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INSIDE: Human Resource Development Efforts by the Japanese Contingents in East Timor

Strategic Imperative for Host Country Economic Capacity Building: "Unity of Understanding"

Supporting the Rule of Law in Fragile States: Prison Medicine

Building Intellectual Capacity in Partner Defense Forces

Developing Host Nation Law Enforcement Capacity for Security Transition

Capacity Building in Korea: A Success Story



[HTTP://PKSOI.ARMY.MIL](http://PKSOI.ARMY.MIL) Thinking Strategically About Building Capacity

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It would be easy to think of Building Partner Capacity (BPC) as the latest military buzzword; however, it is actually a renewed concept shaped by the United States' experience and thinking over the last decade. In recent U.S. strategic guidance, BPC serves as a centerpiece concept focused on whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches. It is also integral to stability operations. As Army doctrine and strategic thought begin to formally embrace the implications of BPC, the PKSOI July Journal explores a few unique aspects of this initiative.



Dr. Rich Yarger sets the tone for this Journal with "Thinking Strategically about Building Capacity." He argues that capacity within a state is an important strategic idea and is always linked to state resiliency – they should be considered together. A strategic perspective focuses capacity building efforts while minimizing the pitfalls of corruption and dependency. Thinking strategically about capacity building provides greater likelihood of long-term success of the partner nation with a corresponding opportunity to form a new partnership for international stability.

In his article "Building Intellectual Capacity in Partner Defense Forces," Professor Raymond Millen contends that developing strategic planning mechanisms and mentoring government officials on rational decision-making are among the best contributions the United States can give another nation state – transcending both the training and equipping functions of security force assistance. He identifies what "good" defense policies and mechanisms look like and describes the potential pitfalls associated with faulty strategic thinking.

Professor Richard Coplen's "Strategic Imperative for Host Country Economic Capacity Building: 'Unity of Understanding'" addresses how specific microeconomic measures promote economic recovery in fragile states. By taking a microeconomic approach at the local, as opposed to national, level, small businesses become the focus of assistance, promising to promote local markets and in turn strengthening long-term national capacity development.

Ms. Jacqueline Chura-Beaver addresses building law enforcement capacity in "Developing Host Nation Law Enforcement

Capacity for Security Transition." She reviews how the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provides an effective approach to law enforcement, forensics, and corrections capacities. Ultimately, she explains, the trajectory of the program must zero-in on long-term development strategies and its implications on the entire criminal justice system and associated institutions rather than, principally, on individual training.

In their article, "Supporting the Rule of Law in Fragile States: Prison Medicine," COL John McGrath and COL Roberto Nang address the importance of a prison system's medical care to support Rule of Law. The combination of humanitarian assistance and good medical care within the prison system strengthens both Rule-of Law and insurgent/criminal reconciliation.

The PKSOI Japanese exchange officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hiroaki Takano, writes of the Japanese success to build civil engineering capacity for a UN peacekeeping operation in "Military Support to Building Civilian Capacity: Human Resource Development Efforts by the Japanese Contingents in East Timor." From his perspective, providing operator and maintenance skills on heavy equipment has increased East Timorese ownership in construction projects.

Captain (USPHS) Bruno Himmler similarly proposes in his article "Negative Health Impacts Related to Conflict: Identifying Key Areas for USG Engagement," that those involved in public health should work together to mitigate and deal with the short and long-term effects of conflict. These effects not only include the more obvious risk factors but also the less obvious, severe and often disabling, psychological harm.

Finally, COL Bryan Groves' "Capacity Building in Korea – A Success Story" examines the history of capacity building in the Republic of Korea, first by Japan and then by the United States. The article highlights a few strategic insights concerning capacity building in Korea: Japan and the United States focused on capacity building and not elusive nation building; both countries invested in human capital to build capital investment; and the Korean people took the lead in building their country, eschewing over-dependence on international assistance. Both Japan and the United States helped shape progressive thinking, management, and leadership of the Korean people through their capacity building efforts.

Thinking Strategically About Building Capacity

Harry R. (Rich) Yarger, Ph.D., PKSOI



Since the end of the Cold War, individual states and the international community have been challenged by an increasing instability resulting from numerous causes: natural disasters, internal conflicts, transnational terrorism and crime, and chronic and seemingly overwhelming societal problems. While not new in human history, the globalized environment of the 21st century make these issues more complex and interrelated. Broad access to information and global mobility informs populations of issues, internationalizes relative social progress, and empowers non-state actors. Informed populations demand more of their governments at home and abroad. Members of the greater international community respond to the plight of troubled states and their populations in various ways.

States intervene to preserve or enhance regional stability or for their own security, sometimes as members of an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) and other times as ad hoc coalitions or unilaterally. On other occasions, grave humanitarian concerns motivate state interventions. States and IGOs have not been alone in acting. The number of NGOs grew exponentially following the fall of the Berlin Wall as concerned people and organizations sought to improve conditions in troubled states in numerous ways, ranging from immediate humanitarian relief to longer-term development efforts.

Increasingly, a number of so-called fragile, failing, or failed states rely on continued international intervention and assistance to meet their populations' needs. A dawning realization has emerged among donor nations and organizations: humanitarian assistance and externally imposed security, while often essential in the immediate term, are not a panacea for the longer run and create their own issues of dependency, corruption, and conflict.

The general conclusion from experience over the last decade—and particularly from the investments in Iraq and Afghanistan—is that providing the host nation with unlimited external assistance or fulfilling an ideal list of state “capabilities” does not a functioning state make. Furthermore, if the number of troubled states and cycle of state dependency continue to grow, the international order will no longer be able to sustain the escalating demands on donors, even if domestic populations and NGO supporters do not first run out of patience. Long-term success requires effective capacity-building within host nations, leading to new contributing member states within the interna-

tional order. If that conclusion is right—and this author agrees that it is—it suggests that if we seek such strategic success, we should understand and think strategically about capacity and capacity-building.

Capacity

Capacity within a state is an important strategic idea. In its broadest sense state capacity is the sum of the power of the whole of the state and its people, and their talent and willingness in developing, integrating, and using the state's power. Hence, capacity is always about tangible and intangible state resources—the sum of a state's realized and potential power. For example, Iraq possesses oil reserves and realizes revenue from them. Yet, Iraq also possesses great human capital—an intangible resource it has not yet brought to bear fully on its problems.

State power can best be understood from the perspective of elements and instruments of power. The elements of power consist of natural and social determinants. Natural determinants are such things as geography, population, and natural resources. Social determinants are the economic, military, political, and socio-psychological power within a state. “Elements of power measure a nation's [inherent] capacity to do something and are a measure of potential power. Instruments of power are tools that can be applied and are a measure of capability. Instruments—useable power—are the potential of the capacity converted to capabilities.”¹

The actual power of the state equals the existence of the appropriate instruments for the circumstances plus government effectiveness plus the national will to act. At the highest level and at its best, realized capacity is the measure of the aggregate ability of the state to exercise its sovereign responsibilities internally and externally. It encompasses the physical and social-psychological attributes of the state and its people. However, capacity is neither ideal nor constant; it is always contextual. Understanding of and experience in applying its capacity by a government and its population are directly related to a state's resilience.

Resiliency

State resiliency is the potential ability of a state as a complex system to recover from crisis or longer term strategic setbacks.

Strategic setbacks are circumstances so significant that they threaten to overwhelm the existing capacity of the state and its people to sustain appropriate levels of success for a fully functioning 21st century state. Consequently, strategic setbacks invariably pose questions of legitimacy and sovereignty for the governments of states. Humanitarian crises or governmental collapse from natural disasters and conflict are obvious examples of potential setbacks. Economic failure or long term stagnation can also pose such a setback.² In the latter case, a state can be simply a victim of the ongoing changes in the strategic environment.

Theoretically, resiliency consists of three fundamental components: the amount of change a state can undergo and still retain control over its functions and structure; the degree to which the state can successfully self-organize in the face of a challenge or change; and the respective society's ability to build and increase its capacity for learning and adaptation to overcome the setback. Resiliency in a state also is related to its geography: geostrategic position, terrain, resources, and peoples.

The United Nations has defined resiliency from a disaster perspective as:

The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.³

Resiliency of the state therefore has physical, social, and cultural aspects: it is about geography and human systems—involving all the state's capacity: power in terms of resources, capabilities, abilities, identity, confidence, and will. The assessment of such potential in the present time, informed by the state's history and culture, provides an estimation of the aggregate resiliency of a particular state. It is also contextual and the nature of any potential strategic setback must be considered in assessing resiliency. A weak resiliency makes recovery more problematic: a stronger resiliency makes rapid recovery more probable. In either case, a strategic approach to capacity-building is required.

On one hand, how the resiliency characteristics can be used and the synergies that can be created among them in regard to the setback and its consequences determine resiliency's role and value in any consideration of a capacity-building strategy for a host state. On the other hand, in building capacity, creating

resiliency must be one of many objectives because the development of resiliency is the key to a more rapid and less costly recovery in future strategic setbacks.

While not predictable with certainty, the assessment of resiliency by intervening states and organizations is important. It provides insights in regard to strategic questions such as whether or not to intervene, what expectations should be vis-à-vis plausible end states, what objectives to seek, what concepts best serve the objectives, and what potential costs and risks are involved? Resiliency assessment has value at the tactical and operational levels also, however, it must always be understood in the context of the broader strategic picture. Its purpose is to shape how capacity building is pursued.

A Strategic Perspective of Capacity Building

All fragile, failing, and failed states are the result of diminished relative capacity as a result of internal or external factors—or some combination of both. Relative to the challenges it confronts, whether social, economic, or conflict related, the state and its people lack the necessary capacity to overcome the adversity and challenges confronting them. Consequently, capacity building is a logical strategic imperative of any international assistance effort.

U.S. Army doctrine defines capacity building as: “The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems.”⁴ The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction defines it as: “The transfer of technical knowledge and skills to host nation individuals and institutions to help them develop effective processes and administer state services across the economic, social, political, and security realms.”⁵ These definitions are helpful but not sufficient in and of themselves to produce an effective capacity building strategic perspective.

From a 21st century strategic perspective, capacity building is those decisions, processes, and activities undertaken by a host nation, its citizens and its international supporters to develop and apply more effectively and efficiently its inherent elements of power in order to best serve its citizens while participating positively in a competitive, globalized world order. Such a perspective in light of an understanding of capacity and resiliency has significant implications for how to approach capacity building.

A recent RAND assessment of countries emerging from conflict lists the major economic capacity areas as: humanitarian assis-

tance; infrastructure; agriculture; currencies, budgets, banking and finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; and natural resource management. It identifies the processes involved as: creating physical security; providing jobs; undertaking policy reforms; reconstructing infrastructure and providing public services; and building institutional capacity.⁶ Economics is just one area of capacity building, it demonstrates the complexity and systemic nature of capacity building. The economic sector interrelates and interacts with other sectors such as security, rule of law, and governance. Capacity building is a strategic level issue.

Capacity building must be proactive and anticipate how the host nation will fit productively into the world order. It does not try to reconstruct the host nation's past but rather bridges the nation's past to an emerging positive future. To do this, both the host government and donor states and organizations must arrive at and pursue compatible policies and strategies. Hence, capacity building is founded in effective partnerships within the state and between the state and its external supporters. It is comprehensive in its approach.

In developing ways forward, context matters. The physical geographic environment, international dynamics, domestic fiscal and political environments, and culture, expectations, talent, and will of all participants matter. Both the United States Institute of Peace and the RAND study emphasize context—past, present, and future.⁷ Success is always a factor of the host nation's past experience—strategic values and narrative, what is achieved, and the expectations of the people affected. A strategic perspective helps communicate to the various audiences what is being done and why. In this regard, it makes clear the distinction between immediate humanitarian and security needs and the building of longer term capacity.


Capacity building must be considered from a holistic perspective. Success does not flow from the “best possible” improvement of any particular aspect of a state's power, but from the integrated development of all aspects with emphasis placed as to gain synergies leading to a fully functioning and resilient state. A picture perfect military security sector that the economic base of the state cannot support represents neither a viable state nor a feasible security paradigm. Nonetheless, capacity-building must center on some root source or sources of state power that form the basis of future viability. Singapore assured its future by focusing on human capital.⁸ And while human capital is always important, other states have focused on inherent natural resources, international trade, and other aspects of potential internal power.

Capacity building is inherently a human enterprise and not solely a consideration of objective factors. Belief systems, resistance to change, and human fallacies are obstacles and part of the larger friction to be anticipated. For example, modern governance builds capacity—international good will, resource management, human capital, rule of law, security, and viable economic systems—that empower citizens to take advantage of competitive opportunities. Consequently, good governance often works against elites who cannot or do not want to compete in an open society. Such elites prefer to see the population trapped in a painful status quo rather than risk their advantageous status in progressive change.

Capacity-building is focused on long term success of the state. While any good capacity building approach seeks to be efficient, it cannot favor efficiency at the expense of effectiveness. The greater efficiency and effectiveness for both the host nation and donors come from future state viability and resilience.


Ultimately, capacity building is manifested as projects to be implemented, but they must be founded in and linked and integrated together through a strategic perspective. If they are not, unintended consequences follow. For example, it is possible for external actors to exceed the capacity of the host nation to accept the supporting actors' assistance or for supporting states and non-state actors to have more resources than they have the capacity to deliver and manage. It is also possible for unrealistic demands of a host to exceed the capacity or will of others to help. When these circumstances exist, trust is lost and it affects the manner in which capabilities are acquired and applied, more often than not creating unfavorable second and third order strategic effects. Such unintended effects can include rises in corruption, crime, inflation, dependency, and conflict as well as issues of effectiveness and efficiency.

In addition, if the policy vision of either donors or host outstrips the capacity of the donors and the host nation, the shortfall creates strategic consequences. When this occurs, too often the solutions to the shortcomings are ad hoc and unrelated to expectations. Consequently, they create opportunities for opportunists and lead to greater unintended and undesirable second and third order effects. When the end desired exceeds the existing capabilities, any solution should consider capacity building as an inherent requirement for strategy and planning. Sequential and cumulative strategies are potential ways to buy time. If action is paramount, then migration strategies and contingency planning become priorities. In either case, effective strategic communications are paramount.



