

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

*Investing in Training for, and during,  
Peace and Stability Operations*

Volume 7, Issue 2

June 2016



**PKSOI**



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Approved for Public Release,  
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**U.S. ARMY**



**STRENGTH  
and WISDOM**

## FOREWORD

Welcome to the June 2016 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations.**

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lessons Learned Report](#), and (4) links to [additional reports and other references](#) that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [ <http://pksoi.army.mil> ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ <https://sollims.pksoi.org> ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



**Sentul, Indonesia (26 August 2014). U.S. Army Sergeant Challis Santos provides medical training to Nepalese service members during Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Capstone Training Event “Garuda Canti Dharma” 2014 at the Indonesia Peace and Security Center in Sentul, Indonesia. “Garuda Canti Dharma,” meaning “Indonesia Service for Peace,” is an Indonesian National Defense Force training event supported by the U.S. Pacific Command’s GPOI Program. Training events such as this contribute to regional peacekeeping training capacity and strengthen multinational cooperation. (Photo by Staff Sergeant Ryan Sheldon.)**

## INTRODUCTION

This SOLLIMS Sampler spotlights the criticality of **Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations**. Along with a selection of thought-provoking lessons, this Sampler provides an extensive list of **references/documents/links** (see [pages 41-42](#)) that can serve as a “toolkit” for trainers, planners, and practitioners. Among the many resources, you’ll find the following:

- [“A Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation,”](#) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (UN DPKO/DFS), 18 August 2015
- [“Guidelines: Design, Delivery and Evaluation of Training \(Training Cycle\),”](#) UN DPKO/DFS, 1 August 2014
- [“Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report - 2012-2013,”](#) UN DPKO/DFS, 1 July 2013
- [“Conflict Trends 2015/2 – 20 Years of Training for Peace \(TfP\): Building Peace Operations Capacity in Africa,”](#) ACCORD, 13 July 2015
- [“Peace and Stability Journal, Volume 5, Issue 4 – 2015 Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop,”](#) PKSOI, July 2015

The abovementioned “Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment” succinctly points out the need for the international community to invest in training:

***The nature of UN peacekeeping is continuously evolving as peacekeeping operations are mandated to perform an ever-growing range of activities. Given the dynamic nature of peacekeeping and the unique challenges that peacekeeping personnel face on an everyday basis, there is a need to ensure that they are adequately equipped with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to perform their duties. Peacekeeping training is a strategic investment that enables UN military, police and civilian staff to effectively implement increasingly multifaceted mandates.***

This imperative – investment in training – is not solely for the UN. Nor is this imperative limited to just “peacekeeping operations.” Multiple recent and ongoing “stability operations” – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, the African Union Mission in Somalia, etc. – have borne out the need for military & civilian agencies to heavily invest in training their personnel, both pre-deployment and throughout deployment. Moreover, these “stability operations” have attested to the requirement for multinational forces, government agencies, inter-governmental organizations, regional organizations, and NGOs to likewise heavily invest in training host nation (HN) personnel – to build HN capacity for long-term stabilization.

The lesson report that follows provides further insights on this critical topic.

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## "QUICK LOOK" (Preview of the Lessons)

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- The U.S. establishment of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in 2005 has contributed significantly to providing trained peacekeepers to support peacekeeping operations around the world. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Brazil's peacekeeping training center has effectively prepared Brazil's contingents for deployment to Haiti by (1) teaching courses that were focused on the key tasks/actions that the unit and its staff were expected to execute in Haiti, and (2) continuously incorporating lessons learned from forces on the ground. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The U.S. Army remains at risk of growing the next generation of leaders (both officers and NCOs) that do not understand the complexity of stability operations, risking re-learning the mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan again. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was a "game-changer" in building security capacity in Afghanistan, making huge strides in comparison to previous efforts/programs. However, although noteworthy progress has been made in developing Afghanistan's security forces, significant challenges remain. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- During 2007-2008, the Iraqi Security Forces underwent rapid growth in size and improved its operational capability due to partnering with the U.S. and reforming its Ministries of Interior and Defense. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The critical Stability Operations sector of "justice and reconciliation," specifically as it applies to Rule-of-Law training to Afghans, was slow to materialize in OEF and initially ineffective in 2006 under the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) contract for the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL). Rule-of-Law training and programs are essential to Stability Operations and must be equally implemented with other Stability Operations sectors... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agricultural advisors deployed to Afghanistan have made numerous short-term impacts on host nation agricultural development, but they have been handicapped in their duties by a number of factors. Although aiming toward longer-term reconstruction effects, USDA agricultural advisors have not made greater progress in this regard due to shortfalls in funding, training, personnel transitions, and assessment frameworks. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Following a period of increased instability, there is a tendency for an elite portion of a failed nation's population to disperse due to concerns of safety amid shifting political realities...The process of training and rebuilding a professional workforce capable of taking over key institutions, drawing from an unskilled indigenous population, is arduous and takes time. Solving this complicated problem is fundamental to establishing success during a stability operation despite the international pressure to reach goals quickly. [\[Read More ...\]](#)

## **SUBJECT: Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations**

### **1. GENERAL**

Perhaps the greatest “enabler” for successful peace and stability operations is Training. It is absolutely imperative that contingents, teams, and individuals designated for deployment to complex environments are properly trained on the spectrum of peace/stability tasks required to accomplish the mission/mandate – and that host nation personnel assuming new roles and responsibilities for their fragile nation/government in the aftermath of conflict/instability are likewise comprehensively trained to accomplish their new duties. The following selection of lessons attests to this imperative.

### **2. LESSONS**

#### **a. TOPIC. Global Peace Operations Initiative ( [1594](#) )**

##### **Observation.**

The U.S. establishment of the [Global Peace Operations Initiative \(GPOI\)](#) in 2005 has contributed significantly to providing trained peacekeepers to support peacekeeping operations around the world. The GPOI has also created an enduring "train the trainer" capability that will continue to provide a steady stream of peacekeepers to support peacekeeping operations in the future.

##### **Discussion.**

Adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) launched in 2005 was the U.S. contribution to the G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations. It was established to work with countries to build their capacity for engagement in peacekeeping operations outside of their own borders. There are 66 partner countries and three regional organizations. GPOI is U.S. State Department funded and its annual budget was \$68 million for 2015.

GPOI objectives include building partner countries' capacity for training peacekeepers to operate in peace operations, thereby enhancing and building the capacities of the United Nations and regional organizations. GPOI initially trained peacekeepers to participate in peacekeeping operations and later transitioned to a "train the trainer" concept, building other countries' capacity to train peacekeepers.

Currently, most of GPOI's efforts focus on developing military peacekeepers for operations in Africa, which is home to the majority of peacekeeping operations in the world today. The level of participation and types of activities vary widely from country to country. Most efforts are managed through the U.S. Combatant Commanders. GPOI also works in close coordination with the country team at the U.S. Embassy of each of the participating countries. GPOI is not designed to support a specific mission. Rather, it is intended to build a host nation's peacekeeping capacity that it can contribute to peacekeeping operations. Diplomatically, the United States encourages the host nations to put their capacity to use by working with the United Nations to identify opportunities to best apply their capabilities.

GPOI efforts include supporting the development of critical enabling capabilities, including airlift, engineering, logistical, and medical support. For example, El Salvador supported the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by supplying helicopters, pilots and support crews. GPOI facilitated the effort by providing spare parts and equipment required for operating in a desert environment.

GPOI also works to promote the role of women and enhance gender integration in peacekeeping operations. In addition to training female peacekeepers, it supports efforts to build Formed Police Units (FPU) through the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU).

Approximately 290,000 peacekeepers were trained as of the end of 2014. Currently, there are approximately 130,000 people serving in the field across 16 peacekeeping operations. Nepal is a top troop contributing country. Nepal has a goal to train and deploy up to 10,000 personnel per year and is increasing its training capacity from three to five training battalions at the Birenda Peace Operations Training Center (BPOTC). GPOI's efforts to produce peacekeepers has significantly increased the resources available to support United Nations and regional peacekeeping operations around the globe.

### **Recommendation.**

The U.S. should continue to lead in the areas of peacekeeping and stability operations. The U.S. should continue to support the UN with funding and leadership and continue to support efforts that contribute to global stability, to include the Global Peace Operations Initiative.



## **Implications.**

The world continues to be a dangerous place with numerous examples of instability. The U.S. has been a stabilizing force in the world through its leadership on the world stage, through its military operations, and by support to peacekeeping operations through funding to the U.N. and initiatives including the GPOI. If the U.S. reduces its international leadership and support to peacekeeping operations, the likely result is a less stable world.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on information received during a USAWC Peace and Stability Operations class trip to visit the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. State Department, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 24-25 March 2015.

Lesson Contributor: Colonel Ben Jones, US Army



## **b. TOPIC. Training Brazilian Contingents for Haiti Peacekeeping Missions ( [2431](#) )**

### **Observation.**

Brazil's peacekeeping training center has effectively prepared Brazil's contingents for deployment to Haiti by (1) teaching courses that were focused on the key tasks/actions that the unit and its staff were expected to execute in Haiti, and (2) continuously incorporating lessons learned from forces on the ground.

### **Discussion.**

In 2005 Brazil established the Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CIOpPaz) – primarily to support preparation of Brazilian Army troops for participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In the preceding year, Brazil had committed troops to MINUSTAH, but lacked an adequate training system for this type of mission – having only archives of procedures for peacekeeping deployments from the 1990s when it sent contingents to Angola. The MINUSTAH mandate was far different – as it allowed the military component to employ the use of force (including lethal force) for self-defense as well as to implement the stabilization tasks of the mission. As CIOpPaz developed its training program, it took into consideration the analysis conducted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) which indicated an adverse presence of groups that would probably offer

armed resistance to the UN military troops. Those groups consisted of (1) supporters of the former president and (2) urban gangs. In fact, the initial Brazilian Brigade Haiti that deployed in 2004 found itself frequently (sometimes daily/nightly) confronting the urban/armed gangs.

