PROFESSIONALIZING MINISTERIAL ADVISING

Raymond A. Millen

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FOREWORD

In this study, Professor Raymond Millen has identified a persistent challenge in U.S. efforts to provide effective security cooperation and capacity building with fragile and failing states—the realm of ministerial advising. From his research and analysis, he has concluded the United States has an opportunity to close the gap between U.S. good intentions and outcomes by recommending the establishment of a professional ministerial corps.

His approach is innovative in the sense that it draws on one of the United States’ greatest strengths—the ability to enhance efficiency and effectiveness through organization. In this respect, the establishment of a ministerial advisory academy seeks efficiencies by consolidating the diverse government agency advisory programs into one facility, thereby eliminating redundancies through a unified faculty, budget, and administration.

As a break from past U.S. practices with advising, this peacetime program would create a large pool of professional advisors for contingency missions and normal security cooperation engagements. Thus, the United States would ameliorate the frustrations associated with ministerial advising in exigent circumstances.

Professor Millen has also rendered a great service to the praxis of ministerial advising with a guidepost of best practices. Gleaning the existing literature on advising, he addresses the common themes of building rapport, exuding professionalism, and exercising patience. He identifies available resources to increase advisory competencies and provides insightful ways to enhance the working relationship with interpreters.
Lastly, he discusses those personality traits and attributes to which all advisors should aspire. Together, best practices would form the core components of the academy curriculum in addition to serving as a handy reference for advisors.

*Professionalizing Ministerial Advising* contributes to the broader advising community through its innovative proposals and delineated best practices. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute expects Millen’s study to have a substantial impact on the greater dialogue of ministerial advising.

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INTRODUCTION

Since 2003, the United States government has manifested a renewed interest in ministerial advising. The interest is limited though and by no means assured. In the past, the lion’s share of advising was limited to combat advisors during times of conflict, with Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador setting a doctrinal example for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with the renaissance in interest for state-building, formal ministerial advising has assumed greater import. Of course, as with any new program, ministerial advising has had its share of problems and errors, resulting in a fair amount of literature on advisory best practices. But, if history is any indicator of future behavior, in all likelihood, once the United States loses interest in ministerial advising, the collective memory will fade. Thus, the intent of this study is to make the case for an association of professional ministerial advisors as well as enumerating advisory best practices.

It is ironic that despite a host of military expeditions and occupations, the United States has yet to perfect ministerial advising. To be sure, some aspects of ministerial advising occurred in conjunction with occupation duties, but these were generally informal: Mexico (1847-1848), The Philippines (1899-1902), Puerto Rico and Cuba (to a limited extent), Veracruz (1914), Rhineland (1919-1923), Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), and Nicaragua (1927-1933). Incidentally, during his tour in The Philippines (1935-1939), Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower became the informal advisor to Filipino President Manuel Quezon in the late 1930s for the fledgling Filipino defense forces. As Eisenhower later recalled, his advising duties included the “orga-
nization of forces, training, finances, [and] personnel. As always, I stressed morale.” Their discussions also touched on “taxes, education, honesty in government, and other subjects.” Eisenhower valued his advisory experience since it broadened his strategic perspective and made him a more effective Supreme Allied Commander and President.

The occupations of Germany and Japan (1945-1952), on the other hand, were concerted efforts, linked to military government, but with a substantial amount of advising dedicated to governance, economic and military reform, and public administration. The formation of NATO in the early 1950s as well as NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the 1990s, also involved a fair amount of advising on political, military, and economic reforms. Yet, despite these collective experiences, the United States never collated these advisory best practices for later reference. Hence, when it comes to advising, the United States suffers from institutional amnesia—starting anew with each iteration.

The history of combat advisory missions provides a recurrent pattern of prevalent missteps and blunders. While the skill sets required for combat advising differ from ministerial advising, they do share common features. For instance, the U.S. experience with combat advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador reveals a pattern of improvisation due to the U.S. Army’s organizational culture—that is, an under-appreciation of the art and science of advising.