A strategic perspective minimizes harm while creating near and long-term opportunities for recovery and future growth at the local and state levels. Assistance is often needed and appropriate. However, get assistance wrong and the situation worsens, compelling someone to go back and undo the damage.

Conclusion

The favorable world order sought by the United States and most other modern states is dependent on a collective body of successful states in positive political and economic competition. Such a body raises the social well-being of the world's peoples and closes the seams in the international order that allow criminal, insurgent, and other malevolent actors to flourish. Inherent within the modern environment of positive competition is a degree of risk of a strategic setback. The international order and its leading powers must insure each state against such setbacks in order to sustain a global community. Some level of state capacity building or rebuilding is implicit in such a guarantee. Strategic capacity building in such states produces or ensures strategic international partners—states who are part of the solution in maintaining an acceptable stability in the international order as opposed to the source of the instability. 

¹Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 11-14.,

²Resilience Alliance, “Resilience;” available from <http://www.resalliance.org/576.php>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2009.

³United Nations, *Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives (2004 Version)*; Available at http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-lwr-2004-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 6 January 2004, 15-16.

⁴Headquarters Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations*, Washington, DC., October 2008, Glossary-3.

⁵United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2009), Appendix E, 11-228.

⁶Keith Crane, et.al., *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009) 6, 13.

⁷United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 9-133 to 9-134. Crane, et.al., *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*, 8, 18.

⁸Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 35-40.

Building Intellectual Capacity in Partner Defense Forces by Professor Raymond Millen, PKSOI



A nation's enduring security capacity ultimately rests on a foundation of independence, sustainment, and resiliency to shocks. Along these lines, countries providing security force assistance, inter alia, to a host nation should remain keenly sensitive to the multi-ordered effects of their policies and strategy initiatives. A classic illustration of unintended consequences is the U.S. assistance rendered to the former Republic of Vietnam, which had become so dependent on the United States that it succumbed to the North Vietnamese 1975 invasion rather promptly after the U.S. Congress abrogated its bilateral treaties and funding agreements with the American ally. Fundamentally, the most powerful assistance a great power can provide a fragile state—through the use of mentors—is the gift of intellectual development. With the power of reasoning, a small country can solve great problems. Without the capability of strategic thinking, a nation state risks becoming a ward of the international community. Establishing a modern, professional military is of no use if the host nation cannot exert it properly, maintain it, and foster its maturity.

More so than any other means, mentors or advisors are primarily responsible for assisting in the development of a host nation's defense establishment. In view of the fact that mentors generally rotate on an annual basis, it behooves them to recognize what good institutions look like and what policy traps to avoid. The “good” sought can reasonably be self-sufficiency, stability, and perhaps a security partnership. In contrast, pitfalls may be excessive dependence on other powers, excessive defense expenditures which lead to economic and regional insecurity, and a security supplicant. Mentors should remain cognizant of the relationship between policy initiatives and path dependency. Path dependency is the adoption of a policy or strategy from which a state cannot deviate without severe costs. ¹This article addresses three areas for building intellectual capacity in partner defense forces: the value of a strategic defense planning system, the importance of a staffing mechanism for national security policy and strategy formulation, and the necessity of balanced host nation military institutions. None of these initiatives requires substantial financial assistance, and the payoff for all involved is a partner who contributes to international stability.

The Value of a Strategic Defense Planning System.

The good produced from a strategic defense planning system



From left to right, Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, met with Pakistan Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and Afghan Chief of General Staff Gen. Sher Mahammed Karimi, during a Tripartite Commission, Dec. 23, 2010. (Photo by U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer Joshua Treadwell)

lies in its predictability and reasoned decisions. As might be expected, the creation of national defense forces starts with a strategic assessment, which in turn should form the quintessence of the national security policy or strategy. The formulation of national security policy—and hence all subordinate processes—necessitates the participation of the appropriate host nation officials (both civilian and military).

The portion of the strategic assessment that addresses national security should focus on the strategic effects desired of the military establishment. Accordingly, the new defense forces should provide adequate defense of the state, require small defense expenditures (i.e., less than five percent of the GDP), and possess a degree of interoperability with allies.

Determining the size, composition, and structure of defense forces is a logical outcome of a strategic defense planning process. The process provides the rational framework regarding every aspect of the military forces. The annual defense planning cycle is iterative, permitting small revisions of documents rather than sweeping changes.

Publication of the national security policy is the catalyst for the strategic defense planning cycle. It contains the national threat assessment, national security objectives, concepts, and guidance, as well as the articulation of ends, ways, and means. The national security policy is reviewed annually, but is only revised when necessary.

The strategic defense planning system comprises three basic documents in descending order: national military strategy, defense planning guidance, and defense capabilities planning guidance. Each document aligns its contents with the document preceding it and serves as the catalyst for the document immediately below it. Generally, the national military strategy focuses on military threats and articulates strategic ends, ways, and means. It provides strategic guidance for the military services to develop the defense planning guidance. In turn, the defense planning guidance identifies operational threats and goals, which develop prioritized operational missions and guidance. This document establishes the organizational structures of the services as well as the duties and responsibilities of the army, air force, and navy staffs and major commands. As the title implies, the defense capabilities planning guidance focuses on capabilities, ranging from recruitment to retirement. It directs planning and training requirements for major headquarters, and it provides programming guidance as well as prioritized required capabilities.

Ideally, force management and the defense budget shape and are shaped by the defense planning documents. The reality is that force size, armaments, and defense budgets are naturally contentious issues for all parties involved. Accordingly, the strategic defense planning system should serve as the definitive authority for defense matters. Without the logic of the system, government officials may very well make defense decisions based on unsubstantiated fears, a confusion of means with ends, or old fashioned parochialism.

Pitfalls to Guard Against. Inasmuch as building partner capacity in military institutions is both difficult and frustratingly slow, the temptation for mentors to write the documents themselves and present them to the host nation officials is strong...and ultimately self-defeating. Historical experience suggests that host nationals will gladly allow mentors to produce documents and pretend to find them useful as long as the money continues to flow. Unfortunately, they learn little from the process and are less likely to follow the policies (or even know the contents therein). Additionally, mentors ought to be vigilant to simple, one-dimensional explanations and solutions to strategic issues. For example, in Afghanistan, the common explanations for the

high attrition rate in the army are low salaries, lack of sufficient benefits, and illiteracy. The issue at hand is not the accuracy of these explanations; rather it is that they are accepted without question or analysis. Another explanation for the high attrition rate could be that warlords are sending their militiamen to receive superb training and equipment in order to bolster their power base. The point is that before embarking on expensive solutions, the issue should be staffed and debated.

The Importance of a Staffing Mechanism for National Security Policy and Strategy Formulation.

The good produced by inculcating the use of staffs is the promotion of order and rational policymaking in government. Strategists and policymakers are more apt to make better decisions when they receive integrated information from the government bureaucracy and have the issues debated in their presence before making a decision. Mentors must pay particular attention to staff organization. In his book, *Strategy and the National Security Professional*, Harry R. Yarger explains that the strategic environment is too complex and chaotic for simple solutions to issues. There will always be multi-ordered effects from policy decisions, so host nation government officials should have the benefit of thorough assessments and learn the art and science of strategic thinking. In this regard, mentors should be well-versed in the intellectual and organizational mechanisms for policy-making.² This is not a sterile process, devoid of a human face. As strategic theorist Colin Gray emphasizes, "Strategy is not a theoretical exercise, but a practical activity involving human beings."³ It is due to this human dimension that strategy has a profound impact on state and human behavior.

A rational system for national decision policy formulation helps shield policy-makers from ex parte and parochial influences. Fortified with the pertinent facts, knowledge of diverse viewpoints, and the implications of a policy, decision makers can rebuff advice which incidentally favors certain sectors of society. The mechanism is no guarantee that some leaders will not practice cronyism and patronage, but it does provide protection for those leaders with noble intentions.

Pitfalls to Guard Against. Without due scrutiny of defense issues, it is quite common for the host government to view the military as a panacea for a host of problems, videlicet, insurgency, civic laxity, and foreign threats, among others. Consequently, the military can grow well beyond what is adequate over a short time period. The most immediate impact of an oversized defense force is the possible emergence of a regional security dilemma. A security dilemma can develop when a country embarks on a military expansion program, which in turn causes



Senegalese military officials perform a pass in review of their troops at the beginning of the closing ceremony for Flintlock 10 May 22, 2010, in Theis, Senegal. Flintlock is a special operations forces exercise focused on military interoperability and capacity-building and is part of a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored annual exercise program with partner nations in north and west Africa. (DoD photo by Master Sgt. Jeremiah Erickson, U.S. Air Force/Released)

neighboring states to increase defense expenditures in turn. In short order, a region can become unstable as fear, mistrust, and competition define state behavior. A security dilemma is what essentially plagued the European continent in the 19th and early 20th centuries, leading to arms races, colonial competition, shifting alliances, numerous small wars, and two world wars that devastated Europe. It is worth noting that professed benign intentions hardly mollify neighbors since intentions can change for the worse.

Mentors ought to be aware that self-interest is the primary driver of human activity. This is not to charge that humankind is devoid of altruism or virtue; it is not. Rather it is the transgressive minority that causes the majority of problems. Defense planning mentors must recognize that whenever vast amounts of money are involved a pernicious entente can materialize among the defense establishment, defense corporations, and the legislative branch of government. Legislators, driven by elections and patronage, favor initiatives that bring employment and money into their districts and provinces. If awarded contracts defense firms offer the promise of jobs in specific locales. The military establishment often lobbies legislators for equipment and weapons that enhance national security. Moreover, the location of military posts and bases are always of interest to legislators because of the largess of jobs and federal money.⁴ While this behavior is not a new phenomenon, defense planning mentors might keep this entente

in mind as officials begin lobbying for larger defense expenditures, which ostensibly defy logic. Reliance on the strategic defense planning system and the staffing mechanism for strategy and policy formulation can do more to bolster intellectual capacity building than any other tool.

The Necessity of Balanced Host Nation Military Institutions. The good produced from balanced defense forces is a matter of sustainable defense expenditures once the benefactors withdraw from the host nation. For the vast majority of countries, an adequate military is more durable than a superlative one. Nothing is worse than saddling a fragile state with a white elephant military.

Most notable, the creation of military institutions always benefits from a holistic approach, and the sooner the organizational structures are established before parochialisms take root, the better. The component services, videlicet, land, air, and naval, should reach an immediate accommodation on their contributions to national security. With limited budgets and resources, each service must accept it will not get everything it deems necessary; hence bargaining must ensue. Often, the optimal division of the defense burden is not apparent, so the logic of the strategic defense planning system should provide the framework for debate. Similarly, the branches within each service: combat, combat support, and combat service support, should remain in correct proportions as the force matures. Sometimes called the tooth-to-tail ratio, the personnel, administrative, and logistical support services are noticeably larger than the fighting forces and the ratio increases as the size of the force and level of sophistication increase. Hence, the initial task is to determine the proper size and the level of sophistication required for the state to defend itself adequately.


Another fundamental question is whether military service should be conscript or volunteer. For fragile states, a conscript army is more cost efficient, promotes civic duty and loyalty to the nation, and is more closely connected with and representative of the citizenry. What young democracies need to avoid is the impression that the military is a tool of government oppression rather than security. Conscription also permits greater oversight of the ethnic distribution within the army. With a volunteer force, it is easier for power brokers to fill the rank and file with favored ethnic groups if oversight is not vigilant. For example, though the ethnic distribution guidelines for the Afghan National Army are 38 percent Pashtun and 25 percent Tajik, the actual distribution is 30 percent Pashtun and 41 percent Tajik.⁵ Whether this is a calculated power play by ethnic Tajik government officials is debatable; however, the issue may

become a source of mistrust of the central government among non-Tajik Afghans. It might transpire that as the state matures, voluntary service will become preferable to the government and the populace, but in view of the increase in support (i.e., recruitment, veterans administration, etc.) and financial (i.e., salaries, bonuses, benefits, pensions, etc.) requirements for a voluntary force, the economy should be robust enough to sustain it.

Pitfalls to Guard Against. President Eisenhower sagely warned of exorbitant defense expenditures in pursuit of complete (and elusive) national security, concluding that a bankrupt country is a defenseless country. Eisenhower implied that it is always easy to justify greater spending by invoking the specter of imminent threats, but at some point, the crushing burden of excessive military expenditures leads to pernicious economic and social consequences—that is, greater impoverishment and a garrison state mentality. A siege mentality can develop as government and society begin justifying the grounds for large military forces. Real and imagined enemies, both domestic and foreign, can take hold in the collective conscience, leading to a garrison state. In his book *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*, John Dziak describes how Soviet leaders used the “enemies of the state” theme to keep Soviet society militarized. While even Soviet paranoia proved justified in the context of the Third Reich, during the Cold War militarization essentially contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Democracies are not immune from this condition either. In *The Siege*, Connor O’Brian premises that Israel suffers from a siege mentality, though not without complete justification. In his memoirs, *Mandate for Change and Waging Peace*, President Dwight Eisenhower wrote of his concern that unsubstantiated fears of the Soviet threat might create a garrison state mentality in America. With this understanding of human nature, defense planning mentors should allay host nation fears by displaying confidence and optimism as part of building partner capacity. For example, mentors should refrain from pessimistic talk with one another concerning capabilities because pessimism can become epidemic. Moreover, mentors should not allow indigenous military officials to become obsessed by hypothetical threats. Like pessimism, fear can spread like wildfire too.

The assumption that donor countries will continue to provide security cooperation may flounder in the face of eventual domestic budget cuts. Similarly, the technological composition of the military must reflect budgetary realities. Sophisticated equipment requires expensive replacement parts and regular maintenance. Afghanistan is illustrative of this last point. Littering the countryside and boneyards, the thousands of rusting wrecks of Soviet armored and wheeled vehicles bear testimony not to combat losses but to a lack of maintenance. Mentors

should strive to prepare the host nation government for eventual independence from military assistance.

