**Scene Setter**

OVERVIEW: This STAFF EXERCISE (STAFFEX) provides the Brigade the training support package (TSP) necessary to train the IAW the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) for the supporting collective task for “Establish Civil Security” which is a subordinate task to the METL task “Conduct Area Security”. The TSP allows the brigade to use its available training time to training the task rather than planning the training.

Included is: A “Road to War”; a FRAGO; a TASKORG; a “.pdf” Ft Polk map; and ANNEX Kilo. There is a separate document to guide discussion, whether used by the BDE Commander, XO, or the STAFFEX Controller if an external team is brought in to facilitate the training.

REQUIREMENT:Operating in a time constrained environment, the Staff will conduct MDMP activities in order to develop Critical Tasks and a Course of Action Statement and Sketch for Phase IV, Stability as well as any Request For Forces (RFF), or Required Information Requirements (RFI).

SITUATION: The Brigade, TF DRAGON- 2/52 IBCT, completed Phases I-III, and the enemy’s ability to mount and sustain operations above Platoon-level is non-existent. The Brigade is now arrayed across the battlespace and is planning for Phase IV Operations. As Phase IV operations were “TBP” in the original OPORD, the attached FRAGORD is provided for the Staff to conduct planning. Your Brigade is not yet operating from FOBs or fixed facilities. As in the FRAGO, the Brigade is vicinity Geronimo Drop Zone. Your three Infantry battalions are operating across the brigade Area of Operation partnering with the Host Nation’s forces; your Cavalry Squadron is conducting Screening Operations in the Southeastern part of your AO; your BSB and BEB are operating near Self Airfield in the Brigade Support Area. To facilitate your training event, your brigade picks the exact grids for STARTEX, allowing you to adjust your footprint in your AO to fit your Concept of the Operation.

1. Enemy Forces:

1. (U) Islamic Republic of Ariana (Ariana or IRA).

(U) Over the last twenty-four months, intelligence indicated Ariana had become increasingly disenchanted with Atropian exploitation and exportation of natural resources to Europe and the West. Ariana increased its support to the South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) and methodically prepared for conflict with Atropia: movement of its air and missile strike assets eastward; systematic probing of Atropian government networks (including those for oil/gas production); aggressive perception management operations to influence ethnic Persians living in Atropia. Also, as part of its Information Warfare (INFOWAR) campaign, Ariana claimed Atropia as a “historical part” of its sovereign territory.

(U) Islamic Republic of Ariana (IRA) military forces commenced a series of large scale, joint and combined arms, offensive oriented training exercises on 28 August 2014 near the international border (IB) with the Republic of Atropia (ROA or Atropia). Each of these exercises lasted two to three weeks in duration. The result of these exercises caused the ROA Armed Forces to remain on a high state of alert which degraded unit readiness and reduced the effectiveness of ROA counterinsurgency operations. On 3 June 2015, IRA forces initiated a large scale operation under the guise of a recurring training exercise that was in fact preliminary posturing for an invasion of Atropia. On 4 July 2017, IRA military forces invaded Atropia. After a brief but deadly decisive action to defeat IRA and restore the international border, IRA forces were pushed back across the border and are now reconsolidating in pre-conflict defensive positions in Ariana. Their ability to continue decisive military operations is severely degraded after heavy attacks by U.S. and Coalition Forces.

(U) Currently, Atropian ground and air forces, supported by six (US) Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF), are successfully holding the enemy FLOT. Intelligence indicates Ariana is experiencing considerable logistical strain and poor moral and recruiting. Ariana’s ability to resume offensive operations into Atropia is next to impossible given attrition from recent combat operations.

1. (U) Insurgents. Atropian stability is impacted by several insurgent, terrorist, and criminal actors.

