

# Lesson Report

## Partnering



**U.S. Navy Seabees and Seabees from the Armed Forces work together on Nov. 15, 2019 to place concrete for grade beams for the new Malatgao Elementary School. The American Seabees are deployed across the Indo-Pacific region supporting partner nations to strengthen partnerships, deter aggression, and enable expeditionary logistics and naval power projection. (U.S. Navy photo by Steelworker 3rd Class Taylor Myers)**

**December 2019**

**Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute  
(PKSOI)**

# Table of Contents

	<u>PAGE</u>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2. Partnering Insights Lessons</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>The Combined Approach to Partnership</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>The Importance of Unity of Effort to Building Partner Capacity (BPC)</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Between NATO and UN: EU Strategic Culture and its Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Joint Venture Public-Private Partnerships as a Way to Economic Development</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Lessons for Multi-National Peace Operations: Experiences in Mali</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Interagency Partnership Center in Mogadishu, Somalia</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Civil Affairs and Partnering in Colombia</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Partnering</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>3. PKSOI Lesson Reports and SOLLIMS Samplers (2014-2019)</b>	<b>27</b>

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This quarter's SOLLIMS Lesson Learned Report theme is partnering. Partnering is a broad concept in peacekeeping and stability operations, ranging from informal cooperation between aiding organizations and local authorities, to the doctrinal concepts embodied in [Joint Publication JP 3-20 Security Cooperation](#).

U.S. security cooperation encompasses all activities with foreign security forces and institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests. Gaining and maintaining access with partner nations to build their capacity in the support of U.S. goals is the centerpiece of security cooperation efforts. As U.S. national policy acknowledges, the nation will rarely conduct unilateral offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Partnering with allies, whether governmental or non-governmental, is foundational to achieving strategic objectives. ([JP 3-20, pp. v-vii and p. I-2](#))

In addition to addressing lessons impacting security cooperation partnering, this report also informs strategic culture, economic development, civil affairs considerations and Women, Peace, and Secu-

rity (WPS). Relationships with allies and partner nations advances national security objectives, promotes stability, prevents conflicts, and reduces the risk of having to employ U.S. military forces in a conflict. ([JP 3-20, p. I-1](#))

## **2. PARTNERING INSIGHTS LESSONS**

### **The Combined Approach to Partnership**

#### **(Lesson #668)**

##### **Observation:**

Much can be gained through a “combined approach” to partnership in Stability Operations. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Host Nation Security Force have recently taken such a combined approach to their partnership. Their new combined partnership is essentially an “embedded” partnership – where forces and personnel are “embedded” through co-location. An “embedded” partnership facilitates development of a common operating picture (COP), allows fully integrated operations, and improves effectiveness of the team – from planning through execution. Additionally, when the activities of the “embedded” partnership are synchronized with other civil component efforts – especially at the local level – greater efficiencies are gained toward building capacity and achieving stability.

##### **Discussion:**

In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has learned that to be successful, its partnership with the Host Nation Security Force must be a true partnership. It must be a partnership of “equals.” Prior to 2009, when the ISAF largely established training teams that worked with the Host Nation Security Force on a recurring basis, the ensuing relationship with the Host Nation Security Force was seen as hierarchical – one of superior to subordinate. Communication gaps and misunderstanding between forces, during planning and execution, often developed. On the other hand, when the International Security Assistance Force changed its approach, and actually “embedded” personnel and staffs with Host Nation Security Forces – i.e., physically co-located these individuals – then misperceptions and communication gaps were greatly diminished, and cooperation markedly improved.

In late 2009, the International Security Assistance Force decided to co-locate personnel/staff with the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, Afghan National Border Police, and National Directorate of Security. It established/expanded combined bases well beyond the Regional Command. This integration took place at every level of command – at Forward Operation Bases and at combat outposts across the entire area of operations. In this combined approach, those co-located elements are now able to conduct “combined” planning, briefing, rehearsals, execution, assessment, and re-training. This combined approach has resulted in greater information-sharing, situational understanding, and combined analysis. This combined approach has vastly improved decision-making, accountability, and ownership. Plans and orders are now written in both languages, which facilitates understanding and ownership. Back-briefs are now attended by leaders from ISAF and the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other Afghan security team members, which facilitates feedback

and decision-making. Overall, this new combined approach has resulted in greater teaming and operational success. It has likewise earned greater respect from the Afghan people who have seen this improved teamwork on the ground.

The Combined Team (team of “embedded” security partners) has moreover learned to focus its presence and its security operations down at the local level. In Afghanistan, politics are primarily local. Tribal loyalties are primarily local. Local population centers (which equate to the “key terrain”) do not look to the central or provincial government for security assistance or other services. They seek security assistance from local sources and from the district level government, at most. Hence, it is at the local level and district level where the presence and impacts of the Combined Team are now being made.

Additionally, the Combined Team (the International Security Assistance Force and Host Nation Security Force, co-located and integrated at bases across the area of operations, with focused attention on the district and local levels) has learned that it is not a stand-alone team. Its team and its “combined approach” are now synchronized with other civil component contributors working in the broader scheme of stability operations throughout Afghanistan. Key civil component contributors include: the Afghan Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and the Afghan Civil Service Institute. The IDLG has played a particularly important role in identifying shortfalls and capacity gaps inside the districts, and then coordinating the allocation of District Delivery Packages (DDPs) – which have provided critical support to hiring efforts, training, and education at the local level. As the IDLG and other civil component organizations are included in the Combined Team’s scheme, and as they synchronize efforts, the whole team is now able to build greater institutional capacity at the local levels, expand civil service, and improve security and stability.

### **Recommendations:**

- Partnering: International Security Assistance Forces should physically embed (co-locate) personnel/teams with Host Security Forces to the greatest extent possible – forming a “Combined Team” throughout the area of operation. This co-location/integration should include the institution of permanent exchange officers and permanent translators. Combined activities should include information-sharing, COP development, planning, briefing, rehearsing, executing, assessing, and retraining.
- Planning: In developing plans for Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Afghanistan, planners should continuously take heed that “key terrain” is the local populace.
- Civil-Military Operations: The Combined Team should coordinate continuously with important civil component elements (local governance, reconstruction teams, and civil servants) to synchronize efforts in order to expand the Combined Team’s reach and impact on the local populace.

### **Implications:**

-If “embedded” partnering is not adopted from the outset in Stability Operations, then potential for cooperation, common understanding, and trust will not be fully realized.



