

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

## Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations

Special Edition

May 2017



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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Distribution Unlimited



## FOREWORD

Welcome to the May 2017 Special Edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations**. This publication has been prepared to coincide with the 10<sup>th</sup> International Lessons Learned Conference (10<sup>th</sup> ILLC), hosted by the New Zealand Army in Queenstown, New Zealand, 15-18 May 2017. Specifically, the lesson report within this “Sampler” aligns with one of the ILLC focus areas, namely “**Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations**.”

The general structure of the “Sampler” consists of: (1) [Table of Contents](#), (2) “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the lessons and links to the full text, (3) [Introduction](#) providing background and context, (4) [Lessons](#), and (5) links to [additional references, lessons, and articles](#) related to the topic and its issues.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing not just with military commanders and their staffs, but also with civilian leaders and practitioners – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, key personnel involved in pre-deployment preparation/training/education, policy-makers, and international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendations
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. **Note:** You must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment then to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the products referenced in this publication.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a resource for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products that we provide for the peace and stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [ <http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu> ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ <https://sollims.pksoi.org> ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



Defense Secretary Leon H. Panetta, left, travels aboard a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with Army General Lloyd J. Austin III, the commander of U.S. Forces Iraq, over Baghdad before meeting with Iraqi leaders, 11 July 2011.

DoD photo by Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jacob N. Bailey.

DoD news article “CENTCOM Commander Leaves Legacy of Leading from the Front” at: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/713547/centcom-commander-leaves-legacy-of-leading-from-the-front>

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## **“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons)**

**Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.**

- Leadership failure – by UN peacekeeping leaders with responsibility for the Malakal Protection of Civilians (POC) site, South Sudan in February 2016 – was a contributory factor to spoilers’ gaining access to this UN site and the resultant deaths of civilians and destruction of property.

**[\[Read More ...\]](#)**

- Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its “golden hour” (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work.

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- Certain leader attributes prominently stand out as “keys to success” – frequently cited in strategic leader assessments and lesson reports from recent peacekeeping and stability operations. Those attributes are: visioning, mapping the environment, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, unity of effort and purpose, strategic communication, and determination toward the vision.

**[\[Read More ...\]](#)**

- During the 2010 earthquake relief operation in Haiti, a myriad of organizations carried out disaster relief roles,... JTF-Haiti took a lead role in organizing and synchronizing a large part of subsequent (post-emergency) relief efforts through a number of innovations in partnering, coordinating, communicating, and building unity of effort among the participating organizations.

**[\[Read More ...\]](#)**

- Leadership on UN peacekeeping missions – with troops from many different nations and cultures – presents an array of challenges for commanders, as experienced by a Polish officer assigned to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). His advice for becoming an “inter-culturally effective leader”: integrate differences, bridge differences, and tolerate differences.

**[\[Read More ...\]](#)**

- Military leaders, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners, as well as their staffs and subordinate leaders, must fully understand the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization, in order to fully establish and exploit development unified action.

**[\[Read More ...\]](#)**

## **SUBJECT: Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Per guidance for the 10<sup>th</sup> ILLC ([Annex A](#)), “**Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations**” has a number of sub-topics/issues that warrant discussion:

- What does right look like? Moral and ethical decisions that are critical to operational success.
- Current operations – understanding decisive change.
- Impulse decision-making vs preparation and repetition.
- Knowledge Management – It is more than just information sharing.
- Understanding different leadership modules and decision-making processes from our Coalition Partners and other agencies.
- Is enough being done to develop our junior leaders?

**Addressing the above issues in order, within this SOLLIMS Sampler, we show that:**

- One of the most critical “moral and ethical decisions” to operational success is attending to the Protection of Civilians. ([Lesson 2.a.](#))
- “Understanding decisive change” involves recognizing what’s needed to transform the situation / “turn the tide” – and then taking bold action promptly and publicly, with key stakeholders’ involvement. ([Lesson 2.b.](#))
- “Preparation and repetition” includes visioning, mapping, and determination towards the vision. ([Lesson 2.c.](#))
- Knowledge Management is indeed “more than just information sharing” – it requires relationship-building, coordination mechanisms/tools, integration and adaptation. ([Lesson 2.d.](#))
- Valuable lessons can be learned from “leadership modules and decision-making processes from our Coalition Partners.” ([Lesson 2.e.](#))
- One can never do enough to “develop our junior leaders” – but one should always optimize their pre-deployment training and “comprehensive approach” awareness. ([Lesson 2.f.](#))

## 2. LESSONS

### a. **TOPIC. Leadership Failure by UN Peacekeeping Leaders – Malakal Violence, South Sudan (Lesson #2552)**

#### **Observation.**

Leadership failure – by UN peacekeeping leaders with responsibility for the Malakal Protection of Civilians (POC) site, South Sudan in February 2016 – was a contributory factor to spoilers’ gaining access to this UN site and the resultant deaths of civilians and destruction of property. Senior leadership’s failure to act on perimeter security issues and on early warning signs, along with failure to act in a timely manner on incidents of violence against civilians, amounts to a case of gross negligence – a case that offers valuable leadership tips.

#### **Discussion.**

**Event Summary:** In February 2016, Malakal POC was an overcrowded camp / POC site with some 47,000 people – including members of Dinka and Shilluk communities which had existing grudges/disputes between them, as well as the Nuer community. On 16 February, two men attempted to enter Juliet Gate of the Malakal POC with rifle magazines, but were stopped by contract guards, then questioned at the gate by UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) members; however, men “in Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) uniforms” from outside the gate then intervened, beating one of the FPU personnel and allowing the two detained men to get away. During the evening of 16 February, small-scale inter-communal clashes between Dinka and Shilluk IDPs took place.

On 17 February, the fencing along the eastern perimeter was ripped open near Block P, a Dinka area in Sector 2, less than 10 meters from an UNMISS sentry post. Small clashes again broke out between Dinka and Shilluk youth in the evening of 17 February. UNMISS sent forces to the area between Sectors 1 and 2; the situation briefly calmed. Hours later, around 10:30 p.m., violence erupted again, largely focused within Sector 2 of the camp, where the Dinka and Nuer were located. Initially, the parties involved in the clashes (Dinka and Shilluk) employed rocks, spears, and machetes, but the situation deteriorated when guns were fired and grenades were thrown. Nuer members joined the fighting against Dinka. Many of the IDPs who lived in Sector 2, or in Sector 3 further south, fled their homes for Sector 1. Nuer and Shilluk fighters eventually retreated back to their shelters, but gunshots continued intermittently for several hours. Around 3 a.m. on 18 February, the situation calmed for the night.

On 18 February, fighters “in SPLA uniforms,” who had already been spotted along the perimeter during the night of 17 February, began entering the same breach in the eastern perimeter during the period 10:20 a.m.-11 a.m. on 18 February. During this time, the fighting resumed at an even greater intensity than

the previous night – and was far more one sided. Dinka fighters along with personnel “in SPLA uniforms” then largely had free reign across much of the camp for at least several hours, firing on Nuer and Shilluk civilians and burning their homes. By 2 p.m., large sections of the camp were reduced to ashes. 2,326 structures were destroyed by fire (around 35% of existing shelters in the POC), the IOM and IMC humanitarian clinics inside the camp were destroyed, three schools were destroyed, and latrines and water storage infrastructure were damaged. UNMISS forces finally intervened at approximately 3:45 p.m. The fighting ended at 4 p.m. The violence at Malakal POC site resulted in at least 144 civilian casualties (CIVCAS), including at least 25 deaths.

