PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess the military contribution to stabilization efforts across the competition continuum.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces of the United States in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the achievement of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance
or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

STUART B. MUNSCH
Vice Admiral, United States Navy
Director, Joint Force Development
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

• Eliminates the obsolete stabilization and reconstruction essential tasks matrix.

• Incorporates the *Stabilization Assistance Review* framework.

• Expands procedures for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program.

• Expands on the link between stability and counterinsurgency and adds the establishment of reconciliation programs.

• Eliminates definitive planning phases in military operations/campaigns, in accordance with Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*.

• Adds network engagement from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

• Eliminates references to transitional security sector assistance and security sector assistance, and includes these activities into the more encompassing security sector reform.

• Adds security cooperation as the sixth joint stability function in Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions.”

• Adds women, peace, and security principles, Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides the context in which joint forces conduct stabilization activities, in coordination with other instruments of national power, to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief

- Discusses an approach to integrate stabilization activities by linking military and civilian activities

- Describes stability sectors

- Discusses joint force components and stabilization activities

- Outlines the joint stability functions, with emphasis on security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, governance and participation, and security cooperation

- Outlines stabilization planning considerations to understand the operational environment, assess strategic guidance, plan stabilization, integrate planning, assess stabilization efforts, and plan transitions and transfer authorities

- Provides guidance on training for stabilization activities

- Discusses stabilization considerations in security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, joint operations, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare

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Stabilization Activities

Stabilization activities are the various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability is the desired end state, and stabilization is the aggregation of activities to restore the functions of the legitimate authorities.

**Stabilization Activities Across the Competition Continuum**

Stabilization activities can be conducted throughout the competition continuum. The nature of the operational environment (OE) may require US forces to conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously, while
also supporting enduring United States Government (USG) stabilization efforts.

**Stabilization Activities in Conflict Prevention**

During security cooperation (SC) activities, stabilization is at the foundation of prevention efforts. Preventive activities conducted by the military often support USG diplomatic efforts before, during, or after a crisis.

**Understanding Stability**

The Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts, due to the inherently political nature of stabilization. This includes playing a lead role in setting stabilization policy, conducting planning to establish overarching strategy, and ensuring all lines of effort (LOEs) within that plan are supporting US strategic objectives. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security US stabilization assistance, and the Department of Defense (DOD) supports both DOS and USAID through the provision of security where applicable and the reinforcement of civilian efforts.

**Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability**

To understand the OE, the joint force must understand both the root causes and current drivers of instability. Root causes refer to the features of the host nation (HN) that contribute to its vulnerability or resiliency in the face of internal and external stresses. These features often include a mix of cultural, demographic, sociological, economic, geographic, and political factors. Examples of underlying causes of violence include economic deprivation, poor governance, lack of government legitimacy, marginalization or persecution of identity groups, a history of conflict in the nation and nearby nations, and demographic growth in youth.

**Principles of Joint Operations to Achieve Stability**

Although the principles of joint operations apply to aspects of any joint operation, emphasis on certain principles, especially legitimacy, and their applicability during stabilization activities is appropriate. Commanders should understand the joint principles in the context of stabilization efforts.

**Fundamentals of Stabilization**

In accordance with direction from the USG lead federal agency for the stabilization effort, the joint force will likely focus on critical priorities at the local level, such as government, police services, prisons, judicial proceedings, and essential services (i.e., medical, fire,
Executive Summary

shelter, water, energy, and waste disposal). As the stabilization effort progresses, the joint force may support USG efforts to reestablish other HN systems/services, such as economic, postal, judicial, media (e.g., radio, television, newspapers), electoral (i.e., constitutions, licensing of political parties, census, and elections), and financial (e.g., banking, tax revenues, and other markets). In the process, the joint force ensures human security, basic needs, protection against human rights violations, rule of law, reintegrating ex-combatants, political inclusiveness, and mobilizing domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. Military planners must coordinate with the HN, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support efforts from all fronts.

The Stabilization Framework

The stabilization framework helps the joint force commander (JFC) conceptualize part of the OE of a nation that requires stabilization in support of US national strategy and interests. The framework emphasizes the training and organization of forces prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. The framework helps organize stabilization efforts and scopes the stabilization activities to achieve their objectives, whether supporting combatant command campaign plans and integrated country strategies or in major contingency operations.

An Integrated Approach to Stabilization

Linking Military and Civilian Activities

Military and civilian leaders link military and civilian activities to achieve unity of effort. They integrate a comprehensive approach to stabilization through close, continuous coordination and cooperation among stabilization partners. With unity of effort, military and civilian leaders overcome internal discord, inadequate structures and procedures, incompatible or underdeveloped communications infrastructure, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is an analytical tool that helps different USG departments and agencies reach a shared understanding of a nation’s conflict dynamics.
The Stabilization Assistance Review

A concerted effort by DOS, DOD, and USAID, the USAID SAR: Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of US Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas highlights the imperative for a revitalized approach to stabilization that is more selective and targeted in how the United States uses its resources to empower local authorities, advance core US interests, mitigate risks, and enable strategic transitions.

Stability Sectors

Security Sector. Generally, security sector programs and policies focus on developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain stability.

Justice and Reconciliation Sector. This sector provides for a fair, impartial, and accountable justice system, while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster.

Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being Sector. Any intervention effort is incomplete if it fails to alleviate immediate suffering. Generally, this suffering includes the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation. Intervening military forces also address civilian harm when it has occurred.

Governance and Participation Sector. Promoting governance participation addresses the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure at both the national and subnational levels. Governance is the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs at all levels.

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Sector. Much of the broader success achieved in stabilization actions begins at the local level, as participants work on modest, carefully targeted economic and governance programs. These programs establish building blocks for comprehensive national reform efforts and shape political dynamics from the bottom up.

Joint Force Components and Stabilization Activities

Military forces provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the HN is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security
Executive Summary

component ideally performed by military forces, but they may also involve contractor personnel (e.g., a private security company).

These activities generally fall into one of three categories representing the collective effort associated with stabilization:

- Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain responsibility but military forces execute or are prepared to execute or support.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

Joint Stability Functions

While the assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among departments depends on the mission and conditions of the OE, the lead agency for all stabilization activities is DOS, with DOD as the supporting agency. Joint force planners coordinate with DOS, chiefs of missions (COMs), and pertinent stabilization partners to support stabilization activities. The joint force supports DOS-essential stabilization tasks in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), concept of operations (CONOPS), and LOE planning functions. The joint stability functions are a tool to help visualize the scope of stabilization efforts within a joint operation. JIPOE, mission analysis, and the CONOPS sequence necessary activities within the LOEs, aligning operational and tactical objectives and developing appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation.

Security

Security activities seek to protect civil populations, territory, and national assets such as infrastructure or natural resources. Such activities may be performed as a component of a military occupation during or after combat, a counterinsurgency (COIN), a peacekeeping operation, or a natural disaster. Security activities seek to reassure rather than compel the civil population, while communicating a clear, credible threat of force to opportunists or adversaries. Security activities are
Executive Summary

considered successful when the HN or other legitimate authority has functional control of its territory and civil violence is reduced to a level manageable by competent HN, joint force, or international law enforcement operations.

Evaluation and Assessment

To plan for and execute stabilization activities, JFCs and staffs conduct an in-depth analysis, in coordination and consultation with stabilization partners familiar with the HN or region, which provide relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The key lies in the development of shared understanding among all stabilization partners involved about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. This requires both a joint process for completing the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information. This conflict diagnosis should describe the drivers of the conflict, core grievances, and opportunities for resolution.

Military Contribution

Territorial Security. In conformity with the legitimate monopoly on the use of force, the HN government must control its borders and must reasonably monitor and control movement within its borders, particularly movement by enemies, militants, and criminals.

Civil Security. The security of the local population and institutions is central to the success of stabilization activities. Whenever it has functional control over all or a part of HN territory, the joint force will typically be responsible for ensuring the security of the civilian population: protecting civilians from a broad range of military, paramilitary, and criminal threats; introducing transitional public security to bolster actual and perceived senses of public order; and eliminating explosive ordnance and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards and threats.

Protection of Civilians Considerations. The protection of civilians is an overarching category that is at the foundation of stabilization efforts. The protection of civilians includes addressing specific categories of threats such as war crimes, ethnic cleansing, sexual and gender-based violence, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Further, it includes categories of joint force action, such
as transitional public security, law enforcement, or the prevention of atrocities. Ensuring predictable and tolerable conditions for the population is imperative to stability.

Public Order and Safety. The primary role of US forces with respect to public order and safety is to conduct transitional public security until HN or other security forces can assume these responsibilities.

Separation of Warring Factions. Separating warring factions involves establishing distinct areas of control that segregates the various factions and enables the joint force to monitor their activities. Separation is designed to create an atmosphere of confidence from attack by former enemies.

Protection of Indigenous Infrastructure. Both the short- and long-term success of any stabilization activities often relies on the ability of external groups to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility.

Protection of Personnel Involved in the Stabilization Effort. The joint force may be called upon to provide protection for US or foreign civilian personnel that are assisting in the stabilization effort.

Threats and Vulnerabilities

Participants. Everyone present during stabilization efforts has the potential to influence the course of events in ways that may be positive or negative. The JFC strives to understand the full range of participants and their motivations, aspirations, interests, and relationships. Generically, the participants can comprise six categories, based on their aims, methods, and relationships: adversaries, enemies, belligerents, neutrals, friendlies, and opportunists.

Shifting Allegiances. Observing behavior is useful to assess allegiances under specific circumstances at a specific time; however, stagnant assessments can be misleading. Applying labels such as “adversary” or “irreconcilable” is a way to organize information when dealing with a problem. However, groups are rarely fixed and bounded entities; labeling them as such can inhibit the commander’s understanding of social
interactions and deprive them of identifying opportunities to influence key participants.

**Insurgency.** When the Armed Forces of the United States are directed to help establish stability, insurgency is normally the most significant threat to security. Insurgencies are primarily internal conflicts that struggle for control of the population.

**Mass Atrocities.** Large-scale, deliberate attacks on civilians of a particular racial, political, or cultural group are a direct assault on universal human values; they fuel instability, particularly in fragile states.

**Security Response**

**Tailored Approaches.** A well-targeted, tailored plan for including the various participants can transform the dynamics of a conflict. Such a plan may allow the commander to co-opt adversarial or belligerent groups into the emerging political settlement.

**Population Security.** To provide protection to the population, JFCs employ a range of techniques, including:

- Static protection of key sites (e.g., market places or refugee camps).
- Persistent security in areas secured and held (e.g., intensive patrolling and check points).
- Targeted action against adversaries (e.g., search or strike operations).
- Population control measures (e.g., curfews and vehicle restrictions, biometrics collection and vetting).

**Countering Adversaries.** Direct military action against adversaries and their narrative may be a central component of a stabilization effort. Accordingly, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement entails breaking the ideological and financial links within and among different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as among the broader population.

**Security Force Organization.** The JFC may organize joint forces into a number of different composite units for the purpose of establishing security in and among the population.
While conventional forces conduct the bulk of the routine security operations, local, non-regular militia may be incorporated as well. Security activities largely focus on protecting key installations, locations, and population centers. Units will normally have their own operational areas for which they are responsible and should be capable of autonomous action.

Transitions and Transferals of Responsibility and Authority

The JFC should consider transferring security sector responsibilities and authorities from the military to DOS and/or an HN lead as soon as practicable. The ability to transfer this responsibility is a function of the threat and the capacity of indigenous security forces. If the joint force is required to establish security in support of a stabilization effort, local security forces are unlikely to have the capacity to counter ongoing threats.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the well-being of the population. Well-being is characterized by access to, and delivery of, basic needs and services (i.e., water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric and community life.

US military participation in humanitarian assistance generally falls into one of two categories: humanitarian assistance that falls under foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and a combination of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).

- USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance is the USG lead federal agency for international humanitarian assistance and disaster response. FHA consists of DOD activities in support of USAID or DOS, conducted outside the United States and its territories, to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA provided by US military forces during a man-made or natural disaster is limited in scope and duration.
- HCA to the local populace coincides with authorized military operations. This assistance should promote the security interests of the
United States and the HN and employ the specific operational readiness skills of participating military personnel. HCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to provide assistance to the HN populace, hone military operational readiness skills, and promote mutual security.

**Stabilization Planning**

JFCs and their staffs develop operation plans (OPLANs) that integrate offense, defense, and stabilization activities, as well as the military’s stabilization efforts with the activities of interorganizational partners. JFCs should ensure subordinate commanders executing stabilization activities understand the overall planning of the operation; the interrelation and integration of various military and civilian stabilization efforts; and the significance of these efforts on joint force missions, tasks, and activities.

**Understanding the Operational Environment**

The OE is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the JFC’s decision making and use of available capabilities. The OE typically encompasses relevant actors, physical areas, factors of physical domains, and information environments, including cyberspace.

Stabilizing the OE requires interactive planning, execution, and continual assessment of various operational aspects.

- **Planning.** Gaining an understanding of the OE is part of the mission analysis process during planning.
- **Execution.** The execution of an operation changes the OE, so continual assessment is necessary to recognize emerging obstacles to and opportunities for mission success. The JFC and staff direct the collection of information from the operational and tactical levels for continual assessment.
- **Assessment.** Operational assessment in stabilization links the theoretical (prediction of relevant actors’ courses of action [COAs]) with the actual (how are the actors behaving?). It helps answer the question: what is the current status of the OE in relation to the established objectives of the operation?
JIPOE Process Considerations for Stabilization Efforts. JIPOE is a key process by which the JFC understands stabilization within the OE.

The four steps of the JIPOE process are:

- Define the OE.
- Describe the impact of the OE.
- Evaluate the adversaries and other relevant actors.
- Determine potential COAs of the adversary(ies) and relevant participants.

Strategic Guidance

The National Security Council assists the President in developing guidance for stability and reconstruction. The ICAF provides a framework for USG assessment prior to stabilization activities. This assessment can help determine roles, responsibilities, and intergovernmental relationships for all USG department and agencies.

Planning Stabilization

Operations planning involves developing a comprehensive approach that integrates the capabilities and contributions of relevant stabilization partners toward a common purpose of security and stability. The comprehensive approach serves as a centerpiece for unity of effort in stabilization. In developing this overarching plan, the JFC and staff employ the same principles of operational design and planning utilized in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. Combat and stabilization are neither sequential nor binary alternatives; the JFC integrates and synchronizes stabilization activities with offensive and defensive activities throughout a joint operation. The JFC’s visualization of the operation determines the emphasis placed on each type of activity as the situation develops.

Integrated Planning

Established policy and procedures are designed to support the military chain of command while engendering comprehensive, cooperative planning between USG military and civilian departments and agencies to implement stability policy and guidance. When developing joint plans, planners should identify opportunities to support and promote a unified USG approach to achieve national security objectives. Interagency planning should be an iterative process that synchronizes diplomatic, development, and defense
implementation planning and tasks to develop unified action to achieve stability.

There is no single process model that describes integrated planning between USG military and civilian departments and agencies. Regardless of the model used for integrated planning, JFCs should work closely with COMs and relevant civilian counterparts to establish appropriate structures and processes that facilitate a shared understanding, interagency planning, and coordinated execution and assessment.

Special Considerations

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). CMO are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, or foster relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. CMO support US objectives for HN and regional stability. CMO require coordination among civil affairs, logistical support, maneuver, health service support, military police, engineer, transportation, and special operations forces.

Command and Control (C2). Traditional military C2 does not apply to relationships with civilian departments and agencies. When an interagency effort is required, the JFC coordinates and integrates efforts between the joint force and interorganizational partners. This capability also requires the JFC to manage and make available relevant, accurate information to appropriate stabilization partners.

Protection. Protection is a joint function that is fundamental in stabilization efforts. The ability to provide physical security to the population and those conducting stabilization activities is often a primary reason for US military involvement in stabilization efforts. The protection function during stabilization emphasizes force protection, force health protection, and civil security.

Sustainment. Stabilization efforts often require substantial logistical support. The overall logistical requirements for stability should be integrated in the OPLAN and be mutually supporting.
Women in Conflict Resolution. Conflict can often disrupt gender roles. Even when women assume roles as combatants, their involvement in the peace process is often neglected. The joint force and stabilization partners should endorse the roles of women as:

- Grassroots decision makers whose sociocultural norms may align with primary roles/responsibilities within the household and are valued as key stakeholders in the demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process.
- Community leaders and heads of households.
- Advocates of social policy reform that protects equal access to resources, legal/justice reform in protecting the rights of all people, and in peace negotiations and agreements that are more sustainable.

Assessment of Stabilization Efforts

The assessment helps the JFC understand changes within the OE and the results of tactical, operational, and strategic activities. During the planning and execution process, the assessment informs the commander’s decisions to employ limited resources to achieve objectives. The decision to adapt plans or shift resources is based upon the assessment of the joint force’s ability to conduct operations.

Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities

Incorporating transitions and transfers of authority is inherent in planning for stabilization activities in joint operations. Effective transition planning creates the conditions for the successful transfer of authority to non-DOD agencies, non-USG entities, or the HN to consolidate gains as a result of military activities. The joint force focuses primarily on the transition of security functions from US and multinational forces to non-DOD agencies and the HN.

Training for Stabilization Activities

Joint and Interagency Training and Exercises. Joint force stabilization training should provide individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in formal joint programs.

Training Prior to Deployment. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) should schedule interagency, international organization, and NGO coordination
training as a part of routine training and exercise participation and as training for a specific operation.

**Unit and Personnel Training with Nonlethal Weapons.** Use of nonlethal weapons requires special training to ensure they are properly used and effectively integrated with lethal weapons and other capabilities. Forces should be proficient in the employment of both lethal and nonlethal force options to reduce the potential for civilian casualties and unintended damage.

### Stabilization Activities in other Joint Operations

The maintenance or reestablishment of stability in foreign nations is most often integral to other joint operations in achieving or contributing to US strategic objectives. Whether building partner capacity to contain adversarial states, countering transnational terrorist groups, or engaging in major combat operations against a hostile regime, the ultimate strategic objective is achieving stability on terms that are compatible with US values and promote US interests.

Integrating stabilization activities into the planning and execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended consequences, translates short-term gains into lasting progress, and provides a bridge between operational objectives and broader strategy.

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**Stabilization Considerations in Security Cooperation**

SC encompasses all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces and their institutions to build relationships that promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the United States access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or build and apply HN capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives.

Destabilization can stem from HN institutions, individuals, or units the joint force chooses to work with or support and the manner in which efforts are executed. Decisions regarding specific considerations (e.g., logistics, procurement, information dissemination, the timing and location of exercises) can have implications that may not be obvious to joint force planners, SC program managers, or SC implementing partners, who are focused on achieving immediate SC objectives. Consequently,
planners carefully consider the potential impact of proposed SC activities on the political dynamics and internal stability of PNs.

In some cases, the joint force may also need to complement traditional SC activities with stabilization conducted in collaboration with US embassy country teams and other interagency partners.

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<th>Stabilization Considerations in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</th>
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<tr>
<td>FHA embodies DOD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. US military FHA activities range from military engagement activities supporting a CCDR’s SC and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency. FHA activities include foreign disaster relief and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need.</td>
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<td>FHA operations are normally conducted in support of USAID or DOS.</td>
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<th>Stabilization Considerations in Peace Operations</th>
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<td>Stability is integral to most peace operations (PO). The majority of PO aim at maintaining or reestablishing HN stability. Although peace enforcement operations often involve major combat operations, branch and sequel efforts often involve stabilization to secure US objectives.</td>
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<th>Stabilization Activities in Joint Operations</th>
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<td>Like other joint operations, major operations include a combination of offensive and defensive activities. While not the focus of the operations, stabilization is a critical enabler to success. Stabilization activities involve a host of tasks executed concurrently with offensive and defensive activities, so they are integral to planning and execution. Consequently, tactical units should understand the role of CMO to mission success.</td>
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<th>Stabilization in Foreign Internal Defense</th>
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<td>US foreign internal defense (FID) doctrine emphasizes that the true nature of the threat to the HN government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than military power. Although the HN government must contain the armed adversaries, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Gaining support of the population is vital to any internal defense and development strategy.</td>
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Executive Summary

Stabilization in Counterinsurgency

An effective COIN strategy separates insurgents from the populace by using military forces to seize terrain; a residual military contingent, police services, and local militias to hold population centers and key areas; and relevant stabilization partners to assist in economic recovery and reconstruction, regenerate essential services, and provide other assistance to build on gains. Thus, a COIN strategy provides the necessary security and assistance for local communities, as the HN government methodically regains territory.

Stabilization in Unconventional Warfare

Stability considerations are especially relevant for unconventional warfare (UW) activities intended to overthrow an enemy government, which could result in dangerous instability or counterproductive regimes, if not addressed in planning. Following overthrow, US support may expand to conduct FID, COIN, and/or stabilization. Where UW objectives are more limited and only seek to disrupt adversary government behavior, the transition phase may be equally limited in scope. Transition following the employment of coercion requires planning for preservation of the resistance or the implementation of DDR programs. In the case of disruption, the US relationship with indigenous elements may stall, go dormant, or transition to other USG departments or relevant stabilization partners. However, UW planners should analyze how the perceived abandonment of allies impacts future operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess the military contribution to stabilization efforts across the competition continuum.
CHAPTER I
STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. General

   a. Per Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Stabilization, “Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning US Government (USG) efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.” Stabilization activities are the various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability is the desired end state, and stabilization is the aggregation of activities to restore the functions of the legitimate authorities.

   b. Nations may be viewed as a network of interconnected systems and interrelated elements consisting of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII). Systems comprise institutions, structures, infrastructures, and organizations to meet the needs of society. Political, economic, civil security, and judicial systems form the foundation of most societies. As societies grow more sophisticated, they develop more systems and subsystems, such as medical, financial, commerce, educational, and essential services (i.e., energy, water, and waste disposal). Stability exists when these systems function in harmony. Disruptions, such as conflict, natural disaster, infectious disease, environmental change, or resource competition, can exacerbate instability. Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security; provide access to dispute resolution; deliver targeted, basic services; and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

   c. Stabilization Partners. Stabilization activities embody the balanced application of the instruments of national power with interagency partners, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational partners, and host nation (HN) interorganizational partners. In addition to interagency partners, United States Government (USG) partners may include states, territories, and the private sector. International organizations include United Nations (UN) bodies, Organization of American States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other similar entities. NGOs represent a host of private and nonprofit organizations providing a variety of services. NGOs may work in specific regions for decades and often have a plethora of experience and knowledge to offer. Some international organizations and NGOs may not support US policy or decline to cooperate with military forces to maintain their neutral status. Multinational partners normally include contributing foreign governments. HN interorganizational partners include government ministries, subnational governments, and the private sector. In the interests of space and readability, this publication uses the term “stabilization partners” to mean one or more organizations. Stabilization actions are conducted as a part of military operations across the competition continuum and can be conducted by military forces before, during, and after conflict. These actions may be
conducted in support of other USG departments and agencies as part of an integrated country strategy.

d. Each organization has a distinct culture, vernacular, mission, capability, and method of operating. In view of these diverse organizations involved in stabilization activities, achieving unity of effort requires patience, continual collaboration and communication, mutual compromises, and persistence. Stabilization is distinct from humanitarian assistance and development activities. It is intended to be short-term in nature (typically between one and five years) and starts to set conditions for building legitimate societal and governing institutions. It is imperative stabilization activities incorporate transition plans to economic growth, private-sector vibrancy, and responsive governance.

e. Unity of Command. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct them in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of command extends beyond the structures and authorities assigned to a joint force commander (JFC). Multinational operations may present challenges for unity of command. The commander must make every effort to foster a feeling of belonging and teamwork among partner militaries, as well as ensuring subordinates follow this example in word and deed. Included in this effort is organizing the force in a way that creates interdependence, thereby fostering unity of effort rather than creating separate, distinct lines of effort (LOEs). A major part of this working relationship is information. Understanding the importance of information and effectively communicating with multinational partners, NGOs, the HN, and the population is critical to success. Conversely, misinformation can hinder efforts and prolong or jeopardize the mission. A perceived narrative often becomes reality. Through communication, the commander can influence relevant-actors’ perceptions, behaviors, and action or inaction and support decision making that will contribute to a successful mission.

f. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is exponentially more difficult to achieve in stabilization activities because participating interorganizational, international, and NGO partners have assorted organizational cultures, attributes, and interests. Understandably, some have a desire to disassociate themselves from the military. Coordination, deconfliction, and information sharing are not enough to cultivate teamwork. Commanders at all levels should establish a congenial atmosphere with these partners. Examples include open invitations to visit civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and/or provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), public affairs (PA) recognition of partner activities, certificate ceremonies for partners, invitations to attend special events, and offers of appropriate assistance. Unity of effort goes beyond external USG partners. A singular, strategic approach to unifying government efforts to achieve local and measurable impact is required from all USG elements. There are clear lines of responsibilities between USG departments and agencies.

g. Joint operations can be a combination of offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities. JFCs integrate and synchronize these operations and activities to accomplish assigned missions, especially those requiring combat operations. Depending on the operational environment (OE), stabilization activities may be the main effort during an
operation or campaign. Regardless, stabilization activities occur in concert with other operations and continue throughout the operation or campaign, remaining engaged with the existing HN government, a new HN government, or appropriate civil authority.

h. Military contributions to stabilization comprise various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stabilization activities may be conducted across the competition continuum. These activities may be conducted in support of the other stabilization partners as part of an integrated country strategy. Commanders appropriately combine stabilization activities with offensive activities and defensive activities to achieve objectives. Commanders might employ stabilization capabilities as part of a combatant command campaign plan (CCP).

i. CCPs generally include military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence actions conducted in support of a chief of mission (COM) and country team stabilization activities. Stabilization activities help establish and maintain long-term partnerships.

j. Stabilization activities—including SC programs, activities, and interactions—are an integral part of CCPs, integrated country strategies, and any phase of an operation that supports a comprehensive stabilization process. This process assists states or regions entering, enduring, or recovering from a crisis; averts potential violent conflict; sustains governance; and promotes economic prosperity. It involves identifying and reducing the sources of instability at all levels, while strengthening mitigating factors across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres in collaboration with legitimate governance in the HN and region (see paragraph 7, “The Stabilization Framework”).

k. Stabilization efforts are a critical component of the USG’s broader strategic and operational approaches to prevent conflict or assist states experiencing internal or external conflict. Accordingly, whenever US policy deems stability as a strategic objective in a region, the application of combat power and/or SC capabilities by the joint force can serve as leverage for stabilization activities. In combination, these capabilities assist the HN in reaching a sustainable political settlement that fosters the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts. This approach involves addressing drivers of instability across PMESII systems in collaboration with legitimate actors in the HN. Consideration should also be given to environmental changes and the demand for natural resources that can be drivers of instability in a region. Appendix F, “Key Stabilization Documents,” provides a list of some key documents.

l. Sustainable security and stability requires the transfer of responsibilities and authorities from the military to another USG department or agency (such as the Department of State [DOS]), the UN, and/or the HN, normally described as a transition at some point during an operation or campaign. The timing of transitions is dependent on the enormity
of the operation, the state of the security environment, and the ability of a nation to assume responsibility.

m. USG stabilization efforts supported by the joint force should be sustainable by the HN over the long-term.

2. Stabilization Activities Throughout the Competition Continuum

a. Stabilization activities may be conducted throughout the competition continuum. Military operations vary in size, purpose, and intensity within a range extending from cooperation (e.g., military engagement and SC), through adversarial competition short of armed conflict (e.g., deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations), and to armed conflict when necessary. The nature of the OE may require US forces to conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously, while supporting enduring USG stabilization efforts. Whether the prevailing context for the joint operation is one of traditional warfare or irregular warfare (IW), combat and stabilization activities usually not sequential activities. Thus, JFC should identify, integrate, and synchronize stabilization activities with offensive and defensive activities within the operation.

b. During military engagement, SC programs, activities, and interactions, as well as deterrence activities and stabilization activities, support the CCP military objectives and objectives of the integrated country strategy. Military support to stabilization efforts in cooperation generally takes the form of recurring contact; military presence; and SC programs, activities, and interactions (e.g., security force assistance [SFA], State Partnership Program, and security assistance [SA]). Combatant commanders (CCDRs) may also provide security and logistics support, supplies, and services to DOS- and United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-led efforts.

For more information on SC, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Security Cooperation.

c. Stabilization activities vary throughout the competition continuum. Many crisis-response and limited-contingency operations (e.g., foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) may not require combat operations and activities, but force protection and security remain paramount. Others (e.g., strikes and raids) may not require stabilization actions but they incorporate stability considerations into planning. Still, others, often protracted operations (e.g., counterinsurgency [COIN]), require a delicate balance of offense, defense, and stabilization activities.

d. Cooperation typically requires a preponderance of capabilities, operations, actions, and activities normally associated with stabilization efforts integrated with fewer of those associated with armed conflict. It also involves working closely with allies and partners to sustain gains made through any preceding competition or armed conflict.

e. Competition typically requires a situation and mission-unique balance of stabilization capabilities and activities than those associated with armed conflict.
Adversarial competition below armed conflict is usually protracted and compared to armed conflict, its actions are often more indirect, with less expenditure of resources.

f. Armed conflict typically requires the majority of capabilities, operations, actions, and activities associated with traditional and/or irregular warfare, integrated with fewer of those associated with stabilization. As armed conflict actions diminish, the proportion of stabilization efforts typically increases as the campaigning shifts to competition and eventually into cooperation. Stabilization efforts are also necessary to secure gains made in armed conflict, without which, those gains may be lost to remaining or new competitors.

3. Stabilization Activities in Conflict Prevention

a. During SC activities, stabilization is at the foundation of prevention efforts. Preventive activities conducted by the military often support USG diplomatic efforts before, during, or after a crisis. Before a potential crisis, these activities prevent or limit violence that interferes with US interests, and during a conflict, they prevent the spread or escalation of conflict. After a conflict, they stop a return to violence. SC deterrence efforts are designed to shape and influence a nation’s security sector positively and deployment of forces to prevent a dispute or contain a dispute from escalating to hostilities. Other potential prevention activities include military-to-military consultations and warnings, inspections, observation missions, and monitoring.

b. Joint forces performing prevention activities focus on support to diplomatic and developmental efforts to lessen the causes of tension and unrest. Military forces tailor these activities to meet diplomatic and development demands. During stabilization activities, particularly in predominately permissive environments, commanders are responsive to any accidental harm to civilians and collateral damage, which may severely impact mission success. Military conflict prevention activities promote both HN and regional stability and generally take the form of SC, military engagement, and presence activities.

4. Understanding Stability

a. DOS is the lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts, due to the inherently political nature of stabilization. This includes playing a lead role in setting stabilization policy, conducting planning to establish overarching strategy, and ensuring all LOEs within that plan are supporting US strategic objectives. USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-security US stabilization assistance, and the Department of Defense (DOD) supports both DOS and USAID through the provision of security where applicable and the reinforcement of civilian efforts. Stabilization activities during a joint operation typically require the expertise of civil affairs (CA) and specialists in civil-military operations (CMO).

For more information on CA and CMO support for stabilization activities, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. A fragile nation-state requires collaboration among all stakeholders to develop a tailored response that creates an environment of security, rule of law, political legitimacy,
and economic stability. In this comprehensive approach, US military forces may support one or more stabilization partners to improve human security, provide humanitarian assistance, and enhance institutions of governance. Military forces support stabilization activities as follows: providing deterrence capabilities to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; and helping to create conditions that enable the HN to establish appropriate political, legal, security, social, and economic institutions. Stabilization activities should seek to transition responsibility to legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law and encourage the meaningful participation of women, youth, minorities, and other disenfranchised populations where appropriate. This transition is a long-term process and ultimately contingent on the support of local stakeholders.

c. Military Contribution to Stabilization. Stabilization activities are often planned and conducted with a diverse group of stabilization partners. However, where there is no appropriate organization to assume lead, or as national objectives dictate, the JFC should be prepared to plan and execute USG stabilization efforts until one or more of the stabilization partners can assume responsibility. Whenever the security situation allows, military forces should maximize the use of local and external civilian capabilities. To be effective, the joint force must understand the root causes and immediate drivers of instability and, if necessary, plan and implement CMO to address them. CMO involve establishing civil security and civil control, restoring essential services, repairing and protecting critical infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian assistance. DOS provides the joint force with policy guidance for stability objectives and can serve to bring in other partners when feasible.

d. Political Settlement

(1) Instability may arise from political conflict; electoral, economic, and social disenfranchisement; or the persecution of minorities. Political power, often residing in elite groups and privileged spheres of influence, often controls the distribution of resources and services, upward social mobility, and economic opportunities within an unstable society. Societal elites comprise people or groups with political influence and power emanating from wealth, status, and prominent positions in the private or public sectors (i.e., bureaucratic, corporate, economic, intellectual, media, religious, academic, social). Political elites may include politicians, ethnic/tribal leaders, community organizers, religious leaders, business leaders, and criminal bosses. Instability may include unrest, uprisings, ungoverned areas, and insurgencies.

(2) Reconciliation is a key consideration for developing a stability strategy and requires political reform to address the root causes of instability. Accordingly, the HN government must publicly and earnestly commit to positive reconciliation: adhere to the rule of law, provide opportunities for upward social and economic mobility, hold fair elections for greater power sharing, and eliminate discrimination and persecution. The United States wields considerable political, economic, and military influence in regard to assistance, which it can use to leverage needed reforms.
(3) To help resolve the situation, stabilization efforts seek to reshape relationships among the HN populace, government, and societal elites. The relationships among these three elements of the HN society are interdependent and are the key to a sustainable political settlement. Stabilization planners and implementers should understand the relationships among these internal elements and recognize external influences from third parties that may affect stabilization efforts beyond the capabilities of any of the internal components.

(4) A political settlement that delivers lasting stability works at multiple levels at the same time—negotiating with elites while reaching past them to shape the perceptions of the communities and networks they rely on for power. This is accomplished through civil, military, and diplomatic activities that are carefully synchronized to reinforce each other and support the HN. Political settlements that are not perceived by the population as delivering grassroots change are unlikely to either constrain opportunistic elites or prevent the emergence of new leaders demanding change, often through renewed violence. In addition, recent US policies and guidance, such as the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 [short title: WPS Act] and the United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security [short title: WPS Strategy], emphasize the value women bring as equal stakeholders, and the DOD, DOS, and USAID SAR: Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of US Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas [short title: SAR] outlines a framework for conducting effective stabilization efforts. Stakeholders can encompass a diverse range of interests, including local, regional, and national leaders from both private and government organizations. Positive engagement with these stakeholders can enable advocates that influence stabilization policies.

For further details, refer to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, Stability.

5. Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability

a. To understand the OE, the joint force must understand both the root causes and current drivers of instability. Root causes refers to the features of the HN that contribute to its vulnerability or resiliency in the face of internal and external stresses. These features often include a mix of cultural, demographic, sociological, economic, geographic, and political factors. Examples of underlying causes of violence include economic deprivation, poor governance, lack of government legitimacy, marginalization or persecution of identity groups, a history of conflict in the nation and nearby nations, and demographic growth in youth (i.e., youth bulge). Root causes can produce grievances that, on their own, do not result in instability but can be exploited to mobilize portions of the population to violence. The root causes give rise to the more immediate drivers of instability: the opportunity, motive, and means for violence. Root causes typically require long-term efforts to resolve and can often only be tackled once some level of stability has been restored. The joint force, along with or in support of interagency partners, may play a role in helping address root causes of a potential conflict, particularly during peacetime military engagement with HNs to prevent conflict before it breaks out. However, in the face of growing or severe instability, stabilization activities concentrate on the immediate drivers to resolve the political crisis and create an opportunity for longer-term processes to deal with the root
causes. For example, including a gender analysis, using sex and age disaggregated data adds to the understanding of the problem and enables the joint force to develop the stabilization and reconstruction actions and activities.

b. **The Root Causes of Instability**

(1) **The Fragile States Framework**

(a) In a democratic society, the government’s prime function is to protect the inalienable rights of its citizens through the rule of law, as well as human and economic security: to prevent cross-border invasions, infiltrations, and loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to, or attacks upon, the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic and economic security; and to enable citizens legally to resolve grievances with relevant echelons of government and disputes among citizens without recourse to violence and intimidation. In contrast, a fragile state is in danger of losing its capacity to govern, and a failed state is deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. Further, it cannot control its borders and suffers from a variety of civil unrest, from different degrees of communal discontent, and from a plethora of dissent directed at the state and groups within the state.

(b) The term “fragile states” describes a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states in which legitimate and representative government struggles or fails to manage social, security, economic, and political pressures. Fragile states fall along a spectrum from weakness to collapse, in which conflict may or may not be a salient factor. When armed conflict is a contributing factor or driver of instability, forging or establishing stability requires more than purely diplomatic and military action. Integrated peace-building efforts are needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a resurgence of conflict. Military planning for stabilization may involve assistance in strengthening national institutions; monitoring elections; promoting human rights; providing for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and fostering security. A fragile state suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of its national and subnational governments (e.g., provinces, districts, townships). Whether that fragility is caused by the consequences of armed conflict; weak governance; ongoing, systemic issues of economics and social inequities; a natural or manmade disaster; or any other circumstances that strain the systems of a stable state, the JFC must understand the context in which stabilization activities are executed.

(c) The fragile states framework has four categories of states—failing, failed, recovering, and stable—although the distinction or exact transition between categories is rarely clear.

1. **Failing State.** The failing state is still viable, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation and level of stability, a failing state may be moving toward becoming a stable state or a failed state.
2. **Failed State.** A failed state may only have remnants of a government due to collapse or regime change, or it may have a government that exerts weak governance in all or large portions of its territory. A failed state is unable to protect and govern the population effectively. It may not have any government with which to work, and consequently, conducting stabilization efforts is difficult, especially with respect to establishing legitimacy of the government and governmental security forces. Under these extreme circumstances, the intervening authority may be legally or operationally required to install a transitional authority. Even with a national government, a failed state may include large ungoverned areas.

3. **Recovering State.** The recovering state is moving toward stability but may still experience varying levels of instability. This state is able to protect and govern its population to some degree. A key consideration is whether the population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. Based on the situation and level of stability, a recovering state may be progressing to being a stable state or regressing to being a failed state.

4. **Stable State.** A stable state is able to protect and govern its population to some degree. The population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. Characteristics of a stable state include such perceptions of government as the legitimate authority with a monopoly on the use of violence, the ability to resolve disputes, the ability to provide for essential services for the people (i.e., security, food, water, energy, shelter, medical, and waste disposal), the ability to influence key regional and international leaders in positive ways, and, finally, the government is able to secure the future of the population.

(d) For the JFC, the distinction among failing, failed, and recovering states is not always clear. For example, such labels may mask sub-national and regional conditions (e.g., insurgencies, factions, and criminal syndicates) within the OE that are more informative and relevant. The JFC should understand the extent and pace at which a nation is progressing toward stability (or vice versa), rather than attempting to categorize a state as failed or not. Therefore, the JFC, working in consultation with the country team and CCDR, must distinguish between fragile states that are vulnerable to failure and those that are already in crisis.

1. **Vulnerable States.** Vulnerable national governments are unable or unwilling to meet the expectations or demands of significant portions of their populations, thereby weakening the perceived legitimacy of the government. These states are not in crisis and may even be moving toward stability, but their vulnerability to failure remains an important consideration for the HN government and USG decision makers.

2. **Crisis States.** Crisis state governments cannot exert effective control over their sovereign territory or are unable or unwilling to provide essential services to significant parts of their territory. Crisis states are already in failure or are quickly spiraling toward violent conflict.
(2) **Elements of Stable States.** Understanding the elements of a stable state provides context for military planners to understand the military’s role as a state moves from failed to stable. Elements of a stable state can be related to the six joint stability functions, which are discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions.”

(a) Security, economic development, infrastructure development, governance, and rule of law encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the nation. However, the context is also determined by state government officials and social relationships that underpin and are interwoven with these elements. Effective stability requires active key leader engagement with local political parties. Military planners should support the consolidation of stability in nations, working with both government, civil society, and nongovernmental parties. In a stable state, the social, cultural, and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

1. **Human Security.** As a requirement for building and sustaining stability, human security encompasses civil security, personal security, and basic needs: food, water, and shelter. Nations provide civil security by protecting and defending their population from internal and external threats and personal security by protecting individuals from persecution, intimidation, reprisals, and other forms of systematic violence. Nations seek to meet the basic needs of the people through direct provision or through self-help. Where the state lacks the capability, capacity, or will to meet security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, whether anti-government, foreign, or criminal. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services, and even an arbitrary form of justice. Hence, providing security, including understanding the different security needs of the population (regardless of gender and age), is fundamental to the development of HN government authority and ultimately the national security of the state. Military planners develop plans to support military peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations. The JFC or other forces may be called to support the HN in conducting stabilization activities by providing military forces for the protection of civilian population, assistance to displaced persons and prisoners, and infrastructure reconstruction.

2. **Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Coupled with the rule of law, the development of a sustainable economy is one of the central components of a stable state. A sustainable economy creates prosperity, particularly when it is market-based. Developing a stable HN economy requires legal reforms that discourage corruption, provide incentives for economic growth and foreign and domestic investment, and provide employment opportunities for the population. These factors, when applied appropriately, reduce the drivers of conflict and instability and may prevent a downward spiral into state failure. Military planners should anticipate that the HN may request the JFC or multinational forces to provide security to prevent hoarding and black-market activities.
3. Stable Governance. Governance in a stable state includes a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful transition of power, resolution of internal policy disputes, and grievance resolution systems that reasonably satisfy the expectations of the population. The prospect of long-term stable governance can occur when effective influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the majority of the governed. While the government can maintain stability through brutality, oppression, and intimidation, such methods are brittle and can cause a rapid collapse of the government if effectively challenged.

4. Rule of Law. Rule of law is a principle of governance in which the state itself; all persons; and institutions and entities, public and private, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated and which are consistent with international human-rights norms and standards. It requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.

For more detailed information on the rule of law, see the Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform.

(b) The structures of a state are the result of a political settlement forged by a common understanding among elites and the communities they represent. Their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organizing political power. The political settlement may be a formal agreement or an informal understanding and serves as the foundation of a political process.

For a more detailed discussion of political settlement, see paragraph 4.d., “Political Settlement.”

(3) The “fragile states framework” and the “elements of a stable state” are tools to help understand how stability is achieved. Although capacity-building at the national level plays a crucial role, societal strength and stability are ultimately rooted at the community level. The JFC should be careful to avoid focusing too heavily on national institutions as a panacea for fragility and instability. This is because, ultimately, stability results from government effectiveness and perceptions of its legitimacy by the people it represents. There are no quick fixes to strengthen governance or build a nation’s ability to improve the lives of its citizens. The JFC’s role in stabilization is focused on the critical tasks associated with the initial to medium-term phases of a long-term process.

(4) Stabilization requires a set of properly trained personnel, who can implement joint stability functions. For planning and guidance, dedicated staff sections for joint stability functions should populate the echelons of staff. Task-organized stabilization teams should deploy with tactical units to enhance stability and security of the rear areas during military operations. Invariably, they involve the close coordination and cooperation of the stabilization partners in various degrees. As such, a civil-military integration (e.g.,
CMOCs, joint interagency coordination groups, or joint interagency task forces (JLTFs)) may serve to promote coordination and cooperation for unity of effort. Stabilization efforts continue until the transition to appropriate civilian authorities, and some form of stability may continue in accordance with US policy.

c. **Understanding the Immediate Drivers of Instability.** The root causes are critical to understanding why a state is unstable, but additional analysis is required to understand how they have manifested in specific political dynamics that threaten the HN. The opportunity, motive, and means of potential adversaries are central to understanding and mapping the causes of instability. These factors are the basis for the design and detailed planning necessary to create a stable HN.

(1) **Opportunity.** Opportunity may emerge slowly over time due to a decline in HN capacity to control its territory and population. It can also arise when HN security force capacity remains level, but the willingness of the HN population to cooperate with HN security forces declines. Conversely, opportunity can also emerge suddenly as the result of a natural or manmade disaster that overwhelms the capacity of the HN government to respond effectively and maintain public order. In these cases, the HN government may face criminal or political opportunists seeking to exploit a sudden vacuum of authority.

(2) **Motive**

(a) The motives for violence vary among individuals, communities, elites, combatants, and sympathizers. For a joint force conducting stabilization activities, it is important to distinguish between the root causes that made a society vulnerable to instability and how those conditions were transformed into drivers of instability by established or aspiring elites. The existence of grievances does not automatically cause instability; poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are unfortunately commonplace. Paradoxically, they exist in many places that are reasonably stable. Political instability can arise when charismatic leaders build compelling narratives that link grievances to their political agenda. Of course, grievances may be genuine; so, if leaders assume political office and pursue reforms legitimately, then a healthy course ensues. However, if such leaders resort to violence or seek to overthrow the established government, then political instability results. Similarly, if a legitimately elected leader begins to dismantle political institutions in the pursuit of amassing power, this too can lead to political instability. Conversely, if the established government uses violence and intimidation to block legitimate elections, then political instability is likely.

(b) In many cases, opponents of the government will not immediately resort to violence; therefore, the response of the HN government may determine whether a crisis is peacefully resolved or escalates. Responding appropriately requires the HN government to accurately distinguish between legitimate criticism and determined subversion. HN governments may default to heavy-handed repressive responses that drive moderates into alliances with extremist hardliners, deepening the instability and pushing the crisis towards open violence. Escalation often involves deliberate attacks by both sides on important civic institutions and the disruption of the norms that help societies function, creating physical
Stabilization Activities

and psychological trauma for individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole that can hamper efforts to resolve the conflict.

(3) **Means.** Acquiring the **means** to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent government authorities is a significant task, and the way militant groups go about securing those resources can strongly influence their behavior. The leaders of militant groups must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of secure communications and logistics—often covertly. Leveraging existing social networks, diaspora support, illicit economies, or state sponsorship can all provide armed participants with the means to challenge HN authority, but each comes with drawbacks as well. Relying on existing social networks can provide a resilient, deeply rooted source of people and funds, but that social identity may limit the ability to win broader support. Diaspora politics and priorities can diverge significantly from those in the theater of operations, creating tensions between local factions and their geographically removed backers. Deepening involvement in illicit economies can transform organizations into criminal organizations as profit becomes an end in itself. State sponsors can often prove the strongest support base, but they have exclusive agendas and expect to wield influence or even outright control. Analysis of how the parties to the conflict—including the HN government and its allies—secure vital resources can provide key insights that shape an effective operation or campaign plan.

*For more information on network engagement, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.*

6. **Principles of Joint Operations to Achieve Stability**

a. Although the principles of joint operations (see Figure I-1) apply to aspects of any joint operation, emphasis on certain principles, especially legitimacy, and their applicability during stabilization activities is appropriate. Commanders should understand the joint principles in the context of stabilization efforts.

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<th>Principles of Joint Operations</th>
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<td><strong>Principles of War</strong></td>
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<td>· Economy of Force</td>
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*Figure I-1. Principles of Joint Operations*
For further details on the principles of joint operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

b. Objective. The objective of a stabilization effort is to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Civilian and military activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels should be carefully aligned to this objective. Aligning activities to the core objective can be particularly challenging in the context of interagency or multinational efforts. The JFC has a key role in shaping the conditions for, and providing a military perspective on, this dynamic process.

c. Offensive. Seizing the initiative with stabilization is critical. Establishing stabilization conditions prevents militants, criminals, and ordinary civilians from impeding military operations and humanitarian assistance. Since conflict and disasters tend to paralyze stricken communities, CMO seek to restore confidence, hope, and order quickly. Seizing this window of opportunity prevents adversaries and desperate civilians from exploiting vulnerabilities, which can hinder military operations. Decisive civil-military action establishes credibility and legitimacy within the HN population regarding the operation. Garnering cooperation and collaboration from the population helps achieve unity of effort in the successful completion of the operation.

d. Mass. Mass applies to other operations, be they the main effort or supporting, when military forces are needed to seize, occupy, and control areas that are beyond the capabilities of civilian authority. Depending on the size of the operational area, the joint force risks over-extension as it extends control over more territory. If the military forces are compelled to utilize combat units as garrison and security of the rear areas, mass at the decisive points is weakened. CMO seek to solve this problem by securing and stabilizing rear areas so the military forces can mass for decisive operations.

e. Economy of Force. Stabilization activities permit the concentration of military forces at critical areas and times. CMO act as an economy-of-force operation to relieve combat units of this necessity. Stabilization activities seek to minimize military resources for local communities by optimizing self-sufficiency. Moreover, CMO seek to garner local cooperation and resources to assist in the swift and successful completion of the operation.

f. Maneuver. To enhance joint force freedom of movement, stabilization activities seek to prevent civilian interference in military operations and to clear obstructions along lines of communications. Through the supervision of local authorities, CMO impose temporary restrictions on civilian activities (e.g., ordinances, curfews, and prohibited areas), so as to permit unimpeded movement of military units and humanitarian assistance. Hired local labor can clear and repair roadways, bridges, and facilities for unimpeded access. CMO divert refugees and displaced persons from primary lines of communications to secluded, safe areas. CMO strive to maintain unimpeded lines of communications during retrograde operations by controlling civilian traffic (e.g., displaced persons and fleeing civilians) on key roads and bridges. By these small and unassuming activities, stabilization contributes to freedom of maneuver in the OE.
g. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command is difficult to achieve with all participants in stabilization efforts, many of whom will not fall under military chains of command. Therefore, commanders should strive to align their efforts with stabilization partners to enable the use of all instruments of national power to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes. Stabilization activities must be closely coordinated with and through appropriate stabilization partners, as well as HN authorities as appropriate. Coordination arrangements among the military and interorganizational participants will often be informal, relying largely on personal relationships and trust built over time, so early and habitual communication is key. The use of liaison officers (LNOs), CMOCs, and PRTs have proven useful in the coordination and cooperation of military and civilian efforts. Commitment to interorganizational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of common interest, promote a common operational picture (COP), and enable sharing of critical information and resources.

h. **Security.** During active military operations, stability and security are closely aligned, which contribute to protecting the force. Through the supervision of local authorities, CMO safeguard supplies, facilities, and key chokepoints from pilferage, sabotage, and espionage, thereby enhancing freedom of action. Civil-military interactions with police and militias may collect relevant information on enemy and militant activities, which may affect local security. During active military operations, informal DDR of local resistance or militias may be necessary to foster stability. In the aftermath of a conflict, a formal DDR program seeks to enhance enduring stability. In both cases, honoring former combatants and encouraging service in the police and military are beneficial. For more information, see Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.”

i. **Surprise.** The local police, the populace, and militias are important sources of information. Information on abandoned enemy documents, equipment, and supplies; on the location of enemy agents; and on enemy activities is important to prevent surprise or to capitalize on enemy vulnerabilities. Civil-military officials serve as a conduit for such information for intelligence exploitation. Further, information on criminal activities and enemy espionage plans can alert authorities to safeguard supplies, prevent sabotage, and prevent enemy raids.

j. **Simplicity.** CMO seek to simplify the achievement of policy and strategic objectives by reducing friction between military forces and the population. Accordingly, stabilization activities align HN authorities and the populace with relevant stabilization partners to resolve problems at the lowest, feasible levels. This approach simplifies military operations by resolving the multitude of local problems before they become acute.

k. **Restraint.** Stabilization activities require careful balancing of actions and their potential impact on the mission. In select circumstances, the carefully targeted application of overwhelming force may be useful in deterring potential spoilers and instilling confidence in allies and the civilian population regarding the credibility of the stabilizing forces. Minimizing loss of civilian life and damage to property and cultural sites, as well as infrastructure and facilities needed for recovery, will often be paramount. Also, when directed, the JFC’s stabilization activities may extend beyond force protection to
encompass protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and stabilization partners. Exercising restraint may reduce civilian harm but will not eliminate it entirely. When civilian casualties and collateral damage occur, JFCs should acknowledge unintended destruction early, express regret, and articulate corrective activities. The credibility and legitimacy of the operations will depend on restraint, using the amount of force consistent with not just tactical but also operational and strategic objectives (and considering secondary effects military operations may have on stability). Rather than overwhelming force, this calls for intermediate force options, including nonlethal weapons and tactics, which enable effective action while minimizing collateral risks.

For more information, see DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.

1. **Perseverance.** Stabilization efforts require a sustained commitment and sufficient support to mitigate destabilizing elements in the HN, while reinforcing stabilizing elements. Commanders should ensure sustainable plans are in place to support USG and DOS objectives throughout the stabilization effort.

   m. **Legitimacy**

   (1) The JFC must sustain the legitimacy of both the operation and the HN government as it matures. HN government credibility and its ability to generate consent is crucial. Consent for the presence of US forces conducting stabilization activities encompasses a spectrum of attitudes and vary from active opposition; through grudging tolerance, acquiescence, or apathy; to active support. Measures undertaken to mitigate civilian harm inevitably contribute to acceptance of the stabilization mission and legitimacy of the HN government. Activities of the United States and other stabilization partners must progressively and inexorably convince the majority of the population and wider audiences, including adversaries, that an acceptable political settlement will be reached.

   (a) In political contexts, legitimacy manifests in the population’s voluntary acceptance of those exercising authority over them. While many states employ some level of coercion to maintain public order, enforce laws, and prevent subversion, legitimacy reduces the need to employ coercive measures—and therefore human and material resources—required to maintain control of its territory. When such perception is negative, it can create grievances and drive instability; when functioning well, it serves as a resiliency factor in the OE. In addition to the formal characteristics of state legitimacy, national and local governments effectively and fairly providing essential services build credibility that fosters stability among all communities.

   (b) While reestablishing HN legitimacy is the ultimate goal, the joint force and its stabilization partners must understand that continuing success rests on their own legitimacy in the eyes of local, international, and US domestic audiences to succeed. This comes into play, for example, when the JFC works in closer alignment with stabilization partners. Even after rudimentary civil authority is established, the JFC’s effectiveness in coordinating a unified response or activity may depend on partners’ perceptions of the
legitimacy of the military operations, as well as the perceptions of the local population. In addition, commanders at all levels have an obligation to assert and protect the legitimacy of operations. Restrained and focused application of force are not just legal obligations, they are critical to sustaining the support of international, local, and US populations.

(2) **Factors of Legitimacy.** Legitimacy of the HN, joint force, or supporting organizations depends on four factors: mandate, manner, consent, and expectations.

(a) **Mandate.** Mandate is the perceived legitimacy of the means by which the mission or HN government gained its claimed authority. The mandate or authority that established the mission often determines the initial perceptions of legitimacy. Multilateral missions with the broad approval of the international community have a higher degree of legitimacy than do unilateral missions. These might include missions conducted by a multinational force under a UN mandate.

(b) **Manner.** The credible manner in which intervening forces conduct themselves and their operations builds legitimacy as the operation progresses. Highly professional forces are disciplined, trained, and culturally aware. They carry with them an innate perception of legitimacy further strengthened by consistent performance, which conforms to the standards of domestic and international law, and, whenever possible, local culture. For military forces, a clearly defined commander’s intent and mission statement establish the initial focus that drives the long-term legitimacy of the mission. Military forces also make every effort to minimize civilian harm. When civilian harm does occur, they address it quickly and in a culturally appropriate way.

