regional Security Officers (RSOs), or other non-DoD personnel security offices.

9. Funding

Section 1210A can be utilized on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. Non-reimbursable Section 1210A support requests will be evaluated in accordance with the SECDEF’s June 19, 2020, memorandum “Reimbursable Activities in Support of Other Entities.” As appropriate, OSD(P)/SOLIC will seek an exception to policy.

Congress did not enact a specific appropriation to fund Section 1210A activities. Funding for non-reimbursable support may only be derived from Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide (O&M, DW) funds. Not more than $18,000,000 of O&M, DW, is authorized to be used to provide non-reimbursable support under this section in each applicable FY (FY 2022 and FY 2023). Therefore, funding for Section 1210A proposals will be identified on a case-by-case basis. CCMDs submitting a Section 1210A proposal should seek to identify funding from within the O&M, DW appropriation, but may submit the proposal as an unfunded requirement (UFR).

For UFRs, the USD(P)/CNSP, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), will work to provide proposal funding.

10. Calendar Year 2022 and 2023 Proposals Timeline

Section 1210A proposals for reimbursable and non-reimbursable support may be submitted now. CCMDs are encouraged to communicate with OSD frequently as they formulate proposals to ensure situational awareness and share lessons learned.

OUSD(P)/CNSP and the Joint Staff will review proposals on a rolling basis and package for approval by the SecDef. A targeted timeline goal is as follows:

D: Cleared CCMD proposal received by OUSD(P)/CNSP
D+5: Initial feedback/RFIs provided. OUSD(P)/CNSP builds SECDEF package
D+10: Legal / Financial review complete
D+20: Formal Decision Memorandum to CCMD

11. Project Types.

Section 1210A requirements that are particularly small in scale may be created as minimal-cost projects, and Section 1210A requirements that are large or complex may be grouped under an Umbrella Project.
Minimal cost projects are Section 1210A efforts costing $15,000 or less. CCMDs may approve a minimal cost project if funds are allocated and available at the CCMD level, and if project objectives can be effectively achieved at this cost, in accordance with Section 1210A legal and policy requirements. Minimal cost projects must meet the same legal, policy, coordination, and management criteria, and are subject to the same requirements for Monitoring and Evaluation of other Section 1210A funded efforts. CCMDs will notify OSD(P)/CNSP when conducting minimal-cost projects to ensure that the CCMD does not inadvertently usurp the SECDEF’s authority to approve Section 1210A projects. CCMDs, through OSD(P) may in certain situations request from the SecDef an increase in the $15,000 minimal cost limit.

Umbrella Projects group two or more interdependent or interrelated Section 1210A efforts. CCMDs may use Umbrella Projects to secure approval for these efforts all at once, rather than requesting separate approvals for each individual subproject. When SecDef, or others so designated, approves an Umbrella Project, each sub-project included in the proposal is also approved. CCMDs must obtain written approval from OSD(P)/CNSP to add subprojects to the Umbrella Project if not included in the original proposal. Umbrellas are used if the effort meets either of the below criteria:

- **Multiple, distinct projects supporting a single effort.** If several distinct projects are designed to support an overarching stabilization objective, they should be grouped under an Umbrella Project. For example, support required to reinforce and encourage good governance in a critical province (through key leader engagements, transportation of critical supplies, etc.) can all be packaged under one Umbrella Project.

- **Multiple, substantially similar minimal-cost projects.** To the extent practical, CCMDs will combine multiple minimal-cost efforts with substantially similar scopes into one approval request. Upon approval, subprojects can be funded at the CCMD, provided all legal and policy reviews are complete. If CCMDs require additional funding for subprojects, the CCMD may submit an unfunded requirement (UFR) to OSD(P)/CNSP which will work with OSD(C) to identify sufficient funds.

### 12. Further Guidance

This document provides guidance on Section 1210A. This guidance is designed to enable the CCMDs to begin liaising immediately with the respective Embassies and other Federal agencies and begin joint planning and drafting of Section 1210A proposals. Updates to Section 1210A guidance will be disseminated, as appropriate.

