Semi-Annual Lesson Report:

Setting the Stage

for Peace and Stability Operations

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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Introduction

This edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute's Semi-Annual Lesson Report explores the challenges and complexities of "setting the stage" for peace and stability operations and activities. A few definitions may be helpful before delving into the enclosed lessons.

First, note the definitions of "stability activities," "stability operations," and/or "stabilization" vary among the proponents and implementers of the construct. The different definitions are found not only between government and non-government organizations, or from one country/region to another, but also within countries. In contrast, the United Nations (UN) does not appear to provide a specific definition, despite the use of the term in the mandate title of several recent or ongoing operations. Instead, the UN appears to leverage the ambiguity to meet the particular objectives of unique missions. In other words, "Stabilisation [sic] is therefore perhaps best understood to embody different guises in different contexts, rather than a distinct form of intervention…."[1]

While the lessons herein may apply to any military or military-analogous intervention force deployed to "keep peace" or re-establish/reinforce stability in another country, this collection does not attempt to define *stability* in an operational milieu. Instead, the collection focuses on the *stage setting* necessary before such intervention.

Dictionaries share similar definitions for the phrase *setting the stage* in two related approaches. One approach defines *setting the stage* as "to create the conditions in which something is likely to happen." The other approach indicates the preparation needed prior to an event: "If someone sets the scene or sets the stage for an event to take place, they make preparations so that it can take place." Similarly, the lessons compiled in this report focus on *condition creation* or *preparation* prior to intervention.[2]

The "Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts To Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas," released in 2018, addresses avenues to create conditions for stability. It asserts:

> [S]uccessful stabilization begins with developing an outcome-based political strategy that outlines our core assumptions and achievable end states and guides all lines of effort—*diplomatic engagement, defense, foreign assistance, and private sector engagement where appropriate* [emphasis added]….[3]

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[1] Linda Robinson, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, and Stephanie Pezard, "Finding the Right Balance: Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2441.html (accessed 30 March 2021). This report summarizes the various definitions of the terms "stability" and "stabilization" in use among practitioners at the time of publication; Cedric de Coning, "The future of UN peace operations: Principled adaptation through phases of contraction, moderation, and renewal," Contemporary Security Policy, 42:2, 211-224 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1899543 (accessed 24 April 2021); De Coning indicates: "The UN Secretariat has resisted pressure to give doctrinal clarity to what stabilization means in the UN context, despite specific recommendations to do so, including from the 2015 UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations;" Jemma Challenger, "The Implications of Stabilisation Logic in UN Peacekeeping: The Context of MINUSMA," 10 April 2021, E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/04/10/the-implications-of-stabilisation-logic-in-un-peacekeeping-the-context-of-minusma/ (accessed 15 April 2021).

[2] "To Set the Stage for Something," MacMillan Dictionary, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/set-the-stage-for-something (accessed 10 April 2021); "To Set the Stage," Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/to-set-the-stage (accessed 10 April 2021).

[3] US Department of State, "Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts To Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas," 2018, 10,

United States (US) Joint forces' doctrine apropos stability activities also refers to preparation ahead of task execution. It stresses, "Planning for stability activities and tasks should begin when joint planning is initiated," and indicates such efforts are as important to ultimate success as the military's offensive and defensive operations. However, the proposed intervention environment may have circumstances that prevent the resource application to create conditions in a manner favorable to the intervention effort. Nevertheless, intervention preparation, which assesses the current environment and plans accordingly, should not get "short-changed" by circumstances.[4]

What might be considered in the preparations—the stage-setting—for peace or stability interventions? For the defense line of effort, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, "Joint Planning," highlights the PMESII framework (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure) as a planning tool, among other models, for both an operational environment (OE) analysis and a strategic estimate. The PMESII framework serves as a basic outline for the lessons included in this collection. Yet, as each element relates to the others, so these lessons may fit into several categories.[5]

Perhaps the key planning consideration for *setting the stage* also comes from Joint doctrine: "By nature, stabilization is typically a lengthy endeavor."[6]

Each of the lessons shared here are also found in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) database, identified by the hyperlink alongside each lesson title. Some of these lessons are edited for brevity. JLLIS access is at https://www.jllis.mil and requires a Department of Defense Common Access Card (CAC) for registration.

Political

"Contested Stabilization" in Post-Conflict Spaces; JLLIS ID#225578

Observation

A May 2020 Brookings online article suggests the stabilization *space* in post-conflict countries may no longer be uncontested:

> Gone are the days when the United States and Europe lead multilateral stabilization operations while their adversaries sit on the sidelines indifferently, or at least inactively. The global redistribution of political and economic power will drive rising powers to seek influence and resources where they can — fragile states are typically weak and moldable, making them rich targets for states looking to shape the world in their image and to the benefit of their interests.[7]

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https://www.state.gov//reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework-for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected-areas-2018/ (accessed 10 April 2021).

[4] "Joint Land Operations," Joint Publication 3-31, 3 October 2019, V-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31.pdf (accessed 30 March 2021).

[5] "Joint Planning," Joint Publication 5-0, 1 December 2020, II-9 and IV-6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 30 March 2021). There are two lessons in each of these planning categories, with two exceptions. The *political* category includes three lessons; the *information* and *infrastructure* categories are combined into one lesson.

[6] "Joint Land Operations," Joint Publication 3-31, 3 October 2019, V-9, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31.pdf (accessed 30 March 2021).

[7] Patrick W. Quirk and Jason Fritz, "Order from Chaos, Contested Stabilization: Competing in Post-Conflict Spaces," Brookings, 26 May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/26/contested-stabilization-competing-in-post-conflict-spaces/ (accessed 15 October 2020). ·

Consequently, the US and its allies must navigate current and future stabilization efforts with awareness of their competition in this space.

Discussion

Most analysts and historians refer to the period of shared global power between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) as "the Cold War," which is generally understood to span the years between World War II's conclusion and the Berlin Wall's *fall* (or its *opening*, depending on one's perspective) in 1989. One of the characteristics of the period was the *bipolar* economic/political/social models available to other nation-states and regions. Nation-states and regions' models seemed limited, at the time, to alignment with either the US or the USSR and their respective philosophies and related policies.

During the 1990s, the global environment was often considered *unipolar*, with the US and its aligned partners dominant in global power and influence. However, the Brookings authors highlight the power changes of more recent decades as both Russia and China seek influence—including, but not limited to, economic influence—over their neighboring nation-states as well as across the globe. Such overt challenges to US influence, according to the authors, suggest "In an echo of the Cold War, fragile states will have more than one model from which to choose" in the next decade or beyond.[8]

Given this strategic environment as "echo of the Cold War," the authors describe "contested stabilization":

> as situations where international actors pursue their own contradictory strategic objectives in a fragile or conflict-affected state. It is the stabilization corollary to a proxy war: Actors engage in stabilization activities — diplomacy and other assistance, to empower local actors and systems they can influence — with the aim of improving their own core interests, gaining access to emerging markets or resources, antagonizing adversaries, and expanding their perceived sphere of influence. Stabilization, a means to secure core national interests, is almost never undertaken altruistically and almost every actor which engages in it has one or more of these objectives in mind.[9]

According to the authors, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is but one example of its interests in influence and power beyond its own borders or those of its near neighbors. While they acknowledge the US has not always acted in an altruistic manner with its own global influence or stabilization efforts, they still highlight concerns for BRI engagement:

> Given the BRI's scale, it is poised to underwrite fragility and instability the world over. None of these outcomes align with enduring U.S. interests, even if the United States itself has made policy decisions in that past that have supported undemocratic ends. Nor do they promote long-term stability, which depends on effective and inclusive institutions and the ability to publicly finance those institutions.[10]

Further examples include the Russian efforts throughout the world, but especially in Africa and South America. Consequently, the authors assert the US needs more thought and "guidance on

[8] Quirk and Fritz, "Order from Chaos."
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

how to approach other international actors with very different strategic objectives from [its] own" in contested stabilization spaces.[11]

Recommendations

The authors assert the ultimate success of US stabilization policies and programs in contested spaces "centers on bolstering those actors aligned with the United States while also going on the offense to contest rivals' efforts to undermine these allies." They outline two main approaches (paraphrased here):[12]

- Leverage *strategic empowerment*; the support of actors "most aligned" with the US and "likely…to govern effectively."
- Build coalitions of donors to bring *political and economic leverage* against international and local actors that prevent stabilization.

Most importantly, however, is the authors overarching outlook for the US:

> Because contested stabilization can be destabilizing — at least in the short term — contesting the stabilization efforts of others demands that we do so for reasons greater than expanding spheres of influence or extracting resources. Our purpose should be to promote the establishment of sustainable, effective, and inclusive institutions that provide human security under the rule of law…While contested stabilization presents a new set of challenges to U.S. foreign policy, it also presents an opportunity to demonstrate our commitment to the values wepurport to uphold, particularly in juxtaposition to our competitors.[13]

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 6 November 2020

Partners and Competitors in Pre- and Post-Conflict, Disaster or Humanitarian Spaces; JLLIS ID# 225552

Observation

The International Peace Institute (IPI) published a report in November 2019 to highlight the challenges and opportunities for forces operating in parallel to UN peace operations. The authors frame the current environment with this note:[14]

> Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has authorized or recognized the deployment of more than forty parallel forces that operate alongside UN peace operations. These parallel forces have included deployments by regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and individual member states, with their duration ranging from several months to many years and with a range of mandates.