(c) **Consent.** Consent is the extent to which factions, local populations, and others support, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, ranges from active resistance; through unwilling compliance, acquiescence, and apathy; to freely given support. Consent is essential to the legitimacy of the mission. The legitimacy of the mission may be called into question if it lacks the consent of the HN or an internationally recognized mandate. Local people rarely perceive unilateral missions to impose regime change as legitimate, even in cases where that regime significantly threatens national or international security or willfully creates conditions that foment humanitarian crises. Commanders should consider this dynamic in the analysis of the local context and when planning operations.

(d) **Expectations.** Expectations are the extent to which those exercising the mandate manage or meet the expectations and aspirations of elites, local populations, and the international community. Expectations inform perceptions. Perceptions are the final arbiter of whether the populace and the international community believe the mandate and operations are legitimate. Realistic, consistent, and achievable expectations—in terms of goals, time, and resources—foster legitimacy during a lengthy operation. Missions that are not perceived to achieve a degree of progress consistent with expectations inevitably degrade the will of the HN government, the local populace, the international community, and the American people.
(3) **Guidance for Maintaining Legitimacy.** Maintaining the legitimacy of the HN and of the joint operation is an ongoing and vital concern for the JFC. The following guidelines apply:

(a) Conduct interorganizational coordination at all levels of interaction to promote legitimacy through a common narrative. The operation is an inherently integrated activity, so considerations for legitimacy should be part of the planning across all USG activities. The JFC should work through and with the country team to ensure the USG effort is in accordance with HN government requirements and complementary to efforts being undertaken by stabilization partners.

(b) Recognize that legitimacy has a strong, legal component. Understanding the relationships between cultural and social legitimacy and its manifestation in legal forms and institutions is essential and requires in-depth analysis. As in any operation, the staff judge advocate (SJA) can be of assistance, but this will require additional expertise from the other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations.

(c) Recognize that a perceived lack of legitimacy in any one operation will impact operations elsewhere. How the United States is perceived as performing operations in one part of the world has a direct impact on the ability of the United States to conduct operations worldwide.

(d) Commanders at all levels must reinforce that legitimacy is a core consideration for all forces. Rules of engagement (ROE), guidelines for interaction with the civilian population, and tactical actions should all support the legitimacy of US activities and respect for the legitimacy of HN authorities. Regardless of whether an operation is conducted under the law of war relevant to military occupation or is conducted with the consent of, and in support of, the HN and its domestic laws, if the HN population does not consent to the authority that is being exercised, they will be less willing partners in promoting the rule of law.

(e) Do not overlook non-state security organizations when analyzing the legitimacy of HN authorities and other stabilization partners. Military and other state-sponsored security agencies may not be the sole source of civil security in the operational area. Private security contractors (PSCs) and local militias may be present, whether officially sanctioned or not. The population may not distinguish between their behavior and that of state security forces.

(f) Recognize that all of these factors and functions are key components of a commander’s communications synchronization (CCS) and should be pursued as such. Establishing the legitimacy of joint force members and activities, while discrediting the legitimacy of the adversary, are critical components of a CCS effort. A conscious, comprehensive approach to CCS is necessary to ensure the coherent, effective, and synergistic union of these activities and concerns.
7. Fundamentals of Stabilization

a. Joint forces supporting USG stabilization efforts should consider the use of the fundamentals of stabilization and the principles of joint operations to plan and execute military activities to facilitate long-term stability.

b. The multidimensional nature of post-conflict stabilization demands effective coordination and collaboration among the stabilization partners. Societies that emerge from conflict have immediate needs. In accordance with direction from the USG lead federal agency for the stabilization effort, the joint force will likely focus on critical priorities at the local level, such as government, police services, prisons, judicial proceedings, and essential services (i.e., medical, fire, shelter, water, energy, and waste disposal). As the stabilization effort progresses, the joint force may support USG efforts to reestablish other HN systems/services, such as economic, postal, judicial, media (e.g., radio, television, newspapers), electoral (i.e., constitutions, licensing of political parties, census, and elections), and financial (e.g., banking, tax revenues, and other markets). In the process, the joint force ensures human security, basic needs, protection against human rights violations, rule of law, reintegrating ex-combatants, political inclusiveness, and mobilizing domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. Military planners must coordinate with the HN, civil society, and NGOs to support efforts from all fronts.

c. Conflict Transformation

(1) Conflict transformation is the process for addressing the underlying causes of violent conflict, while developing viable, peaceful alternatives for people to meet their needs and pursue their political and socioeconomic aspirations.

(2) Successful conflict transformation relies on the empowerment of local stakeholders, at times with the assistance of some stabilization partners, to identify and resolve the primary sources of instability. These efforts reflect the constant tension between the time commitment required to achieve sustainable progress and the need to build momentum quickly. National interest and resources are finite; therefore, conflict transformation efforts focus on the underlying sources of instability while managing its visible symptoms. In nations seeking to transition from war to peace, windows of opportunity exist to address sources of instability. This may include identifying issues of damage, atrocities, trauma, and injustice experienced by the conflict parties, as well as developing approaches that build relationships and include marginalized groups through consensus-building mechanisms, checks and balances on power, and transparency measures. Additionally, civilian casualty mitigation measures should ensure incidental harm caused during military operations is not a detriment to conflict transformation.

d. HN Ownership

(1) Long-term stability is unachievable without HN ownership. The joint force should consider HN views on stability solutions, while conducting course of action (COA) analysis in an operation, within the CCP, and within the integrated country strategy. Where
existing HN systems remain viable and legitimate in the eyes of the HN population, stabilization efforts should allow them to function, rather than circumventing or reinventing them. At the same time, joint forces should carefully assess potential system reforms that address the root causes and drivers of instability. Commitment and constructive participation by the HN's political, civic, cultural, economic, and religious leaders and the populace reinforce capacities and capabilities developed during stabilization. This corporate approach strengthens enduring systems beyond the withdrawal of external support. In seeking HN participation and ownership of stabilization processes, the joint forces should distinguish between genuine ownership and mere acquiescence to an externally imposed solution. This can be a challenge in societies where open disagreement is not acceptable. The use of ministerial advisors, who are well-trained, knowledgeable, and possess suitable personality traits for advising, are of great value in this regard.

(2) Military forces coordinate their activities through HN ministries, as part of a whole-of-government approach, to mitigate sources of instability and build the HN’s legitimacy and capacity. However, in the case of a failed state, a transitional governing authority may be required. This can be a transitional civil authority (typically authorized by the UN and under international lead) or a transitional military authority. Regardless, the transfer of responsibility to the HN government should occur as soon as feasible. For additional information on transitional authority, refer to Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities.”

e. Unity of Effort

(1) Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leadership is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a stabilization effort. Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach when conducting stabilization efforts.

(2) A Whole-of-Government Approach

(a) The US whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of relevant stabilization partners to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

(b) Civilian and military efforts often encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Military forces should coordinate efforts with relevant stabilization partners to mitigate these challenges. Given the challenges of differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes, the joint force should employ organizational techniques (e.g., CMOCs and PRTs) to improve teamwork. Our efforts should be guided by USG objectives, and all LOEs should support the overarching national strategy.

(c) In practice, USG civil-military interaction is often not as robust or complete as desired. Additionally, most USG departments and agencies, as well as other stabilization partners, may not be able to participate until the OE is permissive and resources are available. Often, logistical constraints and port capacity are the limiting
Stabilization Activities

factors for the entry of stabilization partners. JFCs may have to assume responsibility temporarily for tasks outside of those normally associated with the joint stability functions until sufficient security and access have been established for stabilization partners to engage. The JFC works with the COM, DOS, and other interagency partners to integrate CMO with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power in unified action. Other USG departments and agencies may remain after military forces have departed.

(d) Establishing a whole-of-government approach to achieve unity of effort should begin during planning. The civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) should provide studies on indigenous populations and institutions, civil systems, culture, and history to inform joint staff planning. Achieving unity of effort can be problematic due to the challenges of information sharing, competing priorities, differences in lexicon, and uncoordinated activities. The unity of effort framework, contained in the Joint Staff J-7’s [Directorate for Joint Force Development’s] *Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide*, is designed to improve unity of effort across the USG by setting the conditions for increased collaborative planning.

*For further details, refer to the Joint Staff J-7’s Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide and Unity of Effort Framework Quick Reference Pamphlet.*

*For further discussion of the whole-of-government approach and interagency and interorganizational coordination, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

(3) **The Comprehensive Approach**

(a) The comprehensive approach seeks to integrate the cooperative efforts of USG departments and agencies and relevant stabilization partners to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach integrates the perspectives, activities, capacities, and capabilities of stabilization partners that may positively influence and/or support the JFC’s mission. This requires mechanisms and processes that promote interorganizational coordination in the pursuit of unified action. Successful operations involve partners working at their own discretion or present in the operational area but not acting as a member of a multinational force. Integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of participants involved and may vary significantly given the degree of overlap among stabilization partners’ priorities and goals. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain but can be key to achieve success in an operation with a wide representation. It is vital to recognize that stabilization partners present in the OE will likely have different priorities, objectives, and authorities. At the very least, JFCs must be aware of all organizations and individuals that are not formal stabilization partners in the OE. At the strategic and operational levels, commanders should ensure collective efforts are aimed at a set of common strategic and operational goals.

(b) Unlike a whole-of-government approach that aims for true interagency integration toward unity of effort, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced,
cooperative effort. Military and civilian leadership leverage the capabilities of stabilization partners to forge a comprehensive approach, achieve broad conflict transformation goals, and attain a sustainable peace. Leadership supports the activities and goals of others by sharing resources. In a comprehensive approach, participants are not compelled to work together toward a common goal. Instead, they participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that goal represents. If attainment of common goals is seen as being in the best interests of the participants, then they are more likely to forge the bonds that help achieve unity of effort. Some groups, such as NGOs, must retain independence of action. Reconciling that independence with mission requirements may pose specific challenges to the unity of effort of the joint force.

(c) Using a comprehensive approach with NGOs and other nongovernmental participants can prove challenging. Some will not actively cooperate or coordinate with the USG or the joint force. They may be guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Adhering to these principles may mean not participating in any political agendas due to the need for the organizations to rely upon their neutrality to assist with the safety and security of their staff. Nevertheless, commanders should put a particular effort into understanding their role, actions, and constraints with regard to stabilization efforts. Regardless, the joint force should always encourage and welcome nongovernmental participants at CMOCs and PRTs when available.

For more information on nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, see The United States Institute of Peace’s Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.

(4) Negotiation and consensus building are key tools to achieve unified action in any stabilization efforts. Negotiation and consensus building should be fundamental to all interagency coordination and coordination with HN government entities. The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives and purpose are likely products of a pyramid of negotiations and consensus-building activities among responsible and influential leaders of social, economic, informational, political, law enforcement, and military institutions, as well as the relevant population. It is paramount the JFC have an understanding with the COM and all interagency partners as to the commander’s responsibilities, designated authorities, and limitations for negotiation during all aspects of interagency and interorganizational cooperation.

f. Network Engagement

(1) Network engagement provides a framework for JFCs to understand and effectively counter insurgents, terrorists, or other destabilizing threat networks through partnering with friendly networks and engaging neutral networks. Network engagement is the interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander’s objectives within an OE.

(2) In a stability context, friendly networks include joint force and stabilization partners who share common objectives for establishing stability. Building and facilitating
a shared understanding is key to enabling unified action with partners in friendly networks. Unified action provides the opportunity for the JFC to create friendly networks with far-reaching capabilities to engage neutral networks and counter threat networks. It is critical for the JFC to understand partner priorities and the strengths and limits of friendly network members’ authorities and capabilities in engaging neutral networks and countering threat networks. The JFC may need to consider strategies to enable partners who have the ability to promote stability in the HN but do not have sufficient resources. In past operations, the military’s capacity in logistics, security, and presence was leveraged by partners to enable greater civilian access in conflict areas and to support tasks such as project oversight in areas civilians could not access.

(3) Neutral networks may include individuals, groups, or organizations who enable or contribute to instability. Those same networks could also mitigate some aspects of instability. Conflict analysis may identify neutral networks and their potential value or influence. Engagements with neutral networks should strive to turn those networks away from supporting threat networks and toward supporting friendly networks. The joint force should leverage the larger friendly network, to apply authorities and capabilities that exist within the broader friendly network.

(4) Stabilization activities are primarily oriented towards partnering with friendly networks and engaging neutral networks. This is often in the context of countering a threat network or participants that are drivers of instability, such as insurgents, terrorists, or violent participants. The stabilization activities are conducted within the context of other mission areas, such as COIN or counterterrorism (CT). Network engagement can provide a planning framework to maximize effectiveness across mission areas. Network analysis can illustrate relationships and interdependencies between neutral and threat networks and among the actors that comprise them. Network engagement provides a planning framework for maximizing effectiveness across mission areas.

For more information on network engagement, partnering with friendly networks, and engaging neutral networks, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

g. Building HN Capacity

(1) Often, the primary role of external military forces during stabilization efforts is to conduct SFA that builds HN security force capability and capacity. The secondary role is to support the comprehensive efforts of interagency and intergovernmental entities, which strive to develop HN capacity to execute in critical government functions. These efforts may include enhancing the HN’s ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and functions such as disaster preparedness and policing. Capacity-building activities must be carefully aligned with USG strategic objectives and the HN political strategy. In view of political implications, the joint force must assess which capacities to develop, the sequence for developing different types of capacity, the process used to develop new or rehabilitate existing capacities, and the link between functional capacities and systems of governance. The design and implementation of building partner-capacity efforts must reflect integrated assessments. Failure to assess the political implications can result in unintended and potentially counterproductive effects on
broader stabilization efforts. The HN must be able to sustain these capabilities with existing resources, balancing effectiveness with sociocultural, economic, and political considerations. The primary role of military forces conducting SFA is to develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions. However, joint forces may also have a role to support efforts led by other USG departments and agencies to enhance the HNs ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions such as disaster preparedness and policing.

(2) The nature of the joint force operation influences the scope of HN capacity building. Stabilization activities following armed conflict often require comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, SC and military engagement, and CMO to enhance the establishment of government functions. In conjunction with stabilization partners, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, USAID, and DOS, military forces apply a sustained approach with foreign and domestic partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to address shared global interests. Unified action is essential for building partner capacity.

(3) Building HN capacity creates an environment that fosters HN institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthened managerial systems. Broader capacity-building activities within a society seek to develop the ethos and structure of good governance and political moderation. Supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, building capacity is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the HN’s human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.

(4) Activities for building capacity support a partner nation (PN) leadership or build on existing capacities across the six joint stability functions discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions.” To some degree, local capacity always exists; capacity-building activities aim to build, nurture, empower, and mobilize that capacity. Planning for effective activities that build capacity should consider the capabilities and processes the HN possesses.

(5) Activities for building partner capacity develop and strengthen skills, systems, abilities, processes, and resources. HN institutions and individuals adapt these activities to dynamic political and societal conditions within an OE. Most activities for building partner capacity focus on long-term technical assistance programs, which may include SC activities, but may also be targeted to specific responsibilities or functions to achieve decisive results sooner.

(a) Education and training lie at the heart of development efforts.

(b) Organizational development is the creation or adaptation of management structures, processes, and procedures to enable capacity building. This development includes managing relationships among different organizations and sectors (public, private, and community).
(c) Institutional and legal framework development enables organizations, institutions, and individuals to build capacity after necessary legal and regulatory changes are in place.

8. The Stabilization Framework

a. The stabilization framework helps the JFC conceptualize part of the OE of a nation that requires stabilization in support of US national strategy and interests. The framework emphasizes the training and organization of forces prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. The framework helps organize stabilization efforts and scopes the stabilization activities to achieve their objectives, whether supporting CCPs and integrated country strategies or in major contingency operations.

b. The stabilization framework is intended to encompass the process for which all activities across the competition continuum achieves stability. It guides the understanding of the USG efforts and commitment necessary to conduct stabilization activities across the competition continuum.

c. Military forces may need to operate at any point in the fragile state framework. Achieving policy goals could also require the expeditious reduction in the level of violence. Maintaining security creates conditions that permit the safe introduction of other stabilization partners. Security is essential for stabilization; however, establishing security has direct implications both on localized conflict and the broader political landscape. Military operations focus on stabilizing the OE and supporting those working to transform economic, social, and political conditions toward stability. In a failed or failing state, conditions typically require more coercive actions to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions of the OE improve, the constructive capabilities of military forces can focus on building HN civil-security capacity and enable sustained development through DOS, USAID, and other stabilization partners.

d. The strategic framework for stabilization facilitates unified action and an understanding of the broad range of activities by the military and civilian agencies in an OE characterized as a fragile, failing, or recovering state (see Figure I-2). The framework identifies the aggregated objectives to achieve stability: rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, stable governance, and social well-being. The conditions under each objective identify supporting accomplishments for success. The stabilization principles apply throughout the framework for sustained stability: HN ownership and capacity, political primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional engagement. The framework is sufficiently broad, so the joint force, in collaboration with stabilization partners, can establish priorities and track progress at the national and subnational levels. Accordingly, stabilization activities may be arranged in stages: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability.

(1) The initial response stage generally reflects activities executed to stabilize an OE in a crisis state. During this stage, military forces perform stabilization activities in concert with other stabilization partners, during and immediately after a conflict or during a disaster. These activities may also be in support of stabilization partners. The JFC should
avoid military actions that might impede civilian actions, which are often in progress prior to military intervention. In the case of a disaster, as directed, DOD supports USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), which is the lead in any international disaster relief effort. Activities during the initial response phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment, and they allow both the military and civilian personnel to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the HN population. Joint forces always seek to reduce the level of violence and human suffering, while creating conditions that enable other stabilization partners to participate safely in ongoing efforts.

(2) The transformation stage represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building tasks. Military forces perform these tasks in a relatively secure environment, free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. Forces often execute transformation phase tasks in either
vulnerable or crisis states. These tasks aim to build HN capacity, to include support of other organizations. While establishing conditions that facilitate broad unified action to rebuild the HN and its supporting institutions, these tasks facilitate the continued stability of the OE. Transformation in a stability context involves multiple types of transitions, which can occur concurrently.

(3) The **fostering sustainability** stage encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. In particular, military forces must work to develop institutional capacity in defense and security institutions. Effective and accountable HN institutions are critical to sustaining operational and tactical capacity in HN security forces. This stage also represents those stabilization activities undertaken to prevent instability and conflict. Military forces usually perform fostering sustainability tasks only when the OE is stable enough to support efforts. Such efforts implement long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and legitimacy of the HN. Often, military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.

*For more information on foreign assistance in preventing violent conflict in fragile states, see DOS/USAID publication United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.*
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CHAPTER II
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

“…ensure the joint force retains the capability, capacity, and readiness to conduct stabilization efforts, and that those capabilities are compatible with those of other USG [United States Government] departments and agencies.”

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05,
Stabilization, 13 December 2018

1. Linking Military and Civilian Activities

a. Military and civilian leaders link military and civilian activities to achieve unity of effort. They integrate a comprehensive approach to stabilization through close, continuous coordination and cooperation among stabilization partners. With unity of effort, military and civilian leaders overcome internal discord, inadequate structures and procedures, incompatible or underdeveloped communications infrastructure, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. Within the USG, the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives.

b. During stabilization activities, commanders achieve unity of effort across the competition continuum by focusing all activities toward a shared understanding of a common set of policy objectives. Policy focuses on the conditions required to support the strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction’s objectives, which normally address the rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, stable governance, and social well-being.

c. The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is an analytical tool that helps different USG departments and agencies reach a shared understanding of a nation’s conflict dynamics. The purpose of the ICAF is to develop a common understanding of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a nation.

For further details on conflict assessment, refer to Appendix B, “Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process.”

2. The Stabilization Assistance Review

a. Complementing the strategic framework for stabilization, the SAR and the DOD, DOS, and USAID Effective Justice and Security Sector Assistance in Conflict-Affected Areas: Guidelines for US Government Assistance Planning, Design, and Implementation seek to maximize the effectiveness of US stabilization efforts. A concerted effort by DOS, DOD, and USAID, the SAR highlights the imperative for a revitalized approach to stabilization that is more selective and targeted in how the United States uses its resources to empower local authorities, advance core US interests, mitigate risks, and enable strategic transitions.
b. As articulated in the SAR and in accordance with DODD 3000.05, *Stabilization*, stabilization is a “political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security; provide access to dispute resolution; deliver targeted, basic services; and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

c. DOS leads USG stabilization efforts with DOD supporting. Because combatant commands (CCMDs) support stabilization activities, civilian/military annexes to CCPs are interagency products. Synchronization of interagency input is important to ensure military efforts do not inadvertently derail long-term development.

d. The SAR establishes principles for effective justice and security assistance with general guidelines for all foreign assistance planning in conflict-affected areas. Moreover, these guidelines are relevant for support in any area of stabilization.

(1) Identify goals, expectations, and benchmarks early.

(a) Identify strategic objectives for US efforts in justice assistance and SA from the onset to shape policy and planning for USG departments and agencies, while permitting structured local processes to influence program design and prioritization. Ensure a coordinated interagency process to scope those objectives and synchronize with DOS, USAID, and DOD resource-planning processes.

(b) Engage stabilization partners, including other donors, in dialogue about mutual expectations and objectives. Document expectations for PN commitment, utilizing existing tools where practical, such as signed memorandums. and, where appropriate, document expectations of the United States by PNs. Identify benchmarks, metrics, and “red lines” at the outset of new justice and security sector programming, particularly corruption, and incorporate previous lessons learned. Identify contra-indicators of PN performance that reflect a divergence in expectations or goals or that run contrary to US interests. Adjust or suspend programming for insufficient progress or if red lines are crossed. Stand firm with the decision.

(c) Ensure partners understand and agree to adhere to international human rights standards, including the use of force and lawful detention, before the provision of SA.

(2) Proactively assess and seek to manage risk.

(a) Conduct a joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) assessment or estimate, if one does not exist, before starting new justice and security sector engagement. Thereafter, periodically assess the risk of external assistance: inadvertently exacerbating conflict dynamics, promoting oppressive responses to the conflict, downplaying the incentive for political solutions, contributing to abuses, and/or fueling corruption.
(b) Identify all potential legal, physical, reputational, and other risks to the United States and other stabilization partners, to include working with certain state and non-state entities, and for nonengagement in certain sectors. Assess the level of the risk the United States is willing to accept, especially based on previous decisions to accept similar risks and the outcome of those decisions. Develop mitigation strategies to address those risks and identify financial costs for those mitigation strategies.

(3) Adopt holistic, community-based approaches.

(a) When possible, start small (e.g., scope, money, location) and pursue a graduated approach to justice and security sector assistance (SSA) in conflict-affected areas so as not to promote oppressive responses to the conflict. Use graduated approaches to increase understanding of the justice and security-sector systems over time and secure local buy-in for key reforms. Focus on programs that help to reinforce the ability of legitimate local authorities to manage conflict peaceably and prevent a resurgence of violence, especially by improving trust between security forces and local communities.

(b) Approach justice sector engagement holistically, paying sufficient attention to local access to justice mechanisms. Engage with civil society, NGOs, and other stakeholders to incorporate sensitivity to gender, psychosocial needs, and trauma into justice and security sector reforms.

(4) Build flexibility, sequencing, and adaptation into stabilization efforts.

(a) Build an inception period of six months or more into new justice and security sector programming in conflict-affected areas for in-depth analysis and stakeholder consultations and to foster structured processes that cultivate local buy-in. Incorporate flexibility into program design so programming can be targeted and adapted as necessary, based on analysis and consultations. Accept a realistic time frame to plan and implement justice and security assistance in these areas and build in time for unanticipated hurdles.

(b) Develop plans for sequencing justice and SSA at the national level that increase the legitimacy of relevant institutions, not just their capacity. Prioritize assistance that engages leaders who can promote needed reforms that make those institutions more inclusive, especially in addressing constituencies critical to sustaining peace. Simultaneously develop plans to initiate or strengthen civilian control and public oversight of security and justice institutions, including investigative journalism and independent media. Fully consider the risks associated with programs to build the operational and tactical capacity of security forces if they are assessed to lack legitimacy.

(5) Collaborate with international partners throughout the process.

(a) Identify synergies among US justice, security sector reform (SSR), and related efforts undertaken by the UN, World Bank, and other international organizations, so as to improve outcomes and foster effective cost-sharing.
(b) Identify areas or elements where other international actors are expected to take the lead for justice assistance and SA. Accordingly, the United States should not be in the lead in every LOE. Develop mechanisms to share data and analysis regularly with other donors about justice and security sector efforts.

3. Stability Sectors

a. Security Sector

(1) Generally, security sector programs and policies focus on developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain stability. During and after a conflict, intervention forces stabilize the OE by protecting local civilians from the violence of conflict and opportunistic criminals and by restoring the territorial integrity of the state. This stability allows for broader participation by civilian and military personnel from stabilization partners in comprehensive reform efforts. In peacetime, the primary role of the military in the security sector is to support HN military forces. Law enforcement programs normally fall under the purview of law enforcement organizations, such as the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and UN-mandated international police organizations. DOD’s support to civilian security participants is generally limited.

(2) During major crises (e.g., conflict and major disasters), joint forces may assume responsibility for all stabilization activities in the security sector. Stabilization activities typically include protecting HN territory and population, using LOEs that integrate interorganizational activities from other sectors and are aligned with other objectives. Joint forces should not assume that building the capacity of the central government’s military forces is universal. The importance of local security forces drawn from the community they serve has proven effective, especially in tribal environments. In addition, local militia may play an important security role in some contexts at the local level. In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, the USG may direct the implementation of a DDR program as part of SSR.

(3) To foster enduring stability beyond the withdrawal of joint forces, SSR and SC develop competent and legitimate HN security forces for the provision of national security and domestic tranquility. Institutional capacity building (ICB) is important to sustaining competent and legitimate HN organizational structures (e.g., security, rule of law, economic, transportation, medical). HN security forces, such as police, military, interior, and customs and border patrol, have different roles and missions. Further, the traditional lines of authority between local and national forces may vary from one geographic area to another. Consequently, incorporating the expertise of civilian organizations in planning reaps benefits.

(4) In some cases (e.g., insurgencies and disasters), HN government and security forces are a significant threat to their own population. This presents even greater challenges for stabilization efforts if the joint force depends on maintaining HN consent for its presence and operations. Managing such challenges often requires even tighter integration of USG strategic guidance and policies with the joint force at the operational
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and tactical levels. US forces should avoid inadvertently assisting HN governments in carrying out deliberate attacks on civilians, and they may have to take action at the tactical level to prevent such violence. Planners should assess the risk associated with HN abuses against civilians during JIPOE and address those risks in operational design and detailed planning. The inability to prevent and protect against gender-based and sexual violence can potentially impose additional challenges and long-term, negative effects to the overall success of a mission.

(5) DDR Programs. DDR contributes to security and stability in the aftermath of a conflict for the commencement of SSR. The DDR of former combatants (both government and rebel) is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. DDR provides an environment of confidence for voluntary participation in the program. It provides medical, psychological counseling, educational, and vocational needs of the participants, ensuring no one is left out of the program (i.e., men, women, children, families, and disabled veterans). It includes an informal judicial process for atonement of atrocities. DDR provides a process for the reintegration of former combatants into society, as well as the initial personnel and equipment requirements for the new military and police services. Program effectiveness requires extensive planning, organization, funding, and resources, as well as unity of effort from participating stakeholders (e.g., lead nation, international organization, HN government, and NGOs).

For more information on DDR, see Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.”

b. Justice and Reconciliation Sector

(1) The justice and reconciliation sector encompasses far more than policing, civilian law and order, and the court systems of a state. This sector provides for a fair, impartial, and accountable justice system, while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster. In some contexts, this requires integrating formal governmental institutions with informal systems (e.g., tribal or village councils) that enjoy high levels of legitimacy among all or part of the population.

(2) Tasks closely associated with justice focus on ensuring public order and reestablishing a fair, impartial, and effective judiciary and justice system. This system addresses threats to both individuals and public order, helps to resolve disputes, and helps enforce established contracts. Those tasks relating to reconciliation address grievances and crimes, past and present, in hopes of forging a peaceful future for a diverse but integrated society. Reconciliation efforts should not become a vehicle for exacting revenge on groups or communities associated with the actual perpetrators of grave human rights abuses. There are certain statutory human rights requirements that must be met to allow USG stabilization efforts and SC activities. It is essential that stabilization efforts focus on enhancing the effectiveness of justice systems based on local expectations, while ensuring respect for basic human rights standards. Although sharing many fundamental principles, Western models of justice systems should not be employed as a universal template for emulation. DOS and DOJ are often lead agencies in US efforts to support rule of law and
building the capacity of the HN justice system. International organizations such as the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also support HN rule of law and justice system capacity building. The Services’ Judge Advocate General Corps personnel provide support to DOD rule-of-law efforts during stabilization activities. The ICRC focuses on human rights of all parties in conflict situations. JFC awareness of, and coordination with, these organizations is essential to effective implementation of post-conflict tasks associated with the justice sector. One way to empower positive change within the culture is by ensuring gender equality in the justice system, particularly for those most vulnerable (i.e., women and girls), as well as engaging women in leadership reform roles within the system itself.

(3) An integrated approach to justice and reconciliation is central to broader reform efforts across the other sectors. The justice and reconciliation sector is supported by eight key elements:

(a) An impartial, transparent, and accountable judiciary and justice system.

(b) A fair, representative, and equitable body of law.

(c) Effective and scrupulous law enforcement institutions responsive to civil authority and respectful of human rights and dignity.

(d) Mechanisms for monitoring and upholding human rights.

(e) A humane, reform-based corrections system.

(f) Reconciliation and accountability mechanisms for resolving past abuses and grievances arising from conflict.

(g) An effective and ethical legal profession.

(h) Public knowledge and understanding of rights and responsibilities under the law.

(4) Successful interventions promptly address the most critical gaps in capability and capacity as soon as possible. Justice sector reform is a long-term process, and stabilization efforts should adopt a phased approach based on realistic timelines and objectives. Addressing vital issues of justice and reconciliation is typically required to maintain the initiative against subversive and criminal elements competing to fill those gaps. HN involvement in planning, oversight, and monitoring of justice and reconciliation reform is essential and extends beyond officials associated with the central government. Subnational governments often play key roles in promoting justice and civil society’s participation in governments. Promotion of justice and reconciliation initiatives at this level may enhance public legitimacy. Generally, intervention in justice and reconciliation encompasses three categories:
(a) Restored initial response activities to institute essential interim justice measures that resolve the most urgent issues of law and order until HN processes and institutions can assume responsibility.

(b) An established system of reconciliation to address grievances and past atrocities.

(c) Long-term activities to establish a legitimate, accountable HN justice and dispute resolution system and supporting infrastructure.

(5) Justice and reconciliation closely relates to elements within the security and governance activities. Efforts in one sector can either complement or undermine efforts in another. These relationships are further reinforced by the inseparable nature of the tasks to subordinates, which reflects the dynamic interaction among security, governance, and justice. Due to the close relationships among the activities and functions that compose the security, governance, and justice and reconciliation sectors, failure to act quickly in one sector can lead to setbacks in the other sectors.

c. **Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being Sector**

(1) Conflict and disaster significantly stress the ability of a nation’s institutions to provide essential services to the populace. Security and governing institutions that enable the effective functioning of essential services often fail first, leading to widespread internal strife and humanitarian crisis. The intense competition for limited resources may explode into violent conflict, possibly causing pervasive starvation, disease, and death. Because fragile states lack resilient institutions, they are more susceptible to such crises.

(2) Any intervention effort is incomplete if it fails to alleviate immediate suffering. Generally, this suffering includes the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation. Intervening military forces also address civilian harm when it has occurred.

(3) Social well-being is personal access to basic necessities, peaceful coexistence in communities, and equitable opportunities for economic and social advancement. Sustainable solutions establish the foundation for long-term development and address the root causes of conflict that often cause drivers of instability, such as famine, epidemics, displaced civilians, refugee flows, and human trafficking.

d. **Governance and Participation Sector**

(1) Promoting governance participation addresses the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure at both the national and subnational levels. Governance is the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs at all levels. It involves the process and capacity to formulate, implement, and enforce public policies and deliver services. Governance systems can include formal institutions, such as constitutions and legislative bodies, and informal
mechanisms, such as tribal leaders or councils of elders. Often, governance combines 
elements of formal and informal institutions or mechanisms. The appropriate division of 
authority and responsibility between the central and subnational government authorities and 
between the formal and informal institutions varies among nations. Careful assessment of 
the OE is required to develop a problem statement and plan of action that addresses the 
dynamics of the crisis or instability. However, the plan should have the ability to adapt to 
dynamic changes. For the formal institutions, effective governance involves establishing 
rules and procedures for political decision making; strengthening public institution 
management, administrative institutions, and practices; providing public services in an 
effective and transparent manner; and providing civil administration that supports lawful 
private activity and enterprise. Participation includes procedures that actively and openly 
involve the local populace in establishing government structures and policies. Further, 
participation encourages public debate and the generation of innovative ideas. Ultimately, 
the goal is to establish a governance system that reflects the political and economic realities 
of the HN but is resilient enough to adapt as those realities evolve.

(2) The top priority of any stabilization effort is to help build state effectiveness 
and legitimacy. Effectiveness and legitimacy are the hallmarks of a well-functioning 
government and society.

(a) Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to assure the 
provision of order, as well as public goods and services. The scope of the government’s 
role varies from nation to nation and by citizens’ expectations.

(b) Legitimacy is a more intangible quality, dependent on widespread public 
perceptions that government exercise of state power is reasonably fair and in the interests 
of the nation as a whole.

(3) The qualities of government effectiveness and legitimacy mutually interact 
over time. For example, a government initially regarded as legitimate, but fails to perform 
essential functions reasonably well, will lose legitimacy over time. Conversely, a 
government that performs its functions reasonably well can gain legitimacy. Where both 
effectiveness and legitimacy are weak, conflict or state fragility is likely. Where 
effectiveness is the primary deficit, external assistance provides a productive means to 
reverse a decline. Additional resources, equipment, and technical assistance deployed in 
concert with host-government priorities and direction may make the critical difference in 
shoring up a fragile nation-state or in reconstructing a failed one. Where legitimacy is the 
primary deficit, options for external assistance narrow and shift toward nongovernmental 
and private organizations.

(4) Efforts to strengthen civil participation in government foster positive, lasting 
change in society, which enables the people to influence government decision making and 
hold public leaders accountable for their actions. Activities that develop social capital help 
local communities influence policies and institutions at national, regional, and local levels. 
With this assistance, communities establish processes to identify problems, develop 
proposals to address critical issues and grievances, rebuild public service capabilities and
capacities, mobilize the community, rebuild social networks, and develop advocacy. These social capital development activities are founded on three pillars:

(a) Human rights—promoting and protecting social, economic, cultural, political, civil, and other basic human rights.

(b) Equity and equality—advancing equity and equality of opportunity among citizens in terms of gender, social and economic resources, political representation, ethnicity, and race. HN sociocultural factors should be considered before advancing certain aspects of equity and equality.

(c) Participation—supporting involvement in public forums and self-determination in human development.

(5) Response efforts that seek to build local governance and participation should encourage HN ownership of these processes. Previously disenfranchised citizens may require encouragement to participate actively in government reforms. Establishing successful, enduring HN government institutions requires this participation. Even during an intervention with a transitional governing authority performing certain governance functions temporarily, this process to establish full HN governance—complemented by a comprehensive technical assistance program—is vital to long-term success.

(6) Military forces may assume the powers of a sovereign governing authority under two conditions: when military forces intervene in the absence of a functioning government or when military operations prevent a government from administering to the public and providing public services.

For more information, see Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities.”

e. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Sector

(1) Much of the broader success achieved in stabilization actions begins at the local level, as participants work on modest, carefully targeted economic and governance programs. These programs establish building blocks for comprehensive national reform efforts and shape political dynamics from the bottom up. These efforts aim to build the critical societal relationships, institutions, and processes to ensure the sustained viability of the state. Additionally, these activities establish the framework to minimize the risk of threat networks exploiting the situation to gain access to critical financial resources. To support the transition of the society and state to long-term stability, stabilization partners may conduct some or all of the following:

(a) Establish the policies and regulatory framework that supports basic economic activity and development.

(b) Secure and protect the natural resources, energy production, and distribution infrastructure of the HN.
(c) Support and involve the private sector in reconstruction.

(d) Implement programs that encourage trade and investment with initial emphasis on HN and regional investors, followed at a later stage by foreign investors.

(e) Rebuild or reform essential economic governance institutions.

(f) Reconstruct or build essential economic infrastructure.

(2) While conflict and disaster can cause significant economic losses and disrupt economic activity, they may also create opportunities for economic reform and restructuring. In fragile states, elites who benefit from the existing state of the economic situation can discourage the growth of trade and investment, stifle private-sector development, limit opportunities for employment and workforce growth, and weaken or destroy emerging economic institutions. Specific stabilization partners work to legitimize the HN’s economic activities and institutions. Such legitimate institutions provide an opportunity to stimulate reconstruction and stabilization by facilitating assistance from the international community. This community helps develop comprehensive, integrated humanitarian and economic development programs required to achieve sustained success. Ultimately, such success can reduce the likelihood of a return to violent conflict, while restoring valuable economic and social capital to the HN.

(3) The economic recovery of the HN ties directly to effective economic policies and programs of the HN government. Sound economic policy supported by legitimate, effective governance fosters recovery, growth, and investment. Recovery begins at the local level; as markets and enterprises are reestablished, the workforce is employed and public and private investment is restored. These events help to stabilize the HN currency and reduce unemployment, thus providing the tax base necessary to support the recovery of the HN’s treasury. In turn, this enables the HN government to fund the public institutions and services that provide for the social and economic well-being of the people.

4. Joint Force Components and Stabilization Activities

a. Joint force components can include personnel from the Services, special operations forces (SOF), DOD combat support agencies, DOD civilian expeditionary workforce, and DOD contractors.

b. Each of the joint force components has unique capabilities, which nest within the joint stability functions. These capabilities may sometimes be used to execute a stabilization action as part of a joint operation for a contingency or an action that is part of the stabilization effort within a CCP. Like SC, joint components conduct stabilization across the competition continuum.

c. Military forces provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the HN is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces, but they may also involve contractor personnel (e.g., a private
security company). In addition, military forces sometimes provide logistic, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These stabilization activities may be singular in nature or grouped together as part of a stabilization effort. Each situation is unique. These activities generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with stabilization:

1. Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.
2. Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain responsibility but military forces execute or are prepared to execute or support.
3. Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

d. Each joint force component activity should be analyzed against the strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction. The joint force component activities focus on achieving objectives. For example, initial response activities typically focus on establishing civil security or civil control to create a safe, secure environment. This analysis helps determine the nature of the subordinate tasks to be performed and the degree to which tasks may change over time.

e. None of these tasks is performed in isolation. When integrated with complementary activities from other stability sectors into coherent LOE, they represent a cohesive effort to reestablish the institutions that provide for the civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and nation-state. Collectively, the component stabilization tasks reflect a myriad of interrelated activities conducted across the six joint stability functions in support of clearly articulated objectives. Tasks executed in one sector inevitably affect another sector; planned and executed appropriately, carefully synchronized activities complement and reinforce resulting effects. Achieving a specific objective or establishing certain conditions often requires performing a number of related tasks from different stability sectors. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local populace, safety and security are broad objectives.

f. At the operational level, the component stabilization tasks serve as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. Each task and its corresponding stability sector contain a number of related subordinate tasks. In any joint operation, the stabilization activities and related tasks are integrated with offensive and defensive activities and those related tasks.

g. **Joint Force Land Component Activities.** Land component stabilization activities can be grouped into six principal tasks that correspond to the joint stability functions and the stability sectors. Together, they provide a mechanism for interagency coordination, linking the execution of discrete tasks among the instruments of national power that directly support broader efforts as part of unified action.

1. **Establish Security.** To establish civil security, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities:
(a) Protect the civilian population from violence.

(b) Establish transitional public security, which includes establishing public order and interim detention.

(c) Conduct activities to counter illegal combatants and criminal elements by removing adversary anonymity and/or positively identifying persons of trust.

(d) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.

(e) Protect key personnel and facilities.

(f) Establish, reform, or strengthen relationships with HN armed forces and intelligence services through SC at the local, national, and ministerial levels.

(g) Enforce the cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.

(h) Conduct or support DDR of belligerents.

(2) **Establish Transitional Public Security.** Establish transitional public security to promote, restore, and maintain public order. Transitional public security by US and multinational/international organization forces in operations and campaigns involving a large US military presence complements public security. The purpose of transitional public security is to protect civilian populations when the rule of law has broken down or is non-existent. To establish transitional public security, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

(a) Support to the establishment of public order and safety.

(b) Support to the establishment of a criminal justice system.

(c) Support war crimes courts and tribunals.

(d) Support judicial reform.

1. Support property-dispute resolution process.

2. Support justice-system reform.


4. Support war crimes courts and tribunals.

5. Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.
(3) **Restore Essential Services.** To restore essential services, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

(a) Provide essential civil services.

(b) Support humanitarian demining.

(c) Support public health programs.

(d) Support education programs.

(4) **Support to Governance.** To support governance, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

(a) Support transitional administrations.

(b) Support the development of local governance.

(c) Support anticorruption initiatives.

(d) Support elections.

(e) ICB.

(5) **Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Military tasks executed to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a state is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelm the government. Economic problems inextricably tie to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others will likely follow. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. To support economic and infrastructure development, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

(a) Support economic generation and enterprise creation.

(b) Support monetary institutions programs.

(c) Support public-sector investment and private-sector development.

(d) Protect natural resources and environment.

(e) Support agricultural development programs.

(f) Restore transportation and telecommunications infrastructure.

(g) Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
(6) **Support to SC Activities.** SC encompasses all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with FSF and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable PNs to provide the United States access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered SA programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration. SC helps develop partnerships that encourage and enable PNs to act in support of US strategic objectives. SC activities often complement other USG foreign assistance to provide stability, help mitigate drivers of conflict, and assure key partners and allies. Additionally, SC supports US military campaign and contingency plans with necessary access, critical infrastructure, and PN support and enables the achievement of strategic objectives, such as deterring adversaries, preventing conflict, and enhancing the stability and security of PNs. SC supports the implementation of national and theater strategies and remains a vital link to assist in global and theater-shaping activities, which support stabilization. SC remains a primary capability for shaping activities for all CCPs. These SC activities, programs, and interactions assist in shaping the OE and produce conditions necessary to establish stability within the operational area. SC assists PNs and Allies to provide stability by deterring adversaries, preventing conflict, and by building capacity and capability of PNs and Allies.

(a) **Building Security Relationships.** An initial step in building a security relationship includes some form of partnership. Also characterized as building partnerships, it involves developing long-term security and defense relationships with selected nations, designated as PNs, around the globe. With rare exceptions, building a security relationship should be considered a way to achieve other objectives, rather than an objective in itself. The implementation of SSR refines the USG processes and programs for building security relationships with PNs. Essential to international armaments cooperation activities and SC activities (especially SA programs), security relationships help CCDRs support the shaping of the strategic security environment by:

1. Strengthening USG global network of partner relationships.
2. Promoting theater and global stability.
3. Demonstrating USG support for PN sovereignty.
4. Providing compelling messages for stabilization and deterrence.
5. Influencing partners to support US foreign policy objectives and, when appropriate, military operations/campaigns.

(b) **Building Partner Capacity.** Developing specific PN capabilities and capacity for security and defense addresses their internal security and their participation or coordination in operations with US forces or multinational operations. Building partner capacity in the security sector includes FSF and their supporting institutions.
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directed, DOD can also support appropriate PN civilian authorities to strengthen civil-sector capacity at the local and national levels. Building partner capacity can range from individual education and training to ballistic missile defense, depending on the USG-PN relationship. Partner capacity can be described as an extant yet limited capability (e.g., forces, skills, or functions) within a PN’s security or civil sector that can be improved and employed on a national level. Building partner capacity requires a long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and, when necessary, the employment of that PN capacity in support of USG strategic objectives. Potential indicators of PN willingness and commitment include:

1. Accepts US assistance (e.g., SA, SFA, and other instructional-capacity development programs) to enable the PN to achieve stated SSR objectives.

2. Shares expense with USG for updating PN ballistic missile defense forces.

3. Provides support to control, defeat, disable, or dispose of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a neighboring nation.

4. Shares resources and technology via DOD international armaments cooperation programs.

5. Updates and sustains a credible CT force to support USG CT efforts.

6. Shares information with the United States to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat financial systems and networks that negatively affect US or PN security interests.

7. Effectively protects classified and export-controlled information technology.

(c) **Gaining/Maintaining Access.** Access facilitates US defense posture, provides for freedom of movement, and supports freedom of action during military operations by enabling US forces to access PN territory, resources, or leadership. It provides USG forces with peacetime and contingency access to permanent or temporary forward staging or basing facilities, airports, or seaports; ability to obtain overflight rights, passage through territorial waters, shared information, intelligence, or other resources; and opportunities for forward stationing of forces. It also enhances DOD distribution, reception, and retrograde capabilities.

**h. Joint Force Maritime Component Tasks**

(1) Maritime component stabilization activities support the same objectives as land and air component tasks but require different planning considerations due to the dynamic environment and legal complexities inherent in the maritime domain. CMO, in particular, is leveraged to synchronize all instruments of national power—particularly in support of maritime-specific stabilization tasks, to include: maritime safety and security,
FHA, maritime infrastructure and economic stabilization, maritime rule of law, maritime governance and participation. The strategic importance of and growing reliance on the maritime domain will place new and greater demands on the naval Services, to include greater demand for integrated maritime CA activities.

(a) Staging operations from the maritime domain (seabasing) can provide freedom of action and a more secure environment from which to operate. Seabasing can enable the accomplishment of security tasks with little to no support from the HN, which is particularly advantageous during a crisis response. Seabasing can also reduce the joint force footprint ashore in cases where US presence is perceived negatively by the population.

(b) Stabilization activities in the maritime domain are subject to both domestic and international law, as well as US policy. In addition, the HN may have entered into bilateral agreements for cooperation in suppressing activity such as illicit trafficking and unsafe transport and smuggling of migrants.

(c) Including United States Coast Guard (USCG) forces into the joint force maritime component significantly expands the scope of authorities available to the JFC. Title 14, United States Code (USC), grants the USCG broad powers to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters within US jurisdiction. Additionally, the USCG’s numerous bilateral agreements, ranging from search and rescue, combating transnational organized crime networks, proliferation security initiatives, and fisheries enforcement, provide unique capabilities and opportunities to expand favorable global access and improve maritime partner capacity, capability, and interoperability to identify, reduce, and/or eliminate sources of maritime instability. Overall, USCG vessels, personnel, and aircraft, or United States Navy ships with embarked USCG detachments, have the authority to conduct certain safety and law enforcement functions at sea.

For more information on maritime component stability activities, refer to Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02/Navy Warfare Publication 3-07/Commandant Instruction M3120.11, Maritime Stability Operations.

(2) Assessment of the Maritime Environment. The maritime component conducts civil reconnaissance and provides assessments of identified civilian infrastructure and capability requirements in support of the JFC’s objectives. As with assessment in other military operations, assessment of the maritime environment should be collaborative and include other stabilization partners. Assessment begins as soon as the maritime force receives an alert or warning and does not end until after the maritime force has ceased operations and left the area.

(3) Maritime Security and Safety. Maritime security and safety are critical prerequisites for effective maritime governance and the free flow of commerce. Tasks associated with the maritime security and safety function include:

(a) Aid to distressed mariners’ operations.
(b) Antipiracy operations.
(c) Arms control.
(d) Maritime CT operations.
(e) Enforcement of exclusion zones.
(f) Escort of vessels.
(g) Explosive ordnance disposal operations.
(h) Foreign internal defense (FID) operations.
(i) SFA.
(j) Freedom of navigation and overflight operations.
(k) Gas and oil platform operations.
(l) Maritime interception operations.
(m) Maritime safety.
(n) Maritime SC.
(o) Mine countermeasures operations.
(p) Port and harbor security operations.
(q) Riverine operations.
(r) Maritime domain awareness.
(s) SA.
(t) Show-of-force operations.
(u) Integrated maritime CA and/or CMO.

(4) **FHA.** Forces of the naval Services may perform diverse tasks in support of FHA operations. While the afloat pre-positioning force possesses unique expeditionary capabilities ideally suited for initial response, other civilian agencies and organizations are chartered to focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. They are often tasked to provide security to interagency and NGO relief elements. These forces can act as an enabler for civil organizations to achieve more enduring objectives by facilitating...
access to isolated populations and easing the overall burden of providing essential services to affected communities.

(5) **Maritime Infrastructure and Economic Stabilization.** Maritime infrastructure and economic stabilization are inherently non-DOD undertakings. However, forces complementary with the naval Services bring additional access, authorities, capabilities, and partnerships to assist struggling maritime nations to improve maritime economies and governance. This is especially true in situations that involve emergency critical infrastructure assessment and repair. The following are the major tasks associated with the maritime infrastructure and economic stabilization function:

(a) Expeditionary diving and salvage.

(b) Incident response.

(c) Emergency repair of maritime infrastructure and other infrastructure as required.

(6) **Maritime Rule of Law.** Maritime law encompasses the body of law that deals with the broad set of activities linked to the sea and includes domestic law, policy, international law, and CMO, specifically Service maritime civil engagement and CA as a mechanism for the JFC to improve maritime infrastructure and economic stabilization. The following are tasks associated with the maritime rule of law function:

(a) Maritime law enforcement.

(b) Visit, board, and search and seizure.

(c) Counter-illegal trafficking (e.g., narcotics, weapons, WMD, and humans).

(d) Counter-piracy operations.

(e) Counter-illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

(7) **Maritime Governance and Participation.** Maritime governance is a subset of state governance focused on those aspects of governance that impact the seas, bays, estuaries, rivers, and ports. It is imperative that maritime states develop adequate laws to regulate maritime activities and forces of the naval Services that are capable of enforcing those laws. The following are tasks associated with the maritime rule of law function:

(a) Administration of maritime governance.

(b) Improvement of commercial ports.

(c) Regulation of fisheries.
(d) Establishment of regional maritime SC.

(e) Management of waterways.

(f) Intelligence collection and communications support.

(g) Training and assistance for HN security forces.

i. Joint Force Air Component Tasks

(1) Air component stabilization tasks are executed across all the joint stability functions and the stability sectors. Since the majority of the joint stabilization tasks are land-based, the air component will support their execution with unique air-centric capabilities. These capabilities can include mobility; strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electromagnetic warfare; logistics; base support; medical; communications; infrastructure repair; provision of shelter and relief; weather, space; and cyberspace.

(2) Principal air component stabilization tasks include:

(a) Provide humanitarian assistance.

(b) Establish, operate, sustain, and protect critical aviation infrastructure.

(c) Execute medical stabilization activities, to include aeromedical evacuation.

(d) Global integrated ISR.

(e) Transportation for armed forces, other USG departments and agencies, and NGOs.

(f) Command and control (C2).

(g) Agile combat support (particularly to remote, austere bases with extended supply lines and limited communications), which includes assessments, opening and operating airbases, bridging the gap between initial base seizure and the arrival of permanent sustainment forces, airbase defense, area security operations, communications and network operations, and aviation-related civil engineering.

(3) Secondary air component stabilization tasks include:

(a) Restore essential services.

(b) Support economic and infrastructure development.

(c) Engineer skills training for building partnerships.
(d) Weather and environmental expertise.

j. **Joint Force Special Operations Tasks**

(1) SOF support stabilization efforts with a wide range of special operations core activities. These activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations. SOF conduct military engagement activities that support the CCDRs, country teams, and other interagency partners. These activities may shape the OE to keep day-to-day tensions among nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and serve to develop and build HN capabilities and capacities to prevent crisis or that can be leveraged during crises or conflict. In addition, SOF seek to enhance the USG and partners’ situational awareness to anticipate, forewarn, prevent, or forestall crises.

(2) **Principal Special Operations Stabilization Tasks**

(a) Conduct special operations core activities to support stabilization efforts, as explained in JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*.

(b) Support and conduct operations with conventional forces, multinational partners, and international organizations.

(c) Work closely with foreign military, civilian authorities, and populations, when directed.

(d) Deploy rapidly and provide tailored responses.

(e) Gain access to hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas to prepare the OE for future operations and develop options for addressing potential national concerns.

(f) Conduct operations in austere environments with limited support and a low profile.

(g) Assess local situations and report rapidly.
CHAPTER III
JOINT STABILITY FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction

a. While the assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among departments depends on the mission and conditions of the OE, the lead agency for all stabilization activities is DOS, with DOD as the supporting agency. Joint force planners coordinate with DOS, COMs, and pertinent stabilization partners to support stabilization activities. The joint force supports DOS-essential stabilization tasks in the JIPOE, concept of operations (CONOPS), and LOE planning functions. The joint stability functions are a tool to help visualize the scope of stabilization efforts within a joint operation. JIPOE, mission analysis, and the CONOPS sequence necessary activities within the LOEs, aligning operational and tactical objectives and developing appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. While each joint stability function is distinct, all of the functions interact and, in aggregate, determine the effectiveness of stability. Collectively, they are the framework through which the USG identifies the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort. Incorporating tasks within each sector into coherent LOEs is required to ensure efforts are properly aligned to their specific objective and integrated to create desired effects (see Figure III-1).

b. Although some tasks are executed sequentially, success necessitates an integrated approach that focuses on synchronized actions, whether concurrent or sequential, throughout the OE. The interdependence of tasks necessitates a balanced approach to joint stability functions. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one area of stabilization...
depend upon the successful integration and synchronization of activities across the other areas. The JFC should establish LOEs based on the strategy that integrates the stability functions within each LOE. Preferably, the JFC should use them simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across all sectors of the HN. During combat operations, security activities depend on functional governance, economy (especially essential services), and rule of law. Accordingly, the JFC should not presume the HN or other organizations can manage these functions effectively once the joint force has reduced the level of violence.

c. Because the joint force often interacts with various government agencies and other organizations during stabilization activities, the exchange of LNOs enhances coordination, cooperation, and collaboration of activities in the pursuit of unity of effort. For greater effectiveness, LNOs should possess requisite technical and language skills.

*For more information on LNOs, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.*

d. As Figure III-2 shows, the joint stability functions of security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation align with USG stability sectors. These functions inform the strategy, creating stabilization LOEs, which lead to a political settlement.

e. **CCS.** Stabilization efforts depend on the exercise and establishment of legitimacy, credibility, and trust. Fundamental to each of these principles is the alignment of words, images, and deeds. JFCs synchronize their communication into a coherent and unifying narrative, across all LOEs and all units, agencies, and partners supporting these LOEs. Otherwise, they risk disparities in credibility that provide adversaries with propaganda material and jeopardize legitimacy for joint and multinational operations and, ultimately, the

### An Integrated Approach to Stabilization

![Diagram of an Integrated Approach to Stabilization](image)

*Figure III-2. An Integrated Approach to Stabilization*
Joint Stability Functions

HN. Hence, it is essential to synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions with operations and, when appropriate, vice versa. PA assists the JFC with developing and articulating themes and messages and synchronizes the use of information to reinforce and continually align these themes and messages.


