

Lesson Report

Consolidating Gains



US Army Spc. Glenn Vancil, 101st Airborne Division, provides security at Camp Swift, Iraq, during Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Nov. 19, 2016. (US Army photo by Spc. Christopher Brecht)

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**Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI)**

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1. INTRODUCTION

This edition of the PKSOI Lessons Learned Report explores the challenges and complexities of Consolidating Gains, an Army strategic role that sets conditions for enduring political and strategic outcomes to military operations. (p. 3-5, [ADP 3-0](#), *Operations*) Consolidating gains is integral to the conclusion of all military operations, and it requires deliberate planning, preparation, and resources to ensure sustainable success. This planning should ensure US forces operate in a way that actively facilitates achievement of the desired post-hostilities end state and transition of control to legitimate authorities.

During consolidating gains, stability activities often become the primary Army tasks. As units establish area security, the balance of tasks should shift more heavily towards stability tasks focused on the control of populations and key nodes. Army forces execute a greater number of stability tasks as requirements and capabilities evolve to include the integration of all unified action partner efforts. Throughout consolidating gains, the Army retains the lead to establish civil security primarily through security force assistance. The lead for other tasks eventually transfers to another military or civilian organization, although Army forces may retain a supporting role. (p. 2-3, [ADP 3-07](#), *Stability*)

The coexistence of cooperation, competition, and conflict on multiple levels throughout an integrated campaign makes the consolidating gains role very dynamic and complex. For example, stabilization often requires the simultaneous execution of “defensive” measures to increase resilience and “offensive” efforts to counter malign actor destabilization activities. Planners must consequently prepare thoroughly to translate military success into sustained post-hostility stability. Focus on improving joint force lethality must not sacrifice consolidating gains and stability proficiency. This Lessons Learned Report provides practitioner insights and consolidating gains lessons from the strategic perspective.

2. SOLLIMS SUNSET



The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) sunset the Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System (SOLLIMS) on Friday, March 13, 2020. The lessons and resources archived in SOLLIMS have been moved to the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS serves as the system of record for all lessons learned across the joint force.

The decision to sunset SOLLIMS was made in coordination with the US Army Combined Arms Center, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Joint Staff J7 Joint Lessons Learned Division to eliminate the redundancy between the two systems.

Leveraging JLLIS, PKSOI will continue to serve as the integrator of joint lessons learned for P&SO in its role as the Army and TRADOC lead for Joint Proponent of Stabilization and Peace Operations.

Members of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (P&SO) community of practice/interest who possess a DoD Common Access Card (CAC) can now query the JLLIS system for P&SO related observations and document files previously archived in SOLLIMS. The website is <https://www.jllis.mil>.

Those members of the P&SO community who are **not** CAC holders can “Ask PKSOI” for assistance at the PKSOI website, <http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/>.

All members of the P&SO community can still submit lessons. CAC holders can contribute new P&SO lessons directly in JLLIS. All others can submit lessons directly to PKSOI by emailing usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@mail.mil. Lessons should be in Observations, Discussion, and Recommendation format, and if needed can also include Implications, Comments, and Event Description.

PKSOI will continue to produce a quarterly lessons report--formerly called *SOLLIMS Sampler*--with select lessons that are now resident in JLLIS. PKSOI posts all of its quarterly lessons reports on their website at <http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/resources/pksoi-publications/pksoi-lesson-reports-sollims-samplers/>.

PKSOI created SOLLIMS in 2009 as a web-enabled database to provide a repository for observations, insights and lessons pertaining to P&SO. SOLLIMS was an unclassified, open-source system available to a larger P&SO community that spanned joint, interagency, inter-governmental, multinational, and non-governmental organizations. SOLLIMS has served that community for more than a decade holding over 750 P&SO lessons and more than 7,700 resources. All of those lessons and records were transferred to the JLLIS database on March 6, 2020, and PKSOI will continue to produce new lessons directly in JLLIS.

Questions regarding the sunseting of SOLLIMS can be directed to PKSOI by phone at (717) 245-3031 or by email at usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@mail.mil.

Author: Mr. Sam Russell, PKSOI Joint Proponent Analyst. Photo: Tim Holem, "Post-Hurricane Dorian Sunset at Canaveral Lock and Dam," 5 Sep 2019, Brevard County, FL, DVIDS Photo ID: 5725010 (<https://www.dvidshub.net/image/5725010/post-hurricane-dorian-sunset-canaveral-lock-and-dam>) accessed 11 Mar 2020.

3. CONSOLIDATING GAINS STRATEGIC INSIGHT LESSONS

The Importance of Good Governance in Consolidating Gains and Competition

(JLLIS ID # 215454)

Observation:

Good governance is a key consideration in both consolidating gains and when encouraging friendly counter-state actors during an Unconventional Warfare (UW) campaign.

Discussion:

Governance is the way a society's community affairs are conducted and its public resources managed. In robust states at peace, the government is largely responsible for good governance. In fragile states and areas experiencing conflict, however, other actors with a less defined role often participate in governance activities. Further, the role of government in governance is often degraded in these fraught situations. Good governance is especially challenging in post-conflict zones.

The US Army experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early twenty-first century exemplify these challenges. Quickly defeating the Taliban and Saddam Hussein with successful Major Ground Combat Operations (MGCO), the Army was ill-prepared to conduct successful Major Ground Stability Operations (MGSO) to guarantee the political goal of regime change. In Iraq for instance, overwhelming military strength provided short-term security as the Army tried to fulfil its strategic role of consolidating gains.

Fear of Iraqi Ba'athists loyal to Saddam, however, caused the Americans early-on to disband Iraqi military and security forces and fire government administrators.

With good governance infrastructure gone, the Americans tried to stabilize Iraq by rebuilding its Army from scratch, emplacing formal democratic elections, spending hundreds of millions of dollars on largely ill-conceived economic and infrastructure projects, and attempted to create strong central democratic government institutions on a western model. These actions failed to stabilize Iraq because the US disregarded Iraqi societal cultures, values, and norms; ignored existing informal governance structures such as tribal leadership; and devalued existing effective systems in a rush to makeover Iraq in America's democratic image. US stabilization attempts in Afghanistan similarly failed, as numerous Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports document. These stabilization efforts were disastrous because the US failed to respect and facilitate the elements of good governance that made Afghan and Iraqi societies functional prior to the US invasions.

