

SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Multinational Operations

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the July 2013 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Multinational Operations**.

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lessons Learned Report](#), and (4) links to [additional reports and other references](#) that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Multinational Operations** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account

in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [<http://pksoi.army.mil>] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [<https://sollims.pksoi.org>] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



Kabul, Afghanistan – German Chancellor Angela Merkel, center, ISAF Commander General Dan McNeill, left, and European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) Brigadier General Schulz, right, meet with the German contingent at Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force. (Photo credit: ISAF, 3 November 2007.)

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the July 2013 edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Lessons Learned “Sampler.” The focus for this edition is on **Multinational Operations**.

“Unity of effort of all components of an operation, as well as cooperation among all relevant bodies in the field, must be established from the beginning of a mission and must be foreseen in the planning process.”

*[Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations](#),
The Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping*

Establishing and sustaining “unity of effort” in **multinational operations** has often been a challenge over the recent years – due to the multiplicity and diversity of national interests, cultures, policies, operating procedures, and resources involved. Common challenges across these operations have included the following:

- National caveats / restrictions on use of forces
- Interoperability of systems
- Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and training standards
- Levels of resources and capabilities
- National interests, priorities, preferences
- Cultural differences
- Information sharing
- Inclusive planning

*[Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations](#),
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA)*

Despite such challenges, **multinational operations** have likewise frequently provided multiple benefits for the overall mission/intervention (as well as for the contributing nations), such as: (1) political credibility and legitimacy from having multiple countries with a unified position on the use of military forces for the given mission; (2) enhanced force levels (troops and police); (3) aggregate resources/assets/systems; (4) new ideas/perspectives on how to confront various problems; (5) an ability to leverage the respective strengths of the nations involved; and (6) increased levels of experience and proficiencies gained through working with multinational partners – for the benefit of future operations.

This Sampler seeks to explore the various challenges, opportunities, and lessons learned from several recent multinational peacekeeping and stability operations. Key take-aways from are captured in the [Conclusion](#) paragraph.

Multinational Operations

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"QUICK LOOK"

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- All interested parties in a peacekeeping situation must work together to develop a **comprehensive approach** when planning and executing peacekeeping and stability operations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- As the United States continues to participate in Peacekeeping and/or Stability Operations (PKSO) in either a unilateral or multilateral effort, establishing a common approach through developing **"unity" throughout the framework** is essential for achieving and sustaining a lasting peace. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Operation **Unified Protector** demonstrated that NATO can be an effective organization for preventing a humanitarian catastrophe – when there is a call for such intervention within its area of interest. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (**MINUSTAH**) is a difficult mission to manage because of post-earthquake issues and the weakness of the host nation. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- An elaborate **mechanism for employment, control, and evaluation** of military forces for multinational peacekeeping operations seems to be lacking in the existing United Nations (UN) structure. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- **U.S. military observers** on United Nations (UN) field missions provide a low-cost, small-footprint means for building partner capacity, enhancing UN/ multinational operations, and inserting a U.S. presence/influence in the area – in coordination with theater engagement activities. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The United States, with respect to both coalition operations and unilateral actions, tends to forget the **lessons learned** from previous conflicts that can be useful for future operations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a "Blue" Force (UN peacekeeping force) and a "Green" Force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are **operating in tandem**. [\[Read More ...\]](#)

1 July 2013

SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED REPORT – Multinational Operations

1. GENERAL

The vast majority of recently conducted peacekeeping and stability operations have been “multinational operations.” These operations are complex in nature – bringing together various military forces, leaders, and their different standards and ways of doing business together under a single command. “Unity of effort” becomes an immediate and continual challenge, as the multinational partners/participants grapple with communication, coordination, synchronization, and situational awareness issues – throughout planning and execution. Such has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, peacekeeping operations across Africa, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations worldwide.

This report provides several current lessons from the SOLLIMS database that accentuate the importance of analyzing the many difficult issues of multi-national operations and then developing appropriate solutions/improvements – for the benefit of future missions/interventions.

2. LESSONS

a. TOPIC. Comprehensive Approach – Bosnia, Kosovo ([1155](#))

Observation.

All interested parties in a peacekeeping situation must work to develop a comprehensive approach when planning and executing peacekeeping and stability operations.

Discussion.

In Bosnia, a comprehensive approach was used and executed successfully. When operating as a company commander in Bosnia on the outskirts of Brcko, it was apparent that the U.S. ambassador there fully understood the culture of the diplomats, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the military. He masterfully brought all parties together to accomplish the overall mission and achieve the desired end-state. The situation was tense during the Brcko arbitration, as well as later during the beginning of the Kosovo campaign. In both cases, not only did we, as

the military arm, bring in all interested parties and worked to incorporate them into the plan, but the ambassador did as well. After initial planning, we consistently held synchronization meetings monthly with all interested parties to ensure we remained on the same sheet of music. This relationship continued throughout my tour and was also passed to the follow-on unit.

To make the most of conducting operations in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment, we must look at the culture of each of the partners, understand how each operates and plans, and include all of them in the original plans. Then, it is imperative to continuously synchronize throughout the operation. Another key factor in ensuring a comprehensive approach is understanding each of the elements' objectives, and then, most importantly, each needs to be willing to compromise on the "way ahead." This will ensure that each stability sector is addressed and that the requisite level of attention is paid to each.

Recommendation.

1. Understand the culture of partners, and understand their objectives.
2. Include all interested parties in the base plan and in subsequent assessments and plans.
3. Be prepared to compromise. This applies not only for the military side, but for the other agencies as well.

Implication

Without a comprehensive approach in planning and execution, peacekeeping and stability operations may take longer than the political will can tolerate.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on personal experiences in the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns. It was developed for U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2219 – Concepts and Principles.



b. TOPIC. Developing a Unified Purpose during Peacekeeping and Stability Operations ([1057](#))

Observation.

As the United States continues to participate in Peacekeeping and/or Stability Operations (PKSO) in either a unilateral or multilateral effort, establishing a common approach through developing "unity" throughout the framework is essential for achieving and sustaining a lasting peace. This common approach crosses the entire spectrum of actors and stakeholders involved in the intervention and incorporates/integrates all efforts to a common end state taking into consideration the needs/inputs from all, including the host nation. Without a common approach, the complex environment makes accomplishing tasks extremely difficult, as there are numerous cultures, values and political objectives brought to the table by the numerous players involved.

Discussion.

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations traditionally involve the intervention of one or more nations in the affairs of failing or failed states in order to restore or emplace systems to develop a stable environment in the Host Nation. For the purpose of this lesson, I will focus on intervening in a failing state through a multilateral approach in order to create a stable environment. To accomplish this, the United States Government (USG) has developed five stability sectors on which it focuses efforts: Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well Being, Governance, and Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Development.

Unfortunately, not all USG agencies, departments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) view the tasks within each of these sectors the same, nor is there a clear understanding or delineation of responsibilities for tasks in a standing prescriptive document laying this out for the USG. The Army's FM 3-07 and ATP 3-07.5 and the U.S. Institute of Peace's (USIP's) Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction are good documents but do not extend outside their organizations in terms of regulatory requirements, making it difficult to establish a "unity of command" and "unity of effort" within the USG Agencies.