In conclusion, building partner capacity is much more than standing up host nation defense forces and establishing enduring security cooperation. A far greater gift is creating an intellectual foundation for policy and strategy formulation. Like all tools, the strategic defense planning system can serve as the basis for a rational defense establishment. It serves to quell unsubstantiated fears and to rebuff self-interests. Of paramount concern is providing the host nation with the intellectual capital to assume responsibility for its own defense. The worst of all outcomes is to create over-dependency. Don’t believe it? Ask the Republic of Vietnam. 

¹For instance, France’s adoption of the Maginot Line in the interwar years wedded it to a passive defense, an inadequate defense industry, and poor military readiness. When the German threat started to clarify, France was unable to deviate from its national security policy in time.

²The mentor’s primary task is to establish excellent rapport with the mentee. Closely behind this accomplishment comes the need to understand the policymaking mechanism as well as the art and science of strategic thinking. Accordingly, the following books serve as a foundation: James S. Lay Jr., *Organizational History of the National Security Council* (86th Congress, 2d sess., 1960; reprint, Michigan: University of Michigan, 2010); Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and the Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

³Gray, 11.

⁴President Eisenhower brought this entente to light in his 1961 Farewell Address: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”

⁵Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, Special Inspector General to Afghan Reconstruction (October 30, 2009), 59.

Strategic Imperative for Host Country Economic Capacity Building: “Unity of Understanding” by Professor Richard Coplen, PKSOI



The strategic imperative for building a strong sustainable economy in fragile, failing, and post-conflict countries is not a brilliant economic master plan, but an accurate, comprehensive, and dynamic “unity of understanding” of key grassroots social-economic-cultural-political factors by the relevant stakeholders. Since private sector small businesses are frequently the key to sustainable economic development in these environments, the “unity of understanding” should include a thorough analysis of local microeconomic factors. Accordingly, policy-makers/implementers should adopt the perspective of the host country person considering whether or not to start a small business, not the perspective of the macroeconomist focused on national economic trends. As General Martin E. Dempsey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominee, recently stated, “[T]he best information, the most important intelligence, and the context that provides the best understanding come from the bottom up, not from the top down.”¹

Such “bottom-up” analysis can help produce a “unity of understanding” that effectively informs a “unity of effort” to support the building of a robust, diverse, entrepreneurial, and sustainable economy which is predominantly owned, staffed, managed, and financed by the people of the host country. The process of achieving and maintaining this “unity of understanding” can itself be a catalyst for the cooperative behavior needed amongst stakeholders to achieve the strong sustainable economic growth that also supports lasting peace and stability.

Many brilliant national and international master plans for building host country economic capacity have failed. They failed for various reasons, including inadequate understanding of the social-economic-cultural-political dynamics of the host country, inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies, inadequate focus on local economic needs and assets, inattention to building host country capacities and inadequate buy-in and participation by host country consumers and businesspeople, inter alia. This suggests a fundamental lack of understanding of the host country itself and how rational economic actors (humans) consistently act in their own self-interest, not necessarily in accordance with national economic development plans.




Children in the village of Sadey Khel with school supplies distributed by the Gardez Provincial Reconstruction Team

As an illustration of the need for grassroots understanding, a cursory look at the picture above might suggest that the Gardez Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) inadequately understood the needs of children in Sadey Khel, Afghanistan and merely provided candy for the day; however, close inspection of the photo on the next page reveals that the Gardez PRT recognized the need for school supplies (pencils) and nutrition (wheat biscuits) as an investment in human capital and educational capacity building.

To achieve an accurate, comprehensive, and dynamic “unity of understanding” requires a grassroots-focused analytic perspective which recognizes “all politics is local” and “all economics is microeconomics.” To those well known aphorisms one might add, “All effective economic development is local microeconomics.” Accordingly, microeconomic analysis, focusing on the economic activities and decisions of individual consumers and firms should precede macroeconomic analysis, which considers national fiscal, monetary, and trade policy. Therefore, the first step toward “unity of understanding” is to adopt the perspective of the rational individual consumer and small businessperson, producer, manufacturer and farmer in the host country.

For example, consider the rational, self-interested questions asked by a person considering whether or not to start a small business in that challenging and risky environment. The answers to the following questions will provide valuable insights for the appropriate economic development actions for both public policy-makers/implementers and private economic actors:

- Can my new business be profitable in the long-term given the projected costs and availability of inputs (land, labor, capital, energy, parts, seeds, etc.) and the likely market demand and price for my products?
- Will prices remain relatively stable for these inputs and outputs?
- Can I securely transport my product to and gain access to the appropriate local, regional, and/or international markets?
- Are there enough adequately trained and healthy laborers locally available to do the work required at a reasonable wage rate?
- Can I gain access to capital (private or public) in a timely manner and at a reasonable interest rate? Is there safe and secure access to other banking services?
- Are there any barriers to market entry or other potential spoilers that are not surmountable?
- What are the relevant government taxes, regulations, and/or requirements and can my new business comply and remain profitable?
- Does the Rule of Law system provide fair dispute resolution and contract enforcement, adequate protection from corruption, and property and intellectual property rights?
- Will basic services be available, including energy, water and sewage, trash collection, police and fire protection? Is there likely to be long-term stability of the host country currency and international exchange rate?
- Does my national government have the capacity and will to work with international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund to support my industry’s interests, including the ability to prevent foreign competitors from dumping their products in my local market at below market prices?



Children in the village of Sadey Khel with school supplies distributed by the Gardez Provincial Reconstruction Team

The answers to these questions form the core of the relevant local microeconomic “unity of understanding” for the host country. Admittedly, these answers must be augmented by an understanding of other relevant local social-economic-cultural-political factors. The questions and answers described above focus on the critical microeconomic factors impacting the individual businessperson, not macroeconomic factors such as national unemployment rates, government spending, tax revenues, money supply, and others. Host country government officials and supporting external actors, including military forces, can best promote economic development by actions that enable the potential businessperson to conclude that the current and future business climate make the profitability of their new

business likely. Hence, the most critical economic development policies and activities are those that:

- Reduce the risks and increase the predictability of the environment for the aspiring small businessperson.²
- Enable the aspiring small businessperson to access adequate land, labor, capital, inputs, secure transportation, markets, and fair dispute resolution and contract enforcement.

Taking the perspective of the aspiring small businessperson significantly focuses the evolving economic development theory for building strong sustainable economies in fragile, failing, and post-conflict countries. The existing theory, emanating from multiple sources, suggests some common lines of effort, including employment and income generation, macroeconomic stabilization, market economy sustainability, and control of the illicit economy and economic based threats.³ Additionally, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, adds these lines of effort: security; rule of law; governance; economics; and social well-being.⁴ All these lines of effort are important for the overall success of stabilization efforts, but the source documents inadequately address local microeconomic factors.

The existing frameworks for economic development-related analysis are useful and provide relevant insights, but fail to achieve the comprehensive local microeconomic “unity of understanding” needed. A brief tour of the major existing analytic frameworks provides useful insights:

- **Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)**⁵ focuses on identifying the key groups, societal patterns, and institutional performances that prompt core grievances and drivers of conflict. From the economic development perspective, this analysis can be helpful, especially if it identifies economic grievances and drivers of conflict such as high unemployment, lack of education/training opportunities, or perceptions of unfair distribution of economic gains. However, the ICAF is not designed to consider the key questions facing the aspiring small businessperson.
- **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)**⁶ offers useful metrics for assessing progress during an intervention, including several relevant questions for the person considering opening a new business. The most relevant questions include the caliber of the work force, availability of electrical power and access to basic services, whether or not laws and societal attitudes help enable market activity, and access to credit and external markets. Nevertheless, these questions need to be augmented and focused on specific localities.

- **USAID District Stability Framework (DSF)**⁷ is a village oriented effort that seeks resident input to identify the most important problems and action priorities as well as perceptions about who is most capable of solving these problems. From the economic development perspective, this information can be helpful if it identifies economics-related problems, priorities, and perceived most effective action agents; however, the DSF does not focus attention on the microeconomic questions needed.

- **United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework**⁸ addresses economic revitalization needs and plans, but not at the level of local specificity needed. **United Nations Post Conflict Needs Assessment**⁹ addresses macroeconomic needs and strategies, but provides inadequate microeconomic analysis of the local private sector.

- **United Nations and International Labour Organization: Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Guidelines**¹⁰ presents a **Local Economic Profile** which is more comprehensive and locally focused than all other sources, but it does not address all the microeconomic questions raised earlier.

- **U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations**, includes **PME-SII-PT** (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time)¹¹ which addresses many key macro factors, but the resulting analysis does not normally include the local microeconomic insights needed.

- **U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations**, includes **ASCOPE**¹² (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events), which provides useful local information, but not the microeconomic insights needed. The Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment Format is comprehensive and includes significant economic data, but most of it is aggregate macroeconomic information.


- **U.S. Army Field Manual 34-130 (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield)**¹³ considers demographic and economic issues, including living conditions, cultural distinctions, allocation of wealth, political grievances, and social status; however, it remains woefully inadequate for training Army intelligence analysts to perform the comprehensive bottom-up microeconomic analysis needed to inform commanders. As is often the case, current practice in the field outruns doctrine and training in this area. We need to dramatically accelerate ongoing efforts to close this gap.

- **U.S. Army Field Manual 3-34.170 (Engineer Reconnaissance)** provides a useful analytic framework for infrastructure

assessment: Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Other Considerations (SWEAT–MSO).¹⁴ However, this is just a small piece of the puzzle.

• **Asset Building and Community Development Analysis** introduces a useful community asset-based analysis of the following types of capital: human, social, physical, financial, environmental, political, and cultural.¹⁵ This framework needs further refinement to apply it to the post-conflict environment.

Although these analytic frameworks are helpful, they do not offer the detailed localized microeconomic insights needed for policy-makers/implementers to create and maintain the small business enabling environment crucial to sustainable economic development in this challenging environment. This article suggests that we shift our analytic and policy-making/implementing focus to those microeconomic factors which most directly impact the aspiring small businessperson, not macroeconomic trends. Admittedly, this short article merely scratches the surface, suggesting key microeconomic factors to consider; however, more work is needed to ...

1. Augment and refine the questions regarding relevant microeconomic factors.
2. Identify other social-economic-cultural-political factors that most directly impact the aspiring small businessperson’s decisions.
3. Identify the most critical interdependencies between these factors and how policy-makers/implementers can best strengthen and leverage these interdependencies. 

¹Excerpt from a speech by General Martin E. Dempsey, “Our Army’s Campaign of Learning,” delivered on 4 October 2009 at the Association of the United States Army’s Chapter Presidents’ Dinner in Washington, D.C., and published in *Landpower Essay* (Institute of Land Warfare: No. 09-3, November 2009).

²David Dod and James T. Smith, ed., *A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries* (Washington, DC: US-AID, Office of Economic Growth, 2009), 51. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/economic_growth_and_trade/

³United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, D.C., 2009) 7-64. <http://www.usip.org/publications/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction>

⁴Department of the Army. *Stability Operations (FM 3-07)*, Washington D. C.: HQDA, 2008. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>

⁵Department of State, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/what/144930.htm>

⁶U.S. Institute of Peace, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)*, 51-65. <http://www.usip.org/publications/measuring-progress-in-conflict-environments-mpice-0>

⁷U.S. Agency for International Development, *District Stability Framework* www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html

⁸UN Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti 2010-2011 www.ht.undp.org/_assets/fichier/publication/pubdoc62.pdf?PHPSESSID

⁹United Nations Development Programme, *Post-Conflict Needs Assessments* <http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=144>

¹⁰International Labour Organization and United Nations Development Programme, *United Nations, Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Guidelines, 2010. Chapter 3, Fact Finding*, 73 – 115. http://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Instructionmaterials/lang--en/docName--WCMS_141270/index.htm

¹¹U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, February 2008, Glossary C. www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf

¹²U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, September 2006, 1-4. www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-40.pdf

¹³U.S. Army Field Manual 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, July 1994, Chapter 6. www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-130.pdf

¹⁴U.S. Army Field Manual 3-34.170, *Engineer Reconnaissance*, Appendix C, Figure C-1. <https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/24655-1/FM/3-34.170/appc.htm>

¹⁵Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines. *Asset Building and Community Development*, 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008, xi – xv.

Developing Host Nation Law Enforcement Capacity for Security Transition

by Ms. Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, PKSOI



Capacity building is the latest concept being developed and used by agencies to address issues concerning establishment of functioning governments and societies. Broadly understood, the term describes the ability to identify and augment critical human capital that supports effective governing systems and methods. But within the U.S. interagency community, capacity building has many different meanings that vary with each agency. Often, the tactical and operational nuances of an agency's capacity building initiatives are flavored by these individual definitions. This is especially the case in building security capacity. The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provides one example of an effective approach to capacity building, with over 25 years of experience in building host nation law enforcement, forensics, and corrections capacity. The program unveils lessons to further refine capacity building missions for agencies involved in similar programs.

The interagency community adheres to a common definition of capacity building – “The transfer of technical knowledge and skills to host nation individuals and institutions to help them develop effective policies and administer state services across the economic, social, political, and security realms” – but little is written on specific guidelines and activities for success.¹ Recent experiences in capacity building demonstrate how critical it is, especially in the security sector. Within the security sector, threats range from internal, domestic issues generally considered police responsibilities to outside interventions and actors that are more properly a military responsibility; these threats require a spectrum of capacities to minimize and deter potential danger. The military is often asked to deal with both sides of the security mandate, but despite its best efforts, it is ill equipped for domestic, civilian-oriented security missions. Specific expertise is required for security initiatives directed towards more local and citizen-oriented approaches.