SECTION A. SECURITY

2. General

a. Security activities seek to protect civil populations, territory, and national assets such as infrastructure or natural resources. Such activities may be performed as a component of a military occupation during or after combat, a COIN, a peacekeeping operation, or a natural disaster. Security activities seek to reassure rather than compel the civil population, while communicating a clear, credible threat of force to opportunists or adversaries. Security activities are considered successful when the HN or other legitimate authority has functional control of its territory and civil violence is reduced to a level manageable by competent HN, joint force, or international law enforcement operations.

b. Security activities undertaken by the joint force, other expeditionary forces, or the HN to establish security are fundamentally intertwined with diplomatic or political considerations. In many contexts, legacies of violence and conflict have created deep divisions and mistrust among different segments of the population. The JFC should be aware of such divisions and balance pragmatic security measures with political sensibilities. A perfectly logical security measure may be perceived as unfair or callous, creating a grievance. For example, the local populace may view the location of bases as intrusive, the advocacy of disreputable officials as repugnant or the deployment of certain HN security units with despair.

c. Until responsibility transitions to a legitimate authority, the joint force provides security, which is the foundation of stability. The objective is not the complete absence of violence but its reduction to tolerable levels for HN administration and a return to tranquility. These efforts align with two broad priorities: securing HN territory and providing civil security.

d. **Territorial Security.** Control of the HN borders and territory by PN and HN forces is critical to establishing a safe and secure environment. Effective control of HN territory eliminates internal safe havens for insurgents, criminals, or terrorists; prevents illicit economic activities; enables the freedom of movement for commerce and trade; and fosters security for the population.

e. **Civil Security.** Security of the populace, infrastructure, and institutions is essential for successful stabilization. Whenever the joint force occupies a portion or all of a nation’s territory, it becomes responsible for ensuring the security of the civilian population. The nature of the OE may require US forces to conduct various missions simultaneously across
the competition continuum. Accordingly, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities to achieve objectives, which should include measures to protect the population from both internal and external threats. Civil security requires four necessary conditions: cessation of large-scale violence, public order, physical protection, and territorial security.

f. Security requirements vary greatly across the competition continuum, so the JFC should align security activities with the mission and the OE.

(1) During operations or campaigns conducted on the territory of an enemy state, the law of war obligates occupying forces to provide security to the enemy population who fall within the occupying forces’ effective control. Regeneration of local police services for provision of population security and regular interaction with the local populace enhances force protection, which may deny anonymity and safe havens to covert criminal entities and adversaries. CMO and transitional public security operations can assist the JFC in providing civil security. JFCs establish policies and guidance for population and resources control that are commensurate with legal and moral obligations of the joint force and are supported by HN interests and USG objectives.

(2) During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the OE (permissive, uncertain, or hostile) largely dictates the security requirement, which varies fundamentally from operation to operation. During some operations, local security forces, police services, and public cooperation maintain security and stability. In other operations, joint forces may need to establish security and stability in an environment of anarchy, perhaps involving multiple warring factions.

(a) The joint force, preferably in concert with interagency, multinational, and HN partners, must have the capability to establish and maintain a secure environment quickly as the basis for long-term stability.

1. In a hostile environment, the joint force’s priorities are normally to secure the operational area. Concurrently, stabilization activities strengthen this base of operations. Often, this operational approach proceeds area by area, rather than in a single sweeping operation, with the objective of securing the territorial integrity of the nation.

2. In an uncertain environment, offensive activities may not be required, but the JFC must still focus on securing the operational area. In some cases, US forces may provide direct support to HN security forces operating in the area.

3. In a permissive environment, security considerations focus primarily on force protection, relying on HN security forces and local cultural norms to secure the population. Despite this, the joint force should continually monitor the situation and adjust its posture according to changing conditions, to include monitoring the behavior of HN security forces toward the civilian population and government institutions.

(b) In transitional public security, US and multinational military forces promote, restore, and maintain public order. While civil security/protection of civilians
provides the overarching framework, transitional public security is a specific requirement that extends the role of the military beyond its traditional roles and missions.

(c) While the role of joint forces in addressing threats from organized military and paramilitary actors, such as insurgents, rebels, terrorists, and militias, is well-defined, transitional public security clarifies the responsibility of the JFC to ensure basic law enforcement and public order until those duties transition to other competent expeditionary forces or HN institutions. Transitional public security involves protecting the HN civilian population and critical infrastructure from various types of criminal or interpersonal violence, ranging from riots and looting to individual victimization. Transitional public security may typically require the military to establish public order and interim detention and judicial services to protect the population and ensure criminalized power structures do not take root in the absence of law and order.

(d) Successful transitional public security operations typically require working with elements of the HN justice sector that retain some functional capability. In many cases, such institutions may have significant shortcomings or have contributed to the roots of the instability. However, in the absence of viable alternatives, the joint force often relies on elements of these institutions to ensure immediate stability. As such, SSR empowers US and multinational military forces to help HN partners provide public security and justice for the populace and respond effectively to security challenges.

(e) Along with transitional public security, SSR focuses on urgent operational requirements and sets the stage for longer-term reform and rehabilitation of HN security institutions. Joint forces should carefully assess which HN security sector institutions can contribute to stability and explore effective ways to partner with them. This approach requires an in-depth understanding of those institutions and the potential political impact of such engagement. Invariably, the vetting and removal of individuals for past corruption, atrocities, and subversive behavior are necessary for enduring stability, but wholesale removal of an HN security sector institution may be counterproductive. Embedding advisors and/or partnering with US or multinational forces ensures HN institutions behave in a manner that supports stabilization.

(f) When conducting SSR, the JFC should involve interorganizational and multinational partners to assist the HN with longer-term reforms to foster continuity and coherence throughout stabilization.

(3) During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, the joint force is not presumed to be responsible for ensuring the security of the HN population or territory. However, the joint force should monitor the behavior of HN security forces toward the civilian population and government institutions, and it should continually tailor US activities to mitigate risks stemming from unaddressed root causes or potential multi-order effects of US activities. One example is failing to recognize the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse and/or human trafficking violations. Other behaviors may be more subtle, like neglecting to do a gender analysis to understand how certain activities may put vulnerable populations at increased risk.
For more information on SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, and ADP 3-07, Stability.

g. SSR. SSR is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by the HN to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice, as well as adhering to the rule of law. In addition to providing security as required, a major joint force role in stabilization may include supporting SSR. Transformational activities and activities that foster sustainability in the security sector generally fall under the rubric of SSR.

### SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT NECESSARY CONDITIONS

#### Cessation of Large-Scale Violence

- Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt
- Warring parties are separated and monitored
- A peace agreement or cease-fire has been implemented
- Violent spoilers are managed

#### Public Order

- Laws are enforced equitably
- The lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected
- Criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum
- Criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained

#### Legitimate State Monopoly Over the Means of Violence

- Major illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, and demobilized
- The defense and police forces have been vetted and retrained
- National security forces operate lawfully under a legitimate governing authority

#### Physical Security

- Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free of fear from grave threats to physical safety
- Refugees and internally displaced persons can return home without fear of retributive violence
3. Evaluation and Assessment

a. To plan for and execute stabilization activities, JFCs and staffs conduct an in-depth analysis, in coordination and consultation with stabilization partners familiar with the HN or region, which provide relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The key lies in the development of shared understanding among all stabilization partners involved about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. This requires both a joint process for completing the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information. This conflict diagnosis should describe the drivers of the conflict, core grievances, and opportunities for resolution.

b. Initial evaluation and assessments for security should determine the level of security present, as well as the difficulty of establishing or reestablishing security and identifying possible obstacles to success. Analyses should include a broad political, economic, and sociological analyses to understand the drivers of possible or actual conflict and mitigating factors. Specific threats to the establishment of predictable and tolerable conditions should also be assessed. This should include an analysis of threats to the civilian population from both organized violence and interpersonal violence. Assessments should not only consider objective reality but also the perceptions of the local population, as it is their perceptions that will drive their behavior and, therefore, the politics of the stabilization process. The following list of questions, while not comprehensive and dependent on the


3. Evaluation and Assessment

- Women and children are protected from violence
- Key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected from attack

**Territorial Security**

- People and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb
- The country is protected from invasion
- Borders are reasonably well-secured from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans

**SOURCE:** Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
circumstances, may guide the assessment of security during stabilization efforts (see Appendix B, “Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process”):

(1) What is the current level of conflict? Is there a basic level of population security that will permit the conduct of stabilization activities by civilian organizations? If not, what conditions are required before civilian organizations can be employed?

(2) If there is ongoing conflict, are there unsatisfied aims for which disputants remain willing to fight? Even if warring parties sign a peace settlement, do unresolved conflicts persist? Are there factions that remain opposed to the peace settlement? Will the signatories respect the settlement? Do all factions have leadership capable of speaking on their behalf?

(3) Is there an HN government with legitimacy among the population? If not, has this created a power vacuum that is likely to lead to a bitter internal struggle for power? What conditions must be met before peaceful means can effectively substitute for force in determining who governs?

(4) Can the rights of minority or disenfranchised populations be reliably guaranteed, or does at least one of the parties to the conflict perceive political settlement to likely lead to an unacceptable zero-sum form of politics? Do citizens, and in particular minorities and women, enjoy adequate guarantees for fundamental civil and political rights of speech, movement, and assembly within cultural norms?

(5) Are security threats conventional and military or subversive and criminal in nature? Do linkages involving political extremists, paramilitary formations, intelligence operatives, organized crime, and/or corrupt private interests remain potent forces? Are there networks of criminals, warlords, or corrupt or extremist ruling elites that must be addressed?

(6) Who is providing security—HN security forces, external intervention forces such as a UN peacekeeping force, or non-state entities? What indigenous security capacity must be developed to ensure that the threat of political violence ends? Did indigenous security forces disintegrate? Were they responsible for brutality and repression that led to conflict?

(7) Who wins and who loses economically if peace prevails? Does illicit wealth determine who wields political power, fueling continued conflict? What revenue streams flow to major obstructionists that sustain their capacity for coercion, terrorism, paramilitary activities, and intelligence operations?

(8) What is the likely impact of the presence of US or multinational forces? Will foreign forces be viewed as occupiers or as propping up an illegitimate government, regardless of their role in ongoing stabilization efforts? How will the armed forces address the incidental harm to the civilian population that occurs over the course of the mission?
c. Ongoing assessment of the security situation can be problematic because of the time involved for the effects of operations to become apparent. During a crisis intervention, the levels of outcome-based security metrics (e.g., numbers of attacks, civilian deaths, and military casualties) may increase as a result of operations as security is implemented. During this period, intelligence and ongoing threat analysis will normally provide better indications of success. Measures of performance (MOPs) are an important link to the long-term use of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that inform and guide decisions during stabilization efforts. Intelligence and analysis should be shared to the maximum extent possible with the HN and multinational force.

4. Military Contribution

a. **Territorial Security.** In conformity with the legitimate monopoly on the use of force, the HN government must control its borders and must reasonably monitor and control movement within its borders, particularly movement by enemies, militants, and criminals. Territorial integrity is a necessary condition in which ordinary citizens and legitimate goods are able to move in relative freedom within the nation and across its borders and through its ports; illicit commodities and individuals who present threats to security are denied access. As with all security concerns, territorial security balances restrictive security requirements with the political and economic provisions for openness. DOD normally leads this effort, but it may share that lead with the HN and capacity-building support from the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), with significant supporting contribution from DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the intelligence community (IC). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly the USCG and US Customs and Border Protection, may also play significant supporting roles.

(1) **Border Control.** A central component of security is the host government’s ability to monitor and regulate its borders and ports of entry, including land boundaries, airports, inland waterways, coastlines, and seaports, to prevent arms smuggling, interdict contraband, prevent trafficking of persons, regulate immigration and emigration, and establish friendly control over major points of entry. Generally, border and coastal security forces secure national boundaries, while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals, and goods across state borders. The control of border approaches, such as sea lanes, rivers, and air corridors, also contributes to border security.

(2) **Freedom of Movement.** Freedom of movement is a basic human right. All people lawfully enjoy the right to freedom of movement and residence within their state. This right includes the right to leave any nation, including one’s home nation, and to return without restriction. Freedom of movement allows children to travel to school, adults to seek job opportunities, and farmers to take their goods to market. The liberty to move freely also promotes social discourse among communities that might otherwise remain isolated. However, maintaining security may require control of movement. Security forces must, therefore, strike a balance between ensuring the freedom of movement necessary for regular governance and economic activities and the control of movement necessary for security. For example, checkpoints, curfews, and other movement restrictions during
military operations help security forces control movement and enhance security within the operational area, but these restrictions impinge on freedom of movement and impede the resumption of everyday activities. The JFC is responsible for assessing when it is appropriate to relax the movement restrictions.

(3) Identity Activities. Identity activities are used to recognize or differentiate one person from another sufficiently; deconflict, link, or consolidate identities accurately; detect shared characteristics of a group; characterize identities to assess levels of threat or trust; or develop or manage identity information to support decision making. During stabilization, commanders employ identity activities to help establish a safe and secure environment, re-institute proper governance, manage resources, and expand intelligence operations. Identity activities are also used to support rule of law, victim identification, and the response to atrocities. Effective employment of biometric, forensic, and document and media exploitation (DOMEX) capabilities informs all source intelligence analysis and identity intelligence (I²) production. These resources provide the commander with actionable information and intelligence to establish and maintain security; validate presented credentials; protect resources and critical infrastructure; monitor and manage the local population; target threat actors and networks; vet HN personnel; and deter adversaries, criminals, and opportunists from disruptive acts. Identity activities also advance intelligence operations on key personalities, persons of interest, and groups of interest. They enhance the commander’s knowledge and awareness of the OE.

(a) Multiple capabilities augment and enable the efficacy of identity activities. Biometrics capabilities support vetting and screening activities, encourage participation in representative government, enhance physical security and access, and strengthen efforts to protect the civilian population. Additionally, forensics capabilities support counter threat network activities, enhance DDR programs, enable the HN justice architecture and SSR initiatives, and facilitate the development of effective countermeasures. DOMEX capabilities provide insight into adversary, criminal, and opportunist capabilities, tools, capacity, and intent to conduct disruptive acts. Country team representatives are best-suited to provide insight to the commander on the ground as to whether DOMEX capabilities should be implemented in a particular region due to the sensitivities or perspectives regarding USG intervention. For example, medical activities such as inoculations are meant to protect indigenous populations and the appearance of intelligence gathering in the form of biometrics could have a negative effect on SC efforts and only serve to sway the population towards malign actors or shape an anti-USG narrative.

(b) Intelligence analysis and production is a vital component of identity activity support to stabilization activities. Intelligence analysts assess encountered identities against relevant information to increase the commander’s knowledge and awareness of the relevant individuals operating within the OE and inform operational and tactical decision making. Identity activities support force protection, HN screening and vetting decisions, threat network discovery and characterization, persistent and objective-specific targeting activities, and COA development. I² products developed to support
Joint Stability Functions

stabilization in one theater can also be leveraged to support global offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities across the competition continuum.

*For more information on I2, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.*

b. **Civil Security.** The security of the local population and institutions is central to the success of stabilization activities. Whenever it has functional control over all or a part of HN territory, the joint force will typically be responsible for ensuring the security of the civilian population: protecting civilians from a broad range of military, paramilitary, and criminal threats; introducing transitional public security to bolster actual and perceived senses of public order; and eliminating explosive ordnance and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards and threats. Civil security also includes the prevention of human trafficking and the provision of security for internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugee camps. Distinguishing between civilians and active militants is difficult because it involves personal intent, not the ownership of weapons or past affiliations. With input from the joint force SJA and other legal advisors, JFC proclamations and ordinances serve to inform the populace and joint forces of prohibitions and expectations. The JFC’s ROE and directives to the joint force rely on common sense and good judgement to minimize the use of force without endangering force protection.

c. **Protection of Civilians Considerations**

(1) The protection of civilians is an overarching category that is at the foundation of stabilization efforts. The protection of civilians includes addressing specific categories of threats such as war crimes, ethnic cleansing, sexual and gender-based violence, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Further, it includes categories of joint force action, such as transitional public security, law enforcement, or the prevention of atrocities. Ensuring predictable and tolerable conditions for the population is imperative to stability. While the other joint stability functions are important, without population security, progress will be temporary at best. The protection of civilians does not imply an unrealistic level of universal security: prioritizing which threats to address and how to address them is a matter of military judgment for the JFC. While patterns of violence that cost the most lives should generally take precedence, in some cases, the HN population may have come to see certain types of violence as normal, making them less of a threat of instability. The JFC will have to balance multiple considerations and pressure from many different perspectives on which threats should take priority. The population cannot be protected by security forces that remain on operating bases or in central police stations. In most cases, protecting civilians will require a mix of offensive activities to neutralize threats, defensive activities to reduce the vulnerability of the population, and stabilization activities to shape the political dynamics and address the drivers of instability. The success of these efforts depends on an accurate understanding of the nature of the threats to the population and their links to the broader political dynamics of instability.

(2) Conflict can have a significant impact on civilians as they suffer a loss of livelihood, displacement, separation from their family, food insecurity, and the loss of traditional networks. Everyone, regardless of age or gender, is affected differently by
conflict. There is great risk in not including these considerations. Equally, sexual and gender-based violence, with its associated psychological trauma, can often be used as a tactic of war. For instance, the rape of women and juveniles can be perceived as an attack on the honor of male relatives by proving their inability to act as protectors. Rape not only terrorizes and humiliates individuals but it can also be used as a deliberate strategy to target the roles of women in society and, thus, destabilize communities as an aim of war. Rape can also have a long-lasting economic, social, and health impact on the state and surrounding region. To deter sexual and gender-based violence, specific attention should be paid to investments in the required infrastructure (e.g., forensic laboratories) and human resources needed for the reception of victims. By adopting a more interventionist approach, security forces can protect the population from violence.

(3) There is a recognized link among the issues of peace, security, development, and gender equality. It is not enough to promote the participation and the protection of women during and after a conflict. Stabilization and reconstruction initiatives are also needed to ensure stabilization activities are supported by wider development considerations, such as the promotion of economic security and opportunities and access to essential services, such as health care and education. This requires collaborative work with international organizations and NGOs, as well as the HN government.

d. Public Order and Safety. The primary role of US forces with respect to public order and safety is to conduct transitional public security until HN or other security forces can assume these responsibilities. Public order affects early perceptions of state legitimacy and is usually one of the first and most important public tasks. Public order is characterized by the absence of widespread criminal and political violence. Under this condition, the public can conduct daily affairs without fear of violence. Without public order, people will never gain confidence in the public security system and will seek security from other actors, such as gangs, militias, and warlords. Public order is often a responsibility shared across all security institutions, including police services, courts, prisons, and rehabilitation. The security of the population depends on community partnerships between security forces and citizens. Additionally, establishing the rule of law through fair investigations, evidence-based prosecutions, judicial accountability, victim assistance, and correction-related activities are critical to instilling public order and safety. This requirement is largely driven by the size and presence of the joint force, particularly in the immediate aftermath of war or other devastating events. DOD, INL, and the DOS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration generally share leading roles in this area to support the HN and build its capacity. ICITAP and USAID’s BHA may play significant supporting roles.

(1) Policing. Joint forces (particularly CA) entering urban areas should immediately contact or appoint the chiefs of police and direct them to begin police patrols and secure critical facilities (e.g., banks, post offices, government buildings, and cultural centers). If needed, police chiefs may deputize some citizens as auxiliary police to fulfill emergency duties. In the meantime, military foot and mounted patrols may serve as a deterrent to disorder. During this period, the joint force may provide security, maneuver, logistics, and other support to those police forces conducting regular policing activities.
(2) **Clearance of Explosive Ordnance and CBRN Threats and Hazards**

(a) In an area already burdened by collapsed or fragile government institutions, the presence of explosive ordnance and CBRN hazards will likely overwhelm HN authorities.

1. Unsecured explosive ordnance in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) (i.e., landmines, unexploded explosive ordnance [UXO], or abandoned explosive ordnance [AXO]) can be used by terrorists, criminals, or insurgents to disrupt public order, impede economic development, or continue the conflict. These hazards restrict freedom of movement, disrupt economic activities (e.g., husbandry, trade, and commerce), hinder international trade, and detract from the ability of a fragile state to secure its territory.

2. CBRN threats and hazards include material created from accidental or deliberate releases, toxic industrial materials, chemical and biological agents, biological pathogens, radioactive materials, and those hazards resulting from the employment of WMD.

(b) Securing and disposing of these threats and hazards facilitate the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace. This may include rendering safe explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. Decontaminating contaminated equipment or terrain, or reducing, dismantling, redirecting, or monitoring WMD, may require a larger USG or international effort.

For more information on clearing explosive ordnance and CBRN hazards, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; JP 3-15, Barriers and Obstacles in Joint Operations; JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations; JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

e. **Separation of Warring Factions**

(1) Separating warring factions involves establishing distinct areas of control that segregates the various factions and enables the joint force to monitor their activities. Separation is designed to create an atmosphere of confidence from attack by former enemies. An effective technique is to establish buffer zones or zones of separation and direct warring factions to withdraw into temporary camps at a safe distance, an activity that is normally integral to DDR programs. To ensure compliance, the joint force may establish patrols, checkpoints, and patrol bases in and along the zone of separation. Since some freedom of movement for commerce and family visitations is necessary, check points at designated crossing sites ensure traffic is legitimate. Once DDR is complete, the joint force can dissolve the zone of separation. The JFC is normally the lead in this area. Various intelligence services could also play significant supporting roles.

(2) **Supporting the Peace Process.** Stopping armed conflict and securing peace ultimately requires a political—vice military—solution. A robust political settlement is
the cornerstone for sustainable peace that enables warring factions to share power within an agreed framework, participate in the political process, apply for the national security forces, and resolve their political differences in peaceful ways. A peace agreement is normally essential to a DDR program.

3. **Peacemaking (PM) and Peace Enforcement.** The cessation of hostilities among belligerents is an essential step toward improving security for the local populace. These may take the form of cease-fires, peace agreements, or other formal and informal settlements. Establishing these agreements is a diplomatic effort, but military support to PM includes provision of military expertise to the process, military-to-military relations, DDR, SA, peacetime deployments, or other activities that influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement. The joint force may conduct peacekeeping operations (PKO) or peace enforcement operations, such as the enforcement of cease-fires or buffer zones, in support of this process.

4. **Disposition and Constitution of National Armed and Intelligence Services.** The establishment of national armed and intelligence services helps set the conditions for successful SSR. Security and intelligence institutions form the underpinnings of an effective security sector, based in a clearly defined legal framework. They provide the broad guidance and direction for the training and advising effort central to SSR.

5. **DDR** seeks to stabilize the OE by disarming and demobilizing warring factions and by helping former combatants reintegrate into society. DDR provides a way for combatants and their leaders to facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve belligerent force structures, and permit DDR participants to prepare for their return to their communities. A successful DDR program is the gateway for subsequent SSR programs. The objective of the DDR process is to create political reconciliation so society can return to normal activities. DDR addresses numerous issues to include a mix of male and female soldiers, child soldiers, combatant families, labor and sex slaves, and disabled veterans. Disarmament focuses on the safe collection, inspection, transportation, inventory, disposal, and control of weapons, ammunition, and explosive ordnance. Demobilization can take place in conjunction with disarmament but requires assured security for the former combatants. Success hinges on a robust public information campaign to alert everyone of the dates and locations of the DDR sites. Reintegration aims to provide the requisite administrative and medical screening, education, life skills training, and vocational training to assist former combatants return to society. DDR is carefully coordinated and consistent with SSR plans and programs.


f. **Protection of Indigenous Infrastructure.** Both the short- and long-term success of any stabilization activities often relies on the ability of external groups to protect and
Joint Stability Functions

maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. When required, military forces extend protection and support to key HN personnel, infrastructure, and institutions to ensure their continued contribution to the overall joint operation or stabilization effort. In the interest of transparency, military forces specifically request and carefully negotiate this protection. Examples of infrastructure that may require protection include government, religious, or cultural persons or sites of importance, HN military facilities, medical treatment facilities, and power generation and distribution systems. DOD normally leads this effort.

g. **Protection of Personnel Involved in the Stabilization Effort.** The joint force may be called upon to provide protection for US or foreign civilian personnel that are assisting in the stabilization effort. Mission-specific interagency or international memorandums of agreement may be necessary to delineate specific rules and responsibilities, to include ROE. Military forces very rarely provide protection for NGO personnel and only when directly requested. Many NGOs feel their reputation for neutrality, that is their independence from US or any other political and military influence, forms the basis of their security—joint forces should be careful not to impinge upon this reputation. However, joint force personnel should always remain friendly and approachable with NGOs. DOD normally leads this effort, with support for HN capacity building from INL and ICITAP.

5. **Threats and Vulnerabilities**

a. **Participants.** Everyone present during stabilization efforts has the potential to influence the course of events in ways that may be positive or negative. The JFC strives to understand the full range of participants and their motivations, aspirations, interests, and relationships. Generically, the participants can comprise six categories, based on their aims, methods, and relationships: adversaries, enemies, belligerents, neutrals, friendlies, and opportunists. However, individual affiliation may not be apparent, and over time, some participants may change categories. These generic categories can be tailored to reflect the specific groups and interests in fragile and failed states.

   (1) **Adversaries.** An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be necessary. Terms such as insurgents, rebels, spoilers, irregulars, terrorists, warlords, and criminals are commonly used in stabilization, counterinsurgency, and COIN literature; various nations and organizations have different understandings of these terms. As a distinction from the term “enemies,” adversaries may be susceptible to persuasion or co-option to neutralize their hostility or at least their violence. Adversaries may directly oppose the international forces, the political settlement, and/or peace process. Some of them can be actively antagonistic. Not all violence is perpetrated by adversarial groups; in many societies, low-level violence has long been a characteristic of politics. Equally, many less ardent adversaries stop short of significant violence against foreign forces or government authorities in their day-to-day behavior but may provide materiel or moral assistance to more hostile elements. Their reasons for providing such support will not necessarily be personal antagonism toward the HN government but may be based on traditional understandings of hospitality and
obligation, or their reasons may be based on coercion, intimidation, or fear of reprisals. Motivation and commitment are variable across and within groups. Many may be receptive to concessions, or a path back into the mainstream, in the form of limited or national settlements and confidence-building measures. Constant assessment and probing reveal fault lines within and between adversarial groups that can be exploited to change the conflict geometry (see Appendix B, “Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process”).

(2) **Enemies.** An enemy is a person, group, force, state, or other authority that is firmly committed to violent opposition to the HN government and can wage war. Unlike adversaries, enemies are not feasibly susceptible to peaceable persuasion or co-option to neutralize their hostility or, at least, their violence. However, they may be susceptible to coercion. Hence, enemies must be eliminated or isolated from the population. Over time, enemies may be induced to become adversaries, and vice versa.

(3) **Belligerents.** Belligerents are primarily hostile to each other but occasionally engage in hostile acts against the HN government, friendly forces, and the United States. Their motivations, intentions, and relationships may be influenced by historical grievance, self-interest, ideology, religion, or ethnicity. While belligerent hostilities are usually not directed toward intervening forces, they contribute to the societal conflict in destabilizing ways. Instances include competing tribes and warlords, nationalist groups, or religious organizations attempting to influence local or national power structures through the use of violence. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, adversaries attempted to mobilize belligerent groups by focusing their existing ideological, religious, or ethnic tensions toward the coalition. In Iraq, al-Qaeda attempted to mobilize Sunni tribes to oppose coalition forces, claiming disenfranchisement of Iraq’s Sunni political elite. Later, al-Qaeda attempted to foment a civil war by attacking Shi’a civilians and political elites. In Afghanistan, the Taliban instigated antigovernment activities, decrying the presence of foreign forces, government corruption, and limited authority.

(4) **Neutrals.** Neutrality covers those who remain noncommittal to either the government or the antigovernment causes. They are the fence-sitters who are awaiting the outcome of the conflict. The conflict produces uncertainty for neutral groups with the potential for both risk and reward. Groups in this category will often play a critical role in the campaign, especially if they constitute a large proportion of the population. Historically, the acquiescence of neutrals has proven to be vital to the success of an insurgency. This group cannot be expected to support the HN government until it has clearly shown that it is likely to prevail. HN forces may expend resources to ensure neutrals remain neutral.

(5) **Friendlies.** Friendly groups broadly support the HN government and the international force and the political process it backs. They may include members of HN government institutions (including the security forces), dominant groups committed to the political settlement, and, if fortunate, large sections of the population. Building and then maintaining a confederation of allies (which may be in competition with one another) is part of the operational art in stabilization.
(6) **Opportunists.** Opportunists exist in all conflict-affected nations. They tend to be highly enterprising and adaptable, making use of the conflict environment to further their interests. In some cases, opportunists benefit by maintaining the status quo and may attempt to frustrate progress or to prevent any change harmful to their interests. Examples include arms dealers, pirates, and smugglers. Some opportunists may not have a decisive impact on the situation, but criminal gangs operating in organized networks, possibly across national borders (e.g., arms, human, and drug traffickers), can have a significant destabilizing effect. Criminal opportunists and adversaries will exploit their nexus of interests, sharing lines of communications and exploiting instability for their own ends. In addition to criminal opportunists, foreign governments may be opportunists, attempting to exploit ongoing conflict or fragility in a state to further their foreign policy agenda; this may be particularly true when the United States is involved in a controversial role. Lastly, opportunists may include elites embedded within friendly or neutral groups who seek to use the conflict as a means of furthering their groups’ position or their personal power or wealth. Opportunists can be helpful in changing the conflict geometry but, as with all the aforementioned groups, they require constant evaluation, at least for long-term rather than declared goals.

b. **Shifting Allegiances.** Observing behavior is useful to assess allegiances under specific circumstances at a specific time; however, stagnant assessments can be misleading. Applying labels such as “adversary” or “irreconcilable” is a way to organize information when dealing with a problem. However, groups are rarely fixed and bounded entities; labeling them as such can inhibit the commander’s understanding of social interactions and deprive them of identifying opportunities to influence key participants. People often shift identities and allegiances. Belligerents may support some issues but resist others; adversaries today may be neutral tomorrow (or vice versa). Warlords, for example, may start as belligerents, squabbling among themselves but once drawn into the conflict, act as an enemy. Alternatively, they may partner with the HN government and, as a legitimised local government, become recognized as a friendly partner. Any categorization should balance the need to organize an approach to a problem with compartmentalization using labels to describe things that are in reality ambiguous. Commanders must keep an open mind to gain allegiances.

c. **Insurgency.** When the Armed Forces of the United States are directed to help establish stability, insurgency is normally the most significant threat to security. Insurgencies are primarily internal conflicts that struggle for control of the population. An insurgency aims to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region, win a contest of competing ideologies, or both.

*For more detail on insurgency, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.*

d. **Mass Atrocities.** Large-scale, deliberate attacks on civilians of a particular racial, political, or cultural group are a direct assault on universal human values; they fuel instability, particularly in fragile states. Under extreme circumstances, such group persecution can develop into genocide, which attempts to kill or forcibly relocate the population of entire cities or regions. Because history has shown that genocide and mass atrocities manifest themselves in highly variable ways, future perpetrators are unlikely to pursue historical patterns.
For more information, see JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

6. Security Response

   a. Tailored Approaches. A well-targeted, tailored plan for including the various participants can transform the dynamics of a conflict. Such a plan may allow the commander to co-opt adversarial or belligerent groups into the emerging political settlement. Consequently, efforts should:

      (1) Support, protect, empower, and reassure friendly groups and neutrals; for example, by giving public credit for changes in force posture.

      (2) Persuade, provide incentives, or compel belligerents, opportunists, and reconcilable adversaries.

      (3) Marginalize, disempower, and target irreconcilable and actively hostile adversaries and enemies.

   b. Population Security. To provide protection to the population, JFCs employ a range of techniques. Not all will be popular.

      (1) Static protection of key sites (e.g., market places or refugee camps).

      (2) Persistent security in areas secured and held (e.g., intensive patrolling and check points).

      (3) Targeted action against adversaries (e.g., search or strike operations).

      (4) Population control measures (e.g., curfews and vehicle restrictions, biometrics collection and vetting).

   c. Countering Adversaries. Direct military action against adversaries and their narrative may be a central component of a stabilization effort. Accordingly, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement entails breaking the ideological and financial links within and among different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as among the broader population. Developing and maintaining an understanding of the motivations of different adversarial groups allows the JFC to tailor distinct approaches to each. Countering some of these groups may require an accommodation from a position of strength through formal accords or local bargains. However, there may be a number of actively hostile and irreconcilable adversarial groups, and countering these requires a balanced mix of the use of force, information, incentives, and detention.

For further details on countering adversaries during stabilization, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.
d. **Security Force Organization.** The JFC may organize joint forces into a number of different composite units for the purpose of establishing security in and among the population.

(1) While conventional forces conduct the bulk of the routine security operations, local, non-regular militia may be incorporated as well. Security activities largely focus on protecting key installations, locations, and population centers. Units will normally have their own operational areas for which they are responsible and should be capable of autonomous action. Likely tasks include:

(a) **Population Security.** Some elements of the joint force will conduct operations that directly protect the population. This task often requires maintaining a presence among the people. Involvement over time provides enhanced knowledge of, and an intuitive feel for, their specific area. The aim is to become confident and competent when operating in this environment. The integration of indigenous security forces as quickly as possible is essential.

(b) **Infrastructure Security.** Some elements provide permanent security of essential infrastructure and facilities.

(c) **Maneuver.** Maneuver elements create security throughout the operational area with a permanent presence. The maneuver element should conduct routine presence patrolling, normally from secure locations and should always gather information for intelligence. Often, such information provides a timely and accurate picture of security.

(2) SOF may conduct a wide range of special operations core activities against high-value military, critical infrastructure, and high-visibility leadership targets. They should be resourced and trained according to the task and will need to act on verified intelligence. Although these missions are often lethal, they should be supported by complementary activities and operations in the information environment. Integration and coordination of SOF missions with conventional forces conducting population security are vital.

(3) Additional forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces. They can be a separate part of the overall force package and can be deployed, employed, and redeployed where needed. They can be used in support of strike forces or as a reserve for a specific operation. Although good for achieving temporary localized mass, they lack the finely tuned awareness of framework forces and will require LNOs or local security forces attached to them to provide local knowledge.

(4) **Cross-Functional Staff Organization.** Depending on the complexity of the threat, there may be a need to develop specific-focus, cross-functional staff organizations that target narrow aspects of the conflict. These cross-functional staff organizations usually include cross-government representation, possibly including the security services. For example, if the adversary has an IED capability, then developing a specific counter-IED, cross-functional staff organization that targets the whole of the network and IED system
may be necessary to bring the threat under control. Areas that could attract the creation of specific-focus, cross-functional staff organizations with a diminishing military involvement include biometrics and forensics collection and exploitation, counter-IED, counter-threat finance, counter-violent extremist organization, counter-illicit trafficking, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and counter-corruption operations.

(5) **Local Militias and Cadres.** As a short-term expedient to free up other security resources or to generate sufficient mass, the JFC may consider the use of locally recruited militias and other cadres to bolster security and provide information. Being lightly armed, they can provide point security and guard vital installations such as government buildings and businesses. They should not be trained or empowered to conduct offensive operations or arrest and detain people. These militias may be drawn from armed civilian groups, including concerned local citizens, former parties to the conflict, or remnants of the previous indigenous security forces, that have not participated in the DDR program. If considered as an option, the competing advantages and disadvantages require careful analysis and judgment; the key criterion is to bring these home guard units under HN control. In due course, these groups may be formally incorporated into the HN security infrastructure or reintegrated into society through the DDR program. Although the United States has employed paramilitary forces in past conflicts (e.g., World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq), there are numerous legal and policy issues raised by the use of local militias and cadres, some of which have strategic implications. The JFC obtains interagency and SJA advice prior to approving the joint force’s use of local militias and cadres.

e. **SFA.** Providing protection for civil society and expanding security and development zones have historically involved greater security force ratios and have proven more difficult than anticipated. Often, hard choices exist between allocating troops for concurrent capability and capacity-building and operations to isolate and neutralize adversaries, recognizing that the demands of these tasks require different skills and structures. Depending on the HN security force’s existing capability and capacity, SFA success requires trained US/multinational forces that can organize, train, equip, re-build/build, and advise the indigenous security forces. It may also entail the creation of nonstandard security forces, such as home guards, to reach the sufficient demands of population protection. In addition to bolstering security force numbers, indigenous forces lower the profile of intervening organizations and reinforce the security capacities of the state. In contrast, sectarian or poorly disciplined forces may fuel the conflict. The HN government may require firm advice, as well as financial support, to sustain the capabilities required. The generation and subsequent training of indigenous security forces require coordination with broader SSR initiatives, such as the development of civilian oversight bodies, judiciary and detention institutions, transitional justice mechanisms, and DDR programs.

*For further details on SFA, refer to Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform,” and JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.*
7. Transitions and Transferals of Responsibility and Authority

a. The JFC should consider transferring security sector responsibilities and authorities from the military to DOS and/or an HN lead as soon as practicable. The ability to transfer this responsibility is a function of the threat and the capacity of indigenous security forces. If the joint force is required to establish security in support of a stabilization effort, local security forces are unlikely to have the capacity to counter ongoing threats. A combination of threat reduction and increased local security force capacity may result in an appropriate transition point. This decision requires diplomatic, political, and security judgment. The JFC may consider two options: transfer of responsibility from US, multinational, or international organization forces to indigenous military security or transfer of responsibility directly to civil police. Building that capacity would be the function of SC or a FID operation.

b. Police primacy should be the ultimate goal, as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the HN government’s commitment to governing through the rule of law.

SECTION B. FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

8. General

a. The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the well-being of the population. Well-being is characterized by access to, and delivery of, basic needs and services (i.e., water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric and community life.

b. Civilian development agencies generally break humanitarian assistance into three categories: emergency humanitarian and disaster assistance, shorter-term transition initiatives, and longer-term development assistance. These generally parallel the military approach of initial response activities, transformational activities, and activities that foster sustainability; however, in the civilian agencies, each category has distinct operational approaches, staff, and resources.

c. With civil security, the provision of humanitarian assistance fulfills the basic requirements of human security—food, personal security, health, and survival. Human security includes protection from deprivation and disease as well as protection from violence. The assistance provided supplements or complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities, USG departments and agencies, and various international organizations and NGOs that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. In most cases, military support to humanitarian assistance will be provided only at the request of civilian agencies and will be limited to those activities for which the military has a unique capability that would otherwise be unavailable.
(1) Atrocities exacerbate instability and undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the joint force, PN, and HN. The presence of joint forces and the identified threats within the OE in these situations often drive the JFC to take immediate action to conduct humanitarian assistance missions to save lives, reduce suffering, and establish the conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance by civilian agencies and organizations. Operation plans (OPLANs) should include the provision of humanitarian assistance to establish the human security required to maintain operational momentum.

(2) During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the JFC may conduct FHA as a stabilizing influence, particularly when a potential humanitarian disaster could undermine other objectives of the joint operation.

(3) During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, the joint force may conduct humanitarian assistance operations, including training foreign forces to enhance US goals. Such missions require close coordination with the COM and country team to ensure joint force efforts are aligned with US development goals. An objective during FHA missions is to improve the HN capabilities to a degree that future interventions are minimized or not required.

d. US military participation in humanitarian assistance generally falls into one of two categories: humanitarian assistance that falls under FHA and a combination of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).

(1) USAID’s BHA is the USG lead federal agency for international humanitarian assistance and disaster response. FHA consists of DOD activities in support of USAID or DOS, conducted outside the United States and its territories, to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA provided by US military forces during a man-made or natural disaster is limited in scope and duration. FHA may be conducted as a stand-alone mission (e.g., relief following an earthquake or other natural disaster) or as one component of a larger operation (e.g., relief provided during peace operations [PO]). FHA includes the provision of humanitarian relief to affected civilian populations during joint force combat operations. Short-term aid helps the HN, US organizations, and other stabilization partners improve conditions and may expand to longer-term stabilization activities. During FHA operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for collaboration and unity of effort becomes paramount.

For further details on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(2) HCA to the local populace coincides with authorized military operations. This assistance should promote the security interests of the United States and the HN and employ the specific operational readiness skills of participating military personnel. HCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to provide assistance to the HN populace, hone military operational readiness skills, and promote mutual security. While HCA activities can occur following a disaster, they are normally planned well in advance and not in response to disasters. HCA is designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and well-being of its populace. HCA
complements, not duplicates, social/economic assistance provided by other USG
departments and agencies. DOD country team representatives seek concurrence for HCA
project nomination from the USAID mission director or designee prior to submission of
the nomination to the COM (or designee) for concurrence. HCA activities in this category
are conducted to:

(a) Create effects that support the CCDR’s objectives in SC or designated contingency plans.

(b) Increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and
well-being of its populace. Such actions would be characterized as military civic action
(MCA). While US forces manage MCA programs and projects, HN military or security
forces execute them for the economic and social development of the HN civil society. Such
actions enhance the legitimacy of the HN government and military forces in the eyes of the
population. These programs use predominantly HN military forces at all levels in such
fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications,
health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development.
These programs can have excellent, long-term benefits for the HN by enhancing the
effectiveness of the HN, by developing needed skills, enhancing the legitimacy of the HN
government, and showing the people that their government is capable of meeting their basic
needs. MCA programs can be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which
is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of
improvement in HN military treatment of human rights. MCA can also help eliminate
some of the causes of civilian unrest by providing economic and social development
services. MCA may involve US military supervision and advice, but the visible effort
should be conducted by the HN military.

For further details on HCA and MCA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations; JP 3-
22, Foreign Internal Defense; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA’s)
5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). For more details on the
use of DS CAD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding, see
DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).

e. Humanitarian assistance is often considered a high-impact strategic effort—an
important tool in building legitimacy with international audiences. The use of US military
forces for humanitarian assistance has often bolstered favorable local public opinion of the
United States in general and the Armed Forces of the United States in particular. However,
JFCs should remain particularly sensitive to the possible irreparable harm to the US image
whenever such missions have failed to meet larger expectations for stabilization.

(1) Military delivery of aid may politicize humanitarian assistance and is not
always welcomed by others, particularly international organizations and NGOs that
conduct humanitarian assistance every day and consider political neutrality to be their
primary means of security. The US military, regardless of intentions, may also be either
an information target or a physical target for local or global adversaries.
(2) The efficiency and effectiveness with which US forces can deliver humanitarian assistance, particularly medical and dental care, can have the unintended consequence of decreasing the population’s confidence in the HN’s ability to provide basic care. Excessive US humanitarian assistance may delay and undermine the reconstitution of existing medical and other basic needs infrastructure in the HN. To mitigate these possibilities, primary consideration should be given to supporting and supplementing existing infrastructure and to ensuring the use of information and PA activities focus on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the HN.

9. Evaluation and Assessment

The Sphere Project’s *Humanitarian Charter* and *Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* are an appropriate basis for humanitarian-assistance MOEs. The Sphere Project, developed by international organizations and NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance, recommends key indicators for provision of water, sanitation, food, health, shelter, and nonfood items in disasters and establishes voluntary minimum standards for each sector. Whenever possible, the JFC should coordinate with USG interagency partners, such as USAID and DOS, to determine what humanitarian standards and MOEs are appropriate in that nation in each particular situation.

*For further information on assessment, see* The Sphere Project Handbook.

10. Military Contribution

a. **Dislocated Civilian (DC) Support Missions.** These missions are specifically planned to support the assistance and protection for DCs. DC is a broad DOD term that primarily includes displaced people, evacuees, IDPs, migrants, refugees, or a stateless people. These persons may be victims of conflict or natural or man-made disaster. Of import, other stabilization partners may not recognize the term DC, so their policies, mandates, and levels of support vary considerably depending on whether the individuals in question are refugees, IDPs, migrants, or others. Typically, the UN or other international organizations and NGOs build and administer camps, if needed, and provide basic assistance and services to the population. However, whenever US military support is requested, DC support missions may include camp organization (basic construction and administration), provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection), and placement (movement or relocation to other nations, camps, and locations). Military personnel may also conduct identity activities while supporting DC missions. An important priority for the management of DCs is the use of services and facilities of non-DOD agencies whenever coordination is feasible. DC operations are often protracted and require enormous resourcing normally not immediately available through DOD sources. However, whenever non-DOD agencies have significant capabilities on the ground, one or more of those agencies normally lead IDP or refugee operations, with DOD playing a supporting role. Relief providers must take care not to construct camps with a sense of permanence, because that belief discourages return, repatriation, or resettlement. USAID’s BHA will normally lead efforts in support of IDPs. The DOS Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration leads efforts to support refugees. Such efforts are supported by the DOD Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (OHDM).

b. **Trafficking in Persons (TIP).** As defined by DOS, TIP includes sex trafficking, child sex trafficking, forced labor, bonded labor or debt bondage, domestic servitude, forced child labor, and unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. Human trafficking can include, but does not require, movement. People may be considered trafficking victims regardless of whether they were born into a state of servitude, were exploited in their home town, were transported to the exploitative situation, previously consented to work for a trafficker, or participated in a crime as a direct result of being trafficked. At the heart of this phenomenon is the traffickers’ aim to exploit and enslave their victims and the myriad coercive and deceptive practices they use to do so. Ongoing TIP in an area undermines ongoing stabilization efforts, as well as US and HN legitimacy. The DOS Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons normally leads efforts in this area, with support from USAID; ICITAP; the DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training; the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs; and the IC.

(1) Ongoing security activities, such as border protection and freedom of movement activities, should support the HN’s battle against TIP. In particular, the protection of vulnerable populations, such as women and children, from TIP activities is a key part of population security.

(2) Additionally, commanders are morally and legally obligated to deter activities of Service members, civilian employees, indirect hires, defense contractors, and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas.

*For more information on TIP, see DOS Trafficking in Persons Report.*

c. **Emergency Food Assistance and Food Security.** International organizations (e.g., World Food Programme), NGOs (e.g., CARE [Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere]), Catholic Relief Services supported by USAID, and other bilateral donors and multilateral agencies support emergency food needs of afflicted populations in nations where they have a mission or limited mission presence. Occasionally, military involvement may consist of providing security for food aid warehouses and delivery convoys in uncertain and hostile environments. Civilian agencies must first expend existing food production and distribution before requesting military support for food programs. Civilian agencies estimate the degree of hunger in a population by using USAID’s household hunger scale, a rapid assessment methodology. Food security activities are normally led by USAID’s BHA, with support from its Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment; OHDM; and the United States Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service.

d. **Shelter.** Although the basic need for shelter is similar in most emergencies, such considerations as the kind of needed housing, design, available materials, builders, and durability differ significantly in each situation. Civilian humanitarian agencies in the USG,
international organizations, and NGOs determine the appropriate shelter standards in each particular situation and may, on occasion, request DOD support for logistics and engineering to support these programs.

e. BHA maintains a skilled cadre of technical experts in a variety of fields relevant to its disaster response mechanism. This cadre includes experts in sanitation, shelter, humanitarian protection, food security, health, most vulnerable populations, and natural hazards. In some cases, BHA, through the Civil-Military Disaster Operations Division, requests specific DOD support to provide capabilities not available through other agencies.

f. Other Nonfood Relief. Disaster-affected households and those displaced from their dwellings often possess only what they can salvage or carry, and the provision of appropriate nonfood items may be required to meet their personal hygiene needs, to prepare and eat food, and to provide the necessary thermal comfort. BHA maintains stockpiles of commonly used nonfood items in commodity warehouses, including plastic sheeting for

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**SOCIAL WELL-BEING NECESSARY CONDITIONS**

**Access to and Delivery of Basic Needs Services**

The population has equal access to and can obtain adequate water, food, shelter, and health services to ensure survival and life with dignity.

**Access to and Delivery of Education**

The population has equal and continuous access to quality formal and non-formal education that provides the opportunity for advancement and promotes a peaceful society.

**Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons**

All individuals displaced from their homes by violent conflict have the option of a safe, voluntary, and dignified to their homes or to new resettlement communities; have recourse for property restitution or compensation; and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term development.

**Social Reconstruction**

The population is able to coexist peacefully through intra- and intergroup forms of reconciliation—including mechanisms that help to resolve disputes non-violently and address the legacy of past abuses—and through development of community institutions that bind society across divisions.

**SOURCE:** Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping

and Stability Operations Institute
shelter material, blankets, hygiene kits, kitchen sets, water treatment units, and water containers. DOD may also provide nonfood items for humanitarian operations, generally through its humanitarian assistance excess property (EP) program.

**g. Humanitarian Demining Assistance/Humanitarian Mine Action.** Humanitarian demining assistance is any activity related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance for the detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW. Humanitarian mine action is any activity that strives to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of land mines, UXO, and small arms ammunition—also characterized as ERW. ERW includes both UXO and AXO. Humanitarian demining assistance is a form of humanitarian assistance and normally does not support military operations, so it differs from tactical countermine operations. The DOS Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement serves as the lead organization in coordinating all USG humanitarian mine action activities worldwide. DOD humanitarian demining programs are coordinated by the designated CCDR humanitarian mine action program manager, funded by DSCA’s OHDACA funds, and they are coordinated with interagency partners by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The clearance of land mines and ERW, as part of humanitarian or population security measures, should be carefully considered in light of US law. Title 10, USC, Section 407, stipulates that no member of the US military, while providing humanitarian demining assistance, will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other ERW, except for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation. Further, US Service members will not provide such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the US military.

*For further details on humanitarian demining assistance, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions; JP 3-15, Barriers and Obstacles in Joint Operations; and the UN Electronic Mine Information Network.*

**h. Public Health**

(1) Joint force operations to rebuild and protect infrastructure, potable water, proper sewage disposal, and essential health services that contribute significantly to the health of the HN population are closely planned and coordinated with the HN ministries and USG agencies responsible for health sector redevelopment assistance. USG public health stabilization and reconstruction efforts in foreign nations are the responsibility of a USAID mission, with technical and program assistance from USAID regional and technical bureaus (e.g., the Bureaus for Global Health), other DOS bureaus, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Military medical forces normally play a support role in health-sector reconstruction operations, which civilian organizations manage.

(2) The JFC may conduct medical HCA to support local military and civilian health systems or provide direct public health care (i.e., primary medical, dental, veterinary, and other needed care). Medical CMO are coordinated closely with USAID health advisors, other USG departments and agencies, HN medical authorities, NGOs, and international organizations. Primary consideration is given to supporting and
supplementing existing medical infrastructure. The JFC avoids operations that supplant existing public health and medical infrastructure or subvert longer-term plans.

(3) During stabilization efforts, the military may need to provide public health services for humanitarian reasons, to build community trust in the HN government. When authorized, US forces may provide short-term health care to foreign civilian populations on an urgent basis (within resource limitations). The JFC and staff surgeon, in consultation with legal authorities, develop written guidance for the treatment and disposition of nonurgent and nonmilitary patients that are consistent across the theater. Such care will transition to other medical service activities once the HN health system resumes care for the population. Medical personnel may need to assist in reestablishing and supporting indigenous medical infrastructure, particularly those affected by disaster. However, while improving the HN public health systems fosters self-sufficiency and may expedite US military mission accomplishment, care should be taken to ensure healthcare standards are appropriate for the local population and at a level the existing HN medical infrastructure can sustain.

(4) Health sector planning in stabilization requires identifying objectives that link the initial response activities of humanitarian relief, transformational activities, and activities that foster sustainability.

For further details regarding the provision of aid in public health, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

i. Education. Military activities to support education programs generally focus on physical infrastructure. Occasionally, personnel with appropriate civilian backgrounds in education can supplement services, such as administration or academics. Civilian educational organizations seek to improve adult literacy, train teachers and administrators, develop curricula, and improve school-age access to education. As with any infrastructure support, military planners ensure schools or other contributions from the joint force are closely coordinated with HN authorities to ensure long-term sustainability. The USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment normally leads stabilization efforts in education.

11. Transitions

a. The JFC will ultimately transition relief activities to US, intergovernmental, or HN relief organizations. Transition occurs once relief efforts are successful and sustainable and when the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directs or at the discretion of the HN. Transition planning should occur as early as possible as part of planning for FHA.

(1) Criteria for transition may be based on events, MOEs, availability of resources, or a specific date. Examples of events include restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area, an acceptable drop in mortality rates, or a certain percentage of DCs returned home. When other organizations (i.e., USAID, UN, NGOs, and international organizations) are able to assume the mission, US forces may begin the transition.
(2) A detailed transition plan identifying the FHA functions and the gaining authorities expedites the transition process significantly. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. When transitioning to nonmilitary organizations, an unclassified transition plan, written clearly and without military jargon or acronyms, is necessary. Organizing the plan by specific FHA functions, humanitarian clusters, or sectors (e.g., provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhances the transition.

b. Mission transition planning is continuous and receives equal priority with execution planning. At the outset, the joint force coordinates closely with the HN, the lead US agency, and other participants to define the operational and strategic objectives for US military forces in FHA operations. Universally understood and accepted MOEs are developed for each objective and provide the basis for joint force redeployment, while preserving continuity in the long-term relief operations. Specifically, objectives should drive the functions and tasks the joint force performs and determine which functions may transition to other efforts once the requirement is met.

SECTION C. ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

12. General

a. The economic stabilization and infrastructure function includes programs to promote an economy in which people can pursue livelihoods within a predictable and legal system of governance. A sustainable economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.

b. While satisfying the needs of the population (i.e., physical security and humanitarian assistance) is central for fragile states, economic stabilization and development help to consolidate gains in human security and enable political solutions. Although security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to broad-based economic growth increases the likelihood and sustainability of success. Economic measures and reconstruction are not the panacea for stability, but they are essential to progress. Priorities for international agencies and military forces include measures designed to stabilize the economy, protect and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure, generate employment, and address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

c. Economic stabilization includes restoring employment opportunities, initiating market reform, mobilizing domestic and foreign investment, supervising monetary reform, and rebuilding public structures and HN economic capacity-building systems. Infrastructure restoration comprises the reconstitution of power, transportation, water resource management, communications, and health and sanitation; firefighting; education; mortuary services; environmental control; and the restoration of economic production and distribution.
d. Economic and infrastructure security and development are inherently civilian undertakings; however, the presence of US forces frequently creates a conducive, working environment. Occasionally, greater military involvement in economic development is necessary, such as conditions restricting civilian movement or the delayed arrival of civilian agencies.

(1) Economic stabilization is an integral part of military stabilization planning. The protection and restoration of economic foundations and critical infrastructure, as well as the empowerment of civil authority to restore them are integral to stabilization during major military operations or campaigns. As such, military planning and target lists require close coordination with stabilization planning during sustained combat operations.

(2) Joint force participation in economic stabilization activities normally occurs in PO or other crisis response and limited contingency operations. The level of joint force participation largely depends on the OE, civilian capacity, and the mission.

(3) During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, the military rarely participates directly in the economic and infrastructure development. An exception may be stabilization, which supports economic development and reconstruction of critical facilities and dual-use infrastructure, such as seaports and airports. In addition to direct support for economic stabilization and infrastructure development, military forces may serve as the facilitator, convener, and/or coordinator of cross-sector collaborative efforts involving HN leaders and stabilization partners.

e. Building or repairing infrastructure is not the main objective; rather, assisting the HN to establish or reestablish essential services to the public and nurture long-term sustainability of the economy is the intent. Ultimately, a growing, vigorous market economy is the bulwark of stability. As planned and executed, service and infrastructure projects have a direct impact on grass-roots entrepreneurship, the overall economy, and people’s daily lives. These projects help shape a stable OE and diminish threat networks’ access to safe havens and illicit financial resources.

f. When assisting with economic stabilization and infrastructure, the JFC should understand the fundamental dynamics between stabilization and development. Conflict is a significant driver of poverty and vice versa. Economic development is a driver of stability and vice versa. US forces often perform stabilization activities in the midst of development programs, so they should recognize that assistance extends above altruism.