-If “embedded” partnering is to be adopted for Stability Operations, then pre-deployment training and plans should be developed accordingly. Pre-deployment training and plans need to incorporate all aspects and requirements of co-location: facilities, security requirements, communication networks, integrated staffs, exchange officers, translators, supporting resources, etc. Commanders should request that Host Nation Security Force officers attend unit-based training in preparation for missions.

-If the local populace is the “key terrain” in a given Host Nation, then resources – to include Strategic Intelligence resources – should be dedicated to understanding, influencing, and tracking this key terrain, so that the Combined Team can gain and maintain continuous situational awareness and understand the effects of its operations.

-If the Combined Team is to have the ability to share information and coordinate operations with certain civil components (local governance, reconstruction teams, civil service, etc.), as well as leverage their capabilities, then processes, procedures, and resources (information systems) need to be identified, established, and maintained to effect this coordination.

-As the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police expand force structures and employees in the immediate future, the ISAF will need to grow the partnership and “embed” forces accordingly. “Right-sizing” the forces should be based on recent “combined approach” experiences, operational capacity of forces, and key terrain.

### **Sources:**

This lesson is based on the article “[The Combined Team: Partnered Operations in Afghanistan](#)”, by Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. and David W. Pendall in *Small Wars Journal*, published online May 25, 2010.

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in SOLLIMS 18 August 2010.

This lesson was also published in [SOLLIMS Lesson Learned Report “Security Sector Reform,”](#) July 10, 2010 and [SOLLIMS Sampler “Building Capacity,”](#) volume 3, number 1, January, 2012.

## **The Importance of Unity of Effort to Building Partner Capacity (BPC)**

### **(Lesson #2731)**

### **Observation:**

The United States’ experience in the Pacific region indicates successful Building Partner Capacity (BPC) efforts require planning integration from the national policy through strategic and operational levels to the tactical unit implementing the BPC tasks.

### **Discussion:**

The interwar Philippine Defense Mission provides pertinent historical context for the challenges of BPC today for the United States. Initially, the Mission appeared to possess many of the prerequisites modern BPC studies identify as critical to mission success. For example, U.S. and Philippine strategic interests were closely aligned. By 1934, the Japanese navy had announced plans to break the Washington Naval Treaties and resume battleship construction, threatening U.S. Pacific interests. Also, Japan's army had completed its conquest of Manchuria. Consequently, many Philippine leaders feared they were Japan's next target.

Additionally, the Philippine Defense Mission's staff included some of the most talented officers in the interwar Army. Besides Douglas MacArthur, who had commanded both the Philippine Division and the entire Philippine Department in the 1920s prior to rising to Army chief of staff, the Mission's two senior officers were rising stars Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and James Ord.

Finally, the Philippine's leadership was supportive of building an army, committing 25 percent of its budget to defense spending, and, at least initially, gave MacArthur virtual carte blanche in determining "questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel."<sup>1</sup>

The BPC mission to the Philippines failed, however, due to several factors that would be readily recognizable to modern practitioners and analysts. First, it lacked Unity of Effort, especially at the strategic military level. From the beginning, MacArthur was isolated in his efforts to build a Philippine army. Instead, the War Plans Division proposed gradually expanding the Philippine Constabulary rather than building a large, expensive army. Consequently, what were vital priorities for the Mission and the Philippine army were treated with indifference and a lack of funding by the War Department.

Second, current BPC studies note that in order to be effective, U.S. efforts should be tailored to the partner nation's objectives and absorptive capacity. Dafna Rand and Stephen Tankel, for example, find that "U.S. officials should dispense assistance based on what partners need and can absorb."<sup>2</sup> This reflects whether the partner nation has the human capital appropriate for BPC program, the institutional capacity, and perhaps most importantly, the economic capacity. As Jahara Matissek and William Reno observe, "a substantial problem with Western [security force assistance]" is that "it is too focused on building an army in the absence of a viable state that has the institutional capacity and political willpower to sustain that army."<sup>3</sup>

This human capital problem was compounded by a lack of Philippine institutional capacity. Whereas Eisenhower initially had high expectations for the Philippine army and found there were some capable men in the Constabulary, "they seem, with few exceptions, unaccustomed to the requirements of administrative and executive procedure."<sup>4</sup> Finally, the Philippines lacked the political willpower necessary for a successful BPC mission, primarily because it lacked the economic capacity to support MacArthur's grandiose scheme.

BPC Unity of Effort is also critical down to the tactical level. A recent Rand study of U.S. Army Pacific Command's (USARPAC) Security Cooperation (SC) notes that while emphasis on strategic level factors is important, BPC success depends heavily on the focused efforts of the executing unit. A unit is more likely to be effective if it clearly understands which strategic security cooperation objectives it should support, how to prioritize them, and how specific tasks connect to these objectives. Providing

lengthy reference documents containing SC guidance does little to address this gap. These documents are vague (at least when one is searching for event-specific guidance) and can easily overwhelm an executing unit with their sheer volume. Guidance on event objectives needs to be clear, relevant, and concise if it is to be read and applied by an executing unit.

---

<sup>1</sup>Mara Karlin, "[Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint](#)," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96, No. 6 (November/December 2017), p. 112.

<sup>2</sup>Dafna Rand and Stephen Tankel, "[Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment](#)," Center for a New American Security, August 2015, pp. 26-7.

<sup>3</sup>Jahara Matissek and William Reno, "[Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters](#)," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 92, 1st Quarter 2019, p. 66.

<sup>4</sup>Eisenhower Diary, December 27, 1935; and February 6, 1936, in [The Eisenhower Diaries](#), Robert H. Ferrell, ed, (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 11-12, 15.

## **Recommendations:**

-BPC planners should take a Whole of Nation approach to BPC. The U.S. Government, particularly within the War Department, was not unified behind the BPC mission in the Philippines during the interwar years. Failure resulted.

-BPC planners should accurately assess their partner's cultural, technological, economic, and administrative capacity to absorb aid. The Filipinos lacked the institutional capacity to fully benefit from U.S. interwar partner building efforts. Failure resulted.