Exacerbating this situation is the fact that, in a multilateral effort, the same issues exist. Even in a situation where the United Nations (UN) establishes an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), the operating procedures, constraints and limitations, and cultural and political biases of the member states of the TF make it difficult to achieve a common approach to the mission. Granted, in theory the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is in control and establishes the framework for the operation based on UN guidelines, but members of the team are still tethered to their own national interests and policies. Therefore, it is important at this level to achieve a "unity of purpose"

which aligns all stakeholders within the multilateral coalition towards a common approach for achieving a common agreed upon end state.

So far we have considered only the stakeholders from outside the Host Nation. The most important piece is incorporating the stakeholders within and including the Host Nation itself. As a problem set is considered, too often the intervening forces only look at the issue through their lens rather than considering the perspective of the Host Nation itself. This results in a model where the intervening forces decide what is best for the Host Nation rather than figuring out a “way ahead” through interaction with Host Nation Leaders, institutions, and people to gain a full comprehension of what it is the Host Nation views as its needs. The result of the first model is usually short term gains but long term losses. The reason is because, in this case, the identification of the drivers of instability and the creation of mitigation factors to address them was done without Host Nation input and therefore was done based on an outsider's perspective.

An example of a faulty approach can be illustrated in the Justice and Reconciliation Sector. An approach which totally installs western ideals for what constitutes a crime and the applicable punishment is one that would disregard some of the Host Nation traditions, culture, and values, which in-turn alienates many of the people. Initially, Rule of Law may take hold, but in the long term the system may break down because of the dissatisfaction of those tied to the informal systems. A better approach would be to meet with academics, cultural advisors, local and national leaders, and the judiciary, and establish laws and punishments that incorporate the informal and formal norms. Achieving this "unity of understanding" (the incorporation and inculcation of Host Nation inputs into the framework for stability) is key in achieving a common approach to stability operations.

In summation, the execution of PKSO is a very complex undertaking which involves inputs from various stakeholders. Key to effective and efficient operations is the establishment of a unity of command, effort, purpose and understanding in order to develop an agreed-to common approach for achieving the goals. Unfortunately, the systems for achieving this "unity" are very loosely cobbled together, making unity of command, effort and purpose difficult to achieve. In terms of "unity of understanding," national biases and perspectives of "my way is the right way" make this difficult to achieve. However, a common approach must be achieved to ensure a lasting intervention.

Recommendation.

In order to develop a common approach to PKSO, the following recommendations should be adopted:

1. National Level (United States): Continue to work towards a common doctrine across the Joint and Interagency spectrum of Government (include NGOs in this

process as they are willing to participate). This common doctrine should outline the key framework, roles, responsibilities, common definitions and tasks associated with PKSO in order to set the foundation for common understanding of planning, preparing, and executing of these operations.

2. International: Continue to work towards strengthening the position of the UN in terms of common agreements on the functions and responsibilities of the IMTF and SRSG, and then fully back the decisions made by these entities, keeping stakeholder political influence over TF members to a minimum, allowing for single unity of command. Refine an international doctrine on the planning and synchronizing of PKSO in order to provide a foundation for operations and expectation management in terms of planning systems for multinational interventions.

The above two recommendations provide a basis for unity of command, effort, and purpose. The "unity of understanding" is achieved by ensuring that intervening forces establish connections with a broad spectrum of Host Nation representation, including leaders, academics, and common businessmen and workers. To fully achieve the "unity of understanding," the teams must ensure that they consider culture and values in everything they do, not based on their perspective but on the Host Nation perspective. Also key in this recommendation is being cognizant of the biases within the Host Nation towards certain factions, ensuring that not only those in power are engaged, but also those who have been historically marginalized are engaged as well, in order to establish an unbiased perspective through multiple different inputs. This perspective will allow for better refinement of drivers of instability from a holistic Host Nation perspective, leading to a true integrated mitigation strategy.

Implication

If the recommendations are not adopted, then PKSO will continue to be confused and inefficient, with each different stakeholder approaching the issue and the planning foundation with a different methodology. This situation will cause valuable time to be lost as expectations are unclear. A common approach allows everyone to start from a common foundation in terms of planning and expectation of roles and responsibilities, which makes the process more efficient.

In terms of Host Nation understanding, disregard for Host Nation input for your own ways or ideals sets the condition where the Host nation becomes alienated and less likely to sustain stability, actual drivers of instability (DOIs) are not addressed (instead, perceived DOIs are addressed), and resistance increases in the Host Nation as the people see the PKSO forces as imposing their cultures at the expense of the Host Nation's culture (the PKSO forces become viewed as occupiers rather than there to assist).

Event Description.

This lesson is based on inputs provided in the U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2219 – Concepts and Principles.



c. TOPIC. Preventing Humanitarian Catastrophe: NATO in Libya ([765](#))

Observation.

Operation Unified Protector demonstrated that NATO can be an effective organization for preventing a humanitarian catastrophe – when there is a call for such intervention within its area of interest. Operation Unified Protector also demonstrated the importance of integrating multinational partners into such an operation – whether NATO-led or otherwise.

Discussion.

NATO's Operation Unified Protector prevented an imminent humanitarian catastrophe when Qaddafi's forces threatened to overrun Benghazi in March 2011. This intervention gave rebel forces time and space to better organize themselves and subsequently drive Qaddafi from power. It also gave the Libyan populace the opportunity to take control of its own destiny.

At the start of this crisis, when European leaders considered their options for intervening (for preventing the infliction of mass casualties in Benghazi), they came to the conclusion that the only viable option with the requisite speed and resources was NATO. The European Union was not a credible possibility. An ad hoc coalition, led by either France or the UK, was not viable either; this option was not acceptable to several of the NATO nations that were willing to participate militarily. Although there was significant debate and dissension about making this a NATO operation, its members did agree to commit after ten days of discussion – to enforce an arms embargo by sea, to established a no-fly zone, and to adopt a civilian protection mission.

Partners were critical to NATO's success. The most emphatic voices in favor of NATO leading this effort in Libya were actually not NATO members, but were instead Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Sweden. These three nations wanted to join a NATO-led operation. They already possessed some knowledge of what it would take to participate in a NATO operation. They had previously participated in NATO exercises. Four non-NATO nations – Qatar, the UAE, Morocco, and Jordan – ultimately agreed to participate with the NATO political structure on oversight of the operation. Their participation can be seen

as a dividend of NATO's outreach programs to North Africa and the Middle East – the "Mediterranean Dialogue" and "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative." Notably, although these partners were brought into the operation, NATO did not conduct a "war by committee" – i.e., it did not fall into the trap of being too slow or indecisive through excessive deliberation/compromise.

Several nations with relatively small military contingents soon turned out to be large contributors. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway all contributed significantly to this operation. At one point, Nordic allies were conducting 25% of all the strike sorties – pulling far more weight than what was expected of them.

