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**52ID**

**FOB ALEXANDRIA**

**100900 October 2017**

**DT001**

**FRAG ORDER 17-01 (ATROPIAN STABILIZATION) – 52ID (U)**

**(U) References:**

a. (U) Map, NIMA, series 1501A; sheets: NH 15-2, NH 15-3, NH 15-5; scale: 1:250,000 (U).

b. (U) Map, NIMA, series V785, LOUISIANA; sheets: 7345 I, 7345 IV, 7346 I, 7346 II, 7346 III, 7346 IV, 7445 IV, 7446 III, 7446 IV, scale: 1:50,000 (U).

c. (U) Map, NIMA, series V785S; sheets: Fort Polk OIF Training Map, V785SFTPOLKIZSP (NSN: 7643015150880); scale: 1:50,000 (U).

d. (U) CADRG, NGA, Series: CDRG, Item: SPFORTPOLKIZ, Edition 002, scale: 1:50,000 (U).

f. (U) United States European Command Caucasus Military Study and Order of Battle, 1 June 2014 (U).

g. (U) United States European Command Caucasus Area Study, 1 June 2014 (U).

h. (U) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America, the Republic of Atropia, and the Democratic Republic of Gorgas, 1 May 2008 (U).

i. (U) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America, the Republic of Atropia, and the Democratic Republic of Gorgas regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Forces in the Republic of Atropia and the Democratic Republic of Gorgas, 1 June 2008 (U).

j. (U) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 4560, on Humanitarian and Security Situation in the Republic of Atropia, 16 March 2015 (U).

k. (U) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 4668, Condemnation of Islamic Republic of Ariana invasion of the Republic of Atropia, 6 July 2015 (U).

l. (U) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 4670, Authorization For Use of Military Force, 3 August 2015.

m. (U) President of the United States (POTUS) Directive authorizing preparation for deployment of U.S. Forces to the Republic of Atropia, 6 July 2015 (U).

n. (U) President of the United States (POTUS) Directive authorizing deployment of U.S. Forces to and military operations in the Republic of Atropia, 18 August 2015 (U).

o. (U) 52ID Reporting SOP, 1 June 2015 (U).

**(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD:** Local (unless otherwise stated).

**(U) Task Organization:** Annex A (Task Organization) (U).

**1. (U) Situation.**

a. (U) Area of Interest. The 52ID Area of Interest (AI) is the following countries in their entirety, ATROPIA, ARIANA, ARTZAK, GORGAS and the Southern portions of DONOVIA. Notably the AI contains portions of two Geographic Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibility (AOR), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Ariana lies within the USCENTCOM AOR; the entire Caspian Sea and the country of Atropia lie within the USEUCOM AOR.

b. (U) Area of Operations. The 52ID Area of Operations (AO) is AO SHIELD. AO SHIELD includes AO PULLER, AO HOG, AO BEAR, and AO WOLF. **See Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) (U) for specific AO SHIELD operational boundaries.**

(1) (U) Terrain.

(a) (U) Reference g (U).

(b) (U) Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) (U).

(c) (U) Forested areas and numerous waterways in AO SHIELD restrict and compartmentalize mechanized and motorized maneuver; primary avenues of approach and mobility corridors are limited to established roadways.

(d) (U) Creeks and rivers are the only natural terrain features in AO SHIELD restricting foot movement. Precipitation of less than one-half inch in a 24-hour period may limit vehicular movement, but will not hinder cross-country movement or operations of dismounted forces except in low drainage areas. Rainfall in the one to four inch range in a 24-hour period will cause a significant flash flood hazard in low-lying areas.

(e) (U) The forested areas, rolling terrain, and urban centers in AO SHIELD limit the use of electronic warfare equipment in locating electronic emitters, limit long-range observation and fields of fire, and degrade illumination necessary for weapon systems to effectively acquire and engage targets.

(f) (U) Terrain compartmentalization does not support undetected battalion or higher consolidation of forces.

(2) (U) Weather.

(a) (U) Reference g (U).

(b) (U) Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) (U).

c. (U) Enemy Forces.

(1) (U) Islamic Republic of Ariana (Ariana or IRA). Ariana armed forces present a conventional and special operations force military threat to the Republic of Atropia (ROA). Ariana armed forces are a Tier 2 capable armed force with limited Tier 1 chemical, air defense, and armor capabilities.

(a) (U) Islamic Republic of Ariana (IRA) military forces commenced a series of large scale, joint and combined arms, offensive oriented training exercises 15 March 2017 near the international border (IB) with the Republic of Atropia. Each of these exercises lasted two to three weeks in duration. The result of these exercises caused the ROA Armed Forces to remain on a high state of alert which affected unit readiness and reduced the effectiveness of ROA counterinsurgency operations. On 3 June 2017, IRA forces initiated a large-scale operation under the guise of a recurring training exercise that was in fact preliminary posturing for an invasion of Atropia. On 14 July 2017, IRA military forces invaded Atropia. After a 90-day campaign, US and Atropian military forces defeated the IRA military forces and pushed them back across the legitimate and Internationally recognized border. Despite their recent defeat at the hands of coalition forces the IRA is conducting effective logistical resupply of most if not all of the insurgent groups in the AO. Means of resupply is by ground through existing smuggling routes and LOCs from outside the AO, provably from within the Islamic Republic of Ariana but with increasing indicators of resupply lines utilizing criminal elements in all neighboring countries. Ultimate goal is overthrow of legitimate government of Atropia. IRA political goal is to decapitate Atropian instruments of national power and replace leaders with ethnic Arianans and others sympathetic to Arianan causes. IRA provides direct financial and material support to South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) and IRA is ideologically consistent with SAPA.

(2) (U) South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA). The SAPA consists of ethnic Persians identifying culturally and religiously with Ariana. Their goal is an independent ethnic Persian state in western and central Atropia. When operating in an insurgent role, they organize primarily as multi-function or specialty cells. When massing to conduct large offensive operations, they can assemble 50-75 fighters within a 24-hour period. Depending on population support in a given area SAPA can mass up to 125 fighters within 96 hours. SAPA’s efforts to forcefully gain ground and influence large sections of several southwestern and west-central Atropian provinces have been successful, creating pockets of denied territory and strongpoints throughout the region. See Annex B (Intelligence) (U) and Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) (U) for definition and analysis of these areas. SAPA is dependent on logistical resupply from IRA. Means of resupply is by ground through existing smuggling routes and LOCs from outside the AO, mainly from within the Islamic Republic of Ariana but with increasing indicators of resupply lines utilizing criminal elements in all neighboring countries. Ultimate goal is fill power vacuum following overthrow of legitimate government of Atropia. SAPA is client of IRA and receives direct financial and material support from IRA.

(a) (U) SAPA forces, although defeated, are still a tactical threat to U.S. Forces operating in Atropia. The President of the United States (POTUS) has declared SAPA forces hostile, having developed sufficient organization, leadership, resources, popular support, and logistics infrastructure to conduct organized operations against the Atropian government.

(b) (U) IRA SPF will continue to provide SAPA elements logistics, training, communications, and tactical advisory support. Emerging indicators show IRA SPF assistance with SAPA maintenance and sustainment of captured Atropian equipment.

(c) (U) SAPA forces in Atropia have evolved into a paramilitary insurgency since the Arianian invasion.

(d) (U) SAPA and supporting IRAA SPF are conducting rural and urban operations in AO SHIELD to demoralize, disrupt, and defeat Atropian military and police forces

(e) (U) An estimated 70-100 SAPA fighters are operating in and around AO SHIELD. More than half of the fighters meld in and out of the population centers; however suspected groups in the sizes below are operating at the following locations:

(f) (U) Annex B (Intelligence) (U) and Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) (U) provide detailed composition, disposition, and strength information for SAPA’s committed forces operating in AO SHIELD.

(3) (U) Sadvol. Sadvol is a political organization, with an armed security wing, composed of ethnic Atropian nationalists seeking regime change. It is focused on overt political action to influence like-minded Atropians that they can govern more fairly, honestly, and effectively than the Ismailov autocracy. Savdol is dependent on logistical resupply from IRA. Means of resupply is by ground through existing smuggling routes and LOCs from outside the AO, mainly from within the Islamic Republic of Ariana but due to ideological convictions does not deal with criminal elements. Ultimate goal is fill power vacuum following overthrow of legitimate government of Atropia. Savdol sees itself as a moral and legitimate replacement of the current autocracy. Friction is likely to develop between Savdol and Faqih/GMB due to the extreme methods of operating endorsed by their Salafist theo-ideology.

(a) (U) Sadvol political operations within AO SHIELD are normally limited to small scale information warfare (INFOWAR) activities and other actions by multi-functional cells to garner popular support within select urban population centers. Recent operations within AO SHIELD have centered on influencing the major population centers of FLORIEN (15RVQ5678), DARA LAM (15RWQ035415), DERIDDER, LEESVILLE, OAKDALE (15RWQ3209), and SANGARI.