-BPC planners should ensure the commander's intent portion of a security cooperation order is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It should clearly guide subordinate units actually conducting BPC activities. It should address issues such as:

- Should capacity building efforts focus on short-term or long-term capacity building needs?
- How should the unit balance partner-nation goals with U.S. priorities? Broad policy statements in strategic documents should be clearly explained in terms of tactical level contingencies.
- How important is interoperability? Should the team focus on teaching U.S.-specific systems and practices to improve interoperability or adapt their skills to improve the partner's own systems and practices, even if these are not easily compatible with standard U.S. approaches.

- How much effort should go into relationship building? The team should be provided guidance on whether to focus as much as possible on building partner capacity versus prioritizing social time with their partner-nation counterparts to build rapport and make a good impression, even if this means reducing time spent on technical military objectives.
- Are there any secondary objectives? For example, the unit could be told that the maintenance training is tied to other U.S. priorities, such as supporting U.S. foreign military sales (FMS).

### **Sources:**

This lesson is based on:

Benjamin Runkle, "[Macarthur, Eisenhower, and the Lost Lessons of Building Partnership Capacity](#)," published on the Small Wars website, 14 August, 2019.

Stephen Watts, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Sean Mann, Angela O'Mahony, and Michael Schwille, [Pacific Engagement: Forging Tighter Connections between Tactical Security Cooperation Activities and U.S. Strategic Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region](#), Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1920-A, 2018.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in SOLLIMS 29 August 2019.

## **Between NATO and UN: EU Strategic Culture and its Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation**

(Lesson #2723)

### **Observation:**

The European Union's (EU) approach to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in crisis response incorporates two different strategic culture perspectives. The EU's official concept is shaped by NATO's military-centered vision and is subordinated to the achievement of military goals. In practice, however, the application of CIMIC in EU-led crisis response resembles the UN civilian-centered approach, aiming at supporting civilian environment and protection of humanitarian space.

### **Discussion:**

Values, norms, ideas, patterns of behavior, geographic situation and historical context form an organization's strategic culture and influences how it operates. The foundation of the EU's strategic culture is support for democratic values, the rule of law, and equality. Further, it is built on the founding myth of reconciliation and peaceful integration after the experiences of two world wars and a subsequent desire to advance global security efforts. Thus, the EU initially constituted a civilian power, exercising its influence through economic strength, diplomatic cooperation, and supranational institutions.



Following the EU's inability to respond effectively to the Yugoslavia crisis and the Rwanda genocide in the 1990s, however, it began integrating military capabilities into its structure, policy, and strategic culture in order to better protect its security and interests. Reflecting the EU's increasing involvement in military operations, the organization's 2 May 2018 budget proposal suggested a 22-fold increase in EU defense spending for 2021-2027.

Two additional concepts also undergird EU strategic culture: human security and the comprehensive approach. Thus, the responsibility to protect individuals and their human rights constitutes a legitimate reason for the use of force by the Union. The EU's commitment to human security requires a wider range of capabilities beyond traditional, military-based protection of the state. The EU accomplishes this through a comprehensive approach to crisis response.

The comprehensive approach is the integration of security, governance, development and political capabilities in international peace and stability operations. This coherent method also includes cooperation with other actors involved in crisis response, such as international, national, and non-governmental organizations.

The foundational elements of EU strategic culture are thus the integration of civilian power with military capabilities, a focus on human security supported by a comprehensive approach to crisis response, and the valuing of democratic principles, human dignity, and the rule of law. In practice, this strategic culture supports EU crisis response efforts that emphasize protection of human rights, post-conflict reconstruction and development aid, and cooperation with local partners to find solutions.

The EU shares complementary goals and security priorities with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, EU CIMIC has doctrinally prioritized a NATO-inspired focus on support to military operations. Additionally, the 2002 Berlin Plus arrangements obliged them both to develop and deliver military capabilities needed for crisis management in a reinforcing manner. Further, the agreement has enabled the exchange of classified information and given the EU access to NATO's military planning and assets. Consequently, the EU's official CIMIC concept harmonizes with the corresponding NATO doctrine outlined in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.

An additional influencer on EU CIMIC has been the EU's partnering with the UN on missions such as those in Mali and Chad. Different from NATO, the UN's approach to civil-military relations emphasizes the primacy of the civilian authority and humanitarian goals. The EU's adoption of this approach is evident in the recent EU-led military mission European Union Naval Force Mediterranean's (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation Sophia, whose mission since 7 October 2015 has been to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used by migrant traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea. Since coordination with civilian organizations is critical to accomplishing this humanitarian mission, it is a fundamental part of EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia's efforts.

### **Recommendation:**

An organization is most effective when it operates in concert with its strategic culture. While the EU doctrinally prioritizes the military features of CIMIC to enable integration with NATO assets, the EU's strategic culture emphasizes humanitarian aims. Thus, EU-led crisis response operations should be civilian directed to facilitate the ultimate peacekeeping and stability goals of the operations, viewing military capabilities as one of many tools. This would further integrate military and civilian efforts and promote greater coordination with outside actors.

**Source:**

This lesson is based on the article "[Between NATO and UN: EU Strategic Culture and its Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation](#)," by Agata Mazurkiewicza published online by the Czech website Obrana a Strategie on 6 May 2018.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in SOLLIMS 22 May 2019.

This lesson was also published in SOLLIMS Lesson Learned Report "[Strategic Planning for P&SO](#)" September, 2019.



**Peshmerga soldiers earned their Advanced Instructor title at Coalition Joint Task Force training centers in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, Iraq, Nov. 27-28, 2019. The Coalition remains united and determined in its mission to degrade and defeat Daesh and continues to work with allies and partners to implement stabilization efforts. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Gary A. Witte)**

## **Joint Venture Public-Private Partnerships as a Way to Economic Development**

**(Lesson #2343)**

### **Observation:**

Economic development strategies that are pursued in an orderly, synchronized manner can positively contribute to the stabilization and modernization of post-conflict societies. For its part, the United States has generally employed a strategy of working with Host Nation (HN) government officials and top-level business elite when undertaking economic stabilization efforts. However, genuine capitalism relies not so much on state-led initiatives and top-level business ventures (typically having state ties/sponsorship), but rather on the work of grass-roots entrepreneurs. Small businessmen and entrepreneurs, however, often require some degree of assistance in order to gain opportunities and momentum in an environment that is evolving out of strife. One way to do this is through "joint venture public-private partnerships." In this context, "joint venture" refers to joining U.S. & HN entities in an economic/business activity, and "public-private partnership" refers to bringing USG agencies/departments together with private sector business.