In Korea, advisors were junior in rank (a key sensitivity to Korean officers), less experienced, and tended to be patronizing towards their counterparts. Advising offered “little prestige, promotion, or hope of glory,” so the majority of advisors were “cast-offs”
who served only for a short time (i.e., six months to a year). Advisors received no training or preparation for their advisory positions, nor did they know what was expected of them. At best they received a briefing or an orientation but “little information on their mission or duties, much less the conditions under which they worked.” Hence, the mission was plagued by “chronic shortages and frequent turnover.” Advisors did not understand the culture, particularly the significance of face. Koreans placed great importance on “respect, proper behavior, authority, and on a unit commander,” which differed substantially from U.S. values. “Cultural understanding required not only empathy with Koreans, but also self-knowledge—understanding American cultural strengths and weaknesses.” Advisors received no language training, which put the onus of learning English on the Koreans (i.e., counterparts and interpreters). While Americans recognized the need to build rapport, the aforementioned barriers were often too great to overcome. The U.S. Army attempted to improve the effectiveness of advisors with the publication of advisory manuals in 1953 and 1957, which although useful and informative, did not appear to have much impact on the advisory effort. The early advisory effort in Vietnam suffered from the same defects. As historian Ronald Spector noted, “Not only were most American military advisors unfamiliar with the society, culture and language of South Vietnam, but the advisory role itself was unfamiliar.” According to a 1964 RAND study by Gerry Hickey, relations between U.S. advisors and their counterparts were neither that close nor productive. Aside from professional competence, success depended on the ability of the advisor to establish rapport, the amount of time spent with the counterpart, and the willing-
ness to become involved in the counterpart’s daily routine. Hickey recommended the vetting of candidates for “aptitude in working with foreigners” as well as providing language training and instruction on culture and customs, the structure of the South Vietnamese army, and civic action. Furthermore, he recommended extending advisory tours beyond six months, minimizing the number of progress reports required of them, and “instituting continuity, with departing advisors briefing incoming advisors and leaving behind records about their counterparts and the advice that had been given and rejected so that their successors would avoid repeating mistakes and not waste time learning through trial and error.”

As U.S. intervention in Vietnam increased, the number of combat advisors rose in proportion (11,596 by 1968). Advisory tours with Vietnamese combat units remained at six months, a time period far too short for advisors to learn the language and culture, much less understand the strategic vision of the advisory mission. Again, advisors were junior in rank to their counterparts, and few had much military experience and specialization in their fields. Worse, due to the lack of a transition period between predecessors and successors, Vietnamese counterparts would hear the same formulas over and over again, and hence tended to ignore their advisors.

This state of affairs is a bit perplexing since the U.S. Army had established The Military Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) course at Fort Bragg in February 1962. The six-week course included area studies, cultural and language familiarization, counterinsurgency operations, and tactical infantry skills among other fields. From their experiences, “most advisors came to realize that ‘determination, patience, and per-
severance were the most important virtues demanded of advisors . . . more important than the ability to face danger with confidence and resolution’ when working through the daily frustrations and inevitable misunderstandings.”


By 1970, the U.S. Army had instituted incentives to attract quality advisors. For example, qualifications for a district senior advisor (DSA) were the rank of major; combat arms . . . [Command and General Staff College] CGSC graduate; prior Vietnam service; suitable personality and temperament; ability or aptitude to speak Vietnamese; and prior company command. Additional incentives for a 12-month tour included a $50 monthly special pay allowance and consideration for advanced civil schooling. An 18-month tour included similar incentives to the PSA [province senior advisors] program plus guaranteed secondary zone consideration for promotion, no involuntary unaccompanied tours for 5 years, and an invitation to join the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP).

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and as a result of the bitter experiences, the responsibility of advising shifted to the domain of the Special Forces, and the conventional Army quietly dropped it as a skillset.

Despite Special Forces specialization with advising, the 1983 training and advisory effort in El Salvador still experienced difficulties, predominately due to congressionally imposed limitations and restrictions. The initial 55-man MILGROUP training team adhered to one guiding principle for training: “Keep it
simple, sustainable, small, and Salvadoran.” The over-arching goal was to professionalize the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF), through advising so as to alter its tradition of human rights abuses. Beginning in 1984, the MILGROUP organized the training and advisory effort into three teams: Operations, Planning, and Training. While the advisory mission eventually succeeded, the effort took years before fruition.