Good governance is also important in US military support to counter-state groups challenging competitor states in the gray zone. Civil Affairs (CA) forces supporting Unconventional Warfare (UW) campaigns help counter-state actors further US national security interest in these contested areas.

Counter-state actors support US interests through good governance principles such as: providing security and stability; mitigating disputes; providing social services; managing public resources; and, engaging the population. These are essential to building legitimacy, access, and influence and in maintaining a framework of social control in order to consolidate gains. Security and stability, however, go beyond simply demonstrating military strength—they also include providing a framework for stability in daily life. Counter-state groups that the population perceives as most able to establish normative systems for resilient, full spectrum social stability are likely to succeed. (Lewis, pp. 72-3)

Recommendations:

1. The US Army should utilize existing good governance infrastructure and personnel when fulfilling its strategic role of consolidating gains.
2. The US Army should integrate an understanding of existing societal values, relationships, procedures, and norms to leverage good governance when consolidating gains.
3. The US Army should prepare CA teams to support allied counter-state actors through good governance education, training, and skills to conduct assessments, create networks, and gain trust as advisors.
4. The US Department of Defense should re-evaluate current policy and doctrine to better clarify how commanders engaged in UW-shaping campaigns can leverage counter-state good governance efforts.

Sources:

This lesson is based on the following articles:

[“Good Governance and the Counter-state: Consolidating Unconventional Gains”](#) by Steve Lewis, published in *PKSOI Paper Volume 4: 2017-18 Civil Affairs Issue Papers: Civil Affairs: A Force for Consolidating Gains*, pp. 67-82.

[“Government versus Governance: Why the US Military Must Understand the Difference”](#) by Jennifer Jantzi-Schlichter, published *Military Review*, November-December 2018.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in JLLIS 1 April, 2020.

Civil Affairs’ Critical Role in Consolidating Gains

[\(JLLIS ID # 195620\)](#)

Observation:

Civil Affairs forces provide a human geography-focused capability in stability operations that enable commanders at echelon to gain intimate knowledge of the operational environment, be sensitive to changes in stability over time, and quickly execute operational branches and sequels to consolidate gains.

Discussion:

DoDD 3000.05 dated 13 December 2018 defines stabilization as an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning US Government(USG) efforts-diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense-to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.

The Department of State is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts; the US Agency for International Development is the lead implementing agency for non-security US stabilization assistance; and DOD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities.

When US forces prepared for Operation Torch in November 1942, little preparation was made for the consolidation of gains in North Africa upon achieving success against Nazi forces. Within three weeks of landing in Tunisia, LTG Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to GEN George C. Marshall, “There is an acute need for such a body [of civilian experts] because the success of future operations from this base will depend very largely upon the speed with which the economy of this country is rehabilitated, at least to the point of sustaining a majority of the population above the starvation level.” Four days later, he wrote GEN Marshal again: “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each

week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.” (*United States Army in World War II Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, published by the Department of the Army's Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964.)

By the time US forces landed in Normandy in June 1944, the Army had built an extensive civil affairs capability that could provide commanders with a clear understanding of the noncombatant situation in the operational environment and organize local resources to address local issues so as to relieve commanders from using military resources to meet statutory and operational obligations to noncombatants.

In one example, a civil affairs detachment prepared exclusively for the eventual occupation of Munich, Germany. From the time it formed in England a year before entering Munich, the 52-man Military Government Detachment F-213 spent many days “poring over maps and air photos, consulting reference works, and studying the directives of Supreme Headquarters” and “knew Munich better than we did our own home towns.” (*Case Studies On Field Operations Of Military Government Units*, Training Packet No. 7, The Provost Marshal General's School, 1 April 1950.) It continued to track changing conditions in Munich and was prepared to execute its mission regardless of which maneuver headquarters was assigned the mission to liberate Bavaria. By doing so, F-213 gave LTG Patton, whose 3rd Army was eventually given this mission, the ability to quickly establish military government within hours of the surrender of the city on 30 April 1945.

Immediately upon entering the city, members of F-213 “went out to see how nearly the situation in Munich corresponded with the estimate made in the operational plan. They visited the gas plant, the water works, the sewage plant, the electric power plant, and made estimates of the labor and materials needed to restore them to operation. They interviewed Cardinal Faulhaber and a representative of the Lutheran Bishop of Bavaria. They questioned educators and welfare workers.” Within 48 hours of their arrival, “(f)ood, fuel and clothing stocks were surveyed and placed under guard. Banks were closed and the directors told to report back later. Radio and newspaper facilities were seized, while a series of broadcasts from sound trucks was instituted to disseminate reports of world events to the news-starved people.” (The Provost Marshal General's School.)

Forty-five years after the end of World War II, US forces found themselves preparing for another operation to remove invading forces from a sovereign nation – Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait. While now a permanent part of Army structure, 96% of the civil affairs force was assigned to the US Army Reserve and was not initially considered in US Central Command plans for “restoring Kuwait's legitimate government in place of a puppet regime,” as directed by President George H. W. Bush in National Security Directive 45 on 20 August 1990. US government departments and agencies following the events in Kuwait became concerned about the potential post-conflict issues they would eventually face there and it soon became clear that “the scope of post-combat missions relating to the care of displaced civilians, restoration of order, and a return to normalcy—not

only in Kuwait, but possibly in Saudi Arabia and Iraq—was likely to overwhelm the small, active duty Civil Affairs force assigned to the region.” (*Case Study No. 4, Complex Operations Case Studies Series, The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination*, Dennis Barlow, 2010.)

In October 1990, in response to a request to President George H. W. Bush from the Kuwaiti Government-in-Exile, the US government agreed to provide restoration planning, advice, and post-conflict assistance to the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program. On 1 December 1990, fifty-seven specially selected Soldiers of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command and the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade – US Army Reserve units that were mission-focused on the Central Command area of operations –were activated as a civil affairs task force in Washington, D.C. Known as the Kuwait Task Force, these Soldiers represented twenty civil affairs functional specialties and, in coordination with twenty-seven different US government agencies, led the US government’s support of the Government of Kuwait to develop long-term and high-policy issues relating to the restoration of the society of Kuwait. The Kuwait Task Force subsequently deployed to Saudi Arabia in January 1991; was assigned, along with other civil affairs units, to Task Force Freedom, a composite service-support unit commanded by the deputy commanding general of Army Central (3rd Army); and entered Kuwait City on 1 March 1991, 48 hours after the end of the short ground war.