NATO did not rely solely on military means to execute Operation Unified Protector. Rather, NATO took a "comprehensive approach" throughout the operation. It took deliberate measures to employ and synchronize diplomatic, information, intelligence, military, and economic capabilities. Early on, NATO secured a UN Security Council resolution authorizing its campaign to prevent mass casualties. Then, NATO rapidly moved to sanction regime change, helped train and arm the rebel forces, worked to cut off Qaddafi's access to capital, facilitated defections from the Qaddafi camp, and campaigned to boost international recognition of the Transitional National Council.

On the negative side, NATO wrestled with a number of significant issues and strains. During deliberations leading up to intervention, certain NATO members spoke out against conducting this operation. Others attempted to limit France's role as overall lead nation for NATO in this campaign. Others would not contribute military forces. The U.S. played a major combat role in the early phase of the operation, but then executed a military "hand off" of sorts to the rest of NATO two weeks into the operation. The U.S. did continue to provide Special Forces, intelligence, and other vital "key enablers," however, after the "hand off."

All in all, however, Operation Unified Protector was a success for NATO. NATO prevented a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO provided the vital firepower and support that allowed rebel forces to topple the Qaddafi regime. NATO backed change for Libya for a more secure, participatory, and prosperous future.

Recommendation.

1. Consider NATO (and international coalitions) in the future for prevention of humanitarian catastrophe – if/when imminent – within its area of interest.
2. Incorporate other nations (from outside NATO/the coalition) on operations to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. The benefits from political legitimacy and burden-sharing will generally outweigh the cost of compromise.

3. Incorporate other nations (from outside NATO/the coalition) into peacetime exercises for humanitarian catastrophe prevention, so that lessons can be learned from operating together.

4. Use a comprehensive approach when engaged in the prevention of humanitarian catastrophe.

Implication

If NATO/another international coalition were to intervene in the future on a given humanitarian catastrophe prevention operation without adding/ incorporating other additional willing partners, then NATO/the international coalition would lose an opportunity to strengthen the political legitimacy of intervention as well as lose additional resources/burden-sharing support.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Learning from Libya: The Right Lessons for NATO](#)," by Damon M. Wilson, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 1 Sep 2011.

Comments

A related lesson which discusses challenges, strategies, and necessities for protection of civilians in Africa is SOLLIMS Lesson [697](#).

A related article which assesses the UN Security Council's approach to human protection with regard to crises in Libya and the Ivory Coast is "The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, International Affairs, volume 87, number 4, July 2011. This article can be found on the Chatham House site at: <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/176837>

A related publication on mass atrocity response is the [MARO Handbook](#), "Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook," Harvard Kennedy School and PKSOI, 2010.

Information on NATO's "Mediterranean Dialogue" is available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm

Information on NATO's "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative" is available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm



d. TOPIC. Observations from the MINUSTAH Visit by Challenges Forum Project ([940](#))

Observation.

[United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti](#) (MINUSTAH) is a difficult mission to manage because of post earthquake issues and the weakness of the host nation. The mission is still in a post earthquake situation, and the mission realizes it needs to change.

- Strategic Action Group existed before the earthquake and has not been reconstituted, but several Challenges Forum Project team members thought it should be.

- Strategic Planning Group also needs to be reestablished so that the mission can move out from crisis management even though Haiti tends to be in crisis.

Standard UN structure and approach are not optimized for a mission like MINUSTAH. The mission does not fit into the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations Division (UNDPKO) framework like Congo or Sudan, and therefore mutual understanding between the mission and New York is a challenge. There is lack of understanding of development. UNDPKO has a "reporting violations culture" and not an "engagement and fix issues culture." The peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus has been identified as an issue.

Development and peacebuilding are key, and there was a desire among the mission's leadership for the mandate to be more specific in this area to provide more political leverage for MINUSTAH.

It was stated to the Challenges Forum Project team that many of the people in Haiti resent the mission because they believe that it is their money that is paying for the mission. It was not apparent to the team if there was any counter information campaign being conducted by MINUSTAH to deal with this disinformation.

Discussion.

Senior Command and Control:

a. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) seems to be the point of coordination for the mission and therefore structurally the point of weakness. The majority of SRSG's time is spent in the political world, dealing with the Security Council and future of the mission; the rest is spent sorting out discipline and disputes among various stakeholders and attending to visitors. The political processes are key to the success of the mission, and therefore it is appropriate that the SRSG focus a great deal of his efforts on them. Is the UN

asking too much of an SRSG to also manage in detail a complex mission that deals with integrating the entire UN family?

b. Need to reconsider the standard structure of a mission and evaluate if one "uber" Deputy SRSG to manage the mission is needed. The Chief of Staff (COS) does not seem to have the power to do so.

c. Need to establish a viable dialogue with the UN HQ.

i. Some recommend that prior knowledge and experience in the UN HQ is a positive for selection to senior mission leader. Guy for Syria, Cammaert in Congo, etc.

ii. Also, with the type of mission being peacebuilding, the mission needs to deal with the larger UN family beyond DPKO. Can UNDPKO be the coordinator and integrator in New York? The mission in Haiti stated that there are budget problems between UNDPKO and the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) when it comes to this mission. Need to evaluate to what extent integration is occurring in New York in support of deployed missions

Relationships between the different mission components:

a. Processes and procedures must be developed. There is no training or standards for a functioning Joint Operations Center (JOC). Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) education and training has been established by some peacekeeping training centers but there is a need to look at the entire management of a mission and consider if a mission handbook is needed beyond the current start-up guide. JMAC and JOC organizations have been established by individuals who know how something like them works, but there is no institutional UN-wide approach. No guidance on how to achieve a Common Operating Picture.

i. The Mission Project Center (MPC) is active in coordinating all of the projects, to include those of the country team. But this is a project-oriented approach. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are still used by Civil Affairs and others, but the MPC is trying to manage all projects in one place. Not sure how many of the QIPs Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) bring with them and how they are linked into the MPC, although it was stated that TCC QIPs are attempted to be included. In October, the SRSG established the strategic economic and development priorities to assist this process. A project-oriented approach does not mix well with the operational-oriented approach of military and security forces. Question is, what is the relationship between MPC and JOC or the U5 (Plans officer) in the planning process to achieve operational outcomes? This is the challenge of the peacekeeping mission orientation in a peacebuilding context. The JOC does get informed from the Project Implementation Tasking Center

(PITC) when the project is executed in that they have to issue a frag order to the engineer company to execute.

ii. Issue is linkage between projects, civil affairs, operational missions, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and bilateral development.

b. The state of military-police cooperation and interoperability is progressing in that Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other established procedures have produced successful combined operations. But what is the linkage to rest of mission? There were indications that the civil side of the mission was not tightly linked to military and police actions.

c. Civilian cooperation with other components is a question. There was civil military divide, with each side stating they are misunderstood by the other.

d. Helicopter hours seem to be solved in this mission by monthly allocation.

e. Integrated planning is a hope but not reality. There is a problem with consolidation planning in getting all parts of the mission to agree to downsize and have a common understanding. Also, there are cultural issues as to what integration means, as well as personality issues.

i. Example is dependency that has developed. Logistical support to elections: What is the plan to support elections when the UN leaves? Haiti has no heavy engineer equipment that the UN brings.

ii. No master consolidation plan; each section developed its own plan and now has to collaborate.

iii. Focus has been on cuts to satisfy the UN and not on outcomes.

iv. The SRSG must force the process.

v. Transition/consolidation planning is difficult when the mission itself must decide to eliminate positions. The very planners may need to eliminate their own jobs. Civil side pushes back on these decisions. Should an external agency be tasked with this? UNDPKO believes that planning for transition when the mission is established is the answer – as happened with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) – but this does not solve the problem for longstanding missions.