### **UNMISS’ lack of action / leadership failure prior to 16 February 2016:**

- On 8 February, the UN Protection Cluster went to UNMISS civilian leadership to express their concerns about escalating violence within the Malakal POC site, and to ask that a risk mitigation plan be developed. UNMISS leadership in Malakal did not take action on this.
- One week before the 16 February incident, a humanitarian agency became aware that part of the fence in Sector 2 of Malakal POC had been cut. It passed this information to UNMISS leadership. However, nothing was done to fix the fence deficiency.
- A humanitarian agency recognized the scale of the weapons-smuggling problem at Malakal POC and reported this to UNMISS leadership. UNMISS leadership failed to take action.
- A humanitarian agency informed UNMISS leadership that Malakal POC site was getting very tense days before the 16 February clashes. This report was disregarded.
- Gate security at Malakal POC was being handled by contractors. UNMISS’s Department of Safety and Security (DSS) had contracted Warrior Security, a South Sudanese company, for gate security. One could ask, “Why weren’t UNMISS personnel, particularly police personnel, handling gate security?”

### **UNMISS’ lack of action / leadership failure on 17 and 18 February:**

- In the late morning of 17 February, several Nuer and Shilluk leaders met with UNMISS leadership to express their concerns about guns within the Dinka section of the camp and about the two men who attempted to enter Juliet Gate with rifle magazines the previous day, aided by other men “in SPLA uniforms.” UNMISS leadership failed to act on these concerns.



- On 17 February, the fencing along the eastern perimeter was ripped open near Block P, a Dinka area in Sector 2, less than 10 meters from an UNMISS sentry post. UNMISS failed to repair the fencing.

- When the rock throwing and other small-scale violence broke out between the Dinka and Shilluk youth in the evening of 17 February, UNMISS – to its credit – deployed both the FPU and the Quick Response Force (QRF) to the area between Sectors 1 and 2; the situation briefly calmed.

- However, fighting resumed around 10:30 p.m. within Sector 2. Starting with rocks, spears, and machetes, the situation quickly deteriorated, as people from the Dinka side of the camp began to open fire with guns and grenades. There were casualties on both sides. After midnight, a fire was started in the corner of Block W, consuming several shelters and a restaurant in the Nuer section of the camp. UNMISS did not engage to stop the violence.

- By 3 a.m. on 18 February, fighting had subsided within the camp. When the situation was then quiet for 7+ hours afterwards, this would have been an opportune time for UNMISS to carry out certain activities to prevent further violence – such as inserting a force inside Sector 2, patrolling the sectors, repairing the fence, and holding talks with IDP community leaders and local authorities. Yet, UNMISS failed to take action. Had UNMISS inserted an armed presence in Sector 2, such action could have potentially kept fighters from all groups from launching another round of violence.

- At 10:20 a.m., UNMISS sentries reported that there were SPLA soldiers amassing outside. Men “in SPLA uniforms,” also seen the previous night outside the perimeter, entered the breach in the fencing between 10:20 and 11 a.m. Fighting then resumed at an even greater intensity than the previous night. Dinka fighters and men “in SPLA uniforms” rampaged across the camp for several hours, firing on civilians and burning homes (Nuer and Shilluk sections), two humanitarian clinics, and other structures. UNMISS forces continued to sit between Sectors 1 and 2 – despite the fact that fighting was concentrated inside Sector 2.

- When the men in “SPLA uniforms” entered the POC site between 10:20 and 11 a.m., thousands of IDPs streamed toward Charlie Gate in an effort to get into an area where they felt they would be safer. However, UNMISS kept Charlie Gate closed, including by positioning a tank directly behind it. Civilians’ desperation grew. They pounded on the gate and begged to be let through. Many climbed over the fence and suffered injuries from the barbed wire. The IDPs then pushed open Charlie Gate from the inside. One could ask, “Why didn’t UNMISS take action to open Charlie Gate and try to control the flow of IDPs?”

- UNMISS leadership in Juba was slow to address the violence – with the Crisis Management Team meeting for the first time around 3 p.m. on 18 February. One could ask, “Why didn’t UNMISS leadership call a Crisis Management Team meeting in the early morning of 18 February?”

- UNMISS finally moved forces inside Sector 2 at around 3:45 p.m. They drove the Dinka fighters and men “in SPLA uniforms” off the camp within 15 minutes. Around 4 p.m., the situation calmed. Why didn’t UNMISS intervene earlier inside Sector 2?

### **Impact:**

“The most recent assault on the Malakal POC site in February 2016 as well as on Bentiu POC and Bor POC in Jonglei in April 2014 called into question not only the ability of UNMISS to fulfill its protection mandate beyond its own gates, but also within them. The attacks eroded respect for UN peacekeeping and the integrity of the mission’s mandate, and have led to a loss of trust into the mission’s capabilities on part of the IDPs on the site despite the formulation of new contingency plans. Questions have been asked whether the attacks could have been prevented through conflict mediation, better camp management, or other interventions by civilian and police personnel as well as effective protection from external intrusions by UN force.” (Source: [Hannah Dönges article](#))

This Malakal POC catastrophe is a sad case of UN peacekeeping senior leadership failure. It should be noted that the UN Security Council had promulgated the importance of **senior leadership** two years prior to this Malakal POC incident. On 12 February 2014, the Council issued a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2014/3](#)). The statement condemned impediments to the fulfilment of the mandates of UN peace operations, such as attacks on mission personnel and bureaucratic obstacles, and called on the Council to consider the use of “targeted and graduated measures” against those violating international humanitarian and human rights law. Moreover, the 12 February presidential statement “reaffirmed the need for peacekeeping operations to ensure that they implement their protection of civilians’ mandates and **stressed the role of senior mission leadership in this regard.**”

**In Feb 2016, UNMISS senior leadership abandoned its role in this regard.**

### **Recommendations.**

1. UN HQ needs to do a better job of selecting senior leaders (**civilians**) of peacekeeping Missions. UN HQ should consider instituting crisis response testing to screen candidates for Mission leadership positions. If candidates fail to respond appropriately to crises posed in tests, they should not be selected.

2. UN HQ needs to provide improved leadership education for senior **civilian** leaders, senior **military** leaders within Missions (Force Commanders, Deputy Force Commanders, battalion commanders) and **police** leaders – particularly on the subjects of Protection of Civilians, Rules of Engagement, Use of Force, and Force Protection.
3. Senior leaders (civilian and military) need to pay attention to warning signs. In establishing a mission-wide early warning system, senior leaders should incorporate mechanisms along the lines of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). CCIR are elements of friendly and threat information that the commander/leader identifies as critical to timely decision-making. (NOTE: See [“Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations”](#) for more information about CCIR.)
4. Senior leaders need to act during crisis incidents, particularly incidents of spiraling violence. If they fail to act, they should be held accountable and removed from their positions.
5. Senior leaders need to establish a command climate that has elements of trust, unity of effort, and information-sharing – to facilitate both early warning and responding to crises.
6. Senior leaders need to emphasize the importance of Protection of Civilians – whether included in the mandate or not. (NOTE: See [“Strategic Lesson Number 13: The Imperative of Protecting Civilians.”](#))
7. Senior leaders should ensure proper physical security and force protection measures are put into place around all camps (including POC sites) – and should require camp leaders to check them daily and address any identified deficiencies immediately.
8. Senior leaders need to establish response drills for crisis scenarios and Protection of Civilian scenarios. They need to practice those drills with subordinate leaders and staffs.
9. Senior leaders should incorporate lessons learned – covering the subjects of Protection of Civilians, Rules of Engagement, Use of Force, and Force Protection – into their plans, procedures, and response drills.
10. Senior leaders should mentor subordinate leaders on the subjects of Protection of Civilians, Rules of Engagement, Use of Force, and Force Protection.
11. Senior leaders need to establish prevention measures appropriate to their specific situation – to help prevent local disputes from escalating into violence.

