Establish Civil Security

Instructor Notes

Slide 1: **This class will provide a foundational knowledge for the BCT commanders and staffs on Stability operations with a focus on establishing civil security in the immediate aftermath of combat operations.**

Slide 3: **NSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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**This class is divided into 4 parts:**​

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1. **An outline of how Stability nests into Joint and Army Doctrine**​
2. **A Historical vignette to illustrate what happens when military forces fail to establish stability in the immediate wake of combat operations**​
3. **Detail on the major doctrinal concepts surrounding stability**​
4. **The BCTs role in Establishing Stability with a focus on establishing Civil Security in the immediate aftermath of combat operations.**​

Slide 4: **NSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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The purpose of this slide is to start framing and nesting the subject of Establishing Civil Security within Army Doctrine. Throughout the presentation we will relate back to doctrine to establish the linkages from Joint, to Army, to Stability and BCT operational doctrine. The goal of this line of reasoning will be to demonstrate to the BCT commander and his staff that doctrine shows that Establishing Civil Security is clearly his job.​

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The Joint Doctrine of Unified Action emphasizes the synchronization and coordination of ALL activities (both Gov and non-Gov) with military operations (i.e. not just fighting).​

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Unified Land Operations which is the Army’s operational concept stresses SIMULTANEOUS application of Offensive, Defensive, Stability, and Support to Civil Authorities tasks. NOTE the introduction of the concept of **“Consolidate Gains”**which accompanies the idea of seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative. This is a relatively new addition to our doctrine and we will return to this concept later as we discuss the BCT role in establishing civil security.​

​ Slide 5: **NSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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The purpose of this slide is to highlight the balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations as discussed in Joint doctrine.  It highlights how the balance changes as we move through the phase 0-V Joint phases construct. It emphasizes that Stability operations occur in **all** Joint operations phases and are **not limited to nor should they be confused with Joint Phase IV (Stabilize).**​

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The slide further discusses the simultaneity of planning that must occur and the need to be prepared to restore security even as major combat operations are ongoing.​

​ Slide 6: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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The purpose of this slide is to now bring the discussion down to Army Doctrine level. This slide can be moved through quickly. It is simply meant to point out and reinforce that the concept of simultaneous application of Offense, Defense, Stability and Support to Civil Authorities tasks found in Joint Doctrine is further reflected in Army Doctrine.​

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**Unified Land Operations**​

• The central idea of unified land operations is how Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage ​

  in sustained land operations through ***simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. This is the essence of unified land operations,***​

***representing the core of Army doctrine.*** In unified land operations, the emphasis on the individual elements of the combinations changes with ​

  echelon, time, and location. (See figure 2-1.) ​

• While offensive and defensive tasks focus on the destructive effects of combat power against enemy forces and stability tasks focus on restoring host-nation ​

  capacity and capability, no single element is more important than another. Army forces employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportionate ​

  to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of an operational environment. Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability tasks ​

  simultaneously to achieve decisive results as part of an interdependent joint force, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities. The simultaneous ​

  combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of an operational environment, are key to successful operations. (See ADP 3-0 ​

  and ADRP 3-0 for doctrine on unified land operations.) —ADRP 3-07, para. 2-1 and 2-2

 ​ Slide 7: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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The purpose of this slide is to continue the discussion of the balance of offensive, defensive and stability tasks in Army doctrine. It introduces the specific Army Stability Tasks, show how they are broken down into discreet tasks just as are offensive and defensive tasks. A Mouse Click will highlight the task of “Establish Civil Security” which will be our focus for the bulk of the class. The bottom line text in the green box serves as an introduction to the next slide…..​

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**Offensive and Defensive Tasks**​

• Offensive and defensive tasks emphasize employing the lethal effects of combat power against an enemy force, yet they are  also critical to success in some operations emphasizing stability tasks. ​

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• **Offensive tasks**compel the enemy to react, creating or revealing  weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. A successful  offense puts tremendous pressure on defenders, creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration.  Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and surest means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative is the essence of the offense. Offensive tasks seek to throw enemy forces off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction by maneuver and fires. ​

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• **Defensive tasks**counter the offensive actions of enemy or adversary forces. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive tasks retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities and resources. Commanders can use these tasks to gain time through economy of force so they can execute offensive and stability tasks elsewhere. ​

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* **Stability tasks**leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force. These tasks enable forces to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. Stability tasks in operations may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. It also can support the efforts of a legitimate government faced with its inability to maintain security and control due to capacity shortfalls. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When this is not possible, military forces provide essential civil services to the local populace until a civil authority or the host nation can provide these services. In this capacity, military forces perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the activities of other agencies, organizations, institutions, and the host nation.​

     —ADRP 3-07, paras. 2-3, 2-5 and 2-6​

​ Slide 8: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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The purpose of this slide is to bring the discussion full circle back to Unified Action and show how the Army Stability tasks have their parallel tasks found in the Joint Stability Functions and the State Department Stability Sectors (partly this slide is to clarify some of the definitions and language of the similar terms and concepts: Tasks = Army; Functions = Joint, and Sectors = State Dept/Interagency) It then shows how  the tasks/functions/sectors all relate to the end state conditions alluded to on the previous slide and which are outlined in ADP 3.07. All of this sits atop the Stability Principles outlined in ADP 3.07.​

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**STABILITY PRINCIPLES:**​

**Conflict Transformation** focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict intoprocesses for constructive, positive change. The process of conflict transformation​

reduces the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable,peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic​

aspirations. Conflict transformation is based on identifying and mitigating the root causes of conflict and instability while simultaneously building the capacity of local​

institutions to prevent future instability​

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**Unity of Effort:** Success in stability tasks requires all actors to work toward a common goal. Military operations typically demand unity of command, challenging​

military and civilian leaders to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. For U.S. military forces, this is​

the essence of *unified action*: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). ​

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**Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership:** Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. Legitimacy is central to stability​

tasks and has two key aspects, legitimacy and authority that the host-nation government can exercise, and the legitimacy of the operation.​

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**Building Partner Capacity:** the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security,​

rule of law, essential services, governance, economic development, and other critical government functions.​

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Military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restore essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the host nation is able. These essential services provide for minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risks they can accept ​

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The primary stability tasks are fundamental to unified land operations and are conducted across the range of military operations. Commanders can execute the tasks before, during, or after conflict to support a legitimate host-nation government, to assist a fragile state, or in the absence of a functioning civil authority ​

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None of these primary tasks is performed in isolation. At the operational level, the primary stability tasks serve as lines of effort or simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. In any operation, the primary stability tasks—and the subordinate tasks included in each area—integrate with offensive and defensive tasks in unified land operations ​