(1) Stabilization focuses on reducing violence, while addressing the drivers of conflict. Compared to reconstruction, its fulfillment is more urgent and discernible. While commanders wish to achieve immediate results, they should ensure expediency does not detract from developing more permanent solutions. Invariably, the JFC’s objective, in close coordination with USG interorganizational partners, should include setting viable conditions for the transition of responsibility to HN essential services and management of the supporting infrastructures.
Joint Stability Functions

(2) Development activities focus on reducing poverty and address the drivers of enduring poverty. Development initiatives may give less consideration to current conflict dynamics, while stabilization efforts may not consider the implications of long-term sustainability of projects. The JFC should balance the drivers of societal conflict with development activities that mitigate the causes of endemic instability. Hence, the use of joint force development funds and activities may ameliorate common societal conflicts. JFC coordination with the COM and other in-nation agencies serves to avoid undesired effects.

g. Economic stabilization tasks are more effectively performed by PRTs or similar interagency field-based teams with military support and participation. This teamwork combines expertise with operational capacity to foster HN local institutions for legitimate and effective governance, as well as economic stability. In the absence of interagency teams, local commanders should work with stabilization partners to assess, plan, and conduct economic stabilization and infrastructure reconstruction.

For further details on economic stabilization and infrastructure, refer to the Handbook for Military Support to Economic Stabilization.

13. Evaluation and Assessment

a. Each nation has a unique economic structure based on its resources, the needs of the people, laws, customs, traditions, and level of development. Achieving unity of effort among stabilization partners requires an assessment that enables unity of understanding of these socioeconomic factors. As part of a campaign plan, basic planning should include identifying economic goals, MOEs, MOPs, and general COAs (i.e., who, what, where, when, and why). The economic performance assessment should describe the situation, commander’s intent, and national strategic objectives to stabilize an HN economy, reduce the economic drivers of conflict, and increase institutional capacity. Military forces can assist with the gathering, analysis, and sharing of key socioeconomic information (see Appendix B, “Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process”). An economic assessment consists of four steps:

(1) Formulation of a nation’s economic profile to understand the policy, strategy, environment, and performance of the economy. The profile provides the facts and conditions from the mission analysis and a baseline-level of knowledge to share with other USG departments and agencies. In addition to providing key economic data, the profile includes the nation’s economic strategy, economic and social policies, and the existing economic system.

(2) Development of a nation’s economic implementation plan, based on collected data in step one, which clarifies the nation’s economic situation and includes the interests of significant economic stakeholders. This plan provides additional facts and assumptions for mission analysis:

(a) Pre-conflict problems.
(b) The impact of ongoing conflict on the course of the economy.

(c) The impact of the actual or anticipated OE on the economic variables.

(d) Ongoing or planned stabilization and reconstruction programs by the HN, USG, and international and other donor organizations.

(e) HN willingness and capacity to implement such programs.

(3) Identification and analysis of the economic drivers contributing to the conflict. Planned activities seek to mitigate the drivers of conflict and the risk of

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**SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY NECESSARY CONDITIONS**

**Macroeconomic Stabilization**

- Monetary and fiscal policies are established to align the currency to market levels, manage inflation, and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management

**Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace**

- Illicit wealth no longer determines who governs
- Predatory actors are prevented from looting state resources
- Ex-combatants are reintegrated and provided jobs or benefits
- Natural resource wealth is accountably managed

**Market Economy Sustainability**

- A market-based economy is enabled and encouraged to thrive
- Infrastructure is built or rehabilitated
- The private sector and the human capital and financial sectors are nurtured and strengthened

**Employment Generation**

- Job opportunities are created to yield quick impact to demonstrate progress and employ military-age youths
- A foundation is established for sustainable livelihoods

**SOURCE:** Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
recurrence. An analysis should identify the economic centers of gravity, critical factors for mission analysis, and potential COAs. This analysis should answer the following questions:

(a) What are the economic drivers of conflict?

(b) How did the conflict’s outcome affect the drivers?

(c) What are the economic interests of conflict stakeholders and power brokers, and how did those interests influence the course of the conflict?

(d) What potential MOPs, MOEs, and COAs can be taken to reduce these economic influences and prevent a recurrence of conflict?

(e) Are economic power struggles between men and women a factor in the conflict?

(4) Preparation of an economic section for inclusion in an initial staff estimate. This provides a description of the situation and a mission statement and outlines potential general COAs for military support to economic normalization. This section should include:

(a) Summary of the structure and performance of the economy, environment, nation’s economic strategy, the anticipated post-conflict economic conditions, and problems.

(b) USG and PNs’ policy goals and objectives, if available.

(c) Desired end state.

(d) Potential general COAs.

b. Infrastructure analysis should emphasize current conditions and critical local, regional, and national shortfalls. Analysis should include the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to sabotage, direct attack, or other interference by adversaries or natural disasters. Infrastructure analysis should be tailored to orient commanders and planners on the relief priorities for US military and other stabilization partners immediately, and over time, to prevent humanitarian crises and reinforce a secure and stable environment.

14. Military Contribution

Civilian agencies have the lead responsibility for this mission sector, but the joint force may render support, particularly in the conduct of initial response activities of infrastructure restoration.

a. Employment Generation. Providing employment is an immediate peacekeeping task, a post-conflict objective, and a means of establishing the foundation for future economic growth and political stability. The initial emphasis is to provide employment quickly, even if those jobs are temporary and not sustainable. The joint force paying young
men to pick up shovels provides a better alternative to being paid by the enemy to pick up guns. This applies to young women by providing opportunities to learn a productive skill that supports strengthening economic stability within the family, rather than being sold as child brides. While the immediate military focus is on implementing short-term efforts quickly, the US military and stabilization partners should have a common understanding of the problems and risks and align their short-term efforts to support longer-term development strategies as soon as practical. Key determinants of the appropriate nature of the military role in employment generation include the variables within the OE; specifically, the condition of the economic-related infrastructure, the need for employment-generation programs, and emergency responders’ access to the area. USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment normally leads USG efforts in employment generation.

(1) The JFC should coordinate early to request flexible and immediate funding for work initiatives regarding post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction programs.

For further details on DOD funding considerations, refer to Appendix E, “Legal and Fiscal Considerations.”

(2) Creating a secure environment to facilitate employment is a key military contribution. The joint force should assist with providing security for all employment activities, not just US projects, as conditions and resources permit. Additionally, joint force efforts to enable freedom of movement for the population, particularly to and from potential employment and major centers of economic activity (e.g., market places and ports), are an essential part of establishing security that facilitates economic growth. The JFC, together with other USG leaders, may consider establishing a secure economic zone, where civilians can conduct commerce and business activity safely.

(3) Military forces can directly generate employment opportunities for the civilian population by hiring local labor to provide sustainment support to the joint force or by funding local quick impact projects (QIPs) that employ local labor. When directly hiring local labor, JFCs should take care to consider local labor market forces to avoid causing inflationary pressure on wages or draining skilled labor from local industry. Tribal, ethnic, and family ties to local businesses require attention to prevent the unintentional shift of power within the community, alienation of groups, and catalyst of conflict. The joint force should be prepared to bargain with local and national trade unions, which can cause unrest and labor strikes if ignored.

(4) Employment generation initiatives, as part of political and economic recovery plans, require close coordination with DDR programs to help enable the reintegration of former combatants.

(5) While the joint force may generate employment and funding, local governments must pay the salaries for the sake of legitimacy and to avoid the appearance of charity from a foreign nation. Through the principle of indirect governance, the joint
force works through the existing authorities for the management of labor, including salaries.

b. **Monetary Policy.** Establishing a central bank system and basic monetary policy is foundational to a recovering economy. The military may need to provide security and supporting resources to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs and Office of Technical Assistance in establishing monetary policy for a recovering economy.

c. **Fiscal Policy and Governance.** Fiscal policy is an important link between legitimate governance and economic stabilization. The military contributes to HN fiscal activities by providing security for financial institutions and for cash distribution (e.g., salary or contractual payments). The support of customs policy while conducting border security also contributes to HN fiscal development. Additionally, military input may be required when establishing priorities for public spending, particularly on security programs (e.g., DDR and critical security infrastructure). When civilian assistance is unavailable, the JFC may need to facilitate microcredit and other financial programs, including the use of JFC funds, when authorized. Finally, ensuring US forces set an example for transparency in contracting provides indirect influence on HN government agencies. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs and Office of Technical Assistance and the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment lead fiscal and governance efforts for USG, with support from the United States Trade and Development Agency, Foreign Agricultural Service, and the Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law and Development Program.

d. **Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.** The joint force may need to support infrastructure development by providing security, funding and materiel, functional expertise, or construction. Perhaps the most challenging requirement for large stabilization efforts is an infrastructure planning process that determines the priorities and sequencing of critical infrastructure construction, based on the broader planning priorities and resource availability. The restoration of essential services such as waste disposal, water, and energy is clearly a priority for infrastructure construction, based on both humanitarian and governance considerations. Similar considerations drive the requirement for infrastructure projects in essential industrial sectors, such as transportation, communication, agriculture, and production. Priority and emphasis on projects depend on the circumstances. Reconstruction of critical infrastructure and key resources should include protecting associated networks by implementing cyberspace security measures. Critical infrastructure programs are normally led by the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), with appropriate support from naval construction battalions, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Department of Energy.

*For more information, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.*

(1) **Water and Sanitation.** Water is always an immediate priority to sustain life, particularly for DCs. Temporary water infrastructure can be important, even to meet short-term requirements. One common constraint in crisis states is the imperfect state of the
water distribution system. Rebuilding or restoring water facilities as part of long-term reconstruction efforts is usually necessary. Restoring water systems is constrained by the availability of electric power pumping stations. Well drilling or well digging is a common stabilization activity for communities lacking easy access to potable water, which may require a water table assessment. The staff should also study the potential for water accessibility to cause conflict, the community’s capacity to maintain a pump that is installed or to public works maintenance services, and any environmental considerations (e.g., aquifer depletion, wastewater flow). The staff considers the tensions and linkages among water as a life resource, water as an economic commodity (e.g., for personal or industrial use), and water as part of a sanitation system.

(2) Food Production. Restoration of food production is an essential recovery activity. Infrastructure requirements in support of restoring agriculture production and delivery are generally neither an immediate nor a high priority. Food production capacity is usually not badly affected by conflict, unless there is a major population displacement or a deliberate scorched earth campaign. An exception is significant damage to major infrastructure, such as dams or fishing ports. The marketing of food products requires access to roads, transportation, and timely delivery of food products. The staff’s assessment should include agriculture and aquaculture requirements. Farmers may need assistance to harvest and transport crops to the market, especially if their farm equipment is damaged or stolen. Stabilization partners should be alert to farmers hoarding commodities, because this activity spawns a black market and causes inflation. More sophisticated food production systems require a meticulous study of the infrastructure restoration requirements. Hence, a holistic assessment of production (including irrigation systems), transportation, storage, processing, and marketing infrastructure requirements is prudent.

(3) Transportation. Repair of roads and bridges will be a top priority when access to locations with at-risk populations is limited due to damage caused by natural disasters or conflict. Repair of public transportation (e.g., buses and street cars) is necessary for people getting to work. The staff assessment considers the capacity of railroads to meet relief requirements. Railroads have the potential to permit high-volume surface transportation that may be critical to long-term economic viability. Inland waterways may require clearing and dredging, and related infrastructure may need to be repaired. Establishing, reconstructing, and/or maintaining safe, secure, and operational land, air, and maritime ports within nations with access to these ports is crucial to ensure free flow of commerce to support socio-economic stability (e.g., critical income/jobs, food, energy, humanitarian aid, and industrial supplies). Additionally, repair and maintenance of road, rail, air, and waterway services provide employment opportunities. The staff assessment addresses access, capability, and capacity issues associated with ports and airports. In particular, if ports are necessary to support delivery of emergency commodities or to facilitate the restoration of economic activity, they should receive priority in reconstruction. For the mid- to long-term, road reconstruction may be a recovery priority. In addition to integrating national economic activity, expanding the influence of centralized government can be facilitated by having better roads. When prioritizing transportation reconstruction activities, the staff should consider the high cost and longer times for
delivery of transportation infrastructure. The HN’s ability to provide long-term maintenance of roads and other transportation infrastructure should also be assessed.

(4) Information and Communications Technology. Restoring public communication systems is an essential task to provide the population access to news, public information announcements, and the ability to communicate with family and friends. Without such services, people are susceptible to rumors and adversarial propaganda, which undermine stabilization efforts. Repair of facilities and equipment, licensing media outlets, and hiring professional personnel is the first step. While media outlets serve initially to keep people informed, they must also provide entertainment to maintain an audience. Imbuing the media with the idea of independence and freedom of expression are primary objectives, particularly if the former government was autocratic, using the media as an ideological mouthpiece. The process of assessing requirements needs to include building an effective public-private-sector partnership, because private-sector investment generally comes more rapidly. Assessing the regulatory environment can help those conducting stabilization efforts in making recommendations to the HN in order to have a more open and effective communications system. While transition to a market-based system that allocates resources economically is preferred over a system of political allocation of resources, care must be taken with regard to winners and losers of political power to avoid sowing the seeds of the next conflict. Media infrastructure requirements will often be a high priority, in conjunction with building effective participative governance. The JFC should be particularly attentive to the requirements of the modern wireless communications sector, to include Internet access, even in regions where advanced technology would seem to be out of place. Experience has shown that the commercial sector puts its earliest post-conflict emphasis on creating a viable wireless network for the full range of wireless applications. Accordingly, planners should anticipate that electromagnetic spectrum management in particular will be an immediate commercial and economic issue, demanding a high degree of coordination between military users, civilian partners in USAID and the Department of Commerce, the private sector, and the HN government.

(5) Energy. Except for transportation and some industrial and commercial process heat applications, virtually all modern economic, social, and medical services (e.g., network telecommunications infrastructure, medical equipment, water pumps, commercial and industrial equipment) are powered at the retail or local level by electricity. In all environments, sufficient electrical capacity to power this equipment impacts the ability of people to conduct daily functions. During the targeting process, the joint force staff assesses the impact of destruction or degradation of power generation and distribution facilities on stabilization during recovery. This includes assessing the extent of reconstruction efforts in relation to the anticipated benefits of destruction or degradation.

(6) Production Enterprises. Restoration of certain production enterprises is essential in support of reconstruction activities. For example, cement and brick-making plants supply construction materials. Metal working enterprises are necessary for normal economic activity. Assessments include the status of production facilities and requirements to restore their productive capacities. In some nations with economies dependent on an extractive industry, like oil production in Iraq and aluminum ore mining
in Guinea, restoring the production operations is a high priority. Restoration of revenue-earning enterprises can contribute to accelerating recovery.

15. Quick Impact Projects

a. QIPs are relatively short-term, small-scale, low-cost, and rapidly implemented stabilization or development initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate and prominent impact, generally at the local provincial or community level. Their primary purpose is to facilitate political and economic progress, promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of the HN government. In areas where the HN government lacks legitimacy (possibly due to its recent establishment or perceived corruption and incompetence), it may be necessary for the joint force to support QIPs without the presence of the HN government until initial trust can be established and relationships built that will help enhance the legitimacy of the HN government as progress continues. In uncertain environments, where it is deemed the project is critical for early stabilization and cannot wait until the security situation improves, the joint force might implement direct QIPs. In more permissive environments, the joint force may need to implement QIPs with military personnel possessing specialty skills when the capability gap exists.

b. It is useful to distinguish between two types of QIPs: direct and indirect.

(1) Direct QIPs are critical, rapidly implemented, security, governance, or development projects that directly support a goal on the path to stability. Direct QIPs tend to focus on key elements of security (e.g., repair and refurbishment of police stations and vehicle check points), critical enabling infrastructure (e.g., market places, roads, and bridges), or the delivery of essential services (e.g., schools and health clinics).

(2) Indirect QIPs are rapidly implemented security, governance, or development projects that serve primarily to generate legitimacy for the HN government or international forces, thereby indirectly contributing to stability. Indirect QIPs tend to focus on influencing perception and gaining consent. They may be used to communicate positive messages, provide incentives for compliance, facilitate key leader engagement, or demonstrate tangible benefits from peace. Indirect QIPs are particularly effective where lack of demonstrable progress is seen as an important driver of instability. Examples include the construction or refurbishment of parks, the clearance of waste or drainage systems, and broader infrastructure refurbishment programs. Often, the most appropriate indirect QIPs are ones which cluster projects by visibly rolling out initiatives in sufficient numbers to create the perception of systematic change.

c. Where interagency, field-based teams exist, much of this activity will be funded, planned, and implemented by development agencies coordinated through interagency partners. In these circumstances, development and security activities mutually interact within a civil-military integrated plan. In other circumstances, the JFC should understand the various sources of funding in order to capitalize on opportunities for QIPs as they arise. The sources of funding for QIPs are varied and change frequently. QIPs should always be planned with lead civilian agencies accountable for transition and development assistance.
to avoid unintended consequences on longer-term assistance, such as building clinics in areas that cannot maintain their operations. Further, QIPs should be developed and conducted in a manner consistent with current best practices and, in the case of expected future transition to civilian or organizational lead, consider the practices or requirements of anticipated successor organizations.

*For further details on funding and authorities, refer to Appendix E, “Legal and Fiscal Considerations.”*

d. **Guidelines for the Effective Use of QIPs.** Joint force action should consider the actual or potential contribution toward influencing the key conflict drivers within the society and shaping the eventual political settlement. This basis ultimately serves to assess the utility of each QIP. To help the commander balance short-term and long-term imperatives and avoid unintended consequences, the following guidelines for the effective use of QIPs apply:

(1) **Participation.** Ensure the host community and local government are involved in selecting, planning, designing, and delivering QIPs.

(2) **Influence.** Ensure there is a process for communicating the positive benefits of the project to politically significant groups along with the appropriate HN and local community leaders. Use the project to promote understanding, if not reconciliation, and shape the emerging political settlement.

(3) **Minimize Harm.** Ensure the project avoids creating or exacerbating conflicts, jealousies, or rivalries, either by the selection of beneficiaries or by surpassing regional norms.

(4) **Efficiency.** Ensure resources are used in the most efficient and cost-effective way and the project is not diverting resources from more important ones.

(5) **Timeliness.** Ensure the project will be implemented or completed in a time frame relevant to the JFC’s overall objectives.

(6) **Sustainability.** Address recurrent costs associated with the project and, when possible, link the project to longer-term HN development initiatives.

(7) **Coordination.** Ensure the project coheres with national priorities and is coordinated with the activities of other relevant participants.

(8) **Delivery.** Ensure the most appropriate agency delivers the project, favoring local expertise and civilian agencies whenever practicable.

(9) **Monitoring and Evaluation.** Ensure there is a plan for assessing the project’s effectiveness as well as its impact on the overall conflict dynamics.
(10) **Technology.** Ensure the project is technologically appropriate for the community.

16. **Other Considerations**

   a. **Ownership Issues.** A fundamental question for infrastructure projects is the issue of public versus private ownership. With extensive knowledge in this area, USAID concludes that, in most circumstances, private ownership is the desired outcome. This involves a cultural transformation where revenue to pay for utility infrastructure is acquired politically and utility services are likewise allocated among political allies. Hence, investors pay for utility infrastructure, and customers pay fees that recover, at a minimum, the cost of construction, operations, and maintenance. Joint planners supporting civilian agencies that are introducing regulatory reforms should be wary of old political structures reemerging in almost-new forms.

   (1) **Full Privatization.** The shift to privatization in infrastructure and utility services represents a profound change in the OE and conventional public policy and the staff should include this information in the assessment. The old and deceptively simple model of state ownership is rife with underinvestment, underpricing (revenue inadequacy), high costs, low productivity, little innovation, poor service quality, theft of service, political interference, and a general lack of transparency. USAID has found that privatization, if accompanied by unbundling of assets and regulatory reform, offers the highest potential for increased investment, cost-reflective tariffs, incentives for efficiency, innovation, access to superior management and service quality, political insulation, and greater transparency. All of these factors are crucial for long-term effectiveness of the utility or infrastructure project. Key stakeholders in any privatization plan include shareholders, politicians, boards, regulators, business managers, and, at the end of the chain, the customers who will both consume the service and pay the taxes.

   (2) **Partial Privatization.** Sometimes, the joint force may find that local political leaders or the prevailing political culture may be unwilling to risk the certain controversy and possible loss of support that privatization may entail. Thus, joint force infrastructure planners should consider improving, as far as possible, the performance of a state-owned utility, particularly as it relates to the relationship between the business itself and its government owners. The underlying issue will be improving or sometimes completely revamping a climate of highly professional corporate governance. Assuming credible local authorities exist with whom to consult or negotiate, it is critical for the host government to make a viable commitment to cost-covering taxes (or a cost-covering combination of taxes and subsidies). Without such a commitment, private investors are unlikely to buy into the utility. Strong consideration is also given to reducing the government’s fundamental conflict of interest in being both the owner and manager of the utility.

   b. **Cost Recovery.** Regarding stabilization-related infrastructure development, particularly utilities, JFCs need to understand the long-term nature of the project; to wit, the local population must act as the true customers and pay for the services they receive. As part of the larger reform of a utility, cost recovery is often the inclination of service providers to charge fees rather than the willingness of customers to pay. Operating costs include salaries,
energy, costs of goods or services sold, maintenance, information technology, and capital costs (i.e., debt and equity). Long-term success for a complex project demands contract agreements and plans that create a financially solvent system. JFCs should work with local authorities and civic leaders to develop a culture of payment with the recipient population. Achieving a culture of payment requires a break with prior political arrangements. Planners need to assess whether publicly emphasizing such a break calms or incites the political environment. Regardless, the new approach should be perceived as a fair and justified break with the past. Project costs may be director-hidden. Security concerns in particular often add up to 20 percent to an enterprise’s operating expenses. Military planners should remain cognizant of the increased costs for security to a utility’s budget once the intervention force withdraws, assuming concomitant security requirements remain steady. Turnover plans should factor this into the equation.

c. **Delivering Services to Those in Need.** A key subset of cost recovery is designing a system that ensures continued delivery of utility services to customers. Direct subsidies should be avoided, as they generally create a situation where customers and managers lose the will to work toward actual cost recovery. A subsidized safety net of sorts is only effective if households are legally connected to the system and accurately metered. Poorly designed subsidies often have the unintended consequence of encouraging inefficient consumption by households and provide disincentives for the utility to reduce costs or expand its service.

d. **Contracting as a Management Tool.** Planners need to distinguish between contracting for construction services and creating operating contracts to manage reestablished utility services. In many post-conflict and natural disaster scenarios, simply rebuilding the infrastructure and returning it to local authorities does not ensure improved services. USAID has learned that the use of incentive-based operating contracts often mitigates the original weak capacity of the utility staff. If operating contracts are used, planners need to factor in indigenous capacity building so local staffs will ultimately be able to manage their own assets.

*For more information, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.*

e. **Maintenance Standards.** Over time, a project or piece of equipment is subject to deterioration. During a crisis response operation, normal, long-term maintenance requirements for facilities and equipment are often correctly put aside in favor of more immediate operational priorities. Additionally, the majority of joint force interventions likely occur in areas and cultures where Western standards of maintenance are only honored by exception. Therefore, for joint force efforts to have lasting effects, the programs and systems must be designed with the expectation of inadequate maintenance. Project managers can accomplish multiple goals by enlisting local labor for ongoing maintenance efforts. In addition to keeping projects functioning, employing locals can create, over the long term, a small business or team of businesses that supports broader economic growth in the community.

f. **Physical Security.** Construction of security boundaries and other force protection infrastructure is a well-understood military mission. If physical security for facilities and
local populations is not achieved promptly, employment and production suffer. Without physical security, workers can be driven away, facilities destroyed, and local populations terrorized into submission to, or even cooperation with, adversaries. Civilian-oriented services and infrastructure operations demand attention to security, particularly when undertaken in an unstable environment. It is cost-prohibitive to protect all essential services facilities; therefore, risk assessments are required. For facilities with high-value assets (e.g., power plants) or facilities that provide crucial resources (e.g., water pumping facilities), protection is a necessity. However, for facilities that have extensive distribution systems (e.g., power transmission lines and underground water pipes), where absolute protection becomes far more expensive than simply replacing damaged property, total security infrastructure is not cost-effective. Because it is in their interests, sympathetic local populations provide the most effective protection. If these can be kept secure against threats, they can multiply the effectiveness of other security precautions and degrade the effectiveness of most adversary threats. At times, it is cost-effective to construct parallel, redundant, or looped systems to thwart the effects of damage, such as road systems or electrical transmission lines that connect at geographic intervals or at the extremities, so traffic or electricity can flow back around the damaged loops.

**g. Accountability, Auditing, and Financial Oversight.** Infrastructure reconstruction involves significant amounts of resources to implement major works. However, without the proper legal authorities and regulatory institutions in place, it may create inefficiencies, exploitation, substandard work, and the reestablishment of economic conditions incompatible with stability and improved governance. Prompt attention to assisting the HN build the appropriate policies and effective institutions mitigates criminality and corruption right from the outset. Stabilization requires the inclusion of accounting systems and internal control programs into reconstruction operations and assigning them sufficient priority to ensure compliance. The inspector general’s office can provide advice on this issue without detracting from operations. Professional accounting organizations are less concerned with the occasional inconsistency than with systemic neglect or abuse of accounting practices. Initial counseling and subsequent advising prevents bad reports and weak credibility of the operations.

17. Transitions

**a. JFCs should anticipate the transition from military to civilian program management and plan activities supportive of the long-term strategy.** Joint forces can provide immediate support for economic stabilization, but the programs are rarely long-term solutions. To maximize project effectiveness, these projects should be sequenced with the work of international civilian agencies and with the private sector to ensure continuity of effort with employees, functions, and support. The military’s role is to help restore normalcy and fill the gap until civilian-led, longer-term programs commence.

**b. Cooperative planning with other agencies is needed to link short-term emergency programs and transition them to long-term HN and private-sector economic initiatives.** Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that not nesting local projects with larger strategies often results in projects in one sector having unintended effects in another sector,
sometimes in seemingly unrelated areas. Mitigating this risk entails, among other things, continuous communication with HN officials at all levels and USG departments and agencies.

**SECTION D. RULE OF LAW**

18. General

a. Rule of law refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. Rule of law in a nation is characterized by just and legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the following principles: supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, and legal certainty. Such measures also help to avoid arbitrariness, as well as promoting procedural and legal transparency. Rule of law in conflict-affected and fragile states is difficult. Quick results are not realistic. It is often more political than technical, and it must be linked to public administration.

b. Rule of law is key to legitimate governance. Perceived inequalities in the administration of the law and injustices trigger instability. It is of paramount importance that all activities taken by a government and its agents in attempting to restore stability are legal. Though human security may be established through physical security and humanitarian assistance and the initiation of economic stabilization, long-term stabilization requires the establishment of the rule of law. Indeed, the establishment of the rule of law and security sector enforcement often permit the withdrawal of the joint force, which is implementing or supporting stabilization. Rule of law remains a domestic issue within the HN. By extension, the US WPS Act and WPS Strategy emphasize a whole-of-government approach related to the meaningful participation of women. This aligns with security, development, and diplomacy. Within these contexts, DOD identifies women, peace, and security equities in the rule of law and international law. Engaging women in decision making about the security sector within the justice and legal system through policy change promotes stabilization within the HN.

*For more information, see ADP 3-07, Stability.*

c. In general terms, the establishment of the rule of law helps ensure:

1. The state monopolizes the use of force in the resolution of disputes.
2. Individuals are secure in their persons and property.
3. The state is bound by law and does not act arbitrarily.
(4) The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs.

(5) Individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial justice and dispute resolution system.

(6) Individuals have the ability to enforce contracts through an impartial, transparent judicial process.

(7) The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(8) Individuals understand and respect judicial institutions and develop a belief in their equity and fairness that guides the conduct of their daily lives.

(9) Individuals are treated equally under the law regardless of membership in any social class or category.

d. HN rule of law is normally based on the existing legal framework, such as a written constitution. However, if the existing legal framework is manifestly unjust and repressive, a source of grievances, and a driver of conflict, the joint force should be prepared to take remedial steps as directed by USG policy guidance. Whenever US forces occupy enemy territory, they should take all necessary measures under the law of war to restore and maintain public order and safety, while respecting existing laws not prohibited by USG policy guidance. In other situations, such as occupation of liberated territory, intervention in a conflict, or disaster response, the joint force restores public order and safety, while respecting HN laws as directed by USG policy guidance. Planning for stabilization activities to support the strengthening of the rule of law can be complex. However, by adhering to a commonly accepted set of definitions and coordinating with appropriate interorganizational stakeholders, military planners can identify those issues that are critical to understanding the OE and formulating viable, sustainable strategies and concrete tasks. Activities within the rule of law are generally categorized as structural, strategic, or functional (see Figure III-3).

(1) **Structural.** Structural activities in rule of law articulate the components and structures of national and local institutions and the public knowledge and participation in them that are essential to enabling the rule of law. While efforts on building top-down institutions are less complicated and faster to implement, bottom-up institutional efforts are more enduring and acceptable, although time-consuming and resource-intensive. For instance, local justice mechanisms are just as integral to success as national and provincial efforts, and local justice systems may not be understood by only looking at the formal state justice system.

(2) **Strategic.** Strategic rule of law activities deal primarily with the substantive political goals and strategic context required to enable or sustain the rule of law. Operations to strengthen rule of law and SSR should be aligned with this larger context to be successful
and sustainable. All four are closely intertwined. Communications synchronization is essential in promoting the values expressed by the other three activities.

(3) **Functional.** Functional areas of interest focus on specific types of short- and long-term rule of law-related tasks and missions that the JFC commonly supports.

e. Traditional, customary, or informal justice are simply terms applied to the broad range of ways in which communities resolve their disputes nonviolently, using their customs and leadership structures other than formal government systems. In many parts of the world, including those where unstable conditions may require military intervention, traditional and informal justice systems play an important role in adjudicating disputes and providing social order. An estimated 80 percent of people in developing nations seek justice outside formal courts and institutions through such systems. Therefore, no clear division between formal and informal legal systems exists. These systems generally have long histories and a high degree of popular acceptance.
Often, they function parallel to formal justice systems; in some cases, they are competing. In other cases, the formal justice system of the HN government has broken down, and traditional/informal systems are the only effective mechanisms. These systems should not be romanticized as an effective substitute for a broken justice system; however, they can frequently contribute substantially to stability by providing orderly, nonviolent methods of dispute resolution and can serve as a mechanism to reconcile formerly hostile groups. There are important caveats: sometimes such systems may be inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights standards or may in some cases be a driver of the conflict. Military support to traditional justice systems may mirror that provided to more formal systems, including security for judicial officials and comprehensive reform of criminal and civil laws and their enforcement.

f. **SSR** centers not only on HN security forces but also on broader rule of law initiatives. The overall objective of SSR is to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. Transformational activities and activities that foster sustainability in rule of law generally fall under the rubric of SSR.

*For further details on SSR, refer to Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.”*

g. **Judge Advocate Review of Rule of Law Programs.** Programs to influence HN legal systems are not above the law. Apart from US policy considerations, stabilization activities are governed by the rule of law; military activities, as well as any interagency rule of law programs requiring DOD support, are reviewed to ensure they comply with applicable provisions of US law, international law, and HN law, as well as any UN or other international mandate governing the intervention. Such reviews are done by, or under the supervision of, a military judge advocate or an attorney duly authorized to give legal advice to military commanders.

*For further details on the rule of law, refer to the Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform.*

19. **Evaluation and Assessment**

a. A prompt, comprehensive assessment provides situational understanding of the status of rule of law and describes the deficiencies in a state’s justice and security systems. The assessment addresses the various activities for rule of law and the interaction among them. Ideally, as one activity improves, a positive, synergistic effect influences other activities; in contrast, a degradation of one activity might have an unintended consequence for other activities. Best practice supports the use of a multidisciplinary assessment team composed of intelligence analysts and criminal justice participants (e.g., police, judges, and prosecutors) and nonlegal experts (e.g., political scientists, sociologists, or anthropologists with specialist knowledge of the nation’s politics and culture).

b. One of the most important steps in conducting rule of law programs is determining what law applies in the HN. Such a determination is essential to assist the HN government in building security capacity; to conduct joint security operations with HN forces; to
Joint Stability Functions

restore, administer, and reform those laws and systems when required; and to administer temporary HN laws and legal systems as part of CMO during conflict period or afterwards. Regardless of the type of operation, the restoration or strengthening of HN law is one of the most important factors for stability during military operations.

c. To be effective, the JFC must understand the actual state of the legal system. While knowledge of constitutions, codes, and regulations is a starting point, this understanding must extend to the processes for creating, changing, applying, and enforcing the law, as well as understanding the public’s perception, understanding, and acceptance of the systems. If the JFC has a limited understanding of the HN legal system and its functions, it is difficult to make informed decisions about how US forces can or should operate in relation to that system.

d. Understanding the justice functions at work requires looking beyond the formal structures of courts and laws. The political and social dimensions of the justice system require close scrutiny to strengthen the rule of law. A comprehensive understanding of the justice system includes the identification of key leaders, along with political, societal, tribal, or other relationships that play key roles in the operation of the justice system as a whole.

20. Military Contribution

a. Supporting an Interim Criminal Justice System. When conditions require the restoration of governance, establishing an interim justice system is a prerequisite. The JFC supports other USG departments and agencies upon request. Judicial restoration requires a wide range of skilled professionals working under a clearly defined legal authority: judges, prosecutors, court administrators, defense lawyers, corrections personnel, law enforcement, and investigators. Civilian agencies normally support the development of an interim criminal justice system; however, when operating in a failed state, or during and immediately after conflict, the joint force may be required to supply military police, legal, CA, and other personnel to fulfill these roles. Focused efforts should ensure a basic rule of law with the objective of providing a temporary respite for the HN to restore its capacity. Some short-term measures that have proven successful in post-conflict states include emergency mobile courts; detention review committees; interagency working groups; and secure zones for courts, judicial officials, and their families. The JFC should avoid implementing long-term changes to the justice system but rather focus on immediate needs to deal with crime while minimizing pretrial confinement. In permissive environments, DOS leads efforts to establish an interim criminal justice system with DOD support. In uncertain and hostile OEs, the JFC prepares to execute HN legal functions to ensure public order and the welfare of the local population. Relevant rule of law and anticorruption advisors for the military planning process are helpful since immediate activities impact perceived legitimacy and long-term success.

(1) Transitional Public Security. During the beginning of stabilization activities, US and multinational forces may be required to establish, promote, restore, and maintain public order. Transitional public security may involve missions to include
partnerships with HN security and police forces, military government with the US force performing policing functions, suspension of local judicial administration and establishment of US military courts for the trial of civilians for offenses against local law, and the security measures imposed by the US force as the occupying power.

(a) Public order normally involves the partial restoration of the HN criminal justice system, such as policing, law enforcement, investigations, corrections, and courts. However, restoring those institutions typically requires periods of time ranging from weeks to years. The joint force may be responsible for maintaining public security in the interim, and it may require US military forces to perform police functions, partner with HN security and police forces, or impose martial law.

(b) Key public order activities are required, whether performed by the joint force, international police, or HN police and include the following: community patrols, checkpoints and vehicle inspections, criminal intelligence gathering, criminal investigations, arrests and detention, security and regulation of public gatherings, crowd control, protection of critical infrastructure to prevent looting and destruction, and border security. Other potential activities for the JFC include establish interim criminal justice system, support law enforcement and police reform, support judicial reform, support property dispute resolution process, support justice system reform, support corrections reform, support war crimes courts and tribunals, and support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

(c) The JFC should be prepared to perform critical law enforcement functions as quickly as possible, possibly even while combat is ongoing. The JFC should coordinate the military contribution to the maintenance of public order with international police and the HN police to close or mitigate any gap. In the initial response phase, military forces may be the only capable force available to conduct necessary law enforcement functions. The joint force should assess the capacity and capability of the HN security sector, which will inform plans to restore public order.

(d) The JFC should plan on transitioning these functions as quickly as possible to international police and/or USG advisors and trainers and, finally, HN security forces. Successful transitional public security facilitates the orderly transition of civil security and civil control responsibilities to the HN or other legitimate authorities. Transitional public security allows DOD entities and relevant stabilization partners to pursue training, development, and capacity-building activities aimed at strengthening HN security forces and fostering a stable criminal and civil justice system over the longer term.

(e) Transitional public security is complemented by SSR in which US and multinational forces enable HN partners to provide public security and justice for their own people and respond effectively to security challenges. SSR focuses on the urgent operational requirement to reestablish basic functionality to the HN justice sector quickly, leading to deeper justice sector reform over the longer term.
(2) **Indigenous Police Forces.** Integral to establishing rule of law is the initial support military forces provide to law enforcement and policing operations under transitional public security. While local civilian police forces are established, the joint force may provide security to police forces conducting regular policing activities and to police institutions. These efforts may include international police advisors deployed under the auspices of an international police mission and USG advisors, such as USCG advisory teams. INL develops HN police forces, with assistance from ICITAP and DOD. Once personnel are vetted and trained, HN law enforcement agencies and organizations assume responsibility.

(3) **Legal Framework.** Establishing effective rule of law may require a review of the HN legal framework, a justice reform agenda, and general justice reform programs. Many societies emerging from conflict may require a new constitution. All efforts to establish and support the rule of law should take into account the customs, culture, and ethnicities of the local populace. BHA leads the effort for HN legal system reform. INL and the DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training provide support for reforming sustainable institutions that are fair, effective, impartial, and transparent, and serve and protect the public in accordance with human rights standards, uphold the rule of law, and contribute to HN stability.

(4) **Judicial System.** Initial tasks in the judicial system include establishing legal mechanisms for criminal and civil trials. The support provided to judicial institutions parallels efforts with police and security forces to enhance the state’s capability to maintain civil control and security. Of particular importance, the joint force may be required to provide security for judges and other officials and their families to ensure an independent and fair judiciary. INL leads efforts to establish or reestablish transparent, objective, and independent judicial systems with support from the DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training and the USACE.

(5) **Penal System.** The joint force may be required to support the establishment of appropriate penitentiary facilities to support the criminal justice system. Such facilities should be separate from military detention facilities, tying them to the criminal justice system rather than ongoing military operations. In addition, such facilities should ensure compliance with international detention standards, which require separation by gender and by age (children and adults should be separated). Immediate efforts should be taken, particularly in a post-conflict environment, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the current prisoner population to help reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process and to ensure prison conditions are not drivers of conflict or incubators for adversary or criminal organization and indoctrination. INL leads efforts to build corrections systems and facilities that are safe, secure, and humane and comply with international standards with support from ICITAP, USACE, and the joint force.

b. **Property.** One of the most vital services provided by the judiciary branch is the resolution of property disputes. In a fragile state, long-standing disputes over ownership and control of property are common. Authorities must implement dispute resolution mechanisms. This prevents the escalation of violence that can occur in the absence of the rule of law as people seek resolution on their own terms. Typically, the military’s role in resolving disputes is limited, unless the joint force implements these mechanisms in the
absence of a functioning HN government. CA arts, monuments, and archives personnel can support the immediate recovery and securing of property documentation. Efforts in the area of property are led initially by the HN government, however fragile, followed by the UN or regional organizations such as the Organization of American States or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. DOS, USAID, and possibly DOJ normally play a supporting role.

c. **Contracts.** The ability to enforce personal contracts through an impartial, transparent process is fundamental to a state’s stability. Because contracts form the framework for transactions among individuals and businesses, confidence in the ability to resolve contractual disputes is at the foundation of a viable market economy. As with property disputes, authorities must implement mechanisms to resolve contractual disagreements.

d. **War Crimes Tribunals and Truth Commissions.** While a military governing authority may operate military commissions and provost courts, the international community may oversee the conduct of war crimes courts, tribunals, and truth commissions. As part of the broad processes that represent justice system reform, military forces should identify, secure, and preserve evidence for courts and tribunals of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, military forces also provide support in other forms, to include helping to establish courts and tribunals, supporting the investigation and arrest of war criminals, providing security to courts and tribunals, and coordinating efforts with other agencies and organizations. USG efforts to support war crimes tribunals and truth commissions are led by the USAID Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention (CVP), with support from DOS, DOJ, and DOD.

### 21. Transitions

a. The military’s role in ensuring rule of law, other than providing security, is normally limited. However, when operating in a failed or failing state, especially during and immediately after conflict, the joint force may be required to play a direct role in capacity building of justice systems and security sectors. As soon as the security situation warrants, these programs should be transitioned to civilian agencies, either from the United States and multinational partners or the HN. The initial objective of security should be to strengthen civilian policing and security arrangements, allowing the military to resume its military role.

b. Because rule of law, governance, and security sectors are mutually supporting, the joint force should monitor progress to ensure transitions are coordinated. A lag in one of more programs will likely undermine transitions in the other programs.

### SECTION E. GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

#### 22. General

a. **Governance** is the state’s ability to serve a population through rules, processes, and behavior, by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is
exercised in a society. Participation is a process in which the citizenry confers authority on rulers, accepts the rules of governance, and is attentive to the enforcement and modification of these rules. Participation also refers to programs designed to help the people share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. Legitimacy is predicated on predictable and transparent rules and processes. They are manifested in three core functions: representation, security, and welfare.

(1) **Representation** includes political participation, decision-making procedures, responsiveness, and accountability to the needs of the population, regarding decisions and implementation. The effectiveness and legitimacy of representation depend on their appropriateness in the local context. For example, participatory governance does not necessarily equate to Western-style democratic institutions; it could consist of local informal gatherings of village or tribal leaders common in some nations in the Middle East and Central Asia.

(2) **Security** pertains to the maintenance of a government monopoly over the legitimate use of force. It includes border defense, protection of the population, public security, and maintenance of law and order. Establishing or reestablishing competent HN security is fundamental to providing lasting safety for the population. While security facilitates traditional governance and stabilization tasks, it is also imperative for other key missions, such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and some internal military threats.

(3) **Welfare** refers to the delivery of services that fulfill local populace expectations. Service delivery in this context does not refer to a suite of public services derived from Western states’ or international development models. Rather, welfare is limited to the service the HN can sustainably provide, unaided by the external development community.

(a) Stabilization activities often focus on establishing democratic forms of governance that the citizenry views as legitimate. HN legitimacy in this context is based on popular perceptions of the legal or moral rightness behind a set of activities, as well as the propriety and authority of the individuals or organizations making decisions. Democratic institutions reflect the will of the people and respond to their needs, thereby minimizing disenfranchisement and recruitment by destabilizing actors.

(b) Legitimate, stable governance is a system of mutually supporting economic activity, public-sector capacity, balanced government structures, civil-society advocacy, and political accountability. The rule of law epitomizes democratic institutions and is the basis for enduring legitimacy. Accordingly, the promotion of equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, and accountability are byproducts. Legitimate political power sharing is most enduring among the national branches of government and among the subnational branches of government. A balance of power between the national and subnational governments mitigates the overwhelming power of the central government. The hallmark of this type of democratic structure is a small central
government with clearly delineated vested powers, which simplifies capacity building and ensures government officials are not overwhelmed by the myriad of duties normally associated with a large central government.

(c) A national constitution embodies the rule of law and establishes the branches of government, election criteria and terms of service, authorities, and checks and balances. Legitimate, stable governance is strengthened by local constitutions (e.g., provincial or state). In tribal or decentralized societies, provincial constitutions are attuned to unique needs and expectations of their constituents. A constitution should guarantee the protection of inalienable rights for all citizens. Effective governance requires a body of civil servants to manage mechanisms, so building partner capacity promotes enduring, stable governance.

(d) Democratic forms of governance are the most difficult political systems to manage, so they require checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of power in one political body and/or the degeneration into mob rule. Without a constitution and the licensing of political parties, elections can create sectarian, political, or ethnic violence, thereby creating extreme instability. Care should be taken during the licensing of political parties so as not to unduly exclude some parties for ideological concerns. Iterative elections generally serve to dispense with extremist, incompetent, or corrupt politicians and parties.

b. **Distinguish Governance from Government.** While governance may be predominantly provided by a formal central government, this is not always the case, and the two terms are not synonymous. Governance functions may be carried out by a variety of people in an operational area with considerable local variation. Depending on conditions in the operational area and the development community strategy, the JFC may need to deal with different governance officials and structures depending on the local context. Formal, indigenous governance structures may include central, regional, and local governments. Informal structures are likely to vary considerably among HNs and within them, which may be very difficult to understand for outsiders. They could include tribal and clan structures, religious and spiritual leaders, and clubs and associations, as well as criminal or insurgent organizations.

c. Stabilization efforts seek to build local governance, and participation capacity must ensure these initiatives encourage long-term HN responsibility. Disenfranchised, marginalized, and oppressed citizens may need encouragement to participate in governmental processes. Their leadership is essential to establishing successful, enduring HN government institutions. Even when external organizations, such as the UN or regional coalitions, perform certain governance functions temporarily, the processes to build HN capacity—complemented by comprehensive technical assistance programs—are vital to long-term stability.

d. Developing stable governance in fragile states requires improvements in weakened sectors. Given limited resources of time, money, troops, and organizational capacities, prioritization is essential. Introducing democratic institutions goes beyond the
political realm. For societies emerging from an authoritarian regime, the news media, labor unions, and police services will likely view themselves as extended servants of the party in power. For the press to be free and independent, as opposed to a mouthpiece of the government, the government must honor freedom of expression. Independent labor unions must represent their constituents and establish meaningful labor relations with the government. Democratic police services safeguard constitutional rights and enforce legitimately legislated laws. The development community cannot impose these philosophies on HN institutions. While building capacity is important, persuasion, encouragement, and persistence are effective ways to achieve HN buy-in.

e. Establishing a legitimate HN government generally occurs in graduated stages. In the aftermath of an insurgency, former belligerents must undergo DDR into society (see Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform”). In a major conflict resulting in occupation of an enemy nation, prisoners of war are released incrementally with a view of protecting the economy. For example, occupation authorities should draw up a prioritized release list based on the OE and the needs of the HN. Releases should occur over a period of weeks. Once the reintegration of former belligerents into society occurs, SSR and SC programs may proceed.

f. A permissive security environment enables relevant stabilization partners to implement SSR and SC. Should instability persist, the joint force should be prepared to establish or assist HN public administration or to provide short-term support to an established HN government or interim government. As long as civilian access is limited, joint force assistance to key governance functions is essential for early progress. While such military assistance is a stopgap, a whole-of-government approach requires the integration of civilian expertise and advice in the planning process and with in-theater advisory programs.

For further details on governance and participation, refer to the Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media and Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook.

STABLE GOVERNANCE NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Provision of Essential Services

- The state provides basic security, the rule of law, economic governance.

- Basic human needs services; essential services are provided without discrimination.

- The state has the capacity for provision of essential services without significant assistance from the international community.
23. Evaluation and Assessment

a. The USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment framework is designed to assist leaders in prioritizing and administering HN governance areas needing assistance. Data collection and analysis may involve a combination of research and interviews or focus group sessions with key nation stakeholders.

Stewardship of State Resources

National and subnational institutions of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable personnel; the security sector is reformed and brought under accountable civilian control; and state resources are protected through responsible economic management in a manner that benefits the population.

Political Moderation and Accountability

- The government enables political settlement of disputes; addresses core grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national dialogue.
- Manages change arising from humanitarian, economic, security, and other challenges.
- A national constituting process results in:
  - Separation of powers that facilitates checks and balances.
  - Selection of leaders is determined through inclusive and participatory processes.
  - Legislature reflects the interests of the population.
  - Electoral processes are seen as legitimate.

Civic Participation and Empowerment

- Civil society exists and is empowered, protected, and accountable.
- Media are present, professional, and independent of government or political influence.
- Equal access to information and freedom of expression are upheld.
- Political parties are able to form freely and are protected.

SOURCE: Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.
US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Complementing the ICAF assessment of a prolonged conflict, the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment helps identify and assess key issues, key people, and key institutions in HN governance.

For further details on the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment, refer to Appendix B, “Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process.”

b. The JFC should gather information on the state’s media system (including facilities), prior to and after the conflict. Television and radio studios, presses, and communication systems are often targeted and damaged during conflict. Civilian agencies and international organizations require knowledge about who controls or supports the media, including outside nations, political parties or factions, warlords, and criminal organizations. The assessment also considers broadcast content emanating outside of the state. Psychological operations units assess foreign broadcast media capabilities. Assessments include audience reach, location, equipment broadcast range, and frequencies. During joint operations, this data is integrated as part of JIPOE and facilitates execution of joint information function tasks.

For further details on military information support operations and the collection databases used, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

24. Military Contribution

a. Support National Constitution Processes. When the HN has no established government, because of an internal conflict or an intervention in a failed state, developing a national constitution is typically an important step in establishing a foundation for governance and rule of law. Constitutional division of power, checks and balances of power, and representative bodies are common features of democratic institutions. Structural balance of power resides not only among the central branches of government but also between the national and subnational governments (e.g., states or provinces). As such, subnational government constitutions should nest with the national constitution for preserving the inalienable rights of their citizens. Paradoxically, this form of democratic government suits decentralized or tribal societies. Security is essential to allow a new government to begin the governance process. An inclusive and participatory constitutional process that helps build broad-based consensus on the nation’s political future may help prevent reemergence of violent conflict and enhance security efforts. USG departments or agencies take the lead in supporting these activities. If necessary, the military can support this process with CA functional expertise, as well as provide security and logistic support.

b. Support Transitional Governance. DOS and USAID are responsible for assisting transitional governments. While a transitional civilian authority is the preferred agent for a transitional government, initial transitional military authority (i.e., military government) occurs during the occupation of any portion of enemy territory and may continue in the aftermath of the complete defeat and occupation of an enemy nation. As such, the military may support transitional governments through civil administration, as well as providing security to governmental leaders and institutions of all government
branches. A transitional government is temporary, exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.

c. **Transitional Military Authority (Military Government).** Military government is a product of military necessity, which is the aggregate of activities promoting the swift and successful prosecution of a military operation or campaign. Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government. It must then integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing stabilization partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as the security environment stabilizes. Throughout these activities, the JFC continuously assesses whether current operations enable transfer of overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity. During transitional military authority, the following terms apply:

  (1) **Military Governor.** The military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander’s government or superior.

  (2) **Military Governor Proclamation.** The proclamation, propagated through media outlets, informs the populace of the occupation, the intent of the military operation, and military government ordinances. While the proclamation seeks to allay fears and encourage cooperation from the occupied population, it also instructs them to obey the existing laws and military government ordinance.

  (3) **Military Government Ordinances.** Military government ordinances are enactments establishing the authority of a military governor, promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control. Generally, they impose movement restrictions, prohibitions on civilian interference with military activities, and prohibitions on illegal activities (e.g., hoarding, black market, and theft of military supplies and equipment).

d. **Support Governance.** Support to governance is a stabilization task. Transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control, stability, and civil security. DOS has the lead on foreign policy and controls the majority of the resources that can be used under Title 22, USC, and the Foreign Assistance Act. These resources are typically tied to achieving US interests. Once an interim civilian government is established, military resources are exerted to support civil administration.

e. **Support Local Governance.** Before national governance institutions and processes are established, the military should support establishment of effective local-level governance. Local governments are necessary to restore and protect essential services that provide the basic foundations of security and economic stability. Finding political solutions, at the local level, tends to inform the search for a higher-level political settlement. Military support to local governance may include restoring essential or emergency services as required, supporting civil administration, providing security to
governmental leaders and institutions of all government branches, or performing functions of civil administration, within the limits of established authorities. As soon as the security environment permits, USAID leads local governance support, with support from the DOS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

f. **Support Anticorruption Initiatives.** Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a generally unaccountable and illegitimate minority, and provides elites with illicit means of protecting their positions and interests. Insurgents and political opposition groups often use the issue of corruption to attack the government, which may undermine long-term stability. INL leads the effort to develop the HN’s capability to detect, investigate, prevent, and prosecute corruption in security, justice, and other institutions and promote the implementation of international anticorruption standards with support from within USAID and DOJ.

(1) There is no absolute test of corruption; practices that are acceptable in some societies are considered corrupt in others. Some practices, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and extortion, are considered corrupt in all societies. Nepotistic activities, such as patronage or client-based systems, are accepted in varying degrees. Local customs and norms should guide the commander’s assessment. USAID’s *Anticorruption Assessment Handbook* can assist the JFC.

(2) It may be useful to distinguish between grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers to practices pervading the highest levels of government, leading to an erosion of confidence in the rule of law. Petty corruption involves exchanging small amounts of money or granting minor favors by those seeking preferential treatment. The difference between the two is that grand corruption involves distortion of the central state functions, whereas petty corruption exists within the context of established social frameworks. Only where petty corruption exceeds what is acceptable within local norms, or impinges on the population’s security and well-being, will it need to be controlled as part of a stabilization mission. Otherwise, petty corruption is best dealt with by host government agencies.

(3) Providing the HN government legal guidance and assistance can help mitigate the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures, assisted by civilian agencies, ensure lasting success. The strongest military contribution, other than the provision of legal expertise, is the example set by commanders at all levels.

For more information on corruption and anticorruption, see USAID’s Anticorruption Assessment Handbook.

g. **Support Elections.** The ability of the state and its local subdivisions to stage fair and secure elections may be a significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies and organizations that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace. This certainly includes security but may also
include logistic support. USAID and the DOS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor oversee support to elections and other participation programs.

25. Local Governance and Building on Local Capacities

   a. JFC governance efforts should build on the foundations of existing capacity—while adhering to DOS and USAID policy guidance. By identifying existing capacities on which to build, governance capacity building is more likely to develop approaches that are both systemically desirable and culturally feasible.

   b. HN authority in some states may not extend to all parts of the nation, and some localities may have weak or nonexistent formal state institutions. Different forms of non-state authority, which derives its legitimacy from a mixture of force and local acceptance, often fills a vacuum in state governance. Though not always a panacea, strengthening these informal forms of governance may be a better choice than embarking on slow, costly, and potentially inappropriate state-building exercises. Poorly planned institution building may make matters worse by eroding existing local capacity.

   c. Establishing sufficiently effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance institutions and processes throughout the state. Initially, effective local governance almost depends entirely on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people; restoring these services is also fundamental to humanitarian relief efforts. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces establish mechanisms for local-level participation.

   d. During a conflict or its aftermath, support to local governance tasks is normally conducted by a civilian-military team with military support (e.g., provincial reconstruction team). These interagency teams combine expertise with operational capacity to support HN local institutions directly in establishing legitimate and effective governance. Where these teams are not established, local commanders should work with USG departments and agencies and other PNs to assess, plan, and conduct governance stabilization efforts.

26. Essential Services

   a. Governance is the process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function; effective, legitimate governance ensures these are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Military support to governance focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. Good governance includes the following necessary conditions:

   (1) Provision of essential services.

   (2) Stewardship of state resources.