Building Law Enforcement Capacity is Valuable

Stability endeavors in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the importance of internal security issues – specifically the Rule of Law (ROL) and Transitional Law Enforcement (TLE)² – in creating sustainable environments for peace and prosperity. “In many operational environments in which the



Attorney General Eric Holder delivers his remarks at the 2009 annual management conference of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP, with funding support from the State Department and other agencies, places long-term, in-country senior law enforcement advisors to provide tailored rule of law development assistance to civilian police, correctional systems, and border security forces abroad.

Photo by Lonnie Tague for The Department of Justice

US may become involved, there needs to be the ability to apply law and maintain order in addition to the ability to employ lethal force. This will help set the conditions for a return to or development of civil society in the host nation.”³ The U.S. Department of State has recognized the importance of ROL, especially TLE initiatives, in several of its essential tasks.⁴ To date, 27 of the 34 first-tier mandates in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Stabilization Matrix deal specifically with law enforcement mechanisms.⁵ Not only are ROL and TLE critical in the first few months of stabilization, but they are absolutely necessary for countries to progress through reconstruction phases. “Transitional Law Enforcement brings policing work to the fore and is a key bridge between military-led securing of conflict situations and longer-term development of mechanisms to enable a country to own and manage its own security and development.”⁶ In this instance, TLE transitions countries from conflict to stability by providing domestic capacity for law

enforcement. The civilian aspect of security is a threshold for re-establishing ownership of mechanisms inherent to legitimate governments and local institutions.

Considering the role of TLE in stabilization, capacity building should be developed in terms of domestically-based, locally-focused civilian functions to enforce the rule of law. The NO-ETIC Corporation, an independent research organization, recognized this in one of its many reports on TLE. The report noted that

The ultimate aim of any reconstruction or stabilization operation should be to set the pre-conditions for the withdrawal of the international intervention once the host nation no longer needs assistance, [and] some degree of capacity building will be necessary in any reconstruction and stabilization mission. The existence of an effective and professional law enforcement community in the host nation will help ensure stability in the nation and help preclude the requirement for a subsequent reconstruction and stabilization operation. . . . If effective, the value of the capacity building effort should endure beyond the duration of the USG deployment.⁷

The value of promoting law enforcement capacity is its ability to prevent further conflict and establish systems that minimize future risk to regional and U.S. security.

In-house Expertise

Building criminal justice and civilian police capacity is not a new concept, and the U.S. does have the expertise to execute such a mission. ICITAP is one of the most qualified capacity building actors in carrying out a broader mandate to establish the rule of law, specifically in complex and dynamic environments. The program helps host nations build law enforcement mechanisms abroad that advance the rule of law, uphold human rights standards, and foster reform in criminal justice practices.⁸ ICITAP is housed within the Department of Justice, but receives funding from the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defense, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. At State's request, ICITAP sometimes operates under the umbrella of other organizations (including the UN and European Union). The program currently operates in thirty-eight countries throughout the world, is an active participant in the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), and partners with numerous domestic and international organizations.

Protecting the State and the Citizen

Police are an integral part of society, yet they often bear the brunt of unpopularity because of their proximity to the local population. In post-conflict areas, this tenuous relationship is often strained as police take on more aggressive actions to control threats. This can lead to greater public animosity against police forces.

In a post-conflict society, if police are going to be effective in gaining the trust and cooperation of the public, they must support the rights of citizens and not act solely as agents of the state. ICITAP strives to incorporate principles of human rights, human dignity, and equal access to justice in host nation law enforcement institutions through its assistance programs.

Historically, ICITAP has been successful in using its unique approach to capacity building in a myriad of operational environments and has been at the tip of the spear of every major post-conflict mission since it was tapped to help create the new Panamanian police force in 1990. ICITAP's comprehensive array of law enforcement expertise is on exhibit around the world, and spans from working on advanced information systems in Bosnia and Albania to assisting in the ongoing transformation of the Philippine National Police from a military to civilian model of policing. ICITAP has helped build the correctional system in Iraq, manage the police academy in Kosovo, improve capabilities and compliance with international standards of foreign laboratories worldwide, and create marine patrol units in Indonesia and the Philippines.

A key goal of ICITAP is to help create a functional partnership platform that allows for interoperability between U.S. law enforcement⁹ and foreign law enforcement, so they may participate in international investigations and activities, including counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and maritime security issues. The benefits of such a program are both domestic and international: ICITAP helps host nations cope with their own security issues while also contributing to U.S. national security and foreign policy goals.

The ICITAP approach develops both institutions and individuals through mentoring, technical assistance, equipment donations, and training. R. Carr Trevillian, ICITAP Director, notes that in most post-conflict missions, “sacrificing a longer-term institutional development focus for solely short-term objectives risks sustainable outcomes. It also will likely result in ten one-year programs.”¹⁰ ICITAP’s approach attempts to correct this problem. “ICITAP’s approach in post-conflict missions consists of two parallel tracks: (1) immediately standing up basic law enforcement [functions] and (2) initiating [long-term] institutional development programs based on thorough assessments of the host nation’s [existing] capabilities.”¹¹ This two-pronged approach is facilitated by direct involvement of ICITAP personnel who work side-by-side with host nation officials to create change. On average, ICITAP’s senior law enforcement advisors have 20-plus years of experience in domestic law enforcement and have served in numerous assignments as mentors abroad. They work as advisors and trainers, not enforcers of the law. Advisors guide local law enforcement personnel toward establishing, often for the first time, their legitimacy and rapport with the population while simultaneously changing the culture of the institutions and populations they support.

The partnerships that develop between ICITAP officials and host nation officials, and the ability to understand differences between mentors and mentees, effectively drive the process of building law enforcement capacity—trained human capital and institutional structures that complement local security needs. “When we engage in criminal justice development in a post-conflict situation, we must recognize that the U.S. Government is entering into an enduring criminal justice partnership with the host nation,” notes Trevillian. “We are not coming in to tell them what to do. We must build it with them, if development is to be sustainable. They must be our partner in the rebuilding and organizational change process, and they must be willing to institutionalize and replicate best practices and training.”¹² Instead, the organization relies on assessments of the host nation to identify appropriate “entry points” for assistance. This begins with a front-end assessment provided by an interagency team of ICITAP and DOS or USAID personnel, which looks holisti-

cally at security issues affecting long-term stability. From there, ICITAP provides expertise in sequencing and development strategies, and focuses resources to address these capacity issues in the context of the local culture and traditions. If funding is provided, ICITAP deploys experienced law enforcement development subject matter experts to mentor host nation law enforcement actors in how to shape these reforms; ultimately, the host nation decides how to pace and implement these reforms, typically with U.S. assistance at least for the immediate term.

ICITAP is diligent in working with other agencies and donors to ensure that law enforcement development programs complement each other and contribute to the broader goal of transforming the security sector. The organization itself provides assistance in organizational development, criminal investigations, anticorruption, forensics, corrections, and instructor development among others.¹³ Whenever possible, the program works hand-in-hand with the Criminal Division’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance & Training (OPDAT) to develop the prosecutorial and justice sector institutions that form the criminal justice system along with law enforcement and corrections systems.

“We must always ensure that our efforts effectively support the larger USG development mission,” reinforces Trevillian. “Further, for rule of law development to be successful, our strategy must be to address the components of criminal justice reform in an integrated fashion.”¹⁴ This nesting of the law enforcement development component within the bigger development agenda helps define the norms, roles, and culture essential to a functional security sector, especially one that can be sustainable in the long-term. Ideally, ICITAP works with other agencies to develop and reform the entire criminal justice system and institution, not only to train individuals.

Conclusion


ICITAP’s approach to capacity building yields a number of interesting lessons in developing a broader, interagency definition of the concept. First, the program highlights the importance of considering all needs within a security sector, even those considered domestic or non-military responses, to determine capacity requirements and produce institutional change. Stabilization and reconstruction goals cannot be accomplished by only training individuals; instead, law enforcement can be developed and sustainable only if the institutions in which individuals work have the proper organizational structure and capacity. The host nation capacity for these types of missions must be concretely identified and developed to produce a stable security sector. Second, capacity building is a partnership between the host



ICITAP managers from headquarters and South America listen to the Attorney General's remarks.

Nicole Whitaker, conference organizer and deputy assistant director at ICITAP, along with ICITAP-Peru Program Manager Gabriel Grimes, ICITAP-Colombia Program Manager Gary Sheridan, listen to Attorney General Holder's remarks at the annual management conference.

Photo by Lonnie Tague for The Department of Justice

nation and donor nations; it is not a mission to be fulfilled by the donor nation. Stabilizing societies understand and can recognize their needs but need assistance to learn and adapt the appropriate resources, techniques, and procedures to address their needs. Donor nation assistance can help clarify the issues, provide alternative ways to address them, help identify gaps in capacity and capability, and sometimes provide personnel to fill gaps in the short and medium term. It is ultimately the long-term commitment of the host nation that fulfills security needs, and chances for success are greatly increased if donor nations advise the host nation on how best to allocate resources to achieve goals. Lastly, unstable or fragile societies must be able to maintain capacity even in the midst of conflict or disaster. The goal is to refine and augment these capacities to better handle encountered situations in fragile environments. ICITAP accomplishes this mission through mentoring and training within pre-existing or legitimate institutions, an embedded approach to working with the host nation. Such a model is crucial to fully understand how and why capacity is built in countries recovering from stress and conflict. 

¹United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC:

Endowment of the U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009).

²Transitional law enforcement (TLE) is defined as support provided usually to police forces to implement traditional law enforcement functions. A more detailed explanation of TLE can be found in NOETIC Corporation's report, Considerations for the Employment of Transitional Law Enforcement Capabilities (2009).

³Scott Brady and others, Considerations for the Employment of Transitional Law Enforcement Capabilities (Washington, DC: Noetic Corporation, 2009), p. 3.

⁴U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks (Washington, DC: 2005), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/161791.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2011).

⁵Dilshika Jayamaha and others, International Transitional Law Enforcement Environment: TLE Capabilities for International Operations (Washington, DC: Noetic Corporation, 2009), p. vi.

⁶Jayamaha, p. 2.

⁷Brady, p. 5.

⁸Don Bohn and others, United States Government Authorities Relevant to Transitional Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Noetic Corporation, 2009), p. 12.

⁹U.S. law enforcement refers to organizations within the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Marshals Service, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

¹⁰R. Carr Trevillian VI (director, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), Department of Justice), in discussion with the author, June 7, 2011, Washington, DC.

¹¹International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), ICITAP's Post-Conflict Expertise and Support of the U.S. Civilian Response Corps (January 2010), linked from ICITAP Home Page at "Our Expertise," <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/expertise> (accessed May 19, 2011).

¹²R. Carr Trevillian VI (director, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), Department of Justice), in discussion with the author, June 7, 2011, Washington, DC.

¹³For a full listing of ICITAP's functional expertise, see the ICITAP Home Page at "Subject Expert Matter," <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/expertise/subj-expert.html> (accessed May 19, 2011).

¹⁴R. Carr Trevillian VI (director, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), Department of Justice), in discussion with the author, June 7, 2011, Washington, DC.

Military Support to Civilian Capacity Building: Human Resource Development Efforts by the Japanese Contingents in East Timor

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In post-conflict capacity building, international military organizations interact primarily with host nation security forces. This military role becomes more critical when the operational environment is non-permissive, and the international community, sometimes with contributing nations, utilizes a comprehensive approach, which includes a large number of civilians. The U.S. government commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan is an example of the comprehensive approach. Aside from providing security and support to military capacity building, military contingents might also apply their diverse expertise towards building civilian capacity. This article reviews the Japanese experience in East Timor using its military contingent to help build civil engineering capacity in support of the UN peacekeeping operation.

Background

Having violently annexed and occupied East Timor for 25 years, Indonesia maintained an authoritarian rule over the populace. In response to the mayhem following East Timor's referendum on independence from Indonesia, the United Nations approved the deployment of the Australian-led multinational peacekeeping task force, International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in October 1999, issuing a mandate to manage the humanitarian and security crisis. In February 2000, the UN Peacekeeping Operation expanded into the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which included INTERFET. UNTAET administered the territory, exercised legislative and executive authority during the transition period and supported capacity-building for self-government. On 20 May 2002, as East Timor officially became an independent country, UNTAET came to an end with most functions transferred to the Timorese government. However, the military and police functions continued under the subsequent United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET).

The Government of Japan (GOJ) deployed the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) to East Timor in March 2002 in response to a UN request to participate in peacekeeping operations sponsored by the UNTAET and later UNMISET. Between March 2002 and June 2004, Japan rotated four contingents in support of the UN mission. The first contingent was



Group photo at a graduation ceremony. Eight Timorese trainees received certificates

composed of an engineer group with 680 members and some personnel working at UN Force Headquarters as staff officers and noncommissioned officers. The Japan Engineer Group (JEG) took over from the Bangladeshi and Pakistani engineer battalions and assumed responsibility for the engineer effort in mid-April 2002. The primary tasks given by the UN Force Headquarters encompassed the maintenance of main supply routes by repairing roads and bridges, the operation of water supply stations, and the implementation of civil military affairs (CMA). As a part of the CMA task, the JEG, on its own initiative, planned and provided vocational training on civil engineering for Timorese government officials. The training focus featured Timorese human resource development in civil engineering by providing skills and knowledge that would allow the host nation to carry out projects to improve social infrastructure. Reflecting its holistic approach to capacity building, the JGSDF had incorporated this training phase as part of its deployment preparation planning. Along with the idea of vocational training, various types of commercial engineering machinery were included in the JEG's equipment list during the force generation process with the intent of donating it to the Timorese government when the Japanese mission ended.

Why was it important?

From the Host Nation's perspective, civil engineering capability is probably the most essential factor for developing nations so as to maintain and improve hard infrastructure. Not only does robust infrastructure directly support economic development, it forms the basis for various state-building services, such as social service delivery, natural disaster prevention/mitigation, food security, physical security, and so forth.

East Timor was one of the least developed countries by any standards and had very little human capital in the area of civil engineering when it became independent. After hundreds years as a Portuguese colony, followed by Indonesian tyrannical rule since 1975, East Timor was truly a newborn state. Very few people received an adequate education and more than half of entire population was still illiterate as of 2007. In addition, many died during decades of struggle for independence.