Information received from the Brazilian Brigade Haiti (and its battalions) included reports on complex urban operations, robust and intense patrolling, cordon and search operations, and various other operations and tasks – information that was essential for informing the training/instructors at the newly created training center, CIOpPaz. Based upon this information, specific courses were created especially for junior leaders (such as lieutenants and sergeants), but also for company commanders, battalion commanders, and staff officers. In these courses of instruction, the conditions/scenarios for Haiti were explicitly spelled out, and the personnel undergoing the training were taught to fully understand the mandate’s tasks, identify risks, and make and implement appropriate decisions. In the 2005-2007 timeframe, focus areas for training included Rules of Engagement, marksmanship, urban combat, leadership, and engagements with civilian actors – to include engagements involving initial contact, liaison, public information, and conflict resolution. Additionally, lessons learned from the field were incorporated back into the training and doctrine (tasks, techniques, and procedures) – especially in the areas of strategic communication, operations, intelligence, logistics, civil-military coordination, and legal actions. In 2008, when “policing” tasks became prevalent for MINSUSTAH, the training center (CIOpPaz) adjusted its curriculum to cover temporary detention of individuals, prison mandates/tasks, overt policing, riot control, and other policing/security tasks. Then, after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the training center quickly incorporated tasks, techniques, and procedures for burials, protection of displaced persons, provision and execution of security at food/water distribution sites, and various civil-military coordination activities. Later in 2010, CIOpPaz was transformed and renamed the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). Due to the growing volume of tasks/actions foreseen for the first Brazilian contingent to deploy to Haiti post-earthquake, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense decided to establish a Joint Training Center to coordinate the preparation/training of the various personnel (Army, Navy, Air Force, police, and civilian) slated for deployment with MINUSTAH.

CCOPAB’s system of peacekeeping training evolved over the next several years into a system whereby battalion commanders, their staffs, company commanders, and platoon-level leaders (Army, Navy, and Air Force) received generic training related to the UN and specific training related to MINUSTAH at CCOPAB, and they then returned to their organizations to train their subordinates. The training methodology at CCOPAB includes workgroups, command post exercises, and leadership exercises. CCOPAB also provides a series of specialized courses for battalion staff personnel on certain key functions to be performed in Haiti, such as logistics & reimbursement, civil-military coordination, and working with translators and interpreters. In the final phase of

training, the entire battalion participates in an exercise and is evaluated by CCOPAB. This training model is both systemic and flexible – systemic through working with distinct training audiences in a progressive manner, and flexible through adapting to any changes in the mission and operational environment in Haiti and incorporating lessons learned. In fact, the CCOPAB training system includes visits to Haiti, interviews, analysis of reports from units deployed to Haiti, and evaluations of CCOPAB courses of instruction – making adjustments to courses as necessary, and ensuring that the institution is always updated in relation to the everyday work of the mission/contingent. Courses of instruction emphasize targeting/reaching the training audiences/leadership/staffs, training objectives, and performance standards. Confirmation of the quality and methodology used by CCOPAB has been documented in [multiple training certifications from the UN DPKO](#). [Note: A similar training program with multiple exercises was carried out by CCOPAB to train Brazilian naval units/personnel who took part in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).]

### **Recommendation.**

1. The military Command and the training institute/center responsible for the training/readiness of a contingent identified for deployment on a peacekeeping mission should ensure that peacekeeping training programs/courses are appropriately tailored through: (1) ensuring that mission analysis has identified all key tasks that the unit is required to perform and (2) ensuring that a comprehensive assessment of the operational environment (OE) has been conducted and that appropriate conditions have been factored into the instruction/training tasks. Instructors must be fully cognizant of the OE. Commands and training institutes/centers should arrange for periodic exchanges of information about the OE between individuals in-country and leaders preparing to deploy.
2. The military Command and the military training institute/center should also take steps to ensure that lessons learned by contingents in-country get into the hands of the trainers/instructors for incorporation into their programs of instruction.
3. Training evaluations – to standards – are paramount.

### **Implications.**

If training centers/institutes fail to stay current on the key tasks that a deploying contingent/unit is expected to perform on a peacekeeping mission, and fail to incorporate OE assessments and lessons learned into the training program, then that contingent/unit might end up not performing those key tasks to standard (or even not performing them at all) – thereby creating negative perceptions among the local populace. The contingent/unit might then find itself in a precarious position of having to arrange for some form of in-country training to get personnel

properly trained on the requisite tasks – with the need to accomplish both the training and the mission simultaneously.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the paper “[Training for the Deployed Brazilian Battalion at MINUSTAH: A Model Consolidation](#),” by Colonel José Ricardo Vendramin Nunes, Commander of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center, 14 January 2015.

### **Comments.**

Related references:

- “[Ten Years of MINUSTAH and CCOPAB](#),” by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Carlos Alberto de Moraes Cavalcanti, Doctrine Adviser, CCOPAB, 29 September 2014.
- “[Brazil’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations: The New Defence-Security-Foreign Policy Nexus](#),” by Monica Hirst and Reginaldo Mattar Nasser, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), September 2014.
- Link to CCOPAB: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/index.php/en>

Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI



## **c. TOPIC. Incorporation of Stability Operations into U.S. Army Training and Education ( [1399](#) )**

### **Observation.**

The U.S. Army remains at risk of growing the next generation of leaders (both officers and NCOs) that do not understand the complexity of stability operations, risking re-learning the mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan again.

### **Discussion.**

During a period of military down-sizing, fiscal austerity, and prioritizing budget considerations, the U.S. Army has stated in numerous publications the intention to retain the hard lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan in stability operations. Through current doctrine (Unified Land Operations and Decisive Operations), the

Army has committed to an overly broad mission equally balancing offensive, defensive and stability operations. However, of the three broad mission areas, stability operations are the most complex as they require other than military solutions and integration of interagency, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational forces to achieve unity of purpose during interventions. As resources “dry up,” many of the critical organizations required to cooperate in stability (and peacekeeping) operations, to include Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State, USAID, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, etc., lack the funds and personnel to routinely train below the combatant commander headquarters level on stability operations. In addition, access to NGOs during tactical and operational level training exercises is limited to non-existent. Finally, the Army’s Regional Alignment of Forces effort is designed to maintain limited military-to-military cultural and training familiarity, but has almost exclusively focused on offensive and defensive operations. As the Army continues to down size and substantial numbers of veterans depart, the Army will be forced to learn the complexity of closely integrating and supporting diplomatic, development, and political mechanisms to achieve a long term solution during military interventions. Though the U.S. and DoD have adopted a strategy avoiding long term stability operations, even small scale military interventions (such as Kosovo in 1999, Mali in 2013, and Sudan in 2014) required both operational and tactical level units that understand how security efforts support and fit into the broader considerations of successful peacekeeping and stability operations.

The real lessons, which tactical level units do not routinely train during Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations, focus on how leaders understand that stability operations must be purposed-based – directed toward transforming conflict to prevent resurgence of violence while building legitimate governance. Framing considerations of stability operations is not only resident at the strategy level, but also at the operational and tactical levels. Framing ensures we have good goals and employs a framework to gain common purpose from different actors involved. Tactical level units must see incorporation of different actors providing different solutions as critical enablers to success and not as obstacles impeding security concerns alone. Broadening tactical level training and considerations to include interagency, NGOs, and multinational participation complicates training but better approaches the reality of what U.S. forces can expect to face in the near future.

Existing Army education and training at the lieutenant, captain and major levels lack incorporation of necessary details to completely appreciate stability considerations. The officer’s basic course, officer’s advanced courses, and NCO courses do not incorporate stability doctrine into their programs of instruction. Even the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) treats stability operations as an elective (as does the Army War College), vice critical to the core curriculum. Consequently, unless officers benefit from truly broadening assignments (outside of traditional Army), the reality that stability operations are never fast,

easy or cheap is not appreciated until Army leaders find themselves involved in them. It appears that under fiscal austerity we've adopted a strategy that risks Army leaders not understanding that in stability operations, international consensus and support fades quickly in the pressure to go home. Post war efforts cannot be sustained indefinitely. There is a short period of time to "manage down" the continuing local conflict in stages to local actors so the peace process can be sustainable over time. Army leaders involved in stability operations must understand that equal emphasis on a safe/secure environment, supporting a sustainable economy, supporting sustainable government, the complex details of repairing social well-being, and the nuances of returning rule of law and justice require cultural appreciation and personal/routine relationships with individuals who are not in the military. Again, though this is understood at the senior leader level (O6 and above), these details and considerations are rapidly withering at the O5 and below level.

### **Recommendation.**

1. The War College should NOT be the first time Army leaders are exposed in detail to the complexity and considerations of peacekeeping and stability operations. The strategic level is not the only level in which a fundamental understanding of approaches to solutions in stability operations is made. The War College must include adequate coverage of peacekeeping and stability operations in the core curriculum for theater cooperative strategy and joint military operations. As well, CGSC must include peacekeeping and stability operations in the core curriculum and not exclusively focus on joint employment in theater operations.

2. In addition, tactical level officer and NCO education must review, at a minimum, Army doctrine covering stability operations. Even this minimal incorporation of stability operations into the officer basic/advanced courses and NCO education course fails to adequately cover stability operations, as fewer (and even existing) instructors lack experience or familiarity in how other agencies operate or considerations when dealing with NGOs. Though offense and defense employment must be mastered in tactical level education and training, we risk returning to the steep learning curve experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan by denying tactical level introduction, study, and discussion on achieving other than military solutions in modern conflicts.