(b) (U) Estimated Sadvol strength within AO SHIELD ranges between 100 – 200 personnel. The Sadvol armed wing operates in cells ranging in size from 3 - 30 personnel armed with small arms, light machine guns, commercial explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). It is primarily a security force and is not likely to pose a direct threat to U.S. operations, unless provoked.

(4) (U) Faqih and Godly Martyrs Brigade (Faqih/GMB).

(a) (U) Faqih - Jihadist following a Salafist theo-ideology. They seek to establish a Caucasus Emirate/Caliphate. The Faqih are engaged in a campaign to cultivate fundamentalist sentiments into action targeting those who oppose the spread of Islam. Primarily they are engaged in irregular warfare (IW), assassinations, kidnappings, and limited direct action attacks against Atropian Security Forces and government officials throughout Atropia. Their recent actions inside AO SHIELD focus on influencing the major population centers of ANACOCO (15RVQ6757), DARA LAM, DERIDDER, DEQUINCY (15RVP5868), GARDNER (15RWQ2959), LEESVILLE, MANY (15RVQ5492), OAKDALE and SANGARI. Cells are active at these locations and range in size from 3 to 30 personnel. Faqih's primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, light machine guns, IED/VBIED, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

(b) (U) Godly Martyrs' Brigade (GMB) - Jihadist following a Salafist theo-ideology. They support Faqih goals and efforts by providing a suicide capability. The GMB is engaged in an ongoing campaign of spectacular attacks against Atropian Security Forces and government officials throughout Atropia. Their targeting of critical hydrocarbon, electrical, and transportation infrastructure throughout AO SHIELD has escalated in recent months. GMB cells are collocated with each Faqih cell. GMB cells range in size from 3 to 9 personnel. GMB's primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, light machine guns, SVEST/SVBIED, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

(c) (U) Faqih/GMB are engaged in irregular warfare (IW) operations, assassinations, and spectacular attacks against U.S. and Atropian military forces, Atropian police forces, and government officials throughout AO SHIELD. Faqih/GMB are dependent on logistical resupply from IRA but have developed advanced and redundant resupply means using criminal networks. Means of resupply is by ground through existing smuggling routes and LOCs from outside the AO, mainly from within the Islamic Republic of Ariana. Ultimate goal is to enable the overthrow of the legitimate government of Atropia. Faqih/GMB sees itself as a means to rid Atropia of the corrupt and immoral Atropian government. Friction is most likely to develop between Faqih/GMB and Savdol due to the extreme methods of operating endorsed by Faqih/GMB.

(d) (U) Estimated Faqih/ GMB strength within AO SHIELD is between 100 - 250 personnel.

(e) (U) Annex B (Intelligence) (U) and Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) (U) provide detailed composition, disposition, and strength information for Faqih/GMB forces in AO SHIELD.

(5) (U) Baqquani Crime Family (BCF).

(a) (U) The BCF is a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO). The BCF seeks to expand operations, control bases of operations in lightly or uncontested areas, and influence political outcomes. BCF gangs actively provide insurgent and terrorist groups operating in AO SHIELD with military grade arms, explosives, ammunition, and materials to include precursor chemicals like methylphosphonyl diflouride (CH3POF2). Recent reports indicate BCF gangs are operating in AO SHIELD at or near DARA LAM, DERIDDER, GARDNER, KINDER (15RWP1472), LEESVILLE, OAKDALE, OBERLIN (15RWP2287), SHKIN (15RWQ094356), and UNION HILL (15RWQ2529). BCF gangs range in size from 3 - 30 personnel. BCF’s primary weapons include small arms, light machine guns, commercial explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

(b) (U) Estimated BCF strength within AO SHIELD is between 175 - 300 personnel.

(c) (U) Annex B (Intelligence) (U) and Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) (U) provide detailed composition, disposition, and strength information for BCF elements in AO SHIELD.

(6) (U) Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA).

(a) (U) Ariana. Arianian military forces have been defeated and/or retreated across the international border back into Arianan territory. After suffering significant losses, they are unable to conduct large scale combined military operations and are not considered a threat to current operations to restore legitimate Atropian government control.

(b) (U) Insurgents.

1. (U) SAPA. SAPA will conduct limited/small unit (squad sized) strike operations to disrupt, fix, or neutralize U.S. and Atropian military forces operating in AO SHIELD.

2. (U) Sadvol operations are not expected to significantly hinder U.S. or Atropian military operations in AO SHIELD. Sadvol efforts will be restricted to larger urban areas, primarily BAKU.

(c) (U) Terrorist. Faqih/GMB will likely continue to carry out spectacular attacks against U.S. and Atropian military forces operating in AO SHIELD using IED, VBIED, SVEST, and SVBIED. Additionally they will focus on recruiting new membership via Sunni mosques, orphanages, and informal solicitation.

(d) (U) Criminals. The BCF will most likely increase criminal activity in AO SHIELD in support of their regional and extra-regional economic and political goals. They will defend their criminal operations from any perceived threat.

(7) (U) Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA).

(a) (U) Ariana. SPF will provide limited training and sustainment support to remaining insurgents in Aropia and assist SAPA with maintenance and sustainment of captured Atropian equipment.

(b) (U) Insurgents.

1. (U) SAPA. SAPA, with IRA SPF assistance, will attempt to gain access to and employ advanced weapons systems and/or non-persistent chemical weapons in directed and coordinated attacks against U.S. and Atropian military forces operating in AO SHIELD.

2. (U) Sadvol. The Sadvol conducts direct action attacks or INFOWAR operations against U.S. and Atropian military forces operating in AO SHIELD.

(c) (U) Terrorist. Faqih/GMB begin a focused IED, VBIED, SVBIED, and SVEST campaign against U.S. and Atropian military forces operating in AO SHIELD.

(d) (U) Criminals. The BCF proactively conduct direct action attacks against U.S. and Atropian military forces operating in AO SHIELD.

d. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) USEUCOM. Commander, USEUCOM established Combined Joint Task Force - Causcasus (CJTF-C) and designated the following component commanders:

a. (U) Commander, VII (US) Corps is Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).

b. (U) Commander, 6 (US) Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) is designated the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).

c. (U) Commander, Carrier Task Group (CTG) 29.1 is designated the Joint Force Maritime Component (JFMCC) Commander.

(2) (U) CJTF-C.

(a) (U) CJTF-C Mission. CJTF-C conducts Unified Land Operations to stabilize the Caucasus region, protect vital U.S. interests, and support the civil and military authorities of the Republic of Atropia (ROA). CJTF-C will:

1. (U) Conduct Decisive Action operations as required.

2. (U) Conduct humanitarian operations in support of and under the guidance of United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

3. (U) Stabilize and protect the territorial integrity of the ROA.

4. (U) Protect U.S. citizens and designated third country nationals (TCN).

5. (U) Protect the critical economic infrastructure of the ROA.

(b) (U) CJTF-C Commander’s Intent.

1. (U) Synchronize efforts with and support UN and other U.S. government agencies, international organizations (IO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the ROA government in order to protect civilians, provide humanitarian aid, improve security, and protect ROA infrastructure critical to U.S. national interests.

2. (U) Ensure that military operations are synchronized with the Department of State (DOS) USAID OFDA, the lead agency for the U.S. government in humanitarian operations.

3. (U) Assist ROA security forces to provide civil control and civil security.

4. (U) Assist the ROA government portray itself as a caring, capable, legitimate government with competent and capable security forces.

5. (U) Protect U.S. citizens and designated TCN.

6. (U) Terminate military operations as quickly as possible.

(c) (U) CJTF-C End State.

1. (U) ROA government control and territorial integrity are restored.

2. (U) U.S. citizens and designated TCN are protected.

3. (U) CJTF-C Forces prepared to redeploy or conduct follow-on operations.

(3) (U) CJTF-7 (located at ISB MARKSVILLE (15RWQ8840)).

(a) (U) CJTF-7 Mission. CJTF-7 conducts decisive action operations to stabilize Atropia and protect vital U.S. interests. CJTF-7 will:

1. (U) Facilitate UN sponsored humanitarian operations.

2. (U) Restore and protect ROA territorial integrity.

3. (U) Protect U.S. citizens and designated TCN.

4. (U) Protect the critical economic infrastructure of the ROA.

(b) (U) CJTF-7 Commander’s Intent.

1. (U) Synchronize efforts with and support UN and U.S. government agencies, IO, NGO, and the ROA government in order to protect civilians, provide humanitarian aid, improve security, and protect ROA infrastructure critical to U.S. national interests.

2. (U) Lead agency for humanitarian assistance (HA) is DOS. BCTs will facilitate synchronization of (HA) between DOS, USAID and OFDA.