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**Establishing civil security**involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing civil security provides needed space for host-nation and civil agencies and organizations to work toward sustained peace. The host nation cannot achieve security solely through the presence of military forces or just by killing or capturing enemies. The objective aims not to defeat or destroy an enemy but to neutralize threats to a stable society to better establish or reestablish competent host-nation security forces. In the absence of civil capability to establish a safe and secure environment, Army forces often assume greater responsibility for security tasks. Ultimately, Army forces transition these tasks to the host nation once it establishes its capabilities. ​

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**Establishing civil control**supports efforts to institute rule of law and stable, effective governance. Civil control relates to public order—the domain of the police and other law enforcement agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons (known as the Rule of Law sector). Public disorder significantly threatens law and order and therefore the overall effort to establish a secure, stable peace. In the absence of civil capacity, Army forces often take a more active role to establish civil control. Civil control supports a holistic approach to strengthening rule of law. ​

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The **restoration of essential services**in a fragile environment is essential toward achieving stability. The basic functions of local governance stop during conflict and other disasters. Initially, military forces lead efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until forces restore local civil services. Military forces follow the lead of other USG agencies, particularly United States Agency for International Development, in the long restoration of essential services. In many cases, local or international development and humanitarian organizations are already established in theater and can fulfill this function. ​

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**Support to governance**When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. Military efforts to support governance focus on restoring public administration and resuming public services. These services include but are not limited to supporting transitional administration if established, supporting the development of local governance, supporting anticorruption initiatives, and supporting elections. ​

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Military efforts to **support the economic sector**are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a host nation often exhibits stress and ultimately fractures as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelms the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the host nation’s ability to provide for the well-being of its people. Economic problems inextricably connect to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others likely follow ​

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Slide 9: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**​

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The purpose of this slide is to introduce the historical vignette that will illustrate what happens when US forces fail to take measures to establish Civil Control in the wake of combat operations. The vignette is centered around the invasion of Iraq and early months of the occupation. It uses three video clips from an episode of PBS Frontline broadcast on 9 October 2003. The themes to illustrate and emphasize using the video clips and slides are:​

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**1st Clip: Plan/Prepare:**Expect looting and lawlessness in the wake of any combat operation. The military has a tendency to think it does not do civil policing tasks which is a mindset we need to overcome. Historical evidence (in subsequent slides) shows we have actually done a lot of this. Get over the mindset that we only do combat operations and that someone else does civil policing.​

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**2nd Clip: Execution:**What actually happened when military forces sat passively by and allowed looting to take place. Allowing even minor crime to take place with no interference leads to bigger crime (The “broken windows” theory). We have a legal responsibility to provide for public order and safety which is specified in international law and Joint and Army doctrine. ​

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**3rd Clip: Aftermath:**Looting and lawlessness were so widespread and severe that it had a materially negative impact on subsequent reconstruction efforts. The reconstruction officials could not do their job because the military had failed to provide adequate civil security early. Needed facilities had been effectively destroyed. US troops without proper guidance may take actions which have a further negative impact on the situation.​

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**NOTE:** Throughout the discussion the instructor should take care to focus on what could have been done at Div/BCT Tactical level and not let discussion go on a tangent about Strategic/Political decisions.

Slide 10: **VIDEO CLIP: PBS FRONTLINE – BROADCAST 9 OCTOBER 2003**​

Click YouTube link and press play. <https://youtu.be/oE6Sy8D7wAU>

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**CLIP ONE: EXPERT ADVICE**– Pre-invasion; Speaker:​

Mr. Robert M. Perito, National Security Council 1988-1989; ​

Mr. Perito discusses the presentation that he gave to DoD officials on 28 Feb 2003 prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion urging them to be prepared for lawlessness and looting.  He mentions the resistance of US military forces to doing civil police work.​

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Slide 11: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is in answer to the statement from the video “The US military does not do police work.” The reality of history is that the vast majority of our military experience is in interventions and stability operations short of full scale war.

NOTE: Campaign start/end taken primarily from US Army of campaigns: <http://www.history.army.mil/html/reference/campaigns.html>

Math is not precise. Time is rounded to year to obtain the total. Conflicts are those which were land forces centric, therefore naval centric wars like the Barbary Wars are left out.

The requirement for military formations to conduct operations focused on stability is not new. Our involvement in military conflict from the Revolutionary War to Operation Enduring Freedom consists of only eleven conventional military operations. Conversely, that same history reveals hundreds of operations focused on stability with recent history proving no different. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States led or participated in over fifteen operations in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While the magnitude of violence may not match conventional operations, history often measures the duration of stability operations in decades. This fact combines with the disturbing spread of international terrorism, fragile states allowing safe haven to terrorist organizations and or possessing weapons of mass destruction, along with an endless array of humanitarian and natural disasters illustrates the increasing requirement for operations focused on stability.

Things to Highlight: Relative time spent on Interventions and Stability Operations vs. Major Offense/Defense Combat Operations.

Indian Wars: for 101 years units in the US Army were dealing with Native American Indian tribes. Combat was episodic but soldiers were fighting Indians, moving them to Indian Territory, keeping watch on reservations, or guarding frontier settlements from Indian attacks during that entire time.

Civil War Reconstruction: 4 years of combat, 12 years of occupation.

Post Spanish-American War occupations: less than one year of combat led to three separate, lengthy occupations (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines), one of which turned into a 14 year counter-insurgency campaign (Philippines). Also note Latin American “Banana Wars” (largely USMC) which came with heavy stability component.

WWII: 2-1/2 years of war (US) 7 years of occupation.

Recent stability ops: Still ongoing MFO mission; Post Desert Storm; Balkans; ongoing ops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Slide 12: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is an example of where we did do police and got it right.

The United States Constabulary was a United States Army military gendarmerie force. From 1946 to 1952, in the aftermath of World War II, it acted as an occupation and security force in the U.S. Occupation Zone of West Germany and Austria.

Elements of the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions and certain cavalry groups were assigned to form the basis for the new organization. The units converted into Constabulary squadrons and regiments included armored infantry, field artillery, tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft battalions, and mechanized cavalry squadrons. (TEACHING POINT: We used two of our premier armored divisions and our cavalry groups as the basis for this force. It was NOT exclusively an MP force) The Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946.

The Constabulary School was established at Sonthofen, Germany.

The German police maintained their role in the towns while the Constabulary provided area coverage by operating in a role similar to state troopers or highway patrol in the US. The constabulary operated in motorized patrols to guard the borders, keep oversite of displaced person camps, provide backup to the German police, and maintain order in the large areas for which it was responsible.