## **Implications.**

If the aforementioned recommendations are not followed, then UN peacekeeping missions will continue to experience leadership failures and incidents of high civilian casualties – resulting in loss of UN / Mission credibility.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the following sources: (1) [“A Refuge in Flames: The February 17-18 Violence in Malakal POC,”](#) (by Matt Wells; published by Center for Civilians in Conflict, 21 April 2016); (2) [“MSF internal review of the February 2016 attack on the Malakal Protection of Civilians Site and the post-event situation”](#) [published by “Medecins Sans Frontieres” (MSF) aka “Doctors without Borders,” June 2016]; (3) “Protection of Civilians Needs to Be Understood as a Collaborative Strategy and Not a Campsite,” by Hannah Dönges, in [“Global Peace Operations Review,”](#) published by the Center on International Cooperation, New York University (NYU), June 2016; (4) [“Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,”](#) published by Security Council Report, Inc., 15 May 2015; (5) [“Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,”](#) S/2016/341, published by United Nations Security Council, 13 April 2016; (6) [“Statement by the President of the Security Council”](#) on Protection of Civilians, S/PRST/2014/3, published by United Nations Security Council, 12 February 2014; (7) “Accountability for Peacekeeping Failures Must Be Shared by the UN in New York,” in [“Global Peace Operations Review,”](#) published by the Center on International Cooperation, NYU, December 2016; (8) [“Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations,”](#) Joint Staff, 11 Aug 2011; and, (9) [“Strategic Lesson Number 13: The Imperative of Protecting Civilians,”](#) David Mosinski, PKSOI, 27 November 2012.

## **Comments.**

Granted there were mitigating circumstances at Malakal POC – such as the enormous IDP population, the existing/historical tensions between communities, and the fact that SPLA uniforms (and support) were involved. Nonetheless, there is no excuse for failure to act to protect civilians.



**Displaced women sit in the ashes of their shelter, burned during the fighting at the Malakal POC site.**

**Photo: OCHA.**

## **b. TOPIC. Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform (Lesson #703)**

### **Observation**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its “golden hour” (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. Although every peacebuilding context presents its own set of unique and complex challenges, certain key areas of action addressed within the Liberian security sector may also be applicable to wider peacebuilding efforts, particularly for nations recovering from an abrupt end to a civil war. Key areas of action successfully implemented in Liberia revolved around consolidating the state's monopoly of force, maintaining the momentum of peacebuilding, integrating SSR with DDR, operationalizing human security, and mobilizing networks for peace.

### **Discussion**

Upon the conclusion of its 14-year civil war, in August 2003, Liberia faced an incredibly difficult situation with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding. From a pre-war population of three million, more than 250,000 people had been killed, and another one million people were displaced or missing. Pillaging, looting, abductions, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses had occurred on a massive scale throughout the conflict period. Most Liberians had lived in constant fear of the military and police forces, not to mention the numerous warring factions. Liberia's infrastructure had been totally destroyed, with no functioning electrical grids, no public running water, no sewage, and no other public utilities. Throughout the capital of Monrovia, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived in slums consisting of tin shacks and garbage. After 14 years of violence, chaos, and fear, a pause for peace came about when President Taylor accepted an offer of asylum from Nigeria.

Seeing a “golden hour” for peacebuilding upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders/practitioners (including the authors of the Stanley Foundation article cited in “Event Description” below) immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

An initial priority was to consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law. Probably the most critical action taken in this regard was the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program, which was implemented by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in a quick, if not hasty, manner on 7 December 2003. Launching the DDRR program quickly, and involving many of the ex-combatants in transitional labor, kept these ex-combatants focused on material gains and employment – rather than on renewing violence. Simple monetary compensation for the

arms/ammunition surrendered was a key factor for gaining their cooperation. Another motive for these combatants to show up at a DDRR site was temporary amnesty. Blanket or general amnesty was never issued in Liberia; however, temporary amnesty proved to be vital to the success of the DDRR program. A conscious decision was made – in the interest of disarming and demobilizing armed groups – to postpone the implementation of transitional justice in favor of temporary amnesty, and this approach paid large dividends.

The DDRR program succeeded in disarming and demobilizing 101,449 combatants, and it collected 61,918 weapons and 6,486,136 units of ammunition. Throughout execution of the DDRR program, UNMIL disposed of the collected ordinance, and it worked to seal off Liberia's borders from outside interference. An early threat to the DDRR program surfaced during a 10-day period in Dec 2003. Significant riots broke out at one of the DDRR sites (Camp Schieffelin), posing a major threat to the UNMIL contingent there. Consequently, UNMIL put a halt to the DDRR program. However, within four months, once additional UN peacekeepers were on the ground, UNMIL re-energized the program and resumed execution in full force. That persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peacebuilding were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained. The pace of disarmament and demobilization picked up quickly.

Similarly, persistence in “maintaining momentum” kept the crucial 2005 Liberian presidential elections on schedule. In opposition, many senior statesmen, interim government officials, and potential candidates had pushed hard for holding party conventions and for rewriting the constitution in advance of any elections. However, their motives may have been self-serving – to prolong their time in office/exposure, or even to have an opportunity to divert resources (funds from the February 2004 donor conference) for their personal gains rather than for the good of Liberia. Fortunately, the UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in Liberia stood firm on keeping the November 2005 elections on schedule. This resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – to establish and uphold the rule of law.

To consolidate a “monopoly of force” for this new government to uphold the rule of law, the UN, U.S., and the authors of the Stanley Foundation article took the approach of integrating DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The UN worked the “Disarmament” piece – as it systematically disarmed the legacy national military force. The United States simultaneously worked the “Demobilization and Reintegration” pieces, while at the same time restructuring and reforming the force. The entire DDR/SSR program included recruiting, vetting, training, equipping, fielding, sustaining and mentoring the new force. The program also involved constructing new military bases across the country, establishing a professional defense ministry, drafting a national defense strategy, and redesigning the force structure. The point of intersection

between DDR and SSR was “Reintegration” – the process of reincorporating as many appropriate ex-combatants into the new military as possible. For the select few who were able to pass the vetting process, “Reintegration” not only gave them quick employment in the new military, but also served to build trust (between former enemies) and let them become an integral part of the greater Liberian peacebuilding effort. Due to the downsizing of the new military, however, other avenues for reintegration for most ex-combatants (economic avenues, such as public works programs) had to be pursued.