Information based decision-making:

a. JMAC products get mixed results. Some elements – particularly military elements – did not think they were acceptable, while other/civil elements found

them satisfactory. Unable to assess the JMAC's products in that the team could not get a copy of their products.

b. JOC is not functional. Execution is decentralized as is the knowledge of what is going on. Might want to consider a permanent job / civil position to run the JOC.

c. There are different email systems and servers in the mission, which does not encourage information sharing. U5 (Plans officer) stated there were three different Knowledge Management systems.

d. Different cultural approaches toward sharing information. Integration, in this instance, means doing your own plan and operation and then coordinating with others, and not conducting a joint approach from the start across agencies.

e. Many believe that the weekly meetings satisfy information-sharing.

f. Separate components report separately. JMAC, Political Officer, Mission Commander, etc.

g. Integrated Strategic Framework has been developed and is used, as is the JMAC-created Estimate for Consolidation Task Force (covering next five years).

h. Political Affairs section is the key reporting agency to New York and must bring all the strings together. The Challenges Forum Project team did not observe how this works.

Coordination and cooperation:

a. Within the UN family, "humanitarian space" is a constant problem. Disaster response and development need to have better coordination and dividing lines. UNDP and UNDPKO have tensions. Different funding between MINUSTAH and the country team is a problem. Civil Affairs (CA) states that they are the coordinator of all actions in theater, but this creates problems with the military and police. CA chairs coordination meetings with the UN police and military and tries to educate them according to the CA concept. CA chairs state that the CA regional coordinators know the culture and the people and therefore are the logical people to coordinate. In fact, police and military sometimes try to ignore the regional coordinators.

i. Integration between UNDP and UNDPKO with focus on this mission (MINUSTAH) was rejected in New York. An attempt at the senior level to integrate was rejected. (Need more data on this.)

ii. It is difficult to get local/Haitian initiatives accepted in New York, given this is not the high priority mission for New York.

b. With non-UN actors (TCCs, main bilateral actors/donors), the SRSG (vice MINUSTAH) is the main contact for projects with friends/communities of Haiti. TCCs' concepts of what the QIPs and units should be doing do not always match what the MINUSTAH vision is.

Current state of affairs of the mission:

a. Problems getting correct people assigned.

i. For the United Nations Police (UNPOL), Formed Police Units (FPU), etc., getting the best and the most committed with initiative is a challenge. Initiative is an issue, as many look at this as a short-term engagement to just do the minimum.

ii. Issue of balance among national contributions can get in the way of expertise.

b. Budget issues coming from different places – DFS, UNDPKO, and voluntary funds – are a problem. For example, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has a different calendar, budget, and timeline than MINUSTAH.

c. Economic development is not listed as part of the mandate, and the SRSG believes this gives him less leverage up and down the line.

d. FPU issues as to:

i. Missions inside of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps are not considered proper missions by the UNPOL and FPU.

ii. Capability.

iii. Costs.

iv. Coordination.

e. Joint Planning with police lead has happened with Haitian National Police (HNP); this is successful and supported by SOP. Police have a limited planning capability and depend on others in the mission to assist. This can have implications if the UN contemplates a police-heavy mission with no military.

f. Red Cards. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has limited what the military can do. For example, the MOU has prevented the military from guarding IDP camps. Also, countries are hesitant to engage in any drug-related operation.

g. JOC study and new JOC exercise in December 2012 to sort our issues.

Relationship with the host government:

- a. Key is to show the locals a civil face and not a military face. So, an increase of police and a decrease of military are necessary, but the mission feels that the military is better organized and displayed than the police. Never know who you get with the police.
- b. Focus on police, but what about all the private security forces?
- c. Attitudes of locals toward the mission are not always supportive, but not sure what the mission has been doing to address this.

Training and Preparation:

- a. Protection of Civilians (POC) and Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) are issues.
- b. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has held Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HADR) exercises each year to sort out responses.
- c. Need training on JOC functions. Integrated Training Service (ITS) has made this known to PKSOI separately.
- d. Different levels of experience. Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Captains from different countries have greatly different expertise and responsibilities in their TCCs. This disparity becomes a diplomatic and interpersonal challenge. How do you sort this out when one officer replaces another and assumes the portfolio?
- e. No team building exercises were conducted because there was too little time and too much to do (although this needs to be verified).
- f. Language is a training issue, and there are limited Creole translators – maybe one per unit.
- g. Police focus is more on response than long-term planning. This will have implications for future missions in the UN if there is no military component to assist.
- h. Question on in-country training. Most say there is no time to do this beyond the induction training. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for FPU and police were removed to save money. FPU need in-country training even though they are supposed to be ready.
- i. There is a question on the adequacy of the doctrine for police.

Recommendation.

UN needs to review its concept of integrated missions based on the Challenges Forum Project survey. In this essentially peacebuilding mission, there needs to be a deputy for the entire mission to manage the actions of all the parts of the mission.

Implications.

UN missions may begin to resemble Haiti in the future as more assume peacebuilding mandates. The recommendation above should assist them.

Event Description.

The Challenges Command and Control (C2) Research Project involved a Preliminary Phase, which entailed the commissioning by the French Ministry of Defence (DAS) of a study on “Direction, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” designed to kick-start the discussion on the issue. The study was shared with a number of advisers, including the Challenges Partners, for comments and feedback. Also, an expert seminar was organized in New York by the International Peace Institute (IPI) and DAS, in conjunction with the UNDPKO's Division for Policy, Education and Training (DPET), to disseminate key findings from the UNDPKO'S Department for Field Support (DFS) internal evaluation on C2 as a basis for discussion with Member States and other key partners. Part of a conference planned for 24-25 October 2013 in Berlin, organized jointly by IPI and the "Zentrum fuer Internationale Friedens-einsaetze" (ZIF), with DAS support, will further explore the command and control framework and its dilemmas with European stakeholders.

Building on the work already undertaken above, the Challenges C2 Research Project will entail, firstly, ensuring better understanding of current UN C2 arrangements through continued dissemination and discussion of the findings of the UNDPKO DFS Evaluation and further discussion of factors affecting the full and effective implementation of these C2 arrangements. Providing a comparative viewpoint of C2 arrangements across all major peacekeeping providers would also be useful – with Challenges Partners, relevant experts from regional organizations, and other key actors. Therefore, and after extensive discussion among Challenges Partners during their meeting in May 2012 in Geneva at the Challenges Annual Forum 2012, it was agreed that the “Challenges C2 Research Project” could consist of three main elements:

(1) Regional and Member States' perspectives: Some Partners could commission short policy papers of no more than 10 pages to give the perspective of their Member State (on UN C2) or of their regional organization (on their C2 mechanism).