### **Implications.**

The U.S. Army risks tactical and operational level failure by returning to an almost exclusive focus on offensive and defensive training in officer/NCO education as well as CTC rotations. The failure to rapidly adjust at the tactical level from Phase III to Phase IV in OIF 1 is an example of a mistake we will repeat again if our education and training is not current and appropriate and our doctrine is not socialized during junior officer and NCO education opportunities.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson has been developed for PKSOI elective course PS2219b, Peace & Stability Operations - Concepts & Principles, based upon readings and personal experiences.

Lesson Contributor: Colonel Robert Molinari, US Army



## **d. TOPIC. Building Afghan Security Capacity through NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan ( [2419](#) )**

### **Observation.**

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was a “game-changer” in building security capacity in Afghanistan, making huge strides in comparison to previous efforts/programs. However, although noteworthy progress has been made in developing Afghanistan’s security forces, significant challenges remain.

### **Discussion.**

On 21 November 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established a new command, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The purpose of this new command was to coordinate and synchronize the multi-national efforts to raise, equip, train, and sustain Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). NTM-A was a subordinate command to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), also established by NATO. [Of note, the NTM-A Commander (LTG William B. Caldwell, IV) also commanded the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which was charged with planning, programming, and implementing reforms of Afghan security forces in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). At its peak structure, CSTC-A/NTM-A was an 8,000 member advisor/mentor, combat theater forward-deployed strategic command. In November 2013, NTM-A and CSTC-A disaggregated, allowing each organization to focus on its unique mission set. When NATO established the NTM-A in 2009, it also established another 3-star command, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), responsible for “fighting the fight” and for mentoring fielded Afghan forces. IJC was disestablished in December 2014.]

NTM-A’s focus areas were: recruit and grow the Afghan security force, increase the quality of the force, and build the foundation to professionalize the force, while developing the systems to sustain it so that it would become an enduring and a self-sustaining force. In order to do this, NTM-A had to design, contract, and oversee construction of facilities and bases for the ANSF across the country.

NTM-A's collective efforts included, but were not limited to building, organizing and developing a military education system; a complete logistics system including all types of supplies from uniforms, food, maintenance, and billeting; and, the associated administrative systems. In addition, NTM-A had to develop a supporting military medical system.

Some of the issues that complicated this mission and required attention, per [“Statement of LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, for Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 12 September 2012,”](#) included:

- 86% illiteracy rate – required teaching recruits and officers basic reading skills
- 18 years of conflict – led to a hoarding and survival mentality on the part of many Afghans
- Focus on quantity over quality in recruiting and training – resulted in retraining
- Afghan National Army negative growth – resulted in creating a recruiting command
- Leadership shortfalls and challenges – led to creation of multiple schools and courses (Officer/NCO schools)
- Minimal oversight and accountability – required top to bottom review of inventory processes and the inculcation of an ethos of stewardship
- Struggling sustainment – required creation of a logistics system from the national level to local/unit level distribution
- High attrition – required extensive improvements to all soldier support systems, including the recruiting system
- Lack of a manufacturing base – had to create and develop local suppliers; created the Afghan First program to build indigenous manufacturing for ANSF uniforms, boots, etc.
- Substandard pay – required constant dialogue with Afghan leadership to increase pay in all ranks to become a “living wage” to reduce opportunities for corrupt behavior
- Endemic corruption – mandated leadership changes, review of ethical standards
- Tribal tensions – presented unique assignment challenges
- Substandard equipment – required immediate procurement, acquisition and maintenance efforts, to include a mindset change of replacement to one of repair
- Inadequate standards to evaluate training and operations (e.g., 35% weapons qualification rate) – required creation and enforcement of standards
- Numerous language barriers among Afghans themselves and NATO personnel – complicated training

Besides working to address the challenges in the security forces, NTM-A simultaneously had to address the development of the Ministries of Defense and Interior



to provide civilian leadership and oversight of the Army, Air Force, and Police forces.

Prior to 2009 and the establishment of NTM-A, the task of building the Afghan National Army (ANA) was headed by the U.S.-led Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), which launched an initial program to train a 1,800 strong brigade. OMC-A was later reorganized into the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A) when it assumed the additional mission of training the Afghan National Police (ANP). In 2005 it was reorganized again and named the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and made responsible for manning, equipping and training both the ANA and ANP. But although the U.S. provided more than \$10 billion to develop the ANA between 2002 and 2008, this considerable investment failed to achieve the desired results because of chronic shortfalls in training personnel, faulty equipment, slow infrastructure development, poor logistics, and crippling army attrition rates. An analysis by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in January 2009 revealed that Afghan security forces were unable to account for thousands of weapons donated to the army over a period of eight years. (Source: [“The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan: A Game-Changer; Lest We Forget,”](#) by Nick Barley, Small Wars Journal, 5 Dec 2015.)

The ANA force structure was initially organized as an infantry-centric force that was dependent on NATO Coalition support to provide fires, intelligence & surveillance support, route clearance, combat & construction engineering, and other critical enablers. Once the infantry “kandaks” (battalions) had been generated, 12 branch and vocational schools were established between 2010 and 2011 that specialized in engineering, artillery, logistics, maintenance, and professional development.

The ANA force structure was initially a conventional force that was divided into six corps and one division. The six corps were regionally based and were partnered with NATO Coalition Regional Commands, with a division centered in Kabul. Within each corps were three to four brigades each comprising four infantry kandaks, a combat support kandak, and a combat service support kandak. Each corps also had route clearance companies, military police companies, an engineer kandak, military intelligence companies, a combat logistics kandak, and an attached commando kandak.

Prior to NTM-A, equipment deliveries to the ANA were disjointed and ad hoc. ANA units that did not receive new weapons had to use refurbished Warsaw Pact weapons drawn from demobilized militias. With the establishment of NTM-A, however, NATO (and predominantly the U.S.) began equipping the entire ANSF with new NATO-grade equipment. An overarching purpose for the equipping effort was articulated by the NTM-A Commander as follows: “significant investment has been made to consciously provide the army, air forces and police with capable, affordable and sustainable weapons, vehicles, equipment

and infrastructure.” Between November 2009 and August 2011, NTM-A issued 56,859 weapons, 10,700 vehicles and 70,262 communications assets – the equivalent to 64 new kandaks worth of equipment. However, although the ANSF was now being well equipped, the ANSF logistics capabilities were insufficient to support/maintain this new array of equipment across the force structure. The U.S. DoD Inspector General’s Office reported in June 2010 that “...the ANSF logistics systems that support the ANA and ANP remain institutionally immature and insufficiently effective.” (Barley article, SWJ, 5 Dec 2015)

Over the 2002-2008 timeframe, keeping the Afghan security forces sufficiently manned was problematic for numerous reasons – including low pay, no formalized leave plan, the fact that many Afghan soldiers assigned to units in the south spent the majority of their 3-year tours on the front line with little or no relief, and continuous desertions. In 2009, recognizing that “the ANA and ANP were experiencing negative growth due to premature attrition,” the Commander of NTM-A attempted to address this “through better training and pay, predictable rotation policies, and better leadership.” Soldiers’ pay was raised from \$70 a month to \$165. Also, an additional bonus of \$2.50 per day was given to soldiers located in the 14 provinces designated as high threat areas. This had positive effects, significantly improving the attrition rate.

As NTM-A force generated, trained, equipped, mentored and professionalized the ANSF, three functional and complimentary components emerged with regard to developing the ANSF: (1) the institutional Training component – which involved training the Afghans both individually and collectively, and which also included training the Afghan trainers to train themselves; (2) the U.S Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) who would physically embed into an Afghan kandak and train, advise, mentor, and enable; and, (3) “Partnership at every level.” Taken together, these three complimentary components became part of a Transition Process (see “[International Security Assistance Force Joint Command 2014: The Year of Change](#),” Military Review, Jan-Feb 2015) which would lead to the ANSF being able to take over security responsibilities and enable the Coalition’s exit strategy. NTM-A effectively force generated and developed the ANSF, while IJC contributed to the operationalization of the ANSF with ETTs and Partnering.

With regard to the institutional Training component [(1) above], which was managed by NTM-A, at any one time there were 30,000 Afghans conducting training at 70 sites across the 21 provinces of Afghanistan, and there were around 2,000 Coalition advisors assisting in this training. When Afghan recruits began their training, they attended a 9-week “Basic Warrior” course at the Kabul Military Training Center or a Regional Military Training Centre (RMTTC). Upon completion, some deployed directly to their regional corps to backfill infantry kandaks that required additional manpower, while others continued branch/specialty training at one of the branch schools. Most of the “Basic Warriors” and branch specialty graduates would then attend the Consolidated Fielding Centre (CFC) based in Kabul – which fielded newly formed kandaks to their assigned

corps. CFC training focused on “survival training” which included vehicle convoy drills, casualty handling, and reaction to improvised explosive devices and ambushes. Once the newly formed kandaks deployed from CFC, further mentoring and training assistance would continue. To assist/train/mentor them in conducting maneuver operations, patrolling, operating checkpoints, etc., ISAF (IJC) deployed ETTs and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). Also of note, under NTM-A, training/educational institutions such as the National Military Academy of Afghanistan, the Combined Sergeant Majors Course, and the Non-Commissioned Officer Leader Development Course were established and made part of a broader institution called the Afghan National Security University.

Unfortunately, manpower in the NTM-A training staff was insufficient for the myriad tasks. Two years into the program, DoD reported: “The manning resources necessary to develop the ANSF are identified in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document used to identify the forces required to execute the campaign plan. Shortfalls in the institutional trainer requirements set forth in the CJSOR still exist and continue to impede the growth and development of the ANSF.” In October 2011, 1,816 trainers were in-place against the total requirement of 2,778 trainers, with pledges of only 477 additional trainers from NATO nations. Compounding this quantitative shortfall of ISAF trainers was a qualitative shortfall. According to a former Chief of Staff for NTM-A, “very few personnel in NTM-A have recent experience or prior interest in either Afghanistan or ANSF development. Most trainers were detailed from other units that did not specialize in ANSF training.”