[11] Quirk and Fritz, "Order from Chaos." ·
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Alexandria Novosseloff and Lisa Sharland, "Partners and Competitors: Forces Operating in Parallel to UN Peace Operations," International Peace Institute (IPI), November 2019, https://www.ipinst.org/2019/11/partners-and-competitors-forces-operating-in-parallel-to-un-peace-operations (accessed 23 September 2020).

They share the various rationales for deployed forces *in parallel* to UN assets, to include but not limited to "a need to use force, which is often beyond the capabilities of UN missions." By implication, often parallel forces intend to operate in a manner the UN did not endorse for its own mandated forces. The authors also note "For some Western countries, parallel forces have been a way to contribute to peacekeeping indirectly, bypassing a command-and-control structure they distrust." In other words, some Western parallel forces may intend to operate in the same or similar mode as the UN's mandated forces, but are not part of the UN mandate for their own sovereign concerns or interests.[15]

As the authors indicate, the UN may authorize parallel forces by expressed mandate, mere recognition of their presence in the shared space, or some acknowledgement between the first two approaches. At the same time, there are often parallel forces in the shared space not so authorized. Regardless of authorization status, the authors further note: "…the division of labor between UN missions and parallel forces has blurred, and their goals have sometimes come into conflict. This raises the question of whether they are partners or competitors." Further, whether parallel forces are partners or competitors—or both at the same time—their very presence means the field is crowded. Consequently, one forces' operations impacts the other forces' operations—deliberately or inadvertently—which, in turn, impacts their sovereign nations' or international organization's mission and intentions.[16]

While the report focuses on parallel forces operating alongside UN-mandated forces, many of the observations, discussions, and recommendations can apply to any operation or mission where the operating space may be shared with other forces of different nationalities, but not part of an official alliance or other multinational contingent or mission set. This can be in pre- and post-conflict spaces or in post-disaster relief or humanitarian efforts.

Discussion

Despite the challenges inherent in parallel force presence in pre- or post-conflict, post-disaster, or humanitarian space, the authors acknowledge" "parallel forces often allow UN peace operations to be more flexible and to draw on the comparative strengths of different organizations and member states…." While this may be true, the challenges remain.[17]

Among those challenges is the often inadequate coordination of strategic vision, and the related reluctance to share intelligence and information, which has obvious operational impacts. Parallel forces are often Western nation-funded (if not manned), with real and perceptual implications in post-colonial spaces, which "can also threaten the legitimacy or perceived impartiality of UN operations" the parallel forces are intended to complement or augment. When such parallel forces have differing missions from the other forces in operation—such as a force's counterterrorism mission alongside a another force's peace or protection mission—it may intensify these challenges, putting all operations at risk.[18]

Recommendations

The authors suggest the following eight recommendations under two specific headings (shortened and paraphrased below):[19]

[15] Novosseloff and Sharland, "Partners and Competitors."
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

Strengthen Coordination of Assessments, Planning, and Application of UN Standards

1. Deploying parallel forces should conduct joint assessments;
2. The UN Security Council should develop mechanisms to engage with parallel forces; and
3. The UN Security Council should develop a human rights compliance framework to apply to any parallel forces.

Clarify Roles, Responsibilities, and Areas of Operation

4. Parallel forces engaged in peace enforcement or counterterrorism operations should work with the UN peace operation to clearly delineate their responsibilities and areas of operations;
5. UN peace operations should work with parallel forces undertaking counterterrorism operations to assess the risks of collocating;
6. UN peace operations and parallel forces should improve their mutual dialogue and strategic communications with the local population;
7. The Security Council should continue to put in place oversight mechanisms; and
8. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) could request lessons learned from the deployment of previous parallel forces.

Perhaps the most important note is that governments deploying forces must assume they will operate in any space in concert or competition with other forces, regardless of official or formal acknowledgement of the relationship.

Prepared by: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 28 October 2020

The Future of UN Peace Operations with Contraction, Moderation, and Adjustment; JLLIS ID# 226853

Observation

In his March 2021 research paper, Cedric de Coning asserts "UN peacekeeping is likely to remain one of the most visible symbols of global governance and international cooperation" in a pandemic and post-pandemic world. He contemplates the UN peace operations conduct and evolution using a complexity theory lens in short- (next five years), medium- (the next 5-15 years), and long-term (beyond 15 years) periods, which he also calls "contraction, moderation, and adjustment phases". He also states that UN peacekeeping has a *principled adaptive approach* which permits the organization to adjust to current and future realities while "staying true to its core form and identity." He summarizes:[20]

[20] Cedric de Coning, "The future of UN peace operations: Principled adaptation through phases of contraction, moderation, and renewal," Contemporary Security Policy, 42:2, 211-224 (2021) DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1894021 (accessed 15 March 2021). From de Coning's paper: "Complexity theory (is) a theoretical framework for analyzing how complex systems, like societies, organizations, and institutions, function under stress, including how they react to turbulence and disruptions in their environment (Brusset et al., 2016; Kavalski, 2015). Complexity theory (describes) how social systems respond to external stimuli, and how their resilience and adaptive capacity influence the likelihood that they will maintain functioning despite significant changes in their operating environment (Folke, 2006). Complexity theory holds that uncertainty and unpredictability are inherent characteristics of complex systems (Cilliers, 1998). This uncertainty is an intrinsic quality of complex systems, not a result of imperfect knowledge, inadequate planning, or implementation (Popolo, 2011). De Coning explains: "Principled adaptation refers to a process of evolutionary change, in response to transformations in a system's environment where the adaptive process is guided by a set of principles that help the system to maintain its core

> UN peace operations have shown a remarkable resilient capacity to continuously adapt to new challenges over the past 70 years...despite the significant changes currently underway in the global order, and the uncertainties that come with such turbulence, most countries and regional blocs, such as the AU [African Union], EU [European Union], the Nordic region, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), agree on and repeatedly emphasize the importance of the UN, and UN peace operations, as the centerpiece of global governance and a rules-based multilateral order.

Discussion

Using the complexity theory lens, the author assesses UN peace operations across the short- (*contraction*), medium- (*moderation*) and long-term (*adjustment*) phases of the next five-to-beyond-fifteen years. He first notes the UN must engage in "an adaptive process that is emergent from experience and experimentation," which he asserts has been true of UN peace operations for it's more than 70 years history:[21]

> During the post-Cold War period peacekeeping evolved from a limited conflict management tool to a comprehensive conflict resolution instrument. With the contemporary focus on protection of civilians and stabilization, it has now started to swing back to conflict management (Peter, 2019, p. 40). Over the course of this journey the principles of peacekeeping has been interpreted differently, but the principles themselves, and the core blue helmet identity of UN peacekeeping, has been remarkably resilient (de Coning & Peter, 2019).

According to the author, the pandemic and its economic impact, as well as the US Trump Administration's residual effects on UN programs, will cause the UN peace operations' short-term contraction period of the next five years. The Trump Administration's UN budget contribution reduction and its decisions to withhold or reduce financial contributions to several UN programs resulted in an average contraction of 21% of UN peacekeeping expenditures in four years. Even if—or when—the Biden Administration increases US contributions to the UN, it may be a significant time before recovering the operational capacity lost during the Trump Administration.[22]

The global pandemic exacerbated this situation. To reduce mission personnel and local citizens' disease exposure, the UN checked all operational rotations for much of 2020, limited in-country movements, and adjusted activities to achieve social distancing—all of which significantly impacted the ongoing operations. However, those decisions "also resulted in closer cooperation and planning among peacekeeping operations and the rest of the UN system" to include development of an informal *lessons learned* mechanism between UN partners such as the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to name a few.[23]

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identity and function (Folke, 2006). In the UN peacekeeping context, these are the core doctrinal principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force (de Coning et al., 2017)."

[21] De Coning, "The future of UN peace operations."

[22] The author asserts: "the Trump administration used the key role of the United States in the UNSC and 5th Committee of the General Assembly to reduce the overall UN peacekeeping budget by scaling down the size and scope of current missions, and by bringing missions to a close as soon as possible. As a result, between 2015 and 2019 the Trump administration contributed to a 21% contraction of UN peacekeeping expenditure, amounting to approximately $2 billion, which resulted in a 20.5% reduction in uniformed and a 24% reduction in civilian personnel (Coleman, 2021)." Yet to be determined is whether that reduction and/or contraction resulted in more or less effective operations.

[23] De Coning, "The future of UN peace operations."

Despite the UN's improved process coordination, there will be significant impact to current and future operations due to the pandemic. The World Bank expects advanced economies to have at least a 7% decrement in 2021, with related 2.5% decrement in developing economies in the same year. This means the "UN may consequently face a situation where it has much less funding and personnel available than in the past" at a time when the pandemic and its related economic recession may result in a demand increase for UN peace operations. Accordingly, the UN may use instruments other than large-scale missions to address conflict as well as "turn to regional organizations like the AU or other ad hoc arrangements when larger security operations are necessary."[24]

The author describes the medium-term *moderation* of the next five to fifteen years as "adapting to the turbulence of a global order in transition" due in part to the "financial tail of the COVID-19 crisis" as well as the "uncertainty and turbulence associated with a significant shift in the power-distribution in the global order that regulate the international system…." He likens this period to the Cold War, when the UN deployed only thirteen peacekeeping missions, suggesting "peacekeeping during a period of transition is likely to be conservative." As evidence for this comparison, he points out there was no new peacekeeping operations since 2014, and the new missions were deployed as Special Political Missions (SPMs) even if they may have been appropriate peacekeeping missions in the past (i.e., the UN verification mission in Colombia). He suggests SPMs are "easier to obtain approval for special political missions in the UNSC [UN Security Council] because they are seen as less of an imposition on national sovereignty, they are significantly smaller, have a lighter footprint, and are less costly."[25]

He further suggests "one of the innovations—or perhaps rather a mutation—of UN peacekeeping in the early twenty-first century that is unlikely to survive this phase of moderation is stabilization operations." For this point, he gives evidence of the UN Secretary-General's apparent reluctance to define *stabilization* in the UN context, despite the number of current missions with *stabilization* in its title. He indicates:[26]

> These perverse side-effects of UN stabilization operations harm the credibility of the UN and undermine the reputation of UN peacekeeping. Their cost, these negative side-effects and the overall lack of effectiveness of UN stabilization operations helps to explain why the UNSC have started to pivot to special political missions.