Its geographic features underscored the criticality of a civil engineering capability. A small island country of approximately 5,800 square miles, it features an east-west mountain range with peaks above 3,000 yards and steep slopes leading down to the coastlines. The non-mountainous areas are less vegetated, and widespread use of slash-and-burn agriculture has led to deforestation and soil erosion. The country has a tropical climate with extremely heavy rainfall that often causes floods and landslides during the rainy season. The existing poor infrastructure exacerbated the effects of natural disasters. Consequently, many roads and bridges were frequently washed away or severely damaged every year, leaving many villages isolated for extended periods of time.

From the international contributor's perspective, the paramount task for military components in UN peacekeeping operations is to maintain and improve security, and the primary role of force engineers is to assure ground mobility for security forces. However, peacekeepers are more than soldiers; they are diplomats representing their own countries. If operationally permissible, peacekeepers should engage in activities that support their nation's diplomacy. Japan believed that helping East Timor develop its human capital in a visible manner would enhance the perception of Japan not only in East Timor but also among the international community.

Donating heavy engineer equipment at the end of the mission also has benefits for the troop contributing countries from operational and logistic perspective. Since engineer machinery is generally heavy and used in muddy sites, cleaning require-

ments to meet Japanese quarantine standards absorbs enormous time, space, and man-power. Cleaning preparations also require special assets like very sturdy pits and high-pressure water guns as well as a lot of water. When Japan deployed an engineer unit consisting of 600 members to the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia nearly 10 years earlier, it took almost two months to redeploy due to preparation. Most of the time and manpower were spent on washing vehicles. Had it reduced the amount of equipment for redeployment, the contingent could have dedicated more time and manpower towards peacekeeping tasks. Painting equipment also expends time and resources since it must be painted white for UN missions and then painted back to its original color after redeployment. Given all this time and expense, deploying with commercial equipment and donating it at the end of the tour is more economical for a country like Japan.

However, a caveat is worth noting. Donating equipment and goods to support post-conflict countries can become a double edged sword for contributing countries. Donated pieces of equipment are not always properly maintained and used properly by the host nation. Equipment could remain idle if the host nation does not possess the knowledge and skills for operations and upkeep. Donated equipment might even impede the peace process, creating discord among local stakeholders. Donations could cause distrust of local government as citizens second-guess their leader's decision about the ownership and distribution. The contributing country must always assess the possible unintended consequences or risk strong condemnation of the international community, its tax payers, and even the host nation. The diplomatic impact might be worse than doing nothing.

The Japanese Approach

In July 2002, the first vocational training course started in the capital city of Dili—two months before the rotation between the first and second contingents. Though the JEG had planned this capacity building program before UNMISSET became operational, it took a few months to put into practice. The JEG held numerous meetings repeatedly with the UNMISSET and Timorese Government in order to make them understand the program first and then acquire their buy-in for planning and execution. Preparation of trainers and translators required considerable time. Local staff interpreters translated the training instruction in Tetun, the language of East Timor. At this point, it is instructive to point out some practical obstacles faced by trainers. None of the instructors had experience teaching foreign nationals, and none of the local interpreters had any



Vehicle driving examination with attendance of UNTAET SRSG, Mr. Kamallesh Sharma (man in white shirt folding his arms)

knowledge of civil engineering. The course focused on developing operators for excavators and bulldozers. As a UNTAET-inspired practical training opportunity, the six-week course featured riverbed improvement work. Six Timorese trainees attended the course, and to highlight its importance, the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of UNTAET and the Timorese Minister for Construction, Transportation and Infrastructure attended the opening ceremony.

Subsequent contingents continued and refined the vocational training project. The second contingent honed the overall concept to give it consistency and steady development through the last contingent. In concert, the Timorese Government, UNMISSET, and the UNDP supported the concept. Accordingly, the second contingent expanded training to local areas including the Oecussi enclave and added training on a greater variety of equipment. The training curriculum was reviewed and refined each time. Teaching methods and work ethos were incorporated into the training so that trainees could become trainers for other Timorese. The third contingent established two new courses. One was to develop maintenance mechanics so that donated equipment would be well-maintained and properly utilized. The other provided instruction on planning and managing engineer and construction projects. The fourth contingent gave high priority to the project managers' and the mechanics courses in order to build cadre of qualified personnel to provide the Timorese with the capacity to improve their own infrastructure.

A lot of effort went into producing satisfactory results. Though some district governments were reluctant to join this training, the central government successfully persuaded them. The training was by no means easy though. Instructors and translators had a lot of difficulty in attaining training goals. Language barriers required much time for preparation. Since trainees varied in learning skills and work experience, extra training was offered to less capable students to help them achieve acceptable standards. Instructors sometimes had to teach basic mathematics for accurate planning and surveying calculations. In order to hold value and appeal for trainees, some incentives were offered. Certificates were signed by both the contingent commander and the Timorese minister and regarded as official licenses. Stately inauguration and qualification ceremonies signified the importance of the training, underscored by the attendance of high officials from the Timorese government and the UNMISSET, including the minister and the SRSG among others.

All together, the Japanese contingents conducted twelve courses and trained 102 Timorese. Subsequently, at the request of the Timorese Government, a variety of engineer equipment and vehicles were donated as contingents scaled down and departed. At donation ceremonies, the course graduates drove and operated the highly prized equipment, a symbolic illustration of essential skills contributing to state building.

When East Timor issues were discussed at the UN Security Council in October 2003, Kamallesh Sharma, the UNMISSET SRSG, spoke in glowing terms of the JEG achievements, specifically the human resource development efforts. It was quite unusual for an SRSG to call attention to the achievements of a specific unit out of all the other countries participating in the mission.

Interagency and Civil Military Integration for Program Sustainability

Japan withdrew the JEG from East Timor in June 2004. Even though the JEG helped lay a solid foundation for civil engineering in East Timor, continued support was still desired for further progress. In response to the GOJ request, the Japanese De-mining and Reconstruction Assistance Center (JDRAC), a Japanese non-profit organization consisting of JGSDF veterans, continued the JEG human resource development program for a year. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) also provided technical assistance and education to transfer skills for road repair in addition to the management and maintenance of engineer machinery. When the JGSDF first formulated the vocational training program, there was no interagency

plan to support it. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the JICA gradually recognized the need for it, so the GOJ made it a coordinated effort.

Most of the equipment donated by Japan was managed properly and kept in good condition. According to the JICA staff, except for some equipment lost to accidents in East Timor's winding mountain roads, almost all of the equipment was still working as of early 2007. In contrast, more than 400 out of nearly 1,000 vehicles that UNMISSET donated to various actors in East Timor were in disrepair at that time. This proves that adequate education and continuous support is essential whenever equipment is donated to a host nation.

Conclusion

The effort to help build host nation capacity in East Timor is considered as one of the hallmarks of the JGSDF peacekeeping history. The experience and operational lessons provide insights for future peacekeeping operations. Moreover, these types of operations underscore the value of interagency collaboration in support of state building. When Japan deployed the JGSDF humanitarian & reconstruction assistance contingents to post-war Iraq from 2004 to 2006, many of these lessons were applied. JGSDF assistance offered a way that promoted and encouraged reconstruction by the local communities rather than merely dispensing aid unilaterally. The combination of the JGSDF local assistance and ODA support by the MOFA was called "a pair of wheels," describing a unified effort and close collaboration so as to achieve synergy.

It is instructive to note that support of capacity building cannot succeed without trust between the support and the supported—the interplay between teaching and learning. A Timorese local laborer who worked with the JEG said, "When we worked with the occupational military before the independence, guns were always pointed at us. During the colonial era before that, the military never worked with us. But now we can work and eat together. I am very proud of showing my family my photo with my Japanese colleagues." Without earnest devotion, creativity, and mutual affinity among those involved in vocational training, Japanese efforts in building host nation capacity would never have been successful. 🧑



Maintenance of military vehicle at the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) depot before the deployment to East Timor



Loading a military truck with a water trailer in tow onto a commercial carrier (Antonov) for the deployment

Supporting the Rule of Law in Fragile States: Prison Medicine

by Colonel John McGrath and Colonel Roberto Nang (PKSOI)



Since the end of the Second World War the U.S. approach to stabilizing fragile states has consisted of economic aid, assistance with essential services, and the equipping and professionalizing of security forces. The demonstrations of the Arab Spring call that approach into question. The citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain are not protesting the lack of a well trained army, shortages of foreign sponsored development or medical aid projects but governments with ubiquitous corruption, ineffective social programs and deaf ears to their wishes. These conditions are present in hundreds of countries and represent a threat to U.S. interests and international security.

The 2010 Failed State Index lists 37 countries with a combined population of over 2 billion in alert status.¹ These countries suffer from social, political, economic and human rights instability which threaten the safety of their populations, the stability of their regions and potentially, the security of the world. Fragile states pose a threat to the security of the U.S. by denying access to critical resources; acting as transshipment points for illegal weapons, drugs and people; serving as staging, training and recruiting areas for terrorist groups; and destabilizing regions via population migrations, disease or conflict.

The keys to stabilizing these states are to develop good governance, support the Rule of Law, provide internal and border security, promote economic development and improve the distribution of essential services. These are no small tasks as many fragile states gained independence after the exit of their colonial masters and never possessed the structure and capacity to govern. The bipolar world served to temporarily stabilize those governments through large influxes of money and weapons, but left good governance to chance. Developing good governance and stability require long term commitments of resources. Extrapolating from RAND figures, the approximate cost of nation building for the top five states in the Failed State Index would amount to \$54 billion per year in a permissive environment and \$454 billion per year in peace enforcement conditions.²

Rule of Law

Executing the U.S. policy aims of stabilizing fragile states is difficult and complex work. The opening line of Tolstoy's *Anna*



A detainee receives medical care from a U.S. Army soldier at the detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan, Aug. 23, 2010. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Adam M. Stump

Karenina, "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way," applies aptly to Failing States.^{3/4} Each fragile state suffers from a breakdown in one or more of the critical element(s) of statehood; either legitimacy, the right to govern, effectiveness, or the ability to provide essential services to the governed.⁵ Each of these elements is multifaceted and interrelated, but one element common to all is the Rule of Law.

The Rule of Law (ROL) is the principle that the government, its institutions, private entities and the governed are accountable to the laws. It is a key end state in stability operations as well as counterinsurgency.⁶ The core tenet in ROL is that laws "are publically promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated and are consistent with international human rights norms and standards."⁷ Meeting that standard strengthens the people's confidence in the government (legitimacy) and allows the government to more efficiently provide services to the people (effectiveness). Abandoning the effort to attain that benchmark means criminal violence increases, bribes inflate the costs of goods, medicines do not reach hospitals, the people are exploited, and political opponents are attacked or imprisoned. The ROL is the cornerstone to ensuring physical security, safeguarding community participation, improving public health and fighting poverty.⁸

A key element in the ROL is a functional and humane prison system. As the U.S. and European Union (EU) discovered in the Balkans, promulgating sound laws, applying them fairly and then having no facility or an unsafe corrections facility to house offenders does not move the process forward. The U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) successfully introduced community-oriented policing in the Balkans which dramatically controlled street crime, but left untouched the prison system. The result was an inability to cope with organized crime over the long haul.⁹

Medical Care in Prisons

Efforts aimed at professionalizing the corrections system are often the lowest priority. Efforts to improve the care provided to detainees or prisoners fall even lower. Fragile state prisons have critical shortages of physicians, medical supplies and in some cases medical care all together. The concept that prisoners do not give up their human rights when they enter prison or detention is an idea with incomplete acceptance throughout the world.

The lack of focus on prisoner health care extends even to charitable organizations which avoid association with the facilities. Medecins Sans Frontieres which received over \$286 million in donations from U.S. citizens in 2008 and 2009 reported intervening in prisons in only four countries.¹⁰ Similarly, the largest prison oriented international charity, Prison Fellowship International, has provided only \$10 million in medicines and equipment to prisons since 1994.¹¹

Care provided to prisoners is not an empty gesture of kindness. It may save lives and prevent disease miles and months distant from prison. Over 95% of prisoners will be released to the community, bringing with them their illnesses. The impact of prevention and education on that population can be significant. In Russia overcrowded prisons have bred new drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis that have proliferated virulently among the general public.¹² In the fragile states of Africa, drug resistant Tuberculosis and HIV in the prisons now pose a grave threat to the region as they spread to the community through the prison staff and visitors.¹³ The maxim, "Good prison health is good community health," is reflected in these examples.

The other benefit of health care is "humanitarianism." Treating humans with dignity and respect is a common language of reconciliation. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that "to avoid a return to conflict while laying a solid founda-

tion for development, emphasis must be placed on critical priorities such as ...demonstrating respect for human rights."¹⁴ Those held in fragile state prisons may be the next generation of terrorists or community leaders depending on the treatment that they receive.

The humane treatment of prisoners may have longer term and more extensive repercussions. First, the majority of those incarcerated in fragile state prisons have never been convicted of any crime and their length of detention can last years as ineffective and under-resourced judiciaries move slowly through their backlogs. These "unconvicted" make up a large portion of the 30 million men and women incarcerated each year worldwide.¹⁵ Secondly, the list of former prisoners turned national leaders is extensive. Best known is Nelson Mandela, the former president of South African who served 14 years in Robben Island prison, but additionally there are Dilma Rousseff, president of Brazil, a prisoner for five years, Vaclaw Haval, Lech Walesa, Moshe Dayan, Ayman Nour and Benazir Bhutto.¹⁶ The impact of the health care and the manner it is delivered can have a significant effect on their ability and desire to support their country once released.

The improvement in access to medical care for prisoners can also elevate the total quality of the corrections care. In Zimbabwe, "trained, experienced prison officers have left the service in the thousands. Officers are often not paid enough to feed themselves – attendance at work is erratic and prison supplies are stolen."¹⁷ Utilizing health officers to provide care to the correction officers and their families serves as a salary substitute or augmentation as well as a retention tool and preventive medical measure. The benefit to the institution of maintaining well-trained, professional and caring correction officers is substantial.