3. U) Assist ROA security forces to provide civil control and rule of law.

4. (U) Assist ROA security forces to neutralize Anti-ROA insurgent groups.

5. (U) When directed, protect and evacuate U.S. citizens and designated TCN to designated safe havens.

6. (U) Assist the ROA government to portray itself as a legitimate, engaged,, capable, legitimate government with competent and capable security forces.

7. (U) End military operations as quickly as possible, consolidate gains and seamlessly transition to stability operations.

(c) (U) CJTF-7 End state:

1. (U) ROA government control and territorial integrity is restored.

2. (U) U.S. citizens and designated TCN are protected.

3. (U) CJTF-7 Forces prepared to redeploy or conduct follow-on operations.

4. (U) Humanitarian crisis averted.

(4) (U) Elements of 6 (US) AETF. Provide airborne early warning (AEW), counterair (CA), offensive counterair (OCA), defensive counterair (DCA), air interdiction (AI), close air support (CAS), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD), strategic attack, theater airlift, electronic warfare (EW), reconnaissance and surveillance, and Search and Rescue (SAR) support.

(5) (U) CTG 29.1 Carrier Air Wing (CAW) squadrons provide SIGINT support.

(6) (U) 1 (UK) Armoured Division (AD), CJTF-7 Supporting Effort (SE), conducts stability operations in AO TROJAN.

(7) (U) 10 Theater Support Command (10 TSC) operating from CONSTANTA, ROMANIA, provides strategic sustainment support to CJTF-7 and theater opening capability in support of CJTF-7.

(8) (U) 10 Medical Brigade (10 MED BDE), OPCON to 12 ESC, from ISB ESLER (15RWQ6673) manages theatre medical operations and medical logistics support of CJTF-7 and attached units. 1234 CSH, subordinate unit to 10 MED BDE from ISB ALEXANDRIA (15RWQ4365) provides Role 2 and Role 3 medical treatment.

(9) (U) Special Operations Joint Task Force - Caucasus (SOJTF-C). OPCON to CJTF-C. SOJTF-C conducts special operations in support of CJTF-C Commander’s objectives. SOJTF elements operate throughout Caucus region in supporting/supported relationship with CJTF-C elements.

(10) (U) ROA Army (ROAA) forces are in defensive positions arrayed from north to south along the SABINE RIVER under ROA command and control, unless directed to partner with CJTF-7 subordinate units.

(a) (U) ROAA North Force (NORFOR) conducts defensive operations in AO SPEAR north of CJTF-7 AO JAYHAWK (52IDs AO SHIELD). NORFOR elements are deployed as follows:

1. (U) 341 (RA) Recon BDE, located vicinity HORNBECK (15RVQ6265), guards from north to south along the east side of the SABINE RIVER to provide early warning of threat force attacking from west to east.

2. (U) 346 (RA) INF BDE, located vicinity SHREVEPORT (15SVR2999), secures HWYs 84, 191, and 3015 to ensure freedom of mobility.

3. (U) 348 (RA) INF BDE, located vicinity JONESBORO (15SWR2667), defends east of the Red River to block eastward advancement of threat forces attacking from west to east.

(b) (U) ROAA Central Force (CENFOR) conducts defensive operations in AO SWORD west of CJTF-7s AO JAYHAWK (52ID’s AO SHIELD). CENFOR elements are deployed as follows: 350 (RA) INF BDE, located vicinity FAL (15RVQ5827) defends along HWYs 8 and 392 to defeat threat forces attacking from west to east.

(c) (U) ROAA South Force (SOUFOR) conducts defensive operations in AO ARROW west of CJTF-7s AO JAYHAWK (52ID’s AO SHIELD and 52 ID’s AO CENTURION). SOUFOR elements are deployed as follows:

1. (U) 354 (RA) TANK BDE, located vicinity LAKE CHARLES (15RVP7944), defends along I-10 to defeat threat forces attacking from west to east.

2. (U) 356 (RA) Anti-Tank (AT) BDE, located west of DEQUINCY (15RVP5868), defends along HWY 12 to defeat threat forces attacking from west to east.

(d) (U) ROAA reserve units are disposed as follows

1. (U) 352 (RA) TANK BDE occupies TAA vicinity BATON ROUGE (15RXP7871) as strategic reserve, priority of commitment to the HWY 190 avenue of approach.

2. (U) 344 (RA) INF BDE (M) (IFV) occupies TAA vicinity LAFAYETTE (15RWP9444) as operational reserve, priority of commitment to the I-10 avenue of approach.

(e) (U) 941 (RA) SPF BN conducts operations in occupied Atropia to disrupt SAPA operations and to develop Atropian resistance forces.

e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations.

(1) (U) Annex V (Interagency Coordination) (U).

(2) (U) The interagency organizations of the United States Government (USG) present in the ROA include the following: Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), United States Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and Department of Defense (DOD).

(3) (U) The United States maintains an Embassy in BAKU (15RYP8217), ROA and a U.S. Consulate General in DARA LAM within AO SHIELD. Because of the security situation, DOS moved to Ordered Departure status on 6 July 2015. At this time, only essential personnel remain at Embassy Baku and Consulate General Dara Lam. Their role is to represent the United States; protect U.S. interests and the safety/security of American citizens within the limits permitted by international law; negotiate with the ROA Government; ascertain by all lawful means conditions and developments in the ROA, reporting to National Command Authority; promote friendly relations between the United States and ROA; and develop economic, cultural, and scientific relations between the two countries. The U.S. Ambassador (Chief of Mission) is the President’s official representative to the ROA and the highest-ranking U.S. official in the country. He or she speaks on behalf of the USG on all matters pertaining to the ROA Government. He operates primarily from the U.S. Embassy in BAKU.

(4) (U) The following key essential USG personnel represent the U.S. Country Team in Atropia: U.S. Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), Chief of Station (COS), Consul General, Counselor for Political Affairs, Counselor for Public Affairs, Consular Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer (RSO), Defense Attaché, Legal Attaché, and USAID Mission Director.

(5) (U) Intergovernmental. The following intergovernmental organizations are active in the ROA: Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to ROA, United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Program (WFP), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

(6) (U) Nongovernmental Agencies. The following nongovernmental organizations are active in the ROA: International Medical Corps (IMC), Mercy Corps, Atropian Care, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Atropian Red Crescent Society, and Oxfam International.

f. (U) Civil Considerations. Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) (U).

g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization) (U).

h. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) Law Enforcement in AO is absent due to killing and harassment of police. They have likely sought refuge in enclaves of tribal strength.

(2) (U) Villages/Hamlets elected officials and tribal/clan leaders are not assessed as to their attitude toward Atropian government and Coalition Forces (CF).

(3) (U) Arianian forces are capable of sustained defensive operations along the International Border; however, degraded logistical capability and exposure of ground and sea lines of communications to U.S. and ROA air attacks limits their ability to resume offensive operations.

(4) (U) From information available, threat elements have not destroyed local infrastructure and will not plan to do so in order to facilitate their information operations with the people.

(5) (U) Non-Governmental and non-military US and Coalition Force entities will be instrumental to our success if the security situation allows for relative safe operation of these agencies within AO SHIELD.

(6) (U) Ariana will continue to support SAPA insurgent operations in the ROA with equipment, supplies, advisors, and training.

(7) (U) Ariana and anti-ROA insurgent forces will conduct Information Warfare (INFOWAR) operations against 52ID and ROA forces.

(8) (U) SAPA will continue campaign to harass and interdict US and Atropian operations and escalate anti-ROA activities.

(9) (U) Gorgas Airfield Control Groups (GACG) will provide limited assistance to U.S. forces.

**2. (U) Mission.** O/O, 52ID, in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF), establishes civil security, provide immediate human needs, and enables Artropian governmental and military forces to provide civil control for civil populations in AO SHIELD in order to enable the Government of ATROPIA reestablish order.

**3. (U) Execution.**

a. (U) Commander’s Intent.

(1) (U) Purpose. The purpose of our operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment that enables legitimate law enforcement agencies the time and space to reestablish the rule of law and set the conditions to enable the legitimate Atropian military forces to maintain security and facilitate the efforts of the legitimate government to be responsible for immediate human needs and stability.

(2) (U) Key Tasks:

(a) (U) Secure air and ground lines of communication (LOCs).

(b) (U) Neutralize anti-ROA insurgent groups in AO SHIELD.

(c) (U) Protect U.S. citizens and designated TCNs.

(d) (U) Facilitate UN humanitarian operations as directed.

(e) (U) Consolidate gains including area, transitional public, and civil security.

(f) (U) Seamless transition from combat operations to stability operations.

(3) (U) End State:

(a) (U) ROA government control of western Atropia is restored.

(b) (U) Territorial integrity of the ROA is restored to pre-conflict borders.