As opposed to combat advising, the practice of ministerial advising, with some exceptions, lay dormant for years. With some exceptions, the practice of ministerial advising lay dormant for years. And as with similar, past advisory efforts, ministerial advising in Iraq and Afghanistan had an inauspicious start, with assigned advisors receiving little or no training or preparation for the mission. Advisors were often very junior in rank to their counterparts, received no language or cultural training, and were not vetted for their personality traits. While these advisors performed their duties in an admirable fashion, often under difficult circumstances, successful advising became hit or miss. As this study underscores, not everyone, regardless of education, experience, and intelligence, is cut out to be an effective ministerial advisor. Ministerial advisors require prior training and education in their advisory field in order to enhance their effectiveness.

To rectify this shortfall, beginning in 2010, the Department of Defense instituted the Ministry of Defense (and Ministry of Interior) Advisors (MODA) Training Program, which according to OSD Director of Force Readiness and Training Frank DiGiovanni,
ministries. The program has grown and evolved over the years, incorporating lessons learned, responding to new threats in the environment, and anticipating future challenges as responsibility for internal security has transitioned to Afghan control. As the training program has changed and expanded to prepare ministerial advisors for the changing mission in Afghanistan and now for deployment to partner nations across the globe, the emphasis on relationship-building, humility, empathy, and respect has remained constant.11

As the MODA Training Program in Afghanistan demonstrates, trained ministerial advisors signal the U.S. commitment to assist fragile governments as part of building Partner Capacity and Security Cooperation, to include Security Sector Assistance, Security Force Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense; so, host nation ministries should view the effort as beneficial and not the cost of doing business with the United States.12 As past experience shows, ministerial advisors must possess a diverse host of knowledge which marks them as professionals.

If past behavior is any indicator of future actions, budget cuts to current advisory programs are likely to occur once Afghanistan fades from the U.S. foreign policy scene. Thus, the U.S. government will, once again, be caught unprepared whenever a large pool of ministerial advisors is needed posthaste. A fresh approach is needed, one in which ministerial advisors form an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in peacetime.

This study is organized into two parts. First, it proposes a U.S. interagency education system, which not only produces professional advisors, but also creates a large pool of advisors who can deploy to a number of countries quickly. Second, it synthesizes the best practices of advising from available literature, which can
serve as a framework for the education curriculum. The end-product would be a professional ministerial advisory corps, comprising thousands of well-trained and deployable advisors.

Several aspects of this proposal bear emphasis: first, to be effective, training and education must occur in peacetime. Too often in the past, the provision of advisors has been in response to a conflict or in its aftermath as part of stability operations. Consequently, the exigencies of the moment have resulted in ad hoc solutions, with formal training courses cropping up years into the effort. Second, the interagency approach seeks to consolidate the current advisory training from various U.S. agencies, seeking efficiencies in terms of funding, facilities, faculty, and administration. The idea is not so much to replace current training programs, but to incorporate them into a larger educational framework so as to optimize existing capabilities. Third, advisory tours must be of sufficient length to preserve continuity of effort. Obviously, one-year tours are insufficient, so a two-year tour should be the baseline. By this approach, the advisory mission fosters advisor-counterpart rapport, permits advisors to take a long-term view of reform, and mitigates the turmoil associated with frequent turn-overs. Fourth, to attract motivated high quality advisors, incentives are imperative. The opportunity for higher education and career enhancement are certainly factors. Adequate salaries, supplemented by hardship pay, when on mission are also essential. Accordingly, as with other foreign policy and defense professions, the ministerial advisory corps would serve to promote U.S. national interests.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PROFESSIONAL MINISTERIAL ADVISORY CORPS

Due to the advantages for U.S. national security strategy, the President should establish a National Security Council (NSC) study committee to consider the creation of a ministerial advisory corps. At a minimum, the committee would study the need, purpose, and scope of such an advisory pool as an integral part of U.S. Security Cooperation not only in the aftermath of a conflict, but also as a peacetime engagement for interested countries. As such, the ministerial advisory corps must be of sufficient size to meet multiple missions over extended periods. Thereafter, congressional hearings on the proposal would explore the efficacy of a professional ministerial advisory corps, identify the shareholders, and give it legislative authority.