Within one month of the end of the fighting, and as a direct result of the planning and execution efforts of the Kuwait Task Force, “50 percent of the telecommunications and transportation systems in Kuwait was restored, and 30 percent of the devastated electrical grid was repaired. More important was the fact that not one Kuwaiti died from thirst, starvation, or lack of medical attention after the liberation. Civil rights were immediately restored and, astonishingly, there were virtually no acts of retribution or vigilantism directed against suspected collaborators. The sheer volume of supplies coordinated by the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force in the first days was staggering: 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel, 1,250 tons of medicine, 12.9 million liters of water, 12,500 metric tons of food, 250 electric generators, and 750 vehicles.” (Barlow)

MG David Petraeus was not so fortunate when the 101st Airborne Division was unexpectedly given the mission to control the city of Mosul and the Nineveh Province in Iraq in April 2003. The Division had no maps of the city, no knowledge of how the city was organized or run under Saddam Hussein, and no plan to bring the city into post-war stabilization. When the Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team arrived in Mosul – the 3rd largest city in Iraq at the time – on 20 April 2003, “(t)he city of 1.7 million was a shambles – as much from looting as from war. The streets were in chaos, with police and other security forces nowhere to be seen. The city had no electricity, running water or garbage removal. Shops were closed. Most public buildings and factories lay in ruins. There was no administrative or economic infrastructure; the Baghdad based ministries which, under Saddam had controlled all economic activity, were not functioning. Those who had led the old Iraq had disappeared: political leaders, judges, university faculty,

teachers, factory managers, ministry directors. Many of them were suspect, as members of the reviled former ruling Baath Party.” (*The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq*, Abridged, Kirsten Lundberg/Peter Zimmerman, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006.)

The US Army Reserve civil affairs battalion attached to the 101st Airborne Division, likewise, was unprepared to operate in Mosul. Portions of the battalion maneuvered with the Division during combat operations and the remainder of the battalion consolidated with the Division in Mosul. Although unfamiliar with the area as its supported unit, the civil affairs battalion quickly focused on post-combat operations and assisted the division commander, staff, and brigade combat teams as they set about the tasks to establish civil security, assess conditions, organize local industry, and reconstitute local governance in the city and throughout the province.

Recommendations:

1. Prepare for the early and continuous consolidation of gains when planning combat operations.
2. Identify the civil considerations (e.g., major populated areas; internally displaced persons operations; food, water, transportation, medical, government, and industrial capabilities; etc.) in the operational environment that may pose challenges or be useful to US Forces.
3. Designate civil affairs forces to focus exclusively on those civil considerations in specified geographic areas and to:
 - a. Conduct civil intelligence preparation of the battlefield before entering the area of operations.
 - b. Monitor changing conditions in these areas during military or crisis operations.
 - c. Develop and execute coordinated plans to consolidate gains and return areas to "normalcy" as soon as possible.

Implications:

If these recommendations are not implemented, maneuver commanders will struggle to gain and/or maintain situational understanding during critical periods of transition in unified land operations. They risk losing momentum and will likely miss opportunities to trigger operational branches and sequels designed to consolidate gains and facilitate future operations.

Sources:

This lesson is based on readings, observations, and comparisons of stabilization activities in World War II, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lesson Author: Mr. Dennis Cahill, Deputy Director, Civil Affairs Force Modernization, Civil Affairs Branch, USAJFKSWCS/SOCoE. Published in SOLLIMS 23 Feb 2017.

This lesson previously appeared in *SOLLIMS Sampler- Civil Affairs in Stability Operations*, March 2017.



A military government “spearhead” (I Detachment) of the 3rd US Army answers German civilian questions in April 1945 at an outdoor office in the town square of Schlesingen, Germany. I Detachments moved in the wake of division advances to immediately begin the process of civilian stabilization and normalization. (Photo from book, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, by Earl F. Ziemke)

[Consolidating Gains Challenges](#)

[\(JLLIS ID # 215445\)](#)

Observation:

The US Army’s strategic role of consolidating gains is the lynchpin translating battlefield success into enduring political achievement.

Discussion:

Consolidating gains is an US Army strategic role that enables the enduring political outcomes desired by the civilian command authority. The US Army has faced significant challenges fulfilling this role in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. As the United States now pivots to confront the more imminent threat of malign competitors such as Iran, North Korea, Russia, and especially China, the US Army is focusing on its core function

of fighting and winning the nation's wars through Major Ground Combat Operations (MGCO). Even with this shift in priorities, the US Army remains committed to learning the consolidating gains lessons from the last twenty years of operations overseas.

Major Ground Stability Operations (MGSO) follow successful MGCO. Otherwise, the military expedition's goal was simply to punish the enemy or instigate a protracted war. Neither putative expeditions nor unending war are currently explicit goals contained the US National Security Strategy or the National Military Strategy. The consolidating gains role bridges MGCO to MGSO and must be planned for from the outset of operations in order to succeed.

Successful consolidating gains often requires more combat power than what is required for the defeat of enemy forces in the field. Operational and strategic planners must thus plan for these additional resources from the outset of operations. Hopes for a "short war" using "minimum force" are politically palatable, but risk consolidating gains failure.

The ultimate tactical objective is to consolidate gains in a way that ensures the enemy no longer has the means or will to continue the conflict while maintaining a friendly position of relative advantage. Robust area security, key terrain occupation, and local population control are key. This sets conditions for a broader focus on infrastructure and governance improvement.

Operationally, campaign planning must account for the desired end state of military operations and work backward. It should determine how much damage to infrastructure is acceptable and desirable, what is required to physically secure the relevant terrain and populations, and what resources are available among both Army forces and coalition allies.

Consolidating gains generally has a sobering effect on the population, particularly when done quickly. This moderating effect endures if the means that secure a population and enforce its orderly behavior does not excessively interfere with the economic and personal lives of the people.