(c) (U) U.S. citizens and designated TCNs are protected.

(d) (U) 52ID continues consolidating gains by enabling civil security efforts and restoration of essential services by the ROA government and military/security forces.

(e) (U) The international border and the territorial integrity of Atropia is fully restored.

b. (U) Concept of Operations.

1. (U) Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). (U)

(2) (U) Concept of Operations. O/O 52ID, in partnership with ANF, conduct stabilization activities in order to establish civil security, provide for immediate human needs, and facilitate civil control for civil populations by legitimate Atropian governmental and military units in AO SHEILD to enable the Government of ATROPIA to reestablish stable and secure environment. TF DRAGON (ME), TF ACE (SE), TF RAM (SE) and TF KA-BAR (SE) continue Unified Land Operations in their area of operations in order to conduct stabilization activities. TF RED LEG provides fire support throughout the AO. TF SUSTAINMENT provides sustainment with the AO from FOB LIMESTONE. This phase ends upon TOA to a follow-on Army Advise and Assist Brigade and redeployment.

c. (U) Scheme of Movement and Maneuver.

1. 2/52 IBCT, (ME), conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF), to control AO BEAR in order to establish civil security, immediate human needs and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control. Also, protect U.S. citizens and designated TCNs, protect U.S. Consulate in DARA LAM (15RWQ035409), secures GERONIMO FLS (15RWQ033420), secures the BVS Pipeline Marwandi Pumping Station (MPS) (15RWQ043370), and facilitates humanitarian relief operations as required.
2. 2/21 IBCT, (SE 1), conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF), in AO WOLF to provide civil security, establish capacity to be responsible for immediate human needs and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control. Ensures coalition freedom of maneuver along MSR BRONZE. Partner with ROASF units to facilitate efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy movement east along HWY 26 and south along HWYs 171/190 to protect U.S. citizens and designated TCNs, secure key infrastructure, and as required facilitate humanitarian relief operations.
3. 1/21 IBCT, (SE 2), conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF) in AO HOG to provide civil security, establish capacity to be responsible for immediate human needs and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control. Secures MSR BRONZE and conducts decisive action operations to control AO HOG to support ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy forces use of HWY 10 west to east mobility corridor to I-49, protect BVS pipeline infrastructure, protect U.S. citizens and designated TCN, and as required facilitate humanitarian relief operations.
4. 2 MAGTF (SE3) conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF) in AO PULLER to provide civil security, establish capacity to be responsible for immediate human needs and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control and partnership operations to, support ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy north/south freedom of maneuver, protect U.S. interests, protect U.S. citizens and designated TCN, and as required facilitate humanitarian relief operations.
5. 21 CAB, Shaping Operation (SO), supports stabilization activities of 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, and 2 MAGTF in order.
6. (U) Scheme of Mobility/Countermobility.

(a) (U) Appendix 1 (Mobility/Countermobility) to Annex G (Engineer) (U). TBP.

(b) (U) Priority of effort to mobility, survivability, and countermobility, in order.

(c) (U) Priority of support to 1/21 IBCT, 2/21 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 2/52 IBCT, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(d) (U) Special Instructions.

1. (U) CJTF-7 Commander retains employment authority for all long-duration scatterable mines.

2. (U) 52ID Commander retains authority to employ short-duration RAAMS (Four hour).

3. (U) Dumb/non-self destructing, anti-personnel, and or anti-tank mines are not authorized for use by U.S. Forces IAW U.S. Landmine Policy.

(2) (U) Scheme of Battlefield Obscuration. Omitted.

(3) (U) Scheme of Reconnaissance and Surveillance.

(a) (U) Annex L (Information Collection) (U).

(b) (U) 52ID information collection operations focus on situation development, early warning, force protection, target development (support to targeting), and BDA against threat forces operating in AO SHIELD. 52ID will employ theater and national assets to locate and identify threat forces, opposition elements, and their intentions. 52ID G3 directs units to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to answer intelligence requirements identified by 52ID G3. Units assigned a AO conduct reconnaissance and surveillance within that AO to answer their command’s Information Requirements (IR). Units also conduct aggressive counter reconnaissance within their AO to find and destroy threat Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target acquisition (RISTA) assets and forces. Units not assigned a AO conduct R&S and counter reconnaissance as directed in support of base cluster and rear-area security plans. Target Acquisition (TA) radars provide general support surveillance to locate threat forces Indirect Fire (IDF) assets.

d. (U) Scheme of Intelligence.

(1) (U) Annex B (Intelligence) (U).

(2) (U) Concept of Intelligence Support.

(a) (U) 52ID Intelligence Focus:

1. (U) Primary - Detecting, identifying, and tracking threat forces to determine their intentions in order to disrupt their operations.

2. (U) Secondary - Providing early warning of mass-casualty producing attacks directed at U.S. forces, ROASF, and civilians.

3. (U) Tertiary - Detecting, identifying, and tracking threat forces proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) activities.

(b) (U) Facilitating the simultaneous sharing and collaboration of intelligence at all levels for all users by:

1. (U) Consolidating and flattening intelligence and operations networks.

2. (U) Integrating sensors at all levels, expanding accesses, adding analytical and visualization tools (e.g. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) intelligence at brigade and battalion level).

3. (U) Data mining through multiple databases.

4. (U) Mentoring intelligence soldiers to leverage these capabilities.

(c) (U) 52ID provides access to theater and national level assets to include: RC-135 (RIVET JOINT), full motion video from PREDATOR and HUNTER Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), JSTARS MTI, and other systems based upon availability.

(d) (U) Priority of intelligence support is to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

e. (U) Scheme of Fires.

(1) (U) Annex D (Fires) (U).

(2) (U) The purpose of fires is to provide lethal and non-lethal fires (FA, CAS, IO) in support of 52ID, in partnership; with Atropian National Forces (ANF), stability operation to provide for civil security, restores essential services, and provides civil control for civil populations in AO SHIELD to enable the Government of ATROPIA to reestablish order. This will be achieved by neutralizing with FA Level II & III threats in the AO to facilitate establishment of FOBs and partner with Atropian forces in order to provide for civil security, establish capacity to be responsible for immediate human needs, and provide civil control for civil populations and enable the Government of ATROPIA to reestablish order. TF GUNs of GLORY will position to assure that 100% of AO is covered by indirect fires to assure accurate and timely fires are available. Additionally, will position Q53 radar and Q50 LCMR to assure that all FOBs and COPs are within a radar umbrella. Priority of fires is to units in contact, units conducting cordon & search operations, units conducting convoy operations, and units conducting patrols. Priority of non-lethal effects is to units conducting cordon & search operations and units conducting patrols.

(a) (U) Approval authority for fires is defined in Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

(b) (U) Priority of CAS. Priority of available CAS assets is to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(c) (U) Fire Support Tasks (FST).

1. (U) FST 1:

(U) Task: Conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).

(U) Purpose: Neutralize, destroy, and degrade surface-based enemy air defenses IOT protect friendly aircraft conducting air assault, airborne, and/or airland operations.

2. (U) FST 2:

(U) Task: Conduct counterfire.

(U) Purpose: Neutralize enemy ability to place accurate, timely and effective IDF on friendly forces and local population centers.

3. (U) FST 3:

(U) Task: Conduct destruction fires.

(U) Purpose: Destroy enemy conventional forces and enable friendly freedom of maneuver within AO SHIELD.

4. (U) FST 4:

(U) Task: Conduct obscuration fires.

(U) Purpose: Obscure maneuver forces from enemy observation and to prevent enemy detection of friendly force assets.

(d) (U) Additional Nonlethal Effects Tasks. Appendix 13 (Military Information Support Operations (MISO)) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

(e) (U) Priority of Fires. Priority of available GS Fires is to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

f. (U) Scheme of Protection.

1. Annex E (Protection) (U).
2. 52 ID conducts Protection operations throughout the AO to protect the force and conserve combat power. During this phase, the protection effort will be focused on antiterrorism, operational area security (including threats to the local populace and critical infrastructure), and mitigating any emergent threats. As Atropia is stabilized and the local government begins to assume responsibility for security and infrastructure maintenance, it is critical that U.S. forces coordinate with partners to disallow gaps in security that could be exploited by a potential attack on a high value target resulting in high casualties or damage to critical infrastructure. Additionally, the MP effort includes coordinating with Atropian security forces to limit criminal activities that could disrupt efforts to stabilize the country and enable the government of Atropia. Priority of protection support is: Mission Command nodes, high risk personnel, local population, critical infrastructure (including government buildings, and oil infrastructure), and State Department engagement teams.

g. (U) Cyber Electromagnetic Activities.