### 13. Points of Contact

Section 1210A is a new authority with a short timeline for execution. As such, all relevant personnel from DoS, USAID, and DoD are encouraged to email their Section 1210A POCs with recommendations, questions, or draft/pre-approved proposals.

- **OUSD(P):**
  - COL John McNamara, Deputy Director, Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy (SPKP), CNSP, [john.h.mcnamara.mil@mail.mil](mailto:john.h.mcnamara.mil@mail.mil)
Mr. Ryan McCannell, Senior Policy Advisor, SPKP, CNSP, 
ryan.s.mccannell.civ@mail.mil
OUSD(P) Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy Team: osd.pentagon.ousd-policy.list.spkp@mail.mil

Attachments:
Appendix B1 – Proposal Routing Diagram
Appendix B2 – Project Nomination Requirements
Defense Support for Stabilization Activities Process

**Project Nomination**
- Compile project packet in coordination with CCMD
- Determine if reimbursable or non-reimbursable
- Get Chief of Mission approval
- Forward packet to CCMD POC

**CCMD Review**
- Acknowledge Receipt of Packet
- Obtain legal review
- Determine if supportable
  - ID Funding Source (if non-reimbursable)
  - ID Forces (if necessary)
- Get DCOM approval
- Provide formal feedback to submitting agency
- Forward packet with CCMD decision to Joint Staff

**Approval**
- Joint Staff
  - Confirm receipt of packet
  - Pass packet to OSD(P) points of contact
- OSD(P) / SOLIC
  - Obtain legal review
  - ID funding
  - Seek SecDef approval
  - Provide formal feedback to submitting CCMD

**Notes:**
- All packet submittals must be approved/disapproved at DCOM level within 21 days of receipt
- CCMDs can utilize available Defense Wide O&M or identify funding shortfalls to OSD(P) / SOLIC

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POCs: COL John McNamara, john.h.mcnamara.mil@mail.mil
Mr. Ryan McCannell, ryan.s.mccannell.civ@mail.mil
## DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES (DSSA) PROJECT NOMINATION REQUIREMENTS

1. **Submitting Department or Agency:**  
   *(Insert name of department or agency nominating the project)*

2. **Project Name:**  
   *(Choose a project name. Name will be used for tracking purposes so should be appropriately descriptive)*

3. **Org POC:**  
   *(Insert points of contact for nominating department or agency clearly identifying the project lead)*

4. **POC contact info:**  
   *(Include both email and phone for nominating organization point of contact)*

5. **Project Location:**  
   *(Identify project location utilizing either local address, general location name, or Lat/Long coordinates. Location should be easily verifiable. Include satellite photo marking location if possible)*

6. **Project description:** *(Detailed description of the project including as much information as available. Include pictures if possible)*

7. **Estimated Cost:**  
   *(Insert projected cost of the project in U.S. dollars to include the way you determined the estimate, e.g., “$250,000 based on historic cost data.” Identify whether support will be reimbursable or non-reimbursable)*

8. **Issue being addressed and projected benefit:**  
   *(Clearly identify the problem being addressed and the benefit you expect from the project. This section will help prioritize projects within CCMDs or DoD)*
10. **How project supports U.S. Government (USG) stabilization objectives:**
(Insert paragraph describing how the project ties into the USG’s stabilization objectives outlined in the Country’s stabilization annexes. **Project must** support stabilization activities.)

11. **DOS plan supported:**
(Clearly identify the overall plan or line of effort as identified in the Embassy’s integrated country strategy.)

12. **CCMD lines of effort or objectives supported:**
(Coordinate with CCMD to identify the lines of effort supported within the CCMD. Paragraph should clearly identify DoD equities and benefits.)

13. **USAID plan supported (If necessary):**
(Clearly identify the USAID implementation plan goals that the project will support.)

14. **Nominating department or agency’s objectives supported (if necessary):**
(Clearly identify the link to the nominating agencies overall objectives.)