(2) Cross-cutting issues: Other Partners could look at or commission short studies on different topics that a C2 mechanism has to tackle, such as: intelligence and information; the structures of control (communications, intelligence, logistics); the triangular cooperation between the TCCs, the Secretariat, and the Council; the caveats; the relationships between TCCs in the field; the transition arrangements between a UN operation and the operation of a regional organization; the relationships between the military and the police; the relationships between the UN HQ and the Field HQ; contingency planning; etc.

(3) Case studies: Some Partners could do field missions around the issue of C2 in key Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and try to draw lessons from some crisis. In that regard, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) would be a good case to study (with the background of the Kivu crisis). The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) could be another case (in relation to what happened in the crisis of Spring 2011). Additionally, MINUSTAH (which has a significant military and police component and is of particular interest to Challenges Latin American Partners) would also be a good case for further study.



e. TOPIC. Employment, Control, and Evaluation of Forces for Multinational Peacekeeping Operations ([1171](#))

Observation.

An elaborate mechanism for employment, control, and evaluation of military forces for multinational peacekeeping operations seems to be lacking in the existing United Nations (UN) structure. Peacekeeping continues to remain as one of the fundamental tasks of the UN. It has long been understood that international security needs diplomacy and arbitration, backed by a multinational military force to keep the peace and to also counter aggressors. The complexity of today's multinational peacekeeping forces, with various organizational and operational anomalies, requires continuous attention and evaluation.

Discussion.

The UN was essentially created to prevent wars and promote peace. Creation of international stability, rule of law, and economic freedom and opportunity based on stable markets and financial institutions have been a few fundamental goals. It has been understood that international security needed diplomacy and arbitration, backed by military force to counter aggressors, and therefore the UN turned out to be markedly different from the earlier effort, i.e., the "League of Nations." The awareness that international security needed to be backed by

international economic support resulted in interconnected world institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and further augmented by the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, although the UN called for a permanent task force to provide for its "military arm," this task force (the military staff committee) continues to be a fairly lame arm, ostensibly due to the earlier role played by the former Soviet Union. The military staff committee within the UN continues to be a sub-organization with not many contributions to its credit.

The UN is essentially a linear organization, wherein various parallel sub-secretariats complement each other, while the UN Security Council (UNSC) retains a predominant role. All peacekeeping functions are not mandated to the military staff committee and are thus managed through an ad-hoc arrangement. A Lieutenant General who advises the UN Secretary-General oversees these functions, which include all relevant aspects, such as deployment, training, and logistics to support operations around the world. Analytical sections like the Joint Mission Assessment Cell carry out the strategic assessment of the situation before a decision to deploy peacekeeping forces to any country is arrived at. The last five years have seen a few changes in the structure of UN which has improved its functioning in this regard. The creation of the Peacebuilding Support Office under the UNSC has enabled the UN to carry out transition, which had earlier been identified as a persistent problem.

Some of the recent studies and reports have addressed various anomalies in the UN's operations and have resulted in streamlined procedures. The Brahimi Report called for clear, strong, and sustained political support. Strengthening of the "political arm" was considered vital for successful functioning of the UN. After strong political will to support any UN mandate, it was deemed essential that the UN's intervention be backed by the fundamental ability to project a credible multinational force. The report made the point that adequate means were required to ensure availability of a reliable enforcement mechanism, as well as an evaluation mechanism. Additionally, sharing of logistic resources across the globe, instead of creating resources afresh for every operation, was another new idea presented as likely to improve peacekeeping efficiency.

While deciding upon UN engagement, the strategic assessment includes evaluation of threats to peace and security, regional or sub-regional help/support, existence of ceasefire or peace process, safety of UN personnel, and availability of political will to ensure a UN mandate. The Integrated Strategic Framework provides a simultaneous process to assess all relevant details. While authorizing [UN engagement in Mali](#) and utilizing this framework, the UN decided on an inter-mission cooperative arrangement so that troops employed in other UN missions could be diverted to Mali. This provided the UN much needed flexibility, as it does not have a standing headquarters or forces readily available to be deployed in any emergency. Such inter-mission cooperative arrangements are likely to reduce the deployment time when addressing emerging crisis situations.

Recommendation.

1. Inter-mission cooperative arrangements (such as planned for Mali) need to sort out a smooth mechanism for continuing parallel operations by different forces, when present – e.g., the [African-led International Support Mission in Mali \(AFISMA\)](#) and French forces – until the transition to the UN force is completed.
2. While there has been a consistent effort towards improving the performance of the UN, there is yet a need for an integral evaluation mechanism, which should address various organizational and operational anomalies. The Trustee Council is one organ which is grossly underutilized in the existing environment that could become involved, whereas the military staff committee, in view of the enormity of the task, could also be augmented to meet this and other challenges.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the assigned readings and classroom discussion for U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2219 – Concepts and Principles.



f. TOPIC. U.S. Military Observers on United Nations Field Missions ([777](#))

Observation.

U.S. military observers on United Nations (UN) field missions provide a low-cost, small-footprint means for building partner capacity, enhancing UN/ multi-national operations, and inserting a U.S. presence/influence in the area – in coordination with theater engagement activities.

Discussion.

U.S. national security strategy calls for strengthening U.S. engagement in UN peacekeeping. U.S. involvement in UN field missions had been on the decline since 9/11, with the numbers of U.S. "military observers" decreasing from 36 in 2000 to only 8 in 2009 (Source: *UN Year in Review, 2000-2009*, accessed through <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/publications.shtml>). Military observers are those U.S. military personnel deployed in support of UN field missions – per memorandum of understanding between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Military observers fall under the purview of the U.S. Military Observer Group – Washington (USMOG-W), located within the Army G-3/5/7, which exercises Joint command authority over U.S. military observer teams serving on

UN missions – implementing DoD policy with regard to personnel, logistics, administration, force protection, and operations.

U.S. military observers attend a 3-week pre-deployment training course at Quantico, Virginia – which primarily covers force protection training, weapons qualification, tactical survival skills, first aid training, and emergency procedures, but also provides a degree of mission-related training (i.e., UN military observer mission training and country-specific information/orientation). Upon deployment to the UN field mission, U.S. military observers perform functions that are similar to special operations / security force assistance, civil affairs, or military attaché work (or combination thereof). The Senior U.S. Military Observers (SUSMOs) typically serve as primary staff officers within UN/multinational force headquarters, where they assess and advise on UN operations, work to enhance UN mission success, and additionally further U.S. and UN/international political-military interests.

Over the past several years, U.S. military observer teams have participated in UN/multinational peacekeeping missions in Chad, Darfur, Egypt & Israel, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, and Liberia. On these low-cost, small-footprint missions, U.S. military observers have demonstrated high value in many regards:

- They directly demonstrated the commitment of the United States to those UN/multinational missions – endorsing the legitimacy of those missions and encouraging the participation of other nations on those missions.

- They enhanced America's international standing and image. As these U.S. military observers interacted with the military, police, and civilian staff members from other contributing nations (of which there are oftentimes 20-50 other nations represented), they helped shape the perceptions of those individuals/nations of the United States. They have done so in a positive manner through their professionalism and many contributions, as well as through their receptiveness to the thoughts & actions of other nations' staff members.