1. (U) 12 (Cyber Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) (U).
2. (U) Cyber Security is executed through a Defense in Depth strategy that involves people, operations, and technology at all levels of command. DCO/CS is a continuing process, commanders will employ all tools available to counter all type of lethal and non-lethal attacks on friendly information and Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations (C4) systems transferring or processing friendly information. The defense of information networks requires the implementation of the Cyber Security tasks listed below, across all phases of the operation.
3. (U) Commanders will take those defensive actions necessary to protect friendly C4 systems despite enemy actions. Such protective measures may take the form of physical security, anti-jam and Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) techniques, counter-deception, electronic and communications security, line of sight (LOS) path positioning to mask friendly signals from enemy intercept, emission control procedures, operation security (OPSEC), deception, cover and camouflage, and use of low probability of detection and low probability of intercept communications.
4. (U) All levels of command will ensure the physical security and survivability of friendly C4 capabilities when deploying any ECCM to counter enemy lethal and non-lethal attacks on friendly information systems (IS).
5. (U) All levels of command will ensure all network devices meet DoD IA and CS enabled devices/systems configuration per Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Field Security Operations (FO), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), and National Security Agency (NSA) guides. The STIGs contain technical guidance to “lock down” information systems/software that might otherwise be vulnerable to a malicious computer attack.
6. (U) Intrusion detection devices are required on all networks (i.e. NIPRNET, SIPRNET) and will be in place prior to connecting to the GIG. Installations of these devices will be coordinated with the Division G6 Cyber Security Technicians. Units at all levels will maintain firewall devices. Units are required to protect their internal and external networks as well as their point of presence (POP) to the WIN-T backbone from security threats. Deviation from this requirement requires approval from the Designated Approval Authority.

(1) (U) Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) (U).

(2) (U) Minimum Essential Stability Tasks.

1. (U) Civil Security. Identify internal and external security threats to the safety of the civilian population in order to establish a safe and secure environment in AO SHIELD.
2. (U) Civil Control. Identify locations w/o functioning and/or corrupt judicial and law enforcement and prioritize to rebuilding local courts and law enforcement in order to reestablish confidence in the rule of law.
3. (U) Restore Essential Services. Assess for absence of basic civil services, quickly identify locations where they are lacking or absent and prioritize to their restoration to prevent civilian illness and/or death due to their absence.
4. (U) Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
5. (U) Establish Public Order and Safety.
6. (U) Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services.
7. (U) Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
8. (U) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
9. (U) Support identification.
10. (U) Protect key personnel and facilities.

i. (U) Assessment. BCT level assessments will be submitted weekly by 1800 Friday to arrive in time for the DIV level assessment meeting. Measures of Performance for Phase III will be: number of enemy attacks, friendly casualties, status of minimum essential services (food, water, shelter, and medical) and CDR’s operational assessment.

j. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) (U) 1/21 IBCT (SE 1).

(a) (U) Release OPCON of one Infantry Company to 1-26 IN NLT as an element of the 52ID reserve.

1. (U) Establish FOB HOG IVO 15RWQ1225 to establish a secure facility to conduct stability operations.
2. (U) Receive 2/3/HHB/TF RED LEG (Q50) radar for FOB HOG to acquire incoming indirect fire on FOB HOG.
3. (U) O/O establish partnership with 3d BN 1st BDE Atropian National Army (ANA) to increase the combat capability of the Atropian Army.
4. (U) Conduct Area Recon of villages, in AO HOG to provide weekly SWEAT-MSO assessments to determine civil capabilities and requirements in AO HOG.
5. (U) O/O conduct convoy security for all NGOs moving into and out of AO HOG to assure delivery of NGO supplies.
6. (U) BPT conduct cordon and search of all villages in AO HOG to seize unauthorized weapons and detain insurgents.
7. (U) Submit Critical Asset List, Defended Asset List, Criticality Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and Capability Assessment to G3 NLT 30 days to provide assessment to 52ID.
8. (U) Conduct route clearance and route recon of all MSRs and ASRs in AO HOG at least twice daily to establish and maintain assured mobility.
9. (U) Support ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy forces use of HWY 10 west to east mobility corridor to I-49, protect BVS pipeline infrastructure.
10. (U) Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
11. (U) Establish Public Order and Safety.
12. (U) Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services.
13. (U) Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
14. (U) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.

(2) (U) 2/21 IBCT (SE2).

1. (U) Establish FOB WOLF IVO 15RVQ9725 to establish a secure facility to conduct stability operations.
2. (U) Receive 1/3/HHB/TF RED LEG (Q50) radar for FOB WOLF to acquire incoming indirect fire on FOB WOLF.
3. (U) O/O establish partnership with 4th BN 1st BDE Atropian National Army (ANA) to increase the combat capability of the Atropian Army.
4. (U) Conduct Area Recon of villages in AO HOG to provide weekly SWEAT-MSO assessments to determine civil capabilities and requirements in AO HOG.
5. (U) O/O conduct convoy security for all NGOs moving into and out of AO HOG to assure delivery of NGO supplies.
6. (U) BPT conduct cordon and search of all villages in AO HOG to seize unauthorized weapons and detain insurgents.
7. (U) Submit Critical Asset List, Defended Asset List, Criticality Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and Capability Assessment to G3 NLT 30 days to provide assessment to 52ID.
8. (U) Conduct route clearance and route recon of all MSRs and ASRs in AO HOG at least twice daily to establish and maintain assured mobility.
9. (U) Conduct partnership operations to control AO WOLF to support ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, and prevent enemy movement east along HWY 26 and south along HWYs 171/190 to protect 52 ID’s (CJTF-7 DO) northern flank.
10. (U) Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
11. (U) Establish Public Order and Safety.
12. (U) Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services.
13. (U) Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
14. (U) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.

(3) (U) 2/52 (ME).

1. (U) Establish FOB BEAR IVO (GERONIMO FLS) to establish a secure facility to conduct stability operations.
2. (U) Receive 4/3/HHB/TF RED LEG (Q50) radar for FOB BEAR to acquire incoming indirect fire on in AO BEAR.
3. Conduct Partnered operations with 1/350 (RA) INF BDE (-). Conduct linkup with 1/350 (RA) INF BDE (-) at building thirteen in Dara Lam. The Battalion Commander’s name is LTC Nazim Asgar. Unit can conduct the following tasks: fixed site security, CO defense, security patrols, reserve force, crowd control, riot control, cordon and search, and check point operations. Unit will use same ROE as U.S. forces. Unit has the following limitations. It cannot secure U.S. Consulate Dara Lam, act as police/law enforcement, does not have same COMMO or C2 systems as U.S. forces, does not have JTACS, does not have medical support, and cannot be task organized below CO level.
4. (U) Conduct Area Recon of villages in AO BEAR to provide weekly SWEAT-MSO assessments to determine civil capabilities and requirements in AO HOG.
5. (U) O/O conduct convoy security for all NGOs moving into and out of AO BEAR to assure delivery of NGO supplies.
6. (U) Seize unauthorized weapons and detain insurgents in AO BEAR.
7. (U) Secure GERONIMO FLS (15RWQ033420) to facilitate future airland operations. UAS launch and recovery site adjacent to and east of GERONIMO FLS is available for launch and recovery of UAS. The UAS site and hangar at FOB ANVIL (15RWQ047382) are available for use.
8. (U) Secure Marwandi Pumping Station (MPS) (15RWQ043370) to facilitate restoration of hydrocarbon product flow to GORGAS and to finance Atropian Government.
9. (U) Conduct linkup with U.S. Consul General, Station Chief, and other DOS Consulate staff members at the U.S. Consulate (15RWQ0331341300) in DARA LAM to coordinate immediate security measures to protect the facility.
10. (U) Submit Critical Asset List, Defended Asset List, Criticality Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and Capability Assessment to G3 NLT 30 days to provide assessment to 52ID.
11. (U) Conduct route clearance and route recon of all MSRs and ASRs in AO BEAR at least twice daily to establish and maintain assured mobility.
12. (U) Coordinate with USAID/OFDA representative in U.S. Consulate DARA LAM for receipt, security, and delivery of humanitarian supplies IAW USAID/OFDA Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM). MITAM will be provided to unit by USAID/OFDA representative.
13. (U) Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
14. (U) Establish Public Order and Safety.
15. (U) Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services.
16. (U) Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
17. (U) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
18. (U) Conduct law and order operations.
19. (U) Receive attachment of A/21 MP.

(4) (U) 2 MAGTF (SE 3).

1. (U) Establish FOB PULLER IVO 15RVR9011 (NATCHITOCHES REGIONAL AIRFIELD) to establish a secure facility to conduct stability operations.
2. (U) Conduct stability operations in AO PULLER to support ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy north/south freedom of maneuver, and protect 52IDs northern flank.
3. (U) Secure NATCHITOCHES REGIONAL AIRPORT (15RVR9011) to maintain ALOC into AO PULLER.
4. (U) Conduct Area Recon of villages in AO PULLER to provide weekly SWEAT-MSO assessments to determine civil capabilities and requirements in AO HOG.
5. (U) O/O conduct convoy security for all NGOs moving into and out of AO HOG to assure delivery of NGO supplies.
6. (U) BPT conduct cordon and search of all villages in AO PULLER to seize unauthorized weapons and detain insurgents.
7. (U) Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
8. (U) Establish Public Order and Safety.
9. (U) Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services.
10. (U) Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
11. (U) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.