15. **Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness collection plan:**
(Describe the measures of performance (MoP) and measures of effectiveness (MoE) and how they will be monitored)

16. **Who will collect MoP/MoE data?:**
(Describe who will be collecting the data, e.g., third party contractor, local embassy, implementing agency.)

17. **Civilian or military mechanism supporting project:**
(Describe the mechanism for coordination between the nominating
18. Implementer of project: *(Identify the projected implementing department or agency, e.g., Contractor, NGO, Military unit)*

19. Timeline: *(Insert project timeline. Highlight “no later than” start dates and provide reason for chosen date)*

20. Additional Comments: *(Insert any amplifying or clarifying comments here)*
APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms. Pursuant to the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, an abbreviation is a shortened form of a word or phrase pronounced as a word (e.g., SECDEF). An acronym is a shortened form of a phrase of words, where the letters of the acronym stand for the terms of its meaning and is also read as a word (e.g., ASAP [as soon as possible]). An initialism is a shortened form of a word or phrase that is not spoken as a word; each letter is spoken separately (e.g., DoD).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2C2WG</td>
<td>Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHA</td>
<td>Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance, USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Command Campaign Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDCS</td>
<td>Country Development Cooperation Strategies, USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNSP</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics and Stabilization Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, DoS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Defense Institution Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Defense Support to Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSSA</td>
<td>Defense Support for Stabilization Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFA</td>
<td>Global Fragility Act</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>The International Criminal Investigative Training, DoJ Assistance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Integrated Country Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>Line of Effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSSS</td>
<td>Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAI</td>
<td>Operations, Activities, and Investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMO</td>
<td>Range of Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Stabilization Assistance Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO/DAAT</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official or Defense Attaché</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPCPS</td>
<td>Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPKP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Peacekeeping Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Theater Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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USD(P) Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
USG United States Government
WPS Women, Peace, and Security
APPENDIX D. DEFINITIONS

Terms/Definitions. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definition are for the purpose of this document.

**Authority**: USG agencies and organizations draw their authority from the U.S. Code, Presidential directives and executive orders, decisions of the Federal courts and treaties. (gpo.gov) Power to influence thought, opinion or behavior – implies the power of winning devotion or allegiance or of compelling acceptance and belief – the right or power to command, rule or judge.

**Campaign Plans (CP)**: A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign. Source: JP 5-0 (DoD Dictionary)

**Development**: The provision of aid and other assistance to regions that are less economically developed. The provision of assistance to developing countries. Sustained, concerted effort of policymakers and communities to promote a standard of living and economic health in a specific area. (DoS)

**Diplomatic Actions**: (DoD) Those international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad (JP 1-02–see Public Diplomacy). The diplomatic instrument of national power is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives.

**Defense Institution Building**: Security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation’s defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. Also called DIB. Source: JP 3-20 (DoD Dictionary)

**Defense Support to Stabilization**: A process to synchronize missions, activities, and tasks that support or reinforce USG stabilization efforts and promote stability in designated fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the United States. (DoDD 3000-05)

**Defense Support for Stabilization Activities**: A program identified in public law under Section 1210A of the NDAA 2020 and modified under Section 1333 of the NDAA 2022 that authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, provide support to the other Federal Agencies for the stabilization activities of such agencies. DSSA is an important security cooperation program that enables the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) to support Whole of Government stabilization efforts. However, it is just one of many security cooperation programs available to stabilization practitioners and should not be confused with the over-arching DSS policy. (NDAA 2020 and 2022)
**Foreign Disaster Relief**: Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities, as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. Also called FDR. (DoD Dictionary)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**: Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

**Foreign Military Sales**: That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. Source: JP 3-20 (DoD Dictionary)

**Gap**: A capability gap is an inability to perform a task because of a lack of equipment, training, doctrine, authority or support. (Defense Acquisition University [DAU]) A gap can be thought of as the difference between needs and resources. They exist where no agencies have the capacity or authority to meet a requirement.