   (3) Political moderation and accountability.
(4) Civic participation and empowerment.

b. When a legitimate and functional HN government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the HN government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions, some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A state’s domestic legitimacy is related to its perceived ability to provide essential services. In extreme cases, where civil government is completely dysfunctional or absent, military forces may provide basic civil administration functions of government under a transitional military authority.

c. Decisions regarding the selection and priorities of state functions for joint force attention should be in consultation with DOS, USAID, and local authorities. Local confidence in government is enhanced by the visible involvement of HN government authorities in the provision of core functions. Intervention forces should work through and with local authorities. Joint forces should be prepared to execute tasks that local authorities normally lead. However, due to the humanitarian concerns regarding essential service, in alternatively governed areas or territory under military government, this preference should not override the need to restore services as quickly as possible.

d. The joint force follows the guidance of other USG departments and agencies, particularly USAID, in the restoration of essential services. In many circumstances, local or international development and humanitarian organizations may be operating in theater and able to fulfill this function. The military contribution is focused on enabling them to expand their access to the population.

e. Rudimentary essential services can often be restored by locating and working with key existing employees. Joint forces may have experts in public utilities, including CA personnel. These experts should be part of the planning process to restore essential services, including information and communications technology.

f. Securing the provision of essential services is an integral part to providing physical protection to the population. Essential services are often a clear sign of effective governance. Facilities and personnel that provide these services are often perceived as high-value targets for insurgents and other adversaries, so the joint force may need to provide protection.

27. Elections

a. During stabilization operations, elections are often one of the first and most visible steps toward nonviolent political transition, signaling the transfer of authority from the international community to HN leaders. Elections can significantly contribute to stability by providing for peaceful dispute resolution, giving a voice to members of opposition movements, providing broad-based support, and contributing to the legitimacy of the government. In this context, the ability of the United States and relevant stabilization partners to conduct an election support mission successfully, particularly by maintaining a secure environment, can be critical to the establishment of a legitimate government and attainment of mission objectives.
b. Due consideration to the timing and scope of the elections is crucial. In conflicts resulting in regime change and the dismantlement of political structures, elections should start at local levels and occur progressively upwards, culminating with national elections. This bottom-up approach is easier to manage and secure. Further, it provides experience in the electoral process and allows for the formation and development of legitimate political parties. Once the time arrives for national elections, political parties will be better positioned to articulate party platforms and foster political bases.

c. The HN government should implement the election process; however, where HN forces and agencies generate feelings of intimidation and insecurity within the population, international forces and monitoring agencies may be required to oversee and secure the election process. Working in concert, HN government authorities and stabilization partners can craft a comprehensive plan for scheduled elections.

d. Planning should include military tasks to support implementation throughout the entire election process, perhaps extending to several election cycles. While joint forces normally focus on security and logistics tasks, in nonpermissive environments, they may need to perform additional support to HN, USG, and other international civilian agencies election efforts:

(1) Tasks in all phases of the election process.

   (a) Security.

   (b) Logistics.

   (c) PA.

   (d) Unified action.

(2) Tasks in the pre-election phase.

   (a) Elections security.

   (b) Legal framework for elections.

   (c) Voter registration.

   (d) Electoral system.

   (e) HN security force training and mentoring.

   (f) PA and CMO.

(3) Tasks during campaigning and voting.

   (a) Protection of election materials.
(b) Publicity of election sites.

(c) Election-day security.

(d) Election observation, monitoring, and supervision.

(4) Tasks following elections.

(a) Collection and storage of ballots and election materials.

(b) Additional security may be required.

28. Media

a. Although the development of free, independent media is not a primary responsibility of the military, the JFC should prepare the groundwork by assigning CMO and PA sections to these outlets. In the aftermath of a totalitarian regime, rejuvenating freedom of expression requires guidance, encouragement, and patience. This ethos applies not only to the media outlets but also to arts and literature. In essence, unfettered freedom of expression spurs civic participation in governance. The media safeguards the rule of law by holding the government accountable for corruption, incompetence, and overreach. Additionally, media can identify gaps in government services through advocacy. By publicizing public and government activities, the media encourage civic participation and empowerment. In short, the media play an important role in a stable society, and the development of a free press is an important step in stabilization.

b. Stabilization planners should consider the current capacity of the media to print, distribute, and transmit news, as well as the capacity for media education and training. Before developing a media plan, several questions require answers. Who are the main participants in the crisis? Who are the opinion makers? How does the population obtain its information and weather forecasts? Do the citizens have radios, televisions, and access to print media and the Internet? Lastly, what is the literacy rate among the population?

c. During, and in the immediate aftermath of, a conflict, joint forces may establish media outlets to keep the public informed of military activities, USG policy, and multinational force proclamations and ordinances. Particular attention is paid to dispelling rumors and countering false propaganda by adversaries. The joint force should provide critical information to the population about stabilization activities through PA and available media outlets. Information programs need to have an entertainment component (music, culture, arts, and literature) to gain and maintain the attention of audiences. Critical information may include stabilization activities of joint forces, land mine, unexploded ordinance, IED awareness, refugee centers, food and shelter programs, voter registration, and election information. Media outlets may include radio programs, television programs, newspapers, magazines, movies, Internet websites, and social media. Public access to international media outlets should not forestall the development of indigenous media. The JFC’s PA office oversees and works with other
members of the staff to ensure public communications (joint force-sponsored, local, and international media) fulfill the CCS requirements.

d. Aside from the JFC’s PA office, local and international authorities collaborate on the development of public and private media outlets. Funding is paramount, since even private media outlets need sponsors. Start-up tasks include the creation of a legal framework for media operations: licenses, professional standards, and associations for publishers, editors, and journalists; construction and rehabilitation of publishing facilities, machinery, paper mills, transmitters, and theaters; and training and information exchange programs for publishers, editors, broadcasters, and journalists.

e. To avoid perceptions of bias, joint force-sponsored media outlets focus on the dissemination of facts, news events, and items of interest. Joint force media outlets should employ expatriate and local journalists, editors, arts and literature professionals, and broadcasters, since they possess the linguistic and cultural acuity to connect with audiences. Prior to the conclusion of stabilization activities, the joint force should have a transition plan for local media ownership. The transition process should underscore that an independent media, exercising freedom of expression, refrain from becoming spokesmen for political factions.

29. Support to Civil Administration

a. Support to civil administration (SCA) assists in stabilizing a foreign government. SCA consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore civil administration.

(1) SCA in friendly territory includes advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within the limits of authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements. This should include SC and activities to strengthen friendly authorities in conjunction with DOS and appropriate civilian authorities.

(2) During a military intervention, US forces assert transitional military authority, as directed by SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that US forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

b. The joint force may allow the existing government structure to continue under its control and supervision. This arrangement does not mean the United States approves of the existing regime or condones its past activities. It signifies an expedient way to reform a functioning government on short notice, since it is already in place. This process provides a clear path back to locally led governance. This should be done with the support of DOS and USAID.

(1) The JFC may elect to retain all public officials or replace all or selected personnel, for diplomatic or security reasons. In some cases, the JFC may find it necessary to reorganize, replace, or abolish selected agencies or institutions of the existing
government. When feasible, the JFC should engage local leaders to have an active role in establishing the system that works for their culture, values, and norms.

(2) The joint force provides assistance for SCA programs directed toward effecting political reform, strengthening government agencies, and developing self-government at the national and local levels. This may include performing specific functions of governance, such as essential services and security, as well as providing CA and legal expertise to support and assist HN political and governmental leaders.

c. Replacing the existing government and building a new structure are the most drastic options. The JFC should only utilize these options if the old regime has completely collapsed or it poses an intolerable threat to stability. Consequently, the President of the United States directs establishment of civil administration to exercise temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the state in question. US forces assume control as prescribed in directives to the US commander. Military authorities maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory to maintain security and stability. SCA occurs once a civil government is established.

(1) Military occupation is a question of fact. In accordance with the law of war, territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile forces. The authority of the occupying force extends only to territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. International law (including the law of war) establishes specific obligations between the occupying power and the civilian population, involving rights and responsibilities on both sides. Occupying forces assume responsibility for government administration, protection, and the needs of the population (e.g., medical, food, water, shelter, and sanitation). The population is obligated to obey all occupation proclamations, ordinances, and laws.

(2) When required to establish military government, the JFC should establish a transitional military authority to exercise functions of civil administration. Military occupation officials govern indirectly through local officials and direct local police and fire fighters to maintain public order and safety. Military occupation officials rely on local resources to the greatest extent possible for the restoration of essential services. The joint force provides only those resources that cannot be provided by the local communities. Transitional military authorities act on the behalf of the population, while simultaneously ensuring the security of the occupation forces as the top priority. A UN Security Council resolution or similar authority may prescribe specific or additional roles of the transitional military authority.

For further details on military governance, refer to Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities.”

30. Other Considerations

a. Expedient Governance. During stabilization efforts, JFCs influence events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military instrument of national power.
By virtue of their responsibilities to the local populace, they become the executors of national and international policy. They are often required to reconcile long-standing disputes between opposing parties and are entrusted with responsibilities more suited to civilian rather than military expertise. They are frequently called on to restore HN civil authority and institutions to facilitate a desired outcome that supports national and international order. The burdens of governance require culturally astute leaders and joint forces capable of adapting to nuances of religion, ethnicity, and a number of other considerations essential to success. Key resources available to the JFC include foreign area officers and other military regional specialists.

b. **Respect for Religious Customs and Organizations.** The military force should, consistent with security requirements, respect the religious celebrations and the legitimate activities of religious leaders. Religious and political factors often interact within a society, reflecting the motivations and perceptions of the local populace. Religious conventions and beliefs of a society may significantly influence the political dimension of conflict. The methods leaders use to manage religious factors can determine whether conflict and instability result in peace. International law mandates respect for the religious convictions and practices of members of the local citizens. Places of religious worship should remain open unless they pose a specific security or health risk to the military force or the local populace. Religious support personnel assigned within the joint force headquarters are a key resource available to the JFC.

c. **Archives and Records.** Military forces secure and preserve archives and records, current and historical, of all branches of the former government. These documents are of immediate and continuing use to the military force as a source of valuable intelligence and other information. They are of even greater importance to transitional governments by providing invaluable information in running the government.

d. **Mail.** Large quantities of mail and other documents are often found in post offices or at other points of central communications. These may represent an important source of information. The joint force should secure and protect such materials until the forces can deliver them.

e. **Shrines, Cultural Sites, Monuments, and Art.** In general, the joint force protects and preserves all historical and cultural sites, monuments, and works; religious shrines and objects of art; and any other national collections of artifacts or art. The destruction or vandalism of these institutions not only presents potential violations of international law but can also provide significant propaganda victories to adversaries. The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, ratified by the United States in 2009, requires occupying forces to “as far as possible, support the competent national authorities of the occupied nation in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.” In providing such protection, however, the joint force must be mindful of the perceptions they create and comply insofar as possible with relevant cultural constraints. The protection of cultural property under the Convention is not absolute. If cultural property is used for military purposes, or in the event of imperative military necessity, the protection afforded by the Convention is waived.
f. **Vetting.** Successful capacity building relies on dependable vetting processes to screen potential HN civil servants. These processes help commanders select qualified, competent officials while reducing the threat of security risks. Vetting processes should include the participation of local citizens to ensure transparency, cultural sensitivity, and legitimacy. Commanders should monitor these processes closely to prevent the exclusion of specific religious, ethnic, or tribal groups. Commanders should include the use of counterintelligence support, biometrics screening, and I2 products to increase the effectiveness of security vetting processes.

  g. **Atrocities.** Under certain circumstances, the transitional military authority may be required to contend with the aftermath of atrocities, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To the greatest extent possible, the transitional military authority should assist, if called upon, in establishing commissions and with identifying, processing, and memorializing remains of victims. These are especially sensitive matters. The transitional military authority performs these tasks with appropriate sensitivity and respect for local culture and customs.


  h. **Corruption.** Often, the transitional military authority contends with corruption in certain sectors of the HN. Transparent, legitimate processes are fundamental to effective anticorruption programs. Therefore, the transitional military authority needs appropriate anticorruption measures to counter the influence of corrupt officials in HN institutions. Well-intentioned influx of large amounts of cash or goods without sufficient monitoring and safeguards can exacerbate corruption or create it where none existed before. Nevertheless, the military authority should not dismiss corrupt officials before considering the effect of their prestige and influence, as well as the availability of ethical and competent replacements.

### 31. Transitions

  a. Poorly timed and conceived transitions create opportunities for hostile groups to exploit. This is particularly true if the HN government fails to discharge a responsibility adequately that was previously discharged by intervening organizations. Such an outcome severely undermines population confidence in the government. However, an overly cautious and slow approach to transition can also lead to a loss of confidence in the government or create a dependent culture that institutionalizes the international presence and prolongs the intervention.

  b. The transition of governance to HN authorities will not occur by default. Establishing sustainable governance involves extensive international and interagency coordination from the outset to ensure a successful transition. Joint force support to governance should focus on restoring the capacity of the HN, as well as enabling relevant stabilization partners.
SECTION F. SECURITY COOPERATION

32. General

a. Establishing or reestablishing competent HN security forces is fundamental to providing lasting safety and security for the HN and its population. These forces primarily counter external threats; however, they also assist in other key missions, including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and some other internal military threats. Developing HN security forces is integral to successful stabilization activities and includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of HN security forces.

b. SC consists of all DOD interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and PNs. SC is often coordinated by the US military’s SC organization in a nation. These interactions include all DOD-administered SA programs that build defense and security relationships and promoting specific US security interests. Such interests include all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities to:

(1) Develop friendly, partner, and allied military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

(2) Build partnership capacity and enhance or establish relationships with regional national militaries that promote bilateral and coalition interoperability, strategic access, and regional stability.

(3) Gain operational access that supports US strategic requirements in a theater providing freedom of movement and freedom of action during military operations. Access also facilitates other means of support, to include information and intelligence sharing and technology.

33. Evaluation and Assessment

a. SC activities seek to promote stability, develop alliances, and gain and maintain access through security relationships that build both partner capacities and capabilities. The capacities and capabilities of partners directly correlate to the type of activities undertaken. SC goals range from creating a positive relationship that allows freedom of movement, to creating global security interoperability with core partners, to addressing regional security organizations and alliance organizations. A broad range of interconnected and integrated SC operations, activities, and investments can be leveraged to achieve strategic objectives.

b. SC focuses on a wide variety of interoperability programs with HN militaries and core partners and less-advanced security forces of a fragile HN. Military forces use SC efforts to achieve mid- to long-term objectives with partners. Although military forces
may require short-term activities, they take extreme care not to put long-term objectives, nationally and regionally, at risk. The size of SC offices varies from nation to nation based on the size and complexity of the SC program needed to achieve the JFC’s and country team’s objectives.

c. Each SC activity is distinct, based on context and changes over time. SC activities and their purposes adapt as conditions change and as resource availability changes. These activities often span multiple objectives and outcomes and support the CCP’s objectives.

34. Military Contribution

The JFC supports SC through SA, SFA, FID, and SSR. The JFC often uses Title 10 (and Title 22), USC, authorities—which direct training, manning, and equipping of US forces—to support SC. As such, SC embodies sustained activities executed discretely or in concert with each other across the competition continuum, consolidating many requirements, authorities, and force structures.

35. Transitions

a. SC may directly support multiple objectives associated with stability. For example, defense institution building supports the establishment of stable governance or SA, and SFA supports the establishment of a safe and secure environment and a sustainable economy.

b. SC should ensure the assistance provided does not overwhelm the HN’s absorptive capacity. Any assistance the HN receives is useless if it cannot organically provide for the logistics, sustainment, and lifecycle management of the provided defense articles and services. Additionally, all HN assistance should be coordinated with the embassy country team to allow for diplomatic oversight, which will help to ensure there are no adverse impacts to the regional balance of a power and potentially be a catalyst for a destabilizing event in the region (i.e., security dilemma).
CHAPTER IV
STABILIZATION PLANNING

“Already the cities of Germany are being destroyed by bombing; after they have been subjected to military operations, they . . . will be in serious condition. The economy of Germany and Japan will be severely disorganized and in many respects destroyed prior to military occupation. It is highly probable that a great wave of lawlessness, disorder, famine, pestilence, and chaos will attend the collapse of both Germany and Japan. The maintenance of law and order, the reestablishment of essential services, the feeding of starving populations, the maintenance of health and the suppression of epidemics, and initiation of the healing processes of rehabilitation—these will constitute tasks of the greatest magnitude.”

The Public Opinion Quarterly: The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Winter 1943)

1. General

   a. JFCs and their staffs develop OPLANs that integrate offense, defense, and stabilization activities, as well as the military’s stabilization efforts with the activities of interorganizational partners. JFCs should ensure subordinate commanders executing stabilization activities understand the overall planning of the operation; the interrelation and integration of various military and civilian stabilization efforts; and the significance of these efforts on joint force missions, tasks, and activities.

   b. CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs incorporate stabilization activities into planning processes. Stabilization activities play an important role in major operations, campaigns, and limited contingency operations. While national policy drives strategy, strategy in turn informs policy of the practical impacts on stabilization efforts.

   c. Stabilization activities are an integral part of joint operations that focus on achieving dual elements essential to strategic success: defeating the threat and ensuring security and stability throughout the operational areas to enable reconstruction and development. Executed promptly and continuously throughout joint operations and aligned with broad national interests and policy goals, stabilization activities provide an effective proactive tool for reducing violence regardless of circumstances and building partner capacity. Effective stabilization activities assist nations recovering from a conflict or disaster and provide resiliencies for HN by addressing possible drivers of conflict and capacity gaps. Stability planning is integral to the planning process for military operations, campaigns, disaster response, and humanitarian assistance. Planning and execution of joint operations demand a comprehensive understanding regarding the interplay of offense, defense, and stabilization endeavors.

   d. While defeating an enemy may remove a physical threat to security, establishing prompt and enduring stability remains a significant challenge. Therefore, effective joint planning considers the key elements of conflict transformation—how joint, interagency,
and international activities can mitigate the drivers of violent conflict to achieve stability and strategic objectives.

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

   a. A comprehensive understanding of the OE enhances the development of stability to pursue realistic, achievable objectives and to align ends, ways, and means of the JFC. Understanding of the OE is accomplished through JIPOE and the collective staff assessment. Through enhanced understanding of the OE, the JFC can improve the ability to:

      (1) Decipher the true nature of the problem for stabilization resolution.

      (2) Develop realistic objectives.

      (3) Develop an operational approach that is relevant to the character of the conflict, appropriate for the operational area, and achievable in view of JFC capabilities and available resources.

      (4) Consider relevant aspects of the OE during the planning and execution of activities and operations that produce lethal and nonlethal effects.

      (5) Consider potential second- and third-order effects.

      (6) Provide feedback from the JFC to policy makers about the operational feasibility of strategic objectives on stabilization.

   b. The OE is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the JFC’s decision making and use of available capabilities. The OE typically encompasses relevant actors, physical areas, factors of physical domains, and information environments, including cyberspace. A holistic understanding of the OE requires judgment of operationally relevant features. Understanding relevant participants’ decision making and associated behaviors are particularly important. Effective stabilization ultimately depends on the ability of the nation to apply diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to persuade.

   c. Stabilizing the OE requires interactive planning, execution, and continual assessment of various operational aspects.

      (1) Planning. Gaining an understanding of the OE is part of the mission analysis process during planning. Identifying the diverse causes of instability is difficult because they are rarely apparent, so planners seek information from literature, subject matter experts, and other sources before applying judgement. The joint planner can use a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning to craft a mission statement and distinct COA. This can be used to inform the JFC and assist in formulating the commander’s intent and concept of the operation. The iterative planning process hones understanding as the
OE changes and more information comes in. This staff dialogue helps the JFC anticipate potential second- and third-order effects for the development of contingency plans.

(2) **Execution.** The execution of an operation changes the OE, so continual assessment is necessary to recognize emerging obstacles to and opportunities for mission success. The JFC and staff direct the collection of information from the operational and tactical levels for continual assessment. Information that impacts stability helps the staff allocate timely and appropriate resources against problems that may negatively affect military operations. As examples, early detection and response to an outbreak of disease prevents an epidemic that may spread to joint forces; guiding mass groups of displaced persons along lines of communications to safe areas precludes disruption of maneuver and momentum; and immediate regeneration of local economies reduces civilian pilferage of military supplies, hoarding, and a black market. Military necessity is not strictly military in execution but involves the entirety of efforts necessary to bring an operation swiftly and successfully to conclusion.

(3) **Assessment.** Operational assessment in stabilization links the theoretical (prediction of relevant actors’ COAs) with the actual (how are the actors behaving?). It helps answer the question: what is the current status of the OE in relation to the established objectives of the operation? By developing a clear understanding of the current state of these relevant factors, a determination can be made about progress (or lack thereof) toward the desired outcome of the stabilization activities.

For more details on assessment, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

d. OE in Stabilization Efforts

(1) **Components.** The various components of the OE provide a lens through which a joint force may gain an understanding of relevant participants’ decision making and associated behaviors.

(2) **Participants.** The human component is the most important for understanding the OE. These include the population, friendly elements of the joint force, and threats. Other relevant participants may include supporting states and non-state entities (e.g., transnational terrorist or criminal organizations) and/or the NGO community. By first understanding who the participants are and learning as much as possible about them, the JFC develops an approach that may influence the participants’ decision making and behavior (active or passive) in a way that is consistent with the stability operation. Individuals may fit into more than one category (e.g., a tribal leader may work as a district governor, while also working behind the scenes to provide financial and material support to an adversary). Network engagement can provide a framework for classifying relevant participants, and network analysis can help identify linkages, relationships, and dependencies among them. Sociocultural factors require consideration when conducting some identity activities (e.g., biometrics collection), since the general population or NGOs may perceive them overly intrusive. However, when conducted in concert with HN forces
or the NGO community, identity activities can greatly increase operational precision and general security of the HN population, as well as the effective provision of services to affected communities. For example, biometrics collection can prevent the infiltration of external militants into local communities. Identification documents prevent individuals from amassing humanitarian assistance supplies from distribution points.

*For more information on network engagement and network analysis, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.*

(3) **Physical Factors.** In stabilization efforts, the physical factors of the operational area typically and predominantly concern the land domain and littorals. It includes the terrain (including urban settings), infrastructure (including the location of bases and ports), topography, hydrology, hydrography, oceanography, meteorology, and climatology of the operational area, as well as the distances associated with deployment to the operational area and the employment of forces and other joint capabilities. Collectively, many of these factors influence the operational design and sustainment of joint operations. In stabilization efforts, the most important aspects of the physical factors are those that either provide insight into, or impact, the decision making and behavior of the various relevant participants within the operational area. Appreciation of these aspects of the OE facilitates planning and execution of the stabilization efforts.

(4) **Information Environment.** The information environment refers to the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is integral to the OE. Depending on the specific OE, relevant aspects of the information environment may include media outlets (e.g., radio and television), Internet communications (e.g., e-mail, news sites, and social networking sites), landline and cellular telephone communications, and radio communications. Information influences perceptions, behaviors, and decision making of various audiences in the OE. It is important to monitor and be prepared to clarify unintentional misinformation as well as intentional disinformation. The information environment also includes the infrastructure and technology that supports the various types of communication. Understanding the key aspects of the information environment enhances the JFC’s ability to understand, anticipate, and/or influence the behavior of relevant actors within the OE.

*For more information, see JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.*

*For more details on the holistic view of the OE, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.*

**e. Establish an Evolving COP**

(1) The JFC maintains situational awareness of the OE through development of a COP. A COP is a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. The COP is not a real-time common presentation but is based on
parameters approved by the JFC for understanding relevant aspects of the OE by joint and, if possible, interagency and multinational partners. It provides a common awareness of the OE from which to diagnose the nature of the operational problem(s) that the joint force is trying to resolve, and it helps the various partners in an operation plan solutions in a synchronized manner over time and space to create desired effects. To be successful, a

**COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS**

The processes and procedures for establishing a common operational picture (COP) will differ for each operation. The following considerations may be applicable to a COP:

**Collaborative.** A COP is developed among all relevant members of the force. This means a COP is civil-military, joint, interagency, and multinational based on the participants—assuming all are present and relevant. To the extent possible, include elements of the host-nation government and the nongovernmental organization community.

**Comprehensive.** A COP incorporates information from all relevant available sources to include entities from within and outside of the intelligence community. This information is fused together through a system that makes sense for the size and construct of the force. To the extent possible, the process for development of a COP includes a strategy for overcoming cultural, classification, and information technology-related barriers to sharing information.

**Continuity.** A COP includes systems for maintaining continuity across deployments as personnel are moved into new roles. This is particularly essential as personnel redeploy out of theater and new personnel arrive.

**Evolving.** A COP includes systems for adding new information, updating information that already exists, and correcting/modifying aspects of the COP that are no longer accurate.

**Process for Understanding.** A COP includes systems and processes to ensure the right people develop the understanding they need from which to plan and execute. In the development of a COP, collection, collation, and analysis are only as good as the strategy for dissemination and information management.

**Focused and Tailored.** A COP accounts for the limits of personnel to absorb large amounts of data. The concept of a COP does not require every actor to know everything about the operational environment. Instead, at the operational level, a COP requires a collaborative understanding of the minimum information required to inform the operation.

*SOURCE: Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency, National Research Defense Institute, by Ben Connable*
COP should include significant USG partners and—to the extent possible—other relevant stabilization partners. However, in view of the sensitivity of some operating information and intelligence/information, as well as the JFC and COM’s information-sharing procedures, a comprehensive, overarching COP may be a challenge. The COP evolves as the operation or campaign progresses. This requires agreed upon processes for incorporating new information, updating the information that has already been accounted for, and eliminating information that is old and/or no longer accurate.

(2) Without a COP, partner entities within the joint force likely analyze problems differently, leading to uncoordinated attempts at solutions that may undermine if not conflict with one another. This diminishes unity of effort, which dilutes the impact of the joint forces’ activities and messaging and often leads to the inefficient or even counterproductive use of resources. While the COP is normally maintained by the JFC, subordinate commanders may also maintain their common tactical pictures (CTPs). A CTP is an accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network, ground network, intelligence network, and sensor networks. At the tactical level, the CTP is a source of situational awareness. CTP data is often used to inform the JFC’s COP.

f. JIPOE Process Considerations for Stabilization Efforts

(1) JIPOE is a key process by which the JFC understands stabilization within the OE. The JIPOE process yields important information that helps the JFC identify relevant actors, as well as understand, anticipate, and/or influence relevant participants’ decision making and associated behavior with respect to the JFC’s objectives for stabilization. Through JIPOE, information about the OE is made useful to those charged with planning and executing stabilization efforts.

(2) The four steps of the JIPOE process are:

(a) Define the OE.

(b) Describe the impact of the OE.

(c) Evaluate the adversaries and other relevant actors.

(d) Determine potential COAs of the adversary(ies) and relevant participants.

(3) Although military defeat of a threat is almost always integral to stabilization, it is one component of a comprehensive approach to influence participants’ decision making and associated behaviors, aligned with the joint force’s desired outcome. Thus, JIPOE for stabilization efforts uses the same four steps of the JIPOE process with a specified focus.

(4) While defeating threats is important, it is equally important to avoid creating new threats. Maintaining good relationships with the civilian population requires JFCs
immediately acknowledge and address in a culturally appropriate way all incidental harm resulting from military operations. The intervening authority should have established mechanisms to mitigate civilian harm.

_for a more detailed discussion on the stabilization efforts considerations for the JIPOE process, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence._

3. Strategic Guidance

The National Security Council assists the President in developing guidance for stability and reconstruction. The ICAF provides a framework for USG assessment prior to stabilization activities. This assessment can help determine roles, responsibilities, and intergovernmental relationships for all USG department and agencies.

4. Planning Stabilization

a. Joint force stabilization efforts are invariably necessary and complementary to defeat enemies. Operations planning involves developing a comprehensive approach that integrates the capabilities and contributions of relevant stabilization partners toward a common purpose of security and stability. The comprehensive approach serves as a centerpiece for unity of effort in stabilization. In developing this overarching plan, the JFC and staff employ the same principles of operational design and planning utilized in JP 5-0, _Joint Planning_. Combat and stabilization are neither sequential nor binary alternatives; the JFC integrates and synchronizes stabilization activities with offensive and defensive activities throughout a joint operation. The JFC’s visualization of the operation determines the emphasis placed on each type of activity as the situation develops.

b. As planning for stabilization begins, the situation may be ambiguous, so assumptions will most likely outnumber facts. Planners are reminded that assumptions are only useful to continue planning and must be cancelled or turned into facts as soon as possible. As planning develops, the situation becomes more definitive, but uncertainty is still present. Once the operation unfolds and greater understanding develops, the objectives and conditions required to realize them are refined through learning, adaptation, and anticipation. Irrespective of offensive and defensive activities, securing and stabilizing areas of occupation are necessary enablers for success.

c. Operational Approach

(1) Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an OE with the problem analyzed through operational design. This understanding enables JFCs to develop an operational approach to guide the force in establishing those conditions for lasting success. Commanders use common doctrinal terms to visualize and describe their operational approach. The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.

(2) The operational approach conceptualizes the JFC’s visualization for establishing the conditions that define the desired outcome. Land operations invariably
occur in populated areas, so the joint force must factor in the presence of civilians during a mission. In military operations, the most effective operational approach achieves decisive results through balanced combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms. While the stability mechanisms leverage the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, the defeat mechanisms enable the commander to focus the coercive capabilities of the force to provide security, public order, and safety for the local populace.

(3) The conditions of an OE ultimately determine the operational approach. As JFCs and staffs frame the problem during planning, they determine the initial combination of stability and defeat mechanisms necessary for mission accomplishment. This process ends with an integrated, synchronized plan for an operation that pursues the desired outcome. At times, military forces intervene in an unstable and violent situation, in which military forces may initially use defeat mechanisms while protecting the civil populace. In a relatively benign environment where military forces primarily assist or facilitate civil efforts, stability mechanisms dominate.

(4) Stability and Defeat Mechanisms

(a) Stability Mechanisms. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which the joint force establishes secure conditions for the prosecution of other joint stability functions. Some of these functions recover quickly from change in terms of conflict transformation, thereby mitigating the drivers of conflict. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help shape the human dimension of OEs more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

(b) Defeat Mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. They are defined in terms of the broad operational and tactical effects they produce, both physical and psychological. Commanders translate these effects into tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to defeat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Military forces prove most successful when applying deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms. As with stability mechanisms, this produces complementary and reinforcing effects not available with a single mechanism. The four defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.

(c) Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning by providing focus in framing complex problems; they offer the conceptual means to solve them. By combining the mechanisms, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore, one element of the force can focus on reestablishing security and control, while another element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. These focuses are essential in operations conducted among the people where ultimate success is often gauged by the effectiveness of stabilization efforts. Thus, early and deliberate combinations of stability and defeat
mechanisms are vital to success, especially in environments where participants may face active opposition. Combinations of the mechanisms serve to inhibit threats to stability, create an environment of normalcy, and set conditions for military forces to transition stabilization tasks appropriately to other stabilization partners.

d. **Elements of Operational Design in Stabilization**

(1) JFCs and their staffs use the operational art and operational design as tools to understand the OE, visualize and describe their operational approach, and include stability as an operational enabler. The elements of operational design are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that tie stabilization activities to attaining the desired end state. They help refine and focus the CONOPS for the development of a detailed plan or order. During execution, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational design as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds.

(2) Commanders supervise all stabilization tasks within the framework of conflict transformation, which addresses and mitigates all sources of instability. However, the implementation of stabilization tasks may result in unintended consequences. During planning, commanders make all efforts to view stabilization tasks through a culturally focused lens and examine them beyond the first order of effects. Sometimes the populace’s perception of an action, rather than the action itself, creates unrest. This can strike directly at the legitimacy of the operation, especially within the HN populace. While military forces are unlikely to understand all the cultural nuances of an affected society, they should possess humility and an openness to increase awareness. In this manner, they can ameliorate the unintended consequences of an action.

(3) Planning for stability in operations draws on all elements of operational design. However, certain elements are more relevant than others, and some, in particular, are essential to successful operations characterized by stabilization tasks.

(4) **Desired Stability Conditions**

(a) Generally, the end state is a set of desired conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation or campaign transitions or concludes. JFCs achieve strategic objectives through integrated, collective activities of all the instruments of national power. Ultimately, the objective shapes the operation’s character.

(b) Integrating military and nonmilitary capabilities through collaborative planning enables success. These efforts focus on the development of conditions that support a stable, lasting peace.

(c) The JFC and joint force staff should reframe the stability conditions and criteria for consolidating gains as military operations progress and the OE evolves. At the same time, the JFC should guard against an unintentional expansion of tasks and responsibilities, sometimes called mission creep. Hence, the JFC continually monitors
operations and assesses their progress using MOEs and MOPs in regard to stability conditions. These conditions form the basis for decisions that ensure stabilization efforts progress consistently toward the desired end state. Effective stabilization activities relate back to military necessity, alignment with the commander’s objectives, and achievement of the desired outcome.

(d) Stabilization activities capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These civil-military efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, reform institutions to enhance sustainable peace and security, foster a sense of national unity, and create the conditions that enable the HN government to reassert civic responsibilities.

(5) Decisive Points

(a) A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. Examples include:

1. Securing and repairing key sea and air ports for assured logistics;
2. Rejuvenation of local economies and supporting infrastructures to obviate the need to provide for the populace;
3. Immediate medical responses to disease outbreaks to forestall epidemics;
4. Peaceful settlement of major labor strikes or unrest to preclude the use of force;
5. Rebuilding key infrastructure along lines of communications;
6. Securing national borders;
7. Obtaining the political support of key leaders for a transitional authority;
8. Establishing local governments, crafting constitutions, holding political elections, and reducing violence and crime to manageable levels; and

(b) Commanders identify decisive points that most directly influence stability conditions. Effective decisive points enable JFCs to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Ceding control of a decisive point may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination, or expose the
force to undue risk. Decisive points shape the planning of operations and help commanders select clearly decisive, achievable objectives.

(c) Decisive points in stabilization delineate key activities or events required to achieve progress toward increased stability by changing key aspects of the OE. During stabilization, decisive points may be less tangible and more closely associated with important events and conditions, and they typically relate to the human dimension of the problem.

(d) Commanders may associate essential stabilization tasks with decisive points. This affiliation promotes a balance of objectives with stabilization activities. Success requires identifying, prioritizing, and sequencing these essential tasks to minimize the impact on combat power. Accordingly, tactical-level information identifies which tasks are within the capabilities of local communities, which tasks require some assistance, and which tasks require substantial assistance. The availability of other stabilization partners is an attendant variable as well. Military necessity serves as guidance for attending to these essential tasks. In the aftermath of a conflict, stabilization efforts should continue with the focus on transitioning to civil authorities.

(6) LOEs

(a) An LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. LOEs are essential for tracking progress in stabilization, with the human dimension typically as the focus of effort. Effective LOEs link tasks, effects, conditions, and the objective. LOEs are essential to helping JFCs visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They prove particularly valuable where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical, and when used to achieve unity of effort involving other stabilization partners.

(b) LOEs combine the complementary, enduring effects of stabilization tasks with the cyclic, short-term events typical of offensive or defensive tasks. Commanders at all levels use LOEs to develop tasks, identify complementary and reinforcing activities, and allocate resources appropriately. Commanders may designate activities on one LOE as the decisive effort and others as shaping efforts.

(c) JFCs synchronize and sequence related activities across multiple LOEs. LOEs are interdependent, and often, a specific LOE cannot begin until forces create certain initial conditions. Similarly, LOEs do not necessarily progress nor reach their desired outcomes simultaneously. A full complement of LOEs may also include lines focused on offensive and defensive activities, as well as an LOE that addresses the information element of combat power. Tasks along an information LOE typically produce effects across multiple LOEs.

(d) The six joint stability functions provide a framework for identifying the stabilization tasks that exert the greatest influence on an OE. They help to identify the breadth
and depth of relevant civil-military tasks and emphasize the relationships among them. The joint stability functions form the basis for the collaborative interagency planning that leads to developing LOEs, which synchronize the activities of all instruments of national power.

(e) When planning activities, JFCs and staffs study the preexisting HN systems (e.g., political, economic, legal) prior to the conflict or onset of instability. JFCs and staffs consider the implications of USG policies and strategic guidance on the sustainability of stabilization. As operations progress, JFCs often modify LOEs after assessing conditions and collaborating with stabilization partners. LOEs typically remain focused on integrating the capabilities of military operations, while other instruments of national power may support a broader, comprehensive approach to operations. Because each operation is unique, JFCs develop and modify LOEs to keep operations focused on achieving the objective, even as the situation evolves.

(f) Detailed planning requires identifying decisive points along LOEs and closely coordinating with ongoing stability efforts. The aim is to provide tangible progress consistent with supporting the USG strategic objectives in the HN. Close civilian and military coordination is required to ensure short-term activities required to provide security do not undermine long-term political and economic development goals.

(g) Experience has shown that outcome-oriented LOEs require coordinated activity across sectors and functions. LOEs defined around individual sectors or stability functions and assigned to separate functional staff elements may result in counter-productive stove-piping and an inability to synchronize.

e. **Window of Opportunity.** At the initial employment of the joint force, following a transition from sustained combat operations, or following a public change in strategy, a limited window of opportunity exists to demonstrate progress in a manner consistent with the priorities and expectations of the local population. This interlude may provide a period of political will and opportunity for the international community and HN to take actions that address the drivers of conflict and instability. This window of opportunity is an indeterminate but finite period, the length of which will depend on the circumstances.

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**EXAMPLE OPERATIONAL APPROACHES IN STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES**

The following vignettes are designed to illustrate key points related to operational design involving stabilization activities. These vignettes are illustrative, not comprehensive.

**Joint Task Force (JTF) Able** is tasked to train military units of Nation X-ray in desert military operations. The US military is conducting this mission due to unique expertise in this training. The military end state is the establishment of the capability within Nation X-ray forces. Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), Able focuses the military objectives wholly toward this end state, and JTF Able will redeploy once the capability has been established.
A devastating earthquake takes place in the mountainous frontier of Nation Yoke. The Department of State requests assistance from the Department of Defense. JTF Baker is tasked to support the foreign humanitarian assistance operation in the mountainous frontier of Nation Yoke. The US military is able to conduct this mission because it has disaster relief supplies, a deployable logistics coordination capability, and helicopters readily available.

The concept of operations describes the arrival of disaster relief supplies, the establishment of logistics coordination body by Nation Yoke, and clear roads that will allow a flow of supplies into the mountains. CJTF Baker establishes the following lines of effort: support the United States Agency for International Development as it assists Nation Yoke in establishing a disaster relief coordination center, conduct immediate humanitarian assistance in the affected area, and clear roads into the region to allow the passage of supplies. Once international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have facilitated the arrival of disaster relief supplies, Nation Yoke has established a coordination center, and the roads are clear to permit the flow of supplies, JTF Baker will redeploy. Note that although JTF Baker focused on providing appropriate humanitarian assistance to disaster victims, the completion of this relief did not describe the objectives, and indeed, relief efforts may be ongoing even as JTF Baker redeploys.

JTF Charlie is deployed to Nation Zebra conducting a counterinsurgency campaign to try to bolster the newly installed Zebra government. The US military is conducting the mission because Nation Zebra security forces are not capable of securing the population against ongoing insurgent attacks; additionally, the US military is conducting stabilization activities because the operational environment is too dangerous for many international organizations and NGOs to conduct stabilization efforts. The objective is the combination of capable Zebra security forces and declining insurgent forces such that Zebra forces can provide civil security and an operational environment that will permit civilian conduct of comprehensive stabilization efforts.

CJTF Charlie establishes the following lines of effort: conduct operations to secure the population; conduct offensive operations against insurgent groups; conduct stabilization activities to help normalize this fragile state; assist in efforts to achieve a political settlement; and build Zebra security force capacity. Once Zebra forces are capable of securing the population and personnel of civilian nation building institutions and conducting sustained operations against the insurgency, JTF Charlie will redeploy. Note that although the defeat of the insurgency did not describe the end state, military objectives designed to defeat the insurgency were a key part of JTF Charlie’s operation, and the achievement of a political settlement among competing elites remains a primary objective of the overall US effort.
(1) Plans and CONOPS should address this period early and in depth. Failure to act during this period results in a loss of operational momentum. Regaining the initiative after this period has passed is not impossible, but it is more difficult.

(2) Tasks during this period focus on security, allowing other stabilization activities to proceed. The specific requirements will vary according to the circumstances, but consideration should be given to the following:

(a) Physically securing the population, critical infrastructure, and facilities for essential services. Based upon threat, establish population control measures, especially at the borders, to protect and defend the population and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Population control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, collection of biometric information, and voluntary resettlement.

(b) Providing humanitarian assistance to the population, including assistance to DCs (e.g., refugees and IDPs).

(c) Executing QIPs that are verified by CA forces, civil-military teams, or other elements at the tactical level, with minimum delay by a streamlined funding process to reestablish essential services and critical infrastructure.

(3) Transformation occurs over the long term, and attention to transformation activities and activities that foster sustainability competes intensely with the short-term action requirements during this initial period. The JFC, together with the COM and other civilian counterparts, determine critical immediate tasks of longer-term programs, the commitment of resources, and immediate implementation.

(4) **Stabilization in Operations and Campaigns.** Commanders determine the number and purpose of phases used during an operation, as appropriate. Operations and campaigns are based on the following predominant military activities: competition, penetration, and disintegration. Throughout these activities, stabilization is integral, requiring an appropriate balance between offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities. Most importantly, planning for stabilization efforts should begin when joint planning is initiated.

(a) **Competition.** Competition revolves around securing US interests and national security, as well as maintaining stability in the international system, which embodies rule of law, free markets, self-defense, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Since the Second World War, the United States has safeguarded the international system through international organizations, regional associations, alliances, treaties, agreements, and conventions. During this era, new nations have emerged, with several requiring assistance to maintain stability. While assistance varies, depending on the nature of the problems and involvement of stabilization partners, the United States often engages in SC and similar activities to assist struggling nations. As the term implies, competition involves protecting the international order from disruptions, challenges, and violent conflict. Whether peaceful
or not, competition involves ideological, economic, political, and defensive tensions. When it is in national interests and as a strategic objective, the United States employs the military instrument of national power to restore stability in a nation or region. Competition is continuous because the conditions that define an acceptable state are continually changing and require adaptation in action. There are four core elements of competition: influence, advantage, and leverage form the common, fundamentally interrelated aspects through which an actor advances and protects the fourth core element, its interests.

For a detailed discussion of competition, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

(b) In anticipation of a military operation or campaign, the USG establishes policy and strategic guidance regarding US actions in the OE. Foreign area officers, CA forces, and SOF begin focused studies on the political, economic, legal, civil order, educational, and security factors that affect a US intervention. These experts consult stabilization partners, academia, think tanks, and literature to ensure the United States is prepared to address joint stability functions. As time and conditions permit, these same experts dedicate time and effort to further study the problem, to ensure our readiness for hostilities, and to ensure our readiness to move to other phases of the military operation. The initial goal for the coordination and studies is to develop messages to influence select foreign groups, to determine actions to influence behavior, degrade adversary combat capability, reduce interference from the local populace, minimize damage, and increase local support during the conduct of operations. CA and military information support operations (MISO) efforts support the broader focus on countering adversary military capabilities, while simultaneously developing plans for influencing political, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure aspects of the OE. USG policies and strategic guidance provide direction regarding the occupation of liberated territory and enemy territory.

(c) Penetration. The JFC may establish specialty stability functions to render assistance to communities unable to manage specific problems. As an organizational technique for CMO, the JFC may consider broadening the J-9 within the joint echelons of command, as well as the establishment of civil-military teams, joint civil-military operations task forces (JCMOTFs), CMOCs, CA forces, and task-organized CA units for the planning, resourcing, and implementation of joint stability functions. In conjunction with CA forces, the MISO efforts often focus on influencing the perceptions and actions of the local population to gain acceptance of the military operation and to reject enemy support, presence, and activities. While MISO efforts focus on increasing support for stability, US efforts, and US military forces, MISO also works to increase local support for the HN government and elimination destabilizing elements and criminal activity. The size of these elements varies according to the earmarked size of population centers (i.e., villages, towns, and cities). CA forces should accompany land forces during offensive actions to establish stability in the rear areas, especially along the lines of communications. The J-9 produces JFC proclamations, ordinances, directives, and guidance asserting transitional military authority. The JFC may consider the establishment of specialty stability functions pools to render additional assistance to local communities unable to manage local governance. CA forces continue to conduct activities in the same location.
for the duration of the operation and may also accompany the land component as the operation unfolds. Land components may task-organize maneuver forces or CA forces to operate in tactical areas of operation to occupy enemy territory and support stabilization and the commander’s objectives.

(d) Disintegration During Counter-Offensive Actions

1. Upon disintegration of the hostile government and belligerent force, land forces occupy enemy territory and establish temporary military government. Governance is a prerequisite for stabilization. The occupying land force sends elements to enforce its authority within the occupied territory. Military occupation does not require the presence of military forces in all populated areas, although those forces must control the key terrain and population choke-points. Upon entering an urban area, land component forces assert transitional military authority. Commanders or military governors locate or appoint the indigenous or resident civil administration to re-establish governance. Military occupation must be actual and effective. The organized resistance must have been overcome, and the occupying power must have taken measures to establish its authority. The type of forces used to maintain the authority of the occupying power is not material. For example, the occupation might be maintained by permanently based units or mobile forces, either of which would be able to send detachments of forces to enforce the authority of the occupying power within the occupied territory. There is no specific legal requirement that the occupying power issue a proclamation of military occupation. Due to the special relations established between the civilian population of the occupied territory and the occupying power, the fact of military occupation and the territory over which it extends should be made known to the citizens of the occupied territory and to other states. The general historical US policy has been to make the fact of occupation known by proclamation or similar notice. The administration of liberated territory may be conducted in accordance with a CA agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, a military government may be established in the area as a provisional measure. The civil administration disseminates proclamations, ordinances, and CA agreements to reassure the populace and make it aware of restrictions, prohibitions, and expectations.

2. As military operations continue to move the tactical forces onward to additional objectives and new locations, many CA and MISO elements remain in place, to continue expanding stabilization activities. In conjunction with local authorities, CA forces organize and fund labor for rubble clearance, road and key infrastructure repairs, and resumption of essential services. Through the police, the forces focus on preventing hoarding of foodstuff, stashing of abandoned equipment/weapons, and preventing illicit activities, which may fuel a black market and inflation. Forces inspect local jails and prisons for compliance with international law and humanitarian rights. CA forces handle damage claims, conduct investigations, and verify claims for compensation. The CA force alerts higher headquarters of captured enemy documents and equipment, as well as information from the police, for intelligence exploitation. The forces alert higher headquarters of captured supplies and equipment for potential use in military operations. If not needed, the forces arrange for their distribution to or use by the civil populace. The joint force arranges accommodations (e.g., barracks, warehouses, schools, and open fields)
for units and headquarters transiting the area to prevent dispossession of civilian property. As the military operation occupies more territory, CA forces may expand responsibility to cover districts and provinces, visiting various villages or city boroughs on a regular basis.

3. As the OE becomes more permissive and logistical flow allows, other stabilization partners (e.g., DOS, USAID, DOJ, international organizations, and NGOs) should arrive to broaden stabilization. This transition is managed by the JFC and the President’s appointed representative. DOS is the lead federal agency for stabilization. The President’s representative could be the JFC, military governor, special envoy, the US ambassador, or COM. To support the USG stabilization effort, the JFC should consider an organizational interface, such as a CMOC, JCMOTF, JIATF, or task-organized CA force, to enhance integration, coordination, synchronization, and interorganizational cooperation to achieve unified action. Land component commanders establish similar mechanisms at various echelons to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize with the civil component. Accordingly, CA personnel can familiarize stabilization partners with existing problems, deconflict cross-purposes, and prevent redundant efforts. Revitalizing local economies should begin as quickly as feasible. Replacing field animals (e.g., mules, oxen, and horses) or vehicles (e.g., tractors, cargo wagons, and trucks) and providing temporary farm labor help farmers harvest and transport products to markets. Assistance to fishermen may include relaxing movement restrictions, repairing boats, and replacing fishing equipment. CA teams should remain vigilant of disease outbreaks to forestall epidemics. Military medical personnel, international organizations, or NGOs should be alerted immediately of disease outbreaks. In the case of refugees and displaced persons appearing on the battlefield, CA teams in coordination with available international organizations and NGOs should divert them away from the lines of communications to safe areas for assistance (e.g., food, water, shelter, and medical care), using abandoned military posts, schools, or adequate facilities. Transporting refugees and displaced persons to their home communities should occur as quickly as possible.

f. **Force Planning.** Force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component commanders, and support agencies to select, prepare, integrate, and deploy the forces and capabilities required to accomplish an assigned mission. The size and composition of the force depends on the mission, the OE, and the JFC’s CONOPS. However, since stabilization activities occur primarily in the land domain, joint land forces (to include SOF) normally provide the majority of the force required, supported, and enabled by joint air, maritime, space, and cyberspace forces.

*For further details on joint land operations, refer to JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations.*
Chapter IV

(1) **Size of the Force.** Stabilization activities normally require significant forces, particularly when operating in a hostile or uncertain environment. There is no standard template for force-level requirements for stabilization activities; the exact ratio required will depend on a number of variables, most particularly the level of violence. Generating and maintaining these force levels is a challenge for any intervention force, so a plan to develop and integrate an effective and sustainable indigenous security capability is fundamental to success.

(2) **Integration of Conventional and Special Operations Forces.** Success is achieved when operations are planned to optimize the unique capabilities of SOF in conjunction (integrated whenever possible) with conventional forces. The selection of the appropriate ratio of SOF and conventional forces is a deliberate decision, based on thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. The most important factor informing this decision is the capability and expertise required rather than the size of the force required. SOF capabilities (e.g., language, cultural awareness, and regional focus) are an important consideration when choosing forces to conduct stabilization activities. Additionally, SOF’s ability to operate with little external support makes them adept at initiating programs with indigenous forces. The development and employment of SOF capability, such as CA and MISO, enable integrated civil-military coordination, cultural situational awareness, precision targeting, and a synchronized ability to influence during stabilization efforts.

**POLICING EXAMPLE**

The United States, as a whole, has about 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand residents. Larger cities tend to have higher ratios of police to population.

To maintain stability in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, the British deployed a security force (army troops plus police) at a ratio of 23 per thousand inhabitants. This is about the same force ratio that the British deployed during the Malayan counterinsurgency in the middle of the 20th century. In its initial entry into Bosnia in 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Implementation Force brought in multinational forces corresponding to 23 soldiers per thousand inhabitants. After five years, the successor stabilization force finally fell below 10 per thousand.

In the 2008 operations against the Tamil Tigers, force ratios were as high as 60 per thousand.

5. Integrated Planning

a. Established policy and procedures are designed to support the military chain of command while engendering comprehensive, cooperative planning between USG military and civilian departments and agencies to implement stability policy and guidance. When developing joint plans, planners should identify opportunities to support and promote a unified USG approach to achieve national security objectives. Interagency planning should be an iterative process that synchronizes diplomatic, development, and defense implementation planning and tasks to develop unified action to achieve stability.

b. There is no single process model that describes integrated planning between USG military and civilian departments and agencies. Regardless of the model used for integrated planning, JFCs should work closely with COMs and relevant civilian counterparts to establish appropriate structures and processes that facilitate a shared understanding, interagency planning, and coordinated execution and assessment. The importance of personal rapport between military commanders and civilian leaders is imperative. In the absence of formal interagency mechanisms, along with differences in organizational cultural, funding, C2, and other factors, these personal relationships promote teamwork in the development of a cohesive comprehensive approach to stabilization.

c. Interagency planning progresses through three general phases—initial interagency planning, reassessment and revision of plans, and transition planning—which embodies ongoing operations and the transfer of authority from one entity to another. This process should identify additional planning requirements, potential impediments, and assumptions regarding the environment. It should establish a timeline for implementation, priority tasks, lead and supporting USG departments, authorities, and cross-sector linkages and sequencing. This continuous planning process should provide a mechanism to provide feedback, raise resource and logistic requirements, conduct monitoring and evaluation, and ensure the flexibility of USG activities.

d. It is important to ensure the integrated plan does not devolve into a list of activities that is implemented in a mechanical fashion; rather, it should focus on performance and effectiveness. Plans should also address destabilizing elements that may be motivated by ideology, grievance, or greed. Specific motivations, strategies, and tactics employed require continual study as they change and evolve. Operational leaders should devote adequate time to analyze the overall problem to ensure the integrated plan addresses the essential factors that mitigate destabilizing influences.

e. Flexibility is a vital aspect of the reassessment and revision process. Various participating organizations have different reporting processes and schedules. Moreover, progress indicators require varying timeframes for the collection and analysis of data. Despite these challenges, the integrated plan should reflect changes in assumptions and activities occurring in the field (e.g., an HN capital, an HN province, or meetings involving US international and bilateral partners).

f. Building unity of effort is an inherent part of the joint planning process, especially when multiple USG departments and agencies are involved. Cultivating unity of effort
begins early in the planning process by increasing shared understanding and participation in a collaborative planning process. Collaborative planning is particularly suited to operation and campaign planning, such as COIN, FHA, and other operations focused on stabilization activities. A collaborative planning process fosters solutions to problems requiring a coordinated intragovernmental effort and unity of effort in the pursuit of strategic objectives. It also improves the understanding of interagency interrelationships for a given operational area based on roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

g. Other considerations for successful integrated planning include budgeting, authority over resources, and capacity. Differing partner requirements and cycles for budgeting can create gaps or barriers to unity of effort. Local partner representatives may have limited or no authority over resources in the OE. Integrated plans that do not address resource allocations may be of limited effectiveness. Further, partner agencies may lack the capacity to support shared objectives fully. JFCs may need to consider ways of enabling partners to support the mission’s objectives. These considerations should be accounted for in an integrated planning process.

For further details, refer to the Joint Staff J-7’s Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide and Unity of Effort Quick Reference Pamphlet.

6. Special Considerations

a. CMO

(1) CMO are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, or foster relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. CMO support US objectives for HN and regional stability. CMO require coordination among CA, logistical support, maneuver, health service support, military police, engineer, transportation, and SOF. During military operations, CMO enhance stability by integrating the commander’s objectives with civil partners’ stabilization goals at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. CMO are integral to stability during COIN and other operations comprising asymmetric and irregular threats. CMO involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational gains. Although some CMO may directly support combat activities, such as rubble clearance, road repairs, and logistical labor, many of the missions, activities, and tasks associated with stabilization efforts are the essence of CMO. Essentially, the JFC relies on CMO to forge relationships with the local populace and civil authorities in the performance of civilian-related tasks. As such, planning and organizing for stabilization efforts requires a CMO-centric approach.

(2) Initial CMO stability efforts secure and safeguard the populace, establish interim law and order, protect and repair critical infrastructure, and restore essential services. US military forces should be prepared to accomplish or support these tasks whenever CA forces, civil authorities, and relevant stabilization partners lack sufficient capacity. Through active communications with diverse stakeholders, CMO are most effective in creating military and public-private partnerships and promoting HN internal security and stability.
(3) CMO are indispensable to and inseparable from common staff functions, processes, and procedures. The J-9 and appropriate CA forces provide connectivity and understanding that enable unity of effort within the echelons of command and among stabilization partners. Other enabling capabilities, such as SOF, MISO, intelligence, PA, engineers, health services, transportation, military police, and security forces provide the diverse means necessary to execute CMO-related tasks.