(5) (U) 21 CAB (SO).

1. (U) Establish and operate Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) NLT 290900 September 2015. Appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) (U).
2. (U) Conduct air-ground operations (AGO) in support of 52ID decisive action operations in AO SHIELD commencing 300100 September 2015.
3. (U) Support area security operations to ensure unimpeded movement and protect sustainment operations throughout the 52ID rear.
4. (U) O/O, conduct reconnaissance and security operations to interdict enemy forces in AO SHIELD.
5. (U) BPT conduct air assault operations to destroy enemy forces. Priority of air assault support is to 2/52 IBCT, 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, and 2 MAGTF in order. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(6) (U) 52 DIVARTY (SO).

(a) (U) Position artillery assets in PAA 1 (15RWQ301528) and PAA 3 (15RWQ229458) NLT 010600 October 2015 to provide shaping fires in support of 52ID operations in AO SHIELD.

(b) (U) Establish azimuth of search and cueing schedules for radars based on predictive analysis of the enemy’s pattern and timing of indirect fire attacks in AO SHIELD.

(c) (U) O/O, position artillery assets in PAA2 (15RWQ080475) to provide shaping fires in support of 52ID operations in AO SHIELD.

(7) (U) 21 MEB (SO).

1. (U) Position assets and support 52ID stability operations throughout AO SHIELD.
2. (U) Engineer Support Tasks.

1. (U) Annex G (Engineer) (U).

2. (U) Assess, clear, and repair fixed-wing landing zone runways and supply routes in AO SHIELD.

3. (U) Provide survivability support to 52ID rear on a GS basis. Priority of survivability effort is aviation refuel/rearm facilities, mission command nodes, radar systems, cannon artillery, ammunition and fuel transfer points, maneuver units, then CSS units.

4. (U) Maintain current status of friendly and enemy obstacles, fortifications, and minefields throughout AO SHIELD. Report IAW unit SOP.

1. (U) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Chemical (CBRN) Tasks.

1. (U) Appendix 9 (Battlefield Obscuration) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

2. (U) Appendix 10 (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense) to Annex E (Protection) (U).

(d) (U) Provost Marshal Tasks.

1. (U) Appendix 7 (Police Operations) to Annex E (Protection) (U).

2. (U) Appendix 14 (Detainee and Resettlement) to Annex E (Protection) (U).

3. (U) Provide area and route security, priority to MSRs.

4. (U) Operate 52ID EPW/Detainee collection point.

5. (U) Provide battlefield circulation control (BCC).

6. (U) Conduct law and order operations.

7. (U) Search for and defeat Level I, Level II, and Level III threats in the 52ID rear area.

8. (U) Provide 52ID Main CP security.

9. (U) Report all detainee numbers and status to 52ID J2 daily at 0900 and 2100.

(e) (U) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) Tasks.

1. (U) Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) (U).

2. (U) Plan and conduct operations to support U.S./ROA military operations and further U.S. national policy objectives with emphasis on populace and resource control (PRC).

3. (U) Maintain contact with IGOs, NGOs, and GOs operating in AO SHIELD using appropriate civil military guidance.

4. (U) In conjunction with 52ID J9 and IBCT S9s, maintain a current CA assessment of AO SHIELD.

5. (U) In conjunction with 52ID J9 and IBCT S9, validate funding procedures and limitations for projects.

6. (U) Conduct CMO to gain support of the local populace and limit civilian interference in 52ID operations.

(f) (U) Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Tasks.

1. (U) Appendix 13 (Military Information Support Operations) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

2. (U) Conduct MISO in assigned AO directed toward turning the civilian populace away from the anti-ROA insurgent groups, to erode the their support base, and increase effectiveness of Division operations to defeat the enemy.

(8) (U) 52 SUST BDE (SO).

(a) Conduct sustainment operations in support of all forces within AO SHIELD to ensure all 52ID forces have the supplies, services, personnel support, maintenance support, and equipment available to conduct operations. Priority of support is to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(b) Receive, secure, and transport all Humanitarian Assistance (HA) supplies designated to be distributed within 52ID AO SHIELD. DIRLAUTH with BCT/MAGTF for delivery of HA supplies within assigned AO. Identify a primary and alternate POC at ISB Alexandria to receive HA supplies from interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations conducting operations in AO SHIELD.

(9) (U) 1-26 IN BN (52ID RES).

1. Priority for planning are;
   1. Reinforce Geronimo FLS to ensure future air land operations continue uninterrupted.
   2. security of Marwandi Pumping Station to ensure hydrocarbon pumping remains uninterrupted.
   3. Reinforce 2MAGTF at NATCHITOCHES REGIONAL AIRPORT to ensure ALOC remains secure.

k. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) This FRAGORD effective upon receipt. Direct liaison authorized between 52ID and all subordinate units.

(2) (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

(a) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

1. (U) Will Ariana resume their attack?

2. (U) Where are SAPA and IRA SPF attempting to gain access to and/or employ advanced weapons systems and/or chemical weapons?

3. (U) Where have SAPA and associated groups established or expanded areas of influence?

4. (U) What is the composition, disposition, strength and intent of the insurgent forces remaining in the AO?

5. (U) What is the capability and capacity of local law enforcement elements in the AO?

(b) Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR):

1. What is the status of essential services throughout the AO?

2. What is the status of local and national police forces?

3. Change in number of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft available to support operations.

4. (U) Non-mission capable (NMC)/combat loss to below 80 percent OR rate for AAV (all variants), LAV, M1A2, M1107 w/TOW, M119, M777, M109A6, LW 155, HIMARS, OH-58 (all variants), AH-64D/E, UH-60 (all variants), CH-47 (all variants), AH-1Z,UH-1Y, CH-53K, MV-22, F-35B, C-130J, bulldozer/DEUCE, AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, AN/TPQ 53, earth moving equipment, SIGINT equipment (AN/MLQ-40 and AN/PRD-13), SENTINEL, AVENGER, bulk fuel systems (M969 and M978), and water purification assets (TWPS/FWPSS).

5. (U) Fratricides, friendly fire incidents, and incidents involving local Atropian or Gorgan nationals that can undermine U.S. resolve and impact on U.S. efforts in the ROA.

6. (U) Compromise of COMSEC/SOI and actions taken as a result of the compromise.

(3) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(a) (U) 52ID organization and capabilities.

(b) (U) Operational graphics.

(c) (U) Locations of unit areas of operation, command posts, and timeline for attack/deployment.

(d) (U) Location of indirect fire assets, air defense weapons, IC and SIGINT collection assets.

(e) (U) Force protection plans for 52ID routes.

(f) (U) Location and timelines of convoy operations.

(g) (U) Rules of engagement, unit boundaries, fire coordination/restriction measures, and any other constraints/controls on operations.

(h) (U) Friendly reconnaissance activities.

(i) (U) Travel itineraries of command groups and Senior Ranking Officers (SRO), VIPs, or dignitaries.

(j) (U) Names of indigenous personnel providing information to U.S. Forces.

(4) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures. Annex D (Fires) (U).

(5) (U) Airspace Coordination Measures. Appendix 10 (Airspace Control) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

(6) (U) Rules of Engagement. Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

(7) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures.

(a) (U) Annex E (Protection) (U).

(b) (U) Air Defense Warning (adw) is WHITE; weapons control status (wcs) is TIGHT.

(c) (U) Threat condition: charlie (High).

(d) (U) MOPP level: MOPP Ready.

(e) (U) Nuclear threat condition: WHITE.

(f) (U) Biological threat condition: GREEN.

(g) (U) Chemical threat condition: AMBER.

(h) Forward Risk Assessment to the CDR, 52ID (ATTN: G3) at 1200 daily or upon a change of task organization, mission, deployment methods and/or significant weather.

(8) (U) Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures. Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) (U).

(9) (U) Environmental Considerations. Omitted.

(10) (U) Soldier and Leader Engagement. Appendix 13 (MISO) to Annex C (Operations) (U) and Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) (U).

(11) (U) Other Coordinating Instructions.

(a) (U) All fixed-wing landing zone runways are off-limits to vehicular traffic and rotary-wing aircraft parking and landing.

(b) (U) Blackout drive is required east of road intersection vicinity VQ848423 and west of road intersection vicinity WQ053438.

(c) (U) Track vehicle traffic on HWY 469 is not permitted south of the intersection of HWY 469 and HILL 119 ROAD vicinity VQ85504470. HILL 119 ROAD may be used by track vehicle traffic for access to ARTILLERY ROAD.