Doctrine and the Law


U.S. law under Title 22 U.S.Code 2240 currently presents an obstacle to an increase in military involvement in prison medical support. The law prohibits the use of foreign assistance funds for training or advising police, prison or other law enforcement forces of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.¹⁸ An exception exists, however, which permits funds to be used to reconstitute civilian police capability in post-conflict periods. The programs must support the nation's growing stability and include training in human rights and the Rule of Law amongst other stipulations.

In recognition of the current inhumane conditions in many countries that receive U.S. Foreign Assistance money, the Senate

introduced Bill 3798, “The Foreign Prison Conditions Improvement Act of 2010.” The bill sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, which was reported out of committee in December of 2010, authorizes “appropriations of United States assistance to help eliminate conditions in foreign prisons and other detention facilities that do not meet minimum human standards of health, sanitation, and safety, and for other purposes.”¹⁹ It would add an exception to the Title 22 U.S.C. 2240 to allow this assistance. The companion House Resolution 6153 was referred to committee in September 2010 and four of the five cosponsors remain in the House for the 112th Congress.

Conclusions

After ten years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. Military Healthcare System (MHS) providers now have extensive experience in caring for detained populations and are well prepared to assist in medical support to fragile states’ prisons. Although the daily practice of medicine varies greatly from the developed to underdeveloped world, the principles of prevention, diagnosis and treatment in a relationship of dignity and respect do not. As the MHS develops strategies to support stability operations, health support of Rule of Law efforts must be considered on par with the historic approaches.

The answer to corruption and the abuse of power is the Rule of Law. Providing training and aid for fragile states’ prison health care directly supports this effort. The importance of a humane and competent prison healthcare system designed to protect one of society’s most vulnerable population is not solely in the capacity it confers, but in the values in propagates. The recognition of universal human rights establishes the framework for fragile states to grow in responsiveness to the needs of its citizens and ultimately establish long term stability in the international community. 

¹Foreign Policy Magazine Online, “Failed State Index 2010,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (accessed November 23, 2010).

²James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2007), 256.

³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Somalia: U.S. Policy Options, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., February 6, 2002. 4.

⁴Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 1.

⁵U.S. Agency for International Development, *Fragile State Strategy* (Washington D.C: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2005), 3.

⁶U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency, Army Field Manual 3-24* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of the Army, December 2006), D-8.

⁷United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *Principles and Guidelines* (New York: U.N. Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, January 2008), 98.

⁸Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero and Alejandro Ponce A,” *The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index™ 2010*. (Washington, D.C: The World Justice Project, 2010), 1.

⁹Perito, “U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations,” 8.

¹⁰Médecins Sans Frontières, “U.S. Annual Report 2009,” <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/?ref=main-menu> (accessed December 08, 2010).

¹¹Prison Fellowship International 2008 Annual Report, “Thirty Years of Transformation and Reconciliation,” <http://www.pfi.org/media-and-news/publications/2008-annual-report/view> (accessed January 08, 2011).

¹²William S. Weed, “INCUBATING DISEASE: Prisons are rife with infectious illnesses -- and threaten to spread them to the public,” July 2001, http://www.vincebeiser.com/debt-to-society/prisons_download/disease.html (accessed November 23, 2010).

¹³Justin O’Grady et al, “Tuberculosis in prisons in sub-Saharan Africa – the need for improved health services, surveillance and control,” *Tuberculosis* 2011 January 18: 1.

¹⁴Peter Rada, “Rebuilding of Failed States,” July 31, 2007, <http://www.haitiargentina.org/content/download/170/654/file/50.pdf> (accessed November 23, 2010).

¹⁵Nilufar Egamberdi, “HIV and Prisons in sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunity for Action,” November 28, 2007, linked from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/Toolkit%20ADVANCE%20COPY%20NOV%202007%20WEB.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2011).

¹⁶“Mandela appeals for ex-prisoners,” *BBC News – Africa*, March 30, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4862246.stm> (accessed February 18, 2011).

¹⁷Jocelyn Alexander, “Death and Disease in Zimbabwe’s Prisons,” *The Lancet* 373, no. 9668, (2009): 995.

¹⁸Cornell University Law School, “U.S. Code – Title 22 > Chapter 32 > Subchapter III > Part III > § 2420. Police training prohibition,” http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002420----000-.html (accessed February 02, 2011).

¹⁹Gov.track.us, “S. 3798: Foreign Prison Conditions Improvement Act of 2010,” <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-3798> (accessed February 02, 2011).

Negative Health Impacts Related to Conflict: Identifying Key Areas for USG Engagement

by Captain Bruno Himmler, MD, USPHS



Abstract

There are significant public health needs that exist in many parts of the world. The Non-governmental Organization (NGO) community and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have led the way in sponsoring developmental projects and relief efforts aimed at reducing human suffering and disease the burden. Unfortunately, many of these communities are also suffering from protracted internal conflict which impedes the NGO community's ability to respond. Work has been done to identify the major impacts conflict has on public health and mechanisms to measure it.

The military has looked at achieving the same humanitarian effects in these areas plagued by conflict. Unfortunately, there has been no strategic goal established for engagements and many well meaning projects have not led to capacity development or long-term reduction in human suffering. Given the current political climate pervasive throughout the world, we need to look at unifying military and civilian humanitarian efforts if we are to succeed in mitigating the disease and suffering in nations ripe with conflict.

As defined by World Health Organization (WHO) the keys for tracking general health indicators that we need to look at are similar for peaceful and conflict regions of the world. On top of these key health indicators, conflict zones show greater disproportionate suffering among women and children. Compounding the issue in conflict regions is lack of access to health care services. Hospitals and clinics often become targets of opportunity for conflict (suicide bombings, staging locations for

armed conflict) that deters the general populace from seeking care. Conflict-stricken countries have seen several instances of declining immunization rates as families are unable or unwilling to take their children to get immunized for fear of becoming victims of violence.

The Federal Government is currently in the process of revising doctrine to incorporate training and expertise for humanitarian assistance in conflict areas throughout the world. They have gained excellent insight from the lessons learned regarding disaster relief responses (Indonesia, Peru, and Pakistan). Therefore, this paper seeks to provide further guidance of how best to provide public health interventions that will have the greatest impact on human suffering. The ultimate goal is to develop better strategic plans regarding humanitarian assistance for the Federal Government that are complementary to what the civilian sector has already undertaken or will undertake once the security situation allows.

Negative Health Impacts Related to Conflict: Identifying Key Areas for USG Engagement

Since the dawn of time, man has suffered through many episodes of conflict, both internal civil wars and external conflicts which are bad for your health (Tam, Lopam, Bornemisza, & Sondrop, 2004). These conflicts have directly affected all sectors of public health placing people at increased risk of disease, injury and death (Ghobarah, 2003). The Global Burden of Disease study estimated conflict has resulted in 4.8 million disability adjusted life years worldwide (Murray, King, Lopez, Tomijima, & Krug, 2002) (See Figure 1, below).

Burden of conflict reported in *World Health Report 2001*¹⁵

Figure 1. (Source: Murray, et. al. 2002)

WHO region	Deaths			Disability adjusted life years		
	Number due to war (1000s)	% of total due to war	% of total	Number due to war (1000s)	% of total due to war	% of total
African	167.5	53.96	1.58	5 476.2	53.07	1.55
Americas	2.1	0.66	0.04	69.9	0.68	0.05
Eastern Mediterranean	39.0	12.56	0.97	1 365.9	13.24	1.02
European	36.7	11.83	0.38	1 043.1	10.11	0.68
South East Asia	63.2	20.35	0.45	2 210.3	21.42	0.52
Western Pacific	2.0	0.63	0.02	1 54.3	1.50	0.06
World	310.4	100	0.56	10 319.9	100	0.70


Negative Health Impacts Related to Conflict: Identifying Key Areas for USG Engagement

World Health Organization (WHO) has also defined the key public indicators as millennium development goals (MDG) to assess status of health in member countries (Devkota, 2010). Conflict has been directly linked to increase in crude mortality rates in post-war countries with the majority of the increase due to infections (Roberts, & Zantop, 2003).

The main risk factors related to conflict include: disruption of food supplies, disruption of water and sanitation, disruption of clinical and hospital services, shifting of public funding toward security and, lastly, psychological trauma. Furthermore, malnutrition, diarrhea, respiratory infections and malaria account for 60 to 95% of deaths among displaced victims (Noji, 2005). Complicating the problem further is that conflict dissolves the health infrastructures critical for tracking epidemiological data (Tam, Lopman, Bornemisza, & Sondorp, 2004).

Shifting governmental funds to the security sector during protracted conflict has a significant negative impact on public health measures by depleting human and fixed capital (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russet, 2003). Lack of funding for health leads to increased disease burden due to lack of public health educational efforts. See Figure 2 (below) for a conceptual diagram of the indirect effects of conflict on public health infrastructure and overall impact on health.

Conflict has also been linked to significant psychological trauma. Children especially become victims of psychological trauma, often witnessing rape, torture or death. If left untreated this can have significant long-term negative impact on their health status. Development of multidisciplinary treatment approaches is vital to help address the trauma and help children become productive members of society.



Conceptual framework for *Epidemiology in conflict*

Tam et al. *Emerging Themes in Epidemiology* 2004 1:5 doi:10.1186/1742-7622-1-5

At the end of this paper, I will describe some examples of interventions that have been implemented to mitigate negative public health outcomes during protracted conflict.

Descriptive Epidemiology

Characteristics of Persons

There are specific populations that are at most risk for negative health impacts related to conflict. Those involved in humanitarian operations have raised concerns about these populations being marginalized and not being able to access health and relief efforts. These groups include: women, children, elderly, disabled and those with chronic disease.

Characteristics of Place

Regions at greatest risk for conflict are located in the continent of Africa, Middle East, and SE Asia. Unfortunately, these regions also have the least developed health infrastructures and populations in these regions are most vulnerable to the negative effects conflict has on public health.

Race and Ethnicity

With regards to conflict, researchers have not reported an increased risk for adverse outcomes based on race and ethnicity (Wang, Salihu, Rushiti, Bala, & Modvig, 2010). Most violent conflict tends to have a majority ethnic group targeting a minority ethnic group. Differences of religion have also fueled many conflicts, but the vast majority of conflicts have centered around ownership or access to a valuable but limited resource.

Age

Those persons at extremes in age are at increased risk to suffer the negative health outcomes associated with conflict. The very young and very old are often dependent on others for their health and well-being needs. They are often unable to voice their needs and can easily be marginalized during conflict. Finally, when food resources are rationed, the elderly and children often get inadequate proportions to ensure the 18 to 30 year olds that provide security remain healthy. Researchers have shown that in sub-Saharan countries, there was an increase in infant mortality rates and decreased food production leading to malnutrition (Davis & Kuritsky, 2001).

Socioeconomic status

Fuerst et al. (2009) reported that those with greater incomes are protected from the negative health outcomes associated with conflict. Those who can afford international travel can access health care outside of their country. They also often have access to resources to ensure safe drinking water and sanitation. Conversely, they may be at greater risk for targeting related to



Regional offices and regions of the WHO:

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	South East Asia; HQ: New Delhi, India
	Western Pacific; HQ: Manila, Philippines

internal violence. Influential people in the community are prime targets for kidnappings and assassinations which puts them at risk from that perspective.

Major Risk Factors

Linking conflict with public health outcomes can be tricky. To achieve this goal, focusing on measures of health from the World Development Indicators (WDI) would be most appropriate, as this would ensure efforts are linked into the larger WHO millennium development strategies. Key WDI indicators include: access to health care services, life expectancy and infant mortality rates, DPT immunization rates, and fertility rates (Davis & Kuritsky, 2001). With this in mind, risk factors and health implications that can be derived from these indicators are addressed in the following sections.

Disruption of food, water and sanitation

Public services, such as water, sanitation and food supply chains, can be disrupted during periods of protracted conflict. Making matters worse, electrical supply to households also becomes disrupted for extensive periods of time. This disruption leads to lack of access to potable water at the individual level. Simultaneously, water and waste treatment facilities are also dependent on electricity and plumbing; disruption leads to significant risk for water borne disease outbreaks. Fuerst et al. (2009) reported that communities in Cote d'Ivoire affected by protracted conflict had lower rates of tap water use.

Disruption of health care facilities and access

Healthcare facilities are often looted by combatants seeking supplies to treat the injured. Insurgent activity trying to disrupt the government will also target health care facilities and workers for violent actions. Conflict will also increase the number of check points and impassable roads which make access much harder. For the West Bank of Palestine, 18% of people presenting to emergency rooms reported significant delays in reaching the hospital (Rytter, Kjaeldgaard, Bronnum-Hansen, & Helweg-Larsen, 2006). Due to this limited access, it appears that people also wait until their illness is more severe before heading to the hospital. Again, in the Palestine study, admission rate for patients experiencing delays in access was 32% vs. 13% for those not having access barriers (Rytter, Kjaeldgaard, Bronnum-Hansen, & Helweg-Larsen, 2006).

Targeting of women

Women become targets of sexual violent act during times of conflict. As a result, the occurrence of rape and forced prostitution increase during periods of conflict. Rape and prostitution then lead to unwanted pregnancies and sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs) among the effected population. In the Liberian conflict, researchers reported that women experienced an increase in sexual violence (9.2%) during the time of conflict, compared to peacetime (Johnson et al., 2008). This reported incidence of sexual violence report was consistent to other post-conflict communities (Johnson et al., 2008).

Population migration and its effects


Finally, there is often significant movement of civilians in response to protracted violence. Civilian populations will seek refuge in other regions not affected by violence. Many civilians may also be displaced due to direct damage to their homes.