**Governance**: The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. Source: JP 3-24 (DoD Dictionary)

**Host Nation**: A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. Source: JP 3-57 (DoD Dictionary)

**Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief**: Assistance rendered to a country or population in an emergency or crisis context. This could include natural or manmade disaster response or complex humanitarian emergency. (USAID) (3D Planning Guidance).

**Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Assistance**: Assistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominantly United States forces in conjunction with military operations. Also called HCA. See also foreign humanitarian assistance. Source: JP 3-29 (DoD Dictionary)

**Integrated Country Strategy**: a multi-year plan that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. The ICS sets Mission Goals and Objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort among Department of State (State), USAID, and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies with programming in country. The primary audiences for the ICS are the Mission, Bureaus, and interagency partners. (USAID Integrated Country Strategies Guidance &
Instructions

**Interagency**: Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. Source: JP 3-08 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Interagency Coordination**: Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Source: JP 3-0 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Interagency Policy Committee**: An appointed committee that is responsible for designated national security issues that cut across the responsibilities of Executive Branch departments and agencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy toward Iraq or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, or functional, such as arms control agreements with Russia or terrorism in South Asia *(National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System)*.

**Irregular Warfare**: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. Source: JP 1 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Joint Task Force**: A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. Source: JP 1 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Operational Environment**: A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. Source: JP 3-0 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Security Cooperation**: All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. See also security assistance. Source: JP 3-20 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Security Force Assistance**: The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. Source: JP 3-20 *(DoD Dictionary)*

**Stability Activities**: Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Source: JP 3-0 *(DoD Dictionary)*
**Stabilization:** A political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. *(DoDD 3000.05)*

**Stabilization Activities:** Interagency missions, tasks, and activities, including various security cooperation programs, conducted outside the United States that involve an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. *(Derived from DoDD 3000.05 and JP 3-07)*

**United States Code (USC):** The codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States based on what is printed in the Statutes at Large. It is divided by broad subjects into 50 titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives. These titles describe the legal capabilities and limitations of the various agencies within all three branches of the USG.
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION ANNEXES

ANNEX A – Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018

Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas


ANNEX B - 2022 Prologue to the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

The purpose of this prologue to the 2020 Strategy is to reflect emerging threats and opportunities and outline guiding principles to inform our whole-of-government work, in partnership with other countries, institutions and organizations, as we implement the Strategy and its four goals. These principles fall into three categories: (1) we will challenge the U.S. Government status quo, (2) we will pursue meaningful partnership at all levels, and (3) we will exploit synergies with other Administration priorities. In executing these principles, we aim to fulfill the intent of the Act in a way that meets the catalytic vision of the expert civil society coalition and members of Congress who championed the Act and counters the emergent, challenging and historic trends the United States and international partners confront today.


ANNEX C – United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, 2020

The United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability seeks to break the costly cycle of fragility and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. The United States will pursue a new approach that addresses the political drivers of fragility and supports locally driven solutions. The United States will engage selectively based on defined metrics, host country political will, respect for democracy and human rights, defined cost-sharing, and mechanisms that promote mutual accountability with national and local actors


ANNEX D – United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, June 2019

The WPS Strategy responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68-Oct. 6, 2017), which requires, within 1 year of the enactment of the Act, and again 4 years thereafter, the submission of a strategy to the appropriate Congressional Committees and its publication. The WPS Strategy supersedes the 2016 U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; complements relevant laws, appropriations, and Executive Orders, including
the State and Foreign Operations Acts and the National Defense Authorization Act; and satisfies Executive Order 13595.


The WPS Act of 2017 identifies the Department of Defense as a relevant Federal department responsible for implementing WPS. To satisfy the requirements prescribed in the WPS Act of 2017, the Department developed a DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (SFIP). As required by law, the SFIP details the Department’s roles and responsibilities for implementing the WPS Strategy and establishes WPS Defense Objectives to support the WPS LOEs. The SFIP also aims to organize and align the Department’s implementation of the WPS Strategy within the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/11/2002314428/-1/-1/1/WOMEN_PEACE_SECURITY_STRATEGIC_FRAMEWORK_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.PDF

ANNEX F – National Security Strategy 2022 UNCLASSIFIED

Invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition.