In spite of the many challenges, by summer 2013, 3½ years after NTM-A’s establishment, the following had been achieved:

- The Afghan National Army had attained a strength of approximately 183,000. This represented a growth of approximately 86,400 since October 2009.
- The Afghan National Police had attained a strength of approximately 151,000. This represented a growth of approximately 56,800 since October 2009.
- The Afghan Air Force had attained a strength of approximately 6,700. This represented a growth of approximately 2,000 since August 2011.
- Through an increase of Commandos and Special Forces within the ANA, and with the addition of special aviation and elite mobile strike force elements, the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) expanded from a brigade-sized element to the first division-sized special operations force unit in Afghan military history on 16 July 2012.
- In early 2013, the ANSF had begun shouldering the majority of the burden of fighting the insurgency. From October 2012 to February 2013, for example, the ANSF led 87 percent of all conventional operations and 86 percent of special operations, vice ISAF.

- By May 2013, Afghan instructors were training most ANSF personnel, teaching approximately 90% of all classes.
- Over three years' time (May 2010 – May 2013), 194,000 ANSF members had successfully completed Level 1 literacy training, with more than 80,200 achieving Level 2, and 57,100 achieving Level 3.

Although noteworthy progress has been made in building Afghan security capacity [see attached "[Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan \(December 2015\)](#)," the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has pointed out five major challenges hindering further development:

1) Limited Oversight Visibility. With fewer forces in theater, the United States military has lost much of its ability to collect reliable information and data on Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) capability and effectiveness. There are now less than 13,000 U.S. and Coalition troops serving as part of Resolute Support's train, advise, and assist mission. Also, according to SIGAR's latest quarterly report (30 Jan 2016), USFOR-A reported that U.S. advisors have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below the army corps and regional police headquarters level.

2) Questionable Force Strength Numbers. SIGAR's work shows that while the ANDSF's actual strength has approached the goal of 352,000 authorized personnel, it has never been fully achieved. SIGAR's work shows that neither the United States nor its Afghan allies truly know how many Afghan soldiers and police are available for duty, or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities. Associated Press reported ([11 Jan 2016 AP report](#)) that an Afghan official estimated the total ANDSF number at only around 120,000 – far less than the officially reported 322,638 assigned personnel.

3) Unreliable Capability Assessments. In February 2014, SIGAR audited the system used to assess ANDSF capability and found that the assessment tool used to rate the ANDSF was inconsistently applied and not useful. SIGAR found that the rating system's standard operating procedure did not provide clear guidance on the level of detail that was necessary to support a team's rating or what the team's subjective assessments should contain. This unclear guidance led to disparities in the quantity and quality of information across assessments, and to inconsistencies in the evaluations of ANDSF units' capacity to man, train, and equip their forces.

4) Limited On-Budget Assistance Capacity. In a November 2013 review of DoD's safeguards for funds provided to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI), SIGAR identified a number of weaknesses that increased the risk that on-budget funds provided to the ANDSF were particularly vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse. CSTC-A's existing process did not provide its trainers and decision-makers with an understanding of each ministry's financial management capacity, or help them identify risks associ-

ated with capacity weaknesses. SIGAR's work has uncovered several specific cases in which the MOD and MOI were incapable of managing on-budget assistance.

5) Uncertain Long-term Sustainability. In testimony, General John F. Campbell (Resolute Support Mission Commander) said the ANDSF will need to remain at 352,000 at least through 2020. The estimated cost of such a force is \$5.4 billion per year. The Afghan government has not yet been able to make the contribution of \$500 million per year it agreed to at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. This past year the United States contributed \$4.1 billion, and even with U.S. funding of this magnitude, SIGAR's work shows that the ANDSF is unable to sustain itself in many areas. For example, the ANDSF still lacks the air assets they need to protect and support their own forces.

According to SIGAR, these five challenges call into question the capability and effectiveness of the ANDSF – both now and in the future – and raise concerns about efforts to give them the tools and resources they need to fight on their own. According to SIGAR, without strong monitoring and mentoring from U.S. and coalition troops, it is increasingly unlikely the ANSDF will develop into a robust and sustainable force.

### **Recommendation.**

1. When a multinational coalition is involved building/re-building security capacity in a host nation – in partnership with the host nation – the coalition should consider establishing a command to coordinate and synchronize multinational efforts in regard to the equipping, training, and sustaining of host nation security forces. Properly resource that command with sufficient numbers of personnel possessing expertise in training & advising.
2. Teach and enforce accountability of weapons and equipment – upfront and throughout partnering.
3. Emphasize establishment and capacity building of host nation logistics organizations, and ensure that they are able to keep pace with equipping efforts.
4. Ensure appropriate measures are put into place to maximize retention of host nation security personnel (e.g., rotation policies, leave policies, combat/danger pay, etc.).
5. Utilize a comprehensive assessment tool to periodically evaluate the capabilities of host nation security forces. Provide clear guidance for evaluators on use of this tool.

## **Implications.**

Without a single command (adequately resourced) to promote “unity of effort” in building security capacity for a given host nation, and without proper attention to logistics capacity, weapons accountability and personnel systems (i.e., attention through command emphasis, policies, assessment mechanisms, etc.), then multinational efforts will not garner requisite synergies for efficient capacity building, and host nation security force development could become disconnected, delayed, and unduly challenged.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is primarily based on three articles:

1. [“The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan: A Game-Changer; Lest We Forget,”](#) by Nick Barley, Small Wars Journal, 5 December 2015. This article is posted on Small Wars Journal; available via [Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license](#).
2. [“Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces,”](#) statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” 12 February 2016.
3. [“Statement of Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, United States Army,”](#) for Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, 12 September 2012.

## **Comments.**

Related references:

1. [“Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”](#) Department of Defense, December 2015.
2. [“International Security Assistance Force Joint Command 2014: The Year of Change,”](#) by Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, U.S. Army, and Maj. Matthew M. McCreary, U.S. Army, in Military Review, January-February 2015.
3. [“Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”](#) Department of Defense, July 2013.
4. [“ISAF Running List of Talking Points,”](#) ISAF, 29 May 2013.
5. [“The Afghan National Army: Has capacity building become culture building?”](#) by Sergeant First Class Keith W. Norris, U.S. Army, in Military Review, November-December 2012.

6. "The Afghan National Army: Marching in the Wrong Direction?" by Antonio Giustozzi, in "[Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance \(2001–11\)](#)," Afghan Analysts Network, 7 July 2012.
7. "[Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan](#)," Department of Defense, October 2011.
8. "[Return on Investment](#)," by Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, in Armed Forces Journal, 1 August 2011.
9. "[Afghan National Security Forces \(ANSF\)](#)," NATO media backgrounder, 26 October 2010.
10. "[CSTC-A History](#)" page, Resolute Support Mission.

Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI



## **e. TOPIC. Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity [Iraq] ( [502](#) )**

### **Observation.**

During 2007-2008, the Iraqi Security Forces underwent rapid growth in size and improved its operational capability due to partnering with the U.S. and reforming its Ministries of Interior and Defense. Future conflicts will likely arise in failing state and will involve the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency or stability operations. The U.S. Army will have an enduring requirement to build security forces and security ministries.

### **Discussion.**

The United States has long relied on U.S. Special Forces or specially-trained advisors to train security forces of other nations. This is now a core requirement for conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the report "[Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer](#)," the author's [Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)] contention is that this mission is not an aberration but will be an enduring requirement in the future especially with assisting a failing or failed state. LTG Dubik described his organization's [Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)] role as an "indirect approach to transition." MNSTC-I was in the "security business" instead of the

accepted belief that it existed to transition the training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces to Iraqi control.

Key Findings of the report:

- The responsibility for defeating an insurgency lies with U.S. as well as indigenous forces. Passing on an active insurgency to weak indigenous forces is a failing strategy.
  - Training Commands must actively support the efforts of the overall operational commander. MNSTC-I in 2007 generated Iraqi units to fulfill specific needs identified by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno – then the operational commander in Iraq – as he planned his surge campaign and assigned U.S. and Iraqi forces to tasks.
  - MNSTC-I had a direct effect on helping the Iraqis contribute to the counter-offensive, and thus improve the security situation.
  - The end result would ultimately be the indirect effect we all sought: transition of security responsibility to Iraqi control.
- Increasing indigenous security forces reduces but does not eliminate the need for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency conflicts and in the state-building efforts that follow. Policymakers mistakenly equate developing indigenous security forces with an exit strategy from conflict, arguing that as indigenous troops stand up, American forces can "stand-down."
- U.S. efforts to build indigenous security forces can and should stimulate state-building as a whole, providing the impetus and resources for the development of ministries, financial systems, budgeting, contracting, legal development, and other necessary functions of state and industry – as they did in Iraq in 2007-2008.
- Building armies and the institutions that support them takes years. Our transition commands consequently tend to focus on executing long-term development plans. Although such plans are necessary, the transition command must provide a series of achievable, short-term tasks upon which the trainers and advisors can focus attention.
- The perceived trade-off between quality and quantity is a false dichotomy. The U.S. needs to develop indigenous forces that are good enough to fight and defeat specific insurgents in conjunction with U.S. forces. Over time, these forces will have to metamorphose in size and composition ultimately to defend their country against external enemies. These countries will require residual U.S. assets even after the COIN fight, as they acquire these more sophisticated capabilities for national defense. Quantity has a quality of its own.