- They informally acted as reference points for both the Department of Defense and the U.S. Country Team, providing "ground truth" and a better understanding of the situation where the operations were taking place. They sometimes made introductions and opened doors for other U.S. Government representatives needing access to the areas and communities.

- They acted as strategic and operational "enablers" – enabling/facilitating more contributions from other players – such as U.S. Country Team members, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives, UN Mission members, and various U.S. experts in fields ranging from engineering to public works.

- They helped raise the effectiveness of UN military operations – through the expertise and experiences they previously gained while working in their specific military specialty or on other deployments.

- They obtained first-hand knowledge and insights about UN/multinational operations – that could greatly benefit U.S. preparations for, and participation in, future UN/multinational operations.

Recommendation.

The author of the article upon which this lesson is based (see “Event Description” paragraph below) provides the following recommendations:

1. Expand the U.S. military observer program at least twofold, improve visibility of this program at the department/agency level (including Department of State and USAID), and improve visibility of this program in joint doctrine ([JP 3-07 Stability Operations](#), [JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations](#), and the [Capstone Concept for Joint Operations](#)).
2. Continue to improve Combatant Command (COCOM) awareness of U.S. military observer presence and operations in their areas of responsibility.
3. Consider placing the U.S. Military Observer Group (USMOG) under a joint command structure rather than under Army G-3/5/7.
4. Provide more mission-related training to U.S. military observers (e.g., training on UN peacekeeping, UN military observer operations, U.S. interests in the region, working with the U.S. Country Team, cultural awareness, and UN rules of engagement) during pre-deployment.
5. Continue with one-year length of duty tours for U.S. military observers. Revise [DoD Directive 2065.1E](#) (Assignment of Personnel to United Nations Missions) accordingly.
6. Capture the UN/multinational experiences of U.S. military personnel and add this information to personnel records and to lessons learned databases; consider such experienced personnel for filling future UN/multinational/partnership-building assignments at the more senior levels.
7. Conduct deliberate, substantial end-of-tour debriefings of all U.S. military observers back from UN field mission work.

Implications.

If the Department of Defense does not increase numbers of U.S. military observers on UN field missions, then it will miss out on low-cost, high-value

opportunities to build partnership capacity and to advance U.S. national security objectives. If substantial end-of-tour debriefings of U.S. military observers are not conducted, and if lessons are not documented and stored in accessible databases [such as the Stability Operations & Lessons Learned Information Management System ([SOLLIMS](#))], then other U.S. military personnel deploying on future UN/multinational operations will not be able to benefit from those experiences.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement," by Christopher Holshek, Small Wars Journal, 10 February 2011. The article is available from [Small Wars Journal](#) per the Creative Common License at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/673-holshek.pdf>

Comments.

A related report, which recommends that DoD and the Department of State place increased numbers of U.S. staff officers into UN mission staffs as a low-cost, high pay-off strategy, is "U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation," by Citizens for Global Solutions, 12 Oct 2011. This report is available at: <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>

A related report, which calls for the United States to pursue new partnerships with nations in Africa and to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives, relying on advisory capabilities, is the [2012 Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense](#), 5 January 2012.

A related article, which advocates placing more U.S. personnel in UN headquarters and UN peacekeeping operations in the field – to provide much needed expertise to the UN, to offer key links back to the Pentagon, and to encourage other troop-contributing nations to participate – is "[Enhancing U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping](#)," by Nancy Soderberg, PRISM 2, No. 2.



g. TOPIC. Post-Conflict Lessons Learned – Iraq, Afghanistan ([1081](#))

Observation.

The United States, with respect to both coalition operations and unilateral actions, tends to forget the lessons learned from previous conflicts that can be useful for future operations. The most recent example has been our relearning

counterinsurgency warfare, although from the French and Indian War through the Philippines and Vietnam, we should have plenty of institutional expertise in how to defeat an insurgency. We seem to be heading in the same direction post Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as we shift our focus from stability operations to the Prevent/Shape/Win doctrine.

Discussion.

The single most important lesson learned for me from Iraq and Afghanistan regarding post-conflict development has been to understand the context. The United States and by extension the U.S. Armed Forces tend to look at all problems through the liberal democracy lenses. Because we, our allies, and some countries that we have engaged in post-conflict reconstruction have been so successful in a liberal democracy, free market framework, we have a hard time understanding that the system is both a western model and one that takes generations to mature. Installing representative government in a fragile or failing state is highly unpredictable, and the results will be uncertain at best. Our track record has not been good.

Ideally, we would want to understand the context of the state we are going to endeavor to reconstruct post-conflict before we begin the process, although that is often a luxury we can't afford. Understanding the actors, whether internal or external, and their identities is critical. Because of lack of cultural awareness for foreign societies, we often don't have a good idea of the history and cultural baggage that needs to be considered in developing institutions in a state. And, because we are a state whose nation is not based on religion or ethnicity, but a shared identification of our founding documents, we have problems understanding how ethnicity and culture play a role in determining what the national identity is. Some strategies that we have developed in the last decade to help us with that – like Human Terrain Teams (HTT), culture and language training programs, and the Foundry intelligence program – should be retained so that we keep those skills at least in a warm status as we withdraw from our last big contingency operation in Afghanistan.

Although our latest Defense Planning Guidance states we are not going to get involved in large nation-building efforts in the near future, the future is uncertain and we may be called to assist in smaller-scale efforts as part of UN peace and stability missions, or partnered with our other allies. Maintaining our ability to conduct stability operations is important and we (the Army) must maintain that skill set. Other than keeping some of the structures as I've previously mentioned, we must include stability tasks in all our collective training opportunities, but especially at our elite maneuver training centers, such as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the National Training Center (NTC). There have been recent developments to go back to the large maneuver-centric exercises that helped us decisively defeat Saddam Hussein's armies twice. These same training centers, however, came up short on training us to conduct the stability

tasks that ultimately proved more decisive after major ground operations were concluded. We must not let the pendulum swing too far back to the early nineties.

The Combatant Commanders are also critical in the process of preparing for future uncertainties. Including stability tasks in all Theater Strategies and Contingency Plans is critical. Phase V (transition to civil authority) planning and exercising those plans must be sustained.

Recommendation.

1. Include stability tasks in all collective training. The Army's training centers should not "throw out the baby with the bath water" as they pivot to decisive operations. Offense, defense, and stability tasks need to be included in all Army training opportunities.
2. Maintain funding for the language and cultural awareness programs developed for Iraq and Afghanistan. The Foundry intelligence program, Human Terrain Teams, language immersion programs and others have a role in future missions such as the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept.
3. Through the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) process, ensure that Combatant Commanders are including stability tasks in all Theater Strategies and Contingency Plans.
4. Include stability operations and robust inter-agency participation in all Joint exercises.

Implications.

We risk having to relearn the same lessons learned from OEF and OIF on future battlefields if we don't, as an institution, retain this knowledge and apply it to future training events.

Event Description.

This lesson has been developed for the U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2206 – International Development.



h. TOPIC. “Blue” and “Green” Forces Operating in Tandem ([1193](#))

Observation.

Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a “Blue” Force (UN peacekeeping force) and a “Green” Force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are operating in tandem. Various operations have shown that if/when these two forces are not aligned under one command, their operations must be planned, coordinated, and synchronized through other means.

Discussion.

The following operations are illustrative of “Blue” and “Green” forces operating in tandem.

Darfur/Sudan. The African Union-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) involved “Blue” and “Green” elements operating together as a hybrid force, beginning 31 July 2007. UNAMID was set up to be a 26,000-strong peacekeeping force – deployed and commanded jointly by the UN and the African Union (AU) and assigned the mission to protect civilians and support the peace process. However, UNAMID proved powerless to provide security and protect civilians during its early years, 2007-2010. This hybrid force was frequently targeted by rebels/militias – particularly the Janjaweed – and its operations were also severely restricted by the Government of Sudan. UNAMID’s greatest deficiencies were limited mobility (due to lack of aircraft), poor logistics capacity, and weak command and control. Its peak strength reached only 18,969 – kept low because the Government of Sudan repeatedly rejected offers from certain countries to contribute troops to UNAMID. At the outset of UNAMID’s formation [essentially a transition of forces from the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) into UNAMID], no mission analysis was conducted, no courses of action were developed/analyzed, no task organization was conducted, and no training was provided for the new missions/tasks. The UN and AU should have planned, organized, and prepared UNAMID personnel according to the mission/tasks, threats, terrain, troops available, time, and host nation factors. Likewise, the UN and AU failed to establish an efficient operations center, had no means to gather information or develop threat assessments, lacked capacity and will to establish/enforce “humanitarian corridors” to facilitate delivery of aid to camps/settlements, and did not prioritize areas for civilian protection – all to the detriment of the mission. (References 1-6)

Sierra Leone. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was deployed in July 1998 to support the return of the democratically-elected government of Sierra Leone. Its tasks included: monitoring the security situation, monitoring disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, and monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),

had already been operating in Sierra Leone, and it was newly tasked to establish security in the country by flushing out the remnants of the [AFRC/RUF](#) rebel groups and to conduct disarmament and demobilization. However, in December 1998, the rebel alliance launched an offensive to retake Freetown and in January 1999 overran most of the city. This led to the evacuation of most UNOMSIL personnel to Conakry, Guinea. Later in January, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and facilitated the return of the civilian government, while the rebels repositioned into the surrounding countryside. Throughout 1998-1999, cooperation between UNOMSIL and ECOMOG was hampered by the lack of standing coordination and liaison mechanisms, which were never put into place. In October 1999, UNOMSIL was succeeded by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was mandated to assist in implementing the newly established Lome Peace Agreement and its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) plan. Several ECOMOG units were “re-hatted” under the new UN force (UNAMSIL); however, they did not receive any training on UNAMSIL’s mandate or tasks, nor did they receive training on UN Rules of Engagement (ROE). UNAMSIL was formed with no information-gathering or intelligence capabilities, and, resultantly, was taken by surprise by another rebel offensive in May 2000. Fortunately, decisive action was taken to counter the rebels’ gains. In July 2000, India’s contingent launched Operation Khukri to break an RUF siege of Kailahun, where 222 UN troops were essentially held hostage. Then, in August 2000, British forces likewise quickly intervened in response to another hostage situation involving 11 soldiers – defeating a rebel faction called the West Side Boys. By taking decisive action with overwhelming force, this response had the psychological effect of signaling to other rebel groups that the British forces possessed superior firepower and were ready and willing to use it. Sierra Leone's 10-year conflict soon came to an end. (References 5-9)

Haiti. On 14 January 2000, two days after Haiti’s devastating earthquake, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTCOM) established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). From the outset, JTF-Haiti’s leaders and planners worked alongside various counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), focusing on creating a safe and secure environment. Staffs came together and ensured that both organizations’ priorities and workloads were closely aligned. JTF-Haiti's "Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center" proved to be the key node for facilitating this coordination, as well as collaboration between JTF-Haiti, the UN, and partners. This JTF-Haiti coordination center closely tracked and synchronized the efforts of JTF-Haiti, MINUSTAH forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It was manned by 30 military personnel, including one general officer. This center, and the bulk of JTF-Haiti, operated on unclassified information systems and used commercially available programs/tools to build a humanitarian assistance Common Operating Picture (COP) – allowing current situational

awareness for all partners/participants. Additionally, JTF-Haiti and MINUSTAH provided liaison officers across other levels of their organizations – facilitating extensive coordination and unity of effort. JTF-Haiti also worked closely with the UN’s “Coordinating Support Committee” in Haiti (involving host nation ministers and humanitarian agencies) and helped to streamline coordination procedures – whereby requirements could be raised, validated, and quickly passed to the appropriate organizations. In the first few weeks of relief operations, the greatest challenges raised by the Haitian government involved managing, protecting, and providing aid and services for the vast number (over two million) internally displaced persons (IDPs) – especially for those who settled in areas that were prone to flooding. To address this complex problem, JTF-Haiti and USAID worked closely with the UN and the Haitian government to develop and execute a comprehensive IDP strategy. (References 10-12)

Recommendation.

1. Mission/Command. When a “Blue” Force and “Green” Force are deployed to the same area, an effective liaison mechanism needs to be created – to ensure coordination across all levels and synchronization of priorities and actions. The creation of a Joint Operations Center (comprised of military and civilian staff from both organizations) is recommended, as well as the exchange of liaison officers across their organizations. Leaders should decide upon roles, responsibilities, authorities, priorities, and division of labor between the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force.

2. Planning. Recommend the UN refrain from any hasty establishment of peacekeeping forces (such as the way it quickly established UNAMID out of AMIS, and UNAMSIL out of ECOMOG). The UN should instead plan and tailor forces according to the mission, threat groups, terrain considerations, troops available, time, and host nation factors. It should conduct integrated planning with any regional organization (or nation) providing a “Green” Force to work in tandem with the “Blue” Force. They should plan together for the management of IDPs. (Reference 13)

3. Structure/Restructure. Placing units from a “Green” Force (regional force) under a “Blue” Force should not be undertaken unless leaders deem this necessary. Significant problems are likely to arise when units serving under a regional command structure with a different mandate and rules are “re-hatted” and need to adjust/conform to the UN’s mandate, rules, and standards.

4. Training. Mission-specific pre-deployment training should include the following topics: mandate/mission, background to the conflict, current security environment, ROE, Standard Operating Procedures, Code of Conduct, personal behavior, cultural training, crowd control techniques, Protection of Civilians, route/convoy security, and integrated planning/operations.

5. Intelligence/Information. A military information cell should be established within the “Blue” Force headquarters (in the Joint Operations Center) – to serve as the focal point for receiving information/reports on threats and for conducting analysis. The Joint Operations Center should build the COP to enable common situational awareness. “Blue” and “Green” forces should utilize an information-sharing system such as [SOLLIMS](#) for collaboration. (Reference 14)

6. Use of Force. A “Green” Force in support of a UN peacekeeping mandate has proven to be an effective deterrent to “spoilers” of the peace – particularly if/when the UN mission itself lacks such a deterrent capability. The “Green” Force assigned this role must be credible and capable of robust enforcement action. It needs to plan/act in close cooperation with the “Blue” Force.