The author describes the long-term (greater than fifteen years) future of UN peace operations as a period of "finding a new role in an era of coexistence," with the global order settled from a uni- or bi-polar international system to multi-polar system and improved global stability as a result. He cautions, however, that "the need to prevent and manage conflict and maintain international peace and security will not disappear…Once a new order has emerged there will be a need to

[24] The World Bank, 2020; De Coning, "The future of UN peace operations."
[25] Ibid.
[26] The author explains the controversy of *stabilization* missions within the UN. He believes the most important issues are that these mission types do not adhere to the UN's peacekeeping core principles: 1) they do not have the consent of all the conflict parties, only the host state agreement, which gives the host state (often a major party to the conflict) significant leverage compared to the other conflict parties; 2) while the mission personnel may attempt to act impartially, stabilization missions are not impartial but tasked to protect the state and its people and may even have the mandate to disrupt opposing factions, 3) the authorization to use force for more than self-defense or protection is controversial. He also indicates that the ineffectiveness of these operations to end the conflicts (thus far) makes them unpopular. In his opinion, stabilization also removes the host state's incentive to political settlement. Instead, the UN mission becomes "a no peace/no war stalemate, which leaves the UN with no exit path". Further, an entire economy revolves around the mission, from local markets to the larger donor engagement.

consolidate, stabilize and maintain it, and accordingly the scope for peace operations is likely to increase."[27]

Throughout the next two or more decades, there will be security challenges to address, but he highlights climate change, urbanization and new technologies. Climate change threatens already constrained resources, increasing conflict risks, and also demands "climate sensitive" UN missions. "Increased urbanization—75% of the global population is expected to be urbanized by 2050…implies that most of the violent conflicts that future peacekeepers will be tasked to manage are likely to take place in urban contexts." This may further the adjustment from large-scale UN missions "to a future urban public security type peacekeeping model." In regards to technology, the author emphasizes the positive and the negative impact of digitalization and the related effect on UN missions.[28]

Recommendations

The author shares his recommendations in each phase discussion. Specifically, he suggests that peace operations' *contraction* in the short-term (next five years) due to the pandemic and related economic recession "may signify a lasting shift away from the large peacekeeping and stabilization operations that have characterized the first 20 years of the twenty-first century" and should include the *lessons learned* from the pandemic towards more efficient cooperation and collaboration between nation-partners and organizations, such as "a prioritized-task approach to mandate implementation, a more adaptive approach to planning and mission management, and greater utilization of digital technology."[29]

In the *moderation* phase (medium-term of five-fifteen years), he foresees little "political space or appetite for significant new policy or doctrinal developments, or large-scale ambitious peacekeeping operations," especially in the complex stabilization missions. Yet, despite the resource and/or policy and process constraints, he asserts "peacekeeping, even scaled-down, is expected to remain one of the most established and visible symbols of global governance and international cooperation."[30]

For the beyond fifteen years *adjustment* phase, he predicts "a new multipolar era characterized by coexistence" and suggests UN peace operations will reflect this global approach with:[31]

> a focus on political accompaniment, third-party impartial mediation, stability, and technical assistance with recovery and state-building that is perceived as neutral (i.e., free from ideologically pre-determined institutional models), so that national systems can emerge that build on local cultural, historic, and contextual foundations.

The author also points out the UN approved its current peace operations doctrine over a decade ago and its last strategic review was more than five years ago. Therefore, part of the adjustment phase may include revision of UN peace operations doctrine—preceded by a strategic review.[32]

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[27] De Coning, "The future of UN peace operations."
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] The UN finalized its current UN peace operations doctrine ("Principles and Guidelines", also known as "capstone doctrine") in 2008 (see: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/guidance). The UN's High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations conducted "a thorough review of the current United Nations peace operations and the emerging needs of the future" and reported in 2015, over five years ago (see https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations). Now in its third year, the UN Secretary-General launched the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative in 2018 with intent

Regardless of phase or time period, the author notes UN peace operations must: [33]

> adapt to changes in the security landscape such as the growing influence of climate change and its peace and security related risks, the positive and negative roles of new technologies and increased digitalization, and a shift in violent conflict from rural to urban settings. UN peace operations will also have to adapt to developments in the international peace and security practice, such as a shift from large-scale multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping operations, to smaller specialized missions that form part of a broader network of peacebuilding or stabilization activities; a greater focus on data and performance and a shift to people-centered or bottom-up context-specific approaches to peacebuilding.

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 31 March 2021

Military

Re-Learning Conflict Termination; JLLIS ID# 225585

Observation

Mark Gilchrist, an Australian Army officer, suggests in his July 2020 online article on the Modern War Institute at West Point website: "Western militaries have largely forgotten how difficult it is to end hostilities in a conflict where they are a belligerent." He indicates the current efforts in Afghanistan demonstrates "conflict termination is a messy, uncertain, inherently political, and consistently violent process" particularly when the opposition forces are in a position of strength. Therefore, he suggests it is important for military planners to recognize "how the military can satisfy a government's revised political objectives when victory is no longer possible" as conflict termination requires compromise between previously warring parties. [34]

Discussion

In order to have a conflict resolution, and ultimately to have peace, the conflict—the violence between one or more parties—must terminate. However, the period from the decision to engage in the resolution and peace process and actual peace is inherently risky. Yet, it also requires military members "to put aside mental models" of force and violence to defeat an enemy.

The author does not reject the use of force as a leverage in conflict termination. Instead, he suggests the military prepare "to use force cunningly" to keep the parties in negotiations. As he states: "The military's key role in a peace process is, therefore, in calibrating the use of force to reduce

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"to renew mutual political commitment to peacekeeping operations... (and develop) a set of mutually-agreed principles and commitments to create peacekeeping operations fit for the future…." (See: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p.) The most recent A4P event was March 29, 2021.

[33] De Coning, "The future of UN peace operations."

[34] Mark Gilchrist, "Blessed Are the Peacemakers: What Afghanistan Can (Re) Teach Military Planners about Conflict Termination," Modern War Institute at West Point, 22 July 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/blessed-are-the-peacemakers-what-afghanistan-can-reteach-military-planners-about-conflict-termination/ (accessed 6 November 2020).

overall violence as part of a strategy aimed at creating the conditions for political activity to re-commence."[35]

Although the author acknowledges that compromise with the enemy is a difficult mental task for military members, it should be expected of a professional military. As he states: "This is the art of conflict termination, where military planners can give momentum to a political dialogue through 'operationalizing peace.'"[36]

Recommendations

The author suggests four key concepts towards an understanding of the military's role in conflict termination, summarized here:

- The Centrality of Politics and Calibrating Violence. The political outcome in conflict termination is a reduction of violence. Yet, as the author points out:

  > The use of violence can shape multiple audiences: internal and external, on your side and theirs. A failure to understand this almost guarantees that military actions will affect a delicate political balance and potentially undermine the peace process they aim to support...All violence in war is inherently political, but never is it more politically sensitive than during a peace process. Ultimately, violence carried out within the context of a peace process should be geared toward supporting a negotiating position…as military actions can either create momentum for peace or seriously retard it.[37]

- Reconciliation. The author asserts that *"*reconciliation and reintegration are not the same things. Nor are they individually or collectively required to terminate a conflict." Further, no military activity can substitute for political and diplomatic work needed for reconciliation.[38]

- Targeting. The author shares the advantages—and the disadvantages—of targeting enemy leadership. As an example of disadvantage, he points out that in Afghanistan, targeting the Taliban leadership "may have actually created the highly resilient military force."

  He indicates a constant targeting review—with political aspects considered—is necessary. As he points out:

  > there may be a point in the conflict when you want to preserve enemy leadership in order to enhance the stability of the opposition as conflict termination appears more plausible. Or you may seek to dramatically increase the violence level through a surge in precision targeting with the express purpose of incentivizing a ceasefire at a macro or micro level.[39]

- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. According to the author, *"*The paradox of conflict termination is that the de-escalation of violence can create more complicated military problems to solve." As example, he points out the risks inherent with ceasefire implementation while remaining ready to continue the conflict as needed. Consequently: "Planners must have

[35] Gilchrist, "Blessed Are the Peacemakers."
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.

insight into the negotiating strategy, particularly the conditions sought to enable it. This ensures violence can be used incisively to change political, rather than military calculations."[40]

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 14 November 2020

Seizing the "Golden Hour" for Stabilization; JLLIS ID# 225527

Observation

In early 2020, the RAND Corporation released a US Army-sponsored report titled "Seizing the Golden Hour: Task, Organization, and Capabilities Required for Earliest Stage of Stability Operations." As the preface states: "The purpose of the project was to capture lessons learned from U.S. interventions and offer principles for success in the initial phase of the intervention and the nonkinetic [sic] efforts to stabilize the state." In the opening summary, the authors share this observation:[41]

> Despite the apparent consensus among civilians and military officers alike about the importance of the initial phases of stabilization, both the concept of golden hours and their operational implications remain remarkably underdeveloped. At the most basic level, there is very little rigorous evidence about whether golden hours even exist. Assuming they do exist, there is little agreement about their operational implications—in particular, what tasks should be prioritized in this period and what commitments the United States should make now to ensure that it is adequately prepared for such contingencies in the future.[42]

Discussion

"The Golden Hour" is a phrase most commonly used to describe the first hour between a traumatic injury and appropriate-level treatment—the hour in which a life may be saved which may otherwise be lost. The phrase suggests successful recovery from the traumatic injury can best occur if the time between injury treatment identification and application of said treatment is within an hour. While recovery may still occur if the treatment happens outside of the "golden hour," it may be more difficult or require more resources. The authors of this report use the phrase as a metaphor to highlight the important period—and the necessary resources the US government may need to apply—to "set the conflict-affected country on a path to self-sustaining peace."[43]

They addressed five research questions, abbreviated here: [44]

- Do golden hours exist? If so, what are the factors to cause them?
- What is the American experience with such missions, and how was it shaped?
- What tasks could be essential for golden hours? On what scale?
- How should the United States government organize itself and with what coordination necessary to ensure unity of effort between civilian and military actors?