### **Discussion:**

The U.S. Government has not always been able to garner a synchronized, whole-of-government approach to stability operations. For example, the National Security Council established a Joint Interagency Task Force-Iraq (JIATF-I) in April 2008 to bring together full-time representatives from the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security into "smart power" planning teams - for the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity-building, and power projection. However, JIATF-I primarily focused its efforts against existing internal and transnational threats to Iraq's stability, such as al Qaeda, other insurgents, and Iranian actors/influences. Neither JIATF-I, nor any other organization, took the lead in bringing resources together to focus on what was/is perhaps a greater threat to Iraqi stability: a lack of economic development and integration into the global economy.

In stability operations in post-conflict countries (namely, Iraq, Afghanistan), the U.S. Government has generally supported economic reforms and business initiatives with an emphasis on working with Host Nation government officials and upper-level businessmen (typically having state ties/sponsorship). The U.S. Government has paid very little attention to working with grass-roots entrepreneurs. That said, change does not easily come from the upper tier businessmen (in post-conflict countries), as they tend to be established in their ways and more status quo-oriented. If genuine capitalism is to develop and thrive - where individuals working through free markets account for growth and prosperity - in a post-conflict country, it will start and build from the grass roots entrepreneurs, and not from state-led initiatives or state-sponsored economic elite.

Regrettably, two key U.S. Government stakeholders in economic reform have been markedly absent from stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Both organizations

are charged with promoting the integration of U.S. businesses with foreign partners and with fostering the integration of host nations into the global economy. Ex-Im Bank, established in 1934 by an Executive order and made an independent agency in the executive branch by Congress in 1945, is the official export credit agency of the Federal Government. OPIC, founded in 1971, is an agency responsible for assisting U.S. businesses in investing overseas and promoting economic development in new and emerging markets. OPIC also provides financing through direct loans and loan guarantees. Oddly, current (low) operating budgets and a lack of higher political direction/priority have precluded both organizations from addressing trade and investment opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Likewise, the U.S. private sector has not been harnessed to the extent that it could be with regard to planning and executing economic development in those two countries. Many U.S. corporate leaders, although charting business ventures in various other high-risk and emerging markets, may lack the framework for understanding and predicting the local political and market dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct similar foreign ventures in those countries. Although the U.S. Government has been engaged in economic and political risk analysis in these countries, not enough partnering has taken place between the Government and the private sector to discuss and address the political-economic framework, economic development needs, market issues, growth potential, investment strategies, risks, and so forth. Joint venture public-private partnerships (with U.S. corporations teaming with the U.S. Government in the Host Nation to effect joint business ventures) have been sorely lacking. Joint ventures (U.S. business - HN business), if/when undertaken, would allow Host Nation entrepreneurs to better establish themselves in markets. They could provide opportunities for learning how to design and implement successful business, branding, and marketing plans. They would also allow Host Nation entrepreneurs to reinvest profits (portions thereof) into their own independent ventures. However, this transformative power of partnering, markets, and commerce has not been realized in either Iraq or Afghanistan. No single agency or organization has taken the lead on leveraging civilian/private sector efforts for economic development and economic partnering.

### **Recommendations:**

-In order to achieve private sector growth in a post-conflict country, it is recommended that the U.S. Government find a way to better incorporate the talent and insights of the private sector into all levels of planning for economic reform. The goal should be bottom-up change (vice top-driven change).

-Recommend the National Security Council establish a JIATF-like organization to pursue a strategy of economic development and global integration for post-conflict countries. This organization/"economic team" should incorporate U.S. civilian agency and military representatives, and it should place special emphasis on the integration of highly skilled private sector employees to support the building of public-private partnerships. The "economic team" could also include, or could work to leverage, certain international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program.

-Recommend the "economic team" conduct a systematic analysis of economic issues, down to the local levels in the post-conflict country (and incorporating local participation/input). The analysis

should include the following components: (1) Identify local business unions and how they are organized, (2) Determine which population segments fall inside those local business unions, (3) Determine what economic activities may gain community support and governmental legitimacy, (4) Determine what economic activities decreased or disappeared due to the conflict and whether they should be reenergized/resurrected, (5) Determine if certain local leaders are fence-sitters with regard to economic reform, and how they can be won over, (6) Determine who are the likely spoilers of economic reform, and how they can be marginalized, and (7) Determine the most critical economic development issues facing the Host Nation and develop appropriate courses of action.

-Recommend a 5-fold path to modernization along the following lines: (1) Mobilize/Develop local economic activity, (2) Initiate contacts with local businesses to stimulate trade and investment, (3) Rebuild commercial infrastructure, (4) Support broad-based economic opportunity, and (5) Support a free market economy.

-Within the 5-fold path above, small teams of experts should meet with local business leaders and ask what types of investment, training, and market access they need in order to be successful. Follow-up meetings should establish any requirements for training - which most likely would need to come from private sector firms. Additionally, companies and entrepreneurs should then be linked-up with Western business/investors. The U.S. Government should provide special incentives for these "joint venture public-private partnerships" by providing risk insurance and capital financing.

-The U.S. Government should incorporate Ex-Im Bank and OPIC representatives into the "economic team." Through these organizations, the United States could direct appropriate funding to projects/ventures viewed as most important to economic development. The U.S. Government should increase the operating budgets of these two organizations so that they can support high-risk ventures in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

-As a subsequent step to the "economic team" initiative, the U.S. Government should work to develop the next generation of Host Nation entrepreneurs. To do this, Western university educators and administrators could be added to the "economic team." Their role would be to create in-country training and education programs in entrepreneurship, business administration, and management. Additionally, programs similar to the Fulbright scholarship could be designed to bring students to U.S. schools and companies to learn and gain hands-on experience.

-The U.S. Government should consider establishing a multi-agency fund specifically for standing up the JIATF-like "economic team" and for covering stabilization and reconstruction plans and operations. Moreover, a separate budget account could be created to allow for the incorporation of private sector business expertise into the "economic team."

### **Implications:**

If the U.S. Government does not incorporate the private sector into its economic work in a post-conflict country, and if a bottom-up approach is not taken whereby local businessmen and entre-



preneurs are the focus of reform efforts, then economic modernization is not likely to gain momentum. State-sponsored, entrenched business elites may stifle growth through status quo business practices.