(d) (U) Mark and report all enemy obstacles, fortifications, and minefields IAW unit TSOP.

(e) (U) Do not destroy U.S. military equipment without approval from CDR, 52ID.

(f) (U) Do not conduct ground movement and operations within 200 meters of WQ033411 due to presence of an Atropian archaeological site.

(g) (U) Report the following through the chain of command to CDR, 52ID, (ATTN: SJA) by PURPLE 21 FLASH Report (see Reference m (U)).

1. (U) Any death of U.S. forces personnel, to include hostile KIAs, non-battle accidental deaths, and suicides.

2. (U) Any MIA, DUSTWUN, or kidnapping of U.S. forces personnel.

3. (U) All fratricide/friendly-fire incidents (FFI) resulting in death, any injury, or damage to equipment severe enough to render it non-mission capable. This requirement includes fratricide/FFI involving civilians supporting or accompanying 52ID forces or involving “green” forces (ROASF).

4. (U) Any death or serious injury, accidental or otherwise, to a civilian or noncombatant caused by U.S. forces in any circumstance, including as a result of combat operations. Serious injury is defined as physical injury requiring evacuation to and medical treatment at a medical treatment facility.

5. (U) Any instance of detainee abuse or death, whether caused by U.S. or ROASF.

6. (U) All Escalation of Force (EOF) incidents that result in serious injury, death, or property damage in excess of $1,000. For the purposes of this requirement, EOF incidents are defined as the employment of nonlethal force or lethal force that results in weapons discharge where the purpose or intent of the weapons discharge is to defend an individual or unit. EOF SIGACT will contain the following information:

a. (U) Who: number of casualties - civilian and military. Include name(s), age, and gender; other units involved; and witnesses.

b. (U) What: EOF procedures taken, approximate distances, actions/reactions of the subject(s) to EOF procedures, and type of operation being conducted (moving or static).

c. (U) When/Where: DTG/MGRS.

7. (U) Any suspected or known violations of the ROE, U.S. law, ROA law, international law, and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

8. (U) Any entry by U.S. military or ROASF personnel during combined operations into a church, mosque, minaret, prayer house, cemetery, or other religious structure.

9. (U) Any detention of religious or governmental officials, contact with diplomatic personnel, and requisition of civilian property.

10. (U) Any incident evidencing corruption among ROASF personnel or governing officials or where ROASF personnel commit serious criminal offenses. Corruption includes bribery, graft, and extortion. Serious criminal offenses include murder, assault, and theft.

11. (U) Serious legal incidents such as requests for claims of diplomatic immunity by third country nationals, claims made against the U.S. government, mass civilian transfers or evacuations, or actions by U.S. Forces that will have a significant environmental impact.

12. (U) Any accidental or negligent discharge of any weapons system.

13. (U) Any incident in which a contractor fires a weapon.

14. (U) Any Class A accident.

15. (U) Any friendly violations of airspace constraints.

16. (U) Any interaction with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

a. (U) U.S. Commanders must recognize the special status of the ICRC and, subject to reasonable security and operational restrictions, shall cooperate with the ICRC in the performance of their humanitarian duties.

b. (U) Delegates of the ICRC shall have access to all EPWs and detainees that are interned by U.S. Forces. Such access may be prohibited only for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exception and temporary measure.

c. (U) Commanders with custody of EPWs or civilian internees/detainees will detail a JA to serve as liaison with each visiting ICRC team. The detailed JA will notify the SJA of all requests by ICRC delegates to visit EPW or internee/detainee facilities by the most expeditious means available.

d. (U) All contacts with the ICRC will be reported to the 52ID SJA within two hours and a detailed report of all inspections shall be provided within 12 hours.

17. (U) As directed by the CDR, 52ID.

(h) (U) All BCT Surgeon Cells will provide:

1. (U) DNBI reports to 52ID MED OPS twice daily NLT 0600 and 1800 via SIPR.

2. (U) mTBl report to the MED OPS NLT 1000 via SIPR.

(i) U) 52ID PAO must approve all media releases.

(j) (U) Provide escort for humanitarian convoys, if resources are available, in respective AO to assist their safe and unimpeded movement.

(k) (U) BCT commanders will participate in 52ID Commander’s Update Brief (CUB) as directed in Appendix 16 (52ID Battle Rhythm) to Annex C (Operations) (U). See Appendix 1 (Commander’s Update Brief (Blue 1)) to Annex A (Operations Reports) to Reference o (U) for the CUB template, submission requirements, and PACE plan.

(l) (U) Provide grid coordinates of BCT Role 1 and 2 care locations to 52ID MED OPS NLT 24 hours after entry into assigned AO and update as required.

(m) (U) Provide grid coordinates of Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) systems and BCT maintenance collection point locations to 52ID J4 NLT 24 hours after entry into assigned AO/AO and update as required.

(n) (U) Establish a brigade support area upon deployment from ISB ALEXANDRIA to facilitate rapid buildup of combat power and secure reception of logistics distribution convoys.

(o) (U) Establish and operate a Detainee Collection Point upon arrival in assigned AO.

(p) (U) Submit detainee status report daily at 1600 to 52ID SJA.

(q) (U) IOM SC-TACSAT communications with 52ID NLT one hour after arrival in assigned AO.

(r) (U) All units having attached or organic Attack or Scout Rotary wing platforms are required to submit gun tapes of any engagements to 21 CAB Standardization Officer and 52ID Staff Judge Advocate for review of ROE and tactics used in the engagement. Gun tape must be received NLT 72 hours after an engagement. If units are unable to submit gun tape due to equipment malfunctions etc. they are required to provide a written detailed de-brief of the engagement to include ROE used, name and rank of individual who approved the engagement, effects of the engagement, and any other pertinent information that could assist with trend analysis and legal proceedings should a collateral damage or AR 15-6 investigation arise from the engagement.

(s) (U) Coordinate any contact with Host Nation Security Forces or Government officials in respective AO through the U.S. Consulate personnel in DARA LAM.

(t) (U) Establish Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) links (NIPR and SIPR) nlt 48 hours after deployment into AO SHIELD. All WIN-T assets will be operational during RSOI phase at the ISB prior to movement into assigned AO.

(u) (U) BPT meet with Atropian Ministry of the Interior (MOI) officials and local government officials to discuss current security situation in respective AO.

(v) (U) BPT maintain an ROASF Liaison Officer to facilitate coordination with ROASF in respective AO.

(w) (U) BPT partner with ROASF in respective AO to defeat SAPA and Arianian forces.

(x) (U) BPT conduct company and battalion-sized air assault operations to destroy enemy forces and return key infrastructure to ROASF control.

(y) (U) BPT conduct press conferences and media interviews to communicate with the local population and inform the international community about U.S. operations in Atropia.

(z) (U) BPT transmit video and print via Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) NLT 4 November 2015.

(aa) (U) BPT secure U.S. citizens and designated TCNs, secure key infrastructure and facilitate humanitarian relief operations.

(bb) (U) BPT facilitate rearward passage of ROA Army forces.

(cc) (U) BPT facilitate the storage, transport, and distribution of HA supplies within assigned AO. DIRLAUTH with 52 SUST BDE to ensure HA supplies reach the intended recipients within assigned AO.

(dd) (U) Support identification.

(ee) (U) Protect key personnel and facilities.

**4. (U) Sustainment**. Annex F (Sustainment) (U). 52ID secures ISB ALEXANDRIA (15RWQ4365) and facilitates establishment of logistics support activities. Subordinate brigades will establish and secure brigade support areas and conduct unit-level supply support activity operations in order to build and maintain combat power. 52 Sustainment Brigade (SUST BDE) provides sustainment support to all 52ID operations. 21 Replacement Detachment establishes in-gate/replacement operations at ISB ALEXANDRIA. Supporting Role 3 is 1234 CSH at ISB ALEXANDRIA.

a. (U) Logistics.

(1) (U) Priority of support is to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(2) (U) Scheme of EAB Support: 52 SUST BDE provides sustainment support to 52ID at ISB ALEXANDRIA and provides distribution, transportation support, and field-level maintenance support to 52ID and AO SHIELD. Strategic deployment support is provided through 10 TSC which coordinates sustainment support in the theater of war. 12 ESC coordinates inland/ground movement of assets from APOD/SPOD to the ISB and is the lead sustainment headquarters in the theater of operations.

(3) (U) Submit LOGSTAT via the Logistics Reporting Tool (BCS3/S2MC) 0600 and 1800 daily. Ensure basic load data and unit task organization are up-to-date. See Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) (U).

(4) (U) Supply. Priority of supply: Class III (B), V, IV, I (Water), IX, and I (MRE). Limited CLVII resupply available for battle loss replacement. Submit battle loss reports to

52ID J4 within 24 hours of combat loss.