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[40] Gilchrist, "Blessed Are the Peacemakers."
[41] James Dobbins, Stephen Watts, Nathan Chandler, Derek Eaton, and Stephanie Pezard, "Seizing the Golden Hour: Tasks, Organization, and Capabilities Required for the Earliest Phase of Stability Operations," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2633.html (accessed 1 October 2020).
[42] Ibid.
[43] "Golden Hour" can also refer to the period as the sun sets, prior to twilight, when light appears warmer; Dobbins, et al., "Seizing the Golden Hour."
[44] Ibid.

• What military capabilities and capacities are required to leverage golden hours? Which of these should the US military sustain and which can it“regenerate quickly?

In their overall research, the authors determine there is, indeed, a “golden hour” to seize when in transition from conflict to post-conflict or in an intervention. However, they caution that appropriate seizure of such golden hours does not guarantee success in a stabilization mission or period. The paraphrased summary of their findings include:[45]

- Even when all goes well in initial phases, post-conflict countries are fragile; Even if an intervention is poorly conducted in its initial phases, “sufficient resources and luck” may “rescue it.”
- Positive trajectory establishment requires “both planning and preparation beyond that needed to overcome initial resistance.”
- The US post–Cold War intervention experiences “required more ground forces to stabilize the subject society than were needed to affect entry.”
- The manner of conflict termination impacts the post-conflict stabilization. Also, while stabilization “is a government-wide enterprise,” civil and military coordination is more challenging when in a deteriorating security environment.

Recommendations

Few, if any, of the authors’ recommendations are unique to most practitioners or theorists in the stabilization arena. However, the commonality of these recommendations to other research and experiences reinforces their importance. Consequently, government and military leaders charged with these missions and operations should give these recommendations serious consideration. The recommendations from this report include:[46]

- Political and military planning should not occur in separate silos but should be integrated from the start.
- US forces, when they first arrive in a post-conflict context, should reassure potential allies and both deter and co-opt potential enemies.
- Establishing security is absolutely critical in the earliest phases of such operations.
- US decision makers should recognize that initiatives to form local security capacity are long-term commitments and should not sacrifice quality and sustainability in overly accelerated schemes.
- The US must attempt to broker as broad as feasible a coalition of reconcilable political actors and give them a stake in the new political order.
- Planning and preparation for an operation should involve not just the US military but also those civilian actors that will be called to play a role in the post-conflict phase, to ensure a unity of effort critical to the operation's success.
- The US Army should update and refine doctrine and concepts for stabilization. Doctrine at all levels should emphasize the importance of golden hours and the priority tasks that must be implemented to seize them. The US Army should provide concepts and doctrinal guidance on how to plan and conduct so-called low-cost and small-footprint operations.
- The US Army should take steps in the areas of training, education, and leader development to ensure that its leaders retain some knowledge of stability operations. Organizations within the US Army's generating force must continue to serve as proponents for stabilization and preserve and update doctrine to reflect lessons learned.

[45] Dobbins, et al., “Seizing the Golden Hour.”
[46] Ibid.

- The US Army should ensure that it can rapidly expand its capabilities for training soldiers for stability operations and should provide its leaders with the necessary experience when it is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency.
- The US Army and Department of Defense have several broad mechanisms through which they can have rapid access to the appropriate personnel for "golden hours."
- The security force assistance brigades and similar units potentially offer an excellent opportunity for personnel to gain vital experience in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
- Mechanisms to track the civilian skills of reserve component personnel should be strengthened to enable access to these skill sets in a crisis.
- The US Army and Department of Defense can take actions to gain ready access to the necessary manpower they need from outside the Army, including through contracting mechanisms, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and potentially reservists with the requisite civilian skill sets.

In the early section of the report, the authors make an important acknowledgement, suggesting:[47]

> A report such as this one may seem oddly timed. The U.S. defense community has shifted its attention to high-end conventional warfighting contingencies with near-peer competitors. Both the Obama and the Trump administrations expressed an aversion to taking on large-scale, long-term stabilization missions. But this preference for more-limited commitments in scale and time should not keep the United States from making small investments in stability operations to ensure that it can regenerate its ability to perform such missions quickly should the need again arise. As the record of earlier interventions demonstrates, lengthy periods of adaptation to the requirements of stabilization can greatly reduce the odds, and increase the costs, of achieving success. It is precisely in times such as this one, when the United States has the time to prepare, that it is appropriate to reflect on the lessons of past interventions and take steps to avoid the prior mistakes in future contingencies.

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 30 October 2020

Economic

Understanding Intervention Economic Impact in Host Countries; JLLIS ID# 227094

Observation

The relationship cycle of individual poverty—and the often related poor national economic conditions—and the potential for internal conflict is well-established: "conflict breeds poverty, poverty breeds fragility and fragility decreases resilience to conflict." The ongoing pandemic exacerbates the economic crisis in current conflict-affected countries; it may push those countries just emerging from conflict back to crisis.[48]

According to the World Bank Fragility and Conflict Report, one of every five people in the Middle East and North Africa lives in close proximity to a major conflict. Humanitarian needs have multiplied, reaching the highest levels since the World War II and the number of people at risk of

[47] Dobbins, et al., "Seizing the Golden Hour."
[48] United Nations, "With Extreme Poverty Rising Amid Covid-19 Pandemic, More Action Key to Ending Vicious Cycle in Conflict-Affected, Fragile Countries, Top Officials Tell Security Council," 6 January 2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14405.doc.htm (accessed 4 April 2021).

starvation has doubled. International organizations dedicated to peace and stability among neighbor nations, regions, or the world, seek ways to alleviate or mitigate crisis conditions to end the vicious cycle of violence and poverty. This may include some form of physical intervention, usually comprised of military or military-analogous security forces, with a *peacekeeping* or *stability* mandate. Yet, while the intervention's intent may be to promote security, thereby to facilitate long-term economic stabilization and growth, there is "surprisingly little research on the economic impact of peacekeeping."[49]

A 2018 paper titled "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries" attempts to address that research oversight. The authors' findings indicate "peace operations do not appear to have significant positive effects on the economic development of host countries" in the long-term, despite the intervention force's intentions. Other research from 2015 submits that host country short-term economic benefits may not be distributed in a manner conducive to conflict-mitigation: "the very modus operandi of the peacekeeping intervention locks those in a position of privilege at the onset of the mission into a similar position of privilege in the emerging peacekeeping economy."[50]

Discussion

The economic impacts of conflict are frequently described in terms related to costs to the individual and/or the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Different cost types fall in to two categories: *Direct* and *Indirect*.

> 1. *Direct* costs are the cost of violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures, such as the cost of policing, military and medical expenses; and
> 2. *Indirect* costs accrue after the violent event and include indirect economic losses, physical and psychological trauma to the victim and lost productivity.[51]

In the "Economic Value of Peace 2021" report from the Institute for Economics & Peace, the authors also provide a third category, *the multiplier effect,* which "represents the flow-on effects of direct costs, such as the additional economic benefits that would come from investment in business development or education, instead of the less productive costs of containing or dealing with violence." They share:[52]

> In addition to causing suffering, interpersonal violence, social unrest and collective violence hinders productivity and economic activity, destabilizes [sic] institutions and reduces business confidence. Violence disrupts the economy, resulting in adverse and ongoing negative effects even after conflict subsides. These economic disruptions include reduced GDP growth, a less predictable economy, higher levels of unemployment, lower levels of foreign direct investment and higher interest rates and higher inflation.

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[49] United Nations, "With Extreme Poverty Rising;" Vincenzo Bove & Leandro Elia, "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries," CESifo Economic Studies, Volume 64, Issue 4, December 2018, 712, https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifx009 (accessed 15 April 2021). For the purpose of this lesson, peacekeeping, stability activities, and similar actions/operations are included in the term *intervention efforts.*
[50] Kathleen M. Jennings & Morten Bøås, "Transactions and Interactions: Everyday Life in the Peacekeeping Economy," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 9:3, 2015, 281-295, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1070022 (accessed 16 April 2021).
[51] Institute for Economics & Peace, "Economic Value of Peace 2021: Measuring the global economic impact of violence and conflict," 28, Sydney, January 2021, http://visionofhumanity.org/resources (accessed 19 April 2021).
[52] Ibid.