Likewise, the UN and U.S. integrated DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Liberian National Police (LNP). The highly corrupt, brutal police force that had operated during the Taylor years was, unfortunately, still largely intact after the civil war. Its officers posed a significant threat to the state and to peace. In response to this threat, the United States initially put much a much higher priority and much greater attention on reforming the LNP than on reforming the AFL. The U.S. and UNMIL demobilized (purged) all unqualified policemen, vetted/reintegrated a small number of personnel, conducted extensive recruiting/vetting/training of new police forces, established a new police academy, and developed an emergency infrastructure. UNMIL took on the major role of training the LNP, worked with various international partners to build new police stations and barracks, and equipped the force with vehicles and logistics. Also, efforts were made to increase female representation in the force.

A unique approach taken by recovery leaders and new governmental leaders was the effort to operationalize “human security.” The primary focus here was to ensure that the population could gain “freedom from fear” of the military. A number of steps were taken to ensure the new AFL would not appear threatening to the people. As stated earlier, a vetting process was used to screen all of the candidates for the AFL. Secondly, the AFL's force structure was addressed: its size was made deliberately small, it contained no special units (to preclude any loyalties to a specific person, vice the state), and it was ethnically balanced – with all tribes equally represented. Third, non-traditional training was highly emphasized, covering the following subjects: discipline, moral judgment, respect for the laws of war, Liberian history, the Liberian constitution, civics, and literacy. Also, Liberians were taught to be the trainers of the AFL, so that they could take stock in professionalizing their own military.

Finally, besides the many SSR and DDR actions to consolidate the state's monopoly of force, another key short-term action was to mobilize “networks for peace” – for the purpose of counterbalancing “networks for war.” Conflict-recovery leaders were extremely proactive in promoting the actions of peace-minded groups and in establishing multilateral, national, and nongovernmental webs of people and organizations who wanted a warless Liberia. As nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) trickled back into the country, and as evacuated embassy staff personnel returned, these groups/people were significantly helped by the UN, by the embassies, and by recovery leaders to enhance reintegration

and reestablishment of social/support networks. Finally, Liberian women's peace groups were considerably assisted in networking aspects, as they grew to be active informal groups for promoting local, community-based security systems.

### **Recommendations.**

In the immediate aftermath of civil war, when a “golden hour” or “window of opportunity” is presented to lay a foundation for peacebuilding and to impact and include the (former) warring factions, leaders/practitioners should immediately address the following areas of the security sector:

1. Consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law.
2. Maintain momentum of reform and peace.
3. Integrate DDR and SSR in the transformation of military and police forces.
4. Operationalize “human security.”
5. Mobilize “networks for peace” to counterbalance the “networks for war.”

### **Implications.**

If a post-conflict state does not gain a monopoly of force through prompt reform of its security sector, then it will lack the means to uphold the rule of law and may face renewed competition from insurgents, militias, organized crime, and revolutionary movements – who can challenge the state's legitimacy, threaten citizens/communities, and potentially push the state back into wide-scale conflict.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article [“Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia,”](#) by John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate, a policy analysis brief from the Stanley Foundation, June 2010.

### **Comments.**

A related document, which discusses security sector reform in Liberia and the importance of incorporating non-state security actors and community-based approaches, is [“Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building,”](#) by Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, SSI, Jan 2010.



**Jacques Paul Klein, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, speaks on DDR. Camp Schieffelin, Liberia. 8 Dec 2003.**



## c. **TOPIC. Leader Attributes for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations (Lesson #879)**

### **Observation.**

Certain leader attributes prominently stand out as “keys to success” – frequently cited in strategic leader assessments and lesson reports from recent peacekeeping and stability operations. Those attributes are: visioning, mapping the environment, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, unity of effort and purpose, strategic communication, and determination toward the vision.

### **Discussion.**

Leadership in peacekeeping and stability operations at the strategic and operational levels is complex business, with no single set of attributes applying to all leaders or all situations. The following leader attributes, however, are often mentioned as being contributory to success:

Visioning. Visioning is the competency for envisioning a preferred – and achievable – outcome (strategic or operational outcome) and articulating it in a word picture so that others involved in the peacekeeping/stability operation are inspired to support it.

Mapping the environment. Mapping the environment entails the leader’s ability to understand his position relative to national interests, authorities, objectives, available resources, socio-cultural factors, and risks. Mapping contributes to visioning.

Cross-cultural savvy. Cross-cultural savvy encompasses the ability to understand and respect cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A leader with cross-cultural skills is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, and inter-organizational entities.

Interpersonal maturity. Interpersonal maturity includes the willingness and ability to share power, to build relationships and consensus, to resolve contentious issues, and to employ the art of negotiation over extended timeframes.

Unity of effort and purpose. Unity of effort and purpose consists of focusing diverse efforts of agencies and actors involved in the operation on common goals/objectives and toward the purpose of building capacity in the host nation government and society.

Strategic communication. Strategic communication refers to the competency and means by which the strategic or operational leader

communicates intentions and keeps internal and external audiences informed of the vision and actions being taken to achieve it.

Determination toward the vision. Determination toward the vision is the quality of steadily moving forward – with commitment, hard work, patience, and endurance – despite difficulties and setbacks occurring throughout the peacekeeping/stability operation.

There are countless examples in which the above-cited leader attributes were contributory to highly successful operations. Likewise, there are numerous examples in which failures occurred due to the absence of such leader attributes being demonstrated. What follows are just a few examples:

“General Petraeus's achievement (January 2007-September 2008) in Iraq was to push his thoughts down to the lowest level so that everyone on the ground knew what was expected of them, leaving little doubt as to the mission and tasks.” [Visioning] (reference 1)

“The first problem confronted by the Baghdad South Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) was lack of operational direction (i.e., lack of State Department leadership and planning). No definitive guidance was provided to ePRT team members by way of the Embassy, the higher echelon Baghdad PRT, or the Baghdad South ePRT's leadership. ... Without [mapping the environment] and being able to dovetail operations into a larger, more comprehensive operational plan, the resulting effect was to support a number of "look good" projects. ... Unfortunately, these projects did more to destabilize this fragile region than to stabilize it.” (reference 10)

“In Somalia, for example, shortcomings in leader interpersonal maturity and cross-cultural savvy did, in fact, lead to a loss of popular support, low troop morale and the eventual withdrawal of the UN mandate. Similarly, fragmentation of group unity can prove disastrous for peacekeeping and stability operations. Efforts in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia all fell victim to uncoordinated, unsynchronized activities by the various actors, that hindered the overall mission's goals.” (reference 7)

“Whereas U.S. civil-military cooperation (between the Department of Defense, State Department, and other U.S. Agencies) had not been effectively established or practiced during Operating Iraqi Freedom over the course of previous years, the senior military officer and the senior State Department officer on the ground in 2007 – General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker – possessed the keen ability and the willingness to closely and continuously partner on U.S. operations – bringing exceptional unity of effort and oversight for implementing the President's guidance.