1) (U) South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) – SAPA membership consists primarily of ethnic Persians identifying culturally and religiously with Ariana. They seek formation of an independent ethnic Persian state in western and central Atropia. The SAPA represent a significant tactical threat to U.S. Forces operating in JOA SHIELD. They operate primarily at the multifunctional cell level, but can form to groups of 100-150 fighters within a 24 hour period; and depending on population support in a given area can mass up to 500 fighters within 96 hours. SAPA’s recent efforts to forcefully gain and hold ground and influence large sections of several southwestern and west-central Atropian provinces was successful, creating pockets of denied territory and strongpoints. The establishment of these strongpoints began as early as 7 October 2014 in MARSHALL (15SUS7101) and PORT ARTHUR (15RVP0906). SAPA then established a strongpoint in LUFKIN (15RUQ3568) on 6 December 2015; and strongpoints in JASPER (15RVQ0421), LEESVILLE (15RVQ7545), and DERIDDER (15RVQ7212) on 25 January 2015. SAPA then established strongpoints in NACOGDOCHES (15RUQ4297) on 16 March 2015. SAPA continued its expansion by controlling key terrain in SANGARI (15RVQ884412) by 4 July 2015. SAPA’s most recently established strongpoints include BEAUMONT (15RUP9129), ORANGE (15RVP1821), and SHREVEPORT (15SVR2999) on 2 September 2015. Western Shreveport initially fell under SAPA control two weeks after the AA invasion on 4 July 2015. SAPA forces also seized control of the Marwandi Pumping Station (MPS) on 26 September 2015. SAPA’s span of influence and control is prominent within Agdash, Agjabadi, Janga, Kirsham, Kurdamir, Mukhsa, Torvuz, Ujar, and Yevlahk provinces which contain large ethnic Persian populations with several other provinces in eastern Atropia containing smaller enclaves. Since the Arianian invasion, most of the SAPA forces in west-central Atropia have evolved into a paramilitary insurgency. This perception comes from its successes in the Republic of Atropia (ROA) with the rapid takeover of Persian enclaves and the ability to hold ground within central Atropia. The ready availability of recruits, many of whom are ethnic Persian Atropians, are attracted to SAPA’s recent successes. SAPA also increased requisitioning and confiscation of transportation assets and material, to include the acquisition and utilization of captured high-end equipment from the Atropian military. SAPA’s primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, mortars, light and heavy machine guns, MANPADS, technical vehicles, HMMWV gun trucks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), armored reconnaissance vehicles, towed artillery, self-propelled air defense platforms, tanks, IED/VBIED, mines, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and limited access to chemical and biological agents. Disposition of SAPA networks operating in JOA SHIELD:

2) (U) Mokri-Tir Network. JTF- 21 J2 assesses the Mokri-Tir Network total combat power ranges from 800-1300 personnel. Operations of this network control or influence DERIDDER (15RVQ7212), ROSEPINE (15RVQ777265), OBERLIN (15RWP223870), HORNBECK (15RVQ6265), MERRYVILLE (15RVQ4802), SIMPSON (15RVQ995585), SANGARI (15RVQ884412), KHAISTA (15RVQ869389), MARJANI (15RVQ941352), KURTHWOOD (15RVQ784704), MARGHOZ (15RVQ951447), BATOOR (15RVQ942435), the MPS (15RWQ043370), and HWY 28 from LEESVILLE (15RVQ7545) to the IB with GORGAS.

\* Although LEESVILLE is outside JOA Shield, SAPA forces in that area have the capacity to and will likely impact operations throughout JOA Shield.

3) (U) Parizad Network. CJTF-C CJ2 assesses the Parizad Network total combat power ranges from 1150-1800 personnel. Operations of this network influence BEAUMONT, BRIDGE CITY, DAISETTA, DEQUINCY, LAKE CHARLES, LIBERTY, MOSS BLUFF, NEDERLAND, ORANGE, PORT ARTHUR, PORT NECHES, SILSBEE, and SULPHUR.

4) (U) Sadvol – Ethnic Atropian nationalist. They seek regime change. The Sadvol do not pose a significant direct action threat to U.S. Forces operating in JOA SHIELD. Their current operations throughout Atropia are focused on overt political actions to influence like-minded Atropians they can govern more effectively than the Ismailov autocracy. Their recent actions inside JOA SHIELD center on influencing the major population centers of FLORIEN (15RVQ5678), DARA LAM (15RWQ035415), DERIDDER, OAKDALE (15RWQ3209), and SANGARI. Sadvol activity in LEESVILLE and LAKE CHARLES (15RVP7944) influences operations in JOA SHIELD. Although primarily a political organization, Sadvol has an armed wing to provide security for the group’s operations. These cells and armed wings are active at these locations and collectively range in size from 3 to 30 personnel. Sadvol’s armed wing’s primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, light machine guns, commercial explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

c. (U) Terrorists.