This focus on conflict costs (or peace value) assumes that conflict reduction has a positive correlating impact of some degree on the individual and national economy:

> Reducing violence not only avoids the considerable direct costs, but it also allows for the reallocation of resources to more productive sectors such as health and education, which yield compounding benefits to society over time. In this way, violence and the economy can be considered a system, where improvements in one can lead to improvements in the other and vice-versa. For example, meaningful reductions in violence have considerable benefits, such as poverty reduction and economic growth. These, in turn, can reduce the grievances that give rise to violence.[53]

Direct and *indirect* categories may also characterize the projected or real positive economic effects of interventions to prevent, cease, or mitigate conflict, as stated here:

> The economic impact of military interventions on the host economy can be both indirect, through improved security and health-care services—usually provided by affiliated actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—and direct, from the demand for local goods and services to job training.[54]

Other intervention force or entity activities may also lead to positive direct economic effects for host country government and people, to include, but not limited to: civil engineering projects, local services provisioning, transportation, and work opportunities for local population ranging from manual labor to administrative and management tasks. Furthermore, the wages provided to the intervention force or entity are spent in the local economy.[55]

Indeed, international interventions promotes both *direct* and *indirect* positive economic effects on a host country by providing space to reduce or eliminate violence and develop institutions to prevent or mitigate future conflict, thereby increasing "the likelihood of peace"—in the short-term. However, interventions may not have a positive economic effect in the long-term.[56]

The 2018 paper titled "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries" studied the international peacekeeping efforts of eleven countries over the past decade, all predominately—but not exclusively—in the African continent. As part of their study, the authors highlight earlier research that suggests a five-year maximum conflict-free period post-intervention. They suggest this relatively swift return to conflict is one reason for the little long-term economic gains for host countries. The economic benefits attributed to the intervention effort may mitigate the conditions (i.e., environmental, geographical, political, social) that contributed to the initial conflict, but it does not eliminate them. Instead, the short-term positive effects of the intervention economy itself may unintentionally hide the conditions that led to conflict originally.[57]

As shared in the 2018 "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict," authored in collaboration between the UN and the World Bank:

> Many of today's violent conflicts relate to group-based grievances arising from inequality, exclusion, and feelings of injustice. Every country has groups who believe they suffer one or all of these ills in some measure… when an aggrieved group assigns blame to others

[53] Institute for Economics & Peace, "Economic Value of Peace."
[54] Bove & Elia, "Economic Development in Peacekeeping."
[55] Ibid, 715.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid; The research focuses on Angola, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Namibia, Rwanda, and Sudan.

> or to the state for its perceived economic, political, or social exclusion that its grievances may become politicized and risk tipping into violence.[58]

Therefore, if those same concerns of inequality, exclusion, and injustice are not fully addressed, then conflict may re-ignite with short-term economic gains lost and a forfeit of long-term economic growth. Or, "In other words, in many operations peacekeeping is not followed by the expected decrease in violence, and therefore the operation is less likely to have a tangible effect on economic development."[59]

Other authors provide a related cause for elusive long-term economic growth in post-conflict countries: "The locals that come to inhabit a peacekeeping economy attempt to attach themselves to this economy to survive…they aim to benefit while they can, however they can, and to 'get while the getting is good'." De Coning echoes that view, but focuses on the host country's ruling elites inability or unwillingness to address underlying conflict conditions. He observes:[60]

> The longer the UN operation lasts, the more a political economy develops around it—including wider UN system and bilateral donor engagement—that benefits the elites in power, and those that seek their patronage. Some ruling elites in these contexts thus prefer a no peace/no war outcome because a settlement will require compromises and power sharing that will reduce their power and access to sources of revenue.[61]

Those same sources of revenue may provide yet another reason for insufficient host country long-term economic growth. The magnitude of economic resources (i.e., foreign aid) applied as part of an intervention effort may not promote the institutional development sought by the donors. As the authors of "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries" point out: "Peacekeeping operations are normally carried out in poor countries with nearly absent state capacity and large informal markets… [and]…makes them very susceptible to external shocks," which may also simulate "the so-called 'Dutch Disease' phenomenon." In such cases, the short-term positive economic impact may undermine the long-term sustainable economy.[62]

Recommendations

The authors of "Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries" acknowledge there is more research to consider before designating intervention efforts to host-country long-term economic growth as ineffective:

> our results are exploratory and partial, and it is still unclear whether peacekeeping has the potential to kick-start the local economy, or at least to provide a stimulus. Given the limited number of quantitative works on the economic impact of peacekeeping and the lack of

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[58] United Nations & The World Bank, "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict," 2018, 109, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337 (accessed 16 April 2021). There may be other challenges to remaining conflict-free, such as the psycho-social impacts of living in a conflict-environment for years or generations, but this lesson focuses on the economic issues. (See: https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/ripple-effects-war-how-violence-can-persist-after-formal-peace-declared.)

[59] Bove & Elia, "Economic Development in Peacekeeping."

[60] Jennings & Bøås, "Transactions and Interactions."

[61] De Coning, "The future of UN peace operations."

[62] Bove & Elia, "Economic Development in Peacekeeping;" Investopedia describes the term "Dutch Disease" as "widely used in economic circles as a shorthand way of describing the paradoxical situation in which seemingly good news, such as the discovery of large oil reserves, negatively impacts a country's broader economy." (See: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dutchdisease.asp.)

> consensus on a number of important empirical questions, additional empirical research in this area is certainly needed.[63]

Other authors suggest such research should focus "on the practice and politics of the everyday life of peacekeeping, including the transactional encounters between locals and the peacekeepers" and be "anchored in ethnographic methods and that takes account of, but also looks beyond, global structures and constraints in order to foreground the everyday ordinary life of both locals and internationals in peacekeeping sites." They emphasize:[64]

> In the lived experiences of many locals, this [daily transactions]—rather than lofty mandates referring to peace, stability, democracy, transparency, good governance, human rights, restoration of state authority, and gender equality—is more defining of the peacekeeping mission.

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 20 April 2021

Mobilizing the Private Sector for Peace and Reconciliation; JLLIS ID# 226443

Observation

The cost of global conflict keeps increasing. In 2015, the Institute for Economics and Peace estimated that conflict and violence cost at $13.6 trillion. By 2016, the World Humanitarian Data and Trends report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated costs at $14.3 trillion, or 12.6% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Of that number, military spending and internal security accounted for more than half the total, crime and interpersonal violence was 18%, and the remainder—$1 trillion—was simply categorized as "economic loss."[65]

It is simple to understand the reasons for economic loss in conflict-affected areas. Conflict brings uncertainty, and private sector business depends on certainty. Not only do businesses in conflict-affected areas have their profits diminished due to the violence, they may also lose their property—and/or their lives. Instability also creates hesitancy towards (re)establishing business operations in post-conflict areas. However, as a 2020 World Economic Forum (WEF) report asserts: "Various investors and philanthropies have begun to expect that companies report on their achievements related to the (United Nations) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17."[66]

(Sustainable Development Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.)[67]

This expectation is due, in large part, to the increasing influence of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) philosophy on the business world. This philosophy guides private sector businesses

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[63] Bove & Elia, "Economic Development in Peacekeeping,"
[64] Jennings & Bøås, "Transactions and Interactions."
[65] World Economic Forum (WEF), website, "Conflict costs the global economy $14 trillion a year," 15 January 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/conflict-costs-global-economy-14-trillion-a-year/ (accessed 8 February 2021).
[66] Amara Miriam Amadiegwu, Maya Kihiu, Manuel Simon, "Mobilizing the Private Sector for Peace and Reconciliation," World Economic Forum (WEF) with The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 27 March 2020, https://www.weforum.org/reports/mobilizing-the-private-sector (accessed 15 January 2021).
[67] See: https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal17.

to be "increasingly intentional in their contributions to immediate and long-term peace," with correspondingly differing levels of success in recent years and decades. The aforementioned WEF 2020 report contributes to the discussion with a literature review and case study analyses, leading to several recommendations for its title, "Mobilizing the private sector for peace and reconciliation." As example:[68]

> Overall, due to a lack of alternative sources of income and dependence on the environments in which they operate, local businesses and subsidiaries of multinational corporations are highly incentivized to contribute. Small businesses provide a platform for incremental grassroots contributions, national and international brands can help bolster FDI [foreign direct investment] inflows, whilst alliances provide a vehicle for public participation and national political engagements.[69]

Discussion

The 2020 WEF report authors define the private sector as:

> part of the economy that is controlled by private individuals or groups rather than the state and is typically organized and run for profit… [and] also includes companies and business associations – both local and transnational.[70]

They further remind the observer "there are many definitions for peace" but they define it for their purposes as:

> Peace, as referred to herein, encompasses negative peace, which is the absence of violence, conflict and repression. It additionally includes positive peace, which are the institutions, structures, and attitudes, which when strengthened, lead to inclusive and prosperous societies.[71]

They also define corporate *peacebuilding* as "activities undertaken to achieve negative peace" that "also include the activities taken to achieve positive peace." In both cases, they use the example of CBM (Consultative Business Movement) and its impact in South Africa, beginning in the apartheid period and onward. Beyond the CBM and its role in South African peace and reconciliation, the authors provide several examples where "Private sector actors can support peacebuilding in varying scales and during different stages of conflict" as "private sector actors recognize the cruciality [sic] of peace for business prosperity."[72]

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[68] Amadiegwu, et al., "Mobilizing the Private Sector." There are various definition of the phrase "corporate social responsibility" (CSR). In general terms, the phrase "refers to practices and policies undertaken by corporations that are intended to have a positive influence on the world." (See: www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corp-social-responsibility.asp).