### **Sources:**

This lesson is based on the article "Stabilization Operations Beyond Government: Joint Venture Public-Private Partnerships in Iraq and Afghanistan," by Matthew W. Parin, *PRISM*, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 2010. This article can be found at: <http://nduweb03.ndu.edu/press/stabilization-operations-beyond-government.html>

A related article - which similarly advocates economic reform efforts aimed at the grassroots level / local businesses / entrepreneurs - is "Building Democracies and Markets in the Post-Conflict Context," by Aleksandr Shkolnikov and Anna Nadgrodkiewicz, Center for International Private Enterprise, ECONOMIC REFORM Issue Paper No. 0806, 29 August 2008. This article is available at: [www.cipe.org/publications/papers/pdf/IP0806.pdf](http://www.cipe.org/publications/papers/pdf/IP0806.pdf)

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in SOLLIMS 28 October 2010.

This lesson previously appeared in a SOLLIMS Sampler volume 2, Issue 2 entitled "[Economic Stabilization](#)," published July, 2011.

## **Lessons for Multi-National Peace Operations: Experiences in Mali**

### **(Lesson #2728)**

#### **Observation:**

Inequalities between European and African soldiers assigned to The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) causes Africans to suffer a disproportionate share of deaths in support of the mission. This global north/south imbalance has ramifications for future operations worldwide.

#### **Discussion:**

MINUSMA European soldiers are largely strategic managers and coordinators while African troops conduct operations, mostly convoy escort. The reason for this is European states face tightening defense budgets, more imminent defense threats such as a revanchist Russia, and decreasing political will to risk the lives of soldiers overseas after sustaining substantial casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. African soldiers face greater operational risk because Malian instability directly threatens their own nations' stability. Thus, their leaders are willing to place them more directly in the line of fire against separatist and jihadist factions.

Additionally, MINUSMA is multi-cultural organization speaking multiple languages. Cultural differences lead to more than just difficulties in communication and misunderstandings. Structural inequalities underpin cultural differences between European (global north) and African (global south) soldiers, which in turn shape the distribution of death, danger, and supplies in the mission. The disproportionate dangers that African soldiers face compared with their European peers is a result of deployment location, home nation support, and the equipment at their disposal. By October 2016, 91 of 109 MINUSMA personnel killed were from Africa while only 7 came from Europe. Chadian soldiers have suffered the most casualties, with some of their soldiers reportedly serving at mission outposts in the dangerous Sector North for two to three years without a break.

Convoy escort operations provide a cogent example of MINUSMA's challenges. The ability to plan and carry out the movement and maintenance of troops is the foundation of any military operation. For MINUSMA, it has proven challenging to transport supplies from the mission logistics base in Gao to military camps in Sector North, the most volatile part of Mali. The stretch from Gao in the Sector East to Kidal in Sector North is only about 210 miles, but it goes through some of the world's most impassable desert terrain. Depending on weather conditions and if vehicle breakdowns occur, the round trip can take two to three weeks. In theory, the military units that escort the convoy collaborate with other units during the operation. According to the commander in charge of the convoy security unit, however, joint planning of operations is inadequate, and there is insufficient support from headquarters in Sector East once the mission begins.

In addition to hardship, inertia, and inadequate coordination, MINUSMA leadership must manage conflicting priorities and other challenges. For example, due to inadequate force levels, mission headquarters in Bamako assigned the convoy escort task to an African unit that initially deployed as Sector North's quick reaction force. This created frustrations because this contingent was neither trained nor equipped to conduct convoy escort. Nevertheless, although MINUSMA's leadership has made efforts to improve intra-mission cooperation, challenges remain to coordinating multi-Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and combined operations. The difficulties that MINUSMA has faced in ensuring the maintenance of troops have been considerable. First, the military units based in the north do not always receive the supplies that they need and for a number of reasons they have suffered the highest death toll in the mission. Second, the infantry units in Gao and Kidal spend their time escorting convoys, to the detriment of other core functions in support of mandate implementation, such as protecting civilians and gathering information that the mission can act on in operations.

MINUSMA is deployed in an asymmetric conflict environment where there is no peace to keep. Instead they are increasingly conducting anti-terrorist activities. MINUSMA provides insight into the challenges that UN peacekeeping forces face when associated with counterterrorism efforts. Because of the technological, organizational, and experiential advantages of the global north, their soldiers will likely continue to be managers. Global south contributors will likely continue to be front-line soldiers because future UN peacekeeping operations will probably occur in their own backyard and their governments will be more willing to take an active kinetic role to prevent instability from spilling over into their territory.

### **Recommendations:**

-More daily interaction between European and African MINUSMA soldiers would strengthen cohesion and a sense of unity. Operational effectiveness is degraded because Europeans and Africans do not socialize or train together.

-MINUSMA should sufficiently resource European and African soldiers to complete their assigned missions. A sense of shared responsibility and risk would minimize obstacles caused by cultural and language differences and contribute to mission success.

-MINUSMA should implement a plan to reduce negative perceptions and prejudices between Africans and Europeans by sharing responsibilities in core tasks like Protection of Civilians (POC), convoy escort, and collection of mission critical information from the local Malian population.

-MINUSMA should act to reduce the disproportionately African mission death toll by sharing the convoy escort mission with Europeans.

-The UN should adequately resource and authorize MINUSMA to conduct counter-terrorism and anti-organized crime operations. This will increase the chances of stabilization success and strengthen the Malian peace process.

**Source:**

This lesson is based on the article ["Friction and Inequality among Peacekeepers in Mali"](#) by Signe Cold-Ravnkilde, Peter Albrecht & Rikke Haugegaard published online 1 June 2017 in *The RUSI Journal* 162:2, pp. 34-42.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in SOLLIMS 30 July 2019.



Ethiopian and American officials meet before the opening ceremony of exercise Justified Accord 2019 at the Peace Support Training Center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 15, 2019. JA19 is a U.S. Army Africa-led exercise designed to enhance the capacity and capability of participating international staff and forces in peacekeeping operations in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Ian Valley)

### [Interagency Partnership Center in Mogadishu, Somalia](#)

**(Lesson #2565)**

#### **Observation:**

Establishment of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) / Interagency Partnership Center (IPC) was a key Civil Affairs activity in Mogadishu, Somalia.

#### **Discussion:**

The 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion established the initial Interagency Partnership Center in Mogadishu, Somalia in July 2016. The goal of the IPC was to establish clarity for the Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), of all civil military activities in Somalia.