This leadership team ensured that military and civilian contributions were well placed, synchronized, and closely tracked – to meet the overall aim of an American (and Iraqi) political solution – a stable, capable, and legitimate Iraqi government.” (reference 11)

“In the case of Kenya, the efforts of Ms. Dekha Abdi and the other four leaders of Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), and the parallel work of Mr. Kofi Annan and the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities, were absolutely critical in grabbing the attention of the Kenyan people and in mobilizing multiple sectors of society for peace building [through strategic communication].” (reference 12)

“Seeing a golden hour for peace building [in Liberia] upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders ... immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform (SSR). ... [Their] persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peace building were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained. ... The UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in country also stood firm on keeping the November 2005 elections on schedule. This resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – a new government to establish the rule of law.” [Determination toward the vision] (reference 13)

### **Recommendations.**

Leadership “success attributes” should be incorporated into pre-deployment training seminars – for senior leaders preparing to serve on peacekeeping/ stability operations.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the following REFERENCES:

- (1) “[Defining Command, Leadership, and Management Success Factors within Stability Operations](#),” by Dave Fielder, PKSOI Papers, June 2011
- (2) “Strategic Leadership for Transition,” by Colonel Bryan A. Groves, in “[Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance](#),” PKSOI conference report, edited by Harry R. Yarger, 18 August 2011
- (3) “[Strategic Leadership Primer](#),” 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, edited by Colonel (Ret) Stephen J. Gerras, U.S. Army War College, 2010
- (4) “[Social Mentoring – Understanding the People](#),” SOLLIMS Lesson 789, 24 April 2012

- (5) "[Strategic Leadership Competencies](#)," by Leonard Wong et al., United States Army War College, September 2003
- (6) "[Strategic Leadership Competencies for Peacekeeping Operations](#)," by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Mendes Lauria, April 2009
- (7) "[Essential Leadership Competencies in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 435, 30 June 2009
- (8) "[The Challenge of Leadership in the Interagency Environment](#)," by William J. Davis, Jr., in Military Review, September-October 2010
- (9) "[Strategic Messaging in Information Operations](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 874, 6 August 2012
- (10) "[Lessons from an Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Southern Iraq](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 677, 25 October 2010
- (11) "[Political and Military Components of the Surge in Iraq](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 808, 18 May 2012
- (12) "[Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peace Building – Kenya](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 702, 15 March 2011
- (13) "[Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 703, 25 March 2011



**General David H. Petraeus reviews operations in Iraq to a congressional delegation led by Senator Jack Reed. Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, also briefed the delegation. Photo by Staff Sgt. Lorie Jewell, Multi-National Force Iraq, Public Affairs. Baghdad, Iraq. 21 July 2008.**

#### **d. TOPIC. “Whole of International Community” for Foreign Disaster Relief (Lesson #700)**

##### **Observation.**

During the 2010 earthquake relief operation in Haiti, a myriad of organizations carried out disaster relief roles, but no collective command and control structure was in place to manage the whole effort. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) served as the lead agent for the United States; however, it relied heavily on the supporting effort provided by the U.S. military to manage the effort. The U.S. military's Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) was the driving force for planning and delivering relief in the initial/emergency phase of the operation. Additionally, JTF-Haiti took a lead role in organizing and synchronizing a large part of subsequent (post-emergency) relief efforts through a number of innovations in partnering, coordinating, communicating, and building unity of effort among the participating organizations. In a disaster relief operation of this magnitude, such work to gain a “whole of international community” approach is invaluable in gaining efficiencies, saving lives, and mitigating suffering.

##### **Discussion.**

The devastation in Haiti resulting from the 7.0 magnitude earthquake of 12 January 2010 prompted the longest and largest U.S. military effort in a foreign disaster relief operation. At the peak of Operation Unified Response, in February 2010, JTF-Haiti was comprised of over 22,000 service members, 58 aircraft, and 23 ships. Within just two days of the disaster, on 14 January, the headquarters for JTF-Haiti was established by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) – to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal agency, USAID.

JTF-Haiti assumed responsibility for all U.S. forces and began directing activities to assist in providing timely relief. The Department of Defense ordered elements of the Global Response Force (the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post, 2nd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 58 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft) and the USS Carl Vinson, USS Bataan, USS Nassau, and USS Carter Hall to the JTF-Haiti mission. These forces, along with personnel from the SOUTHCOM staff, the Joint Force Special Operations Component, and the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, provided the crux of JTF-Haiti assets.

In the initial emergency phase, the 2nd Brigade/82nd Airborne, under the direction of the JTF-Haiti headquarters (the core of which was the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post) conducted and supported continual humanitarian aid distribution missions (interagency missions) in the heaviest impacted areas of Port-au-Prince. 16 distribution sites were established to provide food, water, and medical care – for well over one million people. On 20 January, the hospital ship

USNS Comfort, equipped with surgical operating teams and orthopedic surgeons, arrived and began conducting round-the-clock medical support.

Because of the rapid deployment of the DoD Global Response Force, JTF-Haiti helped avert a major food and water crisis. Although more than 230,000 people died from the earthquake, the abundant and superior medical assistance provided by the U.S. military and the international community saved thousands of lives.

From the outset, JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked alongside counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), USAID, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Together they developed plans for protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) in makeshift camp – who were at great risk of further disaster due to the impending hurricane season and potential flooding. In February and early March, JTF-Haiti elements conducted comprehensive infrastructure assessments and then executed engineering projects – with the UN and NGOs – to mitigate the risk and reduce the number of people requiring relocation. Then, from mid-March through mid-May, JTF-Haiti supported the Haitian government, UN, USAID, and NGO partners by relocating IDPs from sites still at risk to transitional resettlement sites.

JTF-Haiti's Maritime Component Command, comprised of the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, conducted relief missions outside Port-au-Prince, to the west and to the north. Using the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces, these units brought relief to thousands of Haitians in the outlying regions.

Although the deployment of U.S. military forces and U.S. resources was quick and effective, it was not always efficient. The most significant challenge to the U.S. military – and to the international community – was logistics. Three specific areas presented major challenges to JTF-Haiti's logistical operations (to those of the international players):

- “Incomplete situational awareness” at the outset made it difficult to determine requirements and priorities for providing relief and delivering supplies.
- The “lack of a unified and integrated logistics command and control structure” led to gaps in reception, staging, and movement of forces, equipment, and supplies into Haiti. Logistics staffs were not always aware of many non-military activities and cargos.
- The “initial reliance on the one single airport” (Toussaint Louverture International Airport) for throughput, created the need to validate and prioritize all flights (including international flights) to ensure that only the most critical cargo landed.

JTF-Haiti had a proven logistical system to manage its own requirements; however, it was not designed for managing external flights, requirements, cargo, etc. In spite of this challenge, however, JTF-Haiti's airmen were able to increase flights at the international airport from 13 per day (pre-quake) to a peak of 150 per day. However, even this capacity fell short of the demand. SOUTHCOM's 12th Air Force, in coordination with the UN, then developed a system of time-slots and priorities – driven by the Haitian government – that at least served to meet Haiti's major requirements on a day-to-day basis.

The earthquake had rendered both of the two main piers of the Port-au-Prince seaport as “unusable.” JTF-Haiti, with assistance from U.S. Transportation Command, quickly established a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability to bring supplies in from the sea. This doubled the number of shipping containers received in Haiti from pre-quake numbers. Also, JTF-Haiti established a temporary port capability at the Port-au-Prince seaport through the use of two contracted Crowley barges. This further enhanced the flow of supplies into Haiti and reduced some pressure on the international airport.

From the beginning, the focus of JTF-Haiti was to save lives and mitigate suffering. Security – to protect the people from gangs, looting, and acts of violence – was also an initial concern. However, JTF-Haiti's close working relationship with MINUSTAH and the cooperation and professionalism by MINUSTAH in conducting security operations enabled the JTF to focus its efforts on humanitarian assistance operations. **In the first few days following the earthquake, Lieutenant General P.K. Keen (U.S./JTF-Haiti commander) and Major General Floriano Peixoto (Brazil/MINUSTAH force commander) discussed the necessity and a concept for a safe and secure environment. Bringing their staffs together on this issue ensured that priorities and workloads were aligned.** It enabled MINUSTAH to provide the requisite security, while JTF-H could then focus on delivery of food, water, and emergency medical care. Regular meetings between forces contributed to unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

Another excellent example of partnering was in the development and execution of the first major food distribution plan for Operation Unified Response. JTF-Haiti, the World Food Program, MINUSTAH, and various UN agencies contributed to this effort through joint and combined planning. The locations for 16 food distribution sites throughout Port-au-Prince and its surrounding communities were mapped out, requirements determined, and concepts of operation written, and then these critical sites were rapidly established and supported – for initial deliveries and sustained distribution. Through these nodes, and through the teamwork and communication between these partners (prompted and facilitated by JTF-Haiti), more than two million Haitians received much-needed food and water on a regular basis.

JTF-Haiti's "Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center" was the key node for facilitating the coordination and collaboration between JTF-Haiti and its partners. This coordination center pulled together, and tracked, the efforts of JTF-Haiti, MINUSTAH forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and numerous NGOs. This coordination center was manned by a 30 military personnel, including one general officer. This center, and the bulk of JTF-Haiti, operated on unclassified information systems and used commercially available programs/tools to build a humanitarian assistance common operating picture – shared with all participants.

On the information front, Facebook and Twitter were also used, not only to collect and disseminate information, but also to counter possible misinformation. JTF public affairs personnel used cameras on their cell phones to "Twitpic" key activities and then post them on Twitter and on JTF's Facebook page. The JTF-Haiti's Joint Information and Interagency Center also contributed to the JTF's information management and communication efforts. One of the key products from this center was daily talking points – which provided the overall communication goal, target audiences, themes, and top-line messages.

Although the U.S. administration had issued guidance that the Haitian relief effort was to be a unified whole-of-government effort, with USAID as the federal lead agency, the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of USAID and other players were not clearly defined. There were no specifications on subordinate relationships or divisions of labor. USAID had too few personnel on the ground to form and lead the robust planning that was required early on, for a crisis of this size and scope. Therefore, JTF-Haiti provided a number of planners to USAID to assist on this complex initial planning effort.

The close proximity of JTF-Haiti to the U.S. Embassy was a key factor for facilitating the desired whole-of-government response. The JTF established its headquarters next to the American embassy, which was also close to the MINUSTAH headquarters, and this physical co-location greatly simplified coordination, collaboration, and communication. Staff working relationships were quickly developed, and these relationships paid dividends throughout the operation. Additionally, liaison officers provided to/from JTF-Haiti also greatly benefited communication and unity of effort.

Initially, the JTF commanders and staff did not fully appreciate the number of humanitarian organizations that had been in Haiti since before the earthquake. There had been over 1,000 NGOs working with the UN Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance in Haiti. However, within the first couple weeks, the JTF worked closely with the UN (the UN Coordinating Support Committee in Haiti) to develop UN-approved coordination processes to fulfill perceived requirements – in which requirements were raised, validated, and passed to the appropriate organizations. The JTF additionally worked to coordinate requirements and activities within the UN "cluster system" to ensure unity of effort.



In the first few weeks, it became apparent that the biggest challenge facing the Haitian government was the IDPs – especially those who had set up spontaneous settlements in areas prone to flooding. At the strategic level, the JTF and USAID worked closely with the UN and the Haitian government to develop an IDP strategy. Upon agreement to this strategy, JTF engineering projects were accomplished – which mitigated the risks for those camps (9 major camps) that had been assessed as being likely to experience flooding during the rainy season. Then, approximately 6,000 people at other camps/sites still needed to be moved to safer ground. To complete the operation, the JTF provided the requisite engineering support, transportation assets, and civil affairs teams to the UN, and the endangered people were moved to safety. Various relief efforts continued well after this IDP protection/relocation project – and the partnering and unity of effort prompted by JTF-Haiti's innovations continued to enhance success.

### **Recommendations.**

The authors of this article, General P.K. (Ken) Keen and three Army officers who served in JTF-H, provide the following recommendations that the U.S. military, interagency, the UN, and the international community can apply for future disaster responses:

1. Develop a more robust and capable disaster response assessment and initial life-saving response team. (The Global Response Force was invaluable, but greater situational awareness was needed to set priorities and drive logistics.)
2. Have combatant commands maintain a JTF capable force (with Joint logistics capabilities adaptable to external requirements), trained and ready to deploy in support of a foreign disaster relief operation with the Global Response Force.
3. Develop an international disaster response framework for nations to deploy civilian and military capability to respond to disasters (a framework that allows inclusion in planning, logistics, and information systems).
4. Conduct exercises (with U.S. agencies, partner nations, and the UN) to develop relationships and refine processes and systems.
5. Codify the use of coordination centers like the U.S. JTF-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and UN coordinating support committee; make them adaptable to any existing partner-nation center.
6. Develop and codify unclassified information-sharing tools like JTF-Haiti's humanitarian assistance common operating picture; make them adaptable to any partner-nation's existing system.

7. Examine how best to integrate and support the NGOs and public/private sector in support of humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief. (Consider integration in both assessment teams and response teams.)

8. Tackle the internally displaced persons challenge immediately. (Identify IDP issues and develop appropriate solutions.)

### **Implications.**

If a disaster response framework is not developed to accommodate a “whole of international community” approach, and if exercises (involving U.S. agencies, partner nations, and the UN) are not conducted to clarify and develop relationships and to refine processes and systems, then USAID, DoD, State and others will be building support in an ad hoc manner, rather than in systematic/practiced manner to quickly deliver and efficiently sustain relief to disaster victims.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations](#)," by Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen and Lieutenant Colonels Matthew G. Elledge, Charles W. Nolan, and Jennifer L. Kimmey (U.S. Army), in Military Review, November-December 2010.

### **Comments.**

A related article, which discusses the use of new (unclassified) information systems to improve information-sharing and management during disaster relief operations is “Haiti Earthquake: Breaking New Ground in the Humanitarian Information Landscape,” U.S. Department of State - Humanitarian Information Unit, July 2010. See [SOLLIMS Lesson #681](#) for article and analysis.



**MG Floriano Peixoto and LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen talk with the camp leader of the Ancien Aeroport Militaire IDP camp in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Photo: U.S. Navy. 11 March 2010.**

## **e. TOPIC. Leadership Challenges with Multi-Continental Troops – UNIFIL Case (Lesson #1784)**

### **Observation.**

Leadership on UN peacekeeping missions – with troops from many different nations and cultures – presents an array of challenges for commanders, as experienced by a Polish officer assigned to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon ([UNIFIL](#)). His advice for becoming an “interculturally effective leader”: integrate differences, bridge differences, and tolerate differences.

### **Discussion.**

During the 9th International Lessons Learned Conference (ILLC), held in Tartu, Estonia in June 2015, one of the presenters, a Polish officer, gave a briefing on “Multinational Challenges for Leading Multi-Continental Troops – UNIFIL Case.” As a former commander/leader on the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission, he outlined the many challenges of leading and cooperating with participants from various countries/multiple continents, which sometimes resulted in cultural “confrontations.”