As a break from past practices, the establishment of a professional ministerial advisory corps would permit the United States to engage and influence willing host nations on capacity-building programs (i.e., Security Sector Reform, governance, and essential services), relying on professional subject matter experts. As important, host nation counterparts are more likely to see the value of the reform programs, the advisory mission, and the partnership with the United States.

The ministerial advisory corps requires an expeditious character, ready for deployment upon call-up. The NSC study committee would need to determine the critical positions in a typical host-nation government for advisory match-up—viz. the Cabinet, the National Security Council, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and so forth.
Professionalizing the ministerial advisory corps requires a formal education through an established academy. Currently, various U.S. agencies conduct separate advisory training in support of capacity-building missions. While each provides superb advisory training, there is a danger these training programs will suffer from budget cuts during periods of austerity. Additionally, because these are separate training programs, duplication of effort is inevitable. To compensate for the shortfalls, seek efficiencies, and create unity of effort, the NSC study committee should identify a lead department to organize the education program. Conceptually, training would comprise three phases: basic, specialized, and pre-deployment.

The modern precedence for a corps of trained professionals dates back to the Second World War, in which the U.S. Army’s Military Government Division established a School of Military Government at the University of Virginia. More than 6,000 trained technicians and advisors were earmarked for military governance duties. The specialists included 2,500 commissioned civilians, who attended military and basic military government training at Fort Custer, Michigan, followed by three month’s intensive study at one of ten universities. Half of the studies was devoted to foreign language and foreign area issues. Upon graduation, the civilians returned to their vocations, subject to recall when needed.

Similar to the efforts during World War II, the creation of a professional advisory corps requires formal training and education in order to foster knowledge and skills. To this end, this study advocates a basic advisory course, advanced degree completion, and a pre-deployment training course.
The Basic Advisory Course

The basic advisory course would constitute a generic advisory curriculum for six weeks or so in order to expose candidates to the rudiments and best practices of advising. For the purpose of structure, this study references the Department of Defense’s Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MODA) as a curriculum framework. As mentioned above, the MODA program, administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and conducted by the McKellar Corporation, has trained federal civilians for ministerial advising for the MOD and MOI in Afghanistan since 2010 and is in the process of expanding the program globally. Because MODA provides both basic and deployment training in one seven-week course, this study addresses these features in the appropriate training phases.

While this study uses the MODA program as a model of training, it does not suggest the other programs in use by other prominent agencies—viz., the Office of Technical Assistance (OTA); US Department of the Treasury (DOT); International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP); US Department of Justice (DOJ); Human Rights and Governance (DRG Center), USAID; US Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Counterterrorism; and Office of Criminal Justice and Assistance Partnerships (INL/CAP), DOS—are deficient. Each trains its advisors properly for the mission. The intent is to describe one program, assuming the other programs are similarly structured.

MODA is demonstrably a learning organization, with coursework focusing on the art and science of advising. Coursework is enhanced by guest lecturers,
which include “former U.S. Ambassadors, Afghan officials, Department of State officials, retired military officers, and leading think-tank academics.” The program brings in senior facilitators, who assist with student discussions and assimilation of daily coursework. Additionally, the program regularly seeks improvements to the curriculum, eliciting feedback directly from the field and from former ministerial advisers.¹⁹

By teaching the art and science of advising, the MODA program seeks to create well-rounded advisors. To strategic theorist Harry Yarger, the overarching goal is to learn how to think strategically about strategy formulation: “developing and using the political, economic, socio-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects and set conditions that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstance.” The ability to think in terms of “objectives, concepts, and resources [serves] to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.”²⁰

The program encapsulates the art of advising in a set of guiding principles, titled “The Code of Conduct,” designed to “support U.S. missions and overseas contingencies . . . strengthen the security ministries of partner states . . . [and] forge long-term relationships” with counterparts (covered in the principles and guidelines section).²¹