One of CJTF-HOA's main partnerships was with the State Department and USAID, which provided programs such as Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS+) and Office of Transition Initiatives

(OTI) that helped promote stability and community cohesion through infrastructure development and social and cultural activities.

Another major partner was the Early Recovery Group and Stabilization Advisors, who were members of the United Kingdom Mission Support Team (UKMST). The UK stabilization officers had a direct role to support the Federal Government of Somalia. Partnering with these UK officers allowed US Civil affairs officers to build and expand civil military relationships.

Special Operations Command Forward (SOCFWD) Civil Affairs (Active Duty) personnel provided access to areas/communities and facilitated project development and “train the trainer” events. For example, the Mogadishu Medical Seminar provided/shared best practices from US Army doctors/radiologists for 15 Somali doctors in a weeklong training event.

Likewise, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) training in Mogadishu allowed for weeklong discussion groups and sharing Civil Affairs expertise with Troop Contributing Countries in Somalia.

The IPC collaborated all these efforts with JTF-HOA’s Military Coordination Cell (MCC), which had a plethora of responsibilities. Fortunately, the MCC Chief was able to help facilitate balance and synchronization among the various agencies and foreign militaries (UK, European Union Training Mission, UN, USAID, State Department, and the CJTF-HOA chain of command).

One major factor that stood out the most was the ability of Civil Affairs and the IPC to build key relationships. Civil Affairs personnel don’t have all the answers, and a variety of projects/programs move at different speeds. Coordination was probably the most significant part of relationship-building and bringing everyone together to achieve results, even those that seemed insignificant.

### **Recommendation:**

-Civil-military relationships/partnerships continue to be developed in Somalia. Seasoned Civil Affairs officers with strong interpersonal skills should develop and strengthen these relationships.

### **Implications:**

If this recommendation is not followed, then there will be loss of momentum in efforts to build key relationships with Somali officials, community leaders, and AMISOM forces.

### **Source:**

This lesson is based on personal experience from July to October 2016 at CJTF-HOA.

Lesson Author: Captain Aleksandr Restrepo, 403<sup>rd</sup> Civil Affairs Battalion. Published in SOLLIMS 1 March 2017.

This lesson previously appeared in SOLLIMS Sampler volume 8, issue 1, entitled “[Civil Affairs in Stability Operations](#),” publish in March, 2017.



## Civil Affairs and Partnering in Colombia

### (Lesson #2560)

#### Observation:

The employment of civil affairs personnel – as part of larger U.S. SOF engagement in Colombia – bolstered Colombian security, governance, and development capacity over many years, but particularly during the 2011-2014 timeframe, supporting counterinsurgency operations against the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).

#### Discussion:

Believing that his predecessor had overly militarized counterinsurgency operations in Colombia, Colombia's President Santos decided to pursue a whole-of-government approach, particularly to strengthen the government's presence/authority in recently secured areas. To support his intent, in 2011, President Santos established an Office of Consolidation to carry out the National Consolidation Program (ongoing since 2006). The aim of the new Office of Consolidation was to integrate the efforts of civilian and military agencies, targeting 100 of the country's 1,120 municipalities (i.e., the recently secured areas) for consolidation.

During this timeframe, the U.S. embassy team in Colombia divided USG lead roles to different agencies/departments in support of the National Consolidation Program – broken out by three geographic regions. In northern Colombia, which was relatively secure, USAID had the lead role for the USG. Projects included economic development, basic infrastructure, local governance, and land reform. In southern Colombia, where coca cultivation was most prevalent, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs had the lead. In central Colombia, where the FARC's presence was greatest – and where the Colombian military concentrated its activities – the Department of Defense had the lead. All three USG leads were in support of the Colombian government. Of note, for many years prior to the USG civilian agencies now entering their respective areas, U.S. SOF civil affairs personnel had been operating in those areas – identifying key government officials and establishing/cultivating relationships with them. The civil affairs work/engagement laid the groundwork for U.S. civilian agency activities. In essence, U.S. SOF civil affairs personnel had served as the “vanguard” of governance and development.

In support of the National Consolidation Program, the Colombian Army established the Escuela de Misiones Internacionales Acción Integral – a military school designed to provide instruction in civil affairs, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, and specific programs/actions such as disarmament and demobilization. U.S. SOF experts from Fort Bragg helped develop the school's curriculum, based on U.S. civil affairs and psychological operations doctrine. U.S. SOF Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) and Military Information Support Team (MIST) personnel served as advisors to the school faculty, as did U.S. contractors. U.S. personnel primarily focused on training and advising the school's instructors (Colombians), but also provided some instruction to the students.

In 2012, the Colombian government established a strategic review committee, the Comité de Revisión Estratégica e Innovación (CRE-I), headed by Colombian Brigadier General (BG) Albert Jose Mejia. BG Mejia and two Colombian graduates of the U.S. Army's School of Military Studies developed a new strategy for the Colombian military, titled Espada de Honor (sword of honor). Faulting the Colombian military for an overemphasis on eliminating high value targets, the authors advocated "population-centric" counterinsurgency, working honorably with the people for both their interests and the nation's. This new strategy reconfigured Colombian forces into nine new brigade-level joint task forces (supplementing three joint task forces already in the structure), and it gave each task force responsibility for a certain high-priority area. The strategy also included formation/placement of new Accion Integral teams (comprehensive action teams) at each joint task force headquarters, with civil affairs as the team's primary mission, and psychological operations and infrastructure construction as secondary missions. (However, the strategy also set a goal of cutting the FARC's strength in half by 2014 – which unwittingly encouraged the bulk of the Colombian military to continue to focus on killing or capturing insurgents, vice "population-centric" counterinsurgency.)

Supporting the Colombian military's new (sword of honor) strategy and its comprehensive approach, three U.S. SOF civil affairs teams provided civil affairs training to Colombian army units at brigade and division levels, and two U.S. SOF MIST teams provided psychological operations training at the same levels. Also, intelligence specialists from Special Operations Command, South (SOC SOUTH) provided training for Colombian intelligence personnel, including training on use of the Analyst Notebook to help facilitate interoperability with other intelligence resources. In addition, 7th Special Forces Group personnel / operational support teams served with Colombian forces to help secure forward operating bases, providing advice, expertise and mission planning support.