Effective military governance is a key strategic-level consolidating gains consideration. Throughout most of American military history, a lack of forethought about military governance at the strategic level has made the consolidation of gains during and after large-scale combat markedly more difficult. The reality is that military governance has been an unavoidable component of American military intervention going back to the conquest of American Indian nations during the nineteenth century.

The military finds itself governing out of necessity both during and after conflicts even if it is rarely, if ever, labeled as such. In most cases, this happens because there is no other government entity present to do the job in the first place. The Second World War is one of the few examples of strategists linking military governance and consolidating gains to enduring strategic outcomes.

No matter how much soldiers would prefer to just focus on warfighting, the execution of military government operations is an equally important mission. The US military must plan and prepare for the execution of military governance before, during, and after combat operations. This planning deserves the same, or perhaps greater, level of professional forethought than combat operations have received. Failure to do so results in the type of ad hoc approach that characterized our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. A short-war, minimum-force planning mentality at the strategic and operational level will likely result in insufficient forces to maintain offensive tempo and continuously consolidate gains to win decisively.

The US Army's Civil Affairs (CA) corps is a key contributor to the Army's consolidating gains strategic role efforts. CA is uniquely qualified, connected, and organized to exploit military and civilian equities in a whole-of-nation approach to translating military success to political victory.

Recommendations:

1. Integrate consolidating gains early in the planning process, especially resourcing at the operational and strategic levels. Plan beyond winning the fight to winning the consolidating gains phase to enable stability. At the tactical level, consolidating gains security efforts often require more troops than combat operations.
2. Leverage CA assets for more than support to military ops but also long-term strategic political civilian success.

Sources:

This lessons is based on the following articles:

[“Engineering Peace: Translating Tactical Success into Political Order”](#) by Arnel David and Eliza Urwin, published in *PKSOI Paper Volume 4: 2017-18 Civil Affairs Issue Papers: Civil Affairs: A Force for Consolidating Gains*, pp. 29-46.

[“Three Perspectives on Consolidating Gains,”](#) by Mike Lundy, Richard Creed, Nate Springer, and Scott Pence published *Military Review*, September-October, 2019.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in JLLIS 1 April 2020.



Zambian peacekeepers from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrol areas in North-East of the Central African Republic. (UN photo by Herve Serefio)

[Consolidating Gains through Rule of Law Support](#)

[\(JLLIS ID # 215456\)](#)

Observation:

Consolidating gains sets the stage for developing effective and accountable police services in host-countries as part of in United Nations (UN) peace operations. Over the past twenty years, UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions have significantly enhanced their support to police services in peace operation host countries.

Discussion:

[Consolidating gains](#) sets the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate police authorities. Police services form part of a larger rule of law framework, and their effectiveness relies heavily upon the effectiveness of other rule of law institutions. The more active the police service, the more demand there is upon the other links in the criminal justice chain. If these other elements lag behind police reforms, much of the international investment in police reform will be lost. Thus, support

for strengthening courts, prosecutors' offices, the defense bar, prisons and detention facilities, and other host-country rule of law institutions is not only an essential complement to police reform, these areas of engagement are also vital for lasting peace and security. So too is political and technical support for more fundamental rule of law processes, such as constitution-making and law-making. Consolidating gains activities must aid societies marred by conflict transition to a culture based upon the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

UN peacekeeping policy strengthens the policy basis for rule of law support in post-conflict peace operation settings. UN policy focuses on conflict prevention, regional approaches, improved delivery, and a holistic approach to strengthening the criminal justice chain. This institutional chain must work together effectively, including courts, prosecutors and police. Increased accountability for those committing crimes against peacekeepers is also necessary. UN action plans include a number of steps to support host-countries to detain, investigate, and try those who are suspected of perpetrating attacks on United Nations personnel. On 31 December 2018, UN Security Council resolution 2447 highlighted "the critical importance of strengthening police, justice and corrections elements in peacekeeping operations to assist national governments in stabilizing the situation, extend State authority, end impunity, protect civilians, tackle the underlying causes of conflict, prevent relapse into conflict and build and sustain peace."^[1] Through these inter-connected initiatives, the policy basis for police, justice and corrections assistance by peace operations grows stronger.

There are six ingredients to consolidate gains in peacekeeping policing: (1) Clear mandates for the rule of law (2) sufficient human resources and funding in the field; (3) effective Headquarters operational and advisory support; (4) a solid guidance and training platform; (5) a joined-up approach by relevant United Nations system entities; and (6) full engagement from the national counterparts whom the missions are deployed to support.

Given the natural political hurdles to justice system reform, the experience in post-conflict peacekeeping settings illustrates that targeted political engagement is essential to success. We have also learned that, with a clear strategy and sustained engagement, it is quite possible to generate support from national authorities for justice system reform. Operating under the authorization of the Security Council, United Nations peace operations are uniquely positioned to support national authorities to take steps to end impunity, develop a constitutional framework, and strengthen the justice system.

Despite pressure to reduce funding, UN efforts to improve rule of law institutions has had a significant impact. For example, support from United Nations peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Kosovo and Liberia helped to restart justice and prisons institutions in each setting and lay the ground for more sustainable peace.

[\[1\] S/RES/2447 \(2018\) of 13 December 2018, Op. Para. 1.](#)

Recommendations:

1. Strengthen support to the political role in UN peace operations because improving the rule of law requires a realignment of power dynamics in the host country.
2. Strengthen support for effective non-violent dispute resolution processes.
3. Rule of law activities should be carefully focused on the specific needs of each peace operation. For example, in violent settings, the focus of these efforts should emphasize accountability for those who commit crimes that fuel the conflict, or that commit violent crimes against peacekeepers. In settings in which there is government support to address corruption, such as in Afghanistan, the operation could provide support for effective anti-corruption initiatives.
4. UN and other outside efforts should gain the support of host-nation influencers to ensure reform success.
5. Rule of law efforts should emphasize a population-centered approach to ensure genuine citizen involvement to prevent a return to violent conflict.
6. Rule of law efforts should support the development of a national constitution in at-risk countries that defines the rights, roles, and responsibilities of citizens and government institutions. An inclusive and genuine constitutional process can have a lasting impact on sustaining peace in the post-conflict environment.