MODA instruction on knowledge and skills constitutes the science of advising: providing advisors with the “tools necessary for an advisor to advise effectively;” transforming “their professional competencies into advisory competencies;” and thereby producing “reflective practitioners and effective, successful advisors.” Accordingly, knowledge and skills form the
course objectives in the following training modules: personal security; advisor knowledge and skills; and team performance. Taken together, the MODA program of instruction takes care to align knowledge and skills with the applicable guiding principles so as to produce well-balanced advisors.\footnote{In addition, instruction on the U.S. political system, culture, civics, and history would enhance cultural self-awareness as an integral part of appreciating the complexities of other cultures. Moreover, advisors would be better equipped to explain American attitudes and cultural idiosyncrasies to their counterparts. Instruction on corruption is essential since every society suffers from it. To avoid misperceptions, the instruction must provide a definition (i.e., using one’s position of power for personal gain) and how it differs from culturally accepted patronage and nepotism. Scenarios on ethical dilemmas would be beneficial as well. Similarly, advisors need instruction on the Geneva Convention, Law of Land Warfare, and protocols, as well as their obligations if they learn of violations.} Incidentally, the MODA program vets candidates for appropriate personality traits and attributes in an effort to provide counterparts with compatible advisors.

In the proposed academy basic course, a specific region or host nation is not addressed, so instruction on the structure and missions of U.S. agencies, departments, and bureaus involved in advising as well as on the combatant commands would provide the comprehensive framework for a generic advisory effort. In addition, instruction on the U.S. political system, culture, civics, and history would enhance cultural self-awareness as an integral part of appreciating the complexities of other cultures. Moreover, advisors would be better equipped to explain American attitudes and cultural idiosyncrasies to their counterparts. Instruction on corruption is essential since every society suffers from it. To avoid misperceptions, the instruction must provide a definition (i.e., using one’s position of power for personal gain) and how it differs from culturally accepted patronage and nepotism. Scenarios on ethical dilemmas would be beneficial as well. Similarly, advisors need instruction on the Geneva Convention, Law of Land Warfare, and protocols, as well as their obligations if they learn of violations.

The basic course should introduce students to assessment processes, such as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), strategic thinking, systems thinking, the Deliberate Decision Making Process, and Measuring Progress in Conflict Environ-
ments (MPICE). Additionally, instruction on writing concise reports and giving briefings is of particular use.

An important adjunct to the MODA course material is the basic “Advisor’s Toolkit,” which is a collection of practical suggestions and information for study.23


The toolkit reinforces the course instruction, serving as a quick reference. Advisors can also supplement and personalize their toolkit with useful planning formats, checklists, and tips as a result of additional research.

Aside from the instruction, the basic course serves an administrative purpose as well. Apart from the collection of personal data to build advisor files, a health evaluation and a personality traits appraisal are necessary. Advisors are an investment for the government, so they need to be healthy enough to serve abroad for an extended time period. Scrutinizing an advisor’s personality traits is imperative due to the importance of building rapport (see Best Practices section on Es-
sential Personality Traits and Attributes). While technical competence, education and experience are important considerations, they cannot compensate for an incompatible personality. Not everyone is suitable as an advisor. It is far better to identify pernicious idiosyncrasies early in the process than to discover them after the advisor is deployed. Again, the MODA program relies on facilitator and peer assessments of students in making the determination to retain students for the program.

Conceptually, unless deployed for an immediate advisory mission, graduates from the basic course would return to their civilian or federal vocations until called-up for service and deployment training. This practice would have several advantages. Principally, it saves the government program money, with the parent organizations of candidates providing the travel and subsistence allowances for the basic course. Ministerial Advisory Corps funding would be limited to maintenance and operational costs for the academy, advanced schooling tuition, travel and subsistence for deployment training, and deployment salaries. Second, basic course graduates would serve as informal recruiters with greater outreach as they relate their experiences with friends, family, and colleagues. Third, basic course graduates would have the opportunity for self-assessment as they consider how their normal job responsibilities can be used to enhance their advising skills (i.e., separating the practical from the ideal). Last, the basic course experience should inspire graduates to continue their professional development vis-à-vis the art and science of advising, through additional reading, self-study, and reflection. Altogether, this experience fosters a whole of government perspective.
The academy could hold periodic refresher training, seminars, and conferences so as to maintain the proficiency of graduates as well as introducing new advising techniques and knowledge. In this manner, the program remains dynamic and innovative.