The most significant challenges were: (1) command & control; (2) different training and professional standards; (3) different Tactics, Techniques, and procedures (TTPs); (4) national caveats; (5) attitudes toward obeying orders; (6) attitudes toward following the battle rhythm; (7) cultural awareness; (8) personnel/identity recognition; (9) language; (10) religion; (11) post-colonial syndrome on the part of some members of a certain African contingent; and, (12) climate adaptability.

The officer cited the following Lessons for overcoming the noted challenges: (1) Acquire knowledge about your Partners; (2) Adapt your command style; (3) Make relationship-building a top priority; (4) Understand contingents’ capabilities; (5) Realize that your way is not the only way and that different approaches might be needed; (6) Conduct negotiation – consensus is crucial; (7) Gain understanding of contingents’ variations in English; (8) Establish a common sense of purpose; (9) Establish common SOPs; (10) Establish a Common Operating Picture (COP); (11) Promote equity of risk and reward; and, (12) Employ team-building actions and events.

His bottom line advice for future commanders was: integrate differences, bridge differences, and tolerate differences.

### **Recommendations.**

To integrate differences, bridge differences, and tolerate differences when leading multi-national troops, the briefer offered the following recommendations:

1. Hold integrated training events/exercises in-place to familiarize troops with standards.
2. Hold voluntary “cultural meetings” to allow leaders and troops to gain understanding of cultures represented.
3. Disseminate information about countries' holidays during those timeframes to promote learning/understanding.
4. Organize common free time activities/team-building events (sports, international days, etc.).
5. Disseminate fact sheets (about history, geography, political systems, military, military ranks, etc.) to enhance understanding of contingents.
6. Provide opportunities to learn foreign languages, including that of the host country.

### **Implications.**

Unless leaders take steps to bridge cultural differences of contingents within their command, these differences can lead to misunderstandings and confrontations which, in turn, can degrade conduct of operations.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the presentation “Challenges for Leading ‘Multi-Continental’ Troops – UNIFIL Case,” delivered by COL Miroslaw Smolarek, Chief, Reconnaissance & Command Departments, Military Academy of Land Forces, Poland, during the 9th ILLC, Tartu, Estonia, 2 June 2015. His slides are available in [SOLLIMS Lesson #1784](#).



**Formation of ‘multi-continental’ troops, UNIFIL.  
Photo from COL Smolarek’s 9<sup>th</sup> ILLC presentation.**

## **f. TOPIC. Establishing Civ-Mil Unified Action in a Deployed Environment (Lesson #1564)**

### **Observation**

Military leaders, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners, as well as their staffs and subordinate leaders, must fully understand the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization, in order to fully establish and exploit development unified action. This seemingly easy task is only accomplished through frequent and open dialogue across each contributing organization, and through frequent collaboration. These efforts nest the collective efforts of the developmental team, while simultaneously looking for opportunities to maximize the collective effects of the USG, Multinational partners and NGOs.

### **Discussion**

During my 2nd deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2007 to 2008, my brigade was privileged to have the support of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT); however, during this extended 15-month deployment, our brigade and the PRT didn't establish unified action or maximize our collective potential for the entire duration of the deployment. Quite frankly, the results of this shortcoming were that we wasted valuable time and resources trying to comprehend each other's roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and operational priorities, when we could have been effortlessly and efficiently providing assistance to the Iraqis and the Government of Iraq (GoI).

This friction began during our relief in place (RIP) as we arrived into our new area of operations (AO) and manifested for the next 6-8 months. As OIF progressed from a conventional military operation focused on combined arms maneuver and then transitioned into a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, the U.S. Army established a COIN Academy in Taji, Iraq in order to train and enlighten leaders on COIN operations as they arrived in theatre. The training was both rewarding and worthwhile; however, it didn't possess a single class or block of instruction on development and more importantly, PRTs. Additionally, although the leadership from the battalion that we were replacing made an effort to meet us at Taji prior to our final movement to our new AO, neither its parent brigade nor the region's PRT made an effort to send representatives.

As our brigade and battalions began arriving in the AO, the focus was clearly on maintaining security, transferring responsibilities, and handing over projects and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), while assisting our newly arrived units with understanding the VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) environment we were about to inherit. Again, at the battalion level, we weren't

made aware of, or introduced to, a single representative from the PRT. In fact, our perceptions and understandings of the PRT at this point mirrored those of the battalion we were replacing, because their perspective was the only perspective we had, and it wasn't a positive one. We didn't meet a single representative from the PRT for nearly four months after the completion of our RIP, and the first introduction of a single member was merely to provide the agriculture representative with a security patrol, so that he could inspect a grain project within our AO. Over the next month or so, our only interactions with the PRT were through project inspection security patrols, and these were limited to the platoon level. PRT representatives would fly to our outlying forward operating base (FOB), be met on the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) by one of our platoon leaders, and then they'd depart for the inspection after a short patrol brief. Once the inspection was complete, the platoon leader would ensure the PRT representative was safely onboard his/her return flight, and then the platoon leader would submit his patrol outbrief to the battalion operations officer. Our battalion received no official outbrief from either our brigade or the PRT with regards to the support provided or the project inspected. At this point in the deployment, the only feedback we'd receive was through the platoon leader who provided the security and who engaged the PRT representative.

As our battalion began understanding our AO, our GoI representatives, and the needs of our local populace, we began submitting development project requests through our brigade. Unbeknownst to our staff, a number of the project requests had to be routed through the PRT for approval and feedback. This wasn't known or anticipated until the PRT began rejecting projects because they countered objectives and development projects the PRT was either leading or developing. As a result of our battalion's frustration with the PRT's oversight into our AO and the fact that we had yet to actually meet and collaborate with members of the PRT, our battalion commander demanded a meeting with representatives from our region's PRT.

As a result, it took our battalion nearly 6-8 months to fully understand the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each development contributing organization within our AO and understand who could provide, fund, approve or support our development efforts. It's worth noting that our battalion served as our brigade's decisive effort for resources, funding and support. Although our brigade was applauded for eventually establishing "What Right Looks Like" with regards to development unified action, it could have been accomplished much earlier.

### **Recommendations.**

1. Conduct a joint, combined, JIIM and multilateral operations and intelligence (O&I) briefing each time a new organization or task force (TF) is brought together or replaced within a specific area of operation or region. The briefings should include the following at a minimum: each organization's roles, functions, goals,

objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities for the specific mission.

2. Establish and/or invite representation to each board, cell, working group, and staff section meeting to maintain transparency, collaboration, and unified action.

3. If applicable, civ-mil leadership should conduct battlefield circulation with representatives from the JIIM team in order to address subordinate unit requests for information and understanding.

4. Mandate and establish development specific training venues and professional development forums during home station training, pre-deployment preparation, and combat training center (CTC) experiences.

### **Implications.**

Without fully understanding the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization of the civ-mil team, the following could occur:

1. The USG, the U.S. military, the JIIM contributing members, and NGOs will not achieve unified action.

2. Instead of establishing trust, transparency and collaboration, friction, mistrust, avoidance, and development fratricide will set in, as each organization reverts to a stove-piped approach vice a unified approach.

3. The affected nation, region, and population will be denied both timely assistance and the full benefits of the civ-mil unified effort.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on a 15-month deployment to Kirkuk, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007-2008.