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid. According to one source: The CBM came about in the mid 1980's due to Business Leaders' concerns with their operating environment and context; for example…the negative effects of Apartheid on the Economy and on Human Rights. While these individual Business Leaders were not a homogeneous group, what they did have was enough common ground, which was not dependent on individual motives, to agree that a role should be played. See: https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Hutchings-2017-The-CBM-in-the-transition-to-a-democratic-South-Africa.pdf (accessed February 7, 2021), among other sources.

In their review and analysis of the literature and various case studies, the authors established a few key points for businesses—and potential public-sector and non-government partners—to consider before engaging in peacebuilding in conflict-affected or post-conflict areas. First, they suggest "operating a business according to the law, employing staff members and making a profit does not automatically translate into a peace-positive impact." Instead, the businesses must be *conflict-sensitive* in their operations to avoid unintended consequences. Second, while businesses may be able to influence peacebuilding "through direct and indirect contributions to peace negotiations," such influence may be dependent on the individual or collective businesses' internal structure and core competencies to determine "what peacebuilding activities it is most suited for." Third, while "business alliances have the weight to influence political change that individual actors lack," such as the CBM example, they "are unsustainable models for their involvement." Finally, the authors noted, "a certain threshold of violence and economic costs" must be reached before businesses get involved actively.[73]

Recommendations

The 2020 WEF report points out:[74]

> Despite the market opportunities generated by peace for most businesses in the long-term, the private sector is often reluctant to contribute to peacebuilding. It typically contributes once the costs of war directly impact business operations. This reluctance is partly explained by the fact that many private sector actors, whose core purpose is to generate profit, do not regard peacebuilding as their mandate or responsibility.

Yet, for those businesses that invest in conflict-affected or post-conflict areas—by design or happenstance—the authors summarize six recommendations, paraphrased here:[75]

1. Businesses should adopt a "conflict-sensitive lens" to business practices and operations.
2. Businesses should view value creation for society as a higher business purpose rather than focus on profits for shareholders.
3. Businesses, if highly invested in fostering peace, should consider politically organizing into an alliance.
4. The public sector should become more comfortable working with the private sector on a long-term and sustained basis, not simply around particular projects or interventions.
5. (Legitimate) governments and development practitioners should lead and enable private sector engagement in peacebuilding.
6. The public sector should not disengage from cooperation with private sector actors based on the primary interest of businesses to make profit.

An observer can derive a more overarching recommendation from this report, with its focus on historical case studies. At one point, the authors propose: "It would also be fruitful to consider cases of negative impacts of private sector activities on peace processes." They suggest further study of cases "in which well-intentioned peacebuilding activities from private sector actors produced unintended negative impacts on peacebuilding processes…." They further point out the need for additional metrics that can "measure peace dividends, and more specifically the economic benefits from peace for private sector actors" which in turn may help "to translate conversations about peace into a language that businesses understand."[76]

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[73] Amadiegwu, et al., "Mobilizing the Private Sector."
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 27 February 2021.

Social

Emotion, Memory, and Post-Conflict Reconciliation; JLLIS ID# 226442

Observation

A 2020 paper from the Comparative Strategy journal asserts most practitioners and observers of war believe conflict—and its eventual termination—is *logical* and based on *risk-reward* determination. The author suggests that few practitioners recognize the role of emotion, specifically *adversariality*, in both conflict origin and termination, and, by extension, post-conflict reconciliation. As described:[77]

> Adversariality underpins war. It is the key which starts war, a frame of mind in which interaction with the other party appears to be zero-sum, whether or not it actually is. If evolving adversariality is one of the initiating phases leading to war, then breaking that adversariality must similarly be one of the early developments leading to peace—the whole point of strategy in practice.[78]

In contrast, a decade-old study (2010) argues "Emotions have long been recognized as an important factor to consider in the context of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation." Simply, emotional responses to policies and programs will either encourage or discourage conflict resolution and reconciliation endeavors. Therefore, those interested in sustainable peace facilitation must recognize and leverage a conflict's *emotional ripeness*—or the "emotional readiness to move forward" by its parties.[79]

Some post-conflict reconciliation policies and programs that rely on and refer to emotion are those such as amnesty, apology, and memorialization. Yet, their effectiveness may be inconsistent as conflict participants' memory—and the emotions that memory may recall—can also hinder the peace process or impede peace sustainability.

Discussion

There is a long-standing discourse, or debate, in conflict termination/resolution research and practice that suggests *peace* requires a subordinated *justice*, or a "trade off" of justice for peace.

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[77] Lukas Milevski, "Battle and its emotional effect in war termination," Comparative Strategy, 39:6, 535-548 (2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1826844 (accessed 30 January 2021). The paper focuses on individual commanders' decisions in three historical campaigns: Austria's K€oniggratz 1866 campaign; Germany's defensive 1918 campaign; and the War of the Spanish Succession. In one place, the author states: "Battle begins early in the adversarial life cycle as an expression of hostile intention, but the very experience of battle inevitably rouses passions which both interfere and augment reason, including hostile reason."

[78] Milevski, "Battle and its emotional effect,"

[79] Eran Halperin & Drew Schwartz, "Emotions in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation," Cahier Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale. 1. 215-234 (2010) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259758678_Emotions_in_conflict_resolution_and_post-conflict_reconciliation (accessed 30 January 2021).

Chiefly, the idea is peace in a region or country may depend on community and/or state agreement to '"make peace with" and "find closure" on a violent past even if that past includes directed violent action against the community and/or state.[80]

Examples of *peace* as priority over *justice* during or after peace or conflict termination negotiations may include the interrelated concepts of transitional justice, reconciliation, amnesty, apology, and memorialization. Amnesty in this context generally means an individual or group pardon for illegal—even violent—activities during the conflict. In the 1990s, the international or regional peace-facilitating organizations trended away from the use of amnesty in negotiations. However, by the 2000s into the 2010s, amnesty was again relevant in the peace negotiation tool box. One author points out:

> The use of amnesty, particularly amnesties that allow perpetrators to escape prosecution for the most heinous crimes, has long provoked controversy. Many scholars argue that prosecution is essential, and international law and the UN seem to be following this point of view and turning against amnesties. Other scholars take a more realist stance and argue that amnesty, while undesirable, may prevent further bloodshed by helping end conflicts earlier.[81]

This author emphasizes there are many reasons to consider amnesties, such as demonstration of *good faith* prior to or during negotiations, to entice followers away from rebel and/or violent groups, or even as part of a *responsibility to protect* civilians by stopping the violence. To determine the best use of amnesty depends on the type of conflict endings anticipated or intended. This research indicates "amnesties for heinous crimes are not more effective than amnesties that exclude heinous crimes in reaching negotiated settlements," therefore amnesties may be "ineffective in making negotiated settlement more likely."[82]

One of the reasons for ineffective amnesties—among other policies or programs deriving from post-conflict reconciliation approaches—is the role of individual and community/collective memory and the adversarial emotion memory engenders. Often referred to as *affective memory*, such memory may "prevail and disrupt the reconciliation paradigm, and need to be taken into account in transitional justice processes." As one author describes *collective memory* in post-conflict Argentina:[83]

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[80] Lesley-Ann Daniels, "How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Conflict Termination," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume: 64 issue: 9, page(s): 1612-1637 (October 2020) https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/jcr/64/9 (accessed 1 February 2021). Jill Stockwell, "Does individual and collective remembrance of past violence impede or foster reconciliation? From Argentina to Sri Lanka," International Review of the Red Cross. 101. 1-28. 10. 97 (2019) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337169286_Does_individual_and_collective_remembrance_of_past_violence_impede_or_foster_reconciliation_From_Argentina_to_Sri_Lanka (accessed 28 January 2021).

[81] Daniels, "How and When Amnesty."

[82] Ibid; Examples of conflict ending types given are: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or going to a low level of conflict intensity.

[83] Memory of the feeling or emotion associated with an event. See: https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/affective_memory; Stockwell, "Individual and collective remembrance;" The study focuses on the post-conflict reconciliation efforts from Argentina's "Process of National Reorganization," or "Proceso"—also called the "Dirty War" (1976-1983) by the military *junta* in power. In this period, the state-sponsored terrorism saw over 30,000 citizens in "the missing," or *desaparecidos* ("the disappeared"). The state was also responsible for the kidnapping of hundreds of children, many born to detained women. For a brief overview, see: https://www.history.com/news/mothers-plaza-de-mayo-disappeared-children-dirty-war-argentina.