**Partnering with Universities**

Aside from serving as an incentive for drawing quality advisors, the opportunity to attend specialized training at a partner university increases the advisor’s competence, and hence, value to an advisory counterpart. Ideally, the advisory program would provide tuition assistance for graduate or technical school.

The Ministerial Advisory Corps administration would manage the advanced degree program, encouraging interested students to seek degrees in public administration, political science, economics, law, and the like. The degree program should also include proficiency in prominent languages, such as French, Spanish, or Portuguese since these are widely spoken in many developing countries.

**Pre-deployment Training Course**

For advisors slated for a specific advisory mission, the pre-deployment training course would provide refresher training from the basic course but with special focus on the destination country. Conceptually, the course could last six weeks, depending on curriculum objectives. Based on the MODA program, the curriculum would focus on the local language, culture, history, political/military/police structures, rule of law (political structure and constitution), national security council, as well as the U.S. and host country’s missions, policies, and programs. Practical insights
from facilitators and subject matter experts on the host nation or region would help fill the knowledge gaps. If possible, the program should assign “a cultural partner from the host country” to provide insights and advice on building rapport, cultural peculiarities, and language assistance. Lastly, like the MODA program, the course would culminate with a capstone advisory exercise at a training facility, such as the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana, with ethnic role players serving as ministers, staff, and security for realism.24

As with the MODA program, the deployment Advisors Toolkit would provide supplemental information on the host nation and serve as a handy study reference:25


- **U.S. and Host Country Mission, Polices, and Programs**: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program, Rule of Law, Police Reform, Defense Reform, Challenges of Transition (if applicable), Insurgency and Counter-insurgency (if applicable), Engaging Women in Reform, country team (or combatant command) assessments and plans, and an Acronym List.

Since advisors will likely have a counterpart identified, biographical information should be available. The program should conduct an assessment of the counterpart’s personality and identify potential compatibility friction points. Most importantly, the program should set aside a two-week transition time with the advisor’s predecessor for continuity of effort.
The course should conduct VTC sessions with relevant U.S. embassy officials and/or the command element of the combined/joint task force if applicable. Moreover, advisors should receive current phone numbers and emails of relevant U.S. agencies, embassy offices, Combined/Joint staff, UN offices, and other organizations. Realistically, maintaining current contact rosters is difficult, so having a dedicated staffer on top of this need is worthwhile.

Considerations for the Ministerial Advisory Corps

To draw quality people, the ministerial advisory program must provide a competitive salary for the training courses and deployment missions. If the mission is in a conflict area or post-conflict area in transition, advisors should receive hazardous duty pay as well.

Like the U.S. military reserves, ministerial advisory corps members would remain fully employed in their chosen vocations, with the government making arrangements with the employers for the advisors to attend training courses and deployment missions. Employers gain from this program by having more knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced employees, who in turn bring fresh perspectives and innovations to the workplace.

To be effective advisory tours should be at least two years, including the two-week transition time between predecessors and successors. This should be reflected in the mission-deployment contract, which also specifies whether the deployment is in peacetime, wartime, or transitional in aftermath of conflict.

A point system should apply to advisors with points awarded for training, graduate school, and de-
ployments. The point system would apply to federal job preference, enhancing career opportunities and promotion.

The evaluation system should be designed to enhance the advisor’s career field, so as to remain competitive with peers.

Academy courses should be consolidated in one facility with an established budget, administration, and logistics. Conceptually, relevant government agencies would contribute faculty and resources to the enterprise.

While some marketing of the ministerial advisory corps would be needed initially, veteran advisors can increase recruitment through articles, lectures, and special events.

Logically, the government agencies most interested in ministerial advising are the State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Justice Department, and U.S. Agency for International Development. However, the basic course would also prove valuable for intended advisors below the ministry level, such as civil affairs, police, customs, and subnational government.

