



Guns or Growth: Lessons from Security-First and Civil-Society-First Approaches to Peacebuilding in East Timor

A Case Study by

by Jonathan Taylor Downs

Kennesaw State University

Case Study #0419-09

PKSOI TRENDS GLOBAL CASE STUDY SERIES

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this case study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of PKSOI, Kennesaw State University, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This case study is published as part of the PKSOI Trends Global Case Study Series by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. Content is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to the original author.

Author Biographical Sketch

Jonathan Taylor Downs is a PhD student in the International Conflict Management program at Kennesaw State University. His research focus is on organizational conflict in social movements. He graduated from Georgia Southern University with a BA in History in 2011 and from North Carolina State University with an MA in International Studies in 2013. His previous research focused on conceptions of American identity among priests and volunteers working with Latino farmworkers in North Carolina. After completing his Masters, he spent several years working with organizations in the nonprofit sector dealing with issues of poverty and substandard housing in Panajachel, Guatemala, Raleigh, North Carolina, and Johnson City, Tennessee.





1

In the rather chaotic history of UN peacekeeping operations, where results have not always matched the efforts of the international community, East Timor stands as an undeniable success. In two and a half years... this totally devastated country was entirely reconstructed – rather should I say; constructed – and brought to independence... In the space of 28 months... this country... saw its external and internal security assured, and the establishment of central and district administrations, a police force, a judicial system, legal and regulatory codes, a central bank, a fiscal system, an educational system, agricultural development... and a constitution.

- Jean-Christian Cady, deputy special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in East Timor, February 2000 – July 2001²

It may be called a humanitarian intervention, but if the United Nations really cared about human rights, it would be doing more right now to prosecute people responsible for human rights violations. Every time you talk about an international tribunal with someone who works for the United Nations in East Timor they say, “Well, you know, it takes a lot of money, it takes a lot of time, and it would be a huge hassle.” Though the people of East Timor say they want justice, the United Nations is very reluctant to undertake the task. The United Nations presence in East Timor is almost like the sovereign government of a country. It has never had so much power in one country. In a way, this is like a great experiment for the United Nations—it often seems like a way to build up people’s CVs rather than a way to do something for the East Timorese. I don’t know what all the different motives of UN workers are, but human rights do not seem to be a top priority.

- Ajiza Magno, East Timorese women’s rights and labor activist, 2001³

On September 10th, 1999, over a thousand people huddled together inside a United Nations compound in Dili, East Timor, as pro-Indonesian militias roamed the streets of the territory’s capital city and surrounded the last sanctuary “controlled” by the UN. Amongst this mass of people were local citizens, international reporters, UN officials, unarmed military observers, and people from the countryside and surrounding towns who had been driven from their homes.

Days earlier they had celebrated the successful implementation of a free and fair independence referendum, where the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia. Since the vote, militias had sprung up across the country, killing hundreds of people and displacing thousands more.

Outside the compound's gates, the Indonesian military, the same organization many inside the compound believed to be supporting the armed violence spreading across East Timor, kept the militias from getting to those confined within. While physically trapped, this group was acutely aware of developments far beyond the compound's walls.

In Canberra, New York, Washington, and elsewhere, no definitive assurances had been given that an international force would come to their aid. In Jakarta, the Indonesian government warned that any international action taken without their permission would be interpreted as an act of war. Former Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer remarked, "It would have been a very bloody, and a very disastrous, conflict if it had ever come to that."⁴ As the militias marched, burned, and looted outside and the international community contemplated its next move, this eclectic group of encircled bureaucrats, soldiers, and citizens could only watch, and wait.

Background

East Timor was conquered by the Portuguese in the 16th century and remained under the control of the European power until 1975. That year, the colony's most powerful political party, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), declared the territory's independence. Following the overthrow of an authoritarian regime in Portugal the previous year, Fretilin had been hastily formed to agitate for independence. While anti-independence and pro-Indonesian integration parties also formed, Fretilin was not only larger, but also influenced by Marxist ideology and socialist organizations in other former Portuguese colonies, and it framed its rhetoric in a similar fashion to these parties. For example, the party issued a popular explanatory statement that outlined its aims and goals in 1974:

FRETILIN is the REVOLUTIONARY FRONT OF AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR. It unites all the nationalist and anti-colonialist forces in a common cause – authentic liberation of the people of East Timor from the colonial yolk [sic]. FRETILIN proposes to show the people of East Timor in a way towards PROGRESS, PEACE and FREEDOM [sic]. FRETILIN repudiates all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism, so that the people of East Timor can be truly INDEPENDENT, FREE and PROGRESSIVE.⁵

Another example comes from Rosa 'Muki' Bonaparte Soares, the founding secretary of the first East Timorese women's organization, when she spoke about women in the movement.

The Popular Organisation of Timorese Women is a mass organisation of the Revolutionary Front of an Independent East Timor – Fretilin – which enables Timorese women to participate in the revolution. The principal objective of women participating in the revolution is not, strictly speaking, the emancipation of women as women, but the triumph of the revolution, and consequently, the liberation of women as a social being who is the target of a double exploitation: that under the traditional conceptions and that under the colonialist conceptions.⁶

Indonesia received support from, and was an ally of, the United States and other Western powers during the Cold War, though the U.S. government possessed "knowledge that the Indonesian Army was conducting a campaign of mass murder against the country's Communist Party (PKI) starting in 1965."⁷

Brad Simpson, the founder and director of the Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project, and an associate professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of Connecticut, contends that declassified documents from the National Security Archive demonstrate that US "diplomats in the Jakarta Embassy kept a record of which PKI leaders were being executed, and that U.S. officials actively supported Indonesian Army efforts to destroy the country's left-leaning labor movement."⁸

Eight days after Fretilin's declaration of independence in May 1974, Indonesian forces (TNI) invaded the territory and annexed the region the following year. The United Nations refused to recognize Indonesia's annexation and continued

to consider Portugal as the legitimate administering power of East Timor. The Security Council issued a resolution “deploring the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in East Timor... Regretting that the Government of Portugal did not discharge fully its responsibilities as administering Power in the territory,” while it simultaneously called upon “the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory... [and for] the Government of Portugal as administering Power to co-operate fully with the United Nations as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination.”⁹

Neither Indonesia nor Portugal followed these recommendations, and Portugal made no attempt to expel the Indonesian troops from their former colony. Clashes between guerrilla forces and the Indonesian military continued through the following decades, with the occupation resulting in 102,800 conflict-related deaths.¹⁰ Ramesh Thakur (Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) in the Crawford School at the Australian National University) believes international actors began paying greater attention to these events due to the Cold War coming to an end.

The East Timor conflict was suppressed for decades because sympathy for the plight of the Timorese was subordinated to the Cold War calculation of building up a strong Indonesia as a bulwark against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. As the shroud of the Cold War lifted from the body politic of Asia-Pacific, the rigor mortis of long-suppressed internal dynamics began to ease.¹¹

The Santa Cruz Massacre

In 1991, 250 pro-independence East Timorese demonstrators were killed by Indonesian soldiers in Dili, the capital of East Timor, in what became known as the Santa Cruz massacre. This event was witnessed by two western journalists, Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, and captured on camera by another, Max Stahl. Stahl smuggled the tape of the massacre outside of the country to Australia, where its release resulted in an international outcry and mounting pressure on Indonesia over its human rights record in its occupation of East Timor. Media outlets condemned the Indonesian army's actions across the globe. The *Tapol Bulletin* in Indonesia referred to the massacre as “the Killing Fields of East Timor,” while the *New York Times* ran a headline titled “The Tiananmen in East Timor.”¹²

The International Response

President George H.W. Bush described the massacre as “the tragedy in East Timor,” and told reporters that “we pride ourselves, and I think properly so, on standing up for human rights, and I think we’ve made clear to the parties that are interested there the U.S. position.”¹³

Indonesian foreign minister Ali Atlas told interviewers that it was “because of the Santa Cruz Incident in November 1991 [that support dropped]. That was a turning point in our diplomacy over the East Timor issue... Since then, international political support had been on the wane. Countries that formerly supported us were shocked.”¹⁴

The US Congress, for example, voted to cut off Indonesia's International and Military Education and Training (IMET) aid in October 1992, though several agencies and branches of the military circumvented this legislation and continued to train some Indonesian personnel.¹⁵ In July 1993, the State Department blocked a transfer of F-5 fighter jets to Indonesia, while the Senate passed an amendment in 1994 restricting arms sales to Indonesia until human rights improvements were made in East Timor. One of the amendment's authors, Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI), told reporters that “this sends a clear message to the leaders of Indonesia that we will not be associated with or tolerate their campaign of repression against the people of East Timor.”¹⁶

In 1996, Fretilin's leader in exile, Jose Ramos-Horta, and the Catholic Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, which signaled further international disapproval of the situation in East Timor. The Nobel committee stated that "Carlos Belo, bishop of East Timor, has been the foremost representative of the people of East Timor. At the risk of his own life, he has tried to protect his people from infringements by those in power... [while] Ramos-Horta has been the leading international spokesman for East Timor's cause since 1975."¹⁷ The Committee further added that "in awarding this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Belo and Ramos-Horta, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wants to honour their sustained and self-sacrificing contributions for a small but oppressed people." Belo, in particular, used the protection provided through this award to increasingly challenge the Indonesian government. In his Nobel lecture, Belo commented on his role in resolving the conflict and the Nobel Committee's decision.

I firmly believe that I am here essentially as the voice of the voiceless people of East Timor who are with me today in spirit, if not in person. And what the people want is peace, an end to violence, and respect for their human rights... It is tragic that people have to suffer and die and the television cameras have to deliver the pictures to people's homes everyday before the world at large admits there is a problem. Therein lies the enormous significance and the brave wisdom of the decision of the Nobel Committee to focus on East Timor this year; it represents the extraordinary recognition of East Timor's quest for peace and the recognition of its pleas for an end to suffering.¹⁸

Der Spiegel quoted Belo as saying "the Indonesian soldiery, which has robbed us of our freedom and destroyed our culture, treats us as scabby dogs. Justice is alien to them. The Indonesians keep us like slaves."¹⁹ Belo later denied making this statement, but his international recognition and position in East Timor brought increased attention to statements associated with his name. While Indonesia was still a strong and valuable ally to many western states, the different dynamics of the international system that followed the end of the Cold War exposed the leadership in Jakarta to far more criticism than in previous decades.

From Suharto to Habibie

The combination of international pressures for democratization and a regional economic crisis in 1998 brought about the resignation of longtime leader General Hajji Suharto in Indonesia. While this was more of a changing of the guard, rather than a democratic revolution, Suharto's successor, Vice President B. J. Habibie, was more amicable to external influences on policy and less of an ardent nationalist than his predecessor. In a meeting with President Clinton in 1994 over the issues in East Timor, Suharto told Clinton that "the 19-year occupation of East Timor by Indonesian troops had improved the human rights situation in the remote half-island."²⁰ When asked about East Timorese student protests at the US embassy over the issue of independence he remarked, "these young people do not understand the process of integration of East Timor into Indonesia... They also have no experience to compare how the East Timorese people lived under the Portuguese colonial rule."²¹

After replacing Suharto in 1998, Habibie loosened centralized control and granted a degree of local autonomy in many restive areas across the archipelago, including in East Timor. Following Australian concerns over developments in East Timor, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote Habibie in December 1998 and suggested that recent events "enabled a compromise political solution to be implemented while deferring a referendum on the final status [of East Timor]... for many years."²² Habibie replied that the letter "suggests that I have to solve [East Timor] as how the French have solved their colonies in the Pacific New Caledonia... That means prepare them for 10 years or whatever and then after that give them their independence."²³

He later indicated that the letter "pushed him into a snap decision which led to the independence referendum being held six months later."²⁴ While Habibie's actions upon coming into power placated the population in many parts of the country, the strong secessionist sentiments and international support in East Timor turned these limited concessions

into fuel for a campaign for full independence. FALINTIL, the military wing of Fretilin, continued its guerrilla activities in the region, while the Indonesian military continued to use force against public demonstrations for independence by activists. Given the economic and political turmoil experienced by the Habibie government and the political conditions in the region, Jakarta consented to a UN organized referendum on East Timor's independence. As Allan Gyngell, a former Australian diplomat, commented, "if you were sitting in Jakarta, looking out at the other 210 million Indonesians facing immense problems in a major economic crisis, 'suddenly East Timor doesn't seem like such a vital interest.'"²⁵

UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET and Different Approaches to Peacebuilding

In the years leading up to East Timor's independence vote, international figures expressed their support for continued economic and military relations with Indonesia. In response to a question on US concerns over human rights threatening Asia-Pacific economic cooperation at a news conference with Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating in 1993, President Bill Clinton stated:

The United States does have a very strong position on human rights, and I think we should. I also think your [Australian] government has a good position on human rights, which it has not been reluctant to express in dealing with other nations. But that has not undermined our relationships, commercial relationships and political relationships with countries that we think are making an honest effort to shoot straight with us and to work with us... You mentioned Indonesia... We have questions about the issues of East Timor, as you know, and I think you do, too—your country does, too. But we have had good contact with Indonesia.²⁶

Keating, in response to the increasing international pressure on Indonesia and punitive measures taken by the United States and others following the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, came to the defense of the Indonesian government and Australia's relationship with the country.

It's a matter of recognising that what happened in Dili, as appalling as it was, was not on any evidence a deliberate act of state policy. It was aberrant behaviour by a section of the military which has been responded to in a reasonable and credible way by the Indonesian government. Under those circumstances we believe that essentially punitive responses from the international community are not appropriate.²⁷

After a financial crisis rocked Indonesia in 1997, the IMF and other organizations stepped in to help with macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform.²⁸ As key policymakers like Clinton and Keating, and international organizations like the IMF, took these actions and expressed these sentiments, the international community decided to assist the government in Jakarta with the independence referendum in East Timor, but it left security to the Indonesian military (TNI), as Jakarta "made it quite clear that it would regard any international military operation it did not sanction as an invasion."²⁹

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade determined this to be an agreeable compromise, as any PKO was unlikely to receive support from UN Security Council members who were "either supporters of Indonesia, or who saw serious implications for their own interests in such a precedent."³⁰

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1246 created the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) for this purpose. The mission's 242 staff included "280 civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police... [and] 50 military liaison officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces."³¹ The Security Council mandate also laid out UNAMET's responsibility for incorporating three major components within the mission in the run up to the referendum.

UNAMET should also incorporate... a political component responsible for monitoring the fairness of the political environment, for ensuring the freedom of all political and other non-governmental organizations to carry out their activities freely... an electoral component responsible for all activities related to registration and voting... an information component responsible for explaining to the East Timorese people, in an objective and impartial manner without prejudice to any position or outcome.³²

The Liquiçá Massacre

While UNAMET began the process of educating and registering voters, other domestic actors attempted to influence potential voters in the lead up to the referendum. On the morning of April 6, 1999, thousands of East Timorese gathered at a Catholic church outside the town of Liquiçá. These men, women, and children had fled here after the abduction of three prominent supporters of the region's independence movement by pro-Indonesian militias the night before. Across town, young men drank cocktails of alcohol, animal blood, and drugs as the Besi Merah Putih militia prepared to march on the church.

The militia forces arrived later in the morning and demanded that the church's priest, Father Rafael dos Santos, hand over Jacinto da Costa Pereira, the village chief. Shortly thereafter the armed men entered the compound, threw teargas and attacked those they found inside. By that night, over one hundred people had died at the hands of the Besi Merah Putih militia. The Liquiçá Church massacre was the first of many acts of violence that occurred in 1999 across East Timor in the region's conflict over independence.

"I can say that this is a massacre. We are entering the third millennium, but after this incident we are back in the Middle Ages." – Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, April 7, 1999.³³

Despite the violence over the course of the summer, the referendum was held on August 30th, 1999. UNAMET registered nearly 452,000 voters out of a population of around 800,000, and nearly 98 percent of those voters cast their ballots. 78.5 percent voted for independence over the autonomy offered by the Habibie government. Though the UN mission verified the elections, the Indonesian military and the pro-Indonesian militias increased the levels of violence towards civilians and guerrillas following the vote. Around 1,000 people died in the ensuing conflict and half of the country's population was displaced.

The International Response

At the outset of the post-referendum violence, Australian Prime Minister Alexander Downer told the Australian parliament that "a peace enforcement operation against the wishes of Indonesia would be tantamount to a military attack on Indonesia, and that is not something this country is even going to contemplate."³⁴ UNAMET personnel were soon targeted by militias, such as in Baukau, where "100 U.N. staff members were evacuated 70 miles east to the provincial capital, Dili, the last place in East Timor where the United Nations still maintain[ed] a presence."³⁵

On September 7th, the TNI declared martial law in Dili, to which one anonymous official commented, "martial law will only give these killers more cover... the whole thing would be a joke if it wasn't so tragic."³⁶ UN personnel and over 1,000 refugees remained huddled up in the Dili compound for over two weeks, during which time UNAMET's head of mission, Ian Martin, twice made the decision to evacuate, but changed his mind when his staff refused to leave without finding a means to shelter the growing number of refugees in the compound. One UN official stated during the siege that "Martin is a jelly-belly," while another referred to UNAMET as a "rudderless ship."³⁷ Journalist Marie Colven expressed that "the real danger is to the East Timorese refugees [at the compound], who are targets and who are completely defenseless."³⁸

On September 14th, most of the UN personnel and 1,300 East Timorese refugees were evacuated by Australian troops in coordination with the Indonesian government. In explaining the decision to leave, Martin stated that “conditions were not tenable... It’s crucial there is an international force as soon as possible.”³⁹

A dozen UN personnel, numerous refugees, and several journalists stayed behind. Marie Colven, who remained behind, noted that “the situation here deteriorated dramatically after the convoy left, evacuating UN staff and local staff and their families... It took away most of the army and we were almost immediately besieged by militia.”⁴⁰

Only “moments after most of the staff had evacuated... men with hand grenades arrived to menace the remaining workers and the 1,000 terrified refugees taking shelter there... [the militia] looted supplies with the help of uniformed soldiers and fired at refugees who tried to flee.”⁴¹ The remaining internationals expressed frustrations, as one claimed that “UNAMET has watched impotently as Indonesian forces pursued a ‘scorched earth’ policy in East Timor. Now UNAMET itself is scorched earth.”⁴² Another made allusions to history and stated that “Dili is devastated. It’s just totally devastated. It looks like Dresden.”⁴³ The remaining UN personnel moved to the Australian consulate for protection, while the militia proceeded to loot and set fire to the compound.

During these weeks of siege, the international community contemplated a peacekeeping intervention. On September 10th, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that “the time has clearly come for Indonesia to seek help from the international community to fulfill its responsibility to bring order and security to the people of East Timor.”⁴⁴ Public support for action grew across the globe, but especially in Australia.

Public Opinion

In Melbourne, “25,000 protestors gathered... to hear Xanana Gusmao, speaking by satellite from Jakarta, appeal[ing] for help to save his people.”⁴⁵ Paul Kelly, a prominent Australian journalist, and others criticized the Australian government in the media, with Kelly calling the events in East Timor “the worst foreign policy failure since the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor in 1975... they should have mounted an international effort at an earlier stage in case a peacekeeping force was needed immediately post ballot.”⁴⁶ While the Australian head of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance, Joao Carrasacalao, contended that Australia had a moral obligation to intervene, as “the UN-and by extension-Australia openly told the East Timorese that it was safe to vote for freedom.”⁴⁷

The presence of 20,000 East Timorese refugees inside Australia also put pressure on the Australian government to act.⁴⁸ The United States played a role in pressuring Australia into leading a peacekeeping force, telling “Australian defence strategists in June that the US would consider deploying up to 15,000 troops to East Timor, if bloodshed dramatically escalated in the troubled Indonesian province.”⁴⁹ Following these protests, media statements, and other actions, the Australian government took steps towards initiating the creation of an intervention force. In New York, Australian Foreign Minister Laurie Brereton advocated for the Security Council to establish a war crimes tribunal to “investigate these crimes against humanity and the genocide that’s occurred in East Timor... and that commission should ideally go to East Timor on the coat tails of the peacekeeping force.”⁵⁰ Australian Prime Minister John Howard indicated that Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, along with the UN Secretary General, had indicated support for a peacekeeping force and lobbied the United States to support the potential intervention with troops.⁵¹

There were, however, some who felt the Australian government’s enthusiasm for intervention occurred for different reasons. Dr. Sam Pietsch, a socialist and militant in the Community and Public Sector Union in Canberra, argued:

The Howard Government’s military intervention in East Timor in 1999 was an act of imperialism. It was not forced on a reluctant government by popular pressure, nor were its aims humanitarian. Rather, the intervention used military power to secure longstanding strategic interests of the Australian state. From 1974, successive

Australian governments supported Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in order to foreclose the possibility of rival powers gaining influence in the Indonesian archipelago, which might allow them to threaten Australian interests. But, by September 1999, the Indonesian occupation had become untenable. Australia inserted military forces into East Timor to ensure that the transition to independence would be relatively orderly, avoiding a destabilising power vacuum. The intervention also boosted Australia's ability to defend its economic and strategic interests in the new nation. The success and domestic popularity of the intervention allowed the Howard Government to increase military spending and act more aggressively to defend Australia's imperial interests in the Southwest Pacific.⁵²

Regardless, as news spread of this potential force the Indonesian government expressed reservations about an Australian led intervention. Aisyah Amini, a senior member of the ruling party in Jakarta, urged the UN to exclude Australian, New Zealander, American, Canadian and Portuguese troops from any intervention. She stated that "if the UN sends the troops from Australia, the emotions of people will rise and the conflict will start again."⁵³

When pressed on the issue of an Australian peacekeeping force, the Deputy Chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Dimtayi Hartono, suggested severing diplomatic ties with Australia stating, "we can take drastic measures if necessary, just to show Australia that it needs to be a good neighbor like us. And if Australian troops land in East Timor without UN consent, 200 million Indonesians will take up arms to fight them."⁵⁴

A spokesperson for the National Mandate party (PAN) followed suit and urged Indonesians to "never let Australia terrorize us... We're a big nation whose pride is now at stake."⁵⁵ New Zealand journalist John McBeth noted that "many Australians still see Indonesia as a security threat while Indonesians look upon Australians as patronizing and critical."⁵⁶ Some also viewed Australia as acting as the United States's "deputy sheriff" in the region, which Indonesian foreign minister Dewi Fortuna Anwar felt was "highly damaging to Australia's image in the region. It was rejected by the ASEAN countries and seen as evidence of Australia's 'new arrogance and a resurgence of white racism.'"⁵⁷

Despite these public and diplomatic protests, the Indonesian government conceded to the creation and deployment of a peacekeeping intervention under the leadership of Australia. Sander Thoenes, a Dutch journalist who covered the events in East Timor, credited this change to public pressure on international governments and institutions.

President Clinton, whose administration had been ambivalent about sanctions and declined to send in troops, suddenly cut off military assistance and sales and warned of economic sanctions. The Paris Club of creditor nations delayed any discussion on debt relief for Indonesia until next year. That appears to have done the trick."⁵⁸

Thoenes was killed by Indonesian soldiers near Dili a week after the publication of his article outlining Habibie's decision to allow an Australian led peacekeeping force into the country. Anton Supit, chairman of the Indonesian Shoe Industry, felt that "it was the international pressure that did it... Even if they don't cut off aid, just talking about it hurts our business. The question is not who is right or wrong, but who is talking. If it's a big country or the [International Monetary Fund], it's a problem... We don't have any choice."⁵⁹

Others, like Pande Radja Silalahi, an economist for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, suggested that these sanctions only worked due to the internal struggle for power between Habibie and the Indonesian military, and that "most economists in Indonesia realized it was a bluff... But Habibie used the bluff. He used the hand of the outside world to press the armed forces."⁶⁰

Umar Juoro, an aid to Habibie, expressed at the time of the announcement that "the president has not closed the possibility of inviting an international peacekeeping force... the military and the foreign ministry are very much against it. Habibie is not strong, so he hopes for international support."⁶¹

International Opinion

In a September 11th meeting over establishing this peacekeeping force, the day prior to Habibie's acquiesce, Secretary-General Kofi Annan told members that "extremely urgent action was required to provide for the basic needs of food, water and health care in East Timor."⁶² The representative from Portugal lobbied for intervention and criticized Indonesia's actions, arguing that a member state had never "so clearly and blatantly attempted through violence to destroy a process organized and conducted by the United Nations. The Organization could not afford once again to intervene in a conflict only to stand by helplessly while the process lost its course."⁶³

The EU also "condemned in the strongest terms the escalation of violence and urged the Government of Indonesia to take immediate steps to restore law and order and to cooperate with the United Nations."⁶⁴ Indonesia "did not foresee the need for the introduction of a multinational or peacekeeping force at this stage [in the conflict]... [and argued that] such an operation would be counter-productive."⁶⁵ They further contended that a "peacekeeping mission could hardly be effective when there was no peace to keep. Instead it would evolve into a peace-enforcing mission."⁶⁶ Cuba also came out against the creation of a peacekeeping force. The country's representative stated that they "firmly rejected any unilateral military measures by a State or a group of States. The Government of Indonesia had the capability to restore peace and order in East Timor." Any action they would support required Indonesian agreement and a Security Council mandate.⁶⁷

The UN Responds

The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was established on September 15, 1999 to restore peace and stability, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and assist UNAMET in carrying out its mandate.

[The United Nations Security Council] authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorize the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate.⁶⁸

The mission's mandate did not task INTERFET with providing transitional governance and left Indonesia responsible for the transfer of authority in the territory to the United Nations. In committing to lead the intervention force, Australian Prime Minister John Howard commented on the violence in East Timor and the Indonesian government, as had his predecessor, Prime Minister Keating in 1991.

The total failure of the Indonesian forces to control the violence and put an end to the killings has greatly distressed the Australian people. We have all sensed that a small, vulnerable community was about to be denied the freedom they have sought for so long, and voted so overwhelmingly to achieve. If there had been an alternative to sending in peacekeeping forces then we would have followed it. Many nations, not least Australia, pressed the Indonesian government to restore order but despite assurances, this did not happen.⁶⁹

As a UN Chapter VII intervention, INTERFET sought to "restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and... facilitate humanitarian assistance operations" with permission "to take all necessary measures" in these tasks."⁷⁰ In its initial phases it sought to improve "the security situation in Dili" and provide "security to humanitarian assistance convoys and ground patrols" outside the capital.⁷¹ INTERFET largely

took over for UNAMET, whose long-term plan in East Timor (laid out by Article 6 of the 5 May Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal), had been interrupted by the outbreak of violence.

Article 6: If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.⁷²

This international force, while authorized by the UN, was a state-led PKO in which the costs for the intervention were borne by the participating member states, while the “multinational force should collectively be deployed in East Timor until replaced as soon as possible by a United Nations peacekeeping operation.”⁷³

Under this mandate, the Australian-led force was on the ground and operating less than a week after the intervention was authorized by the Security Council on September 15th. This international action, without any major involvement with local actors, drove the militia forces into West Timor, and the levels of violence in the territory quickly decreased. Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Fowler attributes this rapid achievement to the decision making of INTERFET’s commander, Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove.

On October 5, the USS Belleau Wood arrived off the shores of East Timor carrying the 31st MEU and four heavy lift helicopters. Although the Marines were not allowed to conduct combat operations, their presence had a psychological impact on the TNI and the militias. The MEU had significant combat potential and provided a visible sign of the U.S. commitment to the success of INTERFET. Major General Cosgrove took advantage of this psychological deterrent by making another crucial decision that would alter the course of the campaign.

As the TNI withdrew from East Timor, Major General Cosgrove realized that the militias’ only remaining source of support would be in West Timor. If he secured the western border early, he could cut off the militia supplies and force them to retreat into West Timor. He decided to move one third of his combat force from Dili to secure the western border on October 10, a full three weeks ahead of schedule. This bold move forced the militias to retreat to West Timor and essentially eliminated the militia threat in most areas of East Timor.

The operation had the desired effect; it significantly reduced the militia threat and accelerated efforts to establish security. While the employment of the 31st MEU in combat would have required approval from Washington D.C., its use as a deterrent achieved the desired effect... In addition to its psychological impact on the TNI and the militias, the MEU contributed badly needed capabilities to the operation. Four Marine CH-53 helicopters provided support to both INTERFET and the relief agencies operating in East Timor. The helicopters quickly moved personnel and supplies, bypassing potential threats on the ground and saving valuable time—particularly when compared to the days of travel required to traverse the severely impaired roads.⁷⁴

David Dickens, former director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University, Wellington attributed INTERFET’s rapid success to deterrence and effective communication with the TNI.

Deterrence underpinned the INTERFET implementation of its mission. INTERFET's ground forces, supported by maritime and air power, sought to dislocate the 15,000 strong TNI and militia presence even though the U.N. force numbered only about 5,000 personnel. The shock generated by this force, professional and well-equipped, and deployed with speed, made it appear larger than it was when deployed. The concentration and determination of the force was designed to make plain to the TNI that it would be futile to resist INTERFET directly, and that it would be pointless to seek to renegotiate the 19 September agreement. By encouraging a fast TNI withdrawal the militias' main source of direct support would be sapped. The INTERFET Command calculated that the militias' will to continue their campaign of destruction and resistance to INTERFET would be broken.⁷⁵

Major General Cosgrove expressed that Indonesian military leadership were "taken aback at the size and rapidity of the initial deployments and my clear intention to embark immediately on security operations in Dili."⁷⁶ According to Commodore Brian Robertson, INTERFET's second Maritime Component Commander, Cosgrove also utilized "warships as symbols of his seriousness and intent... [which had a] [d]evastating impact on the resolve of the militia and Indonesian forces who on D-Day would have woken ... to look out across Dili Harbour and see wall to wall grey ships."⁷⁷ While Dickens voiced some support for these accounts and calls INTERFET an overwhelming success, he noted:

However, it is doubtful that the mission would have succeeded if the armed forces of Australia and Indonesia had not been familiar with each other's real capabilities and methods at the operational level. This knowledge of each other's capacities, working methods, and cultural differences was developed over years of shared military co-operation, transparency, and dialogue. Despite the co-operation the Australian commanders of INTERFET received from their Indonesian counterparts, a show of overwhelming force was still necessary.⁷⁸

Fowler also highlighted the U.S. contribution to the mission's success:

The U.S. contribution to Operation STABILISE played a key role in the overall success of the undertaking. The United States helped establish the political conditions necessary for the largely unopposed international effort in East Timor and aided Australia in building a "coalition of the willing" in support of the operation. In terms of the U.S. military contribution, USFI: 1) provided critical capabilities that were not available within the forces of the other contributing countries, and 2) furnished additional capacity, beyond what was made available by others, to meet mission requirements. After the termination of Operation STABILISE, the United States continued to provide political, economic, and military support to international assistance in East Timor. USGET coordinated for the periodic deployment of Joint Force capabilities that enabled humanitarian relief, aided in reconstruction efforts to repair damaged infrastructure, and provided a visible presence to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve.⁷⁹

Peacebuilding Approaches

Security First

The approaches of UNAMET and INTERFET in East Timor demonstrate two different approaches to peacebuilding. One school of thought, known as the "Security-First" approach, suggests that peacebuilding cannot occur without establishing basic security in a region, territory, or state (depending on the context of an intervention). For example, Dr. Albrecht Schnabel (Head of the Asia-Pacific Unit at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) and Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart (Researcher and Project Head at the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik at the University of Hamburg), suggest that priority should be placed on reducing the immediate military deficit between parties so that there is a state monopoly on violence, and so that its security structures become an asset, rather

than a liability to long-term peacebuilding.⁸⁰ They state that the cooperation between local and external “militaries help facilitate the political, economic, and social transformation from a society that has been at war to a society that is able to follow a path towards long-term peace.”⁸¹ They provide a plethora of reasons for the reduction of military deficits and a state monopoly on violence that include (but are not limited to):

For [the creation of] a shift [in the military] from being a threat to society to being a provider of security... for reorientation of the military away from domestic politics... [for] economic and social development... to prevent corruption, criminalization, and illicit trade... [for] prevention of the politicization of judicial appointments, delays of trials, and corruption; and the creation of an effective and impartial judicial system... [to] strengthen civilian expertise in defence, justice, and internal ministries.⁸²

In *Leashing the Dogs of War*, Fen Osler Hampson (Director of Global Security, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada) and David Mendeloff (Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University) explain that Security First advocates “argue that establishing security and basic political stability should be the first-if not exclusive-objective of international interventions... [which] should leave in their wake viable states that have the capacity and instrumental authority ... to manage their internal security affairs.”⁸³ As such, “intervention success is measured not by its ability to establish democracy but by its ability to maintain civil peace and security... [while] international actors should limit their focus to the problems of security management and not concern themselves with democracy promotion and advancement.”⁸⁴

Finally, Neal Cooper (Associate Dean for Research at Bradford University) and Michael Pugh (Professor of International Relations at Bradford University) describe an interpretation of the Security-First approach, which emerged in the late 1990s, as the belief that “a prerequisite for social development and human rights protection is the security and stability that comes through an effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound governance to the military sector itself.”⁸⁵ They examine the Security-First approach within the concept of Security Sector Reform, which the UN defines as the “process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”⁸⁶ Andrzej Karkoszka (Senior Political Advisor to the Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) suggests that security sector reform is a possible way to increase the efficiency of international aid to states and considers it an indispensable measure in the following areas:

Democratisation of a state, which seems impossible without a transformation of the sector’s institutions and methods of their oversight and control... Establishment of good governance practices, that is establishing a rule of elected representatives over all military and security institutions... Economic development, the basis for which is a stable and politically predictable environment... Internal and regional conflict prevention, requiring a security sector which facilitates the effective management of internal tensions and conflicts... Post-conflict recovery, made possible only by demobilisation of combatants and their re-integration into the society... [and] Professionalisation of armed and security forces that is providing for their clearly defined roles and functions structured accordingly to these functions, accepting the rule of law and the dominance of the democratically elected authorities.⁸⁷

Cooper and Pugh provide four critiques of the Security-First approach in practice through security-sector reform.

First, the term ‘security-sector reform’ [following the Security-First approach] may be inappropriate. A better label would be ‘security-sector transformation’, because the shortfalls in security-sector governance in countries

targeted for action are so substantial that nothing short of a transformation in the relationship between civil authorities, civil society and the security sector is required.

Second, even when broadly conceived a focus on the security sector risks overlooking the crucial role that other factors, like the environment or the economy, play in the development and resolution of conflict. This focus risks

over-emphasising the security sector as a target for funds and an agent of change, and increases the likelihood that security-sector reform will become insulated from the wider political economy...

Third, there is a risk that security-sector reform will be dominated by actors concerned to promote a 'traditional' approach more akin to the client relationships of the Cold War...

Fourth, in promoting reform within the security sectors of aid recipients, the interrelationships with regional and global actors can be overlooked. The focus is on deficiencies in weak states, rather than on how the policies and practices of external actors contribute to them.⁸⁸

William Maley (Professor and Foundation Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy) puts the Security-First approach in the context of East Timor by suggesting that many of the understandings and agreements made regarding the East Timor referendum "were premised on the assumption, which proved to be preposterous and which was manifestly preposterous at the time, that the TNI could and would act as a neutral source of security before, during, and after the "popular consultation."⁸⁹ He goes further in stating that "given the constructive roles played by Australian troops and Australian police [in INTERFET], the spin-off benefits [to the task of reconstruction] of an essentially unanticipated deployment may prove to have been considerable."⁹⁰

Civil Society First

"Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it."

-Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld⁹¹

In contrast to the Security-First approach, the Civil-Society-First approach looks to engage and build up civil society in an intervention, and "advocates the strengthening of so-called peace constituencies such as churches, political parties, NGOs, human rights groups and the norms and values that characterize and motivate those groups."⁹² Some, such as Dr. Birte Vogel (Lecturer in Humanitarianism, Peace & Conflict Studies at Manchester University) note that this focus on civil society by international actors has two goals.

First, as indicated in a range of policy documents the intention for providing support to local civil society in the hope of achieving more local legitimacy for peace interventions and including local level perspectives to ensure 'local ownership' and 'sustainability'.

Second, civil society is ought to serve as a tool for protection of the Westphalian state system in its current form and the advancement of liberal state structures imagined by outsiders.⁹³

Kora Andrieu (Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Paris-Sabonne, France) provides a critique of the "top down" model of peacebuilding (which is centered around macro level peacebuilding of institutions by states and international actors) that excludes or marginalizes local civil society actors.

In spite of recurrent calls for a more locally rooted approach to the building of ‘local capacities’, peace operations today are still largely under the influence of US hegemony and neoliberal values. Their aim is to transform war-torn societies along liberal lines, in both the political and the economic spheres. To achieve this, it is argued that the international community must begin by acting illiberally: rebuilding the structures of the state in order to give it the capacity to monopolize legitimate violence and manage the societal conflicts that are the unfortunate by-products of democracy and the free market. Leaders and ‘high politics’ are the central targets, as it is hoped that the rest of society will be affected in turn. However, this kind of social engineering from the top down can be counterproductive for the peace process and the nature of transition. Civil society should not be a secondary target: it should be the primary one. The Weberian approach to peace operations focuses too much on objective sources of legitimacy at the expense of those rooted in local, subjective perceptions of society.⁹⁴

Peace: Negative or Positive?

Johan Galtung, one of the founders of the field of peace and conflict studies, distinguishes between “negative” and “positive” peace. Negative peace is the absence of personal and direct violence, while positive peace is the absence of structural violence and the development of a peaceful society at every level.⁹⁵ Galtung defines the term “structural violence” as circumstances where there is no specific actor who commits acts of violence, stating:

The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.⁹⁶

Thania Paffenholz (Director of the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative in Geneva, Switzerland) builds upon these conceptions of positive and negative peace in the context of interventions.

Whereas negative peace achieves the absence of physical violence through peacekeeping, only positive peace can achieve the absence of structural violence through peacemaking and peacebuilding. Peacemaking in a conflict resolution understanding... aims at removing the tensions between the conflict parties in addressing the causes of violence. Peacebuilding achieves positive peace by creating structures and institutions of peace based on justice, equity, and cooperation. In consequence, peacebuilding addresses the underlying causes of conflict and prevents their transformation into violence.⁹⁷

The Brahimi Report, a series of UN peacekeeping recommendations released by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to the Security Council in November 2000, suggested the creation of integrated mission task forces that “bring together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment.”⁹⁸ In remarking on his experiences with peacekeeping operations involving professionally trained soldiers in Haiti, Lieutenant-General Kinzer, former UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) force commander, stated:

My experience in Haiti reaffirmed my belief that combat trained soldiers, given a focused objective, time and resources to prepare, and led by adaptive and mentally agile leaders at all levels, will perform superbly as peacekeepers. The mission in Haiti clearly demonstrated that if the right conditions are created and sustained by the military component – and the military component is able to synchronize its actions with the international, diplomatic, economic, informational and humanitarian components – success is achievable. Our experience in Haiti has reinforced my belief that preparing for war must be the priority for any Army. The key is to understand the complexities of the peace operation environment you are facing and then adapt your war fighting skills to meet them.⁹⁹

Fernando Isturiz suggests that the Brahimi Report fails to address the issues of training troops and possessing overwhelming superiority in military capabilities and strength.

It could be argued that there is no need for PSO [peace support operations] training as long as the forces involved have high training standards for conventional warfare, since PSO are supposedly much easier to deal with than high-intensity combat. Troops appropriately trained to face worst-case scenarios in conventional warfare would be naturally endowed to deal with the easier case. Any military force organized, equipped, and trained for high-intensity combat should be able to enter a PSO scenario, even at very short notice, and adequately fulfil the mission requirements. Also, without specific training, troops entering peace operations scenarios would be ready to enforce, if needed, a Security Council mandate (robust means and conventional warfare skills). Should enforcement not be necessary, they could timely de-escalate and shift to less complicated tasks... Unfortunately, the Brahimi Report does not address this issue. It rather focuses on the opposite situation in which UN military contingents are not robust enough to perform the mandate's duties. As the report argues:

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.¹⁰⁰

In identifying some of the strengths of the Brahimi Report, Nigel White (Professor of Public International Law at Nottingham University) argues that:

The Panel also identifies the need for the UN civilian police element not simply to be by-standers to the oft-inadequate efforts of the local police... More profound analysis of peace-building by the Panel includes a recognition that elections by themselves are not sufficient but should reflect a 'broader process of democratization and civil society building', 'lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves'.¹⁰¹

Ramesh Thakur (Australian National University) applies the joint peacekeeping and peacebuilding concepts of the Brahimi Report to East Timor, believing the conflict to have been avoidable.

The Brahimi Report reaffirms the importance of structural conflict prevention. Tackling the root causes of conflict - poverty, inequality within and among nations, abusive governments, the absence of democracy, gross violations of human rights, predatory economic policies and the flourishing international trade in weaponry, especially small arms - deserves more than lip service. The Security Council must move beyond its current pattern of reaction and address potential crises holistically and at root before violence breaks out. Had the nettle been grasped ahead of time, the East Timor humanitarian crisis of 1999 could surely have been avoided. Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta of the East Timor transitional government, among others, had given us warning enough of the crisis long before it erupted into full-scale violence in 1999.¹⁰²

UNTAET

In East Timor, INFERET's actions laid the groundwork for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which resumed where UNAMET had left off in the peacebuilding process. UNTAET comprised 6,281 troops, 1,288 civilian police and 118 military observers, but also included 737 international civilian personnel and 1,745 local civilian staff. The mission began operations in a territory facing less violence than experienced under UNAMET, but with issues of its own. Half of East Timor's population remained displaced, and "very worrying allegations

of rapes of women” were being reported in the refugee camps in West Timor, some of which were under “intimidation, threat, and control of militiamen, often from their own districts and communities.”¹⁰³

The UN Security Council issued a resolution in response to the killing of three UN personnel on the border between East and West Timor which called on “Indonesia [to] take immediate additional steps... to disarm and disband the militia immediately, restore law and order in the affected areas in West Timor, ensure safety and security in the refugee camps and for humanitarian workers, and prevent cross-border incursions into East Timor.”¹⁰⁴ Due to these fears and other concerns over violence, rather than falling under the auspices of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UNTAET was administered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Some scholars, such as Oliver Richmond (Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester) and Jason Franks (unaffiliated author on liberal peace transitions and terrorism), claimed that this resulted in a military style governance structure for the mission, which meant that “UNTAET was ill-equipped for peacebuilding because it was structured as a peacekeeping operation,” which would be more suited to stopping violence rather than developing local structures and capacity.¹⁰⁵ In an assessment of the road to sovereignty in Timor-Leste, US Airforce Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Jackson (Operations Officer, Joint Operations Directorate, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington DC), who himself was not a part of any of the involved PKOs, argued that this approach had varying effects on the mission in East Timor.

Assessments of UNTAET’s performance and effectiveness in Timor-Leste are as diverse as the countries that supported the multinational force. Advocates point to the tangible accomplishments of UNTAET as evidence of a mission accomplished. For example, as directed by its first mandate, UNTAET created and maintained a sufficiently secure environment for the administration to operate, for free movement of citizens and personnel, and for the return of over 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Moreover, UNTAET’s success creating and sustaining a secure environment enabled the mission to evolve from operational peacekeeping to peacebuilding; consequently, UNTAET also established East Timorese police academies and multiple military recruiting and training facilities.

UNTAET critics, however, contend that successes in the security arena led to gross failures in the more critical and challenging areas of development and nation-building. A common criticism of UNTAET in this sector is that rather than prepare East Timorese to govern, UN administrators assumed “full control of state functions in the name of efficiency.” Some argue further that the fundamental failing of UNTAET was that “many of its officials were poorly trained, incompetent or just did not care.” UNTAET’s tendency to over-manage rather than properly train East Timorese for their future of self-governance is reflected in the fact that fewer than 50% of management positions in the government were filled by the time UNTAET ceded control of the administration in 2002... Furthermore, [Head of Mission] de Mello exerted absolute control in the nascent nation, thus potentially stifling the ability of the East Timorese to develop organic governing capacity. Nevertheless, UNTAET’s direction and guidance – albeit, perhaps, heavy-handed – enabled national elections to be held exactly two years after the popular consultation.¹⁰⁶

Astri Suhkre (Senior Researcher with a focus on social, political, and humanitarian consequences of violent conflict at Chr. Michelsin Institute, Norway) contends that there were several issues with the DPKO leadership of UNTAET.

The institutional lead of the DPKO in planning and implementing the mission had significant consequences. In general terms it meant that the entire civilian operation was staffed and organized by, and ultimately responsible to, a department that had little experience of ‘governance missions’, no country-knowledge of East Timor, and whose standard operating procedures were designed for military and preferably short-term operations.¹⁰⁷

The DPKO modeled its intervention after previous operations in Kosovo in 1999.

Looking to something more institutionally familiar, the DPKO chose its operations in Kosovo as the model... The Kosovo mission itself reflected a broader doctrinal evolution that incorporated experiences from Namibia to Eastern Slavonia, and UNTAET was not a complete structural replica of UNMIK. The administration for East Timor had only three pillars (as against five in Kosovo) – governance and public administration (GPA), humanitarian and rehabilitation, and the (military) peacekeeping. There was no separate pillar for institution building or reconstruction. While critically important to a ‘governance mission’ in a war-devastated country, both those functions were assumed to be part of GPA. In practice, they were largely taken over by the World Bank, the donors and, very belatedly, the UN Development Programme (UNDP).¹⁰⁸

Resolution 1272, which had authorized the establishment of UNTAET, stated that the mission would “be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.”¹⁰⁹ To fulfill its mandate, UNTAET needed to both nation-build and establish a nation-state simultaneously. Norrie Macqueen (Honorary Research Fellow and Visiting Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, UK) describes these as two competing pressures in which the “‘localization’ of administration and governance is essential. On the other hand, the vesting of sovereignty in an external organization is fundamentally anomalous in a system of territorial nation states and must properly be seen as a temporary expedient to be ended as soon as practically possible.”¹¹⁰

Conceptualizing Reconstruction

In conceptualizing reconstruction, the World Bank discusses the goals and factors related to successful reconstruction at length.

Much of the Bank’s work in post-conflict reconstruction has been in rebuilding infrastructure – a traditional area of strength – but recent operations suggest this is not enough. There is a need for capacity to promote economic adjustment and recovery, to address social sector needs, and to build institutional capacity. New lending operations also involve unique post-conflict elements, including demining, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, and reintegration of displaced populations...

Reconstruction does not refer only to the reconstruction of ‘physical infrastructure,’ nor does it necessarily signify a rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework that existed before the onset of conflict. Conflict, particularly if it goes on for a long time, transforms a society, and a return to the past may not be possible or desirable. What is needed is the reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society. The role of external agencies, including the World Bank, is not to implement this process but, rather, to support it... Post-conflict reconstruction has two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development.¹¹¹

In discussing aid and factors beneficial to reconstruction to Sub-Saharan Africa and other post-conflict countries, the UN Committee for Development Policy suggested the following in 2005.

To be effective, increases in aid volume must be accompanied by improvements in aid quality. Aid should be provided mostly in grants and be untied, more predictable, better harmonized and coordinated among donors and better integrated into the national development framework and budgetary process of recipient countries. Aid conditionality should be mutually agreed upon and fully consistent with the recipient’s development strategy. Aid should be delivered in ways that strengthen the existing administrative machinery, rather than through parallel channels that circumvent and undermine existing institutional arrangements...

Countries in the region need well-functioning public sectors. A capable State plays a critical role for setting the vision, coordinating policies and creating a space for wealth creation by the private sector. Strengthening budgetary processes and public monitoring of the government budget are central [to success]...

Consolidating peace will depend on national institutions that can bring about the peaceful resolution of internal differences and make all actors feel that they have a stake in such a settlement. Such institutions include not only an inclusive political regime but also a legal and economic system that is consistent with social and distributive justice...

Post-conflict reconstruction cannot be successful and sustained without the engagement of the private sector. The creation of national post-conflict private sector development funds geared to critical investments would be a confidence-building instrument for resource mobilization in post-conflict countries. The international community could support such initiatives by extending investment guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency or similar institutions. Preserving the peace will depend on post-conflict countries developing a long-term strategy for sustainable development in partnership with neighbours and other international partners and institutions. With the assistance of donors, this strategy should focus, among other things, on the recovery of sustainable domestic sources of financing.¹¹²

Both the World Bank and UN also emphasize the importance of accumulating local knowledge. The World Bank, for example, suggests keeping up-to-date local knowledge of an area/conflict in order:

to develop an understanding of context, dynamics, and needs so that the Bank is well positioned to support an appropriate investment portfolio when conditions permit; to evaluate the comparative advantages of institutions, including NGOs, operating in the relief phase, in order to identify implementing partners in reconstruction; to consult with humanitarian agencies on the long-term implications of short-term relief strategies; and to counter the adverse economic and environmental problems resulting from refugee and other spillover effects on neighboring countries in conflict.¹¹³

Knowing where you're going

In assessing the opportunities and challenges facing East Timor under UNTAET, the World Bank found three circumstances that made reconstruction problematic. First, the mission had “the power to enact new laws... [and alter] existing ones. As the government, UNTAET was also to establish full governmental structures and prepare the territory for independence... Apart from the scale of this responsibility, the effort was hindered by the UN’s limited knowledge of the country.”¹¹⁴ This is partially attributed by scholars like Suhrke, Goldstone, and others to the transfer of authority over the mission from the DPA during the time of UNAMET to the DPKO during UNTAET.¹¹⁵

With this transfer, many of the personnel involved in East Timor prior to the outbreak of violence following the referendum were not included in the planning and execution of UNTAET’s mission. Goldstone claims that the “DPKO’s overreliance on its recent experience in setting up the UN Mission in Kosovo left it poorly equipped to deal with a range of political dilemmas that were specific to East Timor.”¹¹⁶ This decision, these scholars argue, was based on the success of the UN mission in Kosovo. Others, such as Dr. Andrew Leith (Professor of Economics at the US National Defense University, former Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army, liaison officer to General Cosgrove during INTERFET, and Chief of Protocol and then Deputy Head of the Division of Trade and Investment for UNTAET), contend that local knowledge developed over time, but was hindered by the quota system used by the UN.

Capacity building did develop over time but was hampered by the DPKO quota system. I’d get people ringing me with comments such as “I speak fluent Indonesian, I spent fifteen years working in the country, and I’ve got a

doctorate in establishing healthcare systems in the region.” I would have to explain to them that they would be a wonderful fit for a particular job that was coming up, but DPKO worked on a quota system. So you’d get people employed by UNTAET who did not speak the language, didn’t understand the culture, separated themselves from the community, and lived in their own little compounds or floating hotels just off shore in Dili. Such policies made it really hard to quickly build local human capital in the country.¹¹⁷

Gregory Paul Mayjes (independent scholar and consultant and former professor of linguistics at Kennesaw State University and North Carolina State University) advocates for a greater understanding of intercultural differences and challenges in US military planning and action, and suggests that interventions “have to reflect ethnic, state, and global realities from the cultural ground up... [as] Reductionist external accounts lack the cultural self-awareness to capture the essence of ethnic conflicts and provide adequate responses.”¹¹⁸

Similarly, Benjamin J. Broome (Professor at the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University) and Mary Jane Collier (Professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico) argue “for the value of longer-term, in-situ, collaborations, and the utility of critically engaged work, particularly in relation to issues such as power, privilege, agency, and voice” in peacebuilding research and practice.¹¹⁹

The second circumstance discovered by the World Bank to make reconstruction problematic was “the reconstruction and development needs of post-conflict Timor-Leste were massive, but there was no government capacity or professional expertise to meet those needs. The institutional and human capital of the territory was heavily damaged by the violence.”¹²⁰

Third, “about half the [aid] resources available to the country for reconstruction and development were provided outside the [Trust Fund for East Timor] TFET by donors who used their own policies and procedures,” which made coordination and availability of resources difficult for UNTAET.¹²¹ In 2002, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank released the following table depicting their evaluation of the progress made in the reconstruction of East Timor.

Table 1: East Timor Reconstruction Progress¹²²

Sector	Clear Policies, Plans, Systems, and Institutions	Strong Technical, Management Capacity	Rapid Physical Reconstruction	Rapid Restoration of Service Delivery	Sectoral Planning
Education	»	»	✓	✓	X
Health	✓	✓	X	✓	✓
Justice	»	X	»	»	X
Defense	»	»	✓	n/a	✓
Agriculture	»	✓	»	✓	✓
Roads	»	X	»	✓	X
Water	✓	✓	»	»	✓
Power	X	X	»	»	X
Public Admin.	»	X	»	n/a	X
Comm. Dev.	X	✓	✓	✓	X
Private Sector	X	X	✓	n/a	X
Finance	✓	X	n/a	✓	X

Table 1 Key: ✓ = strong progress made; » = partial progress made; X = weak progress made; n/a = not applicable

While INTERFET had made no attempts at including the local population in its efforts to stem the militia violence, there was also little localization of East Timorese in UNTAET early in its deployment. Suhrke (Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsens Institutt) contends that this initially stemmed from the 5 May Agreements signed between Portugal and Indonesia, as “attempts to include the Timorese would probably have derailed the talks.”¹²³ Additionally, Pro-independence leaders in The National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CRNT) initially favored a gradual transition to full sovereignty.¹²⁴

Goldstone (former deputy director of UNTAET's Political Affairs Department) contends that “the vast majority of East Timorese living in the territory regarded the UN intervention as essentially benign, at worst as an uncomfortable inter-regnum that was the necessary precursor to independence.”¹²⁵ This favorable environment to UNTAET stemmed from the “absence of state institutions of any kind or much of the capacity that would be needed to run them.”¹²⁶ Despite not having any previous involvement in East Timor, the presence of international troops meant that the DPKO remained in charge of the mission, with some assistance from the UN Department of Political Affairs, which had been in charge of UNAMET during the referendum process.

Suhrke describes the institutional culture of the DPKO as believing that “peacekeeping missions must be neutral in relation to the local contending parties” and therefore, “treating the Timorese independence movement as merely a faction [rather than a partner] was consistent with this concern.”¹²⁷ Macqueen also weighs in on the issues of local recruitment in stating that the “process of political localization which was undertaken by UNTAET was fraught with danger for the UN's neutrality... by creating far-reaching power-sharing arrangements therefore, UNTAET would have run the risk of prematurely exposing and exacerbating factional tensions.”¹²⁸

The “Timorization” of East Timor

In December 1999, UNTAET created a National Consultative Council that included local interests in both an advisory and learning role in establishing the justice system, taxation, and other matters.

In September 2000, the East Timor Defense Force was formed largely out of FALINTIL veterans and consisted of approximately 3,000 men. However, over the course of UNTAET's deployment, it faced more pressure to “Timorize” the mission. For example, East Timorese leader (and soon to be president) Xanana Gusmão supported UNTAET but levied some criticism towards the mission in a New Year's speech in January 2001.

Of course, there are many unfortunate things happening, many perceptions which are not in tune with Timorese reality, there is a lot more money available to pay the hundreds and hundreds of foreigners rather than for reconstruction. There is bad management or inclusion of structures and a heavy bureaucratic apparatus that, in some cases, resorts to corruption.¹²⁹

Dr. Andrew Leith (INTERFET and UNTAET from 1999 to 2002) suggests that some political leaders, such as future East Timorese Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri (though not Gusmão, whom he praises) “had a personal agenda that was not in line with the long-term economic development and political success in East Timor.” As such, Alkatiri “did his utmost to replace competent UN employees who were quite well suited for particular positions, particularly in finance, development, and industry and trade areas, with East Timorese cronies.”¹³⁰

In explaining the UN's initial attempts to integrate the East Timorese into UNTAET, Dr. Leith contends that such efforts hindered the country's development and stability.

[de Mello] was then convinced in 2001... to hand across several of the key positions with the administration to East Timorese which meant that they were then empowered to make all the decisions concerning the future

structure of how civil society would run in the country. They had a vested interest, and it was very apparent from the start, to make no decisions whatsoever until the UN departed. They could then make decisions that were solely in the interests of themselves and the few people that were in their inner sanctum in East Timor.

That was the beginning of the rot that led to the 2006 issues in East Timor only four years later when East Timor went into turmoil again and an intervention force had to go back into the country. One of the reasons was that Sergio de Mello made the decision to appoint East Timorese to key positions well before any real capacity had been built up within the administration. Some did have the skills needed as they had been well educated in places like Mozambique, Brazil or Australia, but they were few and far between. The majority lacked the capacity or the will to make long-or short-term decisions about how their department should be run.

It really became an organization that lacked any type of forward momentum after about the middle of 2001. Eventually independence came in 2002 and then the whole country began to unravel because the East Timorese began to focus on the old style of Indonesian governance, which was centralization and bureaucracy at best. At worst the administration became rife with nepotism, collusion and nepotism. There was just no rule of law, no framework for investment and it just unraveled both politically and economically.

Sergio de Mello, who was an incredibly proficient professional assumed that the outcome in East Timor would follow the same path as Kosovo, where he has previously been the Special Representative to the Secretary General. He made the assumption that like the Kosovo model the East Timorese had the capacity to take over control of the administration within a few years of UN intervention. After 25 years of Indonesia occupation the East Timorese desperately wanted to make their own decisions, but they just weren't ready for it. Others had a vested interest in making sure that the administration was undermined by corruption, collusion and nepotism.¹³¹

In another prospective from inside the mission, the head of UNTAET's Office of District Administration, Jarat Chopra, criticized the lack of Timorization and the judicial practices of UNTAET.

There is no common disciplinary procedure for UN operations because member-states have always resisted it on jurisdictional grounds. Yet the local population is considered fully subject to the rule of law and can be tried and punished accordingly... UNTAET resisted Timorese participation in order to safeguard the UN's influence... the UN had no inclination to share power with them during the transition, or to include them in any decision-making beyond perfunctory consultation.¹³²

Chopra and others contend that one of the reasons UNTAET was given such authority in East Timor was the World Bank's requirement that the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP), which was intended to help establish elected village and sub-district councils, be given the status of an international treaty between the World Bank and a sovereign government. Since elections and the creation of a constitution did not occur until late 2001 and early 2002, East Timor did not have a sovereign government, which resulted in the CEP Grant Agreement being signed by the transitional administrator and designated to both East Timor and UNTAET. Chopra (2000) explains the grant negotiation and implementation process between UNTAET and the World Bank as follows:

The negotiations between UNTAET and the World Bank over the CEP also revealed the tension created by UNTAET's preoccupation with control at the expense of the local community's involvement in government. The CEP, which was co-sponsored by the Asian Development Bank, was intended to facilitate the establishment of elected village and sub-district councils. Block grants were to be provided directly to each sub-district, which would then decide development priorities based on proposals submitted by the villages.

The programme was designed to be an introduction to local democracy, as well as a functioning form of self-determination in the reconstruction process. Each layer of administration would be accountable to a popular constituency, rather than, as under Portuguese and Indonesian rule, receiving instructions from higher authorities. Although ambitious, structurally the CEP fitted neatly with the essentially decentralised scheme of district administration. However, UNTAET bitterly opposed the CEP, rejecting it twice and spurning the frontloaded \$35 million available (at a time when no other funds from the international community had arrived).

UN officials realised that the logic of the project dictated that they would control neither how these funds were spent, nor the councils themselves. Accordingly, they made obstructive arguments to the Bank and the CNRT: that the UN would not accept gender equality (since the elected village and sub-district councils were to be composed of equal numbers of men and women); that international staff had to dictate community empowerment; that the Timorese would confuse the election of local officials with national elections; and that community empowerment had to be conducted in a legal vacuum, since UNTAET feared that any national legislation governing local administration would amount to a form of official recognition of these local authorities.

The Bank rejected each argument and, in back-to-back visits by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, UNTAET was cornered into accepting the plan. Although an accommodation was reached whereby the Bank would conduct local elections and present them to the population as such; in fashioning an enabling regulation UNTAET refused to use the word ‘elections’, referring instead to ‘democratic selection.’¹³³

Why the Mission failed

Other observers have criticized UNTAET's actions toward the local population during its deployment in East Timor. Suhrke argues that “the mission was a purely UN operation, with no recognized local counterpart. It had an internationally recruited civil administration, staffed by people with no expertise of the country or knowledge of locally understood languages.”¹³⁴

Michael Smith (deputy force commander of the UNTAET peacekeeping force from January 2000 through March 2001) and Moreen Dee (diplomatic and military historian with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) contend that the mission failed in “creating a sustainable budget, developing a larger and more experienced staff and winning the confidence of the East Timorese.”¹³⁵

Dr. David Kilcullen (Australian author, strategist and counterinsurgency expert) describes two contrasting ideas in counterinsurgency – the “enemy-centric” approach and the “population centric” approach – that can impact confidence in a mission or the ability of an intervention to “win the hearts and minds” of the local populace. The enemy-centric approach “basically understands counter-insurgency as a variant of conventional warfare. It sees counterinsurgency as a contest with an organized enemy, and believes that we must defeat that enemy as our primary task... [or] ‘first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.’”¹³⁶ The population-centric approach, on the other hand, “understands counter-insurgency as fundamentally a control problem, or even an armed variant of government administration. It believes that establishing control over the population, and the environment (physical, human and informational) in which that population lives, is the essential task... [or] ‘first control the population, and all else will follow.’”¹³⁷ Kilcullen describes how the use of these approaches can be situationally dependent with an example from East Timor.

In Timor in 1999 I worked closely with village elders in the border districts. I sat down with several of them one afternoon to discuss their perception of how the campaign was progressing, and they complained that the Australians weren’t securing them in the fields and villages, that they felt unsafe because of the militia (the local term for cross-border guerrillas) and that we needed to do more to protect them.

In actual fact, we were out in large numbers, securing the border against infiltration, patrolling by night, conducting 14 to 21-day patrols in the jungle to deny the militias a chance to build sanctuaries, and working in close in the villages to maintain popular support. There had not been a single successful attack by the insurgents on the population for more than two months. So, “objectively,” they were secure. But -- and this is the critical point -- because our troops were sneaking around in the jungle and at night, staying out of the villagers’ way and focusing on defeating enemy attempts to target the population, they did not see us about, and hence did not feel “subjectively” secure. This was exacerbated by the fact that they had just experienced a major psychological trauma (occupation, insurgency, mass destruction and international intervention) and as a society they needed time and support for a degree of “mental reconstruction.” Based on their feedback (and that of lots of other meetings and observations) we changed our operational approach, became a bit more visible to the population and focused on giving them the feeling, as well as the reality, of safety. Once we did that, it was fine.¹³⁸

Reflecting on his experience, Dr. Andrew Leith describes the shifting opinions of the East Timorese towards the UN presence over the course of the intervention into the country:

Initially the East Timorese revered UNTAET. They were just so grateful that they had independence and were no longer under Indonesian rule. However, from mid-2000 onward the UN and the NGO presence in the country began to grow and compete for the limited resources in a country that had been razed to the ground only six months before. As the East Timorese returned from West Timor or the areas around Dili not only had they no place to live, they had no electricity or water, the food prices were escalating, and many of them became bitter about the presence of the UN. We were all driving around in Land Cruisers, eating at the few local restaurants, buying all the food in the super markets, and had generators and the East Timorese did not.¹³⁹

While the threat of violence drastically decreased over the course of UN involvement, the concerns over representation and coordination in peacebuilding and military forces remained. These two issues, security and representation, present another two schools of thought in peacebuilding. On one hand, a “Whole of Government” (WoG) approach advocates for the coordination of intergovernmental agencies, NGOs, and CSOs to work towards one combined goal. Tom Christensen (University of Oslo) and Per Laegreid (University of Bergen) describe this approach in a domestic context as denoting “the aspiration to achieve horizontal and vertical coordination in order to eliminate situations in which different policies undermine each other,” which will then result in the “better use of scarce resources, to create synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a particular policy area, and to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to services.”¹⁴⁰

In his report on coherence and coordination in Norwegian integrated peacebuilding missions, Cedric de Coning describes WoG as “consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country.” This type of coordination provides a strong and coordinated vision around a governmental (or UN in the case of East Timor) approach to security and peacebuilding by including different government/UN departments, as well as NGOs that typically work with the government/organization. De Coning notes that this approach has failed to “operationalise its stated principles and policies in the context of the alignment of international assistance with the needs of the internal actors... [this] failure to correct this aspect is probably, more than any other, to blame for the poor sustainability of international development and peacebuilding assistance.”¹⁴²

Still, in its 2014 field manual titled *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, the US Army contends that “using a whole-of-government approach is essential in conducting nation assistance [defined as assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory] to prevent insurgencies from developing freedom of movement by exploiting the root causes of conflict within an operational environment.”¹⁴³

The “Whole of Society” approach, on the other hand, advocates for the inclusion of other actors, such as the public or civilian government, to better represent how independent civil society relates to military forces and develops solutions to issues in a conflict area. WoS works in a comparable manner to WoG, but it tackles some of the challenges in relation to how different types of civilians (contractors, civilian government, the public, etc.) relate to military personnel, and how they have different approaches to democratization, governance, and peace.¹⁴⁴ Lisa Schirch (North American Research Director for the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, Senior Policy Advisor with the Alliance for Peacebuilding, and Research Professor at the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University) describes how WoS works as follows:

While many CSOs play important roles in peace and security, they are best able to play these roles when they are independent from government and military forces. A whole of society approach recognizes the key roles civil society plays in building security from the ground up and gives civil society space and independence to play these roles without being tightly coordinated with government or military forces. A comprehensive approach that respects the independent roles of civil society is most likely to enable their contributions to stability and security.¹⁴⁵

Schirch further argues that “the current WoG approach ignores a large part of the equation necessary for peace and security, how government and military forces will relate to local and international civil society efforts related to development and peace.”¹⁴⁶ In their handbook “On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility,’” Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anne Nolan provide their interpretation of the situation in East Timor and the approach taken by international actors.

The crucial misperception, made both by the external actors and by many in the Timorese political elite (who had often spent a long time in exile), was seeing East Timor after the liberation from Indonesian occupation as a tabula rasa – a place void of governance institutions where statebuilding could and would have to start ‘from scratch’. Contrary to this assumption, customary values and governance institutions continue to play a significant role in people’s everyday life. Indeed, since independence there has been an extraordinary resurgence of customary practices, many of which were repressed under Indonesian occupation. They contribute to conflict management, social order and social welfare in the local context, but are widely ignored by the East Timorese political elites and the international donors – with considerable negative consequences...

This example shows how the gulf between communities and government, rooted in the divorce of state institutions from traditional values and practices, can undermine the potential for democracy. State-building in East Timor is in danger of trying to produce a state that people do not recognize as their own, or from which they feel alienated in important ways. This is not a promising path to either effective government or to democracy. Moreover, the situation is a direct result of internal and external state-builders neglecting and (unintentionally) undermining community and customary sources of order and resilience, contributing to the ongoing instability.¹⁴⁷

The UN faced many dilemmas in their intervention into East Timor. The realities on the ground presented a plethora of choices to General Cosgrove, Sergio de Mello, and others over the three years of successive international missions. Whether it comes to the inclusion of actors, Security/Civil Society first approaches, or WoG vs. WoS, their decisions during UNAMET, INTERFET, and UNTAET had a lasting impact on the people and institutions of Timor-Leste and its prospects as a secure and stable state today.

Timeline of Events in East Timor

- 1975 – Indonesia invades East Timor and replaces Portugal as the occupying power
- 1991 – 250 East Timorese pro-independence protestors are killed in the Santa Cruz Massacre
- 1992-94 –US Congress cuts off aspects of military aid to Indonesia

1996 – Jose Ramos-Horta and Carlos Belo Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
1998 – General Hajji Suharto resigns and is replaced by Vice President B. J. Habibie as the head of the Indonesian government
1998 – Habibie loosens centralized control and grants a degree of autonomy to restive areas of the archipelago, including East Timor
1999 – April 6 – The Besi Merah Putih militia carries out the Liquiçá Massacre
1999 – June 11 – UN Security Council authorizes UNAMET
1999 – August 30 – East Timorese independence referendum held
1999 – September 7 – TNI declares martial law in Dili
1999 – September 14 – Most UN personnel and 1,300 East Timorese refugees evacuated from Dili by Australian Troops
1999 – September 15 – The UN establishes INTERFET to restore peace and stability, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and assist UNAMET
1999 – October 25 – UNTAET established

List of Acronyms

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CEP – Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project
CRNT – The National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction
CSO – Civil society organization
DPA – UN Department of Political Affairs
DPKO – UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FALINTIL – Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)
Fretilin – Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)
GPA – governance and public administration pillar of UNMIK
IMET – International and Military Education and Training
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INTERFET - International Force East Timor
MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit
NGO – Non-governmental organization
PAN – Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PDI-P – Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKO – Peacekeeping operation
PSO – Peace support operation
TFET – Trust Fund for East Timor
TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNMIH – United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNTAET - United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USFI – U.S. Forces INTERFET
USGET – United States Support Group East Timor
WoG – Whole of Government
WoS – Whole of Society

Notes:

¹ Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/East-Timor>.

² Quote and first note in Anthony Goldstone, 2004, "UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in and Incomplete State," *Global Governance* (10): 83-98.

³ Magno, Ajiza. 2001. "The Successes and Failures of UN Intervention in East Timor." *Carnegie Council for International Affairs, Human Rights Dialogue*, 2(5). https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_05/articles/883.

⁴ Downer, Alexander. 2000. "International Crisis Resolution: The Example of East Timor. Speech at Oxford. January 26, 2000. https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2000/000126_intl_crisis.html.

⁵ "What is FRETILIN? (A popular explanatory statement)." 1975. In Grant Evans, "Eastern (Portuguese) Timor: Independence or Oppression? Special Report and Photos." An A.U.S. Booklet.

⁶ Bonaparte, Rosa 'Muki'. 1976. "Women in East Timor: Statement by Popular Organisation of Timorese Women." 18 September 1975, *Direct Action*, 7.

⁷ <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/indonesia/2017-10-17/indonesia-mass-murder-1965-us-embassy-files>

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ UN Resolution 385. 1975. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/384\(1975\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/384(1975)).

¹⁰ The Human Rights Data Analysis Group. *The Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999: A Report by the Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group to the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste*. https://www.webcitation.org/65eZ8hHJe?url=http://www.hrdag.org/resources/timor_chapter_graphs/timor_chapter_page_02.shtml.

¹¹ Thakur, Ramesh. 2001. "Cambodia, East Timor, and the Brahimi Report." *International Peacekeeping*, 8(3): 115-124, 117.

¹² *Tapol Bulletin*. 1991. "The killing fields of East Timor." http://vuir.vu.edu.au/26096/1/TAPOL108_compressed.pdf. Tiananmen in East Timor. <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/21/opinion/the-tiananmen-in-east-timor.html>

¹³ George H. W. Bush. 1991. President's News Conference With Foreign Correspondents. December 19, 1991. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20376>.

¹⁴ Santa Cruz Incident a Turning Point in Our Diplomacy. *Tempo Magazine*, 18-24, September 2000. <https://etan.org/et2000c/september/17-23/18santac.htm>.

¹⁵ Berrigan, Freda. 2001. "Indonesia at the Crossroads: U.S. Weapons Sales and Military Training." *World Policy Journal*, <https://worldpolicy.org/indonesia-at-the-crossroads-u-s-weapons-sales-and-military-training/>.

¹⁶ Feingold, Russ. 1994. "LEAHY-FEINGOLD AMENDMENT RESTRICTS ARMS SALES TO INDONESIA: Measure Links Weapons Sales to Progress on Human Rights in East Timor Reports of Violence Continue in Region." Press Release from US Senator Russ Feingold, July 15, 1994. <https://www.etan.org/legislation/archive/fein0794rel.htm>.

¹⁷ Nobel Committee Press Release. 1996. The Nobel Peace Prize 1996. https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1996/press.html.

¹⁸ Carlos Belo. 1996. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo – Nobel Lecture. https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1996/belo-lecture.html

¹⁹ Belo, Carlos. 1996. "They Keep Us like Slaves." *Der Spiegel*, 165. http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/TIM/SPIEGEL_interview-E.html. In *Addressing the World: National Identity and Internet Country Code Domains*, by Erica Waas. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield. <https://books.google.com/books?id=PbOYUSwNxaYC&pg=PA19&lp-g=PA19&dq=carlos+belo+scabby+dogs&source=bl&ots=CoXS1NEje7&sig=YQEDAcDZ13A27JG1saZexdM-DjmY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjqqrV4KpCAhUP-6wKHaVYCloQ6AEIfDAU#v=onepage&q=carlos%20belo%20scabby%20dogs&f=false>

²⁰ Harisumarto, Sukino. 1994. Suharto, Clinton discuss East Timor. UPI. <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/11/16/Suharto-Clinton-discuss-East-Timor/3048784962000/?spt=su>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Howard, John. 1998. "Letter to Habbibie." Quoted in "Companion to East Timor – Howards Letter to Habibie."

UNSW Canberra. <https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/howards-letter>.

²³ “Howard pushed me on E Timor referendum: Habibie.” ABC Australia. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-16/howard-pushed-me-on-e-timor-referendum-habibie/207044>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Gyngell, Allan. As quoted in “John Howard’s Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq” by Allison May McPhail. 2007. Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 121.

²⁶ Clinton, William. 1993. “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Paul Keating of Australia.” <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=47072>.

²⁷ Australia critical of U.S. decision to penalise Indonesia, Agence France-Presse, 26 June 1992. <https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/phase-four>.

²⁸ IMF. 1997. “Press Release: IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Indonesia.” <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr9750>.

²⁹ McPhail, Allison May. 2007. “John Howard’s Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq.” Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 128.

³⁰ DFAT. 2001. East Timor in Transition 1998-2000, An Australian Policy Challenge, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra.

³¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1246. 1999. http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/36127/S_RES_1246%281999%29-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y, 2.

³² Ibid, 2.

³³ Aglionby, John. 1999. “Army Blamed for Timor Massacre.” The Guardian, 7 April. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/apr/08/easttimor1>.

³⁴ Aglionby, John. 1999. “UN Admits East Timor Out of Control.” The Guardian, September. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/sep/04/indonesia.easttimor1>.

³⁵ Lamb, David. 1999. “Militias Attack a U.N. Compound in East Timor: Indonesia: About 100 staffers are evacuated to provincial capital. Nobel laureate seeking refuge nearby flees to Australia, blames violence on the military.” Los Angeles Times. <http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/08/news/mn-7863>.

³⁶ Murdoch, Lindsay. 1999. “As the UN Dwindles, Dili Burns.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 September. <https://www.smh.com.au/world/as-the-un-dwindles-dili-burns-20130526-2n52c.html>.

³⁷ Parry, Richard Lloyd. 1999. “East Timor Crisis: As the UN mission leaves, their HQ burns.” Independent. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/east-timor-crisis-as-the-un-mission-leaves-their-hq-burns-1119230.html>.

³⁸ Martinkus, John. 1999. “E. Timor UN Compound Besieged.” The Washington Post. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/sept99/compound10.htm>.

³⁹ Landler, Mark. 1999. “1,300 Refugees From East Timor Flown to Safety in Australia.” The New York Times, 15 September. <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/15/world/1300-refugees-from-east-timor-flown-to-safety-in-australia.html>.

⁴⁰ Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 1999. “UN compound under seige after evacuation.” Reliefweb, 10 September. <https://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/un-compound-under-seige-after-evacuation>.

⁴¹ Mydans, Seth. 1999. “Militias in Timor Menace Refugees at U.N. Compound.” The New York Times, 11 September. <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/11/world/militias-in-timor-menace-refugees-at-un-compound.html>.

⁴² Epstein, Rafael. 1999. “UNAMET abandons Dili compound but refugees safe.” ABC Australia, 14 September. <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s51832.htm>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Martinkus, John. 1999. “E. Timor UN Compound Besieged.” The Washington Post, 10 September. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/sept99/compound10.htm>.

⁴⁵ McPhail, Allison May. 2007. “John Howard’s Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq.” Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 135.

- ⁴⁶ Kelly, Paul. 1999. "Shattered Myths." *Weekend Australian*, 25 September. As quoted in "John Howard's Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq." By Allison McPhail. Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 134.
- ⁴⁷ Carrasacalao, Joao. 1999. "We Must Repay Debt of Honor." *Australian*, 8 September 1999. As quoted in "John Howard's Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq." By Allison McPhail. Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 135.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid.
- ⁴⁹ Daley, Paul. 1999. "US Marines Set for Dili." *Melbourne Age*, August 10. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/183/34219.html>.
- ⁵⁰ Kirk, Alexandra. 1999. "ALP wants commission to gather evidence of war crimes." *ABC Australia*, 15 September. <http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s51937.htm>.
- ⁵¹ McPhail, Allison May. 2007. "John Howard's Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq." Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 138-140.
- ⁵² Pietsch, Sam. 2010. "Australian Imperialism in East Timor." *Marxist Interventions* (2): 7-38.
- ⁵³ Amini, Aisyah. 1999. As quoted in Tran, Mark. 1999. "UN Evacuates East Timor Mission." *The Guardian*, 14 September. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/sep/14/indonesia.easttimor3>.
- ⁵⁴ Hartono, Dimtay. 1999. *Jakarta Post*, September 13. Quoted in McPhail, Allison May. 2007. "John Howard's Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq." Griffith University, PhD Dissertation.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ McBeth, John. 1999. "Drifting Apart." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 162(40): 14.
- ⁵⁷ Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. 2001. "A Southeast Asian Perspective." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (55)2: 218. As quoted in McPhail, Allison May. 2007. "John Howard's Leadership of Australian Foreign Policy 1996 to 2004: East Timor and the war against Iraq." Griffith University, PhD Dissertation, 153.
- ⁵⁸ Thoenes, Sander. 1999. "What made Indonesia accept peacekeepers." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 September, 1999. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0914/p6s2.html>.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ Ibid.
- ⁶² UN Security Council Report. 1999. "Security Council hears 52 speakers in open debate on situation in East Timor." <https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/security-council-hears-52-speakers-open-debate-situation-east-timor>.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ⁶⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264. 1999. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1264>.
- ⁶⁹ INTERFET. n.d. "INTERFET Homepage." <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nph-wb/20001106130000/http://easttimor.defence.gov.au/index.html>.
- ⁷⁰ Macqueen, Norrie. 2015. "United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)." In *The Oxford handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* edited by Joachim Koops, Norrie Macqueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul Williams. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 648 – 15 September UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1264(1999).
- ⁷¹ INTERFET. "Operations Update East Timor 30 Sep 99." <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nph-wb/20001106130000/http://easttimor.defence.gov.au/index.html>.
- ⁷² United States Institute of Peace. 1999. "5 May Agreement." https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/east_timor_05051999.pdf.

- ⁷³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264. 1999. Articles 9-10. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1264>.
- ⁷⁴ Fowler, Andrew. 2016. "Stability Operations in East Timor." U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 48-49.
- ⁷⁵ Dickens, David. 2001. "The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23(2): 213-232.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Robertson, Brian. 2001. "Not Learning the Lessons of Operation Stabilise." *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* (April/June 2000), 11. Quoted in Dickens, David. 2001. "The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23(2): 213-232.
- ⁷⁸ Dickens, David. 2001. "The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23(2): 213-232.
- ⁷⁹ Fowler, Andrew. 2016. "Stability Operations in East Timor." U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 75.
- ⁸⁰ Schnabel, Albrecht and Hans-Georg Ehrhart. 2005. "Post-conflict societies and the military: Challenges and problems of security sector reform." In *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by, Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 1-16. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- ⁸¹ Ibid, 6.
- ⁸² Ibid, 7-8.
- ⁸³ Hampson, Fen Osler and David Mendeloff. "Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate." In *Leashing the Dogs of War*, edited by Chester Cocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 679-700, 680. United States Institute of Peace.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Cooper, Neil and Michael Pugh. 2002. "Security-sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies." International Studies Center, University of Plymouth. Draft Paper for Center for Defense Studies, King's College, London. <http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj150.pdf>, 5.
- ⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council. 2008. "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform." United Nations Report A/62/659-S/2008/39. <http://undocs.org/A/62/659>.
- ⁸⁷ Karkoszka, Andrzej. 2003. "The Concept of Security Sector Reform." In *Security Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Development*, 1-8. Geneva: United Nations Office at Geneva and Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 5-6. <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Karkoszka.pdf>.
- ⁸⁸ Cooper, Neil and Michael Pugh. 2002. "Security-sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies." International Studies Center, University of Plymouth. Draft Paper for Center for Defense Studies, King's College, London. <http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj150.pdf>, 8-10.
- ⁸⁹ Maley, William. 2005. "International force and political reconstruction: Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan." In *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart 297-312. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 303.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid, 304.
- ⁹¹ Quote in Cutillo, Alberto. 2013. "As Peacekeeping Becomes More Complex, Progress Needed on Training." IPI Global Observatory, September 4. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/09/as-peacekeeping-becomes-more-complex-progress-needed-on-training/>.
- ⁹² Warnecke, Andrea and Volker Franke. 2010. "Sustainable Conflict Transformation: An Analytical Model for Assessing the Contribution of Development Activities to Peacebuilding." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 15(1): 71-93.
- ⁹³ Vogel, Birte. 2016. "Civil society and the liberal peace: Top down interventions from below?" Manchester University. <http://www.blog.hcri.ac.uk/civil-society-liberal-peace/>.
- ⁹⁴ Andrieu, Kora. 2010. "Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the Liberal Paradigm." *Security Dialogue* 41(5): 537-558, 537.
- ⁹⁵ Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3): 167-191.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid, 171.

- ⁹⁷ Paffenholz, Thania. 2010. *Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 45.
- ⁹⁸ Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 2000. "Brahimi Report Executive Summary." http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Brahimi_Report_Exec_Summary.pdf.
- ⁹⁹ Kinzer, Lieutenant-General J. W. 1997. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, p. i.
- ¹⁰⁰ Isturiz, Fernando 2005. "Military forces' training for postconflict peacebuilding operations." In *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by, Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart 74-90. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 78-79.
- ¹⁰¹ White, Nigel. 2001. "Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 6(1): 127-146, 132.
- ¹⁰² Thakur, Ramesh. 2001. "Cambodia, East Timor, and the Brahimi Report." *International Peacekeeping*, 8(3): 115-124, 118.
- ¹⁰³ Struck, Doug and Keith B. Richburg. 1999. "Killings Appear to Fit a Pattern in E. Timor." *The Washington Post* 14 September. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/indonesia/stories/timor091499.htm>.
- Othman, Mohamed. 2005. *Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East Timor*. Germany: Springer, 114.
- ¹⁰⁴ United Nations Security Council. 2000. "Council Condemns "Outrageous and Contemptible" Killing of Three UN Staff in West Timor; Insists Indonesia Disarm, Disband Militia." United Nations, 8 September. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000908.sc6920.doc.html>.
- ¹⁰⁵ Richmond, Oliver and Jason Franks. 2008. "Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste: the Emperor's New Clothes?" *International Peacekeeping* 15(2): 185-200.
- ¹⁰⁶ Jackson, Douglas. 2014. "The Perilous Road to Sovereignty: Lessons Learned Through Tragedy and Triumph in Timor-Leste." Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, National Defense University Foreign Area Officer Association Writing Awards, 1-22: 7.
- ¹⁰⁷ Suhrke, Astri. 2007. "Peacekeepers as nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping*, 8(4): 1-20, 7.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 7-8.
- ¹⁰⁹ United Nations. "UN Resolution 1272. Article 1." 25 October 1999. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1272>.
- ¹¹⁰ Macqueen, Norrie. 2015. "United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)." In *The Oxford handbook of United nations Peacekeeping Operations* edited by Joachim Koops, Norrie Macqueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul Williams, 642-655. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- ¹¹¹ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 1998. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank." The World Bank.
- ¹¹² UN Committee for Development Policy. 2005. "Development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and post-conflict countries." United Nations, Session 7 (March 14-18). 7-18. <https://dokumen.tips/documents/development-challenges-in-sub-saharan-africa-and-post-conflict-countries-report.html>.
- ¹¹³ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 1998. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank." The World Bank, 6.
- ¹¹⁴ World Bank. 2006. "Timor-Leste: Project Performance Assessment Report." 5.
- ¹¹⁵ Goldstone, Anthony. 2004. "UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State." *Global Governance* (10): 83-98.
- Suhrke, Astri. 2007. "Peacekeepers as nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping*, 8(4): 1-20.
- ¹¹⁶ Goldstone, Anthony. 2004. "UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State." *Global Governance* (10), 85.
- ¹¹⁷ Author interview with Andrew Leith, 8/30/18
- ¹¹⁸ Meyjes, Gregory Paul. 2012. "Multiethnic Conflicts in U.S. Military Theatres Overseas: Intercultural Imperatives." In

Conflict Management and “Whole of Government”: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy? Edited by Volker C. Franke and Robert H Dorff. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 383-386.

¹¹⁹ Broome, Benjamin J. and Mary Jane Collier. 2012. “Culture, Communication, and Peacebuilding: A Reflexive Multi-Dimensional Contextual Framework.” *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* 5(4): 245-269, 265.

¹²⁰ World Bank. 2006. “Timor-Leste: Project Performance Assessment Report.” 5.

¹²¹ Ibid, 6.

¹²² Rohland, Klaus and Sarah Cliffe. 2002. “The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems, and Tradeoffs.” Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank Paper No. 2.

¹²³ Suhrke, Astri. 2007. “Peacekeepers as nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor.” *International Peacekeeping*, 8(4): 1-20, 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid, 4. See also: Goldstone, Anthony. 2004. “UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State.” *Global Governance* (10), 83-98.

¹²⁵ Goldstone, Anthony. 2004. “UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State.” *Global Governance* (10), 84.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Suhrke, Astri. 2007. “Peacekeepers as nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor.” *International Peacekeeping*, 8(4): 1-20, 8.

¹²⁸ Macqueen, Norrie. 2015. “United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).” In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* edited by Joachim Koops, Norrie Macqueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul Williams. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 651-52.

¹²⁹ Gusmão, Xanana. 2001. “New Year’s Address.” Speech. <http://www.etan.org/et2001a/january/01-06/01xanan.htm>.

¹³⁰ Author interview with Andrew Leith, 8/30/18

¹³¹ Author interview with Andrew Leith, 8/30/18

¹³² Chopra, Jarat. 2000. “The UN’s Kingdom in East Timor.” *Survival* 42(3): 27-39, 29-31.

¹³³ Ibid, 30-31.

¹³⁴ Suhrke, Astri. 2007. “Peacekeepers as nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor.” *International Peacekeeping*, 8(4): 1-20, 11.

¹³⁵ Smith, Michael and Moreen Dee. 2003. *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 51.

¹³⁶ Kilcullen, David. 2007. “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency.” *Small Wars Journal*. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency>.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Author interview with Andrew Leith, 8/30/18.

¹⁴⁰ Christensen, Tom and Per Laegreid. 2007. “The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform.” *Public Administration Review*, 67(6): 1059-1066, 1060.

¹⁴¹ Coning, Cedric de. 2007. “Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions.” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 1-24, 6.

¹⁴² Ibid, 22.

¹⁴³ Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*. 10-1.

¹⁴⁴ Schirch, Lisa. 2012. “Where Does Whole of Government Meet Whole of Society?” In *Conflict Management and “Whole of Government”: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy?* Edited by Volker Franke and Robert Dorff, 127-152. Strategic Studies Institute.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 129.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 128.

¹⁴⁷ Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anne Nolan. “On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility.’” *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 8*: 1-21, 11-12.