References:

<https://armyhistory.org/mobility-vigilance-justice-the-u-s-constabulary-forces-in-germany-1946-1952/>

<http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/LPD/Gott-Mobility-Vigilance-and-Justice-The-US-Constabulary-in-Germany.pdf>

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 ​ Slide 13: **VIDEO CLIP: PBS FRONTLINE – BROADCAST 9 OCTOBER 2003**

**CLIP TWO: STATUE COMES DOWN 10 April 2003**. Bush and exiles celebrate; Looting spreads; Military takes a passive attitude.

YouTube link: <https://youtu.be/8arG_2wlFYs>

Speakers:

Kanan Makiya: Iraqi expat academic and a professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis University who had called attention to Saddam Hussein’s abuses of his own people. A member of the Iraqi National Congress (a largely expat anti-Saddam political party), Makiya lobbied the US government to invade Iraq in 2003 to oust Hussein on moral grounds.

LtGen James Conway: Commander I MEF during invasion (later Commandant, USMC). Expresses that a level of looting of government buildings is tolerated.

Mr. Laith Kubba: National Endowment for Democracy. Explains that Iraqi people sensed a lack of authority and took advantage of it.

 ​ Slide 14: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to illustrate the point that here you allow little crimes, big crimes will follow; when you police little crimes it sets a tone that big crimes will not be tolerated.

The broken windows theory is a criminological theory of the norm-setting and signaling effect of urban disorder and vandalism on additional crime and anti-social behavior. The theory states that maintaining and monitoring urban environments to prevent small crimes such as vandalism, public drinking, and toll-jumping helps to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.

The theory was introduced in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article by social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling

*Wilson, James Q; Kelling, George L (Mar 1982),* [*"Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety"*](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/)*, The Atlantic, retrieved 2007-09-03*  (*[Broken windows](http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf) (PDF), Manhattan institute* ).

 ​ Slide 15: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to point out that the duties of the occupying power are spelled out in the 1907 Hague Regulations (arts 42-56) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV, art. 27-34 and 47-78), as well as in certain provisions of Additional Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law.

Agreements concluded between the occupying power and the local authorities cannot deprive the population of occupied territory of the protection afforded by international humanitarian law (GC IV, art. 47) and protected persons themselves can in no circumstances renounce their rights (GC IV, art. 8).

The main rules of the law applicable in case of occupation state that:

The occupant does not acquire sovereignty over the territory.

Occupation is only a temporary situation, and the rights of the occupant are limited to the extent of that period.

The occupying power must respect the laws in force in the occupied territory, unless they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the international law of occupation.

The occupying power must take measures to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the occupying power must ensure sufficient hygiene and public health standards, as well as the provision of food and medical care to the population under occupation.

The population in occupied territory cannot be forced to enlist in the occupier's armed forces.

Collective or individual forcible transfers of population from and within the occupied territory are prohibited.

Transfers of the civilian population of the occupying power into the occupied territory, regardless whether forcible or voluntary, are prohibited.

Collective punishment is prohibited.

The taking of hostages is prohibited.

Reprisals against protected persons or their property are prohibited.

The confiscation of private property by the occupant is prohibited.

The destruction or seizure of enemy property is prohibited, unless absolutely required by military necessity during the conduct of hostilities.

Cultural property must be respected.

People accused of criminal offences shall be provided with proceedings respecting internationally recognized judicial guarantees (for example, they must be informed of the reason for their arrest, charged with a specific offence and given a fair trial as quickly as possible).

Personnel of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement must be allowed to carry out their humanitarian activities. The ICRC, in particular, must be given access to all protected persons, wherever they are, whether or not they are deprived of their liberty.

Slide 16: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to outline what doctrine says about US forces responsibility toward civil security and protecting civilians. The idea is to show the linkage from Joint doctrine through general Army Operations doctrine and down to specific Army Stability doctrine.

Joint Doctrine (JP 3-07 Stability) specifies that US forces must establish transitional public security to protect the population when the rule of law has broken down.

Army Operations doctrine specifies Army forces must plan to conduct minimum essential stability tasks.

Army Stability doctrine defines what civil security is and specifies that it is a prerequisite for allowing host nation and/or other agencies to work toward a sustained peace.

Slide 17: VIDEO CLIPS: PBS FRONTLINE – BROADCAST 9 OCTOBER 2003

YouTube: <https://youtu.be/ga_8fdxmD_U>

**CLIP THREE:** LOOTING AND TAXI CRUSHER. Extent of looting surprises US official; Jay Garner realizes that looters have destroyed much of the infrastructure he will need to use to run reconstruction effort. Fuel shortages spark violence; Baghdad residents want US to take control or go home; Jay Garner feels we could have used more troops in Baghdad; US troops seem unsure of what to do and have an unorthodox method of dealing with looters.

Speakers:

Kanan Makiya: Iraqi expat academic and a member of the Iraqi National Congress (an Iraqi expat anti-Saddam political party), Makiya lobbied the US government to invade Iraq in 2003 to oust Hussein on moral grounds. He discusses impact of failure to have an alternative law and order system ready.

LTG(Ret) Jay Garner: retired United States Army lieutenant general appointed in 2003 as Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) for Iraq following the 2003 invasion. He had directed Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq after Desert Storm in 1991. Arrived in Baghdad 18 April but was replaced by Ambassador Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) by 12 May. He discusses his surprise at the extent of the looting and how it impacted his reconstruction efforts.

“Taxi Crusher”: Troops are from 1-64 Armor, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mech). Exact Date of Taxi crushing incident unknown beyond summer 2003. A former company commander of this brigade informed the author of this class that the sum total of the guidance received from higher HQ was “stop the looting.”

Slide 18: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to summarize the vignette. The idea is to portray the escalating level of violence over time due to failure of Coalition force to establish security early. It shows key events along the timeline that the audience should recognize for frame of reference. It also lists various Influencers and opportunists who are taking advantage of the chaos to gain influence, power or profit.

Points to emphasize:

1.) The failure of US forces to establish civil security in the immediate aftermath of the fighting lead to increasing lawlessness demonstrated by extensive looting 10-18 April.

2.) 18 April: The reconstruction team arrived in Baghdad 8 days after the fall of the city (held up because it was felt unsafe to bring them forward). By that time, the infrastructure the team would need was irretrievably destroyed or damaged. This included most office facilities and the entire telecommunications systems. From this point, it may have been possible to reassert US control, but only with great difficulty. Failure to establish civil security early meant it was almost too late to recover by the time the reconstruction team showed up.

3.) The Reconstruction team contained no organic security forces; the plan was to use the remnants of the Iraqi Army and Police. There was a possible window to reestablish security using Iraqi security forces under Coalition control until L. Paul Bremer and the CPA decided upon de-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi Army.