Those people that remain in their country are labeled internally displaced populations (IDP) and those that cross international boundaries are referred to as refugees. Irregardless of where the relocate to, these people often settle in make shift camps that are burdened by overcrowding and lack of general public services. The decreased sanitary conditions noted in these temporary shelters leads to significant infectious disease burden, especially diarrhea, pneumonia and TB. WHO indicates that up to 50% of refugees living in these temporary shelters may be infected with TB (World Health Organization [WHO], 2011).

The Model of Causation

Disruption of food supplies caused by conflict leads to malnutrition and hunger especially in the vulnerable populations. Malnutrition can then lead to immunosuppression (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russet, 2003), poor growth in children and increased incidence of communicable diseases. Disruption of water and sanitation leads to unsafe drinking water and related dehydration/diarrhea. This has been directly linked to increase mortality in children under age 5. Conflict often targets health care facilities including workers. This leads to decreased access to health care for the general population especially in rural areas. Conflict also leads to restriction in travel that disrupts drug and medical supply distribution (WHO, 2011). Inaccessibility to health care facilities leads to increase maternal morbidity and mortality, decreased immunization rates in children and increased morbidity and mortality for those suffering from chronic illnesses. Simultaneously, conflict will also interrupt public health surveillance activities which hinder the ability to monitor disease outbreaks (McDonnell et al., 2004). See figure 3 (below) for model of causation.

Figure 3. Conflict Causal Model



Mental Health Consequences of Conflict

On a separate note, significant work has been done in recent years to bring public attention to the issues of mental health and conflict. Many studies have demonstrated the profound lasting impact conflict can have on a population. Three specific studies were reviewed that looked at the issue of depression and PTSD in post-conflict countries (Johnson, et al., 2008; Steel et al., 2009; Wang, et al., 2010).

Steel et al. (2009) reported that the prevalence of PTSD has been reported up to 99% of the population in post-conflict countries with highest incidence rates in refugee camps. Similarly, depression has been reported in 3% to 86% of the population. Further analysis has shown that the prevalence of torture has been as high as 21% (Steel et al., 2009). They utilized a meta-regression analysis of 5904 articles that surveyed refugees and/or conflict-affected populations. Their conclusion was that torture is very prevalent in conflicts and those that experience torture are at greater risk for PTSD and depression than those who do not experience torture (Steel et al., 2009). Limitations of this study included concern over the possible over-reporting of torture by refugees as a political means to gain more international support or foster greater retribution against the perpetrators in the conflict (Steel et al., 2009). Cultural competence and variations of the understanding of the definition of depression and PTSD were also identified as concerns (Steel et al., 2009).

Another cross-sectional study that used random household cluster surveys in Liberia also demonstrated significant levels of PTSD post conflict, especially in those who suffered from acts of sexual violence, 69% vs. 38% who did not experience sexual violence (Johnson et al., 2008). Johnson et al. (2008) noted similar results for depression with 40% of the 1659 households reporting symptoms consistent with major depression. The incidence of depression was highest in those that suffered from sexual violence (Johnson et al., 2008). This increase concern related to mental health and sexual violence will also be a concern for increased risk for STDs and unwanted pregnancies mentioned earlier. The study focused on adults, and thus cannot be generalized to entire population that includes children (Johnson et al., 2008). Again, this study showed the importance of protracted violence has on the psyche of the survivors that can lead to long term effects.

Finally, a third, cross-sectional cluster survey study on the conflict in Kosovo showed similar issues with PTSD ranging from 17-24% among the survivor population (Wang et al., 2010). Their study also noted that there was a significant

increase in chronic pain sufferers in the population studies that led to a decline in household income (Wang et al., 2010). Many of the sufferers of PTSD, depression or chronic pain also had limited access to health care during and after the conflict (Wang et al., 2010).

These studies show the importance of post-conflict mental health issues and their effect on the overall health of a community. Having community members suffer from PTSD or depression will lead to dysfunctional communities which will slow the overall recovery process. Therefore, early intervention focusing on mental health issues must be paramount.

Future Investigations

The studies have addressed the issues related to risk factors that link conflict to negative health outcomes. Further research is still needed to identify what the long term health outcomes are related to conflict and their disruption of the health care system. In a related question, not much has been written about interventions in conflict zones and the key priorities. Most NGOs focus their efforts to regions that are conflict free or in refugee camps. Given the rise in protracted conflict in the Middle East, there are several opportunities to gather more information related to the health impact of conflict and successful intervention programs that have mitigated the effects.

Preventing or mitigating the effects of conflict on health

Devkota (2010) reviewed positive outcomes achieved in Nepal despite a decade of civil war. Success was partially attributed to coordination among the key stakeholders with focus on women and children. Devkota (2010) indicated that the focus on childhood vaccinations led to decreased infant and under 5 mortality of 31% and 57%, respectively Noji (2005) also advocated for immunization programs against measles, as it was the most important and cost effective measure especially as illustrated in Somalia where more than 50% of the deaths of children were attributed to measles (UN, 2010). The above programs emphasize the importance of primary prevention to mitigate the effects of conflict on the health of children. The UN also noted that in Mozambique, during their conflict spanning 8 years, 454, 000 children perished (UN, 2010). Again this emphasizes the vulnerability of this population subgroup and the importance of interventions that can target them for health protective measures.



Author and then Commander Bruno Himmler from the United States Public Health Services assigned as a health services liaison to PKSOI (black USPHS shirt) on board the USNS hospital ship Comfort with 3 US Navy providers and 4 Project Hope volunteers during Continuing Promise 2009 in El Salvador.

Much work has been done already to align efforts among the USG Federal Agencies. Paramount in this effort is the cooperation between Federal Agencies and the private sector (NGOs, International Organizations (IOs), and academic community). Applied epidemiologists can play a vital role in the interagency process. During times of peace, vital health information is gathered by epidemiologists. Data gathered can be utilized in primary prevention programs and secondary prevention programs. Unfortunately, these health data collection systems cease to function during times of conflict making it difficult to quantify the current needs (Murray et al., 2002). Interventions seeking to alleviate the suffering and death; therefore, need to ensure they can first do quick and accurate epidemiological assessments before implementing humanitarian assistance.

Current guidelines for a humanitarian intervention after a complex emergency include: The Sphere Project, USAID Field Operation Guide, and United Nation's Oslo Guidelines. Unfortunately, they focus on specific interventions that are short term in nature and look to alleviate death and suffering or secondary prevention. The concern today is to develop over metrics for success that look at long range outcomes, like the MDG's of WHO, to determine if we are achieving success. A promising approach is to gather information by way of household health surveys to quantify the indirect health effects of conflict. (Murray et al., 2002).

Of equal importance to interventions is adequate planning. It is imperative that those looking to establish emergency settlements need to ensure proper water, food and sanitation as no amount of curative health interventions can offset their negative impact (Noji, 2005). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recommends 15-20 liters of potable water per day per person, and 1 latrine for every 20 people (Noji, 2005).

Though the Geneva Convention of 1949 mandates the right for access to medical care for civilians (Rytter, Kjaldgaard, Bronnum-Hansen, & Helweg-Larsen, 2006), current experience shows that this concept is not being honored by modern warring factions. To address this issue during protracted conflict, success can be achieved by having mobile medical teams do outreach services to where the people feel the safest. This directly addresses one of the risk factors of lack of access discussed earlier. Security and available modes for transportation will be imperative for this to be successful.

Another key for success is focusing on the nutrition and psychosocial well-being of children (WHO, 2011). As stated earlier, infant mortality rate and malnutrition in children are significant health concerns during conflict. Programs that can ensure adequate immunizations for children will have a significant impact and Diphtheria, Pertussis, Tetanus and Measles cause significant morbidity and mortality in countries with protracted conflict. As stated earlier, a significant barrier to immunizations has been access to clinics, so mobile vaccine programs will be most effective.

Conclusion

Conflict has obvious, significant and direct impacts on health, through trauma and death. Recent work has brought more awareness of the indirect impacts conflict has on public health issues. Often, these indirect causes of morbidity and mortality exceed the direct causes of human suffering. While we have excellent plans and protocols to address the immediate needs caused by conflict, we need to ensure that equal effort is placed on looking at mitigation measures that will also address the indirect, medium and long term effects of conflict.

As noted earlier, applied epidemiologists have an important role to help with conflict mitigation and reconstruction (McDonnell, 2004). They can add value to the process by participating in an interagency review process of the conflict, now called the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework or ICAF*. The epidemiologist's primary role would be to look for effective

means of communication that would guide health program implementations, coordinate donor activity and advocate for support of public health measures (McDonnell, 2004).

This paper has tried to outline the key risk factors and effects conflict has on public health. Combining this information with overall development goals of the World Health Organization can provide important strategic guidance for mitigation interventions. Often, the measurements for success under this model will entail long-term engagements which have not been the traditional focus for USG federal agency interventions (except for USAID). Further, work will still need to be done to allow for a shift in this paradigm.

Lastly, in the past we have neglected the mental health issues associated with conflict. Recent studies now show the significant impact conflict has on mental health and over all community recovery and function. Addressing this issue will also require long term interventions with multi-disciplinary teams.

* For more information on an ICAF: <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/resources/library/tools> 

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Capacity Building in Korea—A Success Story

by Colonel Bryan Groves



Building Partner Capacity has become a major topic of discussion in United States Government (USG) circles. A good case study of building partner capacity is the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK is an interesting study because it benefited from the capacity building efforts not only of USG agencies, but equally importantly, of U.S. business interests and churches, as well as Japanese business interests and the Imperial Japanese Army. (The Japanese role in the modernization of the ROK is a subject of controversy for many Koreans.) Thus, this is a bit of a love-hate story, with a lot of love and some hate for the United States regarding its role in modernizing South Korea, and perhaps equal portions of hate and love for Japan because of its role as an imperial power. More important than the love and hate for our purposes is what went well for the ROK as a result of the capacity building efforts of Japan and the United States.

Japan and Korea share a tumultuous history, in which the Korean people repeatedly repelled various Japanese invasions going back to the 14th century. Until Commodore Perry visited the Orient in the 1850s, both these countries could accurately be described as hermit kingdoms. Perry's visit to Japan forced that nation to come to grips with the modern world. Japan embarked on the Meiji Restoration, instituting a policy of land reform, universal education and industrialization. Consequently, it quickly became a major regional power and expanded its influence in Asia. Taking advantage of the decline of imperial China, Japan began to assert its influence over Korea, co-opting at times Korean royalty and forcing Korea to accept between 1894 and 1896 a series of reforms known as "The Kabo Reforms." Modeled after reforms the Japanese adopted during the Meiji Restoration in the 1850s, these reforms abolished Korea's caste system, outlawed slavery, allowed widows to remarry and set the minimum age for marriage at twenty for men and sixteen for women.¹ The Kabo Reforms would help unleash pent up human potential in Korea and helped build civil capacity.

Japan's complete domination of Korea resulted when President Theodore Roosevelt gave the Korean Peninsula to Japan at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in exchange for Japanese recognition of U.S. rights to the Philippines.² Though Roosevelt received a Nobel Peace Prize for this effort of conflict resolution, the Korean people, many of whom suffered terribly during the Japanese occupation, were not as appreciative as the Nobel



Korean worker inventories rolled steel at Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO). POSCO grew from 38 employees in 1968 to over 29,000 today with extensive financial and technical assistance from the Japanese government and steel industry. POSCO is a leading supplier of steel world-wide. Photo courtesy The Associated Press.

Committee, which may explain the distinct mistrust some Koreans harbor against the United States and Japan. This is not to say the total experience of all Koreans during the Japanese occupation was entirely negative. While it is true that many Koreans suffered terribly under Japanese rule, others benefited personally from Japanese industrial and economic development. Japanese progress attracted many Koreans. What some have described as Korea's first modern political organization, the Unity and Progress Society supported Japan's policies. By 1943, Japanese industrialization of Korea had added over a million factory jobs, and Japanese corporations provided a model for present day Korean corporations.³ One Korean economist maintains that per capita gross domestic product rose over 50% in Korea during the Japanese occupation and that "Japanese colonialism left a rich legacy of capital, including human capital, and institutions more substantial than those typically found under Western colonialism."⁴

Aside from building modern factories, mines and railroads in Korea to better exploit its natural resources, the Japanese

government also developed Korean human resources and gave opportunities to Korean citizens. For example, in his biography, retired General Chi-op Lee (“Speedy Lee”) recounts his career with the Japanese railroad that moved people and goods up and down the length of the Korean Peninsula. Recognizing the opportunities in the Japanese railroad, Lee began attending night school and sought greater responsibilities.