ANNEX G – National Defense Strategy 2022

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) details the Department’s path forward into that decisive decade—from helping to protect the American people, to promoting global security, to seizing new strategic opportunities, and to realizing and defending our democratic values.


ANNEX H – DoDD 2000.13 Civil Affairs, incorporating Change 1, May 2017

This directive reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.13 (Reference (a)) to update established policy and assigned responsibilities for conducting DoD-wide civil affairs operations in
accordance with sections 167, 401, 404, and 2011 of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (b)), DoDD 5111.10 (Reference (c)), and DoDD 5100.01 (Reference (d)).


ANNEX I – DoDD 3000.5 Stabilization, December 2018

This issuance:
• Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts.
• Provides guidance for the planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization.


ANNEX J – DoDD 3000.7 Irregular Warfare, incorporating Change 1, May 2017

IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.


ANNEX K – DoDD 5132.03 DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, December 2016

DoD will prioritize, plan, conduct, and align resources for security cooperation as an integral element of the DoD mission and a tool of national security and foreign policy. DoD security cooperation, which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs and international armaments cooperation, will be undertaken to achieve specific ends in support of defense and national security strategy, rather than serving as an end unto itself.


ANNEX L - DoDD 5205.82 Defense Institution Building, January 2016

DoD, in coordination with other appropriate U.S. departments and agencies and when authorized by law, will develop the capabilities and capacity of allied and partner nation defense institutions in support of defense strategy. Section 3 of this issuance lists legal authorities that may authorize DIB activities.

ANNEX M - DoDI 5132.14 Assessment, Monitoring, And Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, January 2017

M&E of security cooperation programs will: (1) Foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation and track, understand, and improve returns on DoD security cooperation investments. (2) Identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for security cooperation implementation to inform decisions about security cooperation policy, plans, programs, program management, resources, and the security cooperation workforce.


ANNEX N - DoDI 5000.68 Security Force Assistance, October 2010

The Department of Defense shall develop and maintain the capability within DoD general purpose forces (GPF), special operations forces (SOF), and the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) to conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy and in coordination with the relevant U.S. Government (USG) departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “USG agencies”).


ANNEX O – JP 3-07 Joint Stabilization Activities, February 2022

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess the military contribution to stabilization efforts across the competition continuum.


ANNEX P – (Omitted)

ANNEX Q – JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation, validated October 2017

This publication provides joint doctrine to coordinate military operations with other US Government departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.


ANNEX R – JP 3-20 Security Cooperation, May 2017

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation activities.

ANNEX S – JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance May 2019

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess foreign humanitarian assistance operations.


ANNEX T – JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations, July 2018

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess civil-military operations.


ANNEX U – Extracted DSS Security Cooperation Programs

ANNEX V – Security Cooperation Programs Handbook, 2022


ANNEX W – Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018 Securing the Nation One Partnership at a Time and State Partnership Program Fact Sheet

The SPP is an innovative and cost-effective security cooperation program that connects the National Guard with the militaries of partner nations around the globe. Guard units conduct military-to-military engagements with partner nations in support of defense security goals and also leverage societal relationships to build personal bonds and enduring trust. The SPP is not designed to make other militaries self-sustaining. Rather, the goal of the SPP is developing and maintaining important security relationships between the United States and other nations sharing a long-term view of common interests.


https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/State%20Partnership%20Program%20(SPP)%20Fact%20Sheet%2007082022.pdf?ver=DS1IK0wqtOy7CjumYEqxAY%3d%3d

ANNEX X – CENTCOM Command Policy Letter Number 117, Stabilization and Defense Support for Stabilization Activities in the National Security Interests of the United States