- Train forces iteratively to increase quality without compromising the availability of forces. Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard is good enough, given the enemy and other key factors of the situation. Once a force, or part of it, meets that standard, it can be raised and continually improved – especially as part of a coherent partnership program.
  - U.S. forces fighting on the ground played a vital role in continuing the training of the Iraqi Army and Police forces. That role included the embedded training teams, the Coalition maneuver units – called "partner units" – who fought side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts, and the contracted civilian police trainer/advisors. The advisors, trainers, and war fighters continuously upgraded Iraqi combat skills, developed their leadership techniques, and improved maintenance and maintenance management procedures.
- Balancing a force between the Army and the Police requires developing each institution at the right time for use at the right stage of the conflict. The relative requirements for Army and Police forces will change over time, as the state develops.
  - Decelerate the growth and fielding of forces that are ill-suited for current or likely future situations on the ground. Police forces – especially beat-cops rather than paramilitary forces – are poorly suited for a COIN mission, as they cannot link to an effective legal system and cannot stand up to enemy forces. Once counter-offensive operations were completed in an area, and sufficient coalition and Iraqi forces were available to hold and build, the construction of police facilities could take place.
- Strong indigenous senior leaders can and must reform broken institutions – when advised, supported, and even criticized by their U.S. partners, who have leverage with them. Security ministries must be strong enough to manage malign or corrupt actors within their ranks through their own internal affairs processes.

#### Conclusions of the report:

- In fragile, failing, or failed states, it may take a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment, in which case the U.S. must prepare to engage in a long-term cooperative security arrangement with the host nation.
- Nations that require security force assistance and security sector reform are likely also to require external funding for these tasks. Foreign contributions are necessary for success and can have a double benefit – by contributing to the growth of state finances as well as security forces.

- Organizations with responsibilities like MNSTC-I have to be staffed with leaders experienced in operating large, institutional organizations and staffed with members able to link their tactical, day-to-day actions to strategic effects. The Army must train its officers and its general officers better to meet these management requirements.

### **Recommendation.**

These recommendations were based on the 'Executing the Program' and 'Reflections' portions of LTG Dubik's report.

**1. Establish a leadership program in the training command.** The senior military and civilian leaders worked together to create a vision and worked to align the organization around that vision. It was important that the senior leadership have a presence at all training locations in the command. The command ensured senior leaders were visible at those locations. It was important that there was constant communication and feedback throughout the command as the Iraqi security forces rapidly grew in strength and capability.

**2. Establish a management program.** The goal was to make sure the command was executing the tasks correctly, on time, and within the budget and the law. This included daily briefs and presentation, quarterly reviews, external audits, and weekly senior leader reviews.

**3. Improve Security by applying enough force to reduce violence to an acceptable level as quickly as possible, and then keep it down.** Often, improving the military comes before police, national police before local police.

**4. Define 'sufficiency.'** Trainers and advisors must know the training standards. Through training standards, training commands set the bar for trainees. Training commands must not set these standards to a level that is too high / unachievable for trainees. Minimal standards may be enough – so that indigenous units are sufficiently capable to operate in combat situations.

**5. Approach quality iteratively.** This is related to sufficiency. Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard might be good enough. Afterwards, the standard can be raised and improved.

**6. Develop Partners.** Developing the security sector requires partners from the tactical to strategic level. These partners include a combat force, the host nation, and other organizations responsible for development of the host nation's governmental capacity. There must be unity of effort, clear lines of responsibility, and leaders who can forego ego to the mission.

**7. Build the enterprise.** Both the security ministries and the security forces have to grow and develop simultaneously. This requires a training command

with a wide range of skills – from tactical, fighting skills to national organizational and procedural skills. The U.S. must prepare to engage long-term, as it may take a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment.

**8. Create balanced forces.** Both the military and police forces must be developed such that their components can support one another. For example, military maneuver elements should have intelligence and logistical components that are capable to support operational components. Police forces should be linked to a judicial or penal system so that there is a synchronous structure.

**9. Plan for the long-term and execute for the near-term.** Developing the security sector is a long-term proposition. However, there must be specific, achievable short-term tasks that trainers and advisors can focus on. The organization that combines short-term tasks with long-term objectives improves the probability of success.

**10. Secure funding.** The training command must be the advocate for resources to support the assisted nation. Growth and development of the security sector cannot happen without outside assistance. There must be a coherent plan with desired outcomes.

### **Implications.**

1. The Iraqi security force will not be a capable force to eventually operate on its own unless it receives sufficient and relevant training and equipment. Support for OEF and OIF make it imperative for the training commands to accelerate training of military and police forces. However, the quality and training standards must be good enough so that military and police forces can either operate on their own or with some assistance from advisors. The long-term goal is to field a robust and capable host nation (HN) security force.

2. Training commands like MNSTC-I enable indigenous forces to grow in size and capability. As these forces mature and become more professional, they will be able to train on their own or take over the business of primary training. Training commands not only enable indigenous forces, but also help to identify and develop potential leaders. Adequate resources for training commands are essential – allowing them to provide good training and equipment to HN forces. Long-term, Iraqi (and Afghan) security forces should be able to have their own baseline and cadre of professionals so that they need less outside assistance.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the report, “[Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer](#),” by U.S. Army LTG (Ret.) James M. Dubik, a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), August 2009. LTG Dubik was

the former commander of the Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 2007 to August 2008.

Lesson Contributor: Jaime Apo, PKSOI



## **f. TOPIC. Rule-of-Law Training in Afghanistan ( [975](#) )**

### **Observation.**

The critical Stability Operations sector of “justice and reconciliation,” specifically as it applies to Rule-of-Law training to Afghans, was slow to materialize in OEF and initially ineffective in 2006 under the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) contract for the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL). Rule-of-Law training and programs are essential to Stability Operations and must be equally implemented with the other Stability Operations sectors to ensure the Afghan populace has faith in the judicial system and the central government. Early analysis of judicial customs, processes, institutions, and population concerns are critical information requirements to prepare Rule-of-Law training and implementation prior to execution during Stability Operations.

### **Discussion.**

The JSSP contract in Afghanistan commenced in 2006 as a DOS-awarded contract to a U.S. government contractor. The contract awardee, PAE Government Services, conducted trial-and-error analysis of the training curriculum and made improvements over the course of several years. As of 2011, DOS considered JSSP to be their "flagship" Rule-of-Law program and the Afghan Rule-of-Law training showed a better understanding of Afghan culture and capacity.

The Afghan judicial structure was notably different from western systems. Defense attorneys were new to the country’s legal process and there was no jury system. Equally critical, there were no true police detectives. The Afghan judicial system had prosecutors acting as detectives to collect case evidence from crime scenes with the police simply assisting in an arresting capacity. This allowed for a single entity in the system to collect, hold, and present all evidence in a court of law. With the prosecutors focused on legal practice and not evidence collection, there were many issues with evidence provided in courts as related to collection methods, maintenance (tampering), and thorough collection.

Within the judicial system there was unfamiliarity with the judicial processes and judicial institutions with corresponding personalities. This slowed the judicial process and negatively impacted cases by not having all the legal entities aligned. INL and PAE incorporated working and training with prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, AND police into the program of instruction (POI). This allowed for police and prosecutor coordination and a better understanding of duties and requirements. Additionally, the POI incorporated mentoring at higher levels of the Afghan judicial system to include the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and policy levels of the Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Having mentors at the highest levels allowed for better coordination and understanding throughout the judicial system and improved relationships with Afghans throughout system.

The training and mentoring approach used the train-the-trainer concept. INL and PAE conducted the POI with Afghan instructor counterparts. Critical to POI success was the addition of the Critical Thinking course and follow-on mentoring of the students upon course completion at their assignments. JSSP also started “in-house” Afghan training teams by assigning an Afghan prosecutor to develop training for judicial centers, investigative police, and prosecutors on a recurring basis outside of JSSP-led courses. This training is now self-sustaining. JSSP focused on “student-centered” learning vice “teacher-centered” learning. This facilitated learning with student and experiential instruction (Adult Learning Theory). The course provided small group facilitation, proven best for Afghans.

JSSP training initially started with a 7-month POI in 2007 and was based on standard legal courses from U.S. schools that basically loaded three years of law school into a very short period. This approach proved to be too much information for the Afghans. Afghans could learn presented material, but could not apply it. In 2008 INL and PAE changed the format of the POI to 4-weeks instruction, followed by 4-weeks mentoring, followed by 3-weeks instruction, and then ending with a 3-week mentorship. This too was found to be too disruptive to the students. With this approach, the students did very well in class, but did not do well on the job. In 2009-10 INL and PAE created an 8-week POI with more class time on subject matters. The new format used a “hands-on” training approach and infused critical thinking AND legal reasoning. These concepts were not taught in Afghan law schools. With this format, students showed actual application of Afghan law, not simply knowing the law. The POI also included a mock trial in which judges, investigators, police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys (men and women) work together in critical thinking reviews of the case and crime scene investigation. Students appeared to know and understand the judicial relationships and what they can expect throughout the judicial process.

Measure of effectiveness of the POI outside of throughput metrics and convictions/release rates are provided in success vignettes:

1) Afghanistan enforced a “running away” law that prescribed if an Afghan woman left her house without her husband’s permission, she would be punished. JSSP instruction showed that NO such law existed; it was simply a tribal custom. There are now less “running away” cases seen in the judicial process due to the Rule-of-Law training and understanding. This is a significant positive move for female rights in Afghanistan as well.

2) A prosecutor in Kabul provided a written indictment in a 2010 narcotics case. A JSSP-trained Afghan defense attorney provided an 8-page law & evidence-based defense statement (rebuttal). This was the first rebuttal for the newly formed Afghan defense attorneys and a substantial move forward in the Afghan judicial process.

3) Colonel Kehestane [Chief of Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Herat 2011]: “We are giving those graduates (JSSP) the toughest cases.” He also stated that “Since Afghan judges started attending JSSP Rule-of-Law classes, the Afghan judges are finding more fault in prosecutors' cases.” This equates to a refined Rule-of-Law and judicial capacity-building.