Over several years of U.S. SOF engagement in Colombia, a large amount of civil affairs resources was dedicated to quick-impact projects such as construction and medical civil action programs (medcaps). Although such projects had some short-term value, they really did not serve long-term capacity building (i.e., did not enable the Colombians to carry out such work themselves). In contrast, the employment of U.S. SOF civil affairs personnel as trainers and advisors to the Colombian military/government was much more fruitful, helping build long-term capacity. These civil affairs personnel taught and enabled Colombian military units to plan and implement governance and development initiatives in concert with security operations. Civil affairs personnel also provided training and advising to/for local civilian administrators – enhancing their local governance capacity – but this effort was only an adjunct to the main mission of supporting Colombian armed forces.

Related to the work of civil affairs (as well as to work done by non-governmental organizations), many Colombian military officers have cited "education of local youths" as the most critical aspect of development and of countering the FARC's influence. Schools and education have broadened awareness of world affairs for the youths of various rural areas in Colombia, causing many youths to become more interested in democracy and less sympathetic to the insurgents. Generally speaking, increased numbers of youths in rural Colombia over recent years have demonstrated greater willingness to support the Colombian government, much more so than preceding generations. Although rural education has always fallen under the purview of Colombia's Ministry of Education and not the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education was often absent from dangerous areas –

leaving Colombian military/civil affairs (e.g., Accion Integral teams) and non-governmental organizations to sometimes fill the void and thereby influence rural youths.

Overall, U.S. SOF civil affairs personnel, as part of larger U.S. SOF persistent engagement, bolstered Colombian capacity for security, governance, and development. They did so primarily by investing in Colombia's human capital – particularly Colombia's military personnel – in brigades, divisions, joint task forces, and the military school (Escuela de Misiones Internacionales Acción Integral). The advice and assistance of U.S. SOF personnel, together with the SOF's training and educational programs, gave Colombian military professionals both new and greater expertise – making them more effective in their work, enabling them to plan and execute governance and development initiatives in tandem with security operations, and helping them succeed in overcoming internal security issues/insurgents.

Also, while investing in Colombia's human capital, U.S. SOF personnel imparted cultural attributes/values that were seen as beneficial by partner nation security professionals. "The most important thing that Colombia gained from U.S. military assistance was the transfer of culture," said Colombian General (Retired) Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle. "The Americans served as our role models. We watched their behavior, their discipline, their humility, and their commitment to their country, and tried to emulate them."

### **Recommendations:**

The authors of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) publication "Persistent Engagement in Colombia" make the following recommendations:

- Employ U.S. SOF to help partner nations develop large civil affairs capabilities. In countries with formidable internal security problems, civilian governmental agencies are often unwilling or unable to conduct activities in insecure areas. In such circumstances, only the military can perform governance and development tasks. At present, few military organizations outside of NATO possess robust civil affairs capabilities, and therefore they need external assistance to execute governance and development effectively. U.S. civil affairs can do much to help partner nation military organizations build their civil affairs capabilities, particularly if junior U.S. officers are supported by more senior officers with the experience and status to influence partner nation senior officers.

- Focus U.S. SOF civil affairs on long-term capacity building in governance and select components of development, rather than on quick-impact projects. U.S. SOF civil affairs personnel have been effective in building partner nation capacity by providing prolonged training and education to foreign civil affairs units. Most valuable have been training and education in the areas that are most pertinent to counterinsurgency – local governance and local education. By contrast, quick impact projects such as construction or medcaps have generally done little to build partner nation capacity, and have rarely generated enough popular enthusiasm to ensure long-term commitment to the government.

### **Implications:**

If SOF are not utilized to develop civil affairs capabilities of partner nations facing internal security problems, then those partner nations will more than likely continue to struggle with governance and

development efforts in insecure areas. If U.S. SOF civil affairs fail to focus on the long-term – by training and educating personnel on improving local governance and local education systems – then they will miss the mark in generating enthusiasm / local interest for securing a better future, one with good governance and its sustainability over time.

### **Comments:**

Similar use of civil affairs in a multi-faceted approach for COIN is evident in operations conducted by Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines (JSOTF-P) during the 2004-2012 timeframe. “The primary executors of JSOTF-P’s influence Line of Effort (LOE) were the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP’s) and JSOTF-P’s Psychological Operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, special forces, naval special warfare, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), and medical assistance elements. ... The ability of the PSYOP and civil affairs teams to directly engage with the wider population increased the credibility and access of the other SOF teams assigned to work with the AFP throughout key areas of interest.” See “Influence Operations and the Human Domain,” by Thomas M. Scanzillo and Edward M. Lopacienski, Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG) case study, United States Naval War College, 25 March 2015 (attached). See also “Light Footprint and Whole-of-Government Approach – the Southern Philippines,” by David Mosinski, SOLLIMS Lesson #911, 11 January 2013 (available at: <https://www.pksoi.org/lesson/view/id/911>).

### **Source:**

This lesson is based on “[Persistent Engagement in Colombia](#),” by Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Will R. Griego, JSOU report 14-3, July 2014.

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in SOLLIMS 24 February, 2017.



Chief Boatswain's Mate Christopher Hill discusses the well deck capabilities of the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard on Sep. 5, 2018 with members of the Columbian military during a ship tour. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gavin Shields)

## [Women, Peace, and Security \(WPS\) Partnering](#)

### (Lesson # 2739)

#### Observation:

In 2017, The President signed into law the [Women, Peace, and Security Act](#) (WPS) “aimed to increase the United States efforts to enhance the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of overseas conflict prevention (Source: [NSC Press Guidance, June 11 2019](#)).” The [subsequent National Strategy on WPS](#) (June 2019) specifically addressed within one of its four Lines of Effort (LOE) an agenda around Partnering.

#### Discussion:

The National Strategy on WPS states, “Encourage partner governments to adopt policies, plans, and capacity to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions.” Following this, the subsequent drafted Department of Defense WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (as of October



2019) further aligned two Defense Objectives (each with two complimenting Intermediate Defense Objectives) around Partner Nation engagement. Under these Objectives a total of fifteen Tasks specifically identified the Defense Security Cooperation Agency one of the implementing bodies. This Report aims to discuss the application of these various tasks within recent activities observed across the DOD related to the Security Cooperation environment. The Report summarizes some proposed recommendations based on assessment of these observations in implementation of the plan for WPS thus far.

The Department of Defense WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan's Defense Objective 2 states that women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors. Its Intermediate Defense Objective 2.1 states that DOD promotes women's meaningful participation within partner nation defense and security sectors. It consists of:

Effect 2.1.1 – Partner nation women have increased access to and participation in U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs, resources, training, and education opportunities.