Source:

This lessons is based on the article "[The Evolving Role of Rule of Law Support in United Nations Peace Operations](#)" by Robert A. Pulver published online in the *Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) Magazine* number 4, 2019.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in JLLIS 1 April 2020.

National Strategies for Stabilization and Consolidating Gains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria

(JLLIS ID # 214717)

Observation:

The December 2017 US National Security Strategy (NSS) focuses on safeguarding American prosperity and security. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) supports this focus. A November 2018 assessment of the NDS, "Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission" (*PCD*), has 23 recommendations to make the NDS more effective. Two of

these PCD recommendations peripherally address Stabilization and Consolidating Gains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

Discussion:

The NSS promotes US security with a forward-deployed development model that partners with countries that want progress based on free market principles and rule of law. It deemphasizes grant assistance and emphasizes approaches that attract private capital and catalyze private sector activity. (NSS, pp. 33, 38-39) The US will do this by synchronizing diplomatic, economic, and military tools simultaneously, placing a priority on economic support that achieves local and macroeconomic stability, helps build capable local security forces, and strengthens the rule of law in partner nations. (NSS, p. 40) Regarding Iraq and Syria specifically, the NSS states that the US will strengthen a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq as an independent state. The US will seek a settlement to the Syrian civil war that sets the conditions for refugees to return home and rebuild their lives in safety. (NSS, p. 49) For Afghanistan, the US will continue to partner with them to “promote peace and security in the region and pursue anti-corruption reform to increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government and reduce the appeal of violent extremist organizations. The US is committed to supporting the Afghan government and security forces in their fight against the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and other terrorists. The US will bolster the fighting strength of the Afghan security forces to convince the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield and to set the conditions for diplomatic efforts to achieve enduring peace.” (NSS, p.50)

The NDS focuses on deterring war and protecting the security of America. It emphasizes Joint Forces structured to win in an environment of emergent peer nation states, rapidly developing and dispersing technologies, and changing concepts of war that span the entire spectrum of competition. A key NDS Line of Effort is strengthening alliances and attracting new partners. Defeating terrorism and interagency cooperation also remain a key element of the US’s Strategic Approach. The NDS lists 11 Defense objectives. One peripherally addresses preventing terrorism overseas and another addresses “bolstering partner nations against coercion.” (NDS, pp. 4-5) The Strategic Approach to attaining these 11 Defense Objectives includes “develop[ing] enduring coalitions to consolidate gains we have made in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria . . .” (NDS p. 9)

The PCD is a compilation of assessments and recommendations based on The National Defense Strategy Commission’s analysis of the NDS and the larger geopolitical environment in which that strategy must be executed. The bi-partisan Commission appointed by Congress consulted with civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense, representatives of other US government departments and agencies, allied diplomats and military officials, and independent experts. The Commission argues that America confronts a grave crisis of national security and national defense as US military advantages erode and the strategic landscape becomes steadily more threatening. If the United States does not show greater urgency and seriousness in responding to this crisis and does not take decisive steps to rebuild its military advantages now, the damage to American security and influence could be devastating. (PCD, p. 1) PCD provides 32 Findings and Recommendations. Two of them address Stabilization and Consolidating Gains strategy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

Recommendations:

PCD recommendations:

1. Listed as recommendation #10 under “Near- to Mid-Term Force Priorities” in PCD: “Even after the demise of the core ISIS ‘caliphate,’ the United States will still face state and non-state military challenges that require persistent military engagement in the Middle East.

Recommendation: US military posture in the Middle East should not become dramatically smaller, even though the precise mix of US capabilities should be reexamined.” (PCD, p. 66)

2. Listed as recommendation #23 “Civil-Military Relations” in PCD: “There is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy development and implementation. Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of US defense and national security policy. Allocating forces across theaters is an inherently political-military task, decision authority for which should be held by America’s civilian leaders.

Recommendation: An increased civilian role is crucial in integrating responses to global challenges. DOD, with Congressional oversight, must emphasize decision-making processes that highlight the political- military dynamics of force management shifts. The Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy must fully exercise their responsibilities for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans.” (PCD, pp. 69-70)

Additional Recommendations:

3. Specifically determine the strategic outcomes that constitute success for stabilization and consolidation of gains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These strategic outcomes must be measurable, but by no means absolute. Enduring change takes time and is incremental. Indication of progress in corruption elimination, government efficiency, and extremist defeat are attainable strategic outcomes.

4. Specifically link the US military capabilities deployed to desired strategic outcomes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

5. Specifically determine the composition and characteristics of the “enduring coalitions” that will help secure the desired strategic outcomes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

Implications:

America undoubtedly faces threats from a revanchist Russia, aggressive China, and resilient terrorists. The complex synergies created by rapidly changing technology and methods of competition must be mastered by the US if it is to attain its national goals. However, the 18 years of effort invested in Afghanistan, 16 years in Iraq, and 7 years in Syria must not be forgotten. Enduring Stabilization and Consolidation of Gains *are* possible in these nations for minimum cost with properly focused strategies and appropriate resources and forces to implement them.

Sources:

This lesson is based on the following resources:

National Security Strategy. Dec 2017. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf>

National Defense Strategy Commission, *Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission*. 13 Nov 2018. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/11/providing-common-defense>

2018 National Defense Strategy, Unclassified Summary. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

Hoover Institute, "Interview on a New Afghanistan with HR McMaster and Janan Mosazai. Recorded 23 Oct, 2018; Accessed 14 Nov 18 <https://www.hoover.org/research/new-afghanistan-hr-mcmaster-and-janan-mosazai>

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Updated in JLLIS 13 January 2020. Originally published in SOLLIMS 12 November 2018.

This lesson previously appeared in the *Strategic Planning for P&SO Lessons Learned Report*, September, 2019.



Armed Forces of the Philippines airmen work alongside US soldiers during Exercise Balikatan, March 12, 2019. Exercise Balikatan, in its 35th iteration, is an annual US-Philippine military training exercise focused on a variety of missions applicable to consolidating gains. (US Army photo by Sgt. Scott Vargas)

Consolidating Gains in Multi-Domain Operations

[\(JLLIS ID # 215457\)](#)

Observation:

Successfully consolidating gains enables the Joint Force to support proactive stabilization, counter-destabilization, diplomatic, and development efforts.