### **Recommendation.**

1. As with all partner nation training, cultural understanding and adult communication style are critical for learning and implementation. Off-the-shelf POIs need to be quickly adapted to partner nation needs – especially in Rule-of-Law training. Rule-of-Law training should include mentorship at higher levels to provide connectivity throughout the legal continuum. In Afghanistan, and many countries, relationships throughout the Judicial System are often key to success. To further the Rule-of-Law learning experience, JSSP should include more Afghan judges speaking to Afghan law students about what they expect to see in their court room and what they are looking for in a case. JSSP mentors should continue with mentorship post-training to ensure learning is applied and to identify further training needs. Rule-of-Law training needs to sustain the critical thinking and legal reasoning training in the adult learning format.

2. Due to extensive courtroom work for Afghan lawyers, JSSP instructors should be experienced TRIAL lawyers with significant experience. Overseas contracting may attract lawyers out of law school or those who are not trial lawyers. Rule-of-Law training needs trial lawyers who have actually practiced law in a courtroom in front of a judge – the way the Afghans are expected to perform in their judicial system.

3. Afghan Rule-of-Law training needs to include investigators/detectives. This is a new role for Afghans, as the prosecutor also performs in the role of police detective. Need a separation of duties. It would be good to have retired police detectives mentor the Afghan detectives vice having JSSP lawyers instruct the

course. There needs to be a separate investigation and evidence-handling course.

4. JSSP needs to implement a Case Management System (CMS) for the MOJ. This will allow case tracking and closure within the judicial system for accountability and archival.

5. Rule-of-Law training and programs are essential to Afghanistan and other stability operations and must be implemented early and provide for a functioning judicial system. This system affects all the other Stability Operations systems. Early analysis of judicial customs, processes, institutions, and legal challenges and concerns are critical information requirements to prepare Rule-of-Law training and implementation prior to execution during Stability Operations.

### **Implications.**

1. Rule-of-Law training in the Stability Operations sector of “justice and reconciliation” is a critical component to successful Stability Operations.

2. The population will look at the actions of the judicial sector in response to corruption, criminal activity, police misconduct, and other nefarious actions.

3. Success in this training is required early in Stability Operation to support the other Stability Operations sectors.

### **Event Description.**

Author is a National Guard Special Forces officer familiar with military Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions in the Middle East and Africa. From 2009 to 2012, the author served as a program manager and quality assurance manager for PAE Government Services who observed the JSSP contract for PAE Government Services and met with INL and other stakeholders.

Lesson Contributor: Colonel Douglas Paul, US Army



## **g. TOPIC. USDA Agricultural Advisor Work in Afghanistan ( [748](#) )**

### **Observation.**

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agricultural advisors deployed to Afghanistan have made numerous short-term impacts on host nation agricultural

development, but they have been handicapped in their duties by a number of factors. Although aiming toward longer-term reconstruction effects, USDA agricultural advisors have not made greater progress in this regard due to shortfalls in funding, **training**, personnel transitions, and assessment frameworks.

## **Discussion.**

During the 2003-2010 timeframe, the USDA deployed more than 50 agricultural advisors to Afghanistan, working on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These USDA agricultural advisors directly advised Afghan provincial-level agricultural officials. They worked to build Afghan capacity to reestablish markets, provide services to farmers, and achieve host nation agricultural objectives. USDA agricultural advisors planned and implemented agricultural projects for the given province. They also advised the military and PRT leadership on agricultural projects and issues.

Although numerous positive contributions were made by the USDA agricultural advisors, greater longer-term reconstruction effects were not realized, owing in part to shortfalls in **funding, training, personnel transitions, and assessment frameworks**. Where positive impacts were achieved, certain **critical skills, strategies for sustainability, and collaboration with ADTs** were cited as factors for success.

**Funding.** USDA agricultural advisors deployed to Afghanistan had no dedicated funding sources for agricultural projects. To gain funding for agricultural projects within their province, USDA agricultural advisors had to apply for funding through the U.S. military Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) or through USAID's Quick Impact Program (QIP). Beginning in early 2008, agricultural advisors were also able to seek funding from the U.S. National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) in Afghanistan. Overall, most USDA agricultural advisors reported that it was often difficult for them to obtain funding for their projects. Some advisors were unable to receive funding for new agricultural projects, reportedly, because military commanders did not understand/accept the need for the projects. By and large, however, agricultural advisors stated that the lack of their own (USDA) funding source was the primary impediment from undertaking a sufficient number of agricultural projects.

**Training.** USDA agricultural advisors were given four weeks of training prior to deployment to Afghanistan – which included one week each of counter-threat training, Afghan cultural training, a PRT orientation course, and a PRT training exercise at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The latter two weeks/events addressed civil-military and interagency-related subjects. Agricultural advisors also received two days of focused training at USDA headquarters – covering ongoing USDA agricultural activities in Afghanistan, logistics, and administrative issues. According to feedback from agricultural advisors who had completed their deployments to Afghanistan, not enough interagency training had been provided



to them. They felt they were not knowledgeable enough about the interagency effort, and that other PRT members were not aware of agricultural development programs or USDA capabilities.

**Personnel Transitions.** Over the course of the 2003-2010 timeframe, there was a lack of transition/overlap time between USDA agricultural advisors departing Afghanistan and their replacements. In many cases, there were actually gaps of long periods of time from when an advisor departed until his replacement arrived. These gaps often resulted in the termination, or trailing off, of the agricultural projects that had been initiated by the departed advisor. Without sufficient transition/overlap, the newly arrived advisors were often left without relevant information about the area's agricultural situation, without any introduction to key host nation personnel, and without a hand-off/status brief covering the existing agricultural projects. One 2009 advisor reported that a 4-month gap resulted in all previous agricultural projects in his province being lost/terminated. Another advisor commented that the skills taught to local leaders suffered/deteriorated when the replacement advisor was not on board to reinforce them.

**Assessment Frameworks.** Throughout the 2003-2010 timeframe, USDA agricultural advisors did not utilize any certain monitoring & evaluation system to measure the progress of their ongoing projects nor to evaluate project impact. Although advisors routinely submitted reports to USDA with basic information about projects, funds obtained/allocated, and project status, these reports did not provide information regarding the projects' effects on intended beneficiaries – the people and communities of Afghanistan – nor indicators that longer-term development was being facilitated. A simple tool/framework to track & evaluate the progress and effects of the agricultural projects was lacking.

**Critical Skills.** Although USDA agricultural advisors were selected for deployment based on their expertise and knowledge of agricultural subjects, agricultural production, and resource management, most advisors who had completed their deployments to Afghanistan said that such technical skills were actually not the most important skills that they utilized. Instead, they listed various types of interpersonal skills (communication, coordination, networking, facilitation, and flexibility) as being their most utilized skills. Such skills proved to be essential, as they often acted as an unofficial interlocutor between the PRT and the NGOs, among local leaders, and even between the PRT and the ADTs. Such skills were also important for participating in meetings, interacting with USAID and DOS personnel, providing advice to PRT commanders, and obtaining buy-in and funding for their projects from military commanders and USAID reps. Overall, agricultural generalist skills and people skills were determined to be more useful for USDA agricultural advisor duties than specific technical skills.

**Strategies for Sustainability.** "Sustainability" was promulgated as a long-term goal of the USDA's agricultural activities in Afghanistan over the 2003-2010 timeframe. "Sustainability" meant the capacity for project continuation by

Afghans after external (U.S.) support was withdrawn from the given project. To achieve sustainability, USDA agricultural advisors consistently advocated that there should be "local ownership" in the agricultural projects. Numerous returned advisors reported that smaller projects (costing \$25,000 - \$50,000) proved to be more effective, "sustainable", and responsive to local needs than the larger, infrastructure-related projects. Several advisors also stated that local "buy-in" and demand – from the outset of project planning – was critical to gaining sustainability. Finally, a couple advisors also cited "collaboration with ADTs in their province" as one effective strategy to help ensure project sustainability and success.

***Collaboration with ADTs.*** Interactions and cooperation between USDA agricultural advisors and ADTs enhanced the operations of both parties, as well as improved overall agricultural reconstruction in those cases/areas where they collaborated. The ADT's access to funding for agricultural projects, as well as its own organic force protection assets, were especially helpful in overcoming the challenges faced by USDA agricultural advisors, competing for such resources. However, only a limited number of cases/opportunities for USDA-ADT "teaming" actually occurred, as ADTs just began operating in Afghanistan in early 2008.

### **Recommendation.**

1. USDA agricultural advisors deployed on stability operations should be provided with dedicated USDA/government funding, to preclude their having to seek out funding for each and every project.
2. Pre-deployment civil-military and interagency training should be improved, in order to facilitate greater coordination and collaboration among PRT members – at the outset of their deployments. If combined pre-deployment training with actual PRT team members is not feasible, then greater exposure to cultures and procedures (both civil-military and interagency) should be pursued.
3. In-country transitions/overlaps of USDA agricultural advisors (outgoing advisor with incoming advisor) should be mandated, so that every departing USDA agricultural advisor can pass on his accumulated knowledge and expertise to his replacement.
4. All projects should include a monitoring & evaluation system/framework, to track and gauge project effectiveness.
5. Pre-deployment training for USDA agricultural advisors should ensure emphasis on interpersonal, negotiation, and facilitation skills, in order to improve the mission effectiveness of advisors during their deployments.
6. All agricultural projects should be planned and implemented in a sustainable manner. Project selection, scale (small vs. large), and local "buy-in" are key.

7. USDA agricultural advisors should be placed with ADTs (when deployed) for the purpose of collaboration, expertise-sharing, and synchronization of efforts. Also, since USDA agricultural advisors have sometimes sought project funding from ADTs, co-location would benefit USDA agricultural advisors for this purpose.