4.) As the summer goes on the Coalition begins combat operations to fight the growing resistance. Aug 11 riots in Basra are significant since up until this point it had been peaceful.

5.) By the mid-August the beginning of large, spectacular attacks demonstrated we were now fighting a full blown insurgency. The UN HQ attack caused the UN to pull out of Iraq and cease all UN work.

ACTORS: Partners, Threats, Others: Various groups start advancing their own agendas in the power vacuum. Listed are various examples, though it is not comprehensive. Red are presumed enemy, Green are Iraqi “fence-sitters” of unknown loyalty/agenda in 2003, Blue are presumed friendly or sympathetic to US interests but may have their own agenda; Black are working in their own interests without permanent loyalty to a particular side.

-Former Regime Loyalists: Baathist and former military who stage terrorist attacks in opposition to US occupation; largely Sunni.

-Supreme Council For Islamic Revolution in Iraq: Iraqi Shia Islamist party with close ties to Iran. BADR Corps is their armed wing. Noted for having a philosophy of “One Man, One Vote, Once

-Tribal Sheiks: Traditional power brokers in Iraqi society; some are “fake sheiks” appointed by Saddam.

-Muqtada al Sadr: Young firebrand Shia cleric with a strong following among poorer Shia and ties to Iran

-Criminals: those who take advantage of lawlessness for personal gain

-Expat Iraqi Nationals: Multiple groups with varying agendas. Made up largely of Iraqis who fled Iraq in the 80’s and 90’s; many are Shia and Kurds. Iraqi National Congress lead by Achmed Chalabi is an example.

-Kurdish Nationalists: Have an agenda of maintaining an autonomous Kurdish region or separate Kurdish state. Multiple groups with varying agendas and philosophies.

-Foreign Jihadists: Few in number at first but increasingly enter the theater through the summer of 2003.

-Economic Opportunists: Both locals and foreigners who seek to profit from changing conditions in Iraq. Some are out to make a quick profit from inflated prices due to disrupted economy; others have larger entrepreneurial ambitions. Note: Nick Berg, the American captured and beheaded by insurgents in May 2004 is an example. He had traveled to Iraq on his own to secure contract work for his freelance radio tower repair company.

Slide 19: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to begin the discussion of what “we” (a BCT) could have done about the deteriorating civil security situation. This quote is from the Maneuver section of the 3ID AAR.

**NOTE:** Instructor should take care to focus on what could have been done at Div/BCT Tactical level and not let discussion go on a tangent about Strategic/Political decisions.

Slide 20: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to continue the discussion of what “we” (a BCT) could have done about the deteriorating civil security situation. This quote is from the JAG section of the 3ID AAR. You could inject some humor by saying that this is the “lawyers’ version” of what the commanders said on the previous slide.

The full text states:

**Issue:** For political reasons, leaders declared that U.S. forces were “liberating forces” rather than occupying forces. This may have caused military commanders to be reluctant to use the full power granted to occupying forces to accomplish our legitimate objectives.

**Discussion:** As a matter of law and fact, the United States is an occupying power in Iraq, even if we characterize ourselves as liberators. Under International Law, occupation is a de facto status that occurs when an invading army takes effective control of a portion of another country. If necessary to maintain this public affairs position, our national command should have stated that while we were “liberators,” we intended to comply with International Law requirements regarding occupation. This status would have provided us authority to control almost every aspect of the Iraqi life, including the civilian population, government, resources, and facilities, making it easier for us to accomplish all SASO missions. Occupation law also imposed upon us obligations to protect the civilian population to the best of our ability. Because of the refusal to acknowledge occupier status, commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers, such as imposing curfews, directing civilians to return to work, and controlling the local governments and populace. The failure to act after we displaced the regime created a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill.

**Recommendation:** Military leaders must use authority granted occupying forces. We could have done this consistent with our government’s stated position.

**NOTE:** Instructor should take care to focus on what could have been done at Div/BCT Tactical level and not let discussion go on a tangent about Strategic/Political decisions.

Slide 21: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of the following section is to focus on the specific terminology and concepts in stability doctrine as context for the final section which will address the specific BCT role.

Slide 22: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to focus in on Stability as an element of Unified Action, highlight the comprehensive, whole of government and Joint approach and define the primary stability terms. The bottom line block takes us back to end state conditions we are trying to achieve which we will see on the next slide.

**Unity of Effort**

Success in stability tasks requires all actors to work toward a common goa. Military operations typically demand unity of command, challenging military and civilian leaders to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. Effective civilian-military teaming starts with the development of shared goals, aims, and objectives—a unity of purpose—that lead to a relationship of shared trust and a unity of effort becomes possible.

***A Whole-of-Government Approach***

A successful whole-of-government approach requires that all actors—

- Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process.

- Share an understanding of the situation and a problem to be resolved.

- Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.

- integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.

- Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their common goals.

- Allocate resources to ensure continued information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts.

***A Comprehensive Approach***

A comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach builds from the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. Successful operations use this approach, even for those operations involving actors participating at their own discretion or present but not acting as a member of a coalition. Integration and collaboration among actors with different agendas and experience proves challenging. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. Mandates, experiences, structures, and bureaucratic cultures make it difficult to sustain a comprehensive approach. Commanders overcome and mitigate this challenge with extensive cooperation and coordination.

Slide 23: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to return to the overarching end state that the Joint/Interagency force is trying to achieve.

**NOTE:** In the context of the Maneuver BCT in the immediate post conflict environment we will concentrate on the Safe and Secure Environment End State. An Instructor leading question could be: “To which end state could a typical BCT most contribute?”

* This is a tool for strategic mapping/planning. If we had it when at the Dayton Accords or at Bonn, it might have led to more success.
* STRATEGIC MAP ANALOGY: In these missions, there are many possible paths to take in trying to reach an objective. The *framework* presents the map or “big picture” of a mission, showing all possible roads and highlighting key obstacles that may exist along those roads. It is a mapping tool to help planners/practitioners think about WHERE we are going and HOW to get there.
* CROSS-CUTTING PRINCIPLES. These principles apply to every action by every individual in every situation on the ground.
	+ *Host nation ownership/capacity:* Means the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities, even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. Ownership requires capacity.
	+ *Political Primacy:* Means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility for forging a political agreement.
	+ *Legitimacy:* Has 3 facets. The degree to which: 1) the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; 2) the government is accountable to its people; 3) regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government.
	+ *Unity of Effort:* Begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.
	+ *Security:* Is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts an S&R mission to begin with. Security creates the enabling environment for development.
	+ *Conflict Transformation:* Guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. Requires reducing drivers of violent conflict and strengthening mitigators of conflict across all end states.
	+ *Regional Engagement:* Entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation’s and the region’s security and economic and political development.