> As those who personally experienced suffering have talked of their experiences with others, memory has become a common language through which individuals have been able to articulate and share their traumatic experiences…. Members of particular political and ideological groups have created a shared fabric of a life-world in which remembering their loved ones who were affected by political and State violence is central. The spread of these community-based groups, whereby being a group member means assuming a shared identity and subscribing to a shared group past, has resulted in the "pluralization and problematization [sic] of memory." As the boundaries of memory parallel the boundaries of group identity, there is a sense of competitive victimhood as groups compete for the recognition and legitimization of their memories of victimhood, at the exclusion of others, within collective forms of remembrance.[84]

This observation regarding *collective affective memory* contradicts a contemporary view of post-conflict reconciliation which often leans towards truth commissions. While truth commissions have several characterizations that are dependent on the desired outcome for the community or state, they are generally described as "non-judicial inquiries established to determine the facts, root causes, and societal consequences of past human rights violations [with] focus on the testimony of victims of atrocity."[85]

Regardless of desired outcomes, truth commissions' overarching purpose and practice is to recognize individual and community pain and distress and acknowledge survival with the understanding that such testimony enhances healing. However, a recent study indicates "there is scant evidence to prove that this is true," and the "psychological benefits from participating in these mechanisms of "reparative remembering" may be overstated…." Further, this study's author asserts, "reconciliation efforts, more often than not, have yielded a thin form of coexistence rather than a thicker form of social integration."[86]

Apology is another approach often used in the post-conflict reconciliation process in the belief that community violence survivors find such an action therapeutic. However, a recent Republic of Ireland post-conflict case study suggests "attempted apologies or quasi-apologies by non-state groups may not ameliorate the sense of grievance experienced by victims/survivors, and may also serve to revivify social and political 'framing battles' over the past."[87]

Memorialization of war or conflict is well-researched, but mostly in the context of history and culture and less so as a component of post-conflict reconciliation. A 2007 United States Institute of Peace (USIP) paper defines *memorialization* as "a process that satisfies the desire to honor those who suffered or died during conflict and as a means to examine the past and address contemporary issues" but cautions that memorialization "can either promote social recovery after violent

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[84] Stockwell, "Individual and collective remembrance."
[85] International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), website, "Truth Commissions," https://www.ictj.org/gallery-items/truth-commissions (accessed 4 February 2021). Also see: United Nations, website, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document-category/truth-reconciliation/ (accessed 4 February 2021).
[86] Stockwell, "Individual and collective remembrance ."
[87] Stephen Hopkins, "The Politics of Apology and the Prospects for 'Post-conflict' Reconciliation: The Case of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement," International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 14, Issue 3, Pages 524–543 (November 2020) https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/article-abstract/14/3/524/5897704 (accessed 1 February 2021).

conflict ends or crystallize a sense of victimization, injustice, discrimination, and the desire for revenge."[88]

In summary, the individual and community perspective towards post-conflict reconciliation efforts may be context-dependent. A 2020 study found a key determinant of positive or negative attitudes towards reconciliation is *the symmetry* of the experienced community violence. According to the study:

> The more a community was exposed to events of asymmetric violence, which disproportionately affect one group, the more the support for justice was linked to rejecting reconciliation…. Conversely, in one study, the more a community was exposed to symmetric violence, which affects members of all adversary groups, the more the justice and reconciliation were perceived as compatible.[89]

In other words, when all conflict parties suffered—and caused the suffering to others—then there is more likely a positive view towards reconciliation. When the suffering is unbalanced between conflict parties, then they experience a more negative view towards reconciliation. Understanding affective memory and recognizing the emotions involved can explain this finding.

Recommendations

Practitioners and facilitators of post-conflict reconciliation must recognize the transitional justice processes may not alleviate individual or community trauma as anticipated due to the impact of affective memory and related emotional response. As stated:

> Affective memories assume a powerful presence and can prevent individuals from envisioning a future for themselves in which their individual and their nation's past is safely left behind, contained and fixed in the past…. Affective memories challenge and shed light onto historically silenced versions of remembering and reveal in the process just how impoverished the narratives of "transition," "reconciliation" and "healing" can be for capturing the complexities of everyday life in the aftermath of violence and disappearance. For this very reason, the role of affective memories in creating antagonism or solidarity between communities within transitional democracies needs to be given due attention, as these memories provide a fuller picture of that which will otherwise remain unseen and un-narrated, yet will reanimate and alter individuals' understanding of the past, well into the future.[90]

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 15 February 2021.

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[88] United States Institute of Peace (USIP), "The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional Justice," 1 January 2007, https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/01/ (accessed 5 February 2021).
[89] S. Penić S, J.R. Vollhardt, S. Reicher,"Reconciliation Versus Justice? It Depends on the Context: The Role of Symmetric and Asymmetric Violence in Predicting Postconflict Attitudes," Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2021; 12(2):202-212 (April 2020) https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1948550620915064 (accessed 15 January 2021).
[90] Stockwell, "Individual and collective remembrance."

The Role of Nonviolent Movements; JLLIS ID# 226084

Observation

For a sustainable peace, or even mere conflict resolution, the groundwork for peace and its various processes can and should begin as early in the conflict as practical. Yet, engagement in such efforts traditionally focuses on the armed actors, excluding other valuable contributors to the potential peace process. As Jonathan Pinckney of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), observes in his article for the Conciliation Resources' Accord Issue 29 (September 2020): [91]

> Most peace processes focus on brokering deals between armed actors. However, this often obscures the important role that unarmed groups play in preparing the ground for peace, particularly organisations or movements that engage in nonviolent action or civil resistance to help create an enabling political environment and support sustainability. [92]

The author reinforces the importance of nonviolent movements to sustainable peace with a summary of research, recent case studies, and contemporary data. He reflects on research which: [93]

> found that in the 20th and early 21st centuries, nonviolent movements that sought 'maximalist' goals of bringing down a political regime, ending a military occupation or seceding from an existing state *were more than twice as successful* [emphasis added] in achieving those goals as violent movements, and that countries that had a nonviolent movement were significantly more likely to become democratic and *significantly less likely to experience a civil war in the five years* [emphasis added] following the end of the movement. [94]

He asserts nonviolent movements are normally "combinations of social groups, individuals or formal civil society organisations." They can be *hierarchical structures*, such as those found around political parties, but also *diffuse movements* with no discernable leadership. He points out the "explosion in nonviolent resistance movements recently, in places as disparate as Iraq, Algeria and Chile" to emphasize the need to understand the nonviolent movement phenomenon—and the opportunities and challenges therein. [95]

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[91] Cate Buchanan, ed., Conciliation Resources, "Accord Issue 29: Pioneering Peace Pathways," September 2020, https://www.c-r.org/accord/pioneering-peace-pathways (accessed 30 November 2020).
[92] Jonathan Pinckney, "Setting the Stage for Peace Processes: The Role of Nonviolent Movements," Conciliation Resources, Accord Issue 29, September 2020, https://www.c-r.org/accord/pioneering-peace-pathways/setting-stage-peace-processes-role-nonviolent-movements (accessed 30 November 2020).
[93] The author refers to the research of Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan. See: Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, August 2011), http://cup.columbia.edu/book/why-civil-resistance-works/9780231156820, or TedX2013 at https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/success-nonviolent-civil-resistance/. More recently, David Robson, BBC, analyzed the researchers' "3.5% Rule" which suggests it takes 3.5% of the population to join a nonviolent movement to see lasting change in the issue. See: BBC, "The '3.5% rule': How a small minority can change the world," 13 May 2019, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world.
[94] Pinckney, "Setting the Stage for Peace."
[95] As example, the author highlights the nonviolent revolution in Sudan which removed President Omer al-Bashir in 2019. For a concise summary of this crisis (as of March 2020), see: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), "South Sudan's Transition: Citizens' Perception of Peace," https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/03/south-sudans-transition-citizens-perception-peace.

Discussion

In Pinckney's discussion of the topic, he acknowledges nonviolent movements with "moral or ethical" aspects as promoted by historical luminaries such as Mahatma Gandhi. However, he advocates a practical definition as:

> the exercise of power by unarmed civilians outside formal avenues of politics and without the use or threat of physical violence, using tactics such as public protest, demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. Its core rationale is that structures of power and oppression require the explicit or implicit cooperation of subordinate, often excluded and marginalised actors. Strategic use of nonviolent action is intended to bring about the withdrawal of this cooperation, leading to the downfall of the targeted power structure.[96]

In his research, he categorizes three distinct nonviolent movement activity categories as "especially influential in setting the stage for peace processes" and provides examples of each:[97]

- Mitigating violence. With an expressed aim to protect civilians from violence, these nonviolent movement groups often declare themselves neutral and may remain low-profile but appear to "maintain the social structures that will subsequently facilitate social recovery during later peacebuilding phases." One example includes the various Colombian peace movements of the past several decades.

- Pressuring for peace. According to the author, "Nonviolent movements may also act as a powerful source of pressure for peace" and provides the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace movement as an example. While the movement's impetus was to counter violence towards women, it engaged in inter-religious dialogue as well as a national 'sex strike'. At one point, the movement's participants literally blockaded a building to force peace negotiators to continue until agreement.[98]

- Coordinating with armed movements. The author notes nonviolent movements may have close relationships with armed movements. He describes South Africa's multi-decade anti-apartheid campaign and the African National Congress (ANC) and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, collaboration. He points out the nonviolent aspects expanded in the 1980s to the ultimate success of the struggle—and sustained peace. In comparison, he outlines the 1996–2006 Nepalese civil war and the relationship of the Maoist rebels—armed actors—with nonviolent civil society. In this case:

  > Their combined nonviolent protest against the autocracy of the monarchy, known as the 'Second People's Movement', was able to successfully pressure the king to step down. When the political parties subsequently took power, they initiated a negotiation process with the rebels that resulted in a formal peace agreement, ending Nepal's civil war and initiating a transition to democracy.

He further asserts:

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[96] Pinckney, "Setting the Stage for Peace."
[97] Ibid.
[98] The leader of this movement, Leymah Gbowee, was the 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate. (See: http://leymahrgbowee.com/).

> Even when their [nonviolent movement's] stated priority is mitigating violence, this involves pressure on armed actors to change their behavior. Nonviolent movements can be much better placed to impose this kind of pressure than international actors because of their intimate connections to the core constituencies over which armed actors are competing, and their greater claims to local social and political legitimacy.

Implied in his analysis is any specific nonviolent movement may engage in any one—or all—of these three categories of activities independent of another activity or as part of the movement's evolution.