(4) CA forces enhance the joint forces’ ability to execute stabilization activities by providing military commanders knowledge, analysis, and operational capabilities for CMO-related decisions and activities. In terms of military necessity, CMO promote the achievement of objectives. In stabilization, the military has a supporting relationship with HN civil authorities. CA forces provide unique knowledge and perspective of the civil component within the OE to commanders, enhance military engagement with the local populace and civil authorities, help optimize combat power for decisive operations, and enhance the concerted efforts of relevant stabilization partners.

(5) Stabilization activities are fully integrated with the planning and execution of campaigns and operations across the competition continuum, so the involvement of the J-9 is essential. Joint force planners integrate CMO throughout a military operation or campaign. When the scope of the mission is almost completely focused on stabilization, or other FHA operations and activities, a JFC may establish a JCMOTF to accomplish that mission. A JCMOTF is a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint task force (JTF). Normally subordinate to a JTF, a JCMOTF is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission parameters.

For further details on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. C2. Traditional military C2 does not apply to relationships with civilian departments and agencies. When an interagency effort is required, the JFC coordinates and integrates efforts between the joint force and interorganizational partners. This capability also requires the JFC to manage and make available relevant, accurate information to appropriate stabilization partners. Inherent in this capability are actions taken to secure and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. These include proactive cyberspace security actions to address vulnerabilities of the joint force and interorganizational partner C2 networks. A holistic approach to stabilization requires communications and understanding among the various centers, commissions, staffs, augmentations, field offices, and agencies. Complicating these efforts are varying national perspectives regarding the mandate and the resulting mission interpretation. The military must understand all of these positions and maintain communications with stabilization partners to resolve issues as they arise.

(1) Leadership and Authority. Each USG department or agency has different authorities, which govern its operation and determine its use of resources. These authorities derive from several sources: the Constitution, their federal charter, presidential directives, congressional mandates, and strategic direction. Effective stabilization
planning requires the definition of these authorities to be clearly understood and documented at the outset. Of note, international organization authorities are based on their formal agreement among member governments. NGOs, particularly humanitarian NGOs, are independent of national governments and international organizations; each has its own unique and individual governance system. However, NGOs can be funding recipients and have working relationships with national governments and international organizations.

(2) CCS

(a) Strategic guidance and CCS are crucial to success in stabilization efforts. The commander’s narrative during an operation supports the enduring USG message with context, reason/motive, and goal. When activities are conducted in areas with significant adversarial or belligerent activity, a frequent clash among the competing narratives of the protagonists may result. This clash is often called the battle of the narratives. Losing this battle can translate to strategic failure of the operation.

(b) The CCS should take cultural sensitivities and perceptions into account. To facilitate this effort, education and training of joint forces should include appropriate linguistic, historical, and cultural elements. Additionally, pre-deployment exercises and rehearsals should evaluate these skill sets. When feasible, employing HN professionals in CCS messaging enhances its sophistication and credibility among the HN populace.

(c) Throughout the operation, supporting military capabilities should be continually coordinated and synchronized, both horizontally and vertically. The CCS supports the broader interagency communications effort and closely coordinate support from other agencies and organizations. The CCS is commander-driven, proactive, and synchronized with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions.

For further details on CCS, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

(3) Staff Organization Considerations. Key staff organization considerations for stabilization efforts should ensure functions are fully integrated with the commander’s decision-making process.

(a) The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) is responsible for the direction of current and future integrated plans developed by a plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5). Combat and stabilization activities are planned and directed in concert. Cross-functional alignment with key staff functions, such as CMO, engineer, surgeon, SJA, and comptroller, is essential.

(b) The nominations of programs, projects, missions, tasks, and activities that comprise stabilization efforts are normally scrutinized for prioritization and approval by a decision board based on the commander’s priorities, available resources, and staff recommendations. HN input may help determine which projects are nominated and their prioritization. CMO-related projects normally require operational-level approval under the
following conditions: significant expense, stakeholders’ inability to complete due to threats, limited resources, or projects directly tied to a COA. Staff interdependence enriches the project review process. In addition to the standard roles of the J-2 [intelligence directorate of a joint staff], J-3, J-4 [logistics directorate of a joint staff], J-5, and J-6 [communications system directorate of a joint staff] in cross-directorate processes, J-9 (if established and usually responsible for interagency coordination), the comptroller, and the SJA have specific roles in the approval process for stability programs, projects, missions, tasks, and activities. Other staff elements (e.g., engineer and surgeon) may also have important roles depending on the nature of the proposed activities.

1. The J-9 makes project recommendations and validates nominated projects based on its analysis of the OE civil component.

2. The comptroller identifies available funding programs, accounts for their expenditure, and fulfills budgeting requirements. Finance units conduct disbursement actions.

3. Operational contract support (OCS) planners, working groups, or integration cells (if formed) support development and coordination of requirements packages and management of associated contractor personnel in the HN.

4. Service contracting activities conduct contracting operations in support of the joint force.

5. The SJA conducts fiscal law reviews for the funding of projects.

6. The engineering staff element plays an important role when construction and project management capabilities are required, particularly when timelines, resources, construction standards, and task assessments should be applied.

For further details on engineer staff element support, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

7. The surgeon and other staff elements with functional expertise should be a part of the process.

8. Once project nominations are fully staffed, the appropriate staff director chairs the decision board for the chief of staff, deputy commander, or commander, depending upon approval levels and authority mandated within the various funding programs used.

(c) Consideration should also be given to staff interaction with civilian organizations. Options range from exchange of LNOs between JTFs and interagency partners, between JTFs and key stabilization partners, and to fully integrated staffs. At a minimum, the JFC should include civilian agencies in key battle rhythm events, such as cross-functional working groups, to enhance staff integration.

For more information on LNOs, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.
(d) Consideration should be given to augmenting the JFC’s staff with a DOS foreign policy advisor (POLAD) and/or a USAID senior development advisor (SDA). POLADs and SDAs are members of the commander’s staff and perform advisory functions. They can facilitate communication with DOS, USAID, and other interagency partners, but they are not LNOs.

(e) Consideration should be given to highlighting the J-9’s expanded role in supporting the overall staff’s functions during stabilization efforts.

1. The J-9 should develop the analysis of the civil environment for other staff elements. It should produce CMO staff estimates that enrich other staff planning and assessment products and that can best be integrated into the overall operation. The J-9 should draft JFC proclamations and ordinances.

2. The J-9 should provide civil-related expertise and continuous presence to the future operations and future plans event horizons.

3. The J-9 should facilitate interactions with non-DOD stakeholders in planning and execution. The J-9 facilitates cooperation and assists in developing terms of reference for mutually supportive relationships.

4. The J-9 staff should interact with other staff sections throughout the decision cycle and enable collaboration with stakeholder counterparts, higher headquarters staff involved in interagency coordination, and subordinate unit CMO staffs. To enable this, the J-9 staff requires codified coordinating authority with each level of command and with each stakeholder, thereby establishing a clear understanding of representation, authority for collective sharing and reporting of civil information, and policy for access to headquarters processes and procedures. Interorganizational partners may operate at the tactical and strategic levels but often do not have representation at the operational level. This gap may require the J-9 to create mechanisms or processes to facilitate coordination at that level. The alternative is to leverage partner capabilities at the strategic level, as well as accessing mechanisms at the tactical level.

For further details on staff headquarters organization, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

c. Protection

(1) Protection is a joint function that is fundamental in stabilization efforts. The ability to provide physical security to the population and those conducting stabilization activities is often a primary reason for US military involvement in stabilization efforts. The protection function during stabilization emphasizes force protection, force health protection (FHP), and civil security. The context of the operation dictates the intensity of protection requirements during stabilization. Protection requirements should be balanced with the character and objectives of the military operation. In some stabilization activities, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and protective
vests, or using secure communications, may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force’s legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

(2) **Force Protection.** Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. The joint force should be trained and equipped to mitigate threats to US personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. All deploying members should receive threat and force protection briefings prior to and throughout the duration of the operation. Depending on the mission, the OE, and directives from higher-level commanders, force protection may also extend beyond the joint force to encompass protection of civilians and participating stabilization partners. Particularly in hostile OEs, protection of civilians participating in stabilization efforts may be vital to their continued presence in the operational area. However, due to organizational mandates, some NGOs may refuse the protection offered by military forces, so as to uphold the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality. The extent to which joint forces can protect civilian partners should be addressed in the ROE.

(3) **FHP.** Public health threats affect everyone, whether military or civilian. When planning for and conducting stabilization efforts, JFCs should consider the factors that threaten the health of the indigenous population, multinational forces, USG employees, contractor personnel, and pertinent international organizations and NGOs. Personnel earmarked for stabilization activities in other nations may have insufficient natural immunity to endemic diseases. The degree of cultural and social interaction in pursuit of mission requirements, as well as the sharing of food, quarters, and recreational facilities with local nationals, may increase the exposure of personnel to diseases endemic to the HN. Stabilization activities may last for extended periods of time (months or years, not days or weeks), increasing the risk of contracting endemic disease. The enforcement of proper FHP measures will help minimize the risk to personnel.

*For further guidance on FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.*

(4) **Civil Security.** By protecting the population, intervening forces and their interagency partners enable daily life to continue. A stable environment helps stimulate economic activity and supports longer-term development and governance reform. Importantly, it generates confidence in local people regarding their security situation and an economic interest in ongoing stability. Prominent civil security denies adversarial groups’ access to the civilian populace, which is imperative for their survival and expansion.

d. **Sustainment**

(1) Stabilization efforts often require substantial logistical support. The overall logistical requirements for stability should be integrated in the OPLAN and be mutually supporting. CMO should primarily draw on the resources of local communities before requesting logistical support. Planning should also consider the potential requirements to provide support to pertinent stabilization partners.
(2) Cultural and religious considerations are particularly important for logistic planners supporting stabilization actions. Inappropriate foods, materials, and methods will not only prolong the requirement to provide assistance and increase cost and risk but may also have a dramatic negative impact on the local population’s perceptions of the joint force and the stabilization efforts at large. Additionally, local hires and contract awards may need to be distributed among multiple population groups (i.e., religious sects, nationalities, or tribes) to demonstrate impartiality.

(3) DOD relies on contractors and contracted support to perform many tasks. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. OCS provides tools and processes to manage the variety of services that may be required to support stabilization activities, including base operating support, transportation, and security. Contracted support and its associated contractor management challenges should be integrated early in the planning process. OCS can have a positive (and sometimes negative) effect on the civil-military aspects of the overall operation or campaign. Awarding contracts to local vendors can have positive effects, by providing employment opportunities that promote goodwill with the local populace and improve the local economic base.

(a) In some operations, a high degree of local unemployment can trigger local unrest and cause local nationals to support an insurgency simply for financial gain. Maximizing local hires through theater or external support contracting can help alleviate unemployment. However, consideration should be given to mitigating possible inflationary effects of local hiring and unintended adverse consequences, such as the reduction in the number of qualified personnel to serve in HN institutions, due to variations in levels of compensation. US forces should carefully review appropriate labor rates to support sustainable financial systems after US forces withdraw. In addition, US forces should carefully determine the ethnic makeup of their local workforce and use labor in a manner that supports whole-of-government objectives for stability.

(b) Commanders should consider establishing a process to vet contractors under consideration for a contract award. Appropriate vetting of contractor companies and key personnel in management positions of these companies can support stabilization efforts by preventing government funding from inadvertently being transferred to an enemy entity.

(c) Integrating OCS and the use of contracted support as an alternative to deploying US support forces may have other benefits: minimizing the military footprint in the operational area, reducing force operational tempo, and sustaining domestic US political support or buy-in. This effort can be especially important in long-term stability ventures where there are significant contracted support requirements needed to support shortfalls in joint operational capabilities as well as reconstruction requirements.

(d) HN support, like contracted support, can be a significant force multiplier. Whenever possible, available and suitable HN support should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from locations outside of the operational area. HN support can dramatically increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and
reduce the strategic airlift and sealift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the operational area. While contracting and HN support both rely on local or regional providers, there are important policy, legal, and operational differences between the two. Matching requirements to appropriate resources is an essential step in the planning process and should be detailed in the concept of logistics support.

See JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, for more on logistic planning considerations. For further details on construction and facilities contracting, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. For additional information on OCS, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Operational Contract Support. For detailed information on planning OCS, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

e. Women in Conflict Resolution

(1) Conflict can often disrupt gender roles. Even when women assume roles as combatants, their involvement in the peace process is often neglected. The joint force and stabilization partners should endorse the roles of women as:

(a) Grassroots decision makers whose sociocultural norms may align with primary roles/responsibilities within the household and are valued as key stakeholders in the DDR process.

(b) Community leaders and heads of households.

(c) Advocates of social policy reform that protects equal access to resources, legal/justice reform in protecting the rights of all people, and in peace negotiations and agreements that are more sustainable.

(2) Incorporating women into the peacebuilding process can build on societal changes that may be occurring naturally, as a result of the cultural turmoil that ensues from conflict. Ignoring the experiences of women risks overlooking their legitimate needs and concerns in new institutions and settlements. The JFC should support local women’s peace initiatives and local processes to ensure women’s perspectives are recognized as part of an inclusive response to conflict resolution.

7. Assessment of Stabilization Efforts

a. Assessment of stabilization efforts is a key component of the commander’s decision-making cycle. In regard to overall mission objectives, the assessment helps the JFC understand changes within the OE and the results of tactical, operational, and strategic activities. During the planning and execution process, the assessment informs the commander’s decisions to employ limited resources to achieve objectives. The decision to adapt plans or shift resources is based upon the assessment of the joint force’s ability to conduct operations. However, the complex, dynamic, and uncertain nature of stabilization efforts means that some of the objectives’ necessary conditions may be ill-defined or change while the operation progresses.
b. The operation assessment helps answer the question: what is the current OE status in relation to the JFC’s established stabilization objectives? Operation assessment for stabilization efforts uses subjective and objective analysis to determine the status of relevant factors within the OE. By developing a clear understanding of the current state of these relevant factors, the JFC can determine progress (or regression).

c. In complex environments, it may not be possible to tie single discrete actions to network impacts. Consequently, assessment relies on continuously monitoring and evaluating the current situation and the progress of an operation. Commanders should consider the second- and third-order effects, and any other potential cascading effect, their actions may have on their envisioned outcomes and how those actions impact the OE.

For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

8. Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities

a. Incorporating transitions and transfers of authority is inherent in planning for stabilization activities in joint operations. Effective transition planning creates the conditions for the successful transfer of authority to non-DOD agencies, non-USG entities, or the HN to consolidate gains as a result of military activities. The joint force focuses primarily on the transition of security functions from US and multinational forces to non-DOD agencies and the HN. However, in a large footprint operation, especially following a major combat operation, the joint force may need to plan for the transition of non-security functions as well. The military also lays the groundwork for robust SC activities, working with DOS and other US and international partners, recognizing the special circumstances and requirements of an uncertain or hostile environment.

b. Transition is both a strategic and operational process. While the transition of security responsibility and associated SC activities from the JFC and subordinate commanders to the HN military and/or internal security commanders takes place at the operational and tactical levels, the resumption of responsible sovereignty for the legitimate use of force by the post-intervention state is a strategic-level process. Successful transition hinges on determining the US future relationship with the HN based on shared interests; security and acquisition agreements, authorities, resources and forces at the time of redeployment; and the capacity of its security forces to provide for the HN’s internal and external security.

c. Stabilization transitions have political and functional components. To develop a functional plan that implements the activities necessary to support US objectives, planners must understand all aspects of the transition.

(1) Governing Authority Role. The transition of the governing authority is the transfer of authority from the intervention force to civilian authority. This most often occurs at the HN national level, so operational planners have the least influence therein. However, the objectives established at the operational level determine the necessary activities and critical structures for effective transition, subsequent to the operation or campaign. For planners, articulation of the objectives at this level can be nebulous, and
the objectives can change over time. Objectives may include acceptance of de facto spheres of influence over certain regions by dominant groups, as well as considerations for addressing the needs of those various groups.

(2) **Functional.** Functional plans include security force and non-security force activities to balance the security sector, such as SC, governance, policing, judiciary, and economic development. Aside from development of security forces, transition planners consider the continuation of essential military support to non-security programs because they mutually support security transition.

d. Since the HN’s government is also in transition, HN and US objectives may not always overlap. This can lead to a fluid situation based on rapidly changing diplomatic/political considerations and conditions. Commanders and planners should make careful assessments of the HN political environment and the effects that the military instrument of national power will have on the future environment, before major transition activities are initiated. Planners maintain flexibility to meet any changing guidance.

e. Transition planners require familiarity with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. One of the most critical transition tasks is meeting lead-time requirements in planning for funding and authorities beyond the budget and program years. Long lead times (two to three years) necessary to influence budget decisions are inherent in USG funding cycles. Joint urgent operational needs statements may fill some of these requirements, but joint urgent operational needs resources are often short-term and may not meet enduring requirements for staff and materiel. Transition of security programs is not necessarily restricted to national or regional governments. In some instances, tribal or informal organizations may take responsibility for providing security for their people. However, any outreach to informal or subnational organizations should be closely coordinated with the country team and DOS.

f. The primary objective of transitioning tasks from existing mechanisms to or from DOD is to ensure strategic and regional goals are met despite changing authorities or demands in the OE. SA activities are normally funded by DOS in accordance with applicable laws. DOD also conducts Title 10, USC, activities, such as exercises to further the SC objectives. Should the need arise for DOD to execute activities outside of Title 10, USC, authorities, the appropriate department (usually DOS but could also be DOJ/Drug Enforcement Administration for counter-narcotics or other USG departments and agencies) funds the activity, and DOD operates under that authority. In some instances, such as training HN ministry of interior or police forces, DOD may need specific congressional authorization to accomplish the task.

g. Transition of non-DOD activities and transfer of authorities to DOD in crisis response or conflict.

(1) The primary objective of transitioning SA activities and effects to those that support combat or crisis operations is greater speed and flexibility. Some aspects of the peacetime acquisition and funding process may be ill-suited to crisis or combat operations. Special authorities and processes are often established to support the rapid transfer of
typical SC activities to a crisis footing. Commanders and planners should be aware of these tools and develop contingency plans that incorporate these tools.

(2) All of the SA programs administered by DSCA, as SC activities require the consent of DOS. The following examples are by no means all-inclusive:

(a) Foreign military sales (FMS) material requirements may be met in the short term by using leases, drawdown authority, excess defense articles (EDA), and third-nation transfers.

(b) Support for CT and maritime security operations in support of stabilization efforts can be gained by increasing the priority of the affected nation for global train and equip funding. Under Title 10, USC, Section 333, SecDef is authorized to conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign nations for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct, among other activities, border, maritime, and counterdrug, as well as CT, operations.

(c) The Global Security Contingency Fund (Section 1207) is designed to support a country’s military and other security forces that conduct border, maritime, and internal defense as well as CT operations.

h. Transition of non-DOD activities and authorities to DOS or other lead federal agencies and non-DOD agencies in post conflict.

(1) Post-conflict transitions are a continuation of stabilization through the end of enabling civil authorities with the HN. Transitioning to civil authority marks the completion of major military objectives, an increase in the role of civilian organizations, and a gradual diminishment of US military authority. Still, the transition to HN authority requires careful monitoring and execution. There are few clear lines of demarcation in such a transition; progress in one area may well be offset by regression in another.

(2) The transition to civil authority represents a shift to a partnership with the HN, the creation of appropriate force posture, agreements, objectives, and the onset of a permanent relationship. The transition to civil authority ends US control of HN actions and resources. A paradigm shift is necessary because transitions do not entail military activities to accomplish military objectives; rather, they entail the use of military assets in some nonmilitary activities to accomplish diplomatic/political objectives. Transition planning is the link between military operations and the achievement of national strategic objectives.

(3) Many of the stability transitions cut across political and functional areas. Planners should not consider these duties in isolation but remain aware of the possible effects their activities can have across both areas. This requires insight into HN cultures, support from intelligence sources, collaboration with interorganizational stakeholders, and a thorough understanding of the desired political outcomes of the transition.
(4) Ideally, US military operations, activities, events, and investments are to be prioritized, aligned, and integrated with US diplomatic and developmental activities at the nation level to achieve unity of effort and husband scarce resources. While the JFC can exercise command authority over assigned and attached forces, interagency partners outside of DOD do not subscribe to “unity of command” with one single authority and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Nevertheless, many USG personnel in the nation are under COM authority. Like most interagency and multinational activities, effective transitions require a deliberate effort to ensure inclusion, rather than exclusion, of legitimate stakeholders. Commanders should strive to achieve unity of effort, rather than unity of command, when operating with interorganizational other stabilization partners. Within the USG, several touch-points in non-DOD departments and agencies, primarily those in DOS, should be included in the transition planning process:

(a) **DOS.** The SAR, approved by DOD/USAID/DOS, offers stabilization advice on general approaches and outlines interagency stability. The SAR emphasizes that stabilization is an inherently political endeavor. Notably, it assigns DOS overall charge of stabilization efforts.

1. The DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs has dedicated political-military planners aligned with each CCMD who can help planning efforts by explaining DOS global priorities and objectives. This planning element also provides guidance in accordance with DOS joint regional bureau plans that should be integrated into CCPs to achieve overall US objectives. This office can also link CCMD planners with the appropriate regional and functional expertise in other parts of DOS.

2. The DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs is also the lead for formulating DOS positions on DOD legislative proposals related to SC. The DOS joint regional strategy and integrated country strategy provides the DOS regional bureau and the COM’s goals, explains the relationship between those goals and broader USG regional goals, and describes the diplomatic/political environment.

3. DOS has assigned foreign service officers to the CCMDs and certain other DOD components as POLADs. In addition, the DOS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) has stabilization advisors at several CCMDs to provide information and data about conflict dynamics and potential interventions. At some CCMDs, the POLAD may also serve as a civilian deputy to the commander, typically with responsibility for civil-military coordination.

(b) **USAID**

1. The USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) is responsible for enabling civilian-military cooperation in development and security. Its purpose is to improve communication, mutual understanding, and cooperation between USAID and DOD on the strategic and policy level. US objectives are best achieved through a whole-of-government effort that harnesses development, diplomacy, and defense, and USAID seeks to advance the development agenda by cultivating and
maintaining a strong relationship with DOD. CMC is a part of the USAID’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS).

2. Senior and deputy development advisors serve in CCMDs and CPS/CMC. CPS/CMC is responsible for USAID’s civilian-military cooperation policy. CMC plays a role analogous to the DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs with the alignment of planning efforts. CMC authors strategic guidance on development and stabilization in coordination with DOD and other interagency partners. The country development cooperation strategy is USAID’s primary nation-level multi-year strategic plan. It describes a nation’s basic development challenges, outlines the strategic rationale for addressing challenges and opportunities, and lays out a long-term development vision for the nation. USAID requires its field missions to share its country development cooperation strategies with CCMDs, which in turn are encouraged to share CCPs with USAID missions in their areas of responsibility.

(c) Other USG Departments and Agencies. The Departments of the Treasury, Transportation, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy have all played roles in the aftermath of conflicts. While DOS generally has the lead for US activities in a nation once a conflict concludes, DOS does not have direct authority over these departments and agencies. Planners should ensure they are familiar with the capabilities and capacities of each. An interagency team will determine what each department and agency can contribute to the effort.

(5) DOD, DOS, and other USG interagency planners should, at a minimum, consider the following areas for both the DOD and DOS when developing transitions:

(a) DOD

1. PPBE process—planning for resourcing.
2. Joint Strategic Planning System.
3. SC developmental activities (e.g., organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise).
4. FID.
5. CT.
6. FHA.
7. Stabilization tasks.

(b) DOS/USAID

1. DOS/USAID budgeting processes.
2. DOS and USAID strategic plans.
3. Regional bureau plans.
4. Integrated country strategies.
5. Country development cooperation strategies.

(6) Planners should be aware of the authorities under which they plan and fund the transition. These differ from the authorities used to execute the intervention. When transitioning from a named operation (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) to a post-operation bilateral security relationship with a PN, DOD employs or requests authorities and funding suitable to its new mission set (see Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities”). While these authorities and funds are usually established in long-standing SC programs, the post OE is likely to require variations and permutations, especially in an uncertain or hostile environment. For missions in a post-operation nation, the bilateral security agreement is vital for planners to draw on, and, in conjunction with the Joint Staff J-5 [Plans Directorate] and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to identify and request new or modified authorities via the DOD Legislative Program. CCMD staffs should understand that many, if not most, of the activities after stabilization may be conducted under Title 22, USC, authorities. What was once possible under Title 10, USC, may not be as easy under Title 22, USC.

(7) Some of the programs that transition from DOD primacy to other USG departments and agencies are discussed in Appendix E, “Legal and Fiscal Considerations.”

   i. Transition of Non-DOD Activities and Associated Property to HN

   (1) Ideally, transitions of non-DOD activities and associated property come from the result of successful security activities, resulting in the HN’s ability to protect its territory, participate in multinational operations, and become a reliable partner in the international system. In this case the transition involves movement away from temporary authorities and into a reliance on more permanent programs such as FMS to provide defense articles and training. The transfer of US property is highly regulated by law and regulation and typically requires approval above the JTF headquarters. The JTF SJA should be consulted in the planning for, and execution of, any property transfers.

   (2) Planners should take into account USG desires regarding the role of the HN in the region; the DOS and COM country team’s objectives and efforts; other USG departments’ objectives and efforts; and the objectives, efforts, and resources of other nations that complement or undermine USG efforts. DOD’s strategic objectives for its partnership with the HN are typically described along the following lines:

   (a) Denying sanctuary to terrorists, insurgents, criminals, or other hostile transnational elements;
(b) Countering terrorism or the proliferation of WMD;
(c) Sharing intelligence;
(d) Providing or protecting access to the global commons;
(e) Supporting a regional security framework; or
(f) Deterring state aggression.

(3) For nation-level mission analysis, planners should consult DOD’s basic set of strategic guidance documents (such as CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan [JSCP]) down through the CCP and globally synchronized plans. Planners should also reference DOS and USAID’s set of comparable strategic guidance documents, especially their joint regional strategy, the country team’s integrated country strategy, and USAID’s country development cooperation strategy. In some instances, joint operation planners develop a document like the integrated country strategy with their DOS, USAID, and other USG counterparts, as well as SC counterpart staff officers.

(4) During stability transitions, planners consider the HN’s present and likely capabilities. Planners also consider the particular circumstances of a HN and do not expect performance beyond its capabilities, nor should they establish metrics of performance based on US abilities. During the transition of authority, progress should be gauged by a process that confirms the performance and capabilities of each respective HN security force. These capabilities can be gauged through exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of US and multinational forces for contingency operations, while acknowledging HN capabilities and strategic goals. This prevents a premature transition of authority that can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the populace to seek alternative means of security.

(5) Commanders should also consider the regional and holistic aspects of transitioning SC efforts to the HN. Country teams focus primarily on their HN, while CCDRs consider the entire region. Close coordination with DOS regional bureaus reduces the possibility of undermining regional goals.

(6) A final consideration is the transition of SC tasks to subnational or nongovernmental actors. US authorities and processes are oriented towards interactions with the HN national government, but in some instances, the national government cannot or will not provide for public order, settle disputes, or protect the population from outside malign influences. In those cases, transition of security functions to nongovernmental or subnational entities may be necessary.

9. Training for Stabilization Activities

a. Joint and Interagency Training and Exercises. Joint force stabilization training should provide individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in formal joint programs.
PKSOI has developed the Joint Stabilization Studies Course for interagency participants. While previous humanitarian and complex crises have provided opportunities for military and civilian agencies to perform their mission skills, there is a clear requirement for joint force training and planning to improve integration with interagency partners, international organization, and NGOs, to synchronize all components of a US response to a crisis.

b. **Training Prior to Deployment.** CCDRs should schedule interagency, international organization, and NGO coordination training as a part of routine training and exercise participation, and as training for a specific operation. Training participants should include members of the entire JTF headquarter staff and willing NGOs, UN organizations, and USG departments and agencies. JFCs may also cross-train select staff elements through other willing government agencies, international organizations, and the humanitarian assistance community. Joint force training for interagency, international organization, and NGO interaction during stabilization efforts should focus on identifying and assessing military and agency capabilities and core competencies and identifying procedural challenges. Such training also serves to build personal relationships and the trust so important to achieving unity of effort.

c. **Unit and Personnel Training with Nonlethal Weapons.** Use of nonlethal weapons requires special training to ensure they are properly used and effectively integrated with lethal weapons and other capabilities. Forces should be proficient in the employment of both lethal and nonlethal force options to reduce the potential for civilian casualties and unintended damage.

*For additional information on nonlethal weapons training, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-22.40 (Field Manual [FM] 3-22.40)/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 10-10A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.*
CHAPTER V
STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES IN OTHER JOINT OPERATIONS

1. General

   a. The maintenance or reestablishment of stability in foreign nations is most often integral to other joint operations in achieving or contributing to US strategic objectives. Whether building partner capacity to contain adversarial states, countering transnational terrorist groups, or engaging in major combat operations against a hostile regime, the ultimate strategic objective is achieving stability on terms that are compatible with US values and promote US interests. In some cases, this creates a requirement to assess the impact of potential US COAs on stability to identify and mitigate unintended multi-order effects. In other cases, some level of stabilization is required to capitalize on the direct effects of other types of military operations. Integrating stabilization activities into the planning and execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended consequences, translates short-term gains into lasting progress, and provides a bridge between operational objectives and broader strategy.

   b. This requirement does not imply that joint forces conducting other types of operations are always required to execute the full range of military activities associated with large-scale stabilization efforts. Rather, stabilization activities should be integrated into the intelligence, planning, and execution of other joint operations to the extent required by the particular strategic and operational context. This context could be limited to consideration of additional factors during the JIPOE and COA development processes or as extensive as identifying additional LOEs or tasks that are required to ensure operational and strategic success. In some contexts, the joint force may lack the authority or capacity to address those LOEs or tasks. Coordination with stabilization partners may identify other entities that are capable of, and willing to address, the requirement, but the joint force should carefully assess the suitability of possible partners, particularly with regard to the impact on local perceptions.

2. Stabilization Considerations in Security Cooperation

   a. SC encompasses all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with FSF and their institutions to build relationships that promote US interests; enable PNs to provide the United States access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or build and apply HN capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives.

   b. Front-end assessments guide SC planning for contextual, institutional, technical, tactical, and/or financial considerations. Institutional and technical considerations focus on the capacity of defense institutions and military organizations to develop, field, and sustain capable military forces, based on established standards in modern militaries. Tactical military considerations derive from a combination of requests from the PN and US assessments of the capability requirements needed to achieve shared security objectives. Defense capacity-building efforts often focus on improving the technical capability and tactical proficiency of HN security forces. This type of focus often neglects
ministerial and defense institution capacity building. Such an unbalanced approach undermines the tactical gains that can only be sustained by an HN having effective and accountable defense institutions embedded in a broadly legitimate and responsive system of governance.

c. The political, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts of foreign defense institutions and military forces differ enormously from those that have shaped US institutions. The relationship between the government and population, the roles and relationship among various state institutions, civil-military relations, and the internal dynamics of PN militaries often differ enormously from the US model. Efforts to enhance the capacity of one component of the government or security forces may have unintended political effects, thereby creating or exacerbating destabilizing tensions. Providing new capabilities to selected units or organizations can alter the balance of power among various elements of a government or society, particularly where those capabilities work at cross-purposes with joint force intentions. One such enhanced capability is the importance of a gender perspective and inclusion of concepts related to women, peace, and security.

d. Destabilization can stem from HN institutions, individuals, or units the joint force chooses to work with or support and the manner in which efforts are executed. Decisions regarding specific considerations (e.g., logistics, procurement, information dissemination, the timing and location of exercises) can have implications that may not be obvious to joint force planners, SC program managers, or SC implementing partners, who are focused on achieving immediate SC objectives. Consequently, planners carefully consider the potential impact of proposed SC activities on the political dynamics and internal stability of PNs. Assessing that impact requires an in-depth understanding of all the relevant factors in the OE: the PN government and its institutions, security forces, populace, internal and external threats, and the relationships among them. Standard SC implementation mechanisms may require adjustment due to the demands of particular operational contexts. Such flexibility is needed to mitigate risks posed to stability and strategic SC objectives—a challenge that requires close coordination with all the relevant elements of the US SC community. In some cases, the joint force may also need to complement traditional SC activities with stabilization conducted in collaboration with US embassy country teams and other interagency partners.

e. SC activities conducted to increase HN stability during peacetime are important to prevent conflict. SC may occur during any military operation or level of conflict.

f. Military engagement is a collection of activities that includes all contact and interaction between US military forces and foreign armed forces, foreign and domestic civilian authorities, and/or foreign and domestic agencies. The purpose is to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Together, these activities constitute a core element of US national strategy, executed across a wide range of contexts, from joint combined exercises and training to FMS, international military education and training (IMET), and FID. US military personnel and elements must ensure information sharing, with specific emphasis on military technology, is in compliance with national disclosure policy.
Stabilization Activities in Other Joint Operations

**g. SC is designed to encourage regional stability.** SC activities are key peacetime military preventive measures that enhance bonds among potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Peacetime SC comprises all military activities that involve other nations and is intended to shape the OE. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential multinational partners. SC activities support CCP objectives. These activities may be long-term (e.g., training teams and advisors assisting security forces) or short-term (e.g., multinational exercises). Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under peacetime SC include multinational training events and exercises, SA, joint combined exchange training, recovery operations, arms control, and counterdrug activities.

**h. Presence.** Sustained joint force presence in a region promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs mitigate the drivers of conflict and instability. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Joint force presence serves to prevent unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. It also provides an opportunity to formulate a baseline of social, political, and military norms in the region that can be an indicator for potential changes in the OE.

**i.** Joint forces may conduct military engagement, SC, and deterrent activities in relatively stable states. As such, activities that foster sustainability dominate, though transformational activities may also play an important role. Military participation in stabilization outside of war or crisis response generally focuses on SSR, especially training counterpart military units in both combat and stabilization activities.

### 3. Stabilization Considerations in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

**a. FHA embodies DOD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.** US military FHA activities range from military engagement activities supporting a CCDR’s SC and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency. FHA activities include foreign disaster relief and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need. FHA operations can be supported by other US military activities or they may be conducted concurrently with other types of related operations and activities, such as DC support, security operations, and foreign crisis response activities. FHA operations are normally conducted in support of USAID or DOS. US military provision of FHA is limited in scope and duration, designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN that has the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance, and available to support other USG departments and agencies. Although US military forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct military operations, their unique capabilities are fungible for FHA activities.

**b. The US military also conducts FHA activities as part of a CCDR’s SC program and/or to achieve specific CCP objectives.** FHA operations involve US interaction among
various HN agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. During FHA operations, unity of effort, rather than unity of command, is prevalent and paramount. Because DOD normally plays a supporting role during FHA operations, the JFC may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Appropriate organization, C2, and a detailed understanding of participating organizations’ objectives are ways to build consensus and achieve unity of effort.

c. FHA can be conducted simultaneously with, or in support of, various other types of operations, including PO, SA, FID, noncombatant evacuation operations, and CMO, among others. The OE for FHA is characterized as permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The character of the OE may be rooted in conflicts that predate the humanitarian crisis but have been exacerbated by the emergency or opportunists seeking to exploit the crisis and may trigger new conflicts. In conflict-affected humanitarian crises, HN security forces or their adversaries may seek to manipulate FHA efforts in pursuit of exclusive objectives. This can take the form of demanding control of aid delivery or blocking aid to all or part of the population.

d. In more extreme cases, the crisis may severely or entirely degrade HN government capacity to govern some or all of its territory, thereby creating a governance and public security crisis that joint forces may need to address for the purpose of delivering FHA. Under such circumstances, large-scale stabilization efforts may occur alongside FHA operations to secure the population, reestablish local governments, provide essential services, and initiate SSR.

e. Across all scenarios, joint force planners need to assess the OE carefully, to include existing or potential sources of instability and the interests, strategies, capabilities, and perceptions of relevant stakeholders. Joint forces should conduct such assessments in coordination with US interorganizational partners to develop a COP. Further, joint forces should be particularly cognizant of the risks associated with the timing, manner, and quantity of aid delivery, which the local populace may perceive as politically motivated, rather than governed by purely humanitarian or logistical factors. Particularly in environments with endemic conflict, aid delivery can become a source of instability. Joint forces should critically assess whether and how to work with the HN government and local stakeholders, based on an understanding of how they view each other and the United States. Additionally, joint forces should attempt to put an HN face on aid delivery to avoid delegitimizing the HN government. Significant information activities, carefully tailored to the OE, may be required to address or mitigate many of these risks.

For more information, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

4. Stabilization Considerations in Peace Operations

a. Stability is integral to most PO. The majority of PO aim at maintaining or reestablishing HN stability. Although peace enforcement operations often involve major combat operations, branch and sequel efforts often involve stabilization to secure US objectives.
b. Most contemporary PKO are conducted to help resolve complex civil conflicts linked to broader regional instability. While relevant US, UN, and multinational doctrine presumes the consent of the parties to the conflict and a political agreement as a framework for military operations, those characteristics are often absent or ambiguous. Consequently, PKO should be based on an integrated political-military plan at the operational level consistent with strategic guidance or mandate to apply the full range of civilian and military capabilities in a coherent and synchronized manner. The tensions between the established principles of peacekeeping and military necessity to achieve security and stability present enormous challenges for military and civilian leaders and forces deployed to PKO.

c. As with other types of operations in which stability is critical, the JFC should carefully assess the OE, including existing or potential sources of instability, and the interests, strategies, capabilities, and perceptions of relevant stakeholders. Careful attention should be paid to the potential for tensions with the HN government upon whose strategic consent PKO depend for presence in the operational area. Senior policy makers and the JFC should carefully study potential areas of tension with the HN government, since its consent and continued support of a PKO are critical to success. Accordingly, joint force planners deployed in the PKO should provide feedback on friction points manifesting with the HN government and other parties to the conflict and develop realistic solution options to resolve or mitigate those tensions. While the willingness to employ military force at the operational and tactical levels is often critical to the success of PKO, such plans require local and global political context, particularly when deployed under the auspices of an international or regional organization, such as the UN or NATO, respectively.

For more information, see JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

5. Stabilization Activities in Joint Operations

a. Like other joint operations, major operations include a combination of offensive and defensive activities. While not the focus of the operations, stabilization is a critical enabler to success. Stabilization activities involve a host of tasks executed concurrently with offensive and defensive activities, so they are integral to planning and execution. Consequently, tactical units should understand the role of CMO to mission success.

b. Since stabilization activities are inherent to all military operations, planners assess the potential effect of planned combat activities on occupied areas (i.e., civil governance, law and order, and essential services), logistics, and operational momentum. Major combat operations have a significant impact on the ability to stabilize occupied areas.

c. The law of war may require forces to provide for the protection and well-being of the civilian populations in the area they control. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the HN government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When this is not possible, military forces may need to provide minimum levels of civil security and restoration of essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the HN is able. These actions provide minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. JFCs should make every
effort to ensure that if no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then the military forces under their control conduct these actions.

d. The JFC should assess resources available for stabilization tasks without endangering mission success. CA is ideally suited to perform essential stabilization tasks and can serve as the conduit for additional capabilities from relevant stabilization partners once they become available. CA seeks to provide essential services to local communities using existing resources while minimizing the diversion of combat, combat support, and combat service support for stabilization efforts. In this manner, the JFC can focus attention on combat operations.

6. Stabilization in Foreign Internal Defense

a. FID refers to the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a HN government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.

b. US FID doctrine emphasizes that the true nature of the threat to the HN government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than military power. Although the HN government must contain the armed adversaries, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Gaining support of the population is vital to any internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy.

c. Stability considerations are inherent to the multidimensional, interagency, and multinational approach of US FID activities. FID focuses on helping the HN to address the root causes of instability and emphasizes that joint force efforts are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN’s cultural and political realities. Planners are directed to consider the capability of the HN government and leadership, existing treaties and social infrastructure, and the possibility that a proposed solution from the US perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. In fact, an effective solution may be entirely outside the realm of FID and be better accomplished through other means.

d. An HN government leads its IDAD strategy development. Joint forces conducting FID carefully assess the environment to identify obstacles to executing an IDAD strategy. Obstacles may include political corruption, predatory governance, or marginalization along ethno-sectarian, socioeconomic, or ideological lines or perceptions of these things by the populace. Since US FID efforts are launched in support of US strategic interests, joint forces must assess the reasons for HN government recalcitrance, and the options available to US forces to foster the necessary reforms. As with SC, an in-depth understanding is required of the relevant actors in the OE, including the HN government and its institutions (particularly security forces), the population, any internal or external threats, and the relationships among them. However, additional information may be required so joint force planners can understand the potential and limits of US leverage over the HN government, identify constructive partners and obstructive hardliners within the HN government and
society, and develop an approach to assistance that incentivizes the reforms required to address the political roots of instability.

For more information on FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

7. Stabilization in Counterinsurgency

a. COIN is a complex, protracted effort that often requires the integration of numerous interagency efforts to help the HN government sever insurgent access to and control over the population. COIN capabilities are typically associated with PO, FHA, FID, SFA, countering threat networks, and CT. Government reforms and reconciliation programs are important to defeating insurgencies.

b. An effective COIN strategy separates insurgents from the populace by using military forces to seize terrain; a residual military contingent, police services, and local militias to hold population centers and key areas; and relevant stabilization partners to assist in economic recovery and reconstruction, regenerate essential services and provide other assistance to build on gains. Thus, a COIN strategy provides the necessary security and assistance for local communities, as the HN government methodically regains territory. Reconciliation programs offer a way for rank-and-file insurgents to surrender safely in exchange for government amnesty and assistance (e.g., medical, educational, and vocational). A reconciliation program requires an earnest HN government commitment, robust information operations, and reintegration facilities for reconciled insurgents. As military operations seize and hold more territory, the opportunities for reconciliation expand, thereby fatally weakening the insurgency.

c. While core grievances are generally the cause of insurgencies, addressing grievances alone will not end the conflict. Insurgents need close contact with the populace for manpower, food, shelter, and revenue. Militants operate furtively in urban areas, using the population as shields from HN/allied military activities. This protection permits insurgents to plan and prepare activities. Because insurgencies are predominately political, insurgents seek opportunities to spread antigovernment propaganda, such as collateral damage from HN/allied military operations, HN corruption, and grievances. To maintain control of the population, militants use coercive measures, threats, intimidation, and terrorist acts. Insurgents do not require the active support of the populace to survive, simply its acquiescence, which explains the large proportion of fence sitters during an insurgency. Since militant activities and politics are intertwined, the insurgent leadership must build momentum and expand its control of territory to demonstrate its cause as legitimate and successful. Many insurgencies degenerate into stalemates, which can smolder or reignite periodically over decades. When it is in USG interests to intervene or render assistance to the HN embroiled in an insurgency, stability is the fundamental goal.

d. Since a reconciliation program is integral to COIN, US officials must use persistent diplomatic, economic, and financial leverage to gain HN government commitment. Without meaningful commitment, the HN merely demonstrates an unwillingness to address grievances, which may create future instability. For legitimacy, the HN
government must manage the reconciliation program, albeit generally through US guidance, supervision, funding, and some resources. HN information operations serve to inform insurgents, the populace, and security forces of the reconciliation program, the specifics of amnesty, and the ways of surrendering safely. Under US supervision, HN personnel craft messages for resonance and sophistication. The joint force may assist with the means of dissemination. Reconciliation facilities down to provincial or even district level demonstrate the HN government’s commitment to reconciliation. Such facilities provide medical care, food, basic education, vocational training, and stipends for reconciling insurgents. As the program matures, the HN government may employ reconciled insurgents to assist in initial interviews of surrendering insurgents, to collect relevant information for HN and coalition/joint forces, to detect insurgent infiltrators, and to assist in the operation of facilities. While the majority are reintegrated into society, a select number of reconciled insurgents may serve in the military to share their expertise of insurgent tactics and methods, as well as scouts and counter-guerrillas.

e. Interned insurgents often use detention facilities or prisons to radicalize, recruit, and intimidate moderate inmates for the insurgent cause. To offset this activity, detention officials should vet and physically segregate the hard-core from the moderate inmates. Reintegration facilities within the detention facilities serve to provide moderate inmates with basic education, vocational skills, and stipends. These incentives provide inmates with a way out of their predicament and prepare them for reintegration into society as productive citizens. US teams should visit detention facilities to ensure they comply with US and international law.

f. The stability goal of providing human security should be implicit in the wider efforts to improve the standard of governance down to the local level. In some areas, the sequencing is reversed, and addressing other aspects of human security (e.g., rule of law and security of livelihoods) may be a prerequisite to establishing a security presence capable of defending the population from insurgent violence.

g. The establishment of reconciliation facilities during an insurgency accelerates the implementation of DDR of former warring factions in the aftermath. Since both former insurgents and a portion of government security forces must undergo DDR, such facilities would prove beneficial. For more information, see DDR section in Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.”

For more information, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; PKSOI’s Crippling Insurgencies with National Reconciliation Programs: A Primer for Military Practitioners; and ADP 3-07, Stability.

8. Stabilization in Unconventional Warfare

a. Unconventional warfare (UW) is activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through, or with, an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.
Stabilization Activities in Other Joint Operations

b. UW is one mission area of IW. The other areas—CT, COIN, FID, and stabilization activities—are conducted to maintain or reestablish stability. By contrast, UW is used to coerce governing authorities. Undertaking these activities may be done individually or applied in combination, depending on situations unique to the individual operation or campaign.

c. UW military operations do not necessarily end with the enemy’s surrender. Depending on US objectives, a successful UW operation may end abruptly, transition to another form of warfare, and involve protracted support to a transitional government. At the onset of planning, JFCs and staffs should consider the potential unintended multi-order effects of UW activities on theater objectives and US national interests. Even when US support to armed groups is limited, the USG may be held responsible for their activities. Armed movements associated with a single ethno-sectarian identity can inspire similar movements in other communities and trigger a broader inter-communal conflict. Conflicts—particularly involving separatist movements—that begin in one nation may destabilize a region and nearby US allied nations. Neighboring states may take the opportunity to launch a conventional attack on or conduct UW in the affected nation. Even where such risks can be mitigated, it is crucial that UW factor long-term stability considerations into the campaign plan from the outset.

d. Stability considerations are especially relevant for UW activities intended to overthrow an enemy government, which could result in dangerous instability or counterproductive regimes, if not addressed in planning. Following overthrow, US support may expand to conduct FID, COIN, and/or stabilization. Where UW objectives are more limited and only seek to disrupt adversary government behavior, the transition phase may be equally limited in scope. Transition following the employment of coercion requires planning for preservation of the resistance or the implementation of DDR programs. In the case of disruption, the US relationship with indigenous elements may stall, go dormant, or transition to other USG departments or relevant stabilization partners. However, UW planners should analyze how the perceived abandonment of allies impacts future operations.

e. UW planning and operational design, particularly the long-term impact on stabilization for US national security interests, require comprehensive knowledge of the indigenous group the USG is considering supporting and the relevant actors in the OE, as well as the relationships among them. As important, UW planners conduct a detailed and candid analysis of actual US leverage over the indigenous groups, and the ability of the joint force to mitigate strategic risks associated with UW in some contexts.

For more information, see JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.
APPENDIX A
PROCESS FOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Overview

The JIPOE process is used to analyze all relevant aspects of the OE, including the adversary and other actors, the physical domains (air, land, maritime, and space), the information environment (which includes cyberspace), the electromagnetic operational environment, and systems and subsystems of the OE. The JIPOE process provides a disciplined methodology for applying a holistic view of the OE to the analysis of adversary capabilities and intentions.

2. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Process

The JIPOE process consists of four steps: define the OE, describe the impact of the OE, evaluate the adversaries and other relevant actors, and determine potential COAs of the adversaries and other relevant actors.

a. Step 1: Describe the OE. To describe the OE, the joint force staff must clearly understand the purpose of the operation and the JFC’s intent. The staff can organize information on OE systems by using PMESII, as well as the physical aspects of terrain and time. Within each of these system components, the staff can add details on areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). This visualization of the systems provides a comprehensive description of the OE.

b. Step 2: Describe the Impact of the OE

(1) In regard to stabilization, JIPOE enhances an understanding of OE factors that impact the decision making and associated behavior of all relevant stakeholders, to include the adversaries, USG, HN government, and other relevant stabilization partners. The JFC should remain receptive to new information as the OE changes. Since various interactions create a dynamic OE, the JFC and the staff must continually update the JIPOE to maintain an understanding of changing behaviors and decision making within the OE. In this manner, the JFC can capitalize on windows of opportunity to foster stability or mitigate instability. This understanding enables the JFC to better shape the behavior of all actors in a manner consistent with the JFC’s objectives.

(2) Civil Considerations. The ASCOPE categories provide greater insights of PMESII systems within the OE. ASCOPE captures the dynamics of stabilization activities to see if they are having the desired effects. The PMESII-ASCOPE framework permits the JFC to visualize pertinent changes to the OE and direct actions that positively impact stakeholder decision making and behavior. In this manner, the JFC ensures stability activities support the national strategy.
For a more detailed discussion of the ASCOPE framework, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

(3) Information Environment. Integral to stabilization, the information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, and exploit information. Stakeholders in the OE affect the information environment and are impacted by it. Accordingly, messaging activities create aggregate narratives that influence the beliefs and attitudes of relevant stakeholders. The JFC is a competitor in the information environment, so establishing a prominent narrative requires the application of all appropriate channels of information flow. This competition includes monitoring information activities of various stakeholders and denying and/or exploiting nefarious messages.

For more discussion on the information environment, see JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

(4) Relevant Stakeholders

(a) Relevant stakeholders comprise internal and external adversaries, the HN populace, HN security forces, and the HN government. Since each stability scenario is unique, the relative importance of stakeholders requires a fresh study, particularly regarding assumptions on motives. Stakeholder attitudes and affiliations are dynamic, and it is not unusual for them to fall under multiple categories at the same time or move from one category to another over time. As operational realities, local political dynamics, and local expectations change in response to external developments. Stakeholders may shift their allegiances based on their own perceived interests. The impending withdrawal of external military forces can be one of the most potent triggers for realignment.

(b) Other relevant stakeholders might include additional adversaries with regional or global ambitions, criminal elements, unofficial leaders, and power brokers within the indigenous power structures, indigenous unofficial security forces (e.g., local militias), state and non-state entities in other nations, international organizations, and NGOs.

c. Step 3: Evaluate the Adversaries and Other Relevant Stakeholders. Gaining an understanding of relevant stakeholders in the OE is the most important step during stabilization activities. Therefore, the JFC and staff identify and evaluate relevant stakeholders’ capabilities and limitations, current situation, and centers of gravity (i.e., critical sources of strength and vulnerabilities). The JIPOE process also evaluates the doctrine; patterns of operation; and tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by adversary forces.

d. Step 4: Determine Potential COAs of Adversaries and Other Relevant Stakeholders. Once the JFC and staff gain a holistic understanding of the OE, they can study the decision-making patterns, past behaviors, and likely COAs of relevant
stakeholders. In this manner, the JFC and staff can anticipate relevant stakeholder actions and appropriately adapt plans and activities.

*For further information regarding the JIPOE process, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.*
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APPENDIX B
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS AND THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

1. Introduction and Overview

   a. The operations assessment is an iterative, methodical process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. It supports decision making by ascertaining progress on a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. The purpose is to develop, adapt, and refine plans in order to increase the effectiveness of campaigns and operations. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the JFC ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. While discerning a change in the environment is important, the JFC must also understand the cause of the change in order to make an informed decision, allocate resources, and shift efforts appropriately. The assessment complements the commander’s information and intelligence needs to inform critical decisions for progress toward the objective. An effective operations assessment should enhance, not replace, the commander’s intuition.

   b. The operations assessment process is applicable to all military activities and operations. It is built around organizing an approach that frames the assessment metrics and determines the conditions or activities to be assessed. There are no standard approaches for an operations assessment. Military units often find stabilization activities the most challenging to assess accurately because of the difficulty in identifying valid metrics and determining which environmental conditions, particularly social phenomena, have a direct impact on the desired effect or objective. A recurring challenge during stabilization is to develop systematic assessment approaches with workable data collection methods that lead to evaluating stability conditions effectively. The innovative development, establishment, and use of a rigorous assessment approach and collaboration with the interagency community facilitate effectual assessment of stabilization activities. Every operation is unique, and each assessment should be tailored to the situation and the decision requirements of the commander.

   c. Assessment Metrics. The assessment approach should accompany the development of the plan and operational design. It should be nested with the operational design of the JFC’s overall plan, as well as the higher operational and national objectives. The staff develops the operations assessment by framing and integrating plans and metrics for effective execution. An effective operations assessment is predicated on evidence-based information. Therefore, it is essential the staff establish a rigorous analytical approach with metrics and data collection requirements appropriate to the dynamics of the OE and the commander’s information requirements. The two types of metrics commonly used by joint forces are MOPs and MOEs. In developing the assessment approach for stabilization activities, the staff should collaborate with military and interagency subject matter experts to establish the MOP and MOE criteria. Assessing desired MOPs and MOEs of stabilization activities can be challenging, since indications of progress are not immediately apparent. Consequently, the assessments team should ensure military and nonmilitary subject matter experts interpret and validate analyzed data and assessment findings.
(1) **MOEs** assess progress in the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of a desired effect. In stabilization activities, MOEs may require time before becoming apparent. MOEs can be based on quantitative or qualitative measures to reflect trends and show progress or regression toward a measurable threshold tied to specified desired effects or objectives of stabilization efforts. For example, MOEs for defeating an insurgency could be: denying insurgent access to population centers in contested areas, shrinking areas controlled by insurgents, and the monthly rates of surrendering insurgents entering the reconciliation program. MOE indicators can also be added to inform the MOEs. Examples of MOE indicators include HN military capacity and capability, number and effectiveness of insurgent attacks on HN government and population centers, and HN population reporting on insurgency activities.

(2) **MOPs** indicate how well tasks are accomplished. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but they can also reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. MOPs in stabilization should be tied to specific actions or tasks that support the achievement of objectives. The assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress in the stabilization effort, so JFCs require a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels. A MOP example tied to the task of “secure HN government” may be that HN government facilities are fully supporting the population. Another example for the task of “train and equip eight HN military infantry battalions” may be the Manning and equipping levels for each of the eight battalions.

*For further information on assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

2. **Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework**

   a. The ICAF is designed to assist various USG departments and agencies to reach a shared understanding of a nation’s conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. The purpose is to develop a common understanding of the root causes driving violent conflict within a nation, to include identifying grievances and resiliencies that informs US policy and planning decisions. It may include steps to establish a strategic baseline and mitigation strategies for USG evaluation and engagement. ICAF provides a way to apply strategic thinking to the underlying conflict dynamics in a nation or region.

   b. ICAF teams are situation-specific and should include interagency representatives with relevant technical or nation expertise. ICAF teams may be co-led by the DOS CSO and the USAID CVP because those offices have conflict assessment expertise. While the ICAF methodology permits other interagency teams to conduct a conflict assessment, assistance from the CSO and/or CVP is recommended.

   c. An ICAF allows an interagency team to identify potential entry points for future USG efforts in conflict prevention and conflict transformation, but it does not make direct recommendations for program design. Sectoral assessments perform that role and complement ICAF in the following ways:
(1) Results from previous sectoral assessments provide data for the ICAF.