Slide 24: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to introduce the Stability Framework as outlined in JP 3-07 Stability and which is found throughout our Stability doctrine:

The **stabilization framework** is a construct to help the joint force commander (JFC) conceptualize part of the OE of a nation-state that requires stabilization in support of US national strategy and interests. The framework characterizes an OE, identifies distinct stages of activities, assists in defining the types and ranges of tasks performed in that environment, and provides the basis for tools with which to measure progress toward the desired end state. The tasks and activities that make up these stability operations fall into three broad categories: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability.

**The initial response stage** generally reflects actions executed to stabilize an OE in a crisis state.

During this stage, military forces perform stability actions, in concert with other agencies, during or directly after a conflict or disaster when ongoing violence poses a threat.

**The transformation stage** represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity building tasks. Military forces perform these tasks in a relatively secure environment, free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts.

**The fostering sustainability stage** encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. This stage also represents those stability actions undertaken to prevent instability and conflict.

**USING THE STABILITY FRAMEWORK**

Military forces provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the host nation is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces or a private security company. However, military forces sometimes provide logistic, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These tasks generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with a stability operation:

l Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.

l Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces are prepared to execute.

l Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

For the remainder of this class we will focus primarily on BCT actions in the Initial Response stage. A slide animation will outline “Initial response” in a red box.

Slide 25: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to bring the issue back to the Commanders’ business as outline in or operational doctrine. It lists the Army’s stability tasks and their purpose. This sets up the focus on the BCT role in the immediate post conflict environment.

Note that elements of all of these tasks occur all along the continuum of the Stability Framework. They are not exclusively sequential. Elements of all of them can occur simultaneously. We will focus primarily on Establish Civil Security and slightly on Establish Civil Control.

Slide 26: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is twofold: first it shows the breakdown of the tasks of Establish Civil Security and Establish Civil Control into their subordinate task steps as outlined in ATP3-07.5 Stability Techniques Aug 2012. Second, it shows that the task “Establish Public Order and Safety is actually embedded under “Establish Civil Control” rather than “Establish Civil Security.” It is important to highlight this as how the tasks are grouped in our doctrine but point out that as the Army has structured the Combined Arms Training Strategy for BCTs it has grouped “Establish Public Order and Safety” subtask with the bulk of the “Establish Civil Security Tasks” The reasoning is that these highlighted subtasks are ones which a BCT with organic assets and without any special augmentation could perform in their OE or be tasked to assist in performing as part of a larger theater effort.

Note that “Clear Explosive and Other Hazards” is judged as a task the will require significant augmentation of the BCT by military EOD elements or humanitarian de-mining organizations.

Note that the bulk of the Establish Civil Control tasks will require significant augmentation of the BCT with legal expertise, corrections expertise and manpower in the form of law enforcement trainers.

Slide 27: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to refer to the commonly understood concept of defeat mechanisms and use it as a bridge to the next slide which will discuss the concept of Stability Mechanisms.

**Key Points:**

**ADRP 3-07, para 4-56 to 4-57**

A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.

Defeat mechanisms apply primarily to combat operations.

Defeat mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, they describe broad operational and tactical effects.

Commanders must translate these effects into tactical tasks.

Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results proportional to the effort expended.

Used in combination, the effects are likely to be both synergistic and lasting.

Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms:

* **Destroy** means to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
* **Dislocate** means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Turning movements and encirclements produce dislocation. When combined with destruction, dislocation contributes to a more rapid decision at the tactical and operational levels.
* **Disintegrate** means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. Typically, disintegration focuses on capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding.
* **Isolate** means to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. Of the two types of isolation, the first, and more difficult to achieve, is physical isolation. The second, primarily the purview of IO, is psychological isolation*.* While more difficult to measure, the effectiveness of psychological isolation is a vital enabler of physical isolation.

Slide 28: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to introduce the concept of Stability Mechanisms. Discuss which mechanisms a BCT is able to use.

**Key Points:**

**ADRP 3-07, para 4-51 to 4-55**

A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces focus efforts to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.

Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the stability element of Decisive Action.

As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.

* **Compel** means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.
* **Contro**l means to impose civil order. Control also includes activities related to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as security sector reform.
* **Influence** means to impose the will of friendly forces on the situation through information engagement, presence, and conduct. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts across the operational area.
* **Support** means to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively. This commitment may involve establishing or reestablishing the institutions required for normal life. These typically include a legitimate civil authority, market economy, and criminal justice system supported by government institutions for health, education, and civil service.

 Slide 29: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

At this point the class transitions to focus on the specific tasks expected of a Brigade Combat Team.

Slide 30: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to begin the discussion of transition to Stability tasks. The quote is from FM 3-96 2015 Brigade Combat Team manual.

The instructor should stress the following:

Transitions are points of maximum friction as illustrated by the previous vignette. You can argue that we performed a very successful invasion and elimination of the Saddam regime but then failed to manage the transition to stability operations which had long term negative consequences.

Transitions may be unexpected and abrupt. Task org changes for stability may be planned, but may also have to be executed ion a “come as you are” fashion.

Commanders try to achieve change without an operational pause. Operational pauses give the enemy time to recover and reorganize just as the Saddam Fedeyeen and other groups did ion the summer of 2003.

Slide 31: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to show the BCT commander and his staff what the BCT doctrine states that a BCT provides in Stability operations.

The doctrine acknowledges that a BCT lacks the ORGANIC ability to stabilize its OE independently. It must be augmented with additional, specialized assets.

The doctrine states that the BCT’s initial role is in the INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE and in the tasks of establishing security and establishing and maintaining order. Until this is done, other stability tasks cannot take place. In particular it will be impossible to introduce civilian relief organizations.

The doctrine further states that the BCT’s central role is in establishing and maintaining unity of effort. It has the staff and planning skill to integrate government and private agencies into a coherent plan.

 Slide 32: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to introduce and discuss the concept of Consolidate Gains.

Consolidate Gains is a concept outlined in Unified Land Operations. Seize, retain and exploit the initiative are concepts that have been long embedded in our doctrine. Consolidate Gains is a relatively new addition which emphasizes the need to take actions to make the efforts to seize, retain and exploit the initiative permanent.