Recommendations

In Pinckney's recommendations, he offers means to identify nonviolent movement groups and support—or amplify—their efforts. He suggests starting with *existing local peace activism* but cautions "There is no shortcut to intensive study of the local context." Instead, he encourages *cross-contextual comparative research* to determine the existing movements that can leverage peace efforts. He further suggests international support can promote nonviolent movements' aims, reiterating the caution that "international actors should think carefully, informed by robust political analysis, about the long-term consequences of intervention even with nonviolent actors."[99]

In his final recommendation, he observes "Nonviolent movements' connections to grassroots constituencies can help to encourage popular buy-in for peace talks and settlements, raise issues of core concern to the general population, and try to pressure armed actors to stay on track when negotiations threaten to break down" but also notes negotiations may find *diffuse structure* nonviolent movements complicated to include.[100]

The author reemphasizes the necessity to include nonviolent movements in peace process negotiations, regardless of the complexity of such action. He highlights two trends: "the tendency of increased authoritarian repression and shrinking civic space globally...means that the need for nonviolent action is growing" and "the current spike in nonviolent movements shows their potency and potential...[as] many movements that have successfully mobilised huge populations for major change." These trends indicate:[101]

> While nonviolent action may be becoming more common, it is also increasingly likely to face severe repression and be met by violent response. Therefore, closing the gap between nonviolent action and peacemaking is imperative.[102]

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[99] Pinckney, "Setting the Stage for Peace;" The author again refers to Erica Chenoweth's research which apparently "suggests that movements with greater participation by women are more likely both to be successful in achieving their aims and to remain nonviolent." The author's international support example refers to training and education. However, local actors may be suspicious of internationally-funded training and education—as well as externally-funded communications and organizational equipment and infrastructure and other foreign aid. A 2015 interview describes this disconnect: "Funders often speak about the importance of listening to local people. But the funders and the locals have sharply conflicting value systems." See: Washington Post, 4 September 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/04/heres-why-ugandans-resent-some-international-donors-and-aid-groups/. There is also an international aid philosophy that suggests "…by trying to help poor people in developing countries, the rich world may actually be corrupting those nations' governments and slowing their growth." See: World Economic Forum, 23 October 2015, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/does-foreign-aid-always-help-the-poor/.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 20 December 2020

Information and Infrastructure

Digital Infrastructure Investment to Facilitate Stability; JLLIS ID# 227141

Observation

According to many observers, the African continent requires digital infrastructure investment for its long-term economic growth. Okeke, writing for ECDPM, points out: "For too long, African governments, with the support of the international community, have responded to insecurity and conflicts from a reductionist and hard security perspective" and "what is clear is that these initiatives alone will not lead to sustainable peace on the continent." Instead, he suggests infrastructure investment to support a modern global economy:[103]

> With a median age of 19.7, Africa has one of the youngest populations. It also has a mobile phone penetration of almost 100% in key economies such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya. This potential demographic dividend created by digital natives could catalyse the continent's transformation and growth, with the right investments. If Africa is to benefit from the digital economy, investments must be made in the area of reliable energy and internet, data, skills and governance. These critical infrastructures require deliberate actions that would allow Africa to own its technologies and intellectual property rights, and to trade on equal footing with other continents in this age of digital interdependence.[104]

The authors of "Peacekeeping's Digital Economy: The Role of Communication Technologies in Post-conflict Economic Growth" (2018) contend: "Because of the inherent political and economic impacts that missions have…peacekeeping operations should integrate economic impact planning into their deployment processes." Further, that economic impact planning should focus on information communication technologies (ICTs) as "Development studies has recognized the importance of ICTs in economic development, as well as the importance of administrative capacity for establishing business and regulatory standards...." In other words:[105]

> Given what we know about the role of ICTs in economic development, and the increasingly formalized role they play in peacekeeping, we argue that peacekeeping missions can leverage their technology budgets to encourage early stage investment in communications infrastructure that can be used for civilian purposes as well.

Host country long-term economic development is not the only benefit from digital infrastructure investment. The UN's *Digital Tool Kit* (2019) highlights the practical application of digital technologies in mediation and peace agreement in the areas of conflict analysis, engagement with the parties, inclusivity, and strategic communications. Another paper (2020) suggests digital inclusion

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[103] According to its website, "ECDPM is a leading independent think tank that wants to make policies in Europe and Africa work for inclusive and sustainable development." It has offices in Maastricht (the Netherlands) and Brussels (Belgium). Jide Martyns Okeke, "Collective investment in trade and digital infrastructure: A new pathway to silencing the guns in Africa," ECDPM, 8 March 2021, https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/collective-investment-trade-digital-infrastructure-new-pathway-silencing-guns-africa/ (accessed 19 April 2021).

[104] Ibid.

[105] Charles P. Martin-Shields & Nicholas Bodanac, "Peacekeeping's Digital Economy: The Role of Communication Technologies in Post-conflict Economic Growth," 2018, International Peacekeeping, 25:3, 420-445, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1408413 (accessed 16 April 2021).

serves strategic purposes in peacemaking and/or stability. Without the infrastructure in place, none of these processes can be as effective as projected.[106]

Discussion

Charles P. Martin-Shields & Nicholas Bodanac's 2018 paper notes that research "reiterates the need for [intervention] missions to perform deeper economic analysis before and during missions, and a comprehensive discussion about the power missions have as economic actors in host countries." They maintain that intervention forces have a short-term economic impact in the host country, whether positive or negative. Given this expectation, they argue mission planners should deliberately include actions to ensure long-term, positive economic impact. With that view, they emphasize digital infrastructure as the best investment because "as the initial consumer of data and digital services, peace operations and the international organizations behind them can encourage external investment in multi-use technology infrastructure that adds value to the overall economy."[107]

This perspective is especially important as intervention forces anticipate the post-pandemic deployment situations. As example, the African Union (AU) moved its 2016 initiative, "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020" from 2020 to 2030 citing the COVID-19 pandemic impacts as rationale. However, Africa's progress towards "silencing the guns" and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was already mixed. Post-pandemic, some observers anticipate "a contraction of between 3 and 5.4% in GDP" on the African continent, which may reverse any positive achievements towards "silencing the guns."[108]

Digital infrastructure investment may mitigate those reversals by augmenting long-term economic development as well as facilitation of strategic purposes in digital inclusion:

- To build the legitimacy of processes and outcomes by involving a broad range of stakeholders beyond the principal conflict parties.

- To empower women and marginalized groups by providing opportunities for participation in peace processes and political institutions.

- To transform relationships underlying conflict by focusing on the relational dynamics between conflict parties and stakeholders.

- To protect vulnerable groups and reduce the risk of continued violence by enabling early warning and early action.[109]

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[106] United Nations, "Digital Technologies and Mediation in Armed Conflict," Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Centre for Humanitarian, March 2019, www.peacemaker.un.org/digitaltoolkit (accessed 15 April 2021). Andreas T. Hirblinger, "Digital Inclusion in Peacemaking: A Strategic Perspective," The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) Working Paper 14, The Graduate Institute Geneva, February 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339102730_Digital_Inclusion_in_Peacemaking_Summary_of_Findings (accessed 16 April 2021). The author indicates: "By way of definition, the report here suggests that digital inclusion in peacemaking means that the voices of conflict stakeholders are integrated into a peace process in the form of digital data."

[107] Martin-Shields & Bodanac, "Peacekeeping's Digital Economy."

[108] See: https://au.int/en/documents/20200204/african-union-master-roadmap-practical-steps-silence-guns-africa-year-2020-lusaka (accessed 22 April 2021). Désiré Yetsowou Assogbavi, "Will the Restructured African Union meet the Continent's Urgent Challenges?" Accord, 17 February 2021, https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/will-the-restructured-african-union-meet-the-continents-urgent-challenges/ (accessed 19 April 2021). Okeke, "Collective investment in trade."

[109] Hirblinger, "Digital Inclusion in Peacemaking."

Recommendations

Digital infrastructure for inclusion purpose must recognize three interrelated contextual dimensions: technological, socio-cultural, and political. While the term *infrastructure* most closely aligns with the technical dimension (electricity, ICT availability, design, e.g.), the other two dimensions are also important considerations to infrastructure investment. For example, the investment must consider the socio-cultural dimension (i.e., digital literacy, economic limits to technology access, and constrained hierarchies and gender roles reflected in the *off line* communities) to develop the most effective digital infrastructure for the communities it serves. Similarly, the investment must review the political dimension to recognize risks of digital surveillance of users as well as potential restriction of technology by state-elements or conflict parties.[110]

As the UN study asserts, digital infrastructure investment must "first, do no harm," and to that end, the authors offer three practices to "reduce the risk of inadvertently causing harm to the…actors with whom they engage." They include: Digital literacy; Digital safety and security; and Planning and resources.[111]

In summary, digital infrastructure investment offers "both a tactical tool for maintaining security, and a strategic sector that provides unique economic and capital support in post-conflict economies." Therefore, this investment by intervention forces will significantly impact the long-term economic, political and social development of the host country.[112]

Lesson Author: Lorelei Coplen, Lessons Learned Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 22 April 2021

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- PKSOI Lesson Report Partnering (December 2019)
- PKSOI Lesson Report Strategic Planning (September 2019)
- PKSOI Lesson Report Conflict Prevention (June 2019)

[110] Hirblinger, "Digital Inclusion in Peacemaking."
[111] United Nations, "Digital Technologies and Mediation in Armed Conflict."
[112] Martin-Shields & Bodanac, "Peacekeeping's Digital Economy."

- PKSOI Lesson Report SSR and DDR (January 2019)

2018

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