Discussion:

Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) is an US Army concept that involves the entire Joint Force. Consolidating gains activities set the conditions for stability, a fundamental component of MDB. Consolidating gains is a US Army strategic role that creates circumstances for favorable enduring outcomes to military operations. Stability is part of stabilization, a political endeavor allowing an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.

In order to prevent a resumption of armed conflict, the Joint Force must retain the initiative won during conflict and consolidate gains by helping restore public services, reestablish law and order, and isolate and defeat the adversary's subversive activities. The Joint Force must operate both defensively (building stability capacity) and offensively (countering adversarial efforts) to create a sustainable future.

Notably, US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that battlefield success does not automatically lead to the achievement of desired political objectives. This requires the Joint Force to connect lethal and non-lethal military capabilities and activities with political actions and goals. This stability convergence is the essential requirement to consolidate gains.

While the Department of Defense (DOD) is focused on leveraging lethality to win victory on the battlefield, other US Government (USG) organizations such as the Department of State (DOS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) seek to manage relationships, conflicts, and trends in the international community space to attain political objectives. All member of the USG team must fully understand each other's perspectives, roles, and goals to overcome the cognitive dissonance of using violence of military operations in the present to prevent violence in the future and realize a peaceful outcome.

Further adding to the complexity of consolidating gains, planners traditionally lump stability activities into the post-conflict phase. From the Army's perspective, it should reconsider its MDB planning approach and proactively plan stability activities to bridge the conflict and post-conflict process phases. During the non-combat competition period, stability operations protect our allies and partners. During armed conflict, Army stability

tasks protect the legitimacy of (USG) integrated campaigns. During the return to completion after armed conflict, stability activities once again pave the way for transition to relative peace.

Stabilization (proactive stability combined with counter-destabilization) works when diplomatic, development, defense, and other USG actors conduct deliberate coordination and planning, assess the environment, develop shared understanding, and develop common priorities across all phases of activity. This will become more difficult as the environment becomes more complex.

Recommendations:

1. Stability through Consolidating Gains activities should not become synonymous with post-conflict reconstruction and return to civil control. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military's physical presence, capacity, and ability to provide security gave it access that other departments and agencies did not possess. Combined with a predisposition for action, DOD often assumed the leading role, even where it lacked capability. Although doctrine recognizes the importance of stability during all phases of the campaign, singular stability actions should not become short-term tools only to weaken the insurgency instead of part of a synchronized long-term plan to consolidate gains.
2. MDO planners should be prepared to accept a degree of instability while consolidating gains. The level of acceptable instability should be tied to the local culture and understandings of political legitimacy. "Perfect Stability" may not be worth the cost or risk, and may alienate natural allies such as humanitarian organizations who shun military-imposed security and stability.
3. MDO planners should prepare to counter an adversary's deconstruction efforts' Counter-destabilization consists of countering the adversary's lines of effort, targeting their destabilization mechanisms, and interdicting the means an adversary's destabilization activities.
4. MDO planners should be attuned to conflict triggers that may not be associated with adversary actions. Too often planners assume that instability in a region is by design or occurs because of the deliberate actions of an adversary. Instability may be the result of extremely localized situations and may not have anything to do with outside actors.

Source:

This lesson is based on [Stability in Multi-Domain Battle](#) by Colonel Stephen Marr published by the US Army Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in June, 2018.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in JLLIS 1 April 2020.

4. CONSOLIDATING GAINS PRACTITIONER INSIGHT LESSONS

International Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP): A Department of Defense (DOD) Tool for Building Partner Capacity and Consolidating Gains

[\(JLLIS ID # 215458\)](#)

Observation:

DOD has limited funding and authorities to build capacity in partner countries, particularly in the civil sector. Building capacity is critical during a consolidation of gains. The US Department of State (DoS) International Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP) can be leveraged as a resource by DOD during consolidation of gains to not only build partner capacity but also create interoperability between regional partners. IVLP is the premier DoS professional exchange program. It provides firsthand knowledge about US society, culture, and politics, while cultivating lasting relationships. By connecting current and emerging foreign leaders with their American counterparts, IVLP strengthens global US engagement advances national security goals.

Discussion:

IVLP celebrated its 80th anniversary in 2019 and hosts nearly 5,000 international visitors per year with nearly 200,000 participants since 1940. Alumni include over 500 current or former heads of state and leaders. In FY 2018, approx. 1000 individuals from the Near East/North Africa region participated in IVLP. There is generally an equal distribution of male and female attendees with an average age of 25-44.

The IVLP program is managed by each country's USEMB Public Affairs Section (PAS). Project nominations are handled by country and submitted back to DoS D.C. for approval. There are three different types of project submissions:

i. Traditional (aka 'classic') IVLP: A formal project slate is published each FY with various projects on a variety of topics for which individuals can be nominated. There are slates for both regional projects (translation provided) and multi-regional projects (conducted in English). Each USEMB can normally nominate between 15-20 candidates for a variety of projects to allow strategic planning and predictability. Nomination must be done by a USGOV employee connected with the USEMB. Traditional projects normally run three weeks and are fully funded (all travel, lodging, and per-diem paid by DoS). The traditional IVLP slate is released annually o/a 01 March for the following FY. Each embassy holds a selection committee meeting o/a 01 May. Names are due to DoS D.C. for approval NLT 01 June.

ii. On Demand IVLP: This provides a rapid response option that can be coordinated, scheduled, and executed within 3-6 months. The nominator proposes the general agenda, goals, and schedule. There is no selection committee. As long as the nominator embassy concurrence, this type can also include multiple countries, but nominations

must be done via the embassy where the individual is a resident. On demand can be done with translation services or without and the projects normally are shorter, lasting o/a 10 days. Funding for on demand is based off availability. There are no country allocations which provides flexibility to respond to changing priorities but execution must be in the same FY as nomination. Important to also note with this option, international travel is always cost-shared with the nominee and not paid for by USGOV.

iii. Single Country Project IVLP: Similarly to the on demand, the nominator proposes the general agenda, goals, and schedule. These are focused at only one country and translation services are provided in the national language. There are no quotas for single country projects but similar to on demand, allocations are based off budget availability and execution must be done in the same FY as a project nomination. Single country projects are fully funded (all travel, lodging, and per-diem paid by DOS) and normally run three weeks.