1) (U) Faqih – Jihadist following a Salafist theo-ideology. They seek to establish a Caucasus Emirate/Caliphate. The Faqih are engaged in a campaign to cultivate fundamentalist sentiments into action targeting those who oppose the spread of Islam. Primarily they are engaged in irregular warfare (IW), assassinations, kidnappings, and limited direct action attacks against Atropian Security Forces and government officials throughout Atropia. Their recent actions inside JOA SHIELD focus on influencing the major population centers of ANACOCO (15RVQ6757), DARA LAM, DERIDDER, GARDNER (15RWQ2959), MANY (15RVQ5492), OAKDALE and SANGARI. Faqih activity in LEESVILLE and DEQUINCY (15RVP5868) influences operations in JOA SHIELD. Cells are active at these locations and range in size from 3 to 30 personnel. Faqih’s primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, light machine guns, IED/VBIED, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

2) (U) Godly Martyrs’ Brigade (GMB) – Jihadist following a Salafist theo-ideology. They support Faqih goals and efforts by providing a suicide capability. The GMB is engaged in an ongoing campaign of spectacular attacks against Atropian Security Forces and government officials throughout Atropia. Their targeting of critical hydrocarbon, electrical, and transportation infrastructure throughout JOA SHIELD has escalated in recent months. GMB cells are collocated with each Faqih cell. GMB cells range in size from 3 to 9 personnel. GMB’s primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, light machine guns, SVEST/SVBIED, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

d. (U) Criminals – The Baqquani Crime Family (BCF) is a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO). The BCF seek to expand operations, control bases of operations in uncontested or lightly contested areas, and influence political outcomes. BCF gangs are actively supporting insurgent groups operating in JOA SHIELD with military grade arms, explosives, ammunition, and materials to include precursor chemicals like methyl phosphonyl difluoride (CH3POF2). Recently reported BCF operations indicate gangs are operating in JOA SHIELD at or near DARA LAM, DERIDDER, DEQUINCY, GARDNER, KINDER (15RWP1472), OAKDALE, OBERLIN (15RWP2287), SHKIN (15RWQ094356), and UNION HILL (15RWQ2529). BCF activity in LEESVILLE also influences operations in JOA SHIELD. BCF gangs range in size from 3 to 30 personnel. BCF’s primary weapons and weapons systems include small arms, light machine guns, commercial explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

2. (U) Friendly Forces. U.S. Forces transitioned to Phase IV Stability. 52ID in partnership with ANF, are conducting Stability operations to provide civil security, restore essential services, and facilitate civil control to enable transfer of authority back to legitimate Atropian governmental organizations.

a. 2/52 IBCT (ME) conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF) to control AO BEAR in order to provide civil security, provide for immediate human needs and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control. Additionally, the Brigade must protect U.S. citizens and designated TCNs, protect U.S. Consulate in DARA LAM (15RWQ035409), secure GERONIMO FLS (15RWQ033420), secure the BVS Pipeline Marwandi Pumping Station (MPS) (15RWQ043370), and facilitate humanitarian relief operations, as required.

b. 2/21 IBCT, (SE 1), conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF) in AO WOLF to provide civil security, provide immediate human needs and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control. 2/21IBCT ensures coalition freedom of maneuver along MSR BRONZE, partners with ROASF units to facilitate efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevents enemy movement east along HWY 26 and south along HWYs 171/190 to protect U.S. citizens and designated TCNs, secure key infrastructure, and as required facilitate humanitarian relief operations.

c. 1/21 IBCT, (SE 2), conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF) in AO HOG to provide civil security, restore essential services and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control. 1/21 IBCT secures MSR BRONZE and conducts partnership operations to enable ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy forces use of HWY 10 west to east mobility corridor to I-49, protect BVS pipeline infrastructure, protect U.S. citizens and designated TCN, and as required facilitate humanitarian relief operations.

d. 2 MAGTF (SE3) conducts stabilization activities in partnership with Atropian National Forces (ANF) in AO PULLER to provide civil security, restore essential services and facilitate ANF establishment of civil control and partnership operations to, support ROASF efforts to defeat SAPA insurgent threats, prevent enemy north/south freedom of maneuver, protect U.S. interests, protect U.S. citizens and designated TCN, and as required facilitate humanitarian relief operations.

52ID Area of Interest