(2) During a situation assessment, the results of an ICAF identify sectors most critically in need of an in-depth sectoral assessment prior to planning.

(3) At the conclusion of an ICAF and the crafting of a plan, sectoral assessments are conducted to assist in the design of programs.

d. Developed and endorsed by interagency partners, ICAF helps interagency partners reach a common understanding of the conflict dynamics. Through the ICAF process, the interagency team can focus discussion on the conflict parameters, eschewing disagreement on the process.

e. The USG departments and agencies most likely to participate in the use of the ICAF are agencies with responsibilities for planning or programming foreign assistance funds or other international activities. However, on occasion, USG departments and agencies implementing domestic programs may have technical or country expertise to contribute to an ICAF, even if they do not have international programs.

For more information, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

3. United States Agency for International Development Conflict Assessment Framework

a. USAID conducts a conflict assessment on a nation for the following reasons:

(1) Favorable conditions or circumstances in the nation are needed to enable an environment for sustainable development.

(2) The environment requires a blend of immediate relief and stabilization assistance.

(3) Deterioration of stability in the nation requires contingency or scenario planning in response to an imminent crisis requiring the staging of resources.

b. USAID’s CVP Conflict Assessment Framework is a unique methodological approach to identify and understand the dynamics of violence and instability, evaluate the associated risks of an armed conflict, prioritize stability and security goals for a given nation, assess the interaction of the aforementioned factors on existing development programs, examine the inadvertent harm development programs may cause, and study effective ways development and humanitarian assistance can support local efforts to manage conflict and build peace.

c. Additionally, USAID prepares the annual alert list for fragility and risk for instability to gain a greater understanding of the OE. This tool assesses fragility in terms
of a given nation’s legitimacy and effectiveness, as well as the likelihood a nation may experience serious political instability or the outbreak of violent conflict in the near future.

*For more information, refer to USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework.*

4. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

a. To assist policy makers measure progress in conflict environments, the USACE, United States Institute for Peace, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and PKSOI developed the *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework* [short title: MPICE] handbook. MPICE is an objective framework of metrics that assesses the proper balance between goals and resources, and it provides feedback on the efficacy of strategies under implementation. Further, it enables policy-makers to recognize the magnitude of the challenges prior to intervention and continuously tracks the progress of stability efforts.

b. MPICE complements the ICAF, and both can be used simultaneously with other assessment tools. MPICE and the ICAF have two distinct, but related, purposes. Fundamentally, the ICAF assesses the root causes, the drivers of conflict, and the potential resiliency of a HN. As a companion tool for the ICAF, MPICE provides a framework to develop metrics focused on outcomes. These outcomes are MOEs indicating the success or failure of programs and strategies focused on the attainment of objectives reinforcing stability.

c. MPICE provides a list of stabilization-related goals, indicators, and measures. After identifying sources of instability, these factors help identify programming objectives. They are useful for the development of a baseline against which to measure overall stabilization mission progress. MPICE provides a list of stability and reconstruction-related goals, indicators, and measures. It can help assess the relationship among the drivers of violent conflict and the ability of indigenous institutions to resolve conflict peacefully, using five sectors: safe and secure environment, political moderation and stable governance, rule of law, sustainable economy, and social well-being. Each sector comprises two subsectors—conflict drivers and institutional performance—that establish subordinate goals specific to the sector. Indicators and measures are then identified for each subordinate goal. Each indicator states the concept for evaluation, while the measures describe the empirical data for collection. After identifying sources of instability, these factors help identify programming objectives and the development of a baseline against to measure overall stabilization progress.

5. United States Agency for International Development’s Anticorruption Assessment

The USAID *Anticorruption Assessment Handbook* is tailored to the user to conduct anticorruption assessments, efficiently and in sufficient detail. Guided by international best practices, the framework offers a common approach to understanding and assessing the dynamics of corruption, improving anticorruption strategies, and making programs more effective and appropriate to the OE. Assessments provide an initial comprehensive
analysis of issues that affect corruption and anticorruption prospects in a nation, followed by a strategic rationale for final recommendations. This handbook provides a detailed methodology for practitioners, including the production of an assessment report that addresses a wide range of issues and generates recommendations for action. The guidance provides assessment teams with tools for diagnosing the underlying causes of corruption by analyzing both the state of laws and institutions, as well as the political-economic dynamics of a nation. By understanding nation-specific drivers of corruption, assessment teams can develop reasonable insights on government sectors and functions that are most vulnerable to corruption and the types of initiatives that can reverse or control these problems. The framework also provides a rationale for setting priorities, choosing some approaches and rejecting others.

For more information, refer to USAID’s Anticorruption Assessment Handbook.

6. The District Stability Framework

   a. The USAID District Stability Framework (DSF) is designed to help military and civilian personnel identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming. It is employed to gather information using the following lenses: OE, cultural environment, local perceptions, and stability/instability dynamics. This information then helps identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust programming targeted at diminishing the causes of instability or conflict.

   b. The DSF comprises four major components: gaining situational awareness (from the four lenses of data mentioned above), analyzing that data, designing effective programming based on that analysis, and monitoring and evaluating programming.

For more information, refer to ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques; MCTP 3-03A, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations; and Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 11-16, Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team.

7. The Stability Assessment Framework

   a. The stability assessment framework (SAF) is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support CMO planning and nonlethal targeting approaches during operations. The SAF is designed to determine stability dynamics within the battlespace, design programs and activities that address sources of instability, reinforce sources of stability (resilience), and measure their effect in fostering stability.

   b. The SAF focuses on the attributes of the OE and integrates multiple perspectives during planning and assessment. The SAF methodology has four basic components nested within the planning process (problem framing, COA development, COA war game, COA comparison and decision, orders development, transition). The SAF components (civil preparation of the battlespace, analysis, design, and execution) complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes.
For more information, refer to Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-03, Stability Operations.

8. United States Agency for International Development’s Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters

   a. The USAID rapid environmental impact assessment (EIA) identifies, defines, and prioritizes potential environmental impacts in disaster situations, as well as identifying and ranking environmental issues and follow-up activities during a disaster. It is designed as a best practices tool for effective disaster assessment and management. The rapid EIA does not replace a formal EIA, but it does fill a gap until one is available. The rapid EIA is useful for an imminent disaster, for the initial 120 days of a disaster, or for any major change in an extended crisis. The rapid EIA does not provide solutions to resolving environmental problems. It does provide sufficient information to allow those responding to a disaster to formulate common sense solutions to most issues identified.

   b. The rapid EIA is useful for conducting simple analysis of information in the following areas:

      (1) The general context of the disaster.

      (2) Disaster-related factors that may have an immediate impact on the environment.

      (3) Possible immediate environmental impacts of disaster agents.

      (4) Unmet basic needs of disaster survivors that may negatively impact on environment.

      (5) Potential negative environmental consequences of relief operations.

   c. The rapid EIA does not require expert knowledge. Primary rapid EIA users are people directly involved in disaster-response operations, with a basic knowledge of the disaster-management process but no background in environmental issues.

For more information on EIA, refer to USAID’s Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters, Environmental Compliance Procedures, and the Rapid Environmental Assessment Tool.

9. Democracy and Governance Assessment

   The USAID Conducting a Democracy and Governance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development is a guide for constructing donor, in particular USAID, democracy, and governance strategies. The framework guides a political analysis of the nation, leads to program choices, and incorporates what researchers and practitioners have learned from comparative experience. While every nation is unique, important commonalities abound,
which underscore the relevance of anthropology or comparative politics (political science). Most nations have political systems with elements and basic construction that resemble other nations. USAID and other donors have found that political issues are as important to a nation’s development as other issues (e.g., health and economic growth) and that many developmental plans have floundered on political shoals. In particular, donors believe that support for democracy should be part of their development assistance because of the inherent benefits of democratic institutions and because it best supports the developmental effort. HNs also agree, at least officially, since most have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements that include elements of democracy. The strategic assessment framework is designed to help define a nation-appropriate program to assist in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. As such, it is useful in developing strategies that address the core democracy and governance problem(s) in a nation and that identify primary influences and rules of particular institutional arenas.

10. Key Factors

a. An assessment framework should be nested with the overall plan. It requires a comprehensive and enduring methodology, applied consistently from the strategic to the tactical level. A comprehensive assessment framework includes:

(1) Realistic coalition objectives.

(2) Milestones to assess short-term progress against long-term goals.

(3) Stability to preclude wholesale changes to the assessment—particularly during changes in authority—since this impacts accurate trend analysis.

(4) Incorporation of the assessment process into the planning process.

(5) Baseline indicators to MOE of activities in fostering stability.

(6) Local perceptions.

b. While every operation is unique, assessments require a consistent and enduring approach. Key assessment principles include:

(1) **Objectives Led.** For relevancy, the assessment should be derived from the operation or campaign objectives (end state).

(2) **Useable.** The assessment is not an end in itself, so the analysis must be useable. It must measure stability and enable decision making by focusing on decisive operations in the campaign plan and be fully integrated into the OPLAN.

(3) **Achievable.** The assessment plan must be easily executed. The easier the method, the more consistent and reliable the analysis.
Valid. The assessment must have accurate data and analysis. Relevant qualitative and quantitative data are incorporated.


(1) Output indicators (MOPs) simply track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, “Is the activity progressing?” and in the long run, “Is the activity complete?” Examples include the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained. Output indicators are monitored during the implementation of an activity until it is completed.

(2) Impact indicators (MOEs) measure an activity’s impact. Examples include decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). They are generally evaluated after an activity is completed.

(3) Overall stability takes into account the impact of all the activities conducted over a longer period, as well as the influence of external factors. It asks, “Is stability increasing or decreasing?” The key to measuring overall stability is to begin as early as possible to identify positive indicators, create a baseline, and track the indicators at regular intervals. The best overall stability indicators reflect local perceptions of stability, not perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question, “What will local people do or say differently if they believe the environment is getting more stable?” Examples include:

(a) District government recognition—reflects trust and confidence (e.g., locals take their problems to the district government for resolution).

(b) Local-on-local violence—a direct measure of insecurity.

(c) Population freedom of movement—reflects security conditions.

(d) Local perceptions of their government—direct measure of the public’s stated confidence in government competence, transparency, and relevance.

(4) The early establishment of stability indicators serves as a more accurate baseline to measure progress. Although no single indicator can perfectly measure the concept of stability, the general trend in a “basket” of good indicators can be a useful way of identifying whether overall stability conditions are improving. Applying a “weighting” to criterion can introduce bias that may skew an overall score and be inaccurate. Therefore, weighting is generally best avoided.

d. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation

(1) Taking everything above into consideration, a good example of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation is SC activities in Africa. While many planners attempt to
conducted strategic assessments at the CCMD level and try to tie in activities to the OPLAN in this manner, the assessment generally fails because it becomes assessment for the sake of the assessment and it forgets to take into account that it must be end state focused.

(2) Assessment. A baseline assessment is conducted before the activity occurs to ensure the project is necessary. During the activity, trainers (if it is a training event) should conduct an assessment created by the office of primary responsibility from the component that created the case.

(3) Evaluation. While training the unit in question, a disinterested third party evaluates the trainers. Are they training in accordance with the letter of acceptance? Are they culturally sensitive? Are they qualified to instruct? The second level of evaluation is 6-12 months later, when this unit is scheduled to participate in a regional training exercise or, barring an exercise, observed in combat if that was the intent of the training mission. Did they perform as expected? Did they use the equipment they were issued? Should we execute mission again?

(4) Monitoring. Where is the unit now, 12 months after the training? Is this unit being utilized in the proper way? Is the equipment serviceable? Is the HN using the US logistics life cycle? Should we focus on another aspect of the plan? Should we focus on another nation?

(5) Proper assessments are conducted at all levels. This includes operational, strategic, and, most critically, event-level assessments.

11. The Operation Assessment Process

a. JFCs measure the effectiveness and performance of stabilization activities in relation to accomplishing missions and achieving progress toward overall USG stability goals. Determining how stabilization activities support objectives, especially in post-conflict situations, is important, but challenging, because measuring effectiveness may take months or years. Commanders need to establish accurate indicators and track them at repeated intervals, in coordination with interagency partners.

b. The basic steps of the assessment process are integrated into the commander’s decisions for operations.

(1) Identify critical information requirements.

(2) Create an assessment plan to support the OPLAN.

(3) Collect, process, and disseminate information and intelligence.

(4) Conduct event-based and/or periodic assessments.

(5) Provide feedback and recommendations.
For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

12. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations Monitoring Guidance: Data to Inform

The DOS CSO monitoring guidance addresses the collection of real-time information to inform programmatic decisions. Its purpose is to promote responsible management programs and course adjustments as necessary to maximize impact. Monitoring identifies changes in progress or stagnation, the critical factors involved in the change or stagnation, and ways to improve decision-making in the future. Given the relatively limited evidence base in the stabilization and peacebuilding fields for what works, investing in conflict program monitoring is particularly important.

13. United States Agency for International Development Results Framework

USAID employs a results framework to enable the assessment of activities. A results framework graphically displays the desired results to be achieved over a period. It is based on development hypotheses (i.e., theory of change), which theorizes what will occur if a particular intervention is undertaken or from a combination of several building blocks that are critical for bringing about a particular development outcome. Visually, a results framework brings together several, often quite distinct, streams of results, which function synergistically to produce broad development changes. Thus, an economic growth result in a results framework might join with health and education results to realize goals stated in citizen welfare terms.

14. United States Agency for International Development Complexity-Aware Monitoring

Complexity-aware monitoring is intended to complement performance monitoring when used for complex aspects of projects and strategies. Complexity-aware monitoring is appropriate for aspects of strategies or projects where cause and effect relationships are poorly understood, thereby making it difficult to identify solutions and draft detailed implementation plans in advance. Expected results may also require refinement and revision as strategies and projects unfold. Five techniques for complexity-aware monitoring are sentinel indicators, stakeholder feedback, process monitoring of impacts, most significant change, and outcome harvesting.
APPENDIX C
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1. Introduction

   a. Foreign nations routinely take actions to reform the way they provide safety, security, and justice. A foreign nation may carry out reform activities on its own accord without external assistance. In other cases, a nation may seek external assistance when it lacks the resources to bring about necessary reform in its security sector. A nation’s security sector can be local, regional, global, or a combination thereof. When assisting a foreign nation that is conducting SSR, the USG views its support as SSA. External support to a nation’s SSR efforts can also involve multinational and NGO contributions.

   b. DOS serves as the USG lead integrator for SSA for all interagency-provided assistance. DOD’s contribution to SSA occurs primarily through SC activities such as SFA. In more extreme cases, such as during stabilization, DOD assistance may also include CA activities that support reform or the establishment of other functional areas of a nation’s security sector, like rule of law and infrastructure. In all cases, DOS and DOD work in collaboration to achieve unity of effort when assisting a foreign nation that is reforming its security sector.

   c. Second only to providing security, the major joint force role in stabilization is to help reform the HN security sector and build partner capacity to enable long-term stability. The security sector comprises both military and civilian partners responsible for the safety and security of the HN and its populace at the international, regional, national, and subnational levels. These activities include state security providers, governmental security management and oversight bodies, civil society, and non-state providers of justice and security. Helping to build HN capacity in the security sector includes stability activities impacting on security, rule of law, and governance functions. Activities such as building partner capacity and ICB fall under the rubric of SSR, which is the assisted operational application of programs and activities to improve the way an HN provides safety, security, and justice from ministerial level down to tactical units.

   d. SSR refers to the abiding set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Without effective defense and security institutions, reform and development efforts may not be sustainable. SSR requires both a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach to attain the desired outcomes. Whole-of-government is largely an interagency endeavor assisting HN counterparts. The comprehensive approach expands on whole-of-government by including other relevant stabilization partners, such as other nations, international organizations, and NGOs. The implementation of DDR programs is the initial step for SSR, particularly in the aftermath of an insurgency. SSR integrates security-related programs with development, reforms, and resources to assist partner governments in the provision of effective, legitimate, and accountable security for their citizens. Through SSR, the USG helps the HN achieve adequate defense of the homeland, promote domestic tranquility, and foster responsible and transparent government.
e. As the preceding chapters indicate, SSR is a continuation of CMO as part of stabilization. While military and intelligence reforms are the principal focus for joint forces, they cannot occur in a vacuum. Stability requires a balanced approach, so SSR includes immediate and long-term assistance to defense, intelligence, governance, judicial, and police reforms, with particular attention often paid to ICB. For democracies, adherence to the rule of law ensures all the security sectors serve and protect society—rule of law is the glue that holds all the systems together. SSR programs foster enduring institutional and governance frameworks in support of SA, going beyond the provision of equipment and training. SSR programs should ensure the linkages among security, governance, development, and conflict remain aligned. Integrating security sector, governance, and rule of law programs into a comprehensive package—in support of US and HN priorities—ultimately proves more successful and sustainable than a series of individual programs.

f. Stabilization activities in support of SSR occur across the competition continuum. SSR activities often buttress relatively stable, yet vulnerable, states. During crisis response and limited contingency operations (e.g., COIN or PO), the JFC should emphasize SSR programs, even in the midst of military operations. SSR programs build HN capacity, which assist the joint force to combat insurgency, terrorism, and other security threats, even while conducting combat operations. During operations and campaigns, stabilization complements combat operations by including the allied HN in planning and by generating HN capacities in security, governance, and the rule of law. These activities foster security of rear areas and lines of communication for the optimization of combat power for military operations. SSR continues and broadens these activities, while fostering enduring stability and peace.

2. Unified Action in Security Sector Reform

a. SSR requires a whole-of-government effort in order to integrate the support of relevant US interorganizational partners (i.e., federal and state governments). The whole-of-government approach harnesses interagency expertise, resources, and funding. The complex and enduring characteristics of SSR demand an approach that capitalizes on the strengths of collective expertise in the USG.

   (1) DOS. DOS is the overall lead agency for US stabilization efforts, overseeing policy and programmatic support to SSR through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions, as well as directing integrated USG stabilization. DOS responsibilities include oversight of USG foreign policy and programming that may have an impact on the security sector.

   (2) DOD. DOD’s primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or reestablishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the competition continuum. DOD monitors all SSR efforts to ensure its activities remain aligned and mutually supportive.

   (3) USAID. USAID’s primary SSR role is to support governance, conflict mitigation and response, reintegration and reconciliation, and rule of law programs aimed at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security and justice.
(4) Other USG Departments and Agencies. Effective SSR draws on capabilities across the USG, as appropriate. In addition to DOS, DOD, and USAID, other USG departments and agencies provide important capabilities in the conduct of SSR programs. In particular, DOJ, DHS, the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Treasury may play substantial or leading roles in the development and execution of SSR. US interagency partners should de-conflict, standardize, and coordinate their activities in these programs at all levels, as well as through country teams consistent with COM authority.

b. The USG often collaborates with other stabilization partners in pursuit of comprehensive approaches to SSR. The UN integrates SSR across different offices and agencies, including the UN Development Program and the UNDPKO. NATO, the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and major bilateral proponents have advanced a more holistic SSR concept through combined funding mechanisms and enhanced collaboration among defense and development agencies.


c. Contributors to SSR programs normally operate through international organizations to deliver SSR as part of a broader development plan for the HN. HN governments may have a preference for working with earlier associated international organizations and NGOs. Some international organizations and NGOs may have parochial interests, appear indifferent to wider SSR priorities, and see no need to build a broad-based HN capability in a coherent manner. Thus, the USG and UN incorporate their participation into a comprehensive reform plan. PNs may also bring valuable capabilities that the USG cannot provide, such as gendarmes. The UN can take a leading role in DDR programs, which involve multiple organizations. NGOs may also contribute niche capabilities and consultants for security sectors, such as justice and rule of law. Further, they often have a repertoire of local knowledge and established community ties.

d. As with other areas of stabilization, the Armed Forces of the United States may be required to conduct significant portions of SSR that are normally the bailiwick of civilian agencies, particularly when the security situation prevents significant civilian participation.

3. Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform

a. SSR planning should seek to ensure balanced development of the entire security sector, since imbalanced development can undermine the long-term success of SSR efforts. Military activities are generally focused on reforming the HN military forces, but they are often only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform various security sector elements (see Figure C-1). Military forces gradually transfer the responsibilities accumulated during combat operations and stabilization activities to other participants in the SSR effort, whether from one military force to another or to civilian authorities.
Transitions allow the military force to focus on their primary tasks: securing the HN and building up HN security forces.

b. Understanding the relationship between the HN military and law enforcement is necessary, since these forces cooperate in provision of internal security to the state. In many post-conflict societies, appropriate distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions have eroded or disappeared entirely. That erosion could lead to inappropriate military involvement in local community and political affairs, to include corruption of criminal justice and law enforcement functions. A fundamental task

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**Figure C-1. Elements of Security Sector Reform**

Transitions allow the military force to focus on their primary tasks: securing the HN and building up HN security forces.

b. Understanding the relationship between the HN military and law enforcement is necessary, since these forces cooperate in provision of internal security to the state. In many post-conflict societies, appropriate distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions have eroded or disappeared entirely. That erosion could lead to inappropriate military involvement in local community and political affairs, to include corruption of criminal justice and law enforcement functions. A fundamental task
of SSR is to restore the distinction between military and law enforcement functions and to provide robust rule-of-law mechanisms to sustain their separation.

c. Defense Reform. Military forces are developed primarily to counter external threats to the HN. The design of these forces develops from analysis of those threats and the specific capabilities required to counter them. In addition to the capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include a range of defense and security institutions necessary to plan, develop, resource, staff, employ, and sustain that capability to be successful and sustainable. A coherent SSR program directed at defense forces should focus on providing training and advisory teams; construction or repair of basic infrastructure; and equipment appropriate for the size, composition, and budget of the armed forces. Establishing of a strategic defense planning system (i.e., national security strategy, national military strategy, chief of staff operational guidance, and defense capabilities guidance) assists the ministry of defense (MOD) in the appropriate development of its military in support of national security. Involving the MOD in this planning process establishes ownership early and fosters a greater understanding of the logic behind force management and the military budget. Whenever possible, establishing interoperability with the US military is desired to enhance joint operations in accordance with the warfighting functions (e.g., communications and planning procedures). Early creation of oversight and control mechanisms and processes ensures various defense sector elements are accountable to elected and politically appointed civilian leadership in the executive and legislative branches. Accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation. Providing FHA and countering certain types of internal military threats can also be a necessary capability.

(1) Advisors, trainers, and liaison staff require careful selection. Building rapport and maintaining professionalism with HN counterparts are paramount to the advisory mission. Along with military knowledge, suitable advisors should have maturity, experience, and patience among other desired personality traits. An effective SSR advisory program requires extensive pre-deployment training from official organizations. Depending upon the OE and HN requirements, advisors may serve either as resident in-nation advisors, deployed on a long-term basis or deploy on a persistent, sustained, and recurring basis (normally 1-2 weeks at a time, for multiple iterations) as nonresident advisors. While language proficiency is desired, the exigencies of time and the limited availability of qualified personnel often requires the use of HN interpreters. The cultivation of interpreters should be included in the training program. For further details, refer to the PKSOI publication, Professionalizing Ministerial Advising.

(2) The advisor/trainer organization and equipment should reflect the role and structure of the HN organization and activities in ongoing operations. Advisors embedded at various levels, from government ministries to tactical units, need interaction with pertinent US headquarters to enhance mutual situational awareness. Consequently, periodic conference calls or advisor conferences help reconcile ends, ways, and means.
(3) A clear understanding of the command relationship and responsibilities between PN and HN forces is critical to the successful transition of authority. Advisors and trainers provide this essential link and have a significant role within the transition process. Headquarters elements in the HN should have a dedicated staff section for SSR issues to provide assistance to advisors and trainers, as well as interacting with higher headquarters.

(4) Secure borders are a requisite of state sovereignty and territorial control. Professional border forces control border areas to prevent incursions, control migration, and prevent illicit trafficking. Integral to stability, intervention forces should be prepared to augment HN border forces that request assistance. During the development of HN border control capability, intervention forces may need to control the borders and provide coordination of resources, as well as assigning advisors and trainers to build capacity. Border control includes the management of land borders, airspace, coastal and inland waters, territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones.

(5) Border forces are most often engaged in detecting and preventing crime in border areas. These forces include border guards, coast guard, and immigration and customs personnel. Their activities are closely linked with the role of the customs service in facilitating and securing legal trade, smuggling reduction, migration control, and antiterrorism. The goal of effective border management is to confront organized crime and other illicit activities, such as trafficking in arms, commodities, and people, which, in turn, can fuel conflict and insecurity. Oversight of border forces is necessary to curb corruption, which reduces state revenues, erodes confidence, and discourages trade and economic activity. Issues for consideration in the initial development of a border control force include:

(a) Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of people and goods, thereby achieving an appropriate balance among security, commerce, and social norms.

(b) Building capacity to detect and combat illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and other factors leading to instability in border areas. Counterfeit and smuggled goods are not subject to taxation and support organized crime and terrorism. Both are serious issues that undermine government legitimacy and reduce revenue to the treasury.

(c) Strengthening revenue-generating capacity, promoting integrity, and mitigating corruption.

(d) Establishing a border guard under central government control.

(e) Harmonizing border control and customs regulations regionally and enhancing cross-border cooperation.

(f) Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states.

(6) ICB is an essential contribution to DOD efforts to support defense reform. ICB efforts seek to help the partner establish responsible defense governance, to include civilian
oversight of security forces and adherence to the rule of law, as well as improving the efficacy and sustainability of capabilities provided through other security assistance efforts.

See JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information on ICB.

(7) A key element of defense reform is SFA, which DOD defines as activities that contribute to USG unified action to support the development of the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions. SFA provides enabling capabilities, which can support broader SSR programs, as well as other security capacity-building activities. It is conducted across the competition continuum, as a subset of SC. While SFA is normally part of the larger SSR effort, it may be tied to building partner capacity to achieve other strategic purposes (see Figure C-2).

(a) SFA improves the capability and capacity of HN or regional security organization’s security forces. These forces comprise all the state-sanctioned security forces that provide security for an HN or support a regional security organization’s mission, such as military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; national and local police services; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel. Conducting SFA and other capacity-building activities are the primary ways that military forces support a comprehensive SSR program.

(b) Effective SFA supports SSR by establishing conditions that foster the development of HN security forces. The goal of SFA is to enhance legitimacy, credibility, competency, capability, commitment, and confidence. HN security forces must be able to secure the borders, protect the population, address security risks, and hold criminals accountable. SFA comprises five developmental tasks—organize, train, equip, build and rebuild, and advise. When supporting the development of the HN security forces, the JFC must understand the command’s role with the HN or the supported regional security organization. The developmental tasks assist the JFC and the staff assess and allocate resources.

For further details on SFA, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

d. Justice Reform. The HN justice system encompasses an array of formal and informal institutions, groups, and individuals. Institutions include the ministry of justice, law enforcement, law schools and bar associations, and legal advocacy organizations. Groups and individuals include members of the judiciary, legislature, corrections, and prosecutor’s office; public defenders; ombudsmen; regulatory bodies; and human rights and public interest groups. The legal framework includes the constitution, civil laws, common laws, criminal codes, rules, customs, traditional or religious laws, and regulations. Peace agreements may also constitute part of the legal framework in nations recovering from a conflict. Justice systems differ significantly across national boundaries; there may also be multiple justice systems functioning in a nation. To enhance HN legitimacy, justice reform should build upon the existing legal frameworks and international law. SSR planners must avoid imposing external reforms of law, justice, and security on the HN, except where existing laws and justice systems do not meet HN treaty obligations or
customary international law with regard to human rights. Implementing such reform, even when warranted, requires a sophisticated political analysis of the multi-ordered effects on the society. An understanding of a HN’s systems and values is essential to developing justice system reform.

(1) **Legal System.** An effective legal and judicial system is vital to the rule of law. Ready access to justice and clear, widely accepted, and enforceable laws are essential to sustainable national and economic development. Legal and judicial reform is instrumental to SSR, with particular focus on the constitution, national laws, the court system, judges, lawyers, and the corrections system. A formal justice system may be
complemented by the informal customary or traditional justice systems that are unique to particular areas, cultures, or regions. Sometimes called non-state justice systems, traditional justice systems frequently provide important alternatives to formal, codified systems and provide greater access to justice for remote or underserved populations. Traditional justice systems may enjoy high levels of legitimacy with HN populations and may possess unique advantages as a means of promoting SSR programs in a broader context. Conversely, non-state systems may not adhere to human rights aspects of international law. At the very least, SSR planners should gain a thorough knowledge of any alternative systems that may be operating in a particular HN and accommodate them within the overall SSR program.

(2) Transitional justice initiatives are often part of a wider reconciliation process and include unresolved judicial proceeding as a result of past or ongoing conflicts, such as war crimes and atrocities. In such cases, special venues and processes for conflict-related justice and reconciliation are often necessary. Such processes sometimes are incorporated in the comprehensive peace agreements that form the foundation of conflict transformation. Issues to be addressed in the initial development of a legal and judicial system are:

(a) Fair and impartial laws and effective enforcement mechanisms.

(b) Independent, impartial, and competent courts and judges.

(c) Accountability and transparency in the judicial system.

(d) Timely access to justice.

(e) Transparent cooperation between state and traditional institutions.

(f) An integrated approach with other components of the criminal justice system including police and prison/penal reform bodies.

(3) Transitional justice initiatives are politically sensitive and require evaluation at the highest levels to determine the practical application of reforms. Many countries have legal systems based on civil law, which is widely used in continental Europe and Francophone Africa, rather than the common law system, which is typical in the United States and other English-speaking nations. Western notions of fair and impartial laws and timely access to justice may not comport with the cultural norms of the HN and should not be imposed as long as those cultural norms do not violate or are not inconsistent with international legal obligations. Whatever transitional justice initiative is implemented, the HN government and populace must perceive it as legitimate for the sake of long-term stability.

(4) **Law Enforcement.** Police services support an effective and accountable justice system and are central to a legitimate security sector. Although military forces may initiate the development of justice and law enforcement forces, this task is a stopgap. As such, military police and CA personnel with police and legal backgrounds assist in this
endeavor. Appropriate DOJ and UN international police organizations should assume training and assistance as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice-sector and police trainers support a formal advisory program and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Reform of the security sector includes demilitarizing police forces and orienting policing towards community service and protection of individual civil rights rather than as an instrument of control from the central government. Imbuing a community-oriented policing ethos among law enforcement academies, leaders, organizations, and individual officers establishes an environment of mutual trust and partnership with local communities. Using communication skills, critical thinking, and positive narratives, police officers work with local communities to deescalate disputes and resolve problems peacefully. With the advent of mutually beneficial relations, local people provide the police with information on criminal and militant activities because they pose a threat to the community. Community-oriented policing embodies the rule of law, which is a principle of governance. Accordingly, the government, populace, civil society, public and private sectors, and societal entities affirm their accountability to laws. Integral to good governance, laws are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and they are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

(5) Trainers and advisors for the initial development of HN police services should:

(a) Assess police roles, responsibilities, structures, management, and practices.

(b) Understand the traditional role of police within the HN’s society. Then, they develop a force that adopts the community-oriented policing ethos and conforms to internationally accepted law. Changing the institutional mentality of the police force to one that serves and protects the populace requires extensive effort, time, and resources. In some cases, the police service might require a complete overhaul.

(c) Support links across the justice system to ensure system-wide functionality.

(d) Improve police training and the police education system, to include public service, public safety, and community partnership. In the aftermath of conflict, focus training on investigative processes, including the gathering, handling, and preservation of evidence to support ongoing prosecutions. Of import, in some nations, prosecutors conduct investigations, not the police; thus, police training should reflect that distinction. Ensure police training targets protection of civilian issues such as human trafficking.

(e) Enhance the ability of police services to plan and develop criminal intelligence analysis skills.

(f) Strengthen police accountability and transparency and integrate human rights considerations into accountability mechanisms.

(g) Develop an integrated approach that complements the broader SSR program.
(6) Law enforcement reform is nested within the larger justice system reform. The justice system consists of a number of interrelated steps—arrest, detention, prosecution, adjudication, corrections, rehabilitation, and parole. Functionality requires that all work together as a system. Law enforcement reform that outpaces the rest of the justice sector may result in more arrests with inadequate detention facilities and no means of adjudication. This dilemma undermines the public trust and the legitimacy of the government, thereby nurturing narratives propagated by antigovernment movements.

For further details on community-oriented policing, refer to Community-Oriented Policing for CVE Capacity and Creating Positive Policing Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism.

(7) **Corrections System.** As part of the justice system, corrections contributes to the protection of society by incarcerating offenders and providing opportunities for offenders to become law-abiding citizens upon release. In fragile states, overcrowded and poorly managed prisons spawn abuse and torture of prisoners, extremist radicalization of fellow inmates, and incubators for epidemics. In some states, prisoners are often detained without charge, legal counsel, or trial. SSR aligns swift development of corrections systems with the reforms of law enforcement and justice systems. Immediate reforms of a corrections system include:

   (a) Respect for the human rights of detainees, the right to counsel, and adherence to international detention standards, which require separation by gender and age (adults and juveniles). Segregation of vulnerable groups or persons from predators may be required.

   (b) Methods for reducing pretrial detention.

   (c) Improvements to prison health and social services.

   (d) Enhanced HN civilian and multinational oversight of prisons.

   (e) Promotion of prison rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

   (f) Adherence to an integrated approach with the judicial system.

(8) Priorities for technical assistance to the corrections system include staff development and training, management training, policy development, conditions of youth in detention, and the promotion of activities to address prison overcrowding. A sound policy framework is essential for the effective and efficient governance of any correctional system. Corrections policies must adhere to the rule of law; international, regional, and national standards for corrections; and the protection of human rights. Overall goals of corrections reform should include systemic improvements in corrections and criminal justice policies, clear legislation that establishes a consistent approach to offenders based upon shared values and principles, effective rehabilitation programs to reintegrate offenders into society safely, and increased staff professionalism.
Appendix C

e. **Non-State Security Forces.** Local militias, hunting societies, neighborhood crime watches, citizen security patrols, and tribal forces are a frequent response when the state is unable to provide effective security to local communities. SSR programs must acknowledge the presence of these non-state groups and establish a relationship with them through dialogue. Intervention forces may quickly achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with local non-state security groups during a conflict. Because non-state security forces lack accountability mechanisms and oversight systems, they have a tendency to commit human rights violations and prey upon the populace. This behavior is exacerbated by lack of training in law enforcement and the use of force rather than community-oriented policing. As violence increases in frequency and becomes more intense, lack of effective control over militia activities incurs proportionally greater costs. Uncontrolled violence, once accepted tacitly or otherwise, by state authorities or intervening forces, is very difficult to restrain. To the extent that a partnership has developed between local forces and the intervening force, the declining legitimacy and problematic functionality of local militias accrue to their sponsors as well. Accordingly, the DDR of non-state security forces is an essential step in reforming an HN’s security sector. A DDR program permits the HN government to resume its traditional monopoly on the use of force.

(1) **Private Security Forces.** The private security industry comprises those individuals and institutions that provide security for people and property by contract and for profit. The activities of a private security industry without accountability and oversight can present unique governance problems and act as an obstacle to SSR programs for military forces and law enforcement services. Increased security provision by non-state organizations is prevalent in all regions of the world. SSR planners, therefore, must consider the potentially serious implications of the private security industry in the HN, as well as the effects of limited regulation and accountability of a market, which continues to grow in both size and importance. Whenever possible, SSR programs should introduce similar levels of professionalism and accountability in the private sector as they do for the public sector (i.e., military and police). The types of organizations that compose the private security industry include:

- (a) Service providers that conduct mine clearance, logistics and supply, and risk consulting. PSCs also conduct surveillance and investigation and risk assessment and analysis. For example, contractors can provide a risk assessment related to the DOD equities within the women, peace, and security principles to address how they may be a force multiplier in reducing risk.

- (b) PSCs that protect industrial and commercial sites, humanitarian aid missions, embassies, very important persons, and military camps/bases. PSCs are companies contracted by the USG to perform private security functions under a covered contract. For more information on PSCs, see DODI 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.*
(c) Private military companies (PMCs) that support military training, military intelligence, and offensive combat.

(2) Significant challenges exist for incorporating elements of the private security industry into a comprehensive SSR program. SSR planners need to develop a comprehensive system providing for effective regulation and oversight of this industry. In the absence of adequate legislation and regulation, control over the type or quality of services providing these elements becomes problematic. Untrained staff with questionable backgrounds may use armed force and drive vehicles in an undisciplined or extralegal manner.

(3) The introduction of armed PSCs/PMCs compete with the state’s traditional monopoly on the use of force and may hinder law enforcement when unregulated. In states with a history of sectarian conflict, the potential exists for political, ethnic, and religious figures to misuse PSCs/PMCs against rivals. Specific objectives of SSR programs depend on the context of the OE, with the overall aims of increasing democratic oversight and accountability of the entire sector. This can be achieved by formulating a comprehensive system of legislation and regulation for the private security industry, developing effective mechanisms for oversight, and encouraging a culture of professionalism. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requires PSCs performing work under a covered contract to comply with one of two standards of performance as defined by the International Organization for Standardization and the American National Standards Institute.

f. Intelligence and Security Service Reform. Intelligence and security service reform promotes the proper use of intelligence to protect the nation and citizens from surprise attacks. Intelligence and security services are normally located within central government, typically reporting directly to senior decision makers. They should provide warnings and insights about threats and trends that impact the security and economic well-being of a state and allow decision makers to shape policy. The most crucial task facing nations embarking on SSR processes is creating a nationally owned and led vision of security. To this end, a national security review elaborates on overarching threats to the nation and helps develop a national security policy. Such a review allows the HN government to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate security activities, and it delineates between the competing claims for resources. Intelligence services can make a significant contribution to this process through the provision of accurate intelligence on the range of threats facing the nation.

(1) Intelligence services frequently require reform because of former government intrusions on inalienable rights. Authoritarian governments use intelligence and police services to spy, persecute, and commit human rights abuses on citizens. Police states focus on eliminating dissent and perceived threats to those in power. Thus, SSR of the state intelligence services and structures is a necessity for democratic institutions. Indicators of where services may require reform include:
(a) Balance between the necessary secrecy of the intelligence services and transparency regarding their mandates and their powers.

(b) Existence of oversight structures to minimize maladministration.

(c) Extent of control over and public accountability for the financing of intelligence services.

(d) Controls in place to govern the use of intrusive methods of intelligence collections.

(e) Professionalism and ethics of intelligence officers.

(2) Three types of intelligence services may be present in an HN:

(a) Intelligence on foreign or external threats.

(b) Intelligence on threats to internal security.

(c) Intelligence-led advice on policy and decision making.

(3) Foreign intelligence capabilities are needed to study and understand the capabilities of other foreign powers, to prevent strategic surprise. This requires access to both secret and open-source information, primarily focused on national security, military and defense, political, economic, and foreign policy issues. Primary examples of these types of capabilities are the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service.

(4) Security intelligence also serves a domestic purpose, focusing on internal threats to protect citizens, institutions, and systems. Security intelligence is generally distinctive to the law enforcement sector. However, these distinctions are often blurred as domestic and foreign intelligence activities increasingly overlap, particularly in the realm of activities such as CT, which can encompass threats to domestic targets, overseas embassies, armed forces, and commercial interests in foreign nations.

(5) Intelligence is useful in supporting HN policy-formulation and decision-making processes. This can occur through the provision of tactical or strategic intelligence assessments that provide short- and long-term views of a particular issue. It allows governments to reduce uncertainty and manage risk through scoping the possible set of future threats with which the government may be faced.

(6) In reforming and training intelligence organizations, as with the rule of law, the military might not be the ideal lead. However, military intelligence personnel are suitable for the development of the HN military capacity. Traditionally, US civilian intelligence agencies lead efforts in building intelligence capacity in nations undergoing SSR.
4. **Guidance for Security Sector Reform**

   a. **Support HN Ownership.** The HN’s history, culture, legal framework, and institutions must inform the principles, policies, laws, and structures that form an SSR program. The needs, priorities, and circumstances driving SSR will differ substantially among nations. Satisfying the basic security concerns of the HN government and population is instrumental to their commitment to SSR. To ensure the sustainability of reforms, assistance should be designed to meet the needs of the HN population and to support HN ministries, processes, and priorities. To accomplish long-term goals, SSR programs should include the participation of HN stakeholders.

   b. **Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights.** Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights, civilian harm mitigation, and legitimacy are integral to security force development. Military and civilian security forces must carry out their core functions in accordance with these principles. These principles are particularly important for nations with a legacy of abuse by security personnel, which have eroded public confidence in the security sector. SSR programs should include constitutional checks and balances, accountability and oversight mechanisms. Civil society (e.g., media, academia, civic groups, think tanks, and business communities) provides independent oversight of the government to prevent abuses of power, corruption, and incompetence to regain public confidence. The vetting of recruits or candidates is an essential prerequisite for the provision of assistance and training to security forces. Likewise, SSR programs must incorporate an explicit focus on security sector governance. Strengthening the overall legal, policy, and budgetary systems is an important component of SSR for any nation.

   c. **Balance Operational Support with Institutional Reform.** Incentives, processes, resources, and structures must be functioning, to ensure the sustenance of externally supported reforms, resources, and capacities once assistance ends. Equal emphasis is necessary for capacity building programs for HN security forces and government organizations, especially in terms of support, financing, management, and monitoring. Training platforms and materiel assistance requires alignment with development efforts, such as HN infrastructure; personnel and administrative support systems; logistic and planning procedures; and an adequate, sustainable resource base. Effective sustainability depends on developing the institutions and processes that support security forces as well as the human capacity to lead and manage them.

   d. **Link Security and Justice.** A democratic nation’s security policies and practices adhere to the rule of law and the justice sector. SSR stipulates that all security forces operate within the bounds of domestic and international law, and that they protect the rule of law. Police services are an integral part of the justice system and directly support the courts and corrections institutions. Assistance to police services and other state security providers should serve to complement and strengthen judicial institutions, in accordance with the rule of law. Experience demonstrates that police assistance without equal assistance to the justice system can lead to increased arrests without the necessary legal means to adjudicate cases (i.e., legal counsel, fair trial, incarceration, and rehabilitation of...
lawbreakers). Consequently, police services and the populace may seek extralegal justice. Although a tendency may exist to focus on criminal justice systems, civil justice reform may have important implications for law and order, particularly with respect to the resolution of potential conflict drivers, such as land disputes.

e. **Foster Transparency.** Effective SSR programs should be as transparent and open to the public as practical. Program design should foster awareness of reform efforts among HN officials and the population, neighboring nations, the donor community, and other stakeholders in program outcomes. Likewise, DOS, DOD, and USAID practitioners should consult broadly with other stabilization partners and the media to enhance program development and program execution.

f. **Do No Harm.** Donor assistance can become a part of the conflict dynamic serving either to increase or reduce tension. As with any activity that involves changes to the status quo, SSR implementers must seek to minimize adverse, unintended effects on the local population and community structures; the security sector; and the wider political, social, and economic climate. Developing a thorough understanding of the system in need of reform is a prerequisite for the success of any SSR-related activity. Practitioners should conduct a risk assessment prior to implementation and be prepared to adjust activities when needed over the lifetime of the SSR program. When harm occurs despite such precautions, it should be acknowledged and addressed in a culturally appropriate way.

5. **Planning for Security Sector Reform**

a. **Comprehensive Plan.** The military contribution to an SSR program should be incorporated within a comprehensive reform plan, which is a product of all the pertinent stabilization partners. During a FID or COIN operation, the IDAD strategy is the overarching strategy for SSR. In any case, the overarching strategy should set out a realistic timeline for reform that recognizes the context of the issues, as well as the resources available, the HN leadership capacity to deliver change, and existing institutional capabilities. The strategic reform plan should take into account certain factors:

1. **A Comprehensive Vision for the Security Sector.** The comprehensive vision should articulate all threats that seek to destabilize state institutions and formulate appropriate responses. A national security strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means (i.e., security, political, and economic policies) fills this need. The HN government should review the strategy every two years and revise as necessary.

2. **Priorities.** SSR practitioners must establish priorities among the various SSR tasks, the lead element for each, and their funding sources.

3. **The Structure of the Security Sector.** SSR practitioners should also designate roles and responsibilities for the various aspects of the sector defined and measures to strengthen the relationships developed within the sector.

4. **Transfer of Responsibility.** All elements of the strategic reform plan must have desired stability conditions for turning over responsibility to institutions of the HN.
b. Objectives. SSR programs have four primary objectives:

(1) Increase effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security sector.

(2) Improve delivery of security and justice.

(3) Assist local leadership in developing an ownership of the reform process.

(4) Support the development of sustainable security and justice delivery.

c. LOEs. In SSR, the needs and contexts of nations vary greatly. As such, reform efforts must be context-driven. The USG should formulate SSR holistically in a way that encompasses institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, and civilian oversight and governance.

(1) Institutional Structures. From the outset, SSR should support HN national structures that manage the implementation of programs. HN ownership and leadership are essential for effective security sector development. SSR should focus on the organizational structures and management processes within security sector organizations. Training and equipping programs for HN officials (e.g., ministers, judges, prosecutors, corrections officers, and law enforcement officers) are just one part of the equation. Managerial and planning training are essential capacities for the various levels of government—national, provincial, and local—and must soberly reflect existing capabilities. Education levels and organizational skills are key factors in determining the pace of programs.

(2) Resource Management. Sustainable SSR programs must take into account basic resource issues such as the number of qualified personnel, their skill levels, and existing materiel support in the HN. Capacity development is an essential component of SSR programs that must recognize existing resource management structures and resources on hand to enhance basic security and other service delivery, while also working to increase the governance and regulatory capacities of the state.

(3) Operational Capacity. Operational capacity development rests on the ability of US and PN forces to train and advise HN authorities with available resources. Such capacities include the ability to develop security strategies, set priorities, solve problems, and achieve results. Operational capacity transcends training and technical assistance to address basic capacity shortfalls. It requires a tailored, comprehensive approach from all stabilization partners within the OE. Strengthening capacity in HN governments to develop, manage, and implement SSR should be a central aspect of all reform programs. Capacity needs are present throughout the security sector and not just within state institutions. Historically, capacity development programs have fared poorly because SSR practitioners failed to address properly debilitating governance problems (e.g., flagrant corruption, incompetence, and illiteracy). For this reason, a thorough assessment must inform the SSR planning process.
(4) **Civilian Oversight and Governance.** Civilian government oversight bodies manage and oversee the activities of security forces and agencies. Employing formal or informal mechanism, they normally include the executive branch; MODs, interior, justice, and foreign affairs; judicial branch, national security coordination and advisory bodies; the legislative branch and its committees; traditional and customary authorities; the ministry of finance and other financial management bodies; civilian review boards and compliance commissions; and local government structures. Local government structures in security include governors, municipal councils, auditing bodies, civilian review boards, and public complaints commissions.

d. **Planning Considerations.** SSR planning must factor in several interrelated variables that influence reform, to include cultural awareness, leadership capacity building, public trust and confidence, HN dependency, resilience, and desired outcome. Interactions among the security sector and these factors complicate reform efforts. Reform activities in one security sector impact the others. Effective assessment of these variables and their significance on the entire sector should drive the process and help define success.

(1) **Cultural Awareness.** Regardless of the desire to develop HN security forces quickly, SSR requires considerable patience, perseverance, cultural awareness, and relationships built on mutual respect. Organizations and personnel working closely with HN security forces must empathize with their security culture, which is shaped by history, language, religion, and customs. Cultural awareness and sensitivity are necessary to dispel the natural tensions that arise whenever external authorities attempt to dictate the terms and conditions of SSR to the HN. Responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to local culture help limit resentment and resistance to reform, while generating local solutions to local problems. Local help fosters acceptance and strengthens the confidence of the citizens in reform.

(2) **Leadership Capacity Building.** Challenges associated with developing capable, legitimate, and accountable security forces require capable leadership in the HN security sector at all levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR should help the HN identify security force leaders early for training and advising (i.e., train-the-trainer). Such efforts must avoid undermining HN legitimacy while recognizing that assistance, advice, and education may be needed. Programs focused on developing senior leaders, such as DOD-sponsored regional centers for security studies, may provide enduring dividends. Often the HN can augment SSR-sponsored programs for officer training and staff college courses and may even develop similar institutions. This participation ensures future leaders gain the knowledge and skills to manage security forces effectively while meeting the broader responsibilities normally associated with leaders in the security sector.

(3) **Public Trust and Confidence.** In rebuilding the institutions of a failed state, HN commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local populace and the security forces. As SSR proceeds, HN security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterized by crime and violence, particularly in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery
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requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the military and police services. Operating in accordance with the rule of law, the success of these forces engenders the trust and confidence of the local populace. Furthermore, increased public confidence encourages greater public support of the security forces and security efforts. SSR implementers must focus on enhancing the functionality of HN security forces while sustaining and strengthening popular perceptions of legitimacy. A way to achieve this is to plan for and implement a deliberate narrative utilizing effective communication means that fosters a perception of legitimacy for the HN. Public confidence is further strengthened as HN forces support activities that foster civil participation (e.g., providing security for elections), associate the security forces with positive processes, improve the credibility of HN security forces, and provide visible signs of accountability and responsibility.

(4) HN Dependency. During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process that includes sequential provision of training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability of formally trained advisors, and a long-term advisory presence. As the training program matures, HN security forces assume greater responsibility for the security sector. The training program must include minorities and women to forestall the creation of a caste system. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of HN dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability. Depending on an assessment of the OE, SSR officials may need to protect new HN security forces from diverse threats during their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to problems with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting HN security forces may necessitate training outside the physical boundaries of the state.

(5) Perseverance. SSR is a complex activity, so SSR practitioners must exercise persistence and resilience in managing the dynamic interactions of various factors affecting the reform program. SSR practitioners should anticipate problems, even failures, during the process. Early identification of potential points of failure, such as corruption and incompetence, permits timely and innovative solutions.

e. SSR programs and supporting international assistance are inherently political processes. SSR inevitably creates winners and losers since it challenges traditional interests and existing power relationships. SSR, therefore, has an explicitly political objective to ensure that security is provided in a manner consistent with US and internationally accepted democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. HN state and non-state institutions provide and manage security, which is ultimately driven by a nation’s balance of power. Therefore, effective SSR requires a comprehensive governance approach and is not simply a technical and military activity.

6. Foreign Assistance Programs in Support of Security Sector Reform

a. SSR may be initiated following a diplomatic request for assistance from a nation and may be managed through the UN. Accordingly, SSR normally focuses on assistance
existing security institutions and specific capability strengthening initiatives, such as improving indigenous CT capabilities, providing intelligence training, and/or strengthening police investigative skills. The scope for this activity is wide, and each act of assistance should carefully align with local conditions. Initial delivery of assistance to a nation may lead to further involvement across the full range of security sector activity. Foreign assistance programs can support the SSR efforts within a HN.

b. Foreign assistance is civil or military aid rendered to a foreign nation, comprising development assistance, HCA, and SA. The United States provides foreign assistance through SC in conjunction with a CCDR’s theater SC plan. SC comprises all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and PN military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. Foreign assistance can also occur whenever the United States sponsors a FID program or supports FHA in conjunction with other SC efforts. Foreign assistance supports a nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal of foreign assistance is to promote long-term regional stability.

c. Development Assistance Programs. A principal objective of US foreign policy is the encouragement and sustained support to people of developing nations, to improve the quality of life. DOS executes development assistance programs directly or indirectly through USAID, which finances numerous development assistance programs to address the following needs:

(1) Agriculture and nutrition.
(2) Population control.
(3) Health.
(4) Education.
(5) Energy.
(6) Environment improvement.

d. HCA Programs. HCA programs are governed by Title 10, USC, Section 401. This assistance can only be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and it must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, HCA programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:

(1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas.
(2) Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.
(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

e. **SA Programs.** SA programs are governed by Title 22, USC. Through these programs, the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. DOD implements these programs in accordance with policies established by DOS. The principal components of these programs include FMS, foreign military financing, international military education and training, peace operations, and EDAs. Joint force personnel in support of these programs:

(1) Identify HN requirements.

(2) Develop or review the nomination list of programs or projects to support the mission objectives.

(3) Provide input to the feasibility of each program.

(4) Provide input to the prioritization of each program to meet desired outcomes and goals.

7. **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

a. DDR programs are useful stabilization tools that take different forms depending on the context. In some cases, they assist nations to demilitarize after a prolonged internal conflict and commonly occur upon the signing of a peace agreement. In other cases, DDR programs help degrade the ranks of armed groups, including designated terrorist organizations, through the promotion of voluntary defections in an active conflict. Depending on the conflict context and the laws or treaties in place, the trajectory of the former combatant varies greatly.

(1) If DDR is pursued as a component of a peace agreement, the HN security forces draw down to levels which are financially supportable and represent no threat to neighboring nations. Also, in accordance with the peace agreement, a select number of former combatants are designated to serve in the new military and police services. Fostering trust and building an integrated security service is challenging, especially when it involves large numbers of former combatants; however, successful DDR can provide the requisite stability needed for SSR to progress.

(2) If DDR is pursued in the absence of a peace agreement and used in conjunction with lethal operations, combatants must voluntarily defect to HN or partner security forces or civil society. In many cases, the HN puts out a call (informal or formal) for defections, which may be linked to conditional amnesty. Defectors then go through a screening, registration, and rehabilitation process before assimilating into society. Extensive community sensitization and engagement is required to prepare the environment for reaccepting rehabilitated defectors. The goal of this type of DDR is to
degrade the ranks of non-state armed groups and pave the way for community reconciliation and peace post-conflict.

b. Generally, the UN provides the mandate for DDR, and DOS provides policy guidance and support. The joint force can contribute significantly to the DDR program with staff planning, organization, manpower, and resources. Participating stabilization partners provide security forces and police services, which are fundamental to the broad success of the DDR program.

c. DDR is a confidence-building initiative, which allows former combatants to participate in the program without fear for their safety. DDR officials should separate the warring factions by withdrawing rebels into temporary camps and government forces into existing posts/bases. DDR planners should glean the number of participants by gender and age and weapons by type from LNOs. This estimate determines the number of DDR sites needed. Since disarmament is voluntary, offering money for weapons is counterproductive and may encourage arms profiteering. Regardless of HN gun control laws, disarmament focuses on the warring factions only and not the general population. DDR officials are not permitted to offer amnesty to war criminals in exchange for participation. Rather, they are encouraged to surrender to HN or UN authorities for judicial proceedings.

d. DDR LNOs are an effective way to glean the number, gender, and age of DDR participants, as well as the number of weapons by type for DDR planning. DDR officials should introduce LNOs to government and rebel leaders participating in the peace negotiations. In this manner, LNOs can build rapport and trust with their counterparts before the warring factions withdraw to their temporary camps. LNOs should possess compatible personality traits to increase their effectiveness. Past experiences in DDR suggest that rebel leaders may attempt to disregard some insurgents from the DDR program (e.g., female soldiers, child soldiers, families, disabled soldiers, sex slaves, and laborers), so LNOs must make it clear that anyone who served is eligible for the program. A principal duty of LNOs is to keep rebels informed on the DDR schedule, location of their DDR site, and dispel rumors that invariably circulate. With accurate numbers of participants and weapons, LNOs ensure DDR sites are sufficiently prepared for the arrival of participants.