Task 2.1.1.2 – Encourage the composition of partner nation delegations participating in U.S. 414 training, education, and engagements reflect, at minimum, the gender composition of the targeted unit, branch, service, or other defense organization within the partner nation's defense and security force. (The Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR) are the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Combatant Commands (CCMD), and the Services)

Task 2.1.1.4 – In alignment with existing reporting policies and procedures, collect and report on sex- and age-disaggregated data within annual U.S. security cooperation activities. (OPR: DSCA, CCMDs)

Further, Intermediate Defense Objective 2.2 states that DOD works with partner nation defense and security sectors to strengthen their recruitment, employment, development, retention, and promotion of women. It consists of:

Effect 2.2.1 – The Department is postured to provide training and education to partner nations on recruitment, employment, development, retention, and promotion of women in their defense and security sectors.

Task 2.2.1.2 – Conduct research, outreach, and engagements to examine best practices for advancing women's meaningful participation in partner nation defense and security sectors. (OPR: Joint Staff, DSCA, CCMDs, Services)

Currently, under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) policy employed as a Security Cooperation activity, partner and allied nations send their most qualified individuals

(officer and enlisted) to the U.S. to attend selected schools for training. IMET is a title 22 activity funded by the Department of State for implementation by the Department of Defense. Selection for attending these training opportunities is made through each Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) to the Security Cooperation office in each country. It is up to the partner and allied nation to provide the name of the individual to attend training. Each attendee is vetted (Leahy Amendment) to ensure the individual can attend the specified training. This affords the U.S. an opportunity to ensure that qualified women who are in the military are selected to attend training (pending they pass the qualification of education, military training, and physical qualifications i.e. airborne school, air assault school, flight school).

The Department of Defense WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan's Defense Objective 3 states that partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis. Its Intermediate Defense Objective 3.1 states that DOD works with partner nation defense and security sectors to strengthen their commitment to international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). It consists of:

Effect 3.1.2 – Partner nation defense and security sectors have increased knowledge of IHL and IHRL.

Task 3.1.2.1 – Identify and implement opportunities for including human rights and protection of civilians, with an emphasis on women and girls, within annual U.S. security cooperation activities. (OPR: DSCA, CCMDs)

Task 3.1.2.2 – Work with partner nation defense and security institutions to build the knowledge, skills, and abilities of their legal personnel on IHL and IHRL. (OPR: DSCA, CCMDs)

Task 3.1.2.3 – Work with partner nation defense and security forces to build the knowledge, skills and abilities of their operators on IHL and IHRL. (OPR: DSCA, CCMDs)

Task 3.1.2.5 – Build the capacity of partner nation officers, NCOs, and civilians to incorporate standards of conduct into planning, training, exercising, and operations. (OPR: DSCA, CCMDs)

The [Geneva Convention IV-Civilians on the Battlefield](#) outlines the requirements to protect civilians during armed conflict. The [Lieber Code](#) existed regarding the need to distinguish between combatants and civilians. By the early twentieth century, two methodologies for regulation of the conduct of war developed under international law. The Hague Tradition developed a focus on limiting the means and methods used in combat. Protection during hostilities implies the seizure of destruction of civilian property and the protection of civilians during occupation. There exists under the Geneva Conventions no clear definition of “civilian”, the International Committee of the Red Cross lists what constitutes civilians and guidance to pro-

tect. Protection of civilians must be considered and integrated during all military operations. Civilians are protected persons. Women, children, and the old are at risk of violence, to include sexual assault. It is imperative that military planners and personnel conducting operations understand civilian risks, the need to protect civilians during operations, and the need to shape a protective environment.

**Recommendation:**

-IMET provides a good opportunity to ensure Intermediate Defense Objective 2.1 – DoD promotes women’s meaningful participation within partner nation defense and security sectors, and Intermediate Defense Objective 2.2 – DoD works with partner nation defense and security sectors to strengthen their recruitment, employment, development, retention, and promotion of women is tracked to ensure women possess the opportunity to advance in their military organizations. Additionally, women from the partner and allied nations who attend training should be monitored after their IMET training to ensure that their skills received in attending training are utilized and they are afforded the opportunity with favorable assignments to advance their careers.

-The women from the partner and allied nations who attend training should receive instruction on the Rule of Law, Law of Armed Conflict, and Protection of Civilians. This Program of Instruction could be a block during IMET school training and an export version designed for Mobile Training Teams (MTT).

**Source:**

This lesson is based on input from COL Veronica Oswald-Hruktay, U.S. Army War College Women, Peace, and Security Lead, and Mr. Toney Lieto, PKSOI Joint Proponent Analyst for Governance and Participation and Rule of Law.

Lesson Author: COL Veronica Oswald-Hruktay, U.S. Army War College Women, Peace, and Security Lead, published in SOLLIMS 9 December, 2019.



A Canadian soldier provides guidance to a member of a Jordanian Force Female Engagement Team during a coalition situational training exercise near Amman, Jordan on Sept. 3, 2019. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Cpl. Elizabeth Scott)

### 3. PKSOI **Lesson Reports** and SOLLIMS Samplers (2014-2019)

#### 2019

- **Strategic Planning for P&SO**
- **Conflict Prevention**
- **SSR & DDR**

#### 2018

- **Transitional Public Security**
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: The Complexity of Considerations**
- **Stage-setting and Right-sizing for Stability**
- **Complexities and Efficiencies in Peacekeeping Operations**
- **Inclusive Peacebuilding: Working with Communities**
- **Monitoring & Evaluation for Peace and Stability**

#### 2017

- **Lessons on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)**

- Operationalizing Women, Peace, and Security
- Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations
- Civil Affairs in Stability Operations

## 2016

- Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Strategic Communication/Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations
- **Job Creation Programs – Insights from Africa and Conflict-affected States**
- Stabilization and Transition
- **Lessons from the MSF Hospital (Trauma Center) Strike in Kunduz**
- Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations
- Building Stable Governance
- **Lessons Learned – Peacekeeping Operations in Africa**
- Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

## 2015

- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief]
- Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Security Sector Reform

## 2014

- **MONUSCO Lesson Report**
- Reconstruction and Development
- **Veterinary Support, Animal Health, and Animal Agriculture in Stability Operations**
- Women, Peace and Security
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”
- Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces