

SOLLIMS SAMPLER

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the September 2015 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**.

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lessons Learned Report](#), and (4) links to [additional reports and other references](#) that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account

in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [<http://pksoi.army.mil>] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [<https://sollims.pksoi.org>] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



DAKAR, Senegal (19 Oct 2014). A group of U.S. military personnel, including Airmen, Marines, and Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division, board a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III at Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport in Dakar, Senegal. The service members are bound for Monrovia, Liberia, where troops will construct medical treatment units and train health care workers as part of Operation United Assistance, DoD’s support to the USAID-led, whole-of-government effort to respond to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Major Dale Greer)

INTRODUCTION

What is **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance?**, . . . and what are the ‘success factors’ and lessons that senior military leaders should take into consideration?

Joint doctrine states:

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration; designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) that has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance; and may support other USG departments or agencies.

FHA operations (including Foreign Disaster Relief operations) are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DOS).

[JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance](#), JCS, 3 Jan 2014

As initial ‘food-for-thought’ for senior military leader consideration, the following are some of the key observations from JTF-Haiti’s leadership – responsible for guiding US military support of humanitarian relief operations in Haiti in 2010:

Success in a foreign disaster relief operation hinges on partnerships. Operation Unified Response could not have succeeded without the strong partnerships shared and developed with the government of Haiti, UN, USAID, and NGO counterparts.

To coordinate and collaborate with nonmilitary partners, it was necessary to share information. Early on, we decided to be open and transparent.

We recognized that the JTF must be transparent, approachable, and responsive to the public – Haitian and U.S. as well as international audiences.

The most significant challenge facing the U.S. military and the international community in the initial emergency phase was logistics.

[Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations](#), by LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen (US Army) et al., Military Review, Nov-Dec 2010

This Sampler explores the complex issues involved in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. It presents a [lesson report](#) containing ten lessons from recently conducted FHA operations, an extensive list of [references](#), and three [annexes](#) with top observations from operations in Haiti, Japan, and the Philippines.

Additionally, [considerations and guidelines](#) for senior military leaders and staffs to take into account during planning and execution of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief operations are captured in the [Conclusion](#) section.

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"QUICK LOOK" (Preview of the Lessons)

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- Setting the Theater, operational contract support, and communication were key components of successful logistics support during Operation United Assistance (OUA) – the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, in support of USAID. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- "Combined" media interviews (held with State Department, USAID, and DoD representatives), deployed military Public Affairs "enablers," and focused rear detachment support were the key elements of Public Affairs success during Operation United Assistance (OUA)... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Rapid deployment of 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB) and Joint enablers, along with immediate involvement of close-at-hand U.S. military assets, were the keys to success for U.S. Foreign Disaster Relief efforts in the Philippines in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Responsiveness and agility of U.S. SOF assets greatly enabled the success of other actors (host nation government organizations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations/United Nations, and U.S. Pacific Command) during Typhoon Haiyan disaster relief operations in the Philippines. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Joint forces involved in Operation Tomodachi experienced significant challenges with respect to information management, classified/sensitive information sharing with bilateral partners, and unclassified information sharing with all participating organizations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- In the aftermath of the 2010 Pakistan floods, civilian and military responders made a tremendous impact with regard to saving lives and alleviating hunger and suffering; however, relief operations were frequently hindered by issues related to "humanitarian principles" and varying interpretations on guidelines for civil-military interaction. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- During the 2010 earthquake relief operation in Haiti, a myriad of organizations carried out disaster relief roles, but no collective command and control structure was in place to manage the whole effort. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- As part of the response to a natural disaster such as the Haiti earthquake, getting an information operations(IO)/strategic communications (STRATCOMM) program up and running as early as possible provides great benefits. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- During the response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, various new information & communication technologies, new information providers, and a new community of interest emerged – all of which impacted the volume, collection, sharing, and management of humanitarian information. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM's) Operation Assured Delivery [Georgia humanitarian assistance] provides a microcosm of challenges confronted by logisticians during humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)

SUBJECT: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

1. GENERAL

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance operations typically involve a wide array of participants – US Government civilian and military organizations, multinational partners, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental actors, and host nation government authorities. Their various contributions can be vital for saving lives and relieving/reducing human suffering within an affected host nation.

This report includes observations, insights, and lessons from several recent FHA operations – the US Government response to the Ebola epidemic of West Africa in 2014-2015, disaster relief for the Philippines in the aftermath of the November 2013 super typhoon, assistance to Japan following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, disaster relief for Pakistan after the July 2010 floods, disaster relief for Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake, and assistance to Georgia in 2008 in the wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict. Recommendations and guidelines are drawn from these experiences – in the areas of Planning, Command and Control, Information Management & Sharing, Logistics, and Public Affairs – delineated for the reader on pages [45-48](#).

2. LESSONS

a. TOPIC. Logistics Support for Operation United Assistance ([2316](#))

Observation

Setting the Theater, operational contract support, and communication were key components of successful logistics support during Operation United Assistance (OUA) – the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (Sep 2014 - Mar 2015).

Discussion

Setting the Theater. The USAFRICOM logistics staff (J4) coordinated early on with elements of the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLE) early on to "set the theater." JLE partners included U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Key assets that were

provided/deployed included port opening teams, JCASO mission support teams, DLA distribution expeditionary teams, and logisticians for the advance party (ADVON) of the Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA), led by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF). Essentially, USAFRICOM established a network of deployment/distribution nodes, warehousing capacity, operational contract oversight, and mobility staff experts to facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) of the equipment, supplies, and personnel required to support JFC-OUA operations. This initial infrastructure "set the theater" to ultimately manage 350 strategic airlift and 160 intra-theater airlift missions that moved 6,000+ personnel and over 10,000 short tons of cargo, along with tracking multiple strategic sealift vessels that deployed close to 3,000 pieces of equipment.

Operationalizing Contract Support. USAFRICOM J4 developed a plan from the outset to "operationalize" contract support – i.e., aiming to contract as much of the effort as possible to minimize the military footprint yet still meet all USAID requirements. USAFRICOM assigned USARAF as the lead service for contracting and established an Operational Contract Support Integration Cell to synchronize, coordinate, and contract for common contract support in the Joint Operating Area. This central entity functioned as a single point-of-entry for processing contract requirements that enabled timely and relevant contracting solutions for JFC-OUA. Over the course of OUA, USARAF/USAFRICOM let over 400 contracts totaling over \$120 million (USD) and employed a synchronized pre-deployment and operational tracker to account for all contractors.

Communication. USAFRICOM J4 conducted a Joint logistics synchronization session on a daily basis to ensure information-sharing, cross-talk, and coordination among all logistics stakeholders. This was done via Defense Connect Online (DCO), with over 100 participants taking part in a 1-hour session. USAFRICOM J4 utilized a dashboard format for the DCO meeting room, providing areas/pods in which the USAFRICOM J4, USARAF G4, JFC-OUA J4, and supporting commands/agencies could post information, share critical updates, and enter requests for information (RFIs). Senior logistics leaders were given the opportunity to provide verbal guidance and perspective to the group, and all participating stakeholders were given the opportunity to provide updates on key actions.

Recommendation.

For FHA/DR operations, the logistics staff of the GCC should:

1. Coordinate with elements of the Joint Logistics Enterprise early on to "set the theater" and establish a network of deployment/distribution nodes, warehousing capacity, operational contract oversight, and mobility staff experts to facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of the equipment, supplies, and personnel required to support operations.

2. Establish an Operational Contract Support Integration Cell to synchronize, coordinate, and contract for common contract support in the Joint Operating Area.

3. Conduct a Joint logistics synchronization session on a daily basis to ensure information-sharing, cross-talk, and coordination among all logistics stakeholders.

Implications.

If the logistics staff of the GCC fails to proactively set the theater, operationalize contract support, and facilitate communication & information-sharing among logistics stakeholders, then delays in deliveries of equipment/supplies/personnel will likely impede efforts to aid affected communities in the host nation.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on "[Logistics in Support of Operation United Assistance: Teamwork, Transition and Lessons Learned](#)," by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Reibestein, United States Africa Command newsroom article, 19 June 2015.

Comments.

Related references:

1. "[The Joint Logistics Enterprise Enables Operation United Assistance](#)," Captain Ross M. Hertlein, Army Sustainment magazine, July-August 2015.
2. "[101st Sustainment Brigade Supports Operation United Assistance](#)," Colonel Kimberly J. Daub, Major Keith A. Petty, and Major Benjamin Polanco Jr., Army Sustainment magazine, July-August 2015.
3. "Operation United Assistance: Joint and Strategic Partners Enabling Success," Captain Ross M. Hertlein, Chapter 3 of "[Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa](#)," CALL Newsletter 15-09, June 2015.
4. "[Engineers Help Fight Ebola Outbreak in Africa](#)," Captain Andrew K. Hill, Engineer magazine, January-April 2015.
5. "[Operation United Assistance: Logistics Partnership Success](#)," United States Africa Command Directorate of Logistics, USAFRICOM newsroom article, 12 January 2015.



b. TOPIC. Public Affairs Support for Operation United Assistance ([2321](#))

Observation.

"Combined" media interviews (held with State Department, USAID, and DoD representatives), deployed military Public Affairs "enablers," and focused rear detachment support were the key elements of Public Affairs success during Operation United Assistance (OUA) – the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (Sep 2014 - Mar 2015).

Discussion.

"Combined" Media Interviews. During the first several days of operations, Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA) had only four Public Affairs personnel [from [U.S. Army Africa \(USARAF\)](#)] on the ground in Liberia: one planner, one Public Affairs officer, one photo-journalist, and one combat camera specialist. Initially flooded with media requests for interviews, these few JFC-OUA personnel found a way to manage media activities through conducting close coordination with the Public Affairs offices of the [U.S. Embassy \(Monrovia\)](#), [USAID](#), [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](#), and [U.S. Public Health Service](#). An early decision was made that the three primary US Government agencies (DoD/JFC-OUA, State Department/U.S. Embassy, and USAID) would all conduct media interviews together. This decision proved to be a powerful tool that enabled the "team" to field questions according to areas of expertise and portray a "whole-of- government" approach to the audiences. Furthermore, it allowed the relatively small number of available Public Affairs personnel to leverage one another's capabilities and develop a manageable short-term planning & execution timeline of media events.

Deployed Public Affairs "Enablers". Two weeks into the operation, a Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) deployed to Liberia to support JFC-OUA. The JPASE worked for the JFC, but also aided the State Department/U.S. Embassy and USAID in developing a long-range schedule of Public Affairs events, which added predictability to key leaders' calendars, and impacted the narrative to reflect a "whole-of-government" approach into media reporting. The JPASE was a key contributor for attaining successful media relations in Liberia. Its arrival marked a positive shift in the communication environment, overcoming early negative local media reports that were often based on suspicions and rumors. The JPASE accomplished this by scheduling a series of key leader interviews that were open to local and international press – with messages that calmed unfounded fears and educated the public about Ebola. Besides this

JPASE "enabler", once the [101st Airborne Division](#) was identified as the follow-on force (to replace USARAF personnel), a Request for Forces (RFF) was submitted to deploy a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) to meet the needs of the 101st and an estimated increase in Public Affairs requirements. However, DoD did not resource the MPAD, but instead sourced a Public Affairs Detachment (PAD) (with slightly less resources) to support the 101st. The PAD arrived approximately three weeks after the USARAF-to-101st transition, but ultimately provided an enduring capability that developed command information products and contributed to media relations efforts. Overall, these JPASE and PAD "enablers" greatly enhanced the deployed force's capability and credibility; they also helped the local, U.S., and international media gain accurate information to report.

Focused Rear Detachment Support. The USARAF rear detachment Public Affairs team in Italy was a key component for successful Public Affairs operations, doing a great deal of 'behind the scenes' work in support of the forward deployed force and other stakeholders. This rear detachment team proved to be vital for coordinating Public Affairs actions between the forward deployed JFC-OUA, USAFRICOM, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), Army Public Affairs, Army National Guard, DoD Public Affairs, the Joint Staff, the 101st Airborne Division, and III Corps Public Affairs. The USARAF rear detachment Public Affairs team continuously monitored the media environment, coordinated Public Affairs operations/actions, developed products, gained clearance for the products to be released, and helped disseminate them. Also, a single document produced by the rear detachment Public Affairs team which tracked the status of these Public Affairs actions on a daily basis was invaluable for providing situational awareness to all stakeholders and for sustaining successful Public Affairs support throughout OUA.

Recommendation.

During Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) missions:

1. Public Affairs teams / leaders from the State Department, USAID, and DoD (i.e., the GCC's lead Service Component Command or Joint Forces Command) should consider conducting media interviews together. This would allow the limited number of Public Affairs professionals on the ground to leverage one another's capabilities, enable the combined team to field questions according to areas of expertise, and portray a "whole of government" approach to the audience.
2. The GCC and its designated lead Service Component Command should coordinate for "enablers" to support the Public Affairs effort, such as a Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) and Public Affairs Detachment (PAD) [or Mobile PAD (MPAD)].

3. The rear detachment of the lead Service Component Command should support the forward element with a daily report that tracks the status of: the media environment, Public Affairs operations/actions, product development, product clearance (for release), and product dissemination.

Implications.

Without a "whole-of-government" Public Affairs team effort, without key "enablers" such as the JPASE and PAD/MPAD, and without dedicated rear detachment support, the forward-deployed Public Affairs military personnel will be hard-pressed to meet the extensive demands of the U.S., international, and host nation media on a high-visibility FHA/DR mission such as OUA.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "Communicating Ebola: Lessons in Public Affairs Contingency Operations While Setting the Theater in an Expeditionary Environment," by COL David P. Doherty and Michael P. Whetston, Chapter 2 of "[Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa](#)," CALL Newsletter 15-09, June 2015.

Comments.

Related references:

1. "[Ebola: Accurate Information Prevents Rumours and Panic](#)," by Perpetual Crentsil, Policy Note 5/2015, The Nordic Africa Institute, 7 April 2015.
2. "[International Ebola Response and Preparedness](#)," Lead Inspector General (IG) for Operation United Assistance (DoD) (in conjunction with IGs of USAID, DOS, and HHS), 31 March 2015. See section on "Supporting Public Outreach and Communications" on page 62.



c. TOPIC. Military Command and Rapid Entry for Foreign Disaster Relief ([2312](#))

Observation.

Rapid deployment of 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB) and Joint enablers, along with immediate involvement of close-at-hand U.S. military assets, were the keys to success for U.S. Foreign Disaster Relief efforts in the Philippines in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan.

Discussion.

After the Philippine government's request for humanitarian assistance on 9 November 2013, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) directed Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to lead military relief operations in the Philippines, with 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB) serving as the mission commander on the ground. USPACOM also ordered deployment of the USS George Washington and elements of Carrier Strike Group 5 (CSG 5) to the Philippines.

On 10 November, within 6 hours of authorization from USPACOM, 3d MEB "suitcase staff" deployed to the Philippines, consisting of the Commanding General, G-3/Operations officer, Sergeant Major, Public Affairs Officer (PAO), and two communications specialists. Upon arrival of additional staff, the 3d MEB established its Command Operations Center (COC) at the Villamor Air Base in Manila and immediately began coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG-P), and USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) personnel who had already arrived several days before Haiyan hit. [USAID/OFDA serves as the U.S. Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for providing FHA and for coordinating USG efforts.]

USPACOM's Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) also rapidly deployed and played a critical role in setting up an operational Joint HQ, aligning operational design and assessment plans, establishing an operational rhythm with the AFP, USAID/OFDA, and the UN, and implementing the USPACOM FHA Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The DJTFAC provided Joint expertise, regional and local expertise, and detailed knowledge of USPACOM's organization, processes, and procedures. It also provided JTF stand-up and execution assistance when a decision was made later in the operation for establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF-505).

During the first week of disaster relief operations, the U.S. military/3d MEB – working alongside AFP counterparts – was able to quickly respond to immediate needs of the host nation (HN) due to the availability and involvement of U.S. military assets positioned within the region. On 10 November (the day that 3d MEB arrived), the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), which was located in Mindanao (about 600 miles south of the affected region), began conducting aerial surveillance missions to assess airfields, ports, routes, and distress signals. JSOTF-P worked around the clock to obtain information vital for search & rescue operations in the affected areas of Leyte, Samar, and the Western Visayas. JSOTF-P also provided critical needs and damage assessment reports to 3d MEB, which was working hand-in-hand with USAID/OFDA and the AFP.

On 16 November (after about one week of relief operations), USPACOM ordered the activation of Joint Task Force-505 (JTF-505) to take lead of the U.S. military's involvement in this disaster relief mission, replacing MARFORPAC. The decision to establish a Joint Task Force was likely the result of USPACOM's recognition of the size, scope, and complexity of ongoing relief requirements but uncertainty about relief duration. Two days later, on 18 November, JTF-505 established a presence and took charge of operations in the Philippines, under the command of Lieutenant General John E. Wissler, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). After two more days, on 20 November, JTF-505 reached full operational capability. U.S. military forces soon totaled more than 13,400 personnel, 66 aircraft, and 12 naval vessels.

However, by the time JTF-505 was fully operational in theater (20 November), 3d MEB/MARFORPAC and JSOTF-P had already delivered almost all U.S. military assistance requested by USAID/OFDA. According to [USAID Fact Sheet No. 8](#), 19 November 2013: "Over the past several days, logistics operations and capacity have significantly improved in typhoon-affected areas, according to USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The U.N. Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) has initiated flights, the port in Tacloban is resuming service, and trucks from Mindanao and Manila are reaching Tacloban. In addition, both U.N.-contracted and commercial trucks are transporting relief commodities within Tacloban and to neighboring areas. The U.N. World Food Program (WFP) reports that most humanitarian cargo is reaching affected populations by truck or barge at this time, decreasing the need for air transport." Also, according to [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\) Situation Report No. 13](#), 19 November 2013: "The relief operation has scaled up substantially, especially in Tacloban City, now that access and logistics conditions have improved. Significant food and medical assistance has been provided in Tacloban, and water services as well as limited telecommunications services have been restored. All Tacloban residents now have access to clean drinking water and hygiene kits are being distributed."

Days later, on 26 November, JTF-505 and USAID/OFDA leaders informed the USPACOM Commander that the emergency phase of relief operations had terminated, relief was steady state & now well supported by the AFP and several foreign militaries, and unique U.S. military capabilities were no longer needed. Altogether, the U.S. military (3d MEB/MARFORPAC, JSOTF-P, JTF-505, and supporting organizations) had delivered more than 2,495 tons of relief supplies and evacuated over 21,000 people. U.S. military aviation had logged over 1,300 flights, delivering goods and services to approximately 450 sites.

In hindsight, the 18 November decision to activate a JTF was probably unnecessary. As stated, by 19 November, 3d MEB/MARFORPAC and JSOTF-P had delivered almost all U.S. military assistance requested by USAID/OFDA. Their success was the result of 3d MEB rapidly deploying its HQ and staff, utilizing key Joint enabler support provided by the USAPACOM DJTFAC, tying in

to U.S. military assets within the region (JSOTF-P), and diligently managing key U.S. military capabilities (transportation, logistics, surveillance, search & rescue, etc.) in support of USAID/OFDA and the AFP.

Recommendation.

1. For short-term Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) operations (perhaps 30 days or less), the Global Combatant Command (GCC) should assign military "lead" (in support of USAID/OFDA) to a Service Component Command that can quickly deploy a subordinate organization (HQ/staff) to the contingency area (such as MARFORPAC and its 3d MEB). The GCC should provide this "lead" organization with appropriate enablers (e.g., DJTFAC) and with robust communication capabilities.

2. For long-term FHA/DR operations [months-long duration, such as the case of Operation United Assistance (Ebola relief in West Africa)], the GCC should activate and assign military "lead" to a JTF (in support of USAID/OFDA). Planning timelines should account for the days required to man and equip the JTF, establish an initial footprint, and gain full operational capability. Again, the GCC should provide this "lead" organization with appropriate enablers (e.g., DJTFAC) and with robust communication capabilities.

3. For FHA/DR operations, the designated military "lead" should rapidly deploy its advanced echelon (ADVON) to: establish a presence in the host nation (HN), link up with USAID/OFDA, immediately identify and involve U.S. military assets in proximity, incorporate assessment reports into a Common Operating Picture (COP), and partner with HN military and civil authorities.

4. Other considerations for the GCC (mentioned in "[An Inside Look into USPACOM Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan](#)," the article upon which this lesson is based) include:

a. Ensure that correspondence and coordination during an FHA/DR operation is Unclassified (to the greatest extent possible) – in order to maximize information sharing among relief participants.

b. Prioritize the deployment of communication equipment to ensure that sufficient communication capability is available to support any anticipated growth of command and control (C2) requirements.

c. Streamline the reporting process in order to efficiently identify/confirm which service components will fulfill the various requirements generated by USAID/OFDA. Ensure that the USAID/OFDA Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) is accessible and can handle high volume of use by all constituents.

d. Initiate a Situational Awareness Group (SAG) at the earliest point after identification of a major storm system, and establish an Operational Planning Team (OPT) at least 24 hours prior to landfall to help expedite mission analysis and course of action (COA) selection.

e. Develop and utilize a simple checklist to determine capabilities of airfields in areas impacted by the storm system. This checklist can be used to tailor the U.S. footprints for airfields needed/selected.

Implications.

If a GCC establishes a JTF mid-stream during a short-term FHA/DR operation already being managed by a Service Component Command, the GCC will most likely be wasting time and resources: filling Joint billets, equipping the JTF, deploying the JTF, expanding and transitioning C2, etc. It is best to stick with the Service Component Command and its rapidly deployed force (and provide it additional augmentation/enablers as necessary) – unless the mission is intended to be long-term from the outset (months-long duration envisioned), whereupon a JTF should be assigned the mission.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on "[An Inside Look into USPACOM Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan](#)," by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas "Whit" Parker, Major Sean P. Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Lieutenant Colonel Jason E. King, and Dr. Imes Chiu, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA), February 2015.

Comments.

Related documents:

1. "[SOF Support to HA/DR Operations \(Typhoon Haiyan Relief\)](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 1329, 4 March 2014.
2. "[Humanitarian Exchange Magazine: The Typhoon Haiyan Response](#)," Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), January 2015.
3. "[Operation DAMAYAN and Typhoon Lessons \(Philippines\)](#)," SOLLIMS document library.
4. "[Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief \(Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below\)](#)," Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command, July 2011.



d. TOPIC. SOF Support to HA/DR Operations (Typhoon Haiyan Relief) **([1329](#))**

Observation.

Responsiveness and agility of U.S. SOF assets greatly enabled the success of other actors (host nation government organizations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations/United Nations, and U.S. Pacific Command) during Typhoon Haiyan disaster relief operations in the Philippines.

Discussion.

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), based in the Philippines, provided the first operational "eyes on" to capture the scope and depth of devastation caused by Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines. Immediately after Super Typhoon Haiyan swept through the Philippines on 8-9 November, JSOTF-P mobilized response/assessment teams to support humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. Early on 9 November 2013 and throughout the day, JSOTF-P utilized numerous air assets to conduct vital aerial surveys of the hardest hit areas, focusing especially on airports and surrounding roadways.

By 6 p.m. on 9 November, the first JSOTF-P response/assessment team – consisting of one Air Force officer-in-charge (OIC), one Combat Controller (air traffic controller), two Civil Affairs (CA) non-commissioned officers (NCOs), one communications sergeant, and one medic – was successfully inserted into Tacloban Airfield, located at the center of the destruction caused by the typhoon. On 10 November, two similarly organized Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams – including Combat Control Teams (CCTs) (air traffic controllers) from the 353rd Special Operations Group (SOG) out of Kadena Air Base, Japan – were inserted into the airfields at Guiuan and Ormoc. The opening of these airfields allowed for follow-on Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams to conduct additional site surveys, assess the scope of damage in surrounding areas, and determine priorities for inbound relief efforts. At these airfields, the air traffic controllers conducted around-the-clock operations to manage inbound/outbound air traffic, and they also helped organize and advise host nation personnel in the management of airfield operations.

Over a 13-day period (9 to 22 November), JSOTF-P served in a supporting role in this U.S. PACOM HA/DR operation – initially supporting the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade (III MEB), and later supporting Joint Task Force 505, which took over lead from III MEB. Throughout this period, multiple SOF teams

from JSOTF-P conducted aerial and ground movements to assess conditions in remote areas and to interact with local populations, national organizations, and arriving relief agencies to help synchronize efforts. These SOF teams continuously gave III MEB and Joint Task Force 505 accurate insights/assessments on the conditions of affected areas – facilitating planning and allocation of Marine Corps assets, inbound U.S. PACOM assets, and relief supplies.

Each SOF team (working in the remote/affected areas) consisted of one Special Forces 18A officer/team leader, one 18E communications sergeant, one 18D medical sergeant, two 38-series CA soldiers, and one attached CCT. The CA soldiers proved to be the "workhorses" of this operation – producing and updating assessments, coordinating assessments with governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and contributing to higher headquarters' Common Operating Picture (COP). One of these SOF teams – equipped with a Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) terminal, laptop, and cell phone – took initiative by geo-tagging photos and then instantly uploading them to an online map; this practice proved to be useful for COP development/enhancement.

The greatest strength of the SOF teams was their ability to rapidly establish strong relationships with host nation civil authorities, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police, and NGOs, and to then utilize those relationships to connect with others arriving on the scene. SOF teams also proved invaluable at organizing and advising host nation security personnel and local leaders to accomplish several critical tasks: the establishment of local security to prevent looting, the management of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the reception of NGOs, and the design and implementation of distribution networks to move life-saving relief supplies to people in desperate need. As the UN established and expanded its presence, SOF teams also helped connect relief agencies and local leaders to the UN cluster meetings. Without question, SOF teams on the ground demonstrated that there is no substitute for culturally astute personnel who have the skills to rapidly establish relationships with host nation personnel, as well as to expand relationships/connections with newly arriving personnel/organizations.

Recommendation.

1. HA/DR planners in USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, and USAFRICOM should work with counterpart Special Operations planners to identify SOF assets and capabilities that can be leveraged to quickly respond in support of foreign disaster relief missions.
2. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) managing military support during a HA/DR operation should standardize use of open source geo-tagging (see NOTES below) in its Common Operating Picture (COP). The JOC should maximize

sharing of the COP with others involved in relief efforts: U.S. Government/ Interagency, host nation government, UN, and NGOs/relief agencies.

NOTES:

- Open source: freely accessible to the public. See: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/open-source>
- Geo-tagging: the process of adding geographical information to various media in the form of metadata. The data usually consists of coordinates like latitude and longitude, but may even include bearing, altitude, distance, and place names. Geotagging is most commonly used for photographs and can help people get specific information about where the picture was taken. <http://www.techopedia.com/definition/86/geotagging>
- Geo-tagging discussion and methods: http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Geotagging_Source_Photos

Implications.

If SOF assets/capabilities are not incorporated into Global Combatant Command planning for HA/DR operations, then opportunities may be missed to quickly respond to areas with limited access having stranded/isolated populations. If "open source geo-tagging" is not incorporated into a broadly shared COP, then the multiple players involved in planning/executing relief deliveries will have less awareness of actual conditions and needs on the ground.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "[Operation Damayan](#)," by Colonel Robert McDowell, Command Sergeant Major Brian Johnson, Major Joshua Thiel and Lieutenant Jill Weston, Special Warfare magazine, January-March 2014.

Comments.

Related references:

1. "[Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management & Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan \(Yolanda\)](#)," Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA), 30 January 2014.
2. "[Strategic Lesson Number 16: Information Sharing during Disaster Relief Operations](#)," David Mosinski, 11 February 2013.
3. "[Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief \(Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below\)](#)," Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM, 13 July 2011.



e. TOPIC. Information Sharing on Operation Tomodachi ([860](#))

Observation.

Joint forces involved in Operation Tomodachi experienced significant challenges with respect to information management, classified/sensitive information sharing with bilateral partners, and unclassified information sharing with all participating organizations.

Discussion.

In March 2011, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) formed a Joint Support Force (JSF) centered around U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to provide disaster relief support to the Japanese in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami. Military and civilian augmentees from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps along with personnel from USAID, the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and various other U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations converged on Yokota AFB to support operations. In a span of two weeks, the number of personnel working at HQ, USFJ grew from 180 to nearly 800. In that short timeframe, USFJ's communications infrastructure was rapidly adjusted and expanded. Over 300 SIPRNET and classified Combined Enterprise Regional Information System-Japan (CENTRIXS-JPN) clients were transferred over to the (unclassified) NIPRNET domain. Another 500+ workstations were also added to the NIPRNET domain.

One of the greatest challenges for personnel involved in Operation Tomodachi was the ability to rapidly share critical information. Since members of other U.S. Government organizations (i.e., USAID, Department of Energy, etc.) and non-governmental organizations did not possess Common Access Cards (CAC), a non-CAC enabled method of sharing information was required. To meet this requirement, USPACOM established the "Japan Earthquake 2011" site on the All Partners Access Network (APAN). APAN (www.apan.org) is an unclassified network in the public domain which USPACOM had used in previous Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. USPACOM also created a special community of users within APAN (accessible only by invitation) – the Virtual Civil Military Operations Center (VCMOC) – to develop the Common Operating Picture (COP) and to share information in support of joint HA/DR operations.

Although APAN helped to meet the requirement for unclassified information sharing, APAN was not the only unclassified network used during Operation Tomodachi. HARMONIEWeb, which is similar to APAN, was also utilized and

was actually preferred by several groups because they were much more familiar with HARMONIEWeb's features. Also, since it took several days for USPACOM to set up the VCMOC and to determine whom to grant access to it, many of the organizations continued to use and populate HARMONIEWeb, and they were then reluctant to shift gears to APAN when finally granted access to the VCMOC.

With hundreds of staff members coming from different services and organizations, the need for commonly understood Information Management (IM)/ Knowledge Management (KM) procedures became evident very quickly. With the help of experts from the various agencies and organizations, an IM Standard Operating Procedures (IMSOP) were rapidly developed, approved, and disseminated. The IMSOP provided comprehensive guidance to the JSF staff and participating organizations on how they should share specific operational products, which collaborative tools they should use, and instructions on posting and sharing information.

The sharing of classified/sensitive information with partners was yet another major challenge for the JSF – a challenge seen as vital to the overall relief effort. At the beginning of the operation, classified/sensitive information-sharing took considerable time because boundaries and handling instructions were not clearly defined. Foreign disclosure procedures had to be reviewed and streamlined. Once parameters were established/clarified, the sharing and dissemination of classified/sensitive information improved markedly, yet still called for continuous coordination at all levels.

Since the thrust of Operation Tomodachi was to team with the host nation/ Japan on disaster relief operations, it was absolutely essential for both Japanese and U.S. planners/leaders to have the same Common Operating Picture (COP). To ensure Japanese partners gained the same COP, certain classified/sensitive data that could not be downgraded (to unclassified) was transferred from U.S.-only systems to Japanese compatible systems. This requirement highlighted the criticality of cross-domain solutions, such as the Radiant Mercury system, which moved data from (U.S.-only) SIPRNET to CENTRIXS-JPN.

COP development was taken to a higher level than anticipated through USFJ's working with Google to gain unique mapping and imagery support for the operation. More than 300 Web developers from Google headquarters in Tokyo volunteered their services and established a website (www.google.com/crisisresponse/japanquake2011.html) to help identify and locate missing persons – providing maps, shelter locations, news updates, transportation routes and schedules. Google employees also set up a second website (www.sigacts.com/sendai) with "before" and "after" photos of certain areas, which significantly aided JSF's planning efforts with Japanese partners. Additionally, the JSF, with assistance from Google programmers, incorporated Google Earth into the bilateral COP, further enhancing operational capability.

Recommendation.

1. Designate a single portal site where government agencies and NGOs can work together in a collaborative, unclassified environment on HA/DR operations. Feasible options include APAN, HARMONIEWeb, and SOLLIMS. One single network should be designated as the primary network for a given operation, so that information can be centrally managed, kept up-to-date, and shared with/ accessed by all participating organizations.
2. Establish and promulgate an Information Management SOP at the outset of HA/DR operations, so that all participants know procedures for posting and sharing information on the designated portal site.
3. Establish streamlined procedures early for foreign disclosure – so that classified/sensitive information can be more readily shared with foreign partners, NGOs, and IOs engaged in the HA/DR mission.
4. For any classified/sensitive information that cannot be declassified and shared on the designated unclassified portal site, establish mechanisms for transferring requisite data between U.S. and foreign partner classified information systems.
5. Continue to work with Google and other information communication technology (ICT) professionals to bring enhancements/improvements to the COP during future HA/DR missions (e.g., imagery and mapping enhancements, tools/sites to support efforts to find missing persons, etc.).
6. Incorporate use of a public domain website (e.g., APAN, HARMONIEWeb, SOLLIMS) in future HA/DR training events, as well as clearly defined information-sharing instructions disseminated to all participants and streamlined foreign disclosure procedures.
7. Due to the nature of the geographic region, USPACOM and/or USFJ should conduct an HA/DR training event quarterly, as a minimum, to review and update a regional IO SOP; classified and unclassified systems should be identified for rapid implementation and data-sharing processes and products should be practiced during quarterly training events.

Implications.

If one single public domain site is not designated for information sharing for a given HA/DR operation, with an associated IM SOP and streamlined foreign disclosure/information sharing procedures, then U.S. and partner nation planners/leaders will have a less than optimal COP, with information shortfalls potentially hindering mission accomplishment.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "Navy Information Professionals Support Operation Tomodachi," by Captain Craig Goodman, Captain Carlene Wilson, Commander Jeffrey Buss, and Lieutenant Ryan Tashma, in [CHIPS, July-September 2011](#), published by Space & Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic.

Comments.

Related documents:

- Another article which further elaborates on the information sharing challenges of Operation Tomodachi is "Japan's 3/11 Triple Disaster," by Commander Steve Jacobs, [CHIPS, July-September 2011](#).
- An Army Materiel Command briefing highlighting the lack of a common collaborative environment (slide 47) is "[Operation Tomodachi: AMC Lessons Learned](#)," by George Koklanaris, Brian McMeans, and Josh May, 28 July 2011.
- A USPACOM J71 briefing that provides additional recommendations on information sharing (slide 11) is "[Operation Tomodachi Findings](#)," by Colonel Andrew Wilcox, 26 September 2011.



f. TOPIC. Humanitarian Agency Considerations in Disaster Relief Operations – 2010 Pakistan Floods ([943](#))

Observation.

In the aftermath of the 2010 Pakistan floods, civilian and military responders made a tremendous impact with regard to saving lives and alleviating hunger and suffering; however, relief operations were frequently hindered by issues related to "humanitarian principles" and varying interpretations on guidelines for civil-military interaction.

Discussion.

In late July 2010, devastating floods struck Pakistan following a period of extremely heavy monsoon rains. Floodwaters essentially transformed the Indus River basin into an inland sea and submerged approximately 1/5 of Pakistan's landmass – an area larger than England. Around 2,000 people were killed. Some 1.7 million homes were damaged or destroyed. Over 20 million people

were in dire need of assistance, as they had become homeless, injured, malnourished, or ill. A greater number of people were affected by this one disaster than by three previous disasters combined: the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

Just as it had done during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, the Pakistan military again played a pivotal operational and coordination role throughout the humanitarian response to the 2010 disaster. However, the interaction between the Pakistan military and the humanitarian community became much more problematic in 2010 than 2005 – due to ongoing military operations in areas of Pakistan adjacent to Afghanistan, emergent geopolitical pressures, and differing opinions and approaches among humanitarian agencies regarding the context in which they were operating in 2010.

Ironically, just a few months prior to the 2010 Pakistan floods, the humanitarian community had undertaken a major initiative with regard to civil-military interaction for future operations in Pakistan. This initiative was the "[Draft Guidelines for Civil-military Coordination in Pakistan](#)," which was developed by the [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs](#) (OCHA) and then adopted by the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Pakistan in March 2010. Within the humanitarian community, these guidelines were widely thought to be detailed, useful, and thorough. However, Pakistani authorities would not approve of the guidelines because they had not been consulted during the drafting of this document.

Nonetheless, international humanitarian agencies responded to the Pakistan flood disaster with overwhelming support. The Pakistan military itself quickly became engaged in extensive operations to rescue stranded individuals, evacuate communities to safer locations, and distribute relief supplies to isolated populations. For its part, the international humanitarian community also became heavily engaged with wide-ranging support – from provision of mobile disease early warning systems to implementation of integrated food, nutrition, water, and sanitation programs. Millions of Pakistanis were saved from food insecurity – due largely to the efforts of the World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners, who planned and executed the distribution of food and water to 3 million people at the outset of operations in August, then steadily extended distribution to 8 million beneficiaries over the next three months.

However, humanitarian agencies faced significant challenges in broadening their operations to reach people requiring assistance in outlying areas. Their presence tended to be concentrated in large towns and heavily populated areas. This was in part for logistical reasons, but also due to political and security considerations. Particularly problematic was extending relief into the conflict-affected areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which were close to the border of Afghanistan. Various other issues related to "humanitarian principles" and "civil-military interaction" emerged during this particular disaster relief

operation, as cited in the article "[Civil-military Relations in Natural Disasters: A Case Study of the 2010 Pakistan Floods](#)" and summarized below:

- Improved humanitarian outcomes? Yes, but outcomes were degraded by attitudes of Pakistan military and government authorities. To its credit, the Pakistan military did prevent massive loss of life through immediate actions in evacuating people to safer locations and transporting relief supplies to isolated populations. The Pakistan military utilized over 600 boats and a range of aircraft to reach cut-off parts of the country – allowing 850,000 people to be moved to new locations. Another great success was overcoming food insecurity issues for some 8 million people and preventing the outbreak of epidemics and disease – largely to the credit of multiple humanitarian agencies. However, although military and civil/humanitarian actors complemented one another with regard to immediate response capacity and longer term relief, many incidents arose throughout relief operations in which humanitarian principles and internationally recognized standards were disregarded. For instance, the Pakistan military was unwilling to accept the importance of impartiality in aid distribution, allowing a disproportionate level of aid to be delivered to the Punjab area in comparison to other areas. Additionally, the government of Pakistan rejected the relevance of the [Sphere Standards](#) across many sectors of relief – food, water, sanitation, shelter, and health sectors – meaning that some recipients/communities experienced lower than acceptable standards of relief services.

- Inconsistency and different interpretations of "last resort". In accordance with provisions in the "[Draft Guidelines for Civil-military Coordination in Pakistan](#)," the UN HCT in Pakistan endorsed the World Food Programme's use of military helicopters on the grounds of "last resort" – to transport food to areas that were deemed inaccessible by other means, until such time that the UN Humanitarian Air Services could bring assets to bear. The [Pakistan Humanitarian Forum](#) (PHF), however, representing a large number of international NGOs working in Pakistan, firmly decided against the use of military assets. The PHF did not believe the threshold had been reached for resorting to military assets, and it especially had concerns about using military assets to transport civilian relief items into the areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Swat Valley). The PHF feared that humanitarian agencies could be seen as operating and siding with the Pakistan military (violating the humanitarian principle of neutrality), because the Pakistan military was engaged in [counterterrorism operations](#) in these areas. The humanitarian agencies did not want to risk their acceptance by locals and the ability to sustain a long-term presence. Besides PHF, other humanitarian organizations interpreted "last resort" (for use of military assets) as only applying when there is a direct and immediate threat to life – i.e., that military assets were only appropriate in the early, life-saving phase of relief operations. Other humanitarian organizations argued that "cost" should be a determinant of "last resort" – that civilian agencies should only coordinate for military assets when it would be cost-prohibitive for civilian agencies to deliver the large volumes of relief supplies.

- **Geopolitical pressures.** In early August, NATO offered support to the government of Pakistan, including an [air bridge](#). Representatives from the U.S. and the United Kingdom advocated strongly for humanitarian agencies to use this air bridge, as did officials from the government of Pakistan, claiming that this would speed up delivery of relief supplies and reduce costs. In contrast, the [European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department \(ECHO\)](#) took the position that if any of its implementing partners used NATO or other military assets, they would be in breach of their contract. The UN HCT in Pakistan also opposed use of the NATO air bridge. In spite of these pressures/positions from ECHO and the UN HCT, the World Food Programme and the [UNHCR](#) (the UN refugee agency) opted to use the NATO air bridge on a short-term basis, as did a number of other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

- **Different approaches to security.** Pakistani government authorities insisted that armed escorts be used on many relief missions – especially those transiting certain districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh. However, humanitarian agencies varied in their responses to the government's pressure to use armed escorts – with some accepting the armed escorts, others seeking exceptions from superiors, and others objecting outright and even suspending operations. The ones who objected believed that use of armed escorts would undermine long-term acceptance by local communities and place their staffs and programs at risk. Complicating matters, while Pakistani national authorities sometimes compromised with humanitarian agencies on the use of armed escorts, lower-level/provincial authorities in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa insisted on the use of armed escorts. They also objected to aid delivery by expatriates and generally did not work cooperatively with humanitarian actors.

- **Disagreement over how the crisis was characterized.** One of the central issues that emerged from the 2010 Pakistan floods was that it matters how a crisis is characterized. Some international organizations saw themselves as responding to a purely "natural disaster," so they followed the 2007 "[Oslo Guidelines](#)" (guidelines which apply to natural disasters in times of peace). Other international organizations saw themselves as responding to a "complex emergency" in which both the Pakistan national military and NATO were perceived to be parties to a conflict; they tended to follow the 2003 "[MCDA Guidelines](#)" (Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Complex Emergencies). Still other international organizations saw themselves as responding to a "natural disaster within a complex emergency" (for which there are no international guidelines); they tended to follow the "[Draft Guidelines for Civil-military Coordination in Pakistan](#)" or responded in ways that their individual organization deemed appropriate. Similarly, local NGOs also had diverse attitudes and approaches for coordinating with the military. Some showed little concern about the heavy involvement of the Pakistan military in orchestrating relief operations; they routinely coordinated with the military on access issues. Other local NGOs,

however, were more concerned about humanitarian principles and developed poor or distant relations with the military as the weeks and months passed.

In summary, the 2010 Pakistan flood relief was hampered by the absence of agreed-upon guidance for civil-military relations. Had the "[Draft Guidelines for Civil-military Coordination in Pakistan](#)" been approved by the government of Pakistan, relief operations would probably have gone much smoother. However, the relief operation also showed that even approved guidelines/documents are insufficient for ensuring consistency and unity of effort among actors. International humanitarian agencies could not agree on how they characterized the crisis, how they interpreted "last resort", how they responded to geopolitical pressures to use the NATO air bridge, or how they reacted to Pakistani pressure to use armed escorts.

Recommendation.

1. For nations having a recent history of natural disasters, the UN should work with their governments to develop and gain approval of [county-specific civil-military guidelines](#). Such guidelines should address disaster relief operations for (a) times of peace and (b) complex emergencies (conflict situations).
2. The UN OCHA (in collaboration with humanitarian agencies) should update the brochure on "[last resort](#)" to more clearly define the thresholds at which humanitarian agencies may resort to the use of military assets.
3. Throughout disaster relief operations, the UN should encourage host nation authorities to promulgate consistent guidance across all levels of the government and military with regard to the use of armed escorts on humanitarian relief missions.
4. In planning for disaster relief operations, U.S. military planners should identify the various humanitarian agencies involved, as well as attempt to discern their positions regarding the use of military transportation and armed escorts.

Implications.

If the UN OCHA does not clearly articulate and gain consensus on civil-military guidelines for countries prone to disasters (e.g., Pakistan, Philippines, Haiti, etc.), then relief operations in those countries will be hindered by different approaches among humanitarian agencies with regard to working with the military.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "[Civil-Military Relations in Natural Disasters: A Case Study of the 2010 Pakistan Floods](#)," by Ajay Madiwale and Kudrat Virk, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 884, December 2011.

Comments.

1. A related article that cites similar concerns among civil-military relations during flood relief in the Philippines is "[Civil-Military Relations in Disaster Rescue and Relief Activities: Response to the Mudslide in Southern Leyte, Philippines](#)," by Rosalie Arcala Hall and Anita Cular Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, vol. 38, no. 2, 13 December 2010.

2. A related document that describes the humanitarian principles, international guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of the international entities that participate in foreign disaster relief operations is the "[Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief \(Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below\)](#)," Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM, 13 July 2011.

3. Related observations and lessons that discuss cooperation between NGOs and the military during recent disaster relief operations are:

- "[Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations and Recommendations](#)," LTG Ken Keen, Military Deputy Commander, USSOUTHCOM, 4 March 2011
- "[Haiti Earthquake Response - Information Collection, Sharing, and Management](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 681, 25 October 2010
- "[Logistics in Complex Relief Operations - USEUCOM's Support for Georgia in 2008](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 942, 18 January 2013
- "[LIAISON: Civil-Military Lessons Learned in the Response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake](#)," CFE-DMHA, 16 October 2012

4. A journal that discusses civil-military relations, building consensus within the humanitarian community, disaster resilience, and partnering in emergencies is "[Humanitarian Exchange Magazine: Civil-Military Coordination](#)," ODI HPN, January 2013.



g. TOPIC. "Whole of International Community" for Foreign Disaster Relief ([700](#))

Observation.

During the 2010 earthquake relief operation in Haiti, a myriad of organizations carried out disaster relief roles, but no collective command and control structure was in place to manage the whole effort. The U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) served as the lead agent for the United States, however, it relied heavily on the supporting effort provided by the U.S. military to manage the effort. The U.S. military's Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) was the driving force for planning and delivering relief in the initial/emergency phase of the operation. Additionally, JTF-Haiti took a lead role in organizing and synchronizing a large part of subsequent (post-emergency) relief efforts through a number of innovations in partnering, coordinating, communicating, and building unity of effort among the participating organizations. In a disaster relief operation of this magnitude, such work to gain a "whole of international community" approach is invaluable in gaining efficiencies, saving lives, and mitigating suffering.

Discussion.

The devastation in Haiti resulting from the 7.0 magnitude earthquake of 12 January 2010 prompted the longest and largest U.S. military effort in a foreign disaster relief operation. At the peak of Operation Unified Response, in February 2010, JTF-Haiti was comprised of over 22,000 service members, 58 aircraft, and 23 ships. Within just two days of the disaster, on 14 January, the headquarters for JTF-Haiti was established by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) – to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal agency, USAID.

JTF-Haiti assumed responsibility for all U.S. forces and began directing activities to assist in providing timely relief. The Department of Defense ordered elements of the Global Response Force (the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post, 2nd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 58 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft) and the USS Carl Vinson, USS Bataan, USS Nassau, and USS Carter Hall to the JTF-Haiti mission. These forces, along with personnel from the SOUTHCOM staff, the Joint Force Special Operations Component, and the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, provided the crux of JTF-Haiti assets.

In the initial emergency phase, the 2nd Brigade/82nd Airborne, under the direction of the JTF-Haiti headquarters (the core of which was the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post) conducted and supported continual humanitarian aid distribution missions (interagency missions) in the heaviest impacted areas of Port-au-Prince. 16 distribution sites were established to provide food, water, and medical care – for well over 1 million people. On 20 January, the hospital ship USNS Comfort, equipped with surgical operating teams and orthopedic surgeons, arrived and began conducting round-the-clock medical support.

Because of the rapid deployment of the DoD Global Response Force, JTF-Haiti helped avert a major food and water crisis. Although more than 230,000 people died from the earthquake, the abundant & superior medical assistance provided by the U.S. military and the international community saved thousands of lives.

From the outset, JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked alongside counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), USAID, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Together they developed plans for protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) in makeshift camp – who were at great risk of further disaster due to the impending hurricane season and potential flooding. In February and early March, JTF-Haiti elements conducted comprehensive infrastructure assessments and then executed engineering projects – with the UN and NGOs – to mitigate the risk and reduce the number of people requiring relocation. Then, from mid-March through mid-May, JTF-Haiti supported the Haitian government, UN, USAID, and NGO partners by relocating IDPs from sites still at risk to transitional resettlement sites.

JTF-Haiti's Maritime Component Command, comprised of the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, conducted relief missions outside Port-au-Prince, to the west and to the north. Using the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces, these units brought relief to thousands of Haitians in the outlying regions.

Although the deployment of U.S. military forces and U.S. resources was quick and effective, it was not always efficient. The most significant challenge to the U.S. military – and to the international community – was logistics. Three specific areas presented major challenges to JTF-Haiti's logistical operations (and those of the international players):

- "Incomplete situational awareness" at the outset made it difficult to determine requirements and priorities for providing relief and delivering supplies.
- The "lack of a unified and integrated logistics command and control structure" led to gaps in reception, staging, and movement of forces, equipment, and supplies into Haiti. Logistics staffs were not always aware of many non-military activities and cargos.
- The "initial reliance on the one single airport" (Toussaint Louverture International Airport) for throughput, created the need to validate and prioritize all flights (including international flights) to ensure that only the most critical cargo landed.

JTF-Haiti had a proven logistical system to manage its own requirements; however, it was not designed for managing external flights, requirements, cargo, etc. In spite of this challenge, however, JTF-Haiti's airmen were able to increase flights at the international airport from 13 per day (pre-quake) to a peak of 150 per day. However, even this capacity fell short of the demand. SOUTHCOM's 12th Air Force, in coordination with the UN, then developed a system of time-slots and priorities – driven by the Haitian government – that at least served to meet Haiti's major requirements on a day-to-day basis.

The earthquake had rendered both of the two main piers of the Port-au-Prince seaport as "unusable." JTF-Haiti, with assistance from U.S. Transportation Command, quickly established a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability to bring supplies in from the sea. This doubled the number of shipping containers received in Haiti from pre-quake numbers. Also, JTF-Haiti established a temporary port capability at the Port-au-Prince seaport through the use of two contracted Crowley barges. This further enhanced the flow of supplies into Haiti and reduced some pressure on the international airport.

From the beginning, the focus of JTF-Haiti was to save lives and mitigate suffering. Security – to protect the people from gangs, looting, and acts of violence – was also an initial concern. However, JTF-Haiti's close working relationship with MINUSTAH and the cooperation and professionalism by MINUSTAH in conducting security operations enabled the JTF to focus its efforts on humanitarian assistance operations. In the first few days following the earthquake, General Keen and the MINUSTAH force commander, Major General Peixoto (Brazil), discussed the necessity and a concept for a safe and secure environment. Bringing their staffs together on this issue ensured that priorities and workloads were aligned. It enabled MINUSTAH to provide the requisite security, while JTF-H could then focus on delivery of food, water, and emergency medical care. Regular meetings between forces contributed to unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

Another excellent example of partnering was in the development and execution of the first major food distribution plan for Operation Unified Response. JTF-Haiti, the World Food Program, MINUSTAH, and various UN agencies contributed to this effort through joint and combined planning. The locations for 16 food distribution sites throughout Port-au-Prince and its surrounding communities were mapped out, requirements determined, and concepts of operation written, and then these critical sites were rapidly established and supported – for initial deliveries and sustained distribution. Through these nodes, and through the teamwork and communication between these partners (prompted and facilitated by JTF-Haiti), more than two million Haitians received much-needed food and water on a regular basis.

JTF-Haiti's "Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center" was the key node for facilitating the coordination and collaboration between JTF-Haiti and its partners. This coordination center pulled together, and tracked, the efforts of JTF-Haiti, MINUSTAH forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and numerous NGOs. This coordination center was manned by a 30 military personnel, including one general officer. This center, and the bulk of JTF-Haiti, operated on unclassified information systems and used commercially available programs/tools to build a humanitarian assistance common operating picture – shared with all participants.

On the information front, Facebook and Twitter were also used, not only to collect and disseminate information, but also to counter possible misinformation. JTF public affairs personnel used cameras on their cell phones to "Twitpic" key activities and then post them on Twitter and on JTF's Facebook page. The JTF-Haiti's Joint Information and Interagency Center also contributed to the JTF's information management and communication efforts. One of the key products from this center was daily talking points – which provided the overall communication goal, target audiences, themes, and top-line messages.

Although the U.S. administration had issued guidance that the Haitian relief effort was to be a unified whole-of-government effort, with USAID as the federal lead agency, the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of USAID and other players were not clearly defined. There were no specifications on subordinate relationships or divisions of labor. USAID had too few personnel on the ground to form and lead the robust planning that was required early on, for a crisis of this size and scope. Therefore, JTF-Haiti provided a number of planners to USAID to assist on this complex initial planning effort.

The close proximity of JTF-Haiti to the U.S. Embassy was a key factor for facilitating the desired whole-of-government response. The JTF established its headquarters next to the American embassy, which was also close to the MINUSTAH headquarters, and this physical co-location greatly simplified coordination, collaboration, and communication. Staff working relationships were quickly developed, and these relationships paid dividends throughout the operation. Additionally, liaison officers provided to/from JTF-Haiti also greatly benefited communication and unity of effort.

Initially, the JTF commanders and staff did not fully appreciate the number of humanitarian organizations that had been in Haiti since before the earthquake. There had been over 1,000 NGOs working with the UN Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance in Haiti. However, within the first couple weeks, the JTF worked closely with the UN (the UN Coordinating Support Committee in Haiti) to develop UN-approved coordination processes to fulfill perceived requirements – in which requirements were raised, validated, and passed to the appropriate organizations. The JTF additionally worked to coordinate requirements and activities within the UN "cluster system" to ensure unity of effort.

In the first few weeks, it became apparent that the biggest challenge facing the Haitian government was the IDPs – especially those who had set up spontaneous settlements in areas prone to flooding. At the strategic level, the JTF and USAID worked closely with the UN and the Haitian government to develop an IDP strategy. Upon agreement to this strategy, JTF engineering projects were accomplished – which mitigated the risks for nine major camps that had been assessed as being likely to experience flooding during the rainy season. Then, approximately 6,000 people at other camps/sites still needed to be moved to safer ground. To complete the operation, the JTF provided the requisite

engineering support, transportation assets, and civil affairs teams to the UN, and the endangered people were moved to safety. Various relief efforts continued well after this IDP protection/relocation project – and the partnering and unity of effort prompted by JTF-Haiti's innovations continued to enhance success.

Recommendation.

The authors of the article "[Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations](#)" (see Event Description below), provide the following recommendations that the U.S. military, interagency, the UN, and the international community can apply for future disaster responses:

1. Develop a more robust and capable disaster response assessment and initial life-saving response team. (The Global Response Force was invaluable, but greater situational awareness was needed to set priorities and drive logistics.)
2. Have combatant commands maintain a JTF capable force (with Joint logistics capabilities adaptable to external requirements), trained and ready to deploy in support of a foreign disaster relief operation with the Global Response Force.
3. Develop an international disaster response framework for nations to deploy civilian and military capability to respond to disasters (a framework that allows inclusion in planning, logistics, and information systems).
4. Conduct exercises (with U.S. agencies, partner nations, and the UN) to develop relationships and refine processes and systems.
5. Codify the use of coordination centers like the U.S. JTF-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and UN coordinating support committee; make them adaptable to any existing partner-nation center.
6. Develop and codify unclassified information-sharing tools like JTF-Haiti's humanitarian assistance common operating picture; make them adaptable to any partner-nation's existing system.
7. Examine how best to integrate and support the NGOs and public/private sector in support of humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief. (Consider integration in both assessment teams and response teams.)
8. Tackle the internally displaced persons challenge immediately. (Identify IDP issues and develop appropriate solutions.)

Implications.

If a disaster response framework is not developed to accommodate a "whole of international community" approach, and if exercises (involving U.S. agencies,

partner nations, and the UN) are not conducted to clarify and develop relationships and to refine processes and systems, then USAID, DoD, State and others will be building support in an ad hoc manner, rather than in systematic/practiced manner to quickly deliver and efficiently sustain relief to disaster victims.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations](#)," by Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen and Lieutenant Colonels Matthew G. Elledge, Charles W. Nolan, and Jennifer L. Kimmey (U.S. Army), in Military Review, November-December 2010.

Comments.

1. A related article, which discusses the use of new (unclassified) information systems to improve information-sharing and management during disaster relief operations is "[Haiti Earthquake: Breaking New Ground in the Humanitarian Information Landscape](#)," U.S. Department of State - Humanitarian Information Unit, July 2010.

2. SOLLIMS should be taken under consideration by Combatant Commands and JTFs for meeting recommendation #6 above (i.e., Develop and codify unclassified information-sharing tools like JTF-Haiti's humanitarian assistance common operating picture; make them adaptable to any partner nation's existing system).



h. TOPIC. HA/DR Haiti - Jan 2010: Information Operations / STRATCOMM ([627](#))

Observation.

As part of the response to a natural disaster such as the Haiti earthquake, getting an information operations (IO)/strategic communications (STRATCOMM) program up and running as early as possible provides great benefits.

Discussion.

As much as possible, any IO/STRATCOMM program needs to reflect a "comprehensive approach" in action – i.e., all players – military, interagency, NGO/IO – are contributors/participants. In the case of Haiti, setting up a Joint Information Center (JIC) proved to be a 'best practice'; the JIC provided talking points, themes and messages that all players used because they were all

included within the JIC. This made the IO/STRATCOMM program successful as this key information was consistent across all responding agencies.

The need for a single, authoritative source of information is critical; the JIC can serve this purpose if a truly 'comprehensive approach' is applied.

Expect that in some situations – e.g., Haiti, that much of the populace will be illiterate; do not base the IO/STRATCOMM program on a written product approach – i.e., pamphlets and handouts. The distribution of thousands of small radios contributed to the success of the IO/STRATCOMM efforts. Know your community and provide accordingly. In some cases the use of "social media" – e.g., Facebook, Twitter – becomes a very useful tool for getting the word out – again, know your populace.

Some cautions were addressed as to making sure the UN elements are seeing same things that rest of the IO/STRATCOMM players are seeing/sharing – if possible get them integrated into the JIC.

There was never a strategic message prepared for "Recovery" – focus was on health and welfare which is understandable, but at some point the populace needs to know "where do we go from here?"

The [USAID Field Operations Guide \(FOG\)](#) is a good document to have on hand for planning and executing an IO/STRATCOMM program. Chapter II also provides a good tool for conducting a formal assessment of HA/DR operations.

Recommendation.

1. Do an assessment of "who needs to know what" and "how do we best get the word out?" before you initiate the program; get into theater as quickly as possible; be prepared to work in a very austere environment at first – no electricity, no fuel, etc.; bring the equipment you need to be independent.
2. Set up a JIC or similar single source of authoritative information to minimize confusion.
3. Make sure there is significant "vertical" involvement – i.e., if possible, get the local Head of State or similar reps involved as well as the senior military and IA players.
4. When possible, get resources such as the [USAID FOG](#) out to the IO/STRATCOMM team as early as possible; follow up to discuss usage and changes that need to be applied.

Implications.

1. Put an "all-star team" on the ground; put your best foot forward; if the IO/STRATCOMM program gets off to a bad start, it is almost impossible to recoup; loss of credibility.
2. Understand when it's time for the US military / all military to 'go home' – leave necessary PAO + IO footprint and capability if the civilian / host nation cannot take over. Give the health and welfare mission to the government of the host nation as quickly as possible. The people need to see their government as a 'provider' and capable element in the here and now and for the future.

Event Description.

Content based on personal notes taken during the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)-sponsored Haiti Lessons Learned Working Group (WG) held at HQ US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Suffolk, VA 23-24 March 2010. The WG was conducted in the format of a facilitated discussion; there were no formal presentations made by any of the attendees. The discussions were structured around seven focus areas developed by JCOA. These were:

- Gaining Situational Awareness
- Forming the JTF / Command & Control
- Force Protection / Global Force Management
- Expeditionary Logistics / Sea-basing
- Information Operations / STRATCOMM
- Interagency / NGO Partnerships
- Medical



i. TOPIC. Haiti Earthquake Response – Information Collection, Sharing, and Management ([681](#))

Observation.

During the response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, various new information & communication technologies, new information providers, and a new community of interest emerged – all of which impacted the volume, collection, sharing, and management of humanitarian information. During the Haiti relief effort, humanitarian responders employed the latest social networking media, mobile phone text messaging, open source software applications, and commercial satellite imagery to a far greater extent than ever before. Academics/ researchers, ICT professionals, relief volunteers, media members, and other

reporters from the affected population became new sources of data and information. These new information participants & developments are likely to impact future disaster relief operations, presenting both opportunities and challenges for the response agencies.

Discussion.

During the Haiti earthquake response, the humanitarian information environment included unprecedented availability of raw data in many forms, greater usage of new information communication technology (ICT), and the presence of three loosely-connected humanitarian communities of interest. Those three communities of interest were as follows: (1) U.S. Government (USG) community of interest, (2) United Nations (UN) and international community of interest; and, (3) an emergent group of ICT "volunteers" – consisting of humanitarians, corporate foundations, virtually-connected academics, and ICT professionals. All three communities were involved in the collecting and sharing of digital information made available on web portals, platforms, and popular social networking media such as Twitter, Facebook, and Short Message Service (SMS) feeds.

For the U.S. Government community, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was the lead agency for the humanitarian response effort. USAID committed over \$650 million in supplies, grants, and support over a 6-month period beginning in mid-Jan 2010. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was the lead command for the Department of Defense (DoD). At the height of the disaster response effort, it had committed 22,000 personnel, 130 aircraft, and 33 ships to support the operation (Operation Unified Response Haiti). U.S. Department of State (DOS) played a major role in assisting refugees and host families, and supported repatriation and resettlement programs for displaced persons. Other USG agencies – including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) – also provided technical and other assistance for the USG response. To collect and manage information useful to strategic and programmatic decision-making, coordination centers were established at USSOUTHCOM in Miami and at both USAID and DOS in Washington, D.C.

The use of liaison officers contributed significantly to the implementation of a "Whole of Government" approach to the response effort. USAID, DoD, and DOS assigned liaison officers to each other's coordination centers. Additionally, several UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) provided liaison officers to these coordination centers, as well as to USG teams operating in Haiti. These liaison officers greatly facilitated inter-organizational information sharing, fostered relationships and teamwork, and provided greater understanding of cross-community practices.

The DoD/USSOUTHCOM decision to promote the use of unclassified information whenever possible, along with greater use of public domain platforms for information sharing, aided the USG response effort. Much of DoD's/ USSOUTHCOM 's humanitarian-related data and information, which in previous instances resided on classified systems inaccessible to the public, were kept unclassified and allowed to be shared widely for the Haiti response effort. USSOUTHCOM used the All Partners Access Network (APAN) to share unclassified information and to enhance collaboration and coordination. In the first three weeks of the operation, APAN had approximately 1,800 registered users and became the main platform for USSOUTHCOM to share information outside DoD. Imagery products, maps, photos, assessments, situation reports, common operational pictures, requests for information, etc. were made available on APAN and facilitated U.S. civilian-military collaboration and information sharing.

In the UN/international community, the key players were the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Red Cross, international NGOs, World Bank, and European Commission (EC). UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) teams and international search and rescue teams were dispatched to Port-au-Prince. They established Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (VOSOCC) to provide situation reporting and coordination. The UN also activated its UN humanitarian Cluster System (first tested in the 2005 Pakistan earthquake response), to coordinate international relief activities dealing with food, water, sanitation, health, logistics, shelter, and camp management. However, the Cluster System proved to be inefficient in managing information during such a large-scale emergency, due to a lack of dedicated cluster coordinators, information managers, and technical support capacity.

Several new information systems and tools were employed by the UN – a new OneResponse portal for the UN Cluster System, Who is Doing What Where (3W) database, Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment methodology, Displacement Tracking Matrix, and Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework, among others – with the intent of improving coordination and information management. However, these new information systems/tools did not improve the effectiveness of coordination/management, as they had not been fully accepted/integrated into the decision-making processes and practices of UN clusters and community members.

In the ICT community of "volunteers," some of the many players were: InSTEDD, Fortius One/GeoCommons, OpenStreet Map, Tufts University, Harvard University, Frontline SMS, ICT4Peace, Sahana, Thompson Reuters Foundation, Microsoft, Google, and volunteer members of the Haitian community. Portals and platforms used were: CrisisMappers.net, SMS 4636, Ushahidi, STAR-

TIDES, Haiti Voices, ICT4Peace Inventorization Wiki, CrisisCamp Haiti, Crisis-Commons Wiki, crisescomm.ning.com, and blogs.

This new community of virtually connected "volunteers" affiliated with ICT consulting companies, private corporations, open source software proponents, academic/research institutions, and NGOs, as well as Haitian community members and reporters, applied various new ICT applications to the earthquake response effort. "Web 2.0" social network media was used extensively for data collection, information sharing, and collaboration. Google adapted various tools for applications to support the response effort and helped develop a Person Finder application. ICT companies, with support from DOS, collaborated to establish SMS 4636 code that allowed the free transmission of text message information to and from Haiti.

A new virtual CrisisMappers network utilized an open source interactive mapping platform, Ushahidi, to collect, extract, and plot geo-referenced data on a public domain website. Ushahidi and its supporting volunteers/translators received over 80,000 text messages, of which 3,000 were utilized to facilitate response activities. Ushahidi messages and other geo-referenced data – from Twitter, blogs, the media, and humanitarian reporters – helped provide situational awareness for various operational responders. The USCG, the 22nd U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, and other first responders reported using these social media platforms to help carry out emergency assistance operations.

Additionally, geospatial data and satellite imagery were made much more available during the Haiti earthquake response effort than in previous disaster relief operations. GeoEye and Digital Globe – the two largest U.S. commercial satellite vendors – provided vast amounts of pre- and post-earthquake high resolution satellite imagery at no cost, and Google made it available on platforms such as GoogleEarth and GoogleMaps. UNOSAT, iMMAP, MapAction, ITHACA, and other specialized organizations also provided customized Geographic Information System (GIS) and satellite imagery products to humanitarian relief organizations. InterAction, the NGO consortium, launched a new interactive website/database for mapping NGO projects as they were initiated and progressing in Haiti. Overall, the vast amount of geospatial data and imagery from contributing organizations was widely used during the initial relief efforts, and likewise had applications for reconstruction and recovery.

Recommendation.

1. USAID, DoD, and DOS should continue the practice of assigning liaison officers to each other's coordination centers in future disaster relief operations, as this practice facilitates information sharing and the "Whole of Government" approach.

2. DoD should continue to promote the use of unclassified information and public domain platforms in future disaster relief operations, as this greatly enhances collaboration and operational coordination with other responders. Besides APAN, the Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS) would be an ideal candidate for this purpose.

3. The UN should allocate additional resources to its humanitarian Cluster System (particularly coordinators/decision-makers) in future disaster relief operations, and it should take steps to better integrate its latest information management systems/tools into decision-making processes on the ground.

4. The USG and UN/international communities should recognize the emergence of the ICT "volunteer" community in disaster relief operations and identify tools, techniques & procedures for best working with ICT "volunteer" organizations/ personnel. As a starting point, the USG (DoD) could use a virtual "Community of Practice" (COP) – utilizing a public domain website – and encourage ICT "volunteers" to join it to discuss and collaborate on information systems, tools, techniques, & procedures for future disaster relief operations. Additionally, participants in this COP could address how to incorporate information from social network participants and commercial imagery organizations in future disaster relief operations.

5. DoD should include ICT "volunteer" community players, along with Interagency and UN/international community members, in disaster relief training events/ exercises.

Implication.

If USG lead agents (USAID and DoD) do not collaborate with UN/international community members and ICT "volunteers" in humanitarian relief – through their inclusion in a "Community of Practice" and training events/exercises – then those lead agents may lose opportunities and efficiencies with regard to collecting, managing, sharing, and leveraging critical data/information during future disaster relief operations

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Haiti Earthquake: Breaking New Ground in the Humanitarian Information Landscape](#)," U.S. Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit, July 2010.



j. TOPIC. Logistics in Complex Relief Operations – USEUCOM's Support for Georgia in 2008 ([942](#))

Observation.

U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM's) Operation Assured Delivery provides a microcosm of challenges confronted by logisticians during humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

Discussion.

On 8 August 2008, Russia deployed combat troops into South Ossetia and launched bombing raids against Georgia in response to a large-scale Georgian military deployment in South Ossetia the previous day. The conflict between Russia and Georgia continued for the next several days, and by mid-August a humanitarian crisis had developed. An estimated 30,000 people were displaced within South Ossetia, and more than 135,000 were displaced in other parts of Georgia. On 10 August, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia issued a Disaster Declaration, and the Government of Georgia (GoG) officially requested humanitarian assistance – specifically medicines, medical supplies, emergency shelter items, and food.

In response to the crisis, USEUCOM initiated Operation Assured Delivery. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had overall U.S. lead for providing assistance for Georgia's displaced people; USEUCOM was in support. On 15 August, OFDA/USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Georgia to conduct needs assessments, coordinating its efforts with the GoG and relief agencies in-country. However, the delay in this deployment – not taking place until five days after the U.S. Embassy declared a disaster – meant that USEUCOM logistics planners would have to ascertain relief requirements through other sources. USEUCOM logistics planners would face a number of other significant challenges, as outlined below:

- Difficulty Identifying Initial Relief Requirements. There was no formal U.S. Government structure/framework in place for DoD/USEUCOM to engage with USAID on determining relief requirements. Also, as stated, USAID's assessment team (DART) did not deploy and begin providing information until days after USEUCOM had stood up its planning team and initiated [logistics activities](#) (12 August). USEUCOM logisticians worked around the problem of gaining relief needs assessments by simply calling (via telephone) the USAID Director of the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia, who was able to convey a list of anticipated needs.

- Properly Sourcing Relief Supplies. USEUCOM'S logisticians did have tools to search for sources of relief supplies within the Department of Defense

(DoD); however, they had no systems in place for gaining visibility of potential relief supplies from other U.S. Government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Fortunately, however, the USEUCOM humanitarian assistance staff had at least established an ongoing relationship with the Department of State (DOS) "Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Asia," and this individual was able to identify several non-DoD sources of relief supplies located within Germany.

- Disconnects Between DoD Approval Process and Reality. To facilitate the rapid airlift of large quantities of relief supplies from sources to destination (Georgia), USEUCOM logisticians found that pre-crisis planning capacity (for developing transportation cost estimates) and coordination capacity (networks with interagency counterparts) were lacking. A ready capacity (at DoD and COCOM levels) for estimates and coordination was needed to accelerate the approval process. Fortunately, DOS had promptly initiated a request for DoD support after the Embassy's declaration of disaster, and USEUCOM planners were able to follow up with information to facilitate processing and DoD approval.

- Lack of Logistics Planning and Coordination Enablers. DoD "enablers" for Joint-interagency logistics planning and coordination (such as a deployable Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, Military Assistance Collaboration Cell, or Joint Deployable Team with logistics expertise) were not available/involved in this operation. Instead, USEUCOM immediately leveraged the USEUCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center (EDDOC) to orchestrate logistics planning and coordination functions for the movement of relief supplies. The EDDOC quickly assumed coordination with USEUCOM logisticians, DOS personnel, and the U.S. Army's 21st Theater Sustainment Command (21st TSC) and rapidly planned and tracked ground movements of the initial packages of DOS supplies from Pirmasens, Germany to Ramstein Air Base. From there, C-17 flights transported the first shipments of humanitarian relief supplies to Tbilisi, Georgia; missions were conducted/accomplished on 13 and 14 August, owing greatly to the focused work of the EDDOC and 21st TSC.

- Difficulty Coordinating and Deconflicting Airlift. USEUCOM lacked visibility of the first flight by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) into Georgia, which arrived in Tbilisi on the same day as the first DoD/DOS flight – 13 August. USEUCOM also lacked the authority to interact with the ICRC's logistics center in Amman, Jordan, which was planning and executing another four flights to Tbilisi. Fortunately, the Tbilisi airfield had sufficient space and cargo-handling equipment to accommodate those first few shipments from the ICRC and DoD/DOS.

- Limitations in Airfield Offload and Throughput Capacity. Initially, USEUCOM relied on non-governmental organization (NGO) capabilities to offload the initial shipments of relief supplies from C-17s at the Tbilisi airfield.

However, USEUCOM logistics planners were not able to forecast the various relief flights into Tbilisi, nor could they estimate how quickly the NGOs could move supplies off the airfield. They lacked a comprehensive Common Operating Picture (COP) of airfield operations necessary to adequately sequence the delivery of relief supplies. When relief supplies began to build up at the airfield, USEUCOM logistics planners decided that additional offload capacity was needed, and they then requested a U.S. Air Force Crisis Response Group for this purpose.

- Properly Sustaining the Flow of Logistics. As Operation Assured Delivery progressed, USEUCOM endeavored to develop a sustained flow of logistics to satisfy emerging requirements from the GoG and USAID. Without visibility of interagency capabilities and inventories, USEUCOM logistics planners continued to search within DoD for sources of tents, blankets, and additional supplies. As the need for food continued to grow, USEUCOM planners were able to identify a major source of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) in Albany, Georgia (in the United States), and the EDDOC engaged with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to schedule C-17 and C-130 flights for a sustained flow of these rations into Georgia.

- Lack of Unclassified Information-sharing and Collaboration Tools. EDDOC planners hosted daily collaboration meetings to synchronize and share information with USTRANSCOM, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (the Army Service Component Command of USTRANSCOM), various USEUCOM components, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). However, the bulk of this collaboration took place in classified forums, thereby excluding several key interagency representatives who could have helped in the development of logistics solutions – had there been unclassified forums and collaboration tools.

- Lack of Humanitarian Assistance Training/Exercises. USEUCOM had not sponsored any HA/DR exercises prior to the Georgia crisis, which limited the preparedness of its logisticians. In contrast, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) had been conducting an array of disaster relief exercises, seminars, and conferences beginning as early as 2002 – including three HA/DR events during 2010. That experience paid significant dividends for USSOUTHCOM during Operation Unified Response in Haiti, as documented in SOLLIMS Lesson 700, "[Whole of International Community for Foreign Disaster Relief.](#)"

Despite the many challenges and issues outlined above, DoD/USEUCOM was able to deliver over two million pounds of emergency shelters, food, water, bedding, and medical supplies to the people of Georgia over a short timeframe. Between 13 August and 4 September 2008, USEUCOM conducted 59 humanitarian missions/flights – delivering a total of 356,380 HDRs, 154,368 meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), 10,432 cots, 19,184 sleeping bags, 26,422 hygiene kits,

9,254 blankets, 6,040 sheets, 3,431 mattresses, 653 boxes of medical supplies, and various other relief commodities.

Recommendation.

The author of the article "[Logistics Planning and Collaboration in Complex Relief Operations](#)" (see Event Description below) offers the following recommendations:

1. All Combatant Commands (COCOMs) need an integrated logistics planning construct with the interagency in advance of HA/DR crises. There needs to be an interagency framework supporting continuous dialogue between logistics departments and stakeholders, as well ongoing education and training to provide the ability for planners to better understand the processes associated with HA/DR operations and interagency and NGO collaboration. Along with this interagency framework, Joint and interagency doctrine should be updated for HA/DR operations to better identify processes, roles, responsibilities, and structured organizational interactions.

2. DoD needs a standing coordination cell, established to provide continuous planning and coordination with the interagency and NGOs. DoD should consider development of a deployable Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and/or Military Assistance Collaboration Cell with the capacity to synchronize and coordinate logistics requirements and capabilities in advance of and during a crisis/disaster. This enabler should have the capability to develop a comprehensive COP of airfield operations at destination.

3. DoD should continue to develop and deploy collaborative tools to facilitate HA/DR information sharing and coordination. These tools must reside in, or migrate to, an unclassified forum as much as possible to allow participation by other government agencies and key NGOs.

4. All COCOMs should have a robust series of logistics exercises to refine their HA/DR planning skills. At a minimum, tabletop exercises specifically focused on the logistics aspects of HA/DR operations should be scheduled on a frequent basis and attended by representatives of both DoD and the interagency.

5. Military leaders at the COCOM level need a strengthened understanding of the interagency & their HA/DR crisis response roles and responsibilities. Efforts should be taken to develop a catalog or matrix of their respective capabilities that would help logistics planners develop more comprehensive and inclusive HA/DR solutions.

6. DoD needs a capability to assess the overall effectiveness of relief supplies provided. USAID should refine and share its existing measurement tools and processes to assist DoD in assessing the overall effectiveness of HA/DR efforts.

7. Logisticians must gain full visibility of interagency relief supplies and a complete understanding of the processes to source and transport supplies during a crisis. They need to gain visibility of NGO HA/DR activities and inventories involved. They also need to implement processes that will identify all HA/DR materiel that transits to the affected nation via the Defense Transportation System, regardless of source.

Implication.

If a strategic framework for international/foreign disaster relief is not established, and if logistics planning, coordination, and collaboration are not continuously practiced and improved, then the timeliness and the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's response may be less than optimal for future HA/DR operations.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "[Logistics Planning and Collaboration in Complex Relief Operations](#)," by Steven J. Romano, JFQ, issue 62, 3rd qtr 2011.

Comments.

1. Related SOLLIMS lessons which recommend that the USG establish a formal framework for international/foreign disaster relief operations are:

- "[Whole of International Community for Foreign Disaster Relief](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 700, 7 April 2011
- "[Radiological Hazards during Disaster Response Operations - TOMODACHI](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 941, 15 January 2013

2. Additional SOLLIMS lessons that discuss information-sharing requirements for HA/DR operations are:

- "[Haiti Earthquake Response - Information Collection, Sharing, and Management](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 681, 25 October 2010
- "[Information Sharing on Operation Tomodachi](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 860, 27 June 2012

3. A related report that summarizes USG humanitarian assistance to Georgia in 2008, as well as NGO involvement, is "[Georgia – Complex Emergency](#)," USAID Fact Sheet #19, 30 September 2008.



3. CONCLUSION

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance can be critical to saving lives and and relieving/reducing human suffering within an affected host nation in the aftermath of disaster or conflict. In providing assistance, it is imperative that contributing players – i.e., US Government civilian and military organizations, multinational partners, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and host nation government agencies – gain an awareness of each other’s capabilities and contributions early on, and that they cooperate/collaborate during both planning and execution.

The following is a summary of key considerations and guidelines for senior military leaders and staffs to take into account during planning and execution of major Foreign Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief operations:

Planning

- **The GCC (or its “lead” service/organization) should:**
 - **Initiate a Situational Awareness Group (SAG) at the earliest point after identification of a superstorm/typhoon heading towards an area of concern for U.S. disaster relief (e.g., Republic of the Philippines), and establish an Operational Planning Team (OPT) at least 24 hours prior to landfall to help expedite mission analysis and course of action (COA) selection.**
 - **Include interagency advisors (i.e., State Department, USAID/ OFDA) in all stages of planning.**
 - **Conduct a Public Affairs estimate early in the planning cycle, including an analysis of the media landscape.**
 - **Gain awareness of the various intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations involved in providing humanitarian assistance within the host nation.**
 - **Review availability of SOF assets/capabilities for FHA/DR support, particularly for reaching areas with limited access and potentially having stranded/isolated populations.**
 - **Develop and utilize a checklist to determine capabilities of airfields in the area of interest. This checklist can be used to tailor the U.S. footprints for the airfields needed/selected.**
 - **Anticipate requirements for assisting the host nation with internally displaced persons (IDPs) (e.g., relocation/transportation). Partner with USAID/OFDA to develop COAs as needed.**

Command and Control

- For short-term Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) operations (perhaps 30 days or less), the GCC should assign military "lead" (in support of USAID/OFDA) to a Service Component Command that can quickly deploy a subordinate organization (HQ/staff) to the contingency area. The GCC should provide this "lead" organization with appropriate enablers [(e.g., Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC))] and with robust communication capabilities.
- For long-term FHA/DR operations [months-long duration, such as the case of Operation United Assistance (Ebola relief in West Africa)], the GCC should activate and assign military "lead" to a JTF (in support of USAID/OFDA). Planning timelines should account for the days required to man and equip the JTF, establish an initial footprint, and gain full operational capability. Again, the GCC should provide this "lead" organization with appropriate enablers (e.g., DJTFAC) and with robust communication capabilities.
- The designated military "lead" should rapidly deploy its advanced echelon (ADVON) to: establish a presence in the host nation (HN), link up with USAID/OFDA, immediately identify and involve U.S. military assets in proximity, incorporate assessment reports into a Common Operating Picture (COP), and partner with HN military and civil authorities.
- The designated military "lead" should assign a liaison officer to USAID/OFDA's coordination center.

Information Management / Sharing

- The GCC (or its "lead" service/organization) should:
 - Establish reporting procedures in order to efficiently identify (and confirm) which service components will be able to fulfill the various requirements generated by USAID/OFDA. Ensure that the USAID/OFDA Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) is accessible and can handle high volume of use by all USG constituents.
 - Designate a single portal site where the US military, other USG actors, intergovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and NGOs can work together in a collaborative, unclassified environment.

- **Establish and maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP); maximize sharing of the COP with other stakeholders.**
- **Standardize use of open source geo-tagging in the COP. [Note: Geo-tagging is the process of adding geographical information to media/photos in the form of metadata, such as latitude/longitude, bearing, distance, place names, etc.]**
- **Establish and promulgate an Information Management SOP at the outset of FHA/DR operations, so that all participants know the procedures for posting and sharing information on the designated portal site.**
- **Establish streamlined procedures early for foreign disclosure, so that classified/sensitive information can be more readily shared with foreign partners, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs engaged in the FHA/DR mission.**
- **For any classified/sensitive information that cannot be declassified and shared on the designated unclassified portal site, establish mechanisms for transferring requisite data between U.S. and foreign partner classified information systems.**

Logistics

- **The logistics staff of the Global Combatant Command (GCC) should:**
 - **Coordinate with elements of the Joint Logistics Enterprise early on to "set the theater" and establish a network of deployment/distribution nodes, warehousing capacity, operational contract oversight, and mobility staff experts to facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of the equipment, supplies, and personnel required to support operations.**
 - **Establish an Operational Contract Support Integration Cell to synchronize, coordinate, and contract for common contract support in the Joint Operating Area.**
 - **Conduct a Joint logistics synchronization session on a daily basis to ensure information-sharing, cross-talk, and coordination among all logistics stakeholders.**
 - **Gain and maintain visibility on all humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief materiel that transits to the affected nation via the Defense Transportation System, regardless of source.**

Public Affairs

- **Conduct a Public Affairs estimate early in the planning cycle, including an analysis of the media landscape.**
- **Set up a Joint Information Center (JIC) or similar single source of authoritative information.**
- **Public Affairs teams / leaders from the State Department, USAID, and DoD [i.e., the GCC's lead Service Component Command or Joint Task Force (JTF)] should consider conducting media interviews together. This would allow the limited number of Public Affairs professionals on the ground to leverage one another's capabilities, enable the combined team to field questions according to areas of expertise, and portray a "whole of government" approach to the audience.**
- **The GCC and its designated lead Service Component Command should coordinate for "enablers" to support the Public Affairs effort, such as a Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) and Public Affairs Detachment (PAD) [or Mobile PAD (MPAD)].**
- **The rear detachment of the lead Service Component Command should support the forward element with a daily report that tracks the status of: the media environment, Public Affairs operations/ actions, product development, product clearance (for release), and product dissemination.**

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons, through their inclusion in training events and leader education programs, and through senior leader emphasis, significant impacts can be made during the course of future Foreign Humanitarian Assistance operations – to the benefit of all involved in the mission, especially the people of the host nation.


4. COMMAND POC

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Related Documents, References, and Links

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

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- [“The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders,”](#) RAND, 16 October 2013

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 - [“Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: Publications”](#) [OCHA subpage]
- [“USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance \(USAID/OFDA\)”](#)
- [“US Army Humanitarian Relief”](#)



ROXAS CITY, Philippines (July 23, 2015). Filipino first responders, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, a U.S. Navy surgeon, and a Korean surgeon remove a simulated crash victim from a vehicle. The training was part of a weeklong humanitarian assistance disaster relief symposium held in conjunction with the hospital ship USNS Mercy’s visit to the Philippines for Pacific Partnership 2015. Pacific Partnership is the largest annual multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. (Photo by Chief Petty Officer Christopher)

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Annex A

Top Ten Observations from Operation Unified Response (2010 Haiti Earthquake Relief)

- 1) Respond quickly and effectively.
- 2) Protect the people always.
- 3) Build partnerships with key players.
- 4) Coordinate and collaborate to achieve unity of effort.
- 5) Communicate – Communicate – Communicate.
- 6) Support the lead federal agency within clearly defined roles.
- 7) Pull from all available resources to form the Joint Task Force.
- 8) Include the Host Nation Government as much as possible.
- 9) Work closely with the UN humanitarian community.
- 10) Anticipate challenges with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).



Source: “LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response,”
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Annex B

Top Lessons Learned from Operation Tomodachi (2011 Japan Earthquake/Tsunami Relief)

U.S. Forces Japan:

- 1) Bilateral training and exercises prepare forces to work together effectively in disaster response.
- 2) Bilateral information and intelligence sharing are essential to relief efforts.
- 3) A Common Operating Picture (COP) should be established for use by all stakeholders.
- 4) The U.S. military must continue to prepare to support HA/DR operations.
- 5) Host nation preparedness is the best way to avert greater catastrophe.

U.S. Pacific Fleet/Joint Task Force-519:

- 1) Standard tools and guidance for operating in radiologically contaminated environments should be developed for use in future disasters.
- 2) The United States needs a formal framework for coordination of federal agencies in support of international disaster response operations.
- 3) Access to shared information among all partners is critical in responding to a complex disaster.
- 4) Strong bilateral relations facilitate smooth central coordination in times of emergency.
- 5) JTF-519's organization and practices were adaptable to support complex contingency operations.



Source: "Operation Tomodachi: Lessons learned in the U.S. military's support to Japan," by CFE-DMHA staff in collaboration with U.S. Forces Japan and the Center for Naval Analyses, in "LIAISON: Civil-Military Lessons Learned in the Response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake," CFE-DMHA, 16 October 2012

Annex C

Top Lessons Learned from Operation Damayan (2013 Philippines Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda Relief)

- 1) Immediate request for assistance (by the Philippine government) and forward deployed (US) assets saved lives.
- 2) Centralized planning & decentralized execution facilitated coordination.
- 3) Direct planning to ensure Command and Control is part of Course of Action (COA) analysis.
- 4) Establishment of the International Coordination Team (ICT) synchronized effective international support through all phases of USPACOM operations.
- 5) Preplanned scalable force packages optimize HA/DR support.
- 6) Other tactical considerations:
 - Coordination and correspondence during an FHA response should be unclassified as much as possible to maximize information sharing.
 - Ensure communications are in place prior to major transition. Prioritize the deployment of equipment as necessary to ensure sufficient communication capability is available to support anticipated growth of command and control requirements.
 - Ensure that the J5 (Plans Directorate) rapidly establishes Joint Planning Groups (JPG) at the onset of operations in order to ensure timely return to Phase 0 (“Shape”).
 - An assessment framework needs to be extant at the onset of FHA operations.
 - Ensure proper process to determine/confirm DoD support for valid requirements by the lead federal agency USAID/OFDA. Ensure that the OFDA Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) is accessible and can handle the high volume of use from all constituents.
 - Include interagency advisors throughout planning and execution, initiate the Situational Awareness Group (SAG) at the earliest point after identification of a major storm system, and establish the Operational Planning Team (OPT) at least 24 hours prior to landfall for greater mission analysis.
 - Units and organizations must identify stakeholders and LNO locations at the onset of crisis. LNOs should be emplaced immediately to ensure situational awareness, coordinate operations, and ensure mutual support.
 - Develop a simple checklist to determine the capabilities of airfields in the affected area and to calibrate the appropriate US footprint required.

Source: "[An Inside Look into USPACOM Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan](#)," by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas "Whit" Parker, Major Sean P. Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Lieutenant Colonel Jason E. King, and Dr. Imes Chiu, CFE-DMHA, February 2015

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