(a) (U) Limited CL V resupply available until 1 November 2015. BCTs/BDEs must sign for and secure available CL V stocks prior to deployment from the ISB. Establish basic load/combat loads based on initial draws.

(b) (U) Maximize secondary loads on rolling stock to ensure a minimum of three days of supply upon deployment from ISB into AO SHIELD.

(5) (U) Maintenance. Tab B (Maintenance) to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) (U).

(a) (U) Maintenance and Dispatch cycle is 72 hours. All dispatches require field-level QA/QC to validate the DA Form 2404/5988E. Cannibalization is not authorized; controlled substitution as approved by BDE CDRs. Report 026/Unit Combat Power to 52ID daily at 0600/1800.

(b) (U) Priority of ground maintenance: Radars (AN/TPQ-36/37/50), Missiles (TOW/Javelin), AAV (all variants), LAV, M1A2, M3A3, M2A3, M1167 TOW/ITAS Carrier, M109A6, M119, M777, HIMARS, earth moving equipment, SIGINT equipment, bulk fuel equipment, bulldozer/D7, SENTINEL, AVENGER, Water Purification assets, and general support equipment.

(c) (U) Priority of aviation maintenance: AH 64D/E, AH-1Z, UH-60 (all variants), CH-53K, and CH-47 (all variants).

(6) (U) Transportation. 52ID has priority for airlift support; maximize use of airlands and air drops to rapidly deploy combat power into AO SHIELD. Tactical troop transportation will be supported by 52 SUST BDE on a general support basis; 52 SUST BDE has limited FMTV assets to support tactical troop movements and prioritization will be IAW concept of operations.

(a) (U) Priority of forward movement is Class III (B), IV, V, water, and troops. Priority of rearward movement is casualty evacuation. Purified water is the primary source of water in theater.

(b) (U) Units must request convoy clearance to the Defense Movement Coordinator for convoy movement on all local numbered highways; POC is 318-641-5714. Convoys of more than five (5) tactical vehicles will not be allowed to travel without approved DD Form 1265 or 1266 (Convoy Clearance/Special Hauling Permit).

(c) (U) Local law enforcement traffic control points must be operational during unit movement windows of local highways (Gorgas HWY 28 - Ground Line of Communication (GLOC)). Submit movement tables to 52ID G4; convoys will BPT adhere to approved movement timelines as directed by 52ID G4.

(7) (U) Distribution. Tab F (Distribution) to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) (U). Coordinate routine and emergency distribution requirements through 52ID G4.

(a) (U) Request CSSB support via 52ID G4; Request for Support format is provided in Tab F (Distribution) (U). CSSBs will primarily deliver to brigade support areas (BSA) or a secure Logistics Release Point (LRP); throughput to battalion trains is available on a limited basis.

(b) (U) Receiving units are responsible for securing LRPs.

(c) (U) Airlift and airdrops require Joint Movement Request submitted through the BDE Aviation Element to 52ID G3 Air and G4 for coordination and approval; DIRLAUTH with respective Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO) for airland/airdrop coordination measures.

(8) (U) Mortuary Affairs. Tab H (Mortuary Affairs) to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) (U). BDEs will establish unit collection points and develop remains evacuation plans; hasty burials are not authorized.

b. (U) Personnel Services Support. Appendix 2 (Personnel Services Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) (U). 21 HR Detachment provides direct support to 52ID for theater in-gate/RSOI support, and replacement holding.

(1) (U) Unit strength reports (JPERSTAT) due to 52ID J1 NLT 0600/1800 daily via SIPR e-mail (or according to PACE plan) beginning 29 September 2015. Personnel numbers should also be submitted via BCS3 for redundancy. Casualty forecasts due NLT 290900 September 2015. Running estimates should be updated every 72 hours. Casualty packets are due within 24 hours of a combat loss.

(2) (U) Priority of personnel replacement to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(3) (U) Submit Personnel Requirement Requests (PRR) to 52ID G1 for replacements. Units are responsible for coordinating intra-theater movement of replacements from the 21st Replacement Center (FWD) at ISB ALEXANDRIA.

c. (U) Health Services Support. Appendix 3 (Health Service Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) (U). 10 MED BDE provides medical mission command to MEDCOM elements attached supporting CJTF-C; provides general support to all CJTF-C units.

(1) (U) Scheme of Theater Medical Support: 789 Multifunctional Medical Battalion (MMB) provides general support to U.S. forces in AO SHIELD; provides Role 2 area support for divisional and EAB units. 1234 CSH is located at ISB ALEXANDRIA and provides Role 3 medical support to 52ID and all U.S. forces in AO SHIELD; provides life, limb, or eyesight treatment for all other personnel; manages medical supplies and blood banks; and coordinates ground and aero-medical evacuation to support theatre operations. Role 2 Care will be provided by organic brigade and area support medical companies.

(2) (U) Casualties evacuated from theater will proceed to Ramstein AFB, Germany for transfer to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) for extended care/rehabilitation. Priority of medical support set by 52ID Surgeon (SURG).

(3) (U) BCT/BDEs must submit HSS plans to 52ID SURG NLT ????????? for review; MEDSTAT due daily at 0600/1800. Report all AXP locations and active times to 52ID MEDOPS.

(4) (U) Medical Logistics is provided by 10 MED BDE through subordinate MED battalions to supported Brigade Medical Supply Offices. Submit Class VIII shortages to 52ID Surgeon.

**5. (U) Command and Signal.**

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) Location of Commander. 52ID Main Command Post.

(2) (U) Succession of Command. CG, DCG (O), DCG (S), COS, in order.

(3) (U) Liaison Requirements. TBP.

b. (U) Control.

(1) (U) Command Posts.

(a) (U) 52ID Main Command Post located at 15RWQ444662 at ISB ALEXANDRIA.

(b) (U) 52ID Tactical Command Post co-located with 52ID Main Command Post.

(2) (U) Reports. Report SIGACTS IAW Appendix 9 (SIGACT Reporting Standard) to Reference m (U).

c. (U) Signal.

(1) (U) Annex H (Signal) (U).

(2) (U) 52ID SOI 16-02, in effect upon receipt of OPORD.

(3) (U) 52ID TEK 16-02 in effect upon receipt of OPORD.

(4) (U) Priority of Signal Support. Priority of signal support is to 2/21 IBCT, 1/21 IBCT, 2/52 IBCT, 2 MAGTF, 21 CAB, 52 DIVARTY, 21 MEB, and 52 SUST BDE. Priority shifts to 52ID Reserve when committed.

(a) (U) Priority of digital communications between 52ID Headquarters and subordinate units is:

1. (U) Primary: Transverse chat (52ID CUOPS).

2. (U) Alternate: CPOF with Ventrilo.

3. (U) Contingency: Adobe Connect.

4. (U) Emergency: TACSAT (52ID CMD).

(b) (U) Priority of analog communications between 52ID Headquarters and subordinate units is:

1. (U) Primary: FM (52ID CMD: FH 300) (WARRIOR-MAIN).

2. (U) Alternate: TACSAT (52ID) (DAMA) (WARRIOR MAIN).

3. (U) Contingency: Iridium Phone at (337) 531- 9553 (52ID).

4. (U) Emergency: Host Nation Cell Phone Network

(5) (U) 52ID brigade and battalion level subordinate units will use the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) as the primary event reporting tool.

(6) (U) 52ID subordinate units will monitor the following FM NETs while operating within assigned AO/AO: 52IDCMD FH 300, 52ID O/I FH 302, 52ID FIRES FH 308, and 52ID AVN CAG SC CT 71.000.

(7) (U) O/O, conduct COMSEC changeover. The appropriate SOI edition will be directed NLT 72 prior to COMSEC changeover.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:**

MCGUIRE

CG

**OFFICIAL:**

OLIN

COS

**ANNEXES:**

Annex A - Task Organization (U)

Annex B - Intelligence (U)

Annex C - Operations (U)

Annex D - Fires (U)

Annex E - Protection (U)

Annex F - Sustainment (U)

Annex G - Engineer (U)

Annex H - Signal (U)

Annex I - Not Used

Annex J - Public Affairs (U)

Annex K - Civil Affairs Operations (U)

Annex L - Information Collection (U)

Annex M - Assessment (Omitted)

Annex N - Space Operations (Omitted)

Annex O - Not Used

Annex P - Host Nation Support (Omitted)

Annex Q - Knowledge Management (Omitted)

Annex R - Reports (Omitted - refer to 52ID Reporting SOP, 1 June 2015 (U))

Annex S - Special Technical Operations (Omitted)

Annex T - Spare

Annex U - Inspector General (Omitted)

Annex V - Interagency Coordination (U)

Annex W - Operational Contract Support (Omitted)

Annex X - Spare

Annex Y - Spare

Annex Z - Distribution (Omitted)

**DISTRIBUTION:** Special