The Japanese recognized Lee’s talents and offered him a chance to advance—as a lieutenant in the Japanese Army. Lee attended officer candidate school in China, where classroom instruction was supplemented by operations against communist guerrillas. After the Japanese surrendered to the Soviets and the Americans, Lee made his way to the American sector and later joined the ROK Constabulary, then the ROK Army. Lee was just one of many ROK leaders who had previously worked in Japanese industry and/or served in the Japanese military. Lee wrote:

My colleagues and I, and most of the other talented men who founded the country, received a Japanese education and afterwards served in the Japanese government or military. I occasionally have bitter feelings towards the Japanese because of the low quality menial work we were given. Without this background, however, we would have never polished our skills to the degree necessary to build a nation. The nation’s development after liberation wouldn’t have been as tremendous and we wouldn’t have been able to quickly change our impoverished national environment.⁵

Approximately 50,000 Koreans served in the Imperial Japanese Army or its allied Imperial Manchukuo Army, several hundred as officers.⁶ One such officer, Chung-hee Park graduated top in his class from the Japanese Manchurian Military Academy in 1942 and then attended the Imperial Military Academy in Tokyo, graduating in 1944. After World War II, Park joined the ROK Army and later fought in the Korean War. In 1961, he helped lead a bloodless coup in the ROK and later served as president of the ROK from 1961 to 1976.⁷

President Park pushed hard for the rapid and sometimes painful transformation of the ROK economy into an industrial, export-based economy and angered many of his citizens with his decision to normalize relations with Japan. The economic transformation and recognition of Japan, still considered inimical, were part of Park’s “Rich Nation, Strong Army” nation-building strategy. Park pursued his strategy, and despite protests and riots, Park remained firmly in control.⁸

Park put troops to work directly in the villages to “promote ties between the military and civilian populace and intensify anti-communist spirit and support anti-espionage operations.” The ROK units dug wells and built classrooms, clinics, and cultural centers. These new public buildings often were used for anti-communist indoctrination in addition to their primary functions.⁹

In the early 1970s, President Park reinforced his earlier civic-action programs with the Saemaul (New Village) Movement, a combination of self-help projects and government funding that modernized agriculture and improved the standard of living of rural Koreans. One of the principles of the New Village Movement was “Projects forced upon the villagers by the government are doomed to fail.” Park began New Village by giving free cement to participating villages. The following year, villages that used the cement wisely (about half) were given more free cement and a ton of steel rebar. The program was successful and later spread to cities.¹⁰

Regarding the American contributions to building the capacity of the Korean people, the impact of American missionaries was substantial. Between 1895 and 1910, Western (mostly American) Christian missionaries established 796 schools in Korea. These schools ranged from elementary to college level. The American missionary Dr. Horace G. Underwood, who published the first Korean-English and English-Korean dictionary, helped establish Yonsei University, the oldest private university in Korea.¹¹ To date, Yonsei has produced over 300,000 graduates who helped modernize Korea and many Yonsei alumni hold leadership positions around the world.¹²

American missionaries not only promoted Christianity and Christian values and practices, they also promoted American liberalism and influenced Korean higher education and society in several ways: (1) promoting a democratic ideology; (2) advocating equal opportunity for education regardless of social class and regardless of (3) gender; (4) introducing modern subjects such as biology, chemistry and physics taught in English or Korean in lieu of the Chinese classics taught in Chinese; and (5) introducing the college as a form of higher education.¹³ American missionary schools offered Koreans an alternate path of advancement within Korean society. The ROK’s first democratically elected president, Syngman Rhee, studied at an American missionary school.¹⁴ American missionaries were certainly encouraged in their good works by the United States Army and from 1945 through 1948, when the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) administered South Korea, the proportion of Korean children attending primary school increased from 40 to 70 percent of the population.¹⁵

Photo # NH 97174 Marksmanship training for South Korean troops, 1952



United States Army Soldiers train Republic of Korea Soldiers on military marksmanship skills.

Photo courtesy of the United States Navy

American interest in public education in the ROK continued into the 50s and 60s, with the U.S. Government paying Vanderbilt University to send experts from its George Peabody College for Teachers to assist the ROK Ministry of Education. Peabody advisors worked to imbue Korean teachers with “an understanding of the important aspects of community life, a clear concept of the emerging ideals of Korean democracy, and understanding of the social changes . . . as the society moves from a largely agrarian society toward a modern industrially oriented society.” Between 1957 and 1962, approximately twenty thousand Korean educators received basic or advanced instruction in modern educational techniques from Peabody staff serving in the ROK.¹⁶ During that same time frame, 92 Korean educators studied at Peabody’s Nashville campus. Another ambitious program at the University of Minnesota brought 226 Korean professors to the United States to study in fields ranging from agriculture to engineering and medicine to public administration.¹⁷

Aside from building human capital via schools and colleges, American missionaries helped bring American businesses to Korea. These businesses, or for-profit civil society organizations, brought rail and trolley lines, waterworks, telephone lines and electricity to Seoul by 1895.¹⁸ While much of the Japanese development in Korea focused on what is now communist North Korea, from 1945 onwards, all U.S. development focused on the ROK. Most of this development was not accomplished by foreign domestic investment or by various international

development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but by economic assistance to the ROK government which allowed it to carry out its own development programs which were largely market-based and focused on an export-driven economy.


U.S. economic assistance was essential to the ROK’s growth in the 1950s and 1960s because it saved Seoul from having to devote scarce foreign exchange to the import of food and other necessities. From 1953 to 1974, when grant assistance dwindled to a negligible amount, the U.S. provided the ROK approximately \$4 billion of grant aid. About \$3 billion was given before 1968, forming an average of 60 percent of all investment in the ROK. Over time, Park’s policies reduced the need for foreign grant assistance. Before 1965 the U.S. gave the ROK the most aid, but thereafter Japan and other international donors began to give an increasingly larger share of aid to the ROK.¹⁹ U.S. advisors encouraged Park to devalue the Won, the currency of the ROK, which helped boost ROK exports. Park also normalized relations with Japan at the encouragement of the United States.²⁰ While this act was widely unpopular among Koreans at the time, it unleashed a flood of reparations, grant aid and generous terms of credit from Japan which helped fuel continued economic growth.²¹

One example of this flood of Japanese cash and credit is the creation of the ROK’s Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) with significant start-up capital and technical advice from Japan. One source notes that between 1969 and 1985, POSCO received over 673 million USD in loans from Japanese sources and on-site technical advice from Japanese engineers for well over ten years.²² Another source notes that when the USG and other countries spurned President Park’s request for assistance in establishing a steel industry in Korea, Park’s administration invested approximately a sixth of the indemnity fund promised by Japan in 1965 into POSCO, and advisors from Shin Nippon helped set up POSCO’s flagship plant in 1969. POSCO became a major supplier of steel to the ROK, then Japan, and eventually the rest of the world, edging out its older Japanese rival.²³ POSCO has grown from fewer than 40 employees in 1968 to over 29,000 today.²⁴

Finally, any discussion of capacity building in the ROK would be incomplete without mention of the U.S. Army’s contribution to the rebuilding of the ROK Army under the direction of General James A. Van Fleet. Van Fleet formed a cadre of 150 officers and NCOs from U.S. Army units in Korea to conduct individual and collective training of ROK soldiers throughout the ROK Army. Between July 1951 and December 1952, each of the ROK Army’s ten divisions were pulled out of the fight, cycled through retraining, and returned to combat. One ROK assess-

ment of this program noted a fifty percent decrease in personnel and equipment losses by retrained divisions and concluded that “No one can deny that this training of virtually the entire force provided a firm foundation for today’s ROK Army.”²⁵ Van Fleet also arranged to send hundreds of ROK officers to the Infantry School at Fort Benning and the Artillery School at Fort Sill and built a four-year military academy in Seoul modeled after West Point.

The rebuilding of the ROK Army in the middle of a shooting war harkens back to our recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The significance of this achievement goes far beyond the military successes of ROK arms in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and a host of UN peacekeeping operations. U.S. military training greatly enhanced the managerial and leadership skills of ROK veterans serving in the public and private sector. Joel Bernstein, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1964 to 1967, stated that U.S. military training and education had “inculcated throughout Korea a sort of problem-solving approach which is not in its traditional culture.”²⁶

In closing, capacity building should not be confused with nation building. The Korean people rebuilt the ROK and refused to succumb to dependency on the international relief industry. The ROK did have significant economic assistance from both the U.S. and Japan. The Japanese introduced new business and social models which many Korean voluntarily adopted. The U.S. Army, American missionaries, USAID, and programs such as the Peabody Mission introduced new ways of thinking and new methods of management and leadership that complimented the many virtues of the Korean culture and helped the ROK attain the “ideals of Korean democracy.” In this sense, the United States and Japan helped the people of the Republic of Korea help themselves. 

¹Michael Breen, *The Koreans, Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies*, (New York, Thomas Dunne Books, 2004): pp 100-101.

²Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun, A Modern History*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2005, p 142.

³Cummings, pp 147, 168-170, 205.

⁴Chung, Young-lob, *South Korea in the Fast Lane: Economic Development and Capital Formation*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 7, 8.

⁵General Chi-Op Lee, *Call Me “Speedy Lee” Memoirs of a Korean War Soldier*, Won Min Publishing House, Seoul, 2001, pp 27, 29-31, 205, 206.

⁶Gregg Brazinski, *Nation Building in South Korea, Koreans, Americans and the Making of a Democracy*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2007, p 72.

⁷http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Park_Chung-hee, accessed on 27 April 2011.

⁸Dr. John L. Linantud, *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Lessons for the 21st Century from American Nation-Building in the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand*, (Melbourne, The University of Houston Downtown, Second Oceanic Conference on Oceanic Studies, University of Melbourne, 5-7 July 2006): p. 7.

⁹Major Daniel P. Bolger, *Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968*, Leavenworth Papers Number 19 US ISSN 0195 3451 (<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bolger/bolger.asp>)

¹⁰Michael Breen, *The Koreans, Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies*, (New York, Thomas Dunne Books, 2004): 137.

¹¹Sungho Lee, *The Emergence of the Modern University in Korea*;

Source: *Higher Education*, Vol. 18, No. 1, *From Dependency to Autonomy: The Development of Asian Universities* (1989), pp. 89-90.

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¹²<http://www.yonsei.ac.kr/eng/about/overview/>, accessed 29 April, 2011.

¹³Sungho Lee, pp. 90-91.

¹⁴Cumings, pp 111, 157.

¹⁵Brazinsky, p 42.

¹⁶Brazinsky, pp 43, 46.

¹⁷Sungho Lee, pp. 99-100.

¹⁸Cumings, pp 125, 126.

¹⁹SOUTH KOREA - A Country Study, *Country Studies Series* by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12334.html>, accessed 3 May 2011.

²⁰Brazinsky, p. 133.

²¹Chung, Young-lob, p. 324.

²²J.L. Enos and W. H. Park, *The Adoption and Diffusion of Imported Technology: The Case of Korea*, Croom Helm, New York, 1988, pp. 178, 179, 183.

²³San-Hun Han, Henry Wan, Jr., *Irony in Steel – Foundation Myths of Shin Nippon Steel, and POSCO*, 3rd APEA Meeting, Hong Kong, June 2007, p. 6.

²⁴<http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/snapshots/7170.html> accessed 16 May 2011.

²⁵General Paik, Sun Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjom, Wartime Memoirs of the Republic of Korea’s First Four-Star General*, Brassey’s, Dulles, 1992, p. 162.

²⁶Brazinsky, p. 123.



17th IAPTTC Annual Conference 2011
PKSOI Carlisle, Pennsylvania USA

International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres



"dedicated to the achievement of excellence"

November 14th - November 19th 2011



PKSOI in conjunction with the U.S. Army War College and the Center for Civil-Military Relations, will host the IAPTTC annual conference from 14-19 November 2011 in the Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The theme for this year's conference is "Evolving Peace Operations: Challenges, Requirements and Possibilities for Education and Training." In order to focus the discussions on this relevant and timely topic, the Executive Committee has also developed two sub themes: "Identifying future education and training challenges and requirements," and "Identifying possibilities, subject areas and methodologies." Registration has begun for this event, so please visit the conference web site at <http://pksoi.army.mil/iaptc2011/default.cfm> to register for your hotel room. Online registration for the conference will begin on 01 August 2011. For more information the point of contact (POC) for the event is Mr. Scott Braderman. [click here to e-mail](#)



AAP-SO CONFERENCE

Late February 2012
Letort View Community Center
Carlisle Barracks, PA

The 2012 Army Action Plan for Stability Operations (AAP SO) Working group is scheduled for late February 2012. The purpose of the event is to review progress by stakeholders in institutionalizing Stability Operations within the Army in accordance with the publishing of the 2011 AAP SO (planned for Oct 2011). Stakeholders at the working group will be able to better synchronize efforts through active participation and briefing of their command's focus areas and initiatives. This event, in conjunction with quarterly VTCs, is intended to provide a routine mechanism for SO implementation. POC for the AAP SO is LTC David Kosinski, (717) 245-4380, [click here to e-mail](#)

6TH ANNUAL

Stability Operations Training
and Education Workshop, 7-9 February
Washington, DC, site TBD

The 6th annual Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop will be held from 7-9 February in the Washington DC area. This year's theme will focus on what can we as trainers and educators do to improve our students ability to understand what is possible in achieving cooperation in areas of common interest among interagency and interorganizational stakeholders (termed Unity of Purpose/Effort or comprehensive approach) and improve the students' ability to think and work collectively and cooperatively toward that goal. For more information the point of contact (POC) for the event is Mr. Scott Braderman. [click here to e-mail](#)

SOLLIMS

Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System

Programmed Technical Initiatives /FY11

These are mostly in the area of Manager/Administrator functions, but these are ultimately set to help Administrators and Tier Managers tailor their individual workspaces, sub-tiers and Communities of Practice to best support their user needs:

- CMT #7551: Ability to arrange the order in which documents appear in the Knowledge Library. Up until now, documents (referred to as CDRs) were displayed in order of the date they were posted; now Manager can better control where the most key documents will appear. **COMPLETED.**
- CMT #8243: Redesign of Sites and References function; ability to organize references/links by Tier and within Manager defined sub-categories/sub folders. Right now all are listed in date order of when submitted; all the tiers “inherit” the list from the Master Tier – no tailorization. **WORKING.**
- CMT #8894: redesign of Search O&Rs return screen. Now you will only see the results of your search without all the previous header- select information and drop menus. More Google™ and Bing™ type returns. (Still not “scored” at this time – do we need scoring? Let us know using the [FEEDBACK](#) link on the homepage.) **COMPLETED.**

For more information about the web services initiative contact us at:

CARL_SOLLIMS@us.army.mil

- CMT #8242: Implementation of *required fields during ADD O&R activity. Currently, there are no required fields; with this change, users will be presented with an error message telling them that they did not provide information in required fields. The error message will identify the fields missing information. Also, the ADD O&R screens will clearly show which fields are required – for now: **TITLE, OBSERVATION, DISCUSSION and RECOMMENDATION** fields will be required.

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Defining Command, Leadership, and Management Success Factors Operations (Cmd_Ldrship_&_Mgt_Success_Factors_SO_June_2011-CDR-482.pdf)

This monograph, by Dave Fielder, addresses the topic of Command, Leadership, and Management (CLM) is intended to reach a wide audience of actors - including military and civilian "deliverers of effect" at the operations. It integrates disparate and wide-ranging definitions into a framework to study stability operations. Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Kingdom Cross are analyzed. Three case studies - from the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan - are also provided. A research.

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For more information visit <http://pksoi.army.mil>