7. Humanitarian Assistance. The UN should continue the practice of establishing a Coordination Support Committee (host nation government, UN, and humanitarian agency leaders) and should include “Green” Force participation at committee meetings. “Humanitarian corridors” should be established and enforced – covering the main routes that humanitarian relief agencies use for delivery of aid to major sites/camps/settlements, as well as covering the primary routes that IDPs traverse. These corridors/routes need to be cleared of interference from threat groups.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the following **REFERENCES:**

- (1) [“Darfur: An Experiment in African Peacekeeping,”](#) by Michael Fleshman, Africa Renewal, December 2010.
- (2) [“Humanitarian and Social Welfare: UN Challenges in Darfur,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 679.
- (3) [“Neglecting Darfur,”](#) by Omer Ismail and Laura Jones, Enough, 13 September 2010.
- (4) [“UNAMID Background,”](#) [UNAMID – African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.](#)
- (5) [“Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 697.
- (6) [“Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,”](#) by Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010.
- (7) [“Sierra Leone – UNOMSIL – Background,”](#) [UNOMSIL](#), July 1998 - October 1999.

- (8) "[Sierra Leone – UNAMISL – Background](#)," [UNAMSIL](#), October 1999 - December 2005.
- (9) "[Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone](#)," Peace-keeping Best Practices Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, September 2003.
- (10) "['Whole of International Community' for Foreign Disaster Relief](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 700.
- (11) "[Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations](#)," by LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen and LTCs Matthew G. Elledge, Charles W. Nolan, and Jennifer L. Kimmey (U.S. Army) in Military Review, November-December 2010.
- (12) "[MINUSTAH Background](#)," [MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti](#)
- (13) "[Strategic Lesson 7: Planning for an Internally Displaced Persons \(IDP\) Program](#)," by Dan French, PKSOI, 2 May 2012.
- (14) "[Haiti Earthquake Response – Information Collection, Sharing, and Management](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 681.

Comments.

This information may be of interest to:

- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-5, J-7
- USAFRICOM – Deputy Chief of Staff, J-3, J-5, J-7
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)



3. CONCLUSION

Multinational operations have been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, the “norm” for peacekeeping and stability operations. Recent experiences, as highlighted in this Sampler – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Sudan, and Sierra Leone – have shown the importance of participants/partners gaining an awareness of each other’s capabilities early on, and then cooperating/

collaborating throughout the course of operations in both planning and execution.

Key lessons for multinational operations include:

- Understand the culture of partners, and understand their objectives
- Be prepared to compromise. This applies not only for the military side, but for the other agencies as well.
- Allow everyone to start from a common foundation in terms of expectations of roles, responsibilities, and division of labor.
- Use a comprehensive approach in planning operations. Include all partners. Integrated planning does not mean “organizations preparing their plans independently and then coordinating their plans with partners”; it means “planning together.”
- Establish processes and procedures for the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Define tasks, conditions, and standards for JOC activities and disseminate to those who will staff the JOC – so that they can train up prior to deployment. Include processes/procedures for building the Common Operating Picture (COP).
- Establish one common system for sharing information among partners/participants.
- Conduct team-building exercises at the outset of operations.
- Establish a primary office of responsibility for ensuring linkages between the various reconstruction projects, operational missions, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) efforts, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) actions, bilateral development activities, and so on.
- Establish an evaluation mechanism to assess progress in achieving goals and objectives, as well as to identify/address any organizational or operational anomalies affecting progress.
- Capture the experiences of U.S. military personnel involved in UN and other multinational peacekeeping and stability operations, and add this information to lessons learned databases – specifically, [SOLLIMS](#).
- Develop/update an international doctrine covering the planning and synchronizing of peacekeeping and stability operations – in order to have a common foundation for planning, conducting, and transitioning such operations, as well as expectation management for multinational partners.

- Routinely include partners/other nations in U.S./coalition peacetime exercises (peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, etc.), so that lessons can be learned from operating together.
- Continue to resource language and cultural awareness programs. The Foundry intelligence program, Human Terrain System (HTS), language immersion programs, and various others can have a role/impact for future multinational engagements – such as in the [Regionally Aligned Forces \(RAF\)](#) concept.
- Consider the following measures for the case of “Blue” and “Green” Forces operating in tandem:
 - Establish one Joint Operations Center with staffs from both forces.
 - Exchange liaison officers across organizations.
 - Come to agreement upon roles, responsibilities, authorities, priorities, and division of labor between the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force.
 - Ensure integrated planning among the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force.
 - Build and share a Common Operating Picture.
 - Continue the practice of establishing a Coordination Support Committee (consisting of host nation government, UN, and humanitarian agency leaders); include “Green” Force participation at committee meetings.
 - Establish a military information cell (in the Joint Operations Center) – to serve as the focal point for receiving information/reports on threats and for conducting analysis.
 - Develop a common strategy and detailed plan for IDP management.
 - Include the following topics in pre-deployment training: mandate/mission, background to the conflict, current security environment, Rules of Engagement, Standard Operating Procedures, Code of Conduct, personal behavior, cultural training, crowd control techniques, Protection of Civilians, route/convoy security, and integrated planning/operations.
 - Avoid “re-hatting” between forces. When “re-hatting” is deemed a necessity, conduct integrated planning for this transition and ensure forces are trained appropriately.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons on multinational operations, through their inclusion in training events and leader education programs, and through senior leader emphasis, significant impacts can be made during the course of future peacekeeping and stability operations.

4. COMMAND POC

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
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Camp Adazi, Latvia – Soldiers, Airmen and Marines from eight different nations stand together in a formation and watch as three Air Force A10 Warthogs perform a flyover during an opening ceremony for Exercise [SABER STRIKE](#) 2012 on Latvian Army Camp Adazi on 10 June 2012. SABER STRIKE 2012 was a U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)-led theater security cooperation exercise conducted in the Baltic States. One of the major goals of the exercise was to improve NATO interoperability and strengthen the relationship between military forces of the United States, Baltic nations, and other participating nations.

(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michael J. Taylor, 21st TSC Public Affairs.)



RELATED DOCUMENTS, REFERENCES, AND LINKS

- [“Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures \(SOP\),”](#) Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, August 2012
- [“Newsletter 10-12: Multinational Operations,”](#) Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), December 2009
- [“UN Mission Planning and Deployment”](#) folder / documents in SOLLIMS shared library
- [“Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations,”](#) the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 26 October 2006
- [“Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone,”](#) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, September 2003
- [“Re-Hatting” ECOWAS Forces as UN Peacekeepers: Lessons Learned,”](#) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August 2005
- [“Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,”](#) Joint and Coalition Analysis (JCOA), Joint Staff J7, 15 June 2012
- [“Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief \(Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below\),”](#) Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command, 13 July 2011
- [“Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations,”](#) by LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen, LTC Matthew G. Elledge, LTC Charles W. Nolan, and LTC Jennifer L. Kimmey, Military Review, November-December 2010

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SOLLIMS SAMPLER

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