From TRADOC Publication 525-3-1 The US Army Operating Concept: “The consolidation of gains is an integral part of armed conflict and is essential to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. Enemy organizations operate on physical battlegrounds and in other contested spaces such as perception, criminality, and political subversion. To consolidate gains, Army forces often play a supporting role by reinforcing and integrating the efforts of multiple partners. For example, Army units provide military support to governance, rule of law, and law enforcement. Expanded leader and Soldier competencies allow Army forces to consolidate gains in complex environments. Examples include support to law enforcement and financial actions for intelligence analysts, advanced situational awareness for combat arms, investigative skills for military police, reconstruction skills for engineers, rule of law advising for staff judge advocates, and institutional development for civil affairs officers and leaders within the institutional Army. Conventional and special operations forces work together to understand, influence, or compel human behaviors and perceptions. Army commanders understand cognitive, informational, social, cultural, political, and physical influences affecting human behavior and the mission. Leaders exert influence on key individuals, organizations, and institutions through cooperative and persuasive means. For example, when mission accomplishment requires strengthening partner institutions, Army forces exert influence to convince those partners that undertaking necessary reforms and strengthening critical institutions are in their interest. Emphasis on early and effective consolidation activities as a fundamental part of campaign design enables success and achieves lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span.”

Slide 33: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to outline the steps in Consolidate Gains. It could be described for a BCT as similar to tactical consolidation and reorganization but with a focus on the external measures the BCT needs to take not only in regard to physical terrain and enemy but with an added emphasis on addressing the population that resides within the objective area.

Slide 34: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to show a graphic illustration of what Consolidating Gains looks like for a BCT as a way of discussing the concept. It uses a series of successive builds on mouse click.

CONSOLIDATE: Battalion Battle Positions established to defend the areas seized in the attack.

ESTABLISH AREA SECURITY: Outposts and patrols established to extend the brigade’s control and influence outside of the BPs.

STABILITY TASKS: Outposts established within population centers to maintain contact with local population, enforce ceasefires, protect critical facilities as well as guarantee freedom of movement (note border outpost)

INFLUERNCE OVER LOCAL AUDIENCES: (if authorized): Commanders participate in local news broadcasts to convey public information and publicize positive developments

SECURITY FROM EXTERNAL THREATS: Establish border controls and screen/defend international or zone boundaries.

The overarching idea to emphasize with regard to stability is that these are actions that any of us would consider normal for a BCT that had just seized an objective, but that we must consider the human terrain and population in our plan as well as the physical terrain and enemy.

Slide 35: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to outline the Civil Security End state (as opposed to the full stability end state mentioned earlier). These are the ultimate goals for the BCT in its OE.

2-3. Stability requires the cessation of large-scale violence. Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt.

Military forces separated and are monitoring warring parties, implemented a peace agreement or, and have managed violent belligerents.

2-4. Stability requires public order. Military forces establish public order by enforcing laws equitably; protecting the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals; reducing criminal and politically motivated violence to a minimum; and pursuing, arresting, and detaining criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks). Military forces also improve the cleanliness and order of important public places.

2-5. Stability requires legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence. Military forces identify, disarm, and demobilize major illegal armed groups. They have also vetted and retrained security forces so those forces can operate lawfully in a professional and accountable manner under a legitimate governing authority.

2-6. Stability requires physical protection. Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free from fear from grave threats to physical safety. Refugees and internally dislocated persons can return home without fear of retributive violence. Military forces protect women and children from undue violence.

Military forces also protect key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure from attack.

2-7. Lastly, stability requires territorial security. People and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb. Military forces protect the country from invasion and secure borders from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans.

Slide 36: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

The purpose of this slide is to outline the task and subtasks in the Maneuver BCT TE&O found in the Combined Arms training Strategy.

Slide 37: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Enforce Ceasefires:** Army commanders first understand the terms of any ceasefire as well as the gaps and points of dispute. Army commanders identify any contentious issues omitted in the negotiation process to address eventually. Army commanders help host-nation leaders determine if a particular agreement is final or an incremental step. Army units enforce ceasefires with measures such as patrols, guard posts, remote sensors, and checkpoints, possibly a focus on a buffer zone that separates belligerents. Rules of engagement address lethal measures.

**Supervise Spoiler Disengagement:**. Once actors determine the terms of a ceasefire, they begin to disengage from spoilers. Army units supervise this disengagement. They communicate the terms to spoiler leaders and rank-and-file members; host-nation national, regional, and local representatives; the population; and other relevant organizations. Once disengagement has begun, Army units begin occupying and patrolling the buffer zone. Generally, a buffer zone includes a demilitarized zone or buffer zone boundaries and controlled crossing areas that dislocated civilians (DCs), NGOs, or other actors use. As a critical step, disengagement will likely be the main effort for Army units, resulting in less emphasis on other stability tasks until disengagement has progressed satisfactorily.

**Identify and Neutralize Adversaries:** Even in the best circumstances, belligerents attempt to disrupt peace, impede stabilization efforts, or exploit problematic situations for personal gain. Conflict can occur between rival groups and within groups as hardliners attempt to thwart moderates. Army units prefer to maintain strong support for a peaceful political process rather than closely aligning with personalities, factions, or positions. This stance preserves impartiality that will facilitate Army unit engagement with the competing factions as other Army units identify and neutralize potential adversaries. Commanders and staffs identify the adversaries’ compositions, locations, objectives, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Army units treat belligerents as individual criminals breaking the law rather than members of a political or social group. This treatment emphasizes the belligerents’ lack of legitimacy and helps isolate them. Army units neutralize an adversary with inclusive or exclusive measures. Inclusion involves persuading the adversaries that they can achieve their aims through the peace process. This may involve redressing legitimate grievances that have alienated the adversary. Exclusive measures include isolating, arresting, and defeating belligerents through lethal and nonlethal means.

**Provide Security for Negotiations:** Negotiations enable partners to end hostilities, keep hostilities from returning, and secure the subsequent political settlement. Security is a fundamental prerequisite of negotiations. Without security, actors cannot reach stability. Talks disrupted by violence can be catastrophic to a peaceful political settlement.

Slide 38: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Protect Population:** In the initial response phase, Army units protect vulnerable elements of the population. Units ensure vulnerable groups—minorities, women, children, small businessmen, farmers, professional classes, and the elderly—have protection from belligerents. Such groups may be easily victimized in fragile state conditions. Their protection may require extensive presence and patrolling and, when appropriate, incorporating reliable host-nation security groups. Some dislocated civilian (DC) camps and other concentrations require specific security with continuous presence, reliable communications with the endangered groups, or the ability to respond quickly. As threats recede, Army units can ease security measures to levels appropriate to the environment.

**Ensure Access to Endangered Populations:** In the initial response phase, Army units ensure humanitarian aid and security forces can access endangered populations and DC camps. Belligerents often attempt to interfere with humanitarian workers or others who provide support to vulnerable populations. These actions may be motivated to profit, to deny support to the population, or to disrupt stabilization efforts. Although many NGOs prefer not to associate with the military directly, Army units can escort humanitarian convoys.