For more information on LNOs, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, and PKSOI publication, Professionalizing Ministerial Advising.

e. The DDR program should include comprehensive public information services, using every available means (e.g., media, leaflets, loudspeakers, and local authorities), to alert the public and warring factions of the peace agreement and the DDR program. The public information services should identify the locations and dates of operation for the DDR sites. In addition to combatants, public information services should explicitly include female soldiers, slave laborers, sex slaves, child soldiers, soldier families, and disabled veterans in the DDR program. Lastly, public information services should warn the public not to handle unexploded ordinance and mines; rather, they should inform local authorities of their locations for marking and referral to DDR officials for disposal.
f. DDR officials should prepare disarmament sites for a vast influx of weapons, munitions, and equipment. Sufficient space, labor, office supplies, and equipment are needed to collect, record, crate, load, and transport the arms to central collection sites. A sufficiently sized disarmament motor park for rebel vehicles should be located in a place that does not interfere with the weapons turn-in point. Heavy equipment transportation trucks are needed to move the vehicles to central collection sites. Weapons turn-in should progress orderly so participants can proceed to the demobilization site quickly.

g. Demobilization is a significant chapter in the lives of former combatants. Since the demobilization ceremony needs a celebratory atmosphere, DDR officials should select a site which provides sufficient room for veterans to stand in formation, viewing areas for an audience, music (e.g., band or audio equipment), a stage for guest speakers, and a viewing area for official disarmament ceremonies. Pre-printed service certificates are provided to the veterans at the end of the ceremony to honor their service. Veterans selected for service in the new military and police are transported to designated reception centers and the remainder move to the reintegration site.

h. The purpose of reintegration activities is to permit the return of veterans into society so they may pursue a peaceful livelihood. DDR officials may consider establishing reintegration cantonments for efficiency and cost-effectiveness, rather than vying with local communities for facilities, accommodations, electricity, and other commodities. In-processing activities include Service verification, medical screening, biometrics collection, trauma counseling, issuance of stipends, ration cards, and clothes and segregation of male, female, child, family, and disabled soldiers into separate accommodations. Training activities include basic education, life skills, and vocational skills. While NGOs, international organizations, and USG agencies can provide support to reintegration, DDR officials should consider employing HN and local professionals to supplement the effort. Informal judicial proceedings are normally needed to hold veterans accountable for atrocities in a culturally appropriate manner and without overwhelming the judicial system. DDR officials should consider holding a graduation ceremony, issuance of training certificates, and provision of a take-home package for graduates. Transportation of graduates to their home communities may be needed to protect them from robbery. While no timeline is set for reintegration, DDR planners may limit it to six weeks.

i. DDR officials should consider the establishment of a DDR support center for each DDR site to enhance unity of effort. Similar in design to PRT camps, they permit personnel from various agencies and organizations to establish rapport, work together, and pool resources. In view of accommodations, meals, communications support, Internet access, work space, and meeting space, a DDR support center obviates the need for facilities in the local communities. Foremost, DDR support centers build teamwork. DDR officials should consider using CA personnel to manage the centers due to their background and training.

j. Importance of DDR to Stability. DDR programs serve to demilitarize a fragile state and pave the way for SSR programs. DDR permits the downsizing of the military and police services and the orderly integration of former belligerents. The central weapons collection centers select serviceable weapons for the new military and police services,
destroying the remainder. Educational and vocational opportunities permit veterans to reintegrate into society, thereby lowering militant or criminal recidivism. Realistically, a DDR program requires significant planning, organization, resources, and time, but the payoff in terms of enduring stability makes it a worthy endeavor.

*For more information on DDR, refer to PKSOI publication, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Primer for Military Practitioners.*

**8. Transitions**

a. SSR programs should be monitored throughout implementation to ensure they deliver sustainable results while minimizing unintended consequences. Program evaluation at key decision points and at the close of specific projects provides important MOEs to adjust ongoing programs and to provide lessons for future SSR programs. Program evaluation should identify expected outcomes.

b. Military forces gradually transfer the responsibilities they have accumulated during military operations to selected stabilization partners in the SSR effort, whether from one military force to another or to civilian organizations. Transferring security responsibility from intervening to HN security forces should occur in accordance with the tactical, operational, and strategic conditions identified during planning. As forces establish suitable conditions, responsibility for security gradually transitions to the local, provincial, and national government. During the transition of authority, progress through transition should be gauged by a process that confirms the performance and capabilities of each respective HN security force. These capabilities can be gauged through exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of US and multinational forces for contingency operations. This prevents a premature transition of authority, which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the populace to seek alternative means of security, damaging the overall SSR program.
APPENDIX D
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNING AUTHORITIES

1. Transitional Military Authority

   a. General

      (1) Transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. In some instances, military authority may result from an occupation. The decision to occupy is made by the President of the United States. Whether a military occupation exists is a question of fact (i.e., territory must actually be placed under the authority of hostile forces), giving rise to legal rights and duties under international law, including the law of war. Under these circumstances, the military will take the lead in the stability sectors. However, a transitional military authority should draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and organizations once the security situation permits. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of effective government. Until stable conditions exist, military forces are responsible for stability. Once security is firmly established, military government safely transitions responsibility for the stability sectors to civil authority and civil control. The transitional military authority (i.e., military governor) exercises temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority in a foreign territory.

      (2) A transitional military authority restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the United States and its territories, necessity may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including the liberation of allied or neutral territory from enemy occupation forces, a neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile, or an ungoverned area.

      (3) The authority to establish military governance resides with the President and is exercised through SecDef and the JFC. Broad policy formulation and initial planning for transitional military authority is conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the JFC, key staff, subordinate Service components, and allied commanders also participate to a lesser degree. US forces will only assume control prescribed in directives to the JFC.

For discussion on governance, see Chapter II, “An Integrated Approach to Stabilization.”

(4) An occupying force establishes a transitional military authority pursuant to international law (i.e., The Hague and Geneva Conventions) and the law of war. The scope of such authority is determined by international law. In some circumstances, military forces establish a transitional military authority pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution or a similar international legal authority, which can prescribe limits of that authority. Commanders should only take action with regard to transitional military authority after close and careful consultation with the legal advisor.
(5) Civil administration—and the tasks that support it—evolve from the essential stability tasks described in Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions.” Establishing transitional military authority may require military forces to complete tasks typically performed by the HN government. These tasks may be prescribed under international law and UN Security Council resolutions. In cases other than the occupation of enemy territory, the international community typically leads this effort through an international organization, such as the UN. The occupation of enemy territory may result in one nation or a coalition of nations establishing a transitional military authority.

(6) Effective transitional military authority enhances security and facilitates ongoing operations while fulfilling the legal obligations of occupying forces under the law of war. This authority enhances stability by promoting the safety and security of both military forces and the local populace, preventing civilian interference in military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, and maintaining public order. It helps ongoing operations by building local HN capability and capacity to perform government functions and relieving maneuver forces of the responsibility of civil administration. Generally, during major military operations, transitional military authority occurs immediately whenever any territory, regardless of size, is occupied. Until the military authority can safely transition to civil authority and control, activities of the transitional military authority may be performed with civilian personnel assistance and participation. These civilians may come from the HN, a provisional government, the USG, or other stabilization partners. This cooperation facilitates the transition, while ensuring all activities complement and reinforce efforts to set conditions necessary to achieve success. Military authorities should consult with a legal advisor before attempting to compel HN civil servants or other officials to continue to perform their duties.

(7) The objective for a transitional military authority is to establish a government that supports US objectives, restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides humanitarian assistance and essential civil services. The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the requirements of the military operation, UN Security Council resolutions, and/or international law.

(8) The objective of US military government in an occupied territory is to create an effective civil administration. This administration should not pose a threat to future security and stability. The commander of a transitional military authority has the obligation, within the limits set by international law and US laws and treaties, to demand and enforce law and order in an occupied area to accomplish the mission and properly manage the area.

(9) To establish transitional military authority, commanders require a level of compliance from the HN population commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the operational area. In return for such compliance, the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property
rights. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, commanders must observe the principle of governing for the benefit of the governed.

(10) The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several factors, including the legal authorities of the military commander under international law, existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the HN leaders and the populace, ongoing and projected military operations, and the presence of hostile or enemy forces. Regardless of the character of hostilities, military authorities govern indirectly, supervising local civil authorities in accordance with military necessity. As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority.

b. Organization

(1) The JFC is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional military authority under the policy guidance from the President and SecDef. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on international law; UN Security Council resolution; the mission of the military force; the organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces; the military and political conditions of the OE; the nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former HN government; and the physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the HN. The JFC may execute the authorities of civil administration directly, invest the authority in subordinate operational commanders or establish a separate JCMOTF.

(a) Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander or in subordinate operational commands helps ensure activities related to civil administration, including relations between the military and HN civilians, are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. However, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the commander is able to address the requirements of civil administration. Areas of high operational tempo normally require frequent changes in civil administration policies, and military boundaries of operational headquarters do not correspond with existing political subdivisions. The deployment of CA forces for the responsibility of civil administration substantially assists the commander in this regard.

(b) Establishing a separate JCMOTF to conduct civil administration may permit a concentration of expertise and focus on stabilization. However, a command dedicated to stabilization, including civil administration, represents a separate chain of command from combat forces, particularly if the JCMOTF does not report to the JFC executing combat operations. In this case, activities of the transitional military authority require careful coordination with combat forces operating in the area. Accordingly, military units must be cognizant of CMO occurring in their area of operation and not interfere with civil administration activities as governed by military necessity.

(2) The head of an established civil administration system is the civil administrator or military governor. The administrator is a military commander or other
designated person who exercises authority over the occupied territory. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the territory.

(3) A transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilians from the HN, the USG, or other stabilization partners. These partners have the expertise to establish a system of effective government. This cooperation facilitates the transition while ensuring all activities complement and reinforce efforts to establish conditions necessary to achieve success.

(4) Where practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials and employees of the HN government. These officials can continue to discharge their duties properly under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Even with the use of local civilians, the occupying forces still retain the power to exercise supreme authority. As such, military authorities have the power to dismiss any HN official who is corrupt, incompetent, or subversive. HN officials working for the transitional military authority should be appropriately compensated in accordance with occupation currency policies.

(a) The transitional military authority should thoroughly vet and assess the capability of HN government officials to determine if they can support and contribute to the transitional military authority. Military authorities may dismiss at any time HN officials who refuse or undermine the transitional military authority. Additionally, if permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily.

(b) Officials of the transitional military authority should refrain from developing or maintaining personal relationships with local officials and HN personnel. Military personnel do not accept personal favors or gifts offered by local government officials or the local populace unless authorized by an appropriate authority. USG personnel should seek legal guidance and consult ethics rules and regulations for appropriate guidelines for the relationships among military supervisory officials and HN subordinates.

(5) Any member of the joint force may contribute relevant information on the local populace and other aspects of the OE. Foreign area officers, CA personnel, and others normally concentrate their efforts on specific aspects of local culture, general customs, and behaviors. Intelligence analysts will use all this information to produce timely and relevant intelligence and distribute appropriate products throughout the joint force and interorganizational partners, as appropriate.

c. Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries

(1) The laws of the territory subject to military authority/control may not be changed, except to the extent permitted by the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Commanders must consult closely and carefully with their legal advisors before attempting to change any local laws.

(2) In general, the military authority should not impose the customs of another nation on the governed territory. Implementing changes or reforms inconsistent with local customs may foster active or passive resistance, adding friction to an already complex effort. Commanders and their legal advisors must recognize that laws and customs often vary among political divisions of a nation (i.e., among provinces and municipalities). Commanders must identify issues related to ethnic and minority groups so policies of the transitional military authority do not inadvertently oppress such groups.

(3) No adjustments to local boundaries and political divisions are permitted except to the extent permitted by international law. Where possible in the aftermath of a conflict, boundaries of operational areas covered by separate or subordinate military governments should normally reflect existing boundaries as closely as possible.

d. **Forms of Transitional Military Authority**

(1) In general, transitional military authorities are either operational or territorial. An operational form of transitional military authority expands in authority as operations continue. In the territorial form of transitional military authority, the JFC establishes a separate organization under the direct command of the JFC or an authorized subordinate.

(2) **Operational Form of Transitional Military Authority**

(a) The responsibilities and geographic area over which a transitional military authority exercises civil administration may expand as operations continue. Commanders oversee civil functions of government in their respective operational areas. This includes ensuring the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace, as well as providing humanitarian assistance. Under the operational form of transitional military authority, the chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by its staff structure.

(b) Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander helps ensure that activities related to civil administration are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. These activities include relationships between the military force and civilians. By ensuring the integrity of unity of command in an operational area, commanders mitigate much of the friction associated with operations in and among the local populace. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to the HN or other civil authority to help the HN return to full self-governance. Using HN civilian advisory groups helps accelerate this transfer of authority.

(c) The advantages of operational form of transitional military authority, however, are tempered by the rate of military activities. Generally, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the commander can address the requirements of transitional military authority. In areas where the tempo of operations and civil situation
are consistently dynamic, civil administration policies may change frequently. Finally, operational headquarters are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to known political subdivisions. Even after hostilities, conformance of these areas to political boundaries may prove impossible, however desirable.

3) Territorial Form of Transitional Military Authority

(a) In the territorial form of transitional military authority, commanders establish a separate organization to exercise the functions of civil administration. It may be under the direct command of the JFC or an authorized subordinate or it may report directly to SecDef or the President. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the HN. Generally, the territorial form of the transitional military authority follows a separate chain of command from operational forces.

(b) A territorial form of transitional military authority typically uses military manpower and expertise more effectively and economically than an operational form of transitional military authority. Established after the operational area is stabilized, a territorial form of transitional military authority may ensure improved continuity of policy and administration. It should facilitate selecting and assigning specially trained military personnel. A territorial form of transitional military authority operates under the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose to achieve unified action.

(c) However, the existence of a separate chain of command within an operational area or a political subdivision presents unique challenges to the territorial form of transitional military authority. Activities of the territorial military authority must be carefully coordinated with those of operational military forces. These activities must not interfere with ongoing operations or expose the operational force to undue risk. To ensure unity of effort, the territorial form of transitional military authority and the operational forces must maintain close communications, cooperation, and coordination.

4) In practice, the exact form of authority should be adapted to suit the political and military situation in the operational area. A territorial form of transitional military authority may draw certain features from an operational form, or vice versa. As operations progress, the character of the military authority may evolve according to the situation, mirroring the effort to build HN capacity. In certain cases, one type of military authority may dominate in one region of the HN, while another type is better suited for another region.

e. Local Government Officials and Departments

1) Successfully implementing transitional military authority often depends on how the HN government and its civilians participate and contribute. The transitional military authority thoroughly assesses the capability of the remaining HN government officials. This assessment determines if those officials can support and contribute to transitional military authority. The long-term success of the operation may depend on this
Transitional Governing Authorities

assessment. If permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily, and officials who refuse to serve the best interests of the transitional military authority may be suspended. However, such officials may be retained in an advisory capacity at the discretion of the military commander. In such cases, they should continue to receive compensation for their services.

2) Generally, if a transitional military authority is required, high-ranking political officials of the former government will not continue to hold office. Such officials may include heads of the HN government, cabinet ministers, and other political elites. To the extent permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may be required to perform certain duties that would otherwise fall to individuals in these positions.

3) Typically, mere membership in unfriendly organizations or political groups is not by itself considered sufficient grounds for removal from office. However, officials who have served as active leaders of such organizations or political groups may need to leave office. Similarly, officials who prove unreliable or corrupt must leave office through legal action or through an open, transparent administrative process. The willful failure of retained officials to perform their duties satisfactorily is a serious offense against the transitional military authority.

4) The commander’s decisions about whether to retain leaders of the local government will likely vary. In some areas, full local participation may be the norm, while in other areas entire departments, agencies, and bureaus of the local government may need to close. Where practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials and employees of the local government. These officials can continue to discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Under certain circumstances, military forces may protect officials who continue to serve in, or are appointed to, local public service. Hostile elements may pose a threat to these individuals.

5) In some areas, the local populace may have had very limited participation in government due to centralized power in an authoritarian regime or a dominating foreign power. Elitist groups may also have focused regional, provincial, or municipal power under their control, negating the participation of the local populace. In such cases, civilian officials of the former government may flee as occupation forces assume control. Even if they remain, it may be impractical or unsafe for them to continue in office. For this reason, building new partner capability—training local nationals to assume certain government positions—must often precede long-term efforts in building partner capacity.

6) When military authority removes a local official or that official is unavailable, the transitional military authority seeks a fully qualified, trained, and experienced replacement. When selecting officials, the military authority considers their reliability, willingness to cooperate with the transitional military authority, and status in the community. The transitional military authority does not make permanent appointments, however. If a suitable candidate is not available, a representative of the transitional military authority performs the duties of the position until an appropriate replacement can assume
the duties. Commanders at all echelons must avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, local political elements without the approval of higher authority. Military authorities make it clear that future elections decide who will hold office.

f. Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority

(1) Treatment of the Population. Fair treatment of the local populace can help reduce hostility to and increase cooperation with US forces. The proper and just treatment of civilians helps military forces establish and maintain security; prevent lawlessness; promote order; and secure local labor, services, and supplies. Such treatment promotes a positive impression of the military force, the United States, and other stabilization partners. It strengthens the legitimacy of the operation and the transitional military authority in the eyes of the populace, bordering nations, and other members of the international community.

(a) A policy of proper and just treatment does not prevent the imposition of restrictive or punitive measures necessary to secure the objectives of the transitional military authority. In particular, such measures may be needed in an area where the population is actively and aggressively hostile.

(b) Military policies for the treatment of the population vary depending on several factors, which include characteristics of the population, such as their attitude toward the governing forces, the degree of technical-industrial development, socioeconomic conditions, the political system, and local history and culture. Other determining factors are US policies with respect to the HN government. The commander must become familiar with HN customs, institutions, and attitudes and establish policies accordingly.

(c) When determining policies for the treatment of the local populace, commanders should consider the following:

1. Generally, less restrictive measures are appropriate for civilians of friendly or neutral states. More restrictive measures generally are needed with civilians of hostile states.

2. Depending on the culture, the local populace may perceive certain activities as characteristic of an illegitimate or weak military government. On the other hand, certain activities, though permissible under international law, may aggravate an already complex civil situation or reduce the effectiveness of the force in imposing civil control.

3. Force may be used to subdue those who resist the transitional military authority or to prevent the escape of prisoners or detainees suspected of crimes. Force is limited to what is necessary and must be consistent with international law. Legal advisors should be consulted when formulating policies for the use of force and the treatment of prisoners, detainees, and other persons.
(d) Military commanders are authorized to take all prudent and proportional measures consistent with international law necessary to protect their forces. However, during stabilization, the nature of the threat can often inhibit the ability of friendly forces to differentiate between hostile acts, hostile intent, and normal daily activity among civilians. For this reason, military commanders and forces retain the authority to detain individuals and develop a legally acceptable framework under which to confine, intern, and eventually release suspects. This authority has the most legitimacy when sanctioned by international mandate or when bestowed or conveyed from the local or regional government power. The authority granted to military forces to use force and detain individuals can be complex. Commanders should consult with their legal advisors to ensure operations are being conducted in accordance with international, US, and local law.

(2) Economic Stabilization and Recovery. In certain circumstances, military forces may need to act with regard to economic conditions to promote security and civil order. When international law and the governing mandate permit a transitional military authority to conduct economic stabilization and recovery activities, two immediate goals generally exist for the economic sector: to use all available goods and services as efficiently as possible to meet the essential needs of the local populace and to revive the economy at the local level to reduce dependence on external support.

(a) Issues such as stabilizing monetary policy, controlling inflation, and reestablishing a national currency generally exceed expertise resident in the transitional military authority. This lack of expertise underscores the necessity of introducing appropriate civilian specialists as soon as practical. Otherwise, the success of broader economic recovery programs is placed at risk from the outset of operations.

(b) When resources are scarce, an equitable distribution of necessities (i.e., food, water, shelter, and medicine) supports economic stability. To this end, it may be necessary to establish and enforce temporary controls over certain aspects of the local economy. These controls may be designed to affect the prices of goods and services, wage rates and labor practices, black market activity, hoarding of goods, banking practices, imports or exports, and production rates within industry. However, these controls may also have adverse effects that trigger renewed violence. These adverse effects cause potential shortages of goods and services, economic stagnation, corruption, conflict over limited resources, and social tension. Commanders must weigh the decision to implement economic controls very carefully. In doing so, they should seek guidance from higher echelons and from personnel and organizations with appropriate expertise.

For further details on resources control, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(3) Public Health. Establishing public health policy is a primary concern of the transitional military authority for security, public safety, economic, and humanitarian reasons.

(a) Generally, the joint force lacks the capacity to provide sustained medical care for civilians; however, with appropriate resources and security, the transitional
military authority may open and secure humanitarian access to the local populace. It may also take steps, such as establishing temporary clinics, training local health professionals, and augmenting existing medical facilities. In the aftermath of a conflict, military authorities should arrange the immediate release of medical personnel in prisoner of war camps.

(b) The transitional military authority should take steps to secure the public health infrastructure. Such steps can enable functioning hospitals and clinics to remain open so local medical personnel can continue to serve civilians. The transitional military authority can also repair critical transportation infrastructure to ensure continued delivery of medical supplies and accessibility for emergency patient transport. The transitional military authority should ensure the continued functioning of essential services infrastructure so that adequate power, water, and sanitation are available to support health care facilities. Public health policy should also focus on purifying local water supplies; inspecting food supplies; controlling insects and disease; disposing of sewage, garbage, and refuse properly; and properly burying or cremating human remains.

(4) Justice Systems. The ordinary courts in areas under control of the transitional military authority generally continue to function during a military occupation. They may only be suspended if judges abstain from fulfilling their duties, the courts are corrupt or unfairly constituted, or the administration of the local jurisdiction has collapsed. In such cases, the transitional military authority may establish its own justice system. In the aftermath of a conflict, military authorities should arrange the immediate release of judicial officials in prisoner of war camps.

(a) The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force during the occupation. However, the transitional military authority may suspend them during an occupation if they constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Conventions.

(b) During an occupation, the transitional military authority may enact special decrees and penal provisions essential for it to fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, maintain orderly civil administration, and ensure the security of the occupying forces. It may not declare that the rights and actions of enemy nationals are nullified, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law. Penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority during an occupation may not be enforced until they are made public in the national language of that territory. Such penal provisions may not be retroactive, and the penalty must be proportionate to the offense. Courts may only apply those provisions of law that were applicable prior to the alleged offense and are in accordance with the general principles of law. Commanders should consult with their legal advisors before attempting to enact any new penal provisions.

(c) The transitional military authority may establish courts to hear cases on alleged violations of the special decrees and penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority. It may also establish courts and administrative boards for other lawful
purposes. These might include considering the cases of detainees and reconsidering the refusals of requests by aliens to leave the occupied territory.

For further information on courts, commissions, and military tribunals, see the Manual for Military Commissions.

(d) During an occupation, the transitional military authority has certain requirements. During an occupation, US forces and the transitional military authority are not subject to local laws. They are not subject to the jurisdiction of the local civil or criminal courts of the occupied territory, unless expressly agreed to by the transitional military authority or by the occupying power. Only US military courts adjudicate US personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Promptly investigating, arbitrating, and settling local damage claims—to the extent permitted by US law, regulation, and policy—can help to strengthen the credibility of the transitional military authority.

For more information on justice systems, see Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions,” paragraph 30, “Other Considerations.”

g. Transitions

(1) The JFC should transfer control to a duly recognized HN government or interim civil authority as quickly as possible. As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by the military can decrease; however, granting initial authority to civilian government officials does not impact the transitional military authority’s responsibility in the occupied territory. A formal transfer to an authority capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of government and fully recognized by the USG must occur.

(2) The transitional military authority should identify, screen, and train reliable civilians to ease this transfer. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to HN or other civil authority to help it return to full self-governance. The joint force may continue to advise and train HN officials to build capacity, particularly in the security sector, after transferring governance authorities.

2. Interim Civil Authority

a. An interim civil authority is established when the collapse of a government creates a political void. An interim civil authority is also called a provisional or interim government. It can be formed by an outside nation or coalition of nations, local inhabitants, or by an international organization (e.g., the UN).

b. Sometimes, local unelected individuals organize to govern their town or region after a war, or a government may reform itself with provisional status under a coalition following a crisis. In these cases, US forces most often support the COM through collaboration with the US country team.
c. Occasionally, the established government ceases to carry out its basic functions because of foreign or domestic conflict and the situation poses a threat to international peace and stability. In such cases, the international community may decide to establish an interim civil authority, instead of an interim military authority. Examples include the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Although under DOD, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was led by an ambassador and staffed primarily by civil administrators.

d. **Characteristics of Interim Civil Authority**

   (1) The interim civil authority exercises the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. It restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Because the interim civil authority is an external imposition on domestic affairs and affects the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the people, it can transition quickly to local governance. Therefore, the interim civil authority seeks an approach openly cooperative with the HN and its population.

   (2) The timing of this transition varies across the sectors. Success depends on a viable political process that can establish local legitimate governance. The political process can include a range of activities:

   (a) Negotiations towards an enduring, comprehensive peace agreement among the parties to a conflict.

   (b) Holding elections and strengthening democratic processes.

   (c) Assistance to existing local institutions in the extension of state authority.

   (d) National reconciliation.

   (e) Continual attention to the avoidance of a breakdown in the peace or political process.

   (f) Support and assistance to an all-inclusive political process that can successfully move the nation from a post-conflict state towards a sustainable peace.

e. The interim civil administration may organize itself in many ways that might include pillars and interim administrative structures, with combined international and local participation.

f. **Military Role in Interim Civil Authority**

   (1) Military forces provide support to the interim civil authority. Stabilization tasks support the efforts of an interim civil authority when no legitimate government exists.
Stabilization tasks leverage the capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.

(2) In a whole-of-government approach, commanders identify and prioritize critical objectives that need immediate attention. When other agencies, organizations, and the HN lack a capability, commanders collaborate with them to provide military expertise. With an interim civil authority, that may mean that the military provides direct support to some of the offices and agencies of that authority while the overall direction remains with that authority.

(3) The military establishes physical liaison, communication, and data sharing between the interim civil authority and any task force headquarters. Generally, the responsibility for providing the basic needs of the people rests with the HN government, designated civil authorities, or other organizations. When needed, military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restore essential services until a civil authority or the HN is able. These essential services provide for minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how to complete these minimum-essential stabilization tasks and what risks they can accept.
APPENDIX E
LEGAL AND FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This appendix summarizes some of the laws and policies that bear upon US military operations in support of stabilization efforts. No summary provided in this document can replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting SJA.

1. The Law of War and the Department of Defense Policy on Stabilization Efforts

a. As stabilization missions, tasks, and activities are a core military function, there is no change regarding the obligation to comply with all applicable law and regulations. US forces conducting such missions remain bound to adhere to the principles of the law of war, to US laws and treaties, and to customary international law.

b. The nature of stabilization efforts anticipates that they will be conducted in nations, regions, or areas that lack governmental structures capable of completing basic functions and providing services to the local population. Where the environment is not sufficiently permissive to allow civilian governments, agencies, international organizations, or NGOs to provide adequate assistance to local populations, US military forces may be required to conduct operations in those areas. The operation of US forces in these circumstances generates several legal issues that concern commanders at all echelons.

2. Authority to Assist a Foreign Government

a. DOS plans and implements foreign policy. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE) is the President’s principal advisor on foreign policy and is chiefly responsible for US representation abroad.

b. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the SECSTATE. USAID is the principal USG provider of global development and humanitarian assistance.

c. The US military has limited authority to provide assistance to foreign governments. For FID, US forces may be authorized to make limited contributions. When authorized, US forces may provide assistance to police services.

3. Non-International Armed Conflict

a. Most often, HN stabilization and security efforts are conjoined during an insurgency, with the government and militants vying for control of the population. As such, the main body of the law of war dealing with international (inter-state) armed conflict does not strictly apply to these conflicts—a legal position that can be a source of confusion to commanders and US Service members. It bears emphasis, however, that Article 3, which is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is specifically intended to apply to non-international (including intra-state or “internal”) armed conflicts.
b. By specifying that its application does not affect the legal status of the parties to a conflict, Common Article 3 makes clear that those taking an active part in the hostilities have no special status under international law. They are not, when captured, prisoners of war but may be held for the duration of hostilities for analogous reasons. They may also be prosecuted as criminals for bearing arms against the government and for other offenses,
Legal and Fiscal Considerations

so long as they are accorded the minimum protections described in Common Article 3. US forces should remember that militants may be considered criminal suspects within the HN legal system. US forces must carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at the scene of an attack. This evidence is crucial to the HN legal system, thus promoting the rule of law by holding criminals accountable.

c. During all such military operations, commanders must be aware of Common Article 3 and the status of civilians under the laws of the HN. This awareness is crucial during stabilization due to increased interaction between military forces and the civilian population. The most effective means of maintaining legitimacy in stabilization is to conduct the mission in a professional manner consistent with international legal standards.

d. Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) establish the legal status of foreign military personnel in an HN. Criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries are some of the topics usually covered in SOFAs. Other documents that may reflect the legal status of military personnel include diplomatic letters, memorandums of agreement, and memorandums of understanding. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the HN, DOD personnel may be subject to HN laws.

e. The Geneva Conventions formally recognize the ICRC as an impartial humanitarian organization under Common Article 3. In non-international armed conflicts, the ICRC may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The ICRC’s efforts in non-international armed conflicts include protecting the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and endeavoring to prevent suffering.

4. Detainee Operations

a. Detainee operations of suspected militants, in general, should not be undertaken unless they are well-planned, coordinated with the HN, and directed by the highest authority. The detention of suspected militants during stabilization is a complex task. Detention is a highly diplomatically/politically sensitive issue, and the manner in which detainee operations are carried out can have a large, negative impact on the civilian populace and could affect the success or failure of stabilization efforts.

b. Two fundamental considerations inform the detention of suspect militants. First, the legal basis for detention defines all activities and processes for handling detainees. The legal basis should address the appropriate reasons for detaining individuals, the length of detention, and possibly a standard for continued detention or release from custody. Second, commanders must monitor and enforce the humane treatment of detainees, both from a legal perspective for US-held detainees and from a training perspective when working with HN security forces. Commanders must specifically detail the parameters of detainee operations in orders and directives to subordinate units.

c. Standards for Detention and Internment. Regardless of the precise legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in custody by US forces, they must receive humane treatment until properly released. They also retain the minimum
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protections articulated in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Specially trained, organized, and equipped military police units, in adequately designed and resourced facilities, should manage detention operations. Detention operations must adhere to the standards contained in DODD 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, and CJCSI 3290.01, Program for Detainee Operations. The interrogation of detainees may only be conducted by qualified and certified personnel and must be in accordance with DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. Military police personnel operating detention facilities may not assist in or “set the conditions for” interrogation. Military police have a responsibility to protect detainees in their care.

d. Release of Detainees to the HN. The permanent or temporary release of detainees from US military custody to the HN, other multinational forces, or any non-DOD USG entity, requires the approval of SecDef, or the SecDef’s designee. The permanent or temporary release of a detainee to a foreign nation may be governed by bilateral agreements or based on ad hoc arrangements. However, detainees may only be released in accordance with the applicable US law, the law of war, and US policy.

e. International Organizations, NGOs, and Similar Organizations

(1) During detention operations, commanders may encounter representatives of organizations seeking to protect detainee interests. Such representatives often seek access to detainees and/or offer their services to assist in the care and maintenance of detainees. Effective detainee operations planning establishes a mechanism for command interaction with such organizations to maximize the benefit of potential contributions to the US effort. Commanders should anticipate that, upon initiation of detention operations, these organizations will continually request access to and/or information about detainees throughout the operation. Commanders should seek guidance through operational command channels for responding to such requests prior to or soon after the initiation of detention operations. In the absence of mission-specific guidance, all such requests for access or information should flow via the established chain of command to the OSD.

(2) The ICRC is an independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence. The ICRC has a permanent mandate under international law to take impartial action for prisoners, the wounded and sick, and civilians affected by conflict. Commanders should remain aware of the special status granted to the ICRC by the Geneva Conventions. Per DOD policy, and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC is the only organization presumptively authorized access to detainees, as well as to offer services during any armed conflict, however characterized. ICRC access to detainees is subject to temporary suspension based on military necessity. As a general rule, commanders should coordinate with legal and PA advisors before ordering a suspension of ICRC access to a detainee.

For more information, refer to DODD 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, and the Operational Law Handbook.

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5. Investigations

a. Investigations are essential tools that enable commanders to understand events occurring within the operational area and promote the enforcement of discipline due to demonstrated or suspected misconduct. Furthermore, investigations provide commanders with a record of military activities during operations that critics, adversaries, and revisionists may dispute in the future. Properly conducted investigations demonstrate a commitment to professionalism by US forces and assist in gaining or maintaining legitimacy with the populace.

b. For investigations during a joint operation, the SJA should follow the regulations of the most applicable Service. Determining applicability for investigations involves whether a particular Service requires a certain investigation, which Service has the most at stake in the outcome of the investigation, any local or command guidance regarding joint investigations, and other matters that would contribute to an informed decision.

c. Since investigations in all Services follow similar basic concepts and result in a thorough conclusion if conducted properly, the Service regulation ultimately used is not that important. Under no circumstances should investigators combine regulations and conduct a hybrid investigation. The Services are shown great deference in regards to administrative matters as long as regulations are followed correctly.

6. Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian Personnel and Contractors

Modern operations involve many DOD civilians as well as contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF). Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice now allows for the prosecution of people accompanying US forces in times of declared war or contingency operations. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act further allows for the prosecution in federal courts of DOD civilians and CAAF. Typically, DOD civilians and CAAF implicated in criminal activities will be referred to DOJ for action. However, military courts may be used to prosecute those serving with or accompanying US forces in the field during a declared war or contingency operations. DOD civilians and CAAF may be subject to general orders. They are also subject to US laws and, unless otherwise specified in a SOFA or similar agreement, to the laws of the HN; they may be prosecuted or receive adverse administrative action by the US or contract employers. DODDs contain further policy and guidance pertaining to allegations of criminal activity against US civilians and CAAF.

7. Funding Issues

a. A basic tenet of fiscal law is that expenditure of public funds may be made only when expressly authorized by Congress. The fiscal rules surrounding stabilization are a web of statutes, annual appropriations, policies, regulations, and directives that may be confusing. The financial impacts of stabilization efforts are a major concern of the JFC. Planning must take into account the legal authority, authority limits, funding sources, and mechanisms that allow US forces to dispense supplies and services. The SJA and the
comptroller should be involved in planning for stabilization efforts as early as possible. The JFC must coordinate expenditures with the appropriate agency prior to the expenditure of funds.

b. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. USAID expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22, USC. Provisions of Title 10, USC, authorize small amounts of money. These funds are appropriated annually for commanders to provide humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. These standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally require significant advance coordination within DOD and DOS. As such, they can be of limited value in a rapidly evolving OE.

c. As was stated previously, federal law generally prohibits DOD from expending funds to provide training or materiel support to FSF. Generally, such expenditures must be made through DOS foreign assistance funds under Title 22, USC. While DOS has supervision and control of Title 22, USC, foreign assistance programs, DOD frequently implements them. SA programs and the relationship between DOD and DOS for program implementation require a thorough understanding. The major types of SA programs authorized under Title 22, USC (Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act [AECA]), as well as the administrator of each program, the funding request, and the approval timeline for these programs, should be understood.

For more information on SA programs, see The Security Assistance Management Manual.

d. There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring the use of Title 22, USC, funds for foreign assistance:

(1) Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization Training. DOD may fund the training (as opposed to goods and services) of foreign militaries with operation and maintenance (O&M) dollars only when the purpose of the training is to enhance interoperability, familiarization, and safety training. O&M funds may not be used for SA training. This exception applies only to interoperability training.

(2) Congressional appropriation or authorization to conduct foreign assistance. DOD may fund foreign assistance operations if Congress has provided a specific appropriation or authorization to execute the mission, as authorized in Title 10, USC, Chapter 16.

e. Effective foreign forces need training and equipment. US laws require Congress to authorize such expenditures. US laws also require DOS to verify that the HN receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights.

f. Except where authorized by Title 10, USC, Chapter 16, or in individual legal provisions, all training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man hours and materiel requested from DOS under the Foreign Assistance Act. The President may authorize deployed US forces
to train or advise HN security forces as part of the operational mission. In this case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Examples of additional appropriations to allow DOD to provide training and assistance to foreign forces include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to the DOD for its role in such “train and equip” efforts. In May of 2004, the President signed a decision directive that made the Commander, United States Central Command, under policy guidance from the COM, responsible for coordinating all USG efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi Security Forces, including police. Absent such a directive, DOD would have lacked authority to take the lead in assisting the HN in training and equipping its security forces.

g. In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities that are not permanent law within the USC but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriations acts. These special authorities often contain “dual key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE (or in other cases, with the concurrence of the relevant COM). Keeping track of the currency of these authorities can be very challenging, as they frequently expire at the end of each fiscal year (FY), making their continued availability entirely dependent upon annual renewals by Congress. Some of the major special authority programs passed by Congress since 2005 follow. Consult the local SJA and comptroller for current fiscal authority. The authorities listed are provided for historical purposes to inform the reader that temporary authorities may exist outside the traditional Title 22, USC, planning cycle.

(1) **Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (Title 10, USC, Section 333).** SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, is authorized to conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign nations for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct one or more of the following:

(a) Counterterrorism operations.

(b) Counter-WMD operations.

(c) Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations.

(d) Counter-transnational organized crime operations.

(e) Maritime and border security operations.

(f) Military intelligence operations.
(g) Operations or activities that contribute to an existing international coalition operation that is determined by SecDef to be in the national interest of the United States.

(2) **Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism (Title 10 USC, Section 127e.)** Codified into Title 10, USC, in the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, it authorizes SecDef, with the concurrence of the relevant COM, to expend up to $100,000,000 during any FY to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by US SOF to combat terrorism.

(3) **Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program**

(a) In addition to the above temporary authorities, in 2003, Congress enacted a permanent DOD authority, the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (codified at Title 10, USC, Section 345), which authorizes DOD appropriated funds to pay any costs associated with the education and training of foreign military officers, MOD officials, or security officials at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs, including the costs of transportation and travel and subsistence costs.

(b) The goals are to build and strengthen the global network of combating terrorism at the operational and strategic levels, build and reinforce these antiterrorism capabilities of PNs through operational- and strategic-level education, contribute to efforts to counter ideological support to terrorism, and provide the US military with a flexible and proactive program that can respond to emerging requirements. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict provides policy oversight. DSCA provides financial management. The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program requires approval from the COMs prior to any event or activity.

(4) **CCDR Initiative Fund.** Title 10, USC, Section 166a, authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide DOD funds to a CCDR for the following activities:

(a) Force training.

(b) Contingencies.

(c) Selected operations.

(d) C2.

(e) Joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign nations).

(f) HCA, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
(g) Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign nations (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).

(h) Defense personnel expenses for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.

(i) Force protection.

(j) **Joint Warfighting Capabilities.** This statute further states that the CJCS, “in considering requests for funds in the CCDR Initiative Fund, should give priority consideration to:

1. Requests for funds to be used for activities that would enhance the war fighting capability, readiness, and sustainability of the forces assigned to the commander requesting the funds;

2. The provision of funds to be used for activities with respect to an area or areas not within the area of responsibility of a CCMD that would reduce the threat to, or otherwise increase, the national security of the United States; and

3. The provision of funds to be used for urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance, particularly in a foreign nation where the armed forces are conducting a contingency operation.”

(5) DSCA provides FHA program assistance and support for CCMDs via OHDACA funding.

h. The **Leahy Amendment** contains additional constraints on government funding of SFA/FID missions. The law, first enacted in the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (i.e., the annual DOS appropriations act), prohibits the USG from providing funds to the security forces of a foreign nation if DOS has credible evidence the foreign nation or its agents have committed gross violations of human rights, unless SECSTATE determines and reports that the government of such nation is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

i. **Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.** In military operations, commands require specific authority to expend funds. That authority is normally found in the DOD Appropriations Act, specifically O&M. In some contingency operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of dealing with stabilization efforts and related mission types like COIN. Recent examples include the CERP [Commanders’ Emergency Response Program], the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program funds.

j. **Foreign Claims**
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(1) Under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA) of 1961, meritorious claims for property losses or injury or death caused by Service members or the civilian component of the US forces may be settled “to promote and maintain friendly relations” with the HN. Claims that result from “noncombat activities” or negligent or wrongful acts or omissions are also compensable. Categories of claims that may not be allowed include losses from combat, contractual matters, domestic obligations, and claims that are either not in the best interest of the United States to pay or are contrary to public policy.

(2) In adjudicating claims under the FCA, the Foreign Claims Commission applies the law of the country in which the claim arose to determine both liability and damages. This includes the local law or custom pertaining to contributory or comparative negligence and joint tort feasors (i.e., one who commits a wrongful act). Payments for punitive damages, court costs, filing costs, attorneys’ fees, and bailment are not allowed under the FCA.

(3) Generally, the FCA does not apply in foreign nations where the United States has an agreement that provides for the settlement or adjudication and cost sharing of claims against the United States arising out of the acts or omissions of a member or civilian employee of the US military. For example, if a unit deploys to Korea, Japan, or any NATO or Partnership for Peace nation, claims are managed by a command claims service under provisions outlined in the applicable SOFA.

k. Condolence or Solatia-Like Payments

(1) Condolence or solatia payments are monetary or in-kind payments provided to an individual or family as an expression of sympathy or condolence for an injury or a death. Condolence and solatia payments are not claims payments. These payments are only made in certain cultural groups where payments in sympathy or in recognition of loss are common.

(2) These payments are meant to be made immediately and are generally nominal. The individual or unit involved in the damage has no legal obligation to pay; compensation is simply offered as an expression of sympathy in accordance with local custom. Condolence and solatia payments are not paid from claims funds. Instead, solatia payments are made from a unit’s O&M funds while condolence payments may also derive from other sources.

(3) Prompt payment of condolence/solatia ensures the goodwill of local national populations, thus allowing the United States to maintain positive relations with the HN. Condolence or solatia payments should not be made without prior coordination with the CCDR.

1. Transitioning USG and Partner Resources

(1) Transition of Resources among USG Departments and Agencies
(a) In the aftermath of a major conflict or disaster recovery, resources are not merely forces and their mobility platforms but include programs, their manning and funding streams, and associated authorities. Rather than force formations allocated for employment, program organizations are established and sourced by the Armed Forces of the United States and other USG departments and agencies. This iterative planning process resembles building a program and usually needs to include a discussion of risk if the required resources are not made available.

(b) Nation planning (e.g., the integrated country strategy) should inform senior leaders what the new SC effort can accomplish given available resources and required additional resources to foster progress toward the new (desired) outcomes. This planning should inform/support the CCDR’s inputs for major DOD processes that allocate resources or influence resource allocation, such as global force management, program and budget review, the comprehensive joint assessment and CJCS’s risk assessment, the CCMD’s integrated priority list, and the DOD Legislative Program.

(c) Concurrent with referencing the Joint Strategic Planning System/PPBE process, the integrated planning team must conduct a great deal of horizontal outreach and planning with interagency, HN, and other international partners. As the DOD-sourced resourcing plan develops, other interagency partners, the HN, and others conducting security/development assistance post-transition can request the assumption of responsibilities and the provision of resources. Planners must be informed of other interagency strategic planning, in particular DSCA, DOS and USAID. Planners ought to work with counterparts to complement and support their goals and activities in the post-transition nation. Likewise, US joint force transfer of responsibility should include collaboration with all participants (e.g., DOS, USAID, HN counterparts, NATO, or UN partners) in the same functional area.

(d) As in post-conflict transitions, planners must understand the annual planning, programming, and resourcing cycles into which their transition plans feed to have necessary personnel, equipment, and funds on hand when required during and after the transition. The extensive lead times (i.e., two to three years) for developing long-term resources and personnel still exist. Planners must account for the transition of authorities from Title 10, USC (specific wartime authorizations), to Title 22, USC; many Title 10, USC, authorities disappear as the operation ends. Also, many of these authorities and funding sources may be year-to-year, instead of multi-year, making long-range planning difficult.

(e) Some of the programs that transition from DOD primacy to other USG departments and agencies may include:

1. Public security and rule of law. These activities may have been funded under the Global Security Contingency Fund or specific congressional authorization but may now need to transfer to the DOS’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program. DOJ and DHS also have programs of similar description to INCLE.
2. Economic assistance provided under wartime authorizations may now necessitate Economic Support Fund money, administered by USAID.

3. US military activities that separate warring parties may transfer to the PKO program.

4. Specific congressional authorizations (e.g., the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Iraq Security Forces Fund) may expire, requiring other mechanisms or FMS to create the same effects.

(2) Transition of Resources to Partners and the HN

(a) Overseas contingency operations authorities and funding streams normally expire upon declaration by the President that the operation is ended, as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ended on 31 August 2010 and post-combat advise and train Operation NEW DAWN did on 15 December 2011. After such authorities expire, transition or new acquisition of resources to partners and the HN generally flow from one of the following programs:

1. FMS. The FMS program is a form of SA authorized by the AECA and a fundamental tool of US foreign policy. Under Section 3 of the AECA, the United States may sell defense articles and services to foreign nations and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. SECSTATE determines which nations will have programs. SecDef executes the program.

2. Foreign Military Financing. The AECA authorizes the President to finance procurement of defense articles and services for foreign nations and international organizations. Foreign military financing enables eligible PNs to purchase US defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or, for a limited number of nations, through direct commercial contracts channels. SECSTATE determines which nations will have programs and SecDef executes the program.

3. IMET allows nations to use their national funds to receive a reduced cost for other DOD education and training. IMET exposes foreign students to US professional military organizations and procedures, as well as effective civilian control of the military. The program facilitates valuable interpersonal relationships that provide US access to and influence with military and civilian leadership of PNs.

4. INL. The DOS INL partners with DOD to build capacity and policy direction across a broad swath of areas—law enforcement, criminal justice, corrections, rule of law, transnational organized crime, anti-corruption, trafficking of illicit goods, and cyberspace and financial crimes—by providing diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, training and other support to strengthen law enforcement, justice, and security institutions. INL may be the first organization DOD planners turn to when deciding how to transition interim security functions from DOD to other USG control. INL also has the Office of
Knowledge Management, under which DOS enhances a HN’s rule of law capabilities, including the deployment of US police officers and advisors.

5. **Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).** The GPOI addresses major gaps in international capacity to conduct peace support operations. Such gaps include a shortage of peacekeepers and formed police units, limited national capability to train and sustain peacekeeping forces, and a lack of international coordination mechanisms to assist deployment and employment of peacekeepers. GPOI SC programs develop PN capacity to provide peacekeeping forces to conduct UN and regional peace support operations effectively. GPOI is funded through the PKO account, which the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages.

6. **Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.**

These programs, administered by DOS, focus on demining activities, the clearance of UXO, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. This becomes increasingly important as refugees return to their homes and the reconstruction effort begins after a major conflict.

(b) Other programs that enable the transfer of resources from USG to the HN.

1. **EDA.** Under authorities established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the AECA, defense articles declared as excess by the military departments can be offered to foreign governments or international organizations in support of US national security and foreign policy objectives. Typically, EDA is transferred to support US allies in their modernization efforts and to assist Latin American and Caribbean nations in their counter-narcotics programs. Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes grant transfers of lethal and nonlethal EDA to nations, which receipt of such articles were justified to Congress for the FY in which the transfer is authorized. EDA may also be sold to foreign nations under the normal FMS system authorized by the AECA. The EDA program is administered by DSCA.

2. **EP Program.** DOD is authorized provision of nonlethal, excess supplies for humanitarian relief purposes, in coordination with DOS. The DOD EP Program is managed by DSCA and refers to nonlethal EP made available to donate for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief purposes. EP donations typically include furniture, medical and school equipment and supplies, vehicles (e.g., fire trucks and ambulances), tools, and construction equipment.

3. **Transition of Material to International Organizations (e.g., UN, African Union).** Transfer of material and resources to an international or regional organization, such as the UN or African Union respectively, are generally conducted on a case-by-case basis. Normally nations participating in an international effort provide their own material. Funding for UN peacekeepers may come from the DOS PKO account. DOS has used INCLE funding to support training and equipping UN police personnel for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. These funding sources may allow the successful continuation of public security, law and order, and justice sector activities after an
Appendix E

intervention force transfers responsibility for these activities to an international organization.

(c) **Mechanisms.** Many of the mechanisms and policies that allow the transfer of resources are found in DSCA’s *Security Assistance Management Manual*. Planners are encouraged to reach out to experts in this manual, including legal advisors, to understand resource transfer options in a particular situation.
APPENDIX F
KEY STABILIZATION DOCUMENTS

1. Overview

This appendix provides general summaries of stabilization documents from key government, intergovernmental, and nongovernment agencies.

2. United States Government

a. DODD 3000.05, Stabilization, sets policy for the DOD with regard to stabilization. DOD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population. DOD conducts stabilization activities throughout all levels of conflict and across the competition continuum. The magnitude of stabilization missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration. Subsequently, DOD leads stabilization to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until it is feasible to transition responsibility to other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international organizations.

b. Reconstruction-Essential Tasks. DOS outlines key stabilization tasks within five broad areas: security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. They are organized into short-, medium-, and long-term goals. Many tasks are crosscutting and require consideration of other tasks, especially when prioritizing efforts.

3. United Nations

a. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the UN’s policy-making body in humanitarian affairs. It is the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance and is a unique forum involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. It was created to strengthen coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the UN and IASC on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. The aim is to assist humanitarian and military professionals deal with civil-military issues in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in accordance with international law, standards, and principles.

b. The UNDPKO plans, prepares, manages, and directs UN PKO. UNDPKO is responsible for the capstone publication, UN PKO: Principles and Guidelines.
4. United States Institute of Peace

a. The US Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress to prevent and resolve violent international conflicts; promote post-conflict stability and development; and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide.

b. In 2005, the Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-permissive Environments, facilitated by the US Institute for Peace, was created, which ultimately produced the Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. These guidelines seek to mitigate frictions and facilitate interaction between the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs conducted in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments.

c. Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations provides short scenarios of typical international involvement in peace missions, natural disasters, and stabilization efforts, as well as an introduction to the organizations that may be present when the international community responds to a crisis. Included are descriptions of the roles of the UN and other international institutions, NGOs, the US military, and other USG departments and agencies.

d. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf). This manual presents strategic principles for all major activities in stabilization and reconstruction missions in one place. It provides a foundation for decision makers, planners, and practitioners—both international and HN—to construct priorities for specific missions.
APPENDIX G
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General


d. DOS/USAID, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.


2. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program.

b. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.

c. DODD 3000.05, Stabilization.

d. DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning.

e. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).

f. DODD 5205.82, Defense Institution Building.

g. DODI 2000.30, Global Health Engagement Activities.

h. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).
i. DODI 8220.02, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications


c. CJCSI 3110.01K, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).


e. CJCSI 3150.25G, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

f. CJCSI 5130.01F, (U) Relationships Between Commanders of Combatant Commands and International Commands and Organizations.

g. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

h. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

i. JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.


k. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

l. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

m. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

n. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.


p. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

q. JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

r. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

s. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
t. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.


w. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*.


z. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.

aa. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

bb. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.

c. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

4. Allied Publications


   b. Allied Tactical Publication-3.2.1.1B, *Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks*.

5. Multi-Service Publications

   a. ATP 3-57.20/Marine Corp Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-03A.2, *Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.


   c. FM 6-05/MCRP 3-30.4/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 2-3.73, United States Special Operations Command Publication 3-33, *Multi-Service Techniques for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*.


6. United States Army Publications

   a. ADP 3-07, *Stability*. 
b. FM 3-07, Stability.

7. United States Marine Corps

   a. MCWP 3-03, Stability Operations.


8. United States Navy Publication

   Navy Warfare Publication 3-29, Disaster Response Operations.

9. General Publications

   a. Civilian Surge, Key to Complex Operations, National Defense University.

   b. Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.


   f. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, US DOS.

   g. General Guidance for Interaction between UN Personnel and Military and Other Representatives of the Belligerent Parties in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

   h. Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations.


1. *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, RAND.

m. *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*, RAND.

n. *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework*, S/CRS [Secretary of State/Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization], US DOS.


t. Handbook for *Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure*, USJFCOM.

u. Handbook for Military Support to Post-Conflict Governance, Elections, and Media Development, USJFCOM.


x. *Security Sector Reform*, USAID, DOD, US DOS.


APPENDIX H
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Dr. Ray Millen, PKSOI, US Army; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Col Carl Keller, Joint Staff J-5; and Mr. Larry Seman, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07, Stability, 03 August 2016.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program’s (JLLP’s) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of observations, issues, best practices, and lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint
Appendix H

document through the joint doctrine development process by providing insights and lessons learned derived from operations, exercises, war games, and other events. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Insights and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

UNCLASSIFIED. This JP is approved for public release. Access to this publication is unrestricted; distribution is unlimited and releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, National Guard Bureau, and Joint Staff.

7. Printing and Distribution

a. The Joint Staff does not print hard copies of JPs for distribution. An electronic version of this JP is available on:

(1) NIPRNET Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (limited to .mil and .gov users with a DOD common access card),

(2) SIPRNET JEL+ at https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp, and


b. This JP can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, National Guard Bureau, Joint Staff, and combat support agencies.
### GLOSSARY

**PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS**
**(ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
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<td>BHA</td>
<td>Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAF</td>
<td>contractors authorized to accompany the force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>combatant command campaign plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>commander’s communication synchronization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGTTP</td>
<td>Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (USAID)</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (USAID)</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>common tactical picture</td>
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<td>CVP</td>
<td>Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention (USAID)</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOMEX</td>
<td>document and media exploitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>DSF</td>
<td>District Stability Framework (USAID)</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>excess defense articles</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
<td>environmental impact assessment</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>excess property</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Foreign Claims Act</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FHP</td>
<td>force health protection</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual (USA)</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<td>FSF</td>
<td>foreign security forces</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>I2</td>
<td>identity intelligence</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN)</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>intelligence community</td>
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<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICB</td>
<td>institutional capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>J-9</td>
<td>civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civic action</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
<td>Marine Corps reference publication</td>
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<td>MCTP</td>
<td>Marine Corps tactical publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>ministry of defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operation and maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHDACA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DSCA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHDM</td>
<td>Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>peacemaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>private military company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure</td>
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<td>PN</td>
<td>partner nation</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
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<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>private security contractor</td>
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<td>QIP</td>
<td>quick impact project</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>stability assessment framework</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>security cooperation</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>support to civil administration</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>senior development advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SECSTATE</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>security sector assistance</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>TIP</td>
<td>trafficking in persons</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

security sector reform. A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Also called SSR. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07)

transitional military authority. Temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07)
**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process.