An ideal IVLP candidate is an emerging leader working in a field important to US strategic goals. They have limited exposure and knowledge of the US and are likely to return to their country and share their experiences with others. They are personally known by a member of the USGOV who will nominate them, have a passport from their country of nationality, and are able to obtain a J1 VISA.

IVLP is not a training program and is strictly focused at an exchange of ideas similar to what would be seen in a subject matter expert exchange. IVLP is not a propaganda tour or protocol/VIP experience (lodging and travel are done at government rate). It is also not a program for trade delegations, those coming to conduct business, or to buy goods/services. Senior leaders near end of their careers or those with extensive knowledge of the US are not appropriate. US citizens (including dual citizens) cannot participate.

Recommendation:

The nomination of IVLP projects using traditional, single country, and on demand formats can help DOD consolidate long term gains. Each FY, DOD should look to leverage IVLP as a tool to build partner capacity with more frequency. The entry point is with each USEMB PAS section. DoS encourages the inter-agency to propose nominations. Historically, there are not frequently large amounts of annual nominations originating from DOD.

Implications:

The sharing of ideas and information helps mold respective partner nation mid-level leaders into the senior leaders of tomorrow and is critical in order to achieve success when consolidating gains. While the IVLP project nomination process requires some administrative effort, the payoff is significant. Without improved use of IVLP, DOD is missing out on a resource to develop long term partner capacity. Since DOD funding authorities continue to be limited, particularly for civil sector capacity building, IVLP can be a

leveraged not only to build partner capacity but also create interoperability between regional partners.

Source:

Recent experience during a 2019-2020 mobilization and deployment in support of the USARCENT G34CMO Directorate. A Civil Affairs Support Detachment consisting of 14 mobilized US Army Reservists from the 352nd Civil Affairs Command conducted civil-military operations in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to build partner capacity during consolidation of gains.

Lesson Author: LTC Marco A. Bongioanni, Detachment 10 Commander, Civil Affairs Support Detachment, USARCENT G34CMO. Published in JLLIS 1 April 2020.



Members representing the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army, US Army, US Marine Corps, US Air Force, US Embassy, Canadian Armed Forces and the Jordan Directorate of Military Women’s Affairs listen closely during the discussion portion of a Gender Integration Working Group hosted by the Civil Liaison Team-Jordan, Civil Affairs Support Detachment- US Army Central, Jan. 23, 2020 at Joint Training Center-Jordan. (US Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Shaiyla B. Hakeem)

Consolidating Gains through Gender Integration with Coalition Partners and the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army

(JLLIS ID # 215459)

Observation:

Opportunities exist to improve gender Integrated communication between coalition partners and the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army.

Discussion:

In 2000 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). UNSCR Resolution 1325 was a landmark, legal and political document from the Security Council that required parties in a conflict to prevent violations of women's rights, to support women's participation in peace negotiations and in post-conflict reconstruction, and to protect women and girls from wartime sexual violence.

In 2017 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan created the Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The focus of the JONAP is to ensure national and regional stability through gender equality and women's participation, particularly in national peace and security efforts. Also in 2017, the United States adopted the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 to promote the "meaningful participation of women in mediation and negotiation processes seeking to prevent, mitigate, or resolve violent conflict." In 2019, the United States adopted the Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. This Strategy "promotes the meaningful inclusion of women in processes to prevent, mediate, resolve, and recover from deadly conflict or disaster."

The Joint Training Center-Jordan (JTC-J) Civil Affairs Officer in charge of gender advising convened a networking event on 20 January 2020 for US, coalition partner, and Jordanian gender integration stakeholders. US Embassy Political Officer, Mr. Adam Kotkin, discussed the United States Agency International Development (USAID) Implementation of the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security and also shared statistics about gender integration across Jordan. The Jordanian Director of Women's Military Affairs, Colonel Maha AL-Nasser, provided a brief to on the Jordanian National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Women Peace and Security Initiative. Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 61st Battalion Commander, LTC Mohammed Khal'doon, and two female officers from the Jordanian Border Directorate also attended the conference.

An important Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army gender integration goal is to increase the percentage of women in the organization from 1.4% to 3%. Current challenges to this effort are the lack of infrastructure to house and train females, and the lack of a reserve force to facilitate the incorporation of more women into the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army. The start of a female recruiting campaign in March and the opening of a new

Women's Center in May supports attaining this goal. The Jordanian Armed Forces Women's Center will provide the much needed infrastructure to facilitate the housing and training of females joining the military forces. There are already 14,000+ female applicants since the recruiting commenced.

Recommendations:

1. Maintain collaboration between coalition partners and the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army through use of the shared platform called PiX.net. The Protected Internet exchange, or PiX, is a US government-sponsored program to assist with unclassified information sharing among US government agencies and military, as well as with foreign partners. PiX helps people working on similar problem sets connect with each other in a secure space. Everything that was shared during the first Gender Integration Working Group is uploaded to this shared workspace, and future publications and updates will be posted here.
2. This will enhance consolidating gains planning by emphasizing WPS considerations to facilitate a seamless transition from combat to stability operations. Emphasizing WPS initiatives at the tactical level and coordinating between every unit in an area of responsibility will improve the collective awareness of the initiatives. By focusing specifically on how gender adds crucial perspective to every aspect of military operations, the units can better plan and facilitate for the best learning environment while training side-by-side with our Jordanian partners.
3. Increase publicity about Jordan's gender integration efforts by publishing stories in periodicals such as UNIPATH (military magazine) about initiatives like King Abdullah II's daughter, Princess Salma, completing fixed-wing aircraft preliminary pilot training in January, 2020. Another way to consolidate gains is by addressing the crosscut of gender and WPS using the 17 proposed DoD WPS Principles. One of these, for example, is Countering Violent Extremism in which opportunities lie to partner is fusing together best practices related to the meaningful participation of women. In volume 9, No. 1 of UNIPATH, an article describing the counter-extremism program within the Jordan Armed Forces could include the differences that gender play in furthering their cutting-edge counter-extremism curriculum.
4. Ensure continued facilitation of a Gender Working Group by engaging the Civil Affairs Support Detachment (CASD).