### **Implications.**

If deploying USDA agricultural advisors are not adequately prepared/armed for their deployments with dedicated (USDA) funding, with comprehensive civil-military & interagency training, and with assured in-county overlap time with departing agricultural advisors, then they will be handicapped in their mission and can only have limited impact on agricultural reconstruction.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the paper "[Assessing the Effectiveness of Agricultural Advisor Projects in Afghanistan](#)," by Karisha Kuypers and Professor David A. Anderson, the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, Interagency Paper No. 1/October 2010.

### **Comments.**

Related references:

- "[Agribusiness Development Teams in Afghanistan – Key Players in Economic Development](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 689, 15 March 2011. This lesson discusses the value of ADT projects for economic growth and stability in Afghanistan.
- "[Optimizing CERP Practices](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 745, 20 May 2011, and "[Reconstruction Traps](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 693, 4 January 2011. These lessons highlight the benefit of small-scale vice large-scale reconstruction projects.
- "[PRTs in Supporting Stability and Reconstruction Operations \(Afghanistan\)](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 243, 3 November 2009; "[Comprehensive Planning within Task Force and PRT Operations](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 447, 5 August 2009; and, "[Lessons from an Embedded Reconstruction Team in Southern Baghdad Province](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 677, 25 October 2010. These lessons discuss the importance of assessing & measuring the effects of projects.

Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI



## **h. TOPIC. Training a Professional Workforce within an Indigenous Population ( [444](#) )**

### **Observation.**

Following a period of increased instability, there is a tendency for an elite portion of a failed nation's population to disperse due to concerns of safety amid shifting political realities. This group of highly educated individuals frequently departs *en masse* prior to/during/or following a violent state conflict. The flight of these highly skilled individuals who serve in important leadership positions takes place in both the public and private sectors. The failed state then suffers for a lack of leadership in multiple sectors, thereby disabling the society's ability to function effectively once violence ends and the rebuilding process begins, leaving it susceptible to corruption or negative outside influence. This professional workforce is an essential group for future effective governance by an indigenous population, and the training of replacements for those who depart is a key variable for the success of a stability operation. The task of this training falls on the international stability operations staff arriving as experts, also known as 'outside interveners,' who sometimes temporarily manage important institutions until a highly skilled indigenous workforce can be trained to take over.

### **Discussion.**

The process of training and rebuilding a professional workforce capable of taking over key institutions, drawing from an unskilled indigenous population, is arduous and takes time. Solving this complicated problem is fundamental to establishing success during a stability operation despite the international pressure to reach goals quickly. If the end goal of a stability operation is to create a sovereign and independent host nation; the training of an indigenous professional workforce at all levels is fundamental.

A need to focus on important infrastructural requirements is frequently cited as primary to stability operations, including institutions capable of serving the public in fundamental ways: establishing a reliable local police force, enabling trust-worthy penal and judicial institutions that can enforce the Rule-of-Law, and restoring institutions that serve in the generation and management of state revenues. Stability operations frequently allow outside experts to shoulder these multiple tasks in initial stages, but fail by the experts remaining too long rather than training civilians of the host country to take over the work. This tendency is often referred to as the "driving" effect.

An important example lies in the control/management of the financial system of a host nation during a stability operation. Frequently, a failed state's financial system functioning post-conflict receives large infusions of international capital and is incapable of absorbing and managing the monies of the state. The void of indigenous leadership opens the country to the "driving" effect, whereby outside

interveners take the helm of key posts for an extended period of time. However, the rush to allow the indigenous population to take over during a stability operation too soon is often based on unrealistic timelines with high expectations, leading to a weak financial system susceptible to bribery, corruption, and further financial ruin.

Training and coaching host country nationals so they can take the helm of critical institutions is an important step to maintaining peace once hostilities have calmed. If the outside experts of the stability operation remain at the helm of an institution too long, they risk losing the confidence of the host country and its population. However, if the stewardship of the institution is relinquished too soon, incompetent replacements from the indigenous population could irreparably damage the institution.

### **Recommendation.**

1. Outside experts could lead important institutions as a “short-term” policy during stability operations. This will limit the effect of “driving” by outside interveners referred to in the discussion. The institution must return to its highest operational level with outside help without allowing foreign experts to remain indefinitely.
2. Use coaching and mentoring strategies to train the local population. These are preferable but institutions must be created that move beyond a 2-dimensional training/educational approach. The concept of coaching/mentoring should encompass both “advising and action,” whereby the knowledge is transferred first and not long after, the responsibility.
3. Give host country nationals the opportunity to take the helm of implementing projects once they are effectively trained. A stability operation should aim for the local citizens to quickly take the wheel and drive the process of effectively leading themselves.
4. Outside experts must develop project management programs to handle massive infrastructure reconstruction. The programs should include the apprenticeship of local trainees, with the development of a professional workforce being the long-term goal.
5. Continue the mentoring and coaching of local individuals to gain expertise in leadership, management, and technical skills. This is important once stability operations culminate. This long-term phenomenon should be accompanied by a willingness to be patient and thorough by the implementing authorities.

### **Implications.**

The purpose of stability operations in a failed state is to make progress when the services that comprise the infrastructure of the state – including a reliable local police force, trustworthy penal and judicial institutions that can enforce the Rule-

of-Law, and institutions that serve in the generation and management of state revenues – have ceased to function. These services combine to form a ‘social contract’ that exists between the citizens and the state when they are functioning properly. The process of establishing the professional workforce that facilitates this social contract is fundamental to curtailing violence and providing a lasting peace. Since this highly skilled group is frequently absent in a failed state, rebuilding the social contract by effectively training and enabling host nation leaders in the private sector, civil society groups and government is an essential part of stability operations. If an effective training policy is not used to enable infrastructure quickly, the safety of skilled international experts cannot be guaranteed. Hostilities may continue due to feelings of disenfranchisement within the local population. This could then lead to a downward spiral of violence that prevents the indigenous population from being trained to eventually comprise the professional workforce. Without effective coaching and mentoring techniques used simultaneously with knowledge training, the costs will continue to rise and the host country will remain unstable, at risk, and in conflict indefinitely.

### **Event Description.**

On 28 October 2008, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the Institute for Public Research, and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) hosted a Nation-State Building 101 Workshop. This workshop focused on the role of stability operations in rebuilding legitimate and effective national, sub-national, and local governments and fostering civil society and social reconciliation. The information referred to in this lesson is from Panel 1 of the workshop: “Interim Government and the Transition to Sovereignty.” This panel was chaired by Dr. Phyllis Dininio, formerly Senior Governance Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State. The keynote speaker was Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who was the founder and served as the Director, Institute for State Effectiveness; served as the Minister of Finance, Afghanistan; and, is currently serving as the President of Afghanistan. The panelists included Dr. Derick Brinkerhoff, Senior Research Fellow, Research Triangle Institute and Dr. Karen Guittieri, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and a research professor for PKSOI. CNA and PKSOI produced the [“Nation-State Building 101 Workshop Report,”](#) edited by Susan Merrill, 26 February 2009.

Lesson Contributor: Robert Hillkirk, PKSOI



### **3. CONCLUSION**

Recent peace and stability operations have demonstrated the importance of investing in Training – both before and during operations. Key suggestions/recommendations from the lesson authors in this compendium include the following:

- The U.S. should continue to lead in the areas of peacekeeping and stability operations. The U.S. should continue to support the UN with funding and leadership and continue to support efforts that contribute to global stability, to include the Global Peace Operations Initiative.
- The military command and training institute/center responsible for the training/readiness of a contingent identified for deployment on a peacekeeping mission should ensure that peacekeeping training programs/courses are appropriately tailored through: (1) ensuring that mission analysis has identified all key tasks that the unit is required to perform and (2) ensuring that a comprehensive assessment of the operational environment (OE) has been conducted and that appropriate conditions have been factored into the instruction/training tasks. Instructors must be fully cognizant of the OE. Commands and training institutes/centers should arrange for periodic exchanges of information about the OE between individuals in-country and leaders preparing to deploy.
- The military command and training institute/center should also take steps to ensure that lessons learned by contingents in-country get into the hands of the trainers/instructors for incorporation into their programs of instruction.
- Training evaluations of peacekeeping contingents – to standards – are paramount.
- The War College should not be the first time Army leaders are exposed in detail to the complexity and considerations of peacekeeping and stability operations. The strategic level is not the only level in which a fundamental understanding of approaches to solutions in stability operations is made. The War College should include adequate coverage of peacekeeping and stability operations in the core curriculum for theater cooperative strategy and joint military operations. As well, Command and General Staff College (CGSC) should include peacekeeping and stability operations in the core curriculum and not exclusively focus on joint employment in theater operations. In addition, tactical level officer and NCO education should include, at a minimum, Army doctrine covering stability operations.
- When a multinational coalition is involved building/re-building security capacity in a host nation – in partnership with the host nation – the coalition should consider establishing a command to coordinate and

synchronize multinational efforts in regard to the equipping, training, and sustaining of host nation security forces. Properly resource that command with sufficient numbers of personnel possessing expertise in training & advising.

- Trainers and advisors must know the training standards.
- Plan for the long-term and execute for the near-term. Developing the security sector is a long-term proposition. However, there must be specific, achievable short-term tasks that trainers and advisors can focus on. The organization that combines short-term tasks with long-term objectives improves the probability of success.
- Secure funding. The multinational training command must be the advocate for resources to support the assisted nation. Growth and development of the security sector cannot happen without outside assistance/resources. There must be a coherent plan with desired outcomes.
- Rule-of-Law training and programs are essential to stability operations and must be implemented early and provide for a functioning judicial system. This system affects all the other stability operations systems/sectors. Early analysis of judicial customs, processes, institutions, and legal challenges and concerns are critical information requirements to prepare Rule-of-Law training and implementation plans prior to execution during stability operations. Rule-of-Law training should include mentorship at higher levels to provide connectivity throughout the legal continuum.
- Pre-deployment training for advisors should ensure emphasis on interpersonal, negotiation, and facilitation skills.
- Use coaching and mentoring strategies to train the professional workforce of HN government institutions, as needed, post-conflict. Strategies should move well beyond a two-dimensional training/educational approach of trainers imparting knowledge to the civil servants. Rather, they should encompass both “advising” and “action” – whereby the knowledge is transferred first and not long after, the responsibility.
- Continue the coaching and mentoring of local civil servants long-term in order for them to gain expertise in leadership, management, and technical skills. This long-term effort should be accompanied by a willingness to be patient and thorough by the implementing authorities.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned recommendations on Training in support of peace and stability operations – and through their inclusion in campaign and operational planning activities, in pre-deployment training programs/events, and in the curriculums of training institutes/centers – significant impacts can be made during the course of future peace and stability operations.