**Perform Civil Police Functions:** In the initial response phase, Army units perform civil police functions. Depending upon host-nation capability gaps, Army units may initially be required to police local areas until the HN establishes police organizations. Army units conduct policing continuously to maintain order within its communities and formations. When directed, it also applies policing activities to host-nation populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent.

**Safeguard Witnesses and Evidence:** In the initial response phase, Army units locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents, and other evidence. Army units often discover witnesses or evidence instrumental in judicial proceedings for recent events or serious incidents that occurred prior to the military operation.

**Control Crowds and Civil Disturbances:** In the initial response phase, Army units control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances. Generally, Army units prevent incidents of looting and civil disturbances early so they do not just get worse. Units secure key facilities, detain violators, and apprehend any identified instigators of violence. Engagement with local leaders positively affects mass behavior.

**Secure Criminal Justice and Security Institutions:** In the initial response phase, Army units secure facilities, records, storage equipment, and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions.

Slide 39: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Implement a Plan for Disposition of Security Institutions:** During the initial response phase, Army units implement a plan for disposition of host-nation forces, intelligence services, and other national security institutions. Initially, they retain host-nation security forces as currently disposed and organized rather than risk instability by disbandment. Disbandment would remove the security architecture and result in many unemployed and possibly armed combatants dispersed around the country. Army units attempt to gain influence over these forces, possibly in their capacity as a transitional military authority (TMA). Some forces accomplish limited missions such as providing security for infrastructure. Other forces perform public works projects to keep them occupied while providing a limited and nonthreatening but useful function. Where using disposed forces is not feasible, U.S. forces often sets up payment or emergency financial assistance for displaced former military or security force personnel. Underemployed, trained, and heavily armed populations tend to breed insurgents and other belligerents.

**Identify Future Roles, Missions, and Structures:** The TMA develops a mid-term (six months to one year) plan for host-nation security forces to identify their future roles, missions, and structures. The plan includes strong host-nation involvement, to avoid the host-nation officials and the population rejecting the plan as not legitimate. U.S. forces develop the plan in consultation with host-nation representatives and the U.S. country team. While the TMA develops and approves these plans at the national level, Army units provide relevant input, recommend modifications as deficiencies are identified, and may develop local interim plans in the absence of higher level guidance. Army units clearly identify interim measures as such to host-nation representatives, so the representatives do not get too accustomed to having a certain level of power. Army units identify host nation missions by establishing transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems. Eventually, hasty arrangements evolve to permanent structures that include strong civilian control over security forces. The plan includes organizational structures and locations, accounting for internal and external security threats.

**Vet Officials:** U.S. forces vet senior officers and other individuals for past abuses and criminal activity. Leadership is perhaps the key variable in successful stability tasks. While Army units cannot replace all people in positions of responsibility, Army commanders can ensure that key individuals in their areas of operations are both trustworthy and capable. Such determinations factor past performance, current usefulness, and future appropriateness. Past performance includes participation in abusive or criminal activities. Current usefulness includes experience in the position and availability of alternative candidates. Future appropriateness includes potential, education and experience, and any requirement to diversify appointees by ethnic group or some other consideration.

Slide 40: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Negotiate Terms:** Army units negotiate terms with belligerents. Army units begin or conduct disarmament operations within a larger DDR process. Often, Army units with an extended local presence have the best position and a strong incentive to directly negotiate terms, particularly when negotiations require frequent informal sessions to resolve issues. DDR matters often fall into this category, as any original peace agreement may focus on the cessation of hostilities and avoid subsequent matters.

**Establish Weapons Control Programs:** In this phase, Army units establish and enforce weapons control programs, including collection and destruction. Generally, some level of weapons control enhances security in a fragile state. However, efforts at complete disarmament create destabilization if they eliminate or threaten the HN’s minimum levels of self-defense capability. Army leaders consult responsible host-nation representatives regarding residual levels of weapons individually owned, held by local security forces, or stored in controlled facilities and accessible during an emergency.

**Reassure Disarmed Factions:** Before disarming, belligerents want credible assurances that it is in their interest to do so. These assurances may relate to security, amnesty, justice, and basic needs. Belligerents need assurance that they and their families will have security. They also want amnesty for previous actions they may have taken. Often belligerents also want justice for negative actions taken against them. Lastly, they want Army units to provide them and their families with basic needs such as food and shelter.

**Establish a Monitoring Program:** Army units establish a monitoring program in the initial response phase. An effective monitoring program gauges DDR progress and helps identify second-order effects. The program indicates progress by decreased incidents of violence, reduced numbers of armed groups and individuals, greater freedom of operation for legitimate security forces, and an improved sense of security among the population.

**Establish Demobilization Camps:** Army units establish demobilization camps. These temporary camps process, billet, and educate former combatants. Army units also use these camps to turn in and store weapons and to issue items such as clothing or identification cards.

**Ensure Needs Are Met:** Army units ensure belligerents have adequate health, food, and security. This task is an essential prerequisite for reintegrating former combatants into society. If accomplished effectively, it will greatly lessen the possibility that DDR efforts will fail. In many cases, U.S. forces extend the task to provide for the belligerents’ family members and local communities as well.

Slide 41: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Establish Border Control and Boundary Security:** Units use guard posts, ground and aerial patrols, and checkpoints along major roads that cross the border. Units receive instructions regarding permissible cross-border traffic, requirements (such as identity cards or passes), prior crossing coordination, and rules of engagement. Units continually improve border security with fences, signs, and growing participation by host-nation forces. In situations where cross-border traffic is either not permitted or permitted only under select circumstances, Army units make arrangements to support security forces with quick reaction forces, fires, or other means.

**Establish and Disseminate Rules Relevant to Movement:** The host-nation population often has many reasons to travel from homes and local areas. Such circulation is important in a normally functioning society. In a failed state or other situation requiring stabilization, other situations create movement. Large numbers of dislocated civilians fleeing a crisis or returning home, relief agencies circulating and belligerents attempting to conduct movements illustrate other types of movement. Army units have to conduct effective population resource control that balances legitimate circulation, manages dislocated civilians, and neutralizes belligerents. Suitable rules may include requiring identity cards, travel passes, controlled convoys, curfews, movement time windows, off-limits areas, or on-the-spot permission for an individual to pass through a checkpoint.

**Dismantle Roadblocks and Establish Checkpoints:** Belligerents use roadblocks to establish control over an area, extort money or other valuables from transiting civilians, or identify and target victims. Such roadblocks directly challenge the credibility of Army units and the HN and should be vigorously searched out and eliminated. Large accumulations of stationary people or vehicles often indicate these roadblocks. Belligerents establish some roadblocks permanently and others temporarily in unsecured areas. Army units can use aerial patrols and Soldiers inquiries to identify roadblocks. When they engage with the population, Soldiers frequently ask about existing roadblocks. A gray area may exist between these roadblocks and those established by local groups to enhance their security. In some cases, physical roadblocks may be left over from a conflict. Army units may need to clear or repair the infrastructure so that unheeded travel can resume.