**Gen. Mark Hertling (Cdr, MND-North), PRT members, and Iraqi leaders discuss drought issues at FOB Warhorse. Photo by SPC Ryan Elliott, 14<sup>th</sup> PA Det. 17 July 2008.**

### **3. CONCLUSION**

Recent peace, stability, and humanitarian operations across the globe illustrate the importance of good, strong, ethical leadership – particularly by senior leaders. Key recommendations from lessons within this publication include:

- Senior leaders need to emphasize the importance of Protection of Civilians – whether included in the mandate or not. They should mentor subordinate leaders on the subjects of Protection of Civilians, Rules of Engagement, Use of Force, and Force Protection. They should establish an organizational climate that has elements of trust, unity of effort, and information-sharing – to facilitate responding to crises.
- Organizations/agencies should address “success attributes” for senior leaders during pre-deployment training/education sessions. Attributes:
  - Visioning
  - Mapping the environment
  - Cross-cultural savvy
  - Interpersonal maturity
  - Unity of effort and purpose
  - Strategic communication
  - Determination toward the vision
- Senior leaders should build relationships with partners at the outset of operations. They should establish coordination centers/mechanisms and make them adaptable for partners’ involvement. They should encourage use of unclassified information-sharing systems/tools and the integration of inputs from all stakeholders into a common operating picture.
- Leaders should take steps to help bridge cultural differences between their organization and partner nation organizations, as well as cultural differences between their organization and the people of the host nation. In other words, leaders should work to ensure cultural understanding and tolerance across the organization. This can be done through educational sessions, cultural events/meetings, team-building activities, information dissemination, etc.
- When a “golden hour” or “window of opportunity” for conflict transformation emerges, leaders should focus on the following actions:
  - Consolidate the state’s monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law
  - Operationalize “human security”
  - Mobilize “networks for peace” to counterbalance the “networks for violence”



- Senior leaders should maximize opportunities for junior leaders to participate in pre-deployment training, education, and professional development forums related to civ-mil partnering in complex operations. Upon deployment, senior leaders should ensure that junior leaders are made aware of civ-mil partners operating in their area and afford them opportunities to attend meetings/briefings with partners as appropriate.

Through further dissemination of these lessons on “leadership in crisis and complex operations” – as well as through thoughts and perspectives shared at the 10<sup>th</sup> ILLC – civilian and military leaders may be better postured for success in future crisis and complex operations.

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## Annex A

### 10<sup>th</sup> ILLC Focus Areas

#### Focus Areas

Four Focus Areas were selected by the host to fully utilize the information and lessons sharing during the 10<sup>th</sup> ILLC, 15-18 May 2017. To maximize the four themes, a further 20 topics have been provided (listed below) to concentrate the presenters' discussions and maximize the knowledge-sharing experience.

#### 1. Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations

- What does right look like? Moral and ethical decisions that are critical to operational success.
- Current operations – understanding decisive change.
- Impulse decision-making vs. preparation and repetition.
- Knowledge Management – It is more than just information sharing.
- Understanding different leadership modules and decision-making processes from our Coalition Partners and other agencies.
- Is enough being done to develop our junior leaders?

#### 2. Defense Engagement

- Planning and understanding Defense Engagement.
- Capacity Building – What does excellence look like?
- Sharing lessons from Capacity Building.
- Soft skills critical to Defense Engagement.
- The role of women in Defense Engagement.

#### 3. Working in an Interagency Environment

- Planning and understanding the environment.
- Knowledge Management and information-sharing.
- Success factors of working in an Interagency environment.
- Utilizing innovation and adaptable practices.

#### 4. Red Teaming (Enhancing our Critical Thinkers)

- What do the leaders of the future look like?
- Growing critical thinkers vs. recruiting critical thinkers.
- Enhancing innovation and creative minds.
- Do critical thinkers make better leaders?
- The role of emotional intelligence quotient (EQ) and cognitive intelligence quotient (CQ) within Critical Thinking.

## Annex B

### Top Ten Observations from Operation Unified Response (2010 Haiti Earthquake Relief)

- 1) Respond quickly and effectively.
- 2) Protect the people always.
- 3) Build partnerships with key players.
- 4) Coordinate and collaborate to achieve unity of effort.
- 5) Communicate – Communicate – Communicate.
- 6) Support the lead federal agency within clearly defined roles.
- 7) Pull from all available resources to form the Joint Task Force.
- 8) Include the Host Nation Government as much as possible.
- 9) Work closely with the UN humanitarian community.
- 10) Anticipate challenges with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).



Source: “[LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response](#),”  
LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen (U.S. Army), 17 January 2010

## Annex C

### Additional References, Lessons, and Articles

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items]

- [“CALL Newsletter 10-46: Complex Operations,”](#) Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), June 2010
- [“The Challenge of Leadership in the Interagency Environment,”](#) William J. Davis, Jr., Military Review, September-October 2010
- [“Civil-Military Leaders’ Workshop 2015 – Insights Paper,”](#) Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC), June 2015
- [“Commander’s Moral Obligation to Protect Civilians,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 1320, David Mosinski, 20 February 2014
- [“Defining Command, Leadership, and Management Success Factors within Stability Operations,”](#) Dave Fielder, PKSOI Papers, June 2011
- [“Leadership Gaps Diminish Protection of Civilians \(POC\) Mandate Implementation by UNMISS,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 2551, Katrina Gehman, 2 Feb 2017
- [“Leading Together,”](#) a leadership film, ACMC, 30 March 2017
- [“Leading United Nations Peace Operations,”](#) Maj. Gen. (Ret) Robert Gordon, 16 February 2017
- [“Stability Operations in Haiti 2010: A Case Study,”](#) Emma Vialpando, PKSOI Papers, 31 March 2017
- [“Strategic Leadership Competencies for Peacekeeping Operations,”](#) Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Mendes Lauria (Brazilian Army), April 2009
- [“Strategic Leadership Primer,”](#) 3rd edition, edited by Colonel (Ret) Stephen J. Gerras, U.S. Army War College, 2010
- “Strategic Leadership for Transition,” Colonel Bryan A. Groves, in [“Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance,”](#) edited by Harry R. Yarger, PKSOI conference report, 18 August 2011
- [“Strengthening the Selection, Preparation, Support and Appraisal of Senior Leadership in Peace Operations,”](#) Dr. Jibecke Joensson, 8 March 2017
- [“Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide,”](#) Joint Staff J7, 31 August 2013
- [“Working Together in the Field for Effective Humanitarian Response,”](#) L. Saavedra and P. Knox-Clarke, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)/Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 13 February 2015

## Annex D

### Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers (Available in [SOLLIMS Library](#))

#### 2017

- Civil Affairs in Stability Operations

#### 2016

- Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Strategic Communication / Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations
- Stabilization and Transition
- Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations
- Building Stable Governance
- Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

#### 2015

- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief]
- Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Security Sector Reform

#### 2014

- Reconstruction and Development
- Women, Peace and Security
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”
- Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces

#### 2013

- Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Multinational Operations
- Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People
- Protection of Civilians

#### 2012

- Medical Assistance / Health Services
- Reconciliation
- Civ-Mil Cooperation
- Building Capacity

#### 2011

- Ministerial Advising
- Fighting Corruption
- Economic Stabilization

#### 2010

- Transition to Local Governance
- Rule of Law and Legitimacy
- Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

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