The CASD is made up of 12 Civil Affairs trained Officers and NCOs and also includes a Geospatial Analyst and an Information Technology Specialist for a total of 14 team members. This team is assigned to the CENTCOM AOR and is divided physically among 5 countries: Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, UAE and Uzbekistan. The individual Officers assigned to these countries are designated as the Civil Liaison Team (CLT) Chief or Officer-in-Charge (OIC), and the Non-commissioned Officer (NCO), if there is one assigned, as the (Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge) NCOIC.

The Civil Liaison Team (CLT) Chief is best suited to lead the Gender Working Group as they are trained facilitators with a specific focus on the civil considerations of the country they are assigned to. Given gender is a crucial consideration for any population and must be addressed as an integral part of analysis and planning, the CASD's Civil Liaison Team Jordan is in the best position to execute this mission.

Source:

This lesson is based on the experiences of MAJ Majel A. Savage, CLT-J Chief, Joint Training Center-Jordan.

Lesson Authors: This lesson is co-authored by COL Veronica Oswald-Hrutkay, WPS Integrator Lead for the US Army War College, MAJ Majel A. Savage, CLT-J Chief, Joint Training Center-Jordan and Mr. Jack Dougherty, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. Published in JLLIS 1 April 2020.

Note: The 2020 January Draft DOD WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan are Women, Peace and Security Principles are (also available on JLLIS):

- Diversity & Inclusion
- Gender Integration
- Inclusive Leadership Development
- Professionalization of Partner Nation Armed Forces
- Recruitment & Retention
- Sexual Harassment & Assault Prevention
- Sexual Exploitation & Abuse Prevention
- Gender-Based Violence Prevention
- Protection of Civilians
- Protection of Children affected by Armed Conflict
- Countering Trafficking in Persons
- Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief
- Countering Violent Extremist Organizations
- International Humanitarian Law
- International Human Rights Law



US Marine Cpl. Hailey McNeill (left), with 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit Female Engagement Team (FET), practices physical search procedures with a Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army Quick Reaction Force FET member during detainee operations and handling training August 5, 2019 in Jordan. The US is committed to the security of Jordan and to partnering closely with JAF to meet common security challenges. (US Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Shaiyla B. Hakeem)

Staff Integration for Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

(JLLIS ID # 213305)

Observation:

Reserve Component civil affairs (CA) companies and psychological operations (PSYOP) detachments are often not integrated into brigade combat team (BCT) operations due to delayed input into the military decision making process (MDMP) and little to no CA and PSYOP representation organic to the staff.

Discussion:

A maneuver BCT is authorized one CA Captain and one Sergeant First Class PSYOP planner. When these positions go unfilled, there are no organic staff members to focus on integrating civil military operations (CMO) and military information support operations (MISO) into BCT operations. Even when a BCT does have an assigned CA CPT and PSYOP SFC, integration of CMO and MISO is difficult. Civil affairs and PSYOP enablers, along with any organic BCT staff, should be doing analysis of the information environment (IE) and the civil component of the operational environment (OE) during mission analysis. Oftentimes, the analysis of the IE and civil component are missed because the BCT does not demand this as an output from the enablers. Civil affairs and PSYOP enablers are not part of the early planning which precludes input into operations orders (OPORDs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDS). Security in the support zone is a critical component of consolidating gains and setting conditions for future operations. Due to the lack of integration, the BCT is often ill-prepared to address challenges within the IE and civil component of the OE which most often arise in the support zone.

Recommendation:

If a PSYOP and CA team is not present for Leaders Training Program (LTP), the BCT must plan for CMO and MISO. If the BCT does not have an organic CA CPT or PSYOP SFC, the BCT should designate another information related capability, such as PAO, to integrate CMO and MISO into BCT operations. These designated staff members should clearly outline CA and PSYOP due-outs and inputs into the operations process. During mission analysis, the BCT XO should expect and require analysis of the IE and civil component to be included. During course of action development (COA DEV), the BCT executive officer (XO) should expect CA and PSYOP enablers to present solutions to the IE and civil component problems defined in MA. In addition, the CA and PSYOP should provide inputs to targeting and shaping operations in the BDE deep fight during COA DEV/analysis. The initial plan to address the IE developed during MDMP should then be re-evaluated and re-synchronized during the targeting working group with CA / PSYOP inputs.

Lesson Author: Mr. Kevin E. Kreie, Observer/Controller, National Training Center. Created in JLLIS 4 November 2019.



Observer-Controller/Trainers from the 1st Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Training Brigade participate in a civil affairs training event Oct. 7, 2019 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo courtesy 1st Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Training Brigade)

5. PKSOI **Lesson Reports** and SOLLIMS Samplers (2014-2019)

2019

- **Partnering**
- **Strategic Planning for P&SO**
- **Conflict Prevention**
- **SSR & DDR**

2018

- **Transitional Public Security**
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: The Complexity of Considerations**
- **Stage-setting and Right-sizing for Stability**
- **Complexities and Efficiencies in Peacekeeping Operations**
- **Inclusive Peacebuilding: Working with Communities**
- **Monitoring & Evaluation for Peace and Stability**

2017

- **Lessons on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)**
- **Operationalizing Women, Peace, and Security**
- **Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations**
- **Civil Affairs in Stability Operations**

2016

- **Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**
- **Strategic Communication/Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations**
- **Job Creation Programs – Insights from Africa and Conflict-affected States**
- **Stabilization and Transition**
- **Lessons from the MSF Hospital (Trauma Center) Strike in Kunduz**
- **Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations**
- **Building Stable Governance**
- **Lessons Learned – Peacekeeping Operations in Africa**
- **Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping**

2015

- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications**
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief]**
- **Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations**
- **Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students**
- **Security Sector Reform**

2014

- **MONUSCO Lesson Report**
- **Reconstruction and Development**
- **Veterinary Support, Animal Health, and Animal Agriculture in Stability Operations**
- **Women, Peace and Security**
- **Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students**
- **Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”**
- **Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces**

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