**Ensure Freedom of Movement:** Host-nation freedom of movement fosters economic development, meets population needs, executes transition processes, facilitates NGO operations, and potentially allows civilians to escape zones of conflict. Additionally, overly restricted movement may conflict with the HN’s laws or constitutions. Effective units quickly identify impediments to the population’s freedom of movement and continually reassess as these obstacles evolve. Civilians may stop travelling because of concerns for personal safety; threats may come from criminals, insurgents, members of other ethnic groups, or the host-nation security forces. If Army units determine that security related concerns deter civilians from travel, Army units with host-nation security forces increase efforts to secure transportation networks with expanded patrolling, additional traffic control points, and aerial surveillance.

Slide 42: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Secure Documents:** These documents include documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, professional certificates, birth records, and driving licenses. To preserve elements of an existing host-nation identification system, Army units ensure the security of facilities that contain records. These facilities include administrative offices with documents regarding the population at large and membership in organizations, courthouses, military headquarters, party headquarters, police stations, prisons, bureaus, or security and intelligence offices. Securing these facilities may prevent attempts to destroy records to conceal identities, hide past criminal activities, or obfuscate property ownership.

**Establish Identification Program:** In many situations, the HN will have a suitable existing identification system. In other cases, Army units create a new identification program that includes registering and issuing identity cards. Initially Army and host-nation personnel manually record information on forms and then transfer it to a database. Information can include identification number, card number, previous identification number, name, aliases, hometown or city area, address, parents, occupation, tribe, arrest record, military service, and other data. Units can issue interim identity cards to individuals over a certain age (for example fifteen). Any identification program enables monitoring population movements, recognizing patterns, and correlating movements. Such identification enables units to identify possible belligerents or criminals undermining current stabilization efforts or wanted for previous crimes.

**Enforce Identification Program:** In the initial response phase, Army units ensure individuals have personal forms of identification.

Once Army and host-nation units issue identification cards, they use and check them routinely. The HN disseminates rules for their possession by all available information means such as posters, the Internet, radio, and television. In situations where few visitors and all inhabitants know each other, inhabitants will rarely carry their cards. Indeed, that a village leader can vouch for all inhabitants may be sufficient. In other cases, however, their use can become a routine part of life. The HN may require identification cards—

l At random checks by security forces. The frequency of such checks can be increased or decreased according to the security environment.

l At checkpoints and traffic control points.

l When making purchases at stores or markets.

l When seeking employment.

l When seeking government services, such as school registration, elections, licenses, pensions.

l When seeking services such as humanitarian assistance, medical care, cell phones, or automobile repair.

U.S. and host-nation security forces enforce routine checks politely and without antagonizing the population. They also should be familiar with the cards and know what discrepancies to look for (such as forged signatures or certain known wanted personnel). Forces may temporarily detain and investigate those persons unable to present an identity card. The HN needs a replacement system for lost or damaged cards. Without being abusive, this system should be an inconvenience to cardholders to encourage accountability.

Slide 43: **INSTRUCTOR NOTES:** The purpose of this slide is to highlight the collective tasks found under the subtask. The focus for the BCT in the immediate post conflict environment are the initial response tasks.

**Protect Stabilization and Reconstruction Personnel and Resources:** Host-nation stabilization and reconstruction and USG representatives need security from insurgents or criminals to function effectively. Since NGOs often arrive first in the area and can best assist the host-nation population, Army units often protect NGOs as well. Such actors only reluctantly coordinate with military forces. They perceive coordination as inconvenient, unnecessary, or potentially jeopardizing to the neutral stance they prefer to maintain. At a minimum, Army units attempt to maintain situational awareness of their activities and locations and consider them when planning and conducting operations. Army units attempt to share contact information, agree to reasonable security measures, and discuss contingency plans.

**Provide Emergency Logistic Support:** Notwithstanding general limitations on support from the U.S. military to other actors, sometimes military forces assist with emergency fuel, transportation, or other logistic support. Army units may help arrange for host-nation security forces to provide such support to non-U.S. recipients.

**Protect Cultural Sites:** In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites. Belligerents target religious sites for sectarian violence and treasure seekers loot cultural sites. Army units ensure that forces secure both sites as part of the initial response phase, although cultural sensitivities may suggest that Army units quickly transfer these security efforts to host-nation organizations. Protecting such sites includes identifying and neutralizing would-be attackers, including thieves.

**Protect and Secure Critical Infrastructure and Civil Records:** Critical infrastructure includes bridges, ports, dams, roads, power plants, and other facilities. Some infrastructure has only local significance but remains important to the population. Others will have broader relevance, particularly those related to natural resources. Securing hospitals, universities, business centers, and large companies in the initial response phase greatly minimizes disruption to the economy and society while providing a base for future economic growth and stability.

**Protect and Secure Important Institutions:** In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure strategically important institutions. While perhaps requiring initial security from Army units, governance centers such as executive buildings, legislatures, and courthouses return to responsible HN control as soon as possible. If the previous regime was unpopular, an angered population might target these facilities. Such situations put Army units in a difficult position. Although they should refrain from action against the population, such facilities often contain evidence and are necessary for future governance. Effective Army units solicit the involvement of local host-nation leaders who can help reduce the level of violence.

**Protect Military Facilities and Means of Communications:** In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure military facilities and means of communications. Army units often secure host-nation military facilities. Since these facilities probably contain weapons and munitions, Army units maintain control to prevent adversaries gaining their acquisition. Additionally, control over host-nation military facilities provides greater influence over and coordination with host-nation forces. Army units maintain control to preserve evidence, records, or other items of intelligence value. Finally, they maintain control so the host-nation’s security forces can use the facilities in the future.

**Identify, Secure, Protect, and Dispose of Munitions:** In the initial response phase, Army units identify, secure, protect, and dispose of munitions. Army units’ areas of operations may contain munitions storage areas and caches already established by the host nation military or belligerents. These caches may not necessarily be in or near former military sites. Army units prepare to search civic, public, or government buildings, schools, transportation venues, and sewer systems. These locations are ideal cache sites, as enemy forces know U.S. forces will not target such sites.

Army units identify and secure munitions to prevent pilfering by belligerents or harm to civilians who might be looking for items of value. Depending upon the condition of the stocks, Army units use explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to destroy this material. NOTE: THIS REFERS TO SECURING MUNITIONS STOCKPILES AN CACHES, NOT UXO DISPOSAL OR HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING

***End of Notes***