#### 4. COMMAND POC

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Afghanistan (April 2016). Afghan National Defense and Security Forces personnel enrolled in an 8-week training course on force management look on as Major General Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), discusses the importance of personnel management. “The train-the-trainer course was created in order to improve force management systems and practices while empowering Afghan security institution personnel to take the lead in charting their organization’s future,” said Don Vandergriff, the lead instructor for the course.

(Text by Lieutenant Stephen Webber. Photo by Lieutenant Charity Edgar.)

Article at: <http://www.rs.nato.int/article/news/afghanistan-s-security-leaders-train-for-the-future-in-force-management-course.html>

## Annex A Related Documents, References, and Links

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

### Guides/Handbooks

- “[Guidelines: Design, Delivery and Evaluation of Training \(Training Cycle\)](#),” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (UN DPKO/DFS), 1 August 2014
- “[A Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation](#),” UN DPKO/DFS, 18 August 2015

### Journals/Periodicals

- “[African Horizons](#),” U.S. Army Africa [training event coverage], 14 October 2015
- “[Conflict Trends 2015/2 – 20 Years of Training for Peace \(TfP\): Building Peace Operations Capacity in Africa](#),” ACCORD, 13 July 2015
- “[Peace and Stability Journal, Volume 5, Issue 4 – 2015 Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop](#),” PKSOI, July 2015

### Presentations

- “[Agriculture Development for Armed Forces Pre-Deployment Training \(ADAPT\)](#),” California State University, Fresno, 3 March 2016
- “[Peacekeeping Training: Briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations](#),” UN DPKO/DFS, 4 February 2014
- “[Peacekeeping Training Centers in Africa, Middle East and Asia](#),” Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), 26 August 2010
- “[Peacekeeping Training Centers in the Americas](#),” ZIF, 26 April 2012

### Studies/Reports/Articles

- “[The Addition of Trainers to Iraq: Background](#),” Kathleen J. McInnis, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 16 June 2015
- “[EUTM-Mali Lessons Learned](#),” Spanish Army, 20 October 2015
- “[Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report - 2012-2013](#),” UN DPKO/DFS, 1 July 2013
- “[Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment - Annexes to the Final Report, 2012-2013](#),” UN DPKO/DFS, 1 July 2013

- [“Lessons Learned from Training with African Militaries,”](#) Keith Finan, AFRICOM Red Team, 9 April 2014
- [“Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia,”](#) Howard Olsen and John Davis, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 29 October 1999
- [“What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ – Issues for Congress,”](#) Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, CRS, 18 December 2015
- “Yellow Cycle Training: Best Practice from 205 Corps,” Timothy Hrushka, COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT), in [“SFActs – Volume 5, Issue 2,”](#) CAAT, June 2014

### **Training Center Websites**

- [“Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers \(AAPTIC\)”](#)
- [“International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres \(IAPTIC\)”](#)
- [“Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre \(KAIPTC\)”](#)

### **Training Material**

- [“Counter-Corruption Education and Training Programs”](#) Library in SOLLIMS
- [“Preparing to Prevent: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Mitigation – Scenario-Based Training,”](#) USAFRICOM and PKSOI, 26 November 2014
- [“UN Pre-Deployment Training”](#) Library in SOLLIMS

### **US Military Doctrine**

- [“ADP 3-07 Stability,”](#) HQ, Department of the Army (HQ DA), August 2012
- [“ADRP 3-07 Stability,”](#) with change 1, HQ DA, 25 February 2013
- [“ATP 3-07.5 Stability Techniques,”](#) HQ DA, August 2012
- [“ATP 3-07.31 Peace Ops,”](#) with change 1, HQ DA, 17 April 2015
- [“FM 3-07 Stability,”](#) HQ DA, June 2014
- [“JP 3-07 Stability Operations,”](#) Joint Staff, 29 September 2011
- [“JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations,”](#) Joint Staff, 1 August 2012
- [“MCIP 3-33.02 Maritime Stability Operations,”](#) Department of the Navy, 25 May 2012

## **Annex B      Priority Training Needs (for Peacekeeping)**

[Source: [Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment](#)]

The following priorities and needs were identified through a desk review and over 800 interviews conducted at UN Headquarters and in peacekeeping missions and service centers. These priorities are relevant to all peacekeeping personnel:

### **UNDERSTANDING OF:**

- The UN and peacekeeping history, basic principles, types of mandates, decision-making bodies (e.g., Security Council and General Assembly), decision-making processes and Member State dynamics
- DPKO/DFS objectives/mission mandate and the linkages with one's own function
- Contribution of individual components to the overall mandate and inter-dependence between components operating in multidimensional peacekeeping contexts
- Local context (history, customs and culture) to better interact with local constituents
- Mandated tasks (such as Protection of Civilians, child protection, and promotion of human rights) and cross-cutting issues such as gender and how to integrate them in one's work
- Rules of Engagement

### **APPLICATION OF:**

- UN peacekeeping fundamental principles (consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate)
- Highest standards of behavior and integrity
- Human rights and international humanitarian law and related UN policies
- Zero-tolerance for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)
- UN core values and competencies

### **OTHER CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE AREAS AND SKILLS IDENTIFIED FOR CIVILIAN PROFESSIONAL STAFF, MILITARY AND POLICE:**

- Situational and political awareness: Peacekeepers operate in a highly political environment and need to be aware of the political dimensions of the conflict and motivations of different actors
- Analytical skills in a peacekeeping context
- Communication skills to better interact and build rapport with colleagues and teams, as well as with host country population, authorities, and institutions
- Drafting skills to distill key points and inform sound decision-making
- Strategic thinking and planning, starting with the ability to prioritize and understand the integrated assessment and planning processes
- Capacity to advise, mentor and coach personnel within the mission and host country counterparts to strengthen national capacities

## Annex C “National Capacity-Building” or “Training of National Staff” in PK Missions?

[Source: [Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment](#)]

“**National capacity-building**” and “**training of national staff**” are two critical areas mentioned throughout DPKO literature and during the Training Needs Assessment (TNA) interviews. Both are important. While they may be complementary and/or overlap in certain respects, clear distinctions should be made between them in terms of expectations, objectives, and scale/scope.

“**National capacity-building**” as a mandated activity of some missions focuses on strengthening national and local institutions in order to foster sustainable development, peace and security. As the goal is for post-conflict countries to reach a point where no further UN presence is required, the development of relevant national capacities is critical to ensure an effective and sustainable handover of mission responsibilities to national partners. During the TNA, many interlocutors highlighted the need to support the host country’s efforts in developing areas such as a professional military, national police, and solid legal institutions by working closely with all UN and other international partners. As one manager explained, “it is no longer about capacity-substitution, but about encouraging involvement and increasing the sense of ownership of stabilization and peacebuilding activities by the national actors.” In order to achieve this, international staff – in particular those involved in working with national constituents – must have a basic knowledge of capacity-building and an ability to impart knowledge, build trust, and work with people.

“**Training of national staff**,” sometimes termed “national staff capacity-building,” refers to all training activities organized or authorized by the UN as a part of the UN’s human resources development, and is considered a form of investment in its workforce. In this sense, training of national staff in peacekeeping missions is no different from training activities for other categories of UN personnel. However, the UN strives to target increasing numbers of national staff (also termed “**locally-recruited staff**”), since they account for more than 60% of civilian personnel. Joining in this effort, many missions have developed specific programs and guidelines for national staff training.

Feedback received during the TNA revealed that these two concepts are often blurred or conflated – and that no common understanding regarding them exists across peacekeeping missions. Clear guidance on the short- and long-term objectives of national staff training in peacekeeping missions would assist Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) in making decisions about training programs for national staff, and how such activities should mesh with – or be distinct from – longer-term sustained building of national capacity by UN Country Teams and other partners. This is particularly important as available funding for training of peacekeeping personnel is unlikely to grow, while training demands continue to increase.

## **Annex D      Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers** (available in [SOLLIMS library](#))

**Building Stable Governance** (Mar 2016)

**Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping** (Feb 2016)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications**  
(Dec 2015)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief]** (Sep 2015)

**Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations** (Jul 2015)

**Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Students** (May 2015)

**Security Sector Reform** (Feb 2015)

**Reconstruction and Development** (Nov 2014)

**Women, Peace and Security** (Aug 2014)

**Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students** (Jul 2014)

**Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”** (Apr 2014)

**Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces** (Jan 2014)

**Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations** (Oct 2013)

**Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students** (Aug 2013)

**Multinational Operations** (Jul 2013)

**Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People**  
(Apr 2013)

**Protection of Civilians** (Jan 2013)

**Medical Assistance / Health Services** (Oct 2012)

**Reconciliation** (Jul 2012)

**Civ-Mil Cooperation** (Apr 2012)

**Building Capacity** (Jan 2012)

**Ministerial Advising** (Oct 2011)

**Fighting Corruption** (Apr 2011)

**Economic Stabilization** (Jan 2011)

**Transition to Local Governance** (Oct 2010)

**Rule of Law and Legitimacy** (Jul 2010)

**Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping** (Jun 2010)

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

<https://sollims.pksoi.org>



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