Aside from civilian advisors, the military has a vested interest in the education program. Certainly, civil affairs soldiers and foreign area officers would find the basic course useful as background to their duties, and many are earmarked for graduate school as part of their career track. Senior Service College graduates (e.g., colonels) would likewise benefit from the basic and deployment courses since they are often earmarked as advisors for senior foreign officers as part of security cooperation and even for ministers in hostile environments. They can also assist general officers, who generally have no time to attend the advi-
Sorry courses, on best practices for advising. Ideally, as the education program becomes an institution, some of its graduates will likely become general officers, so benefits to U.S. foreign policy will accrue.

BEST PRACTICES FOR ADVISING

Best practices for advising should form the core of the advisory program curriculum, pervading classroom instruction, lectures and seminar discussions. These are goals the adviser strives to master.

Establishing Rapport and Professional Stature

As recognized from the advisory efforts of past conflicts and confirmed again in Iraq and Afghanistan, building rapport with the counterpart is the initial and most important goal for the advisor. "In the end," counsels Foreign Service Officer Michael Metrinko, "establishing personal rapport with a host country official is the basis for success as an advisor, and the qualities in an advisor’s personality that allow for such a relationship are difficult to quantify." Former Ministerial Advisor John Gillette upholds Metrinko’s sentiment: “The key to advising is relationships, relationships, relationships. By this I mean the advisor needs to be equally capable at building horizontal and vertical relationships within both the host nation ministry and the advisor’s command. Relationships established based on mutual respect are essential in order to make concrete progress.” Former Iraqi Army advisor Joshua Potter’s experience corresponds with these judgments. “In order to have a positive and measured effect, we are responsible for forging a relationship based on professional respect
and personal understanding of each other. This is impossible if we are ethnocentric in our approach. We must listen to their perspective and understand their systems in order to effectively advise.”

However, advisors must not view the establishment of rapport as a discrete event, requiring no further attention. As the U.S. Army Research Institute underscores: “Relationship building is an ongoing activity that occurs throughout a deployment rather than occurring a few times early in a deployment.” Building rapport extends beyond personal relationships, albeit important. Ultimately, the counterpart must have confidence in the assistance programs and in the U.S. partnership; the advisor is the link to that trust.

The advisor must be careful not to rush this process. Special Forces officer Mark Grdovic avers that building rapport requires patience and time, often during informal activities with the counterpart. T.E. Lawrence (i.e., Lawrence of Arabia) cautioned that the advisor should “go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore.” Vietnam War advisors were instructed to “avoid rushing your acceptance by your counterpart. Overselling yourself will arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Time spent developing a healthy relationship will pay large dividends later on.” Like Grdovic, T. E. Lawrence counselled that fostering rapport is not confined to the formal setting; informal activities, such as sharing meals, accompanying him on trips, social functions, athletic events, and casual conversations are culturally more effective venues for “dropping ideas.” In a related theme, Nadia Gerspacher and Adrian Shtuni of the U.S. Institute of Peace see patience as integral to the trust-building process.
Building rapport must be balanced with professionalism. To be both credible and useful to the counterpart, the advisor must safeguard his professional standing, by no means an easy achievement. As the name implies, a professional is the product of education, self-study, experience, reflection, good judgment, and personal integrity. T.E. Lawrence advised, “Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. . . . To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds.” MODA teaches that the advisor is duty bound to “uphold the standards of respectability worthy of a representative of the United States Government; be a role model of public service professionalism.” This suggests that as a professional, the advisor maintains both a close but appropriate relationship with his counterpart so as not to be seen as “going native” or compromising his professional integrity. Hence, advisors must be credible on two fronts: first, they must maintain the respect of their own institution; second they must secure the trust of the counterpart and his office.

Because patience and professionalism are essential to advising, this study addresses them in further detail in the character traits and attributes section (pages 35-54).

Gaining Competencies

Education and self-study establish the basic foundation for competency and proficiency. In Metrinko’s view, “A good advisor’s skill set includes language ability, cross-cultural adaptation and knowledge, and a solid foundation in American history and politics,
as well as expertise in his particular military field.” Similarly, Grdovic believes that

advisers need to arrive with a reasonable macro understanding [of the country, culture, and conflict] so that they are ready to start developing a micro understanding of their new environment. This region-specific, counterpart-specific, micro-level understanding, developed from time spent in country with the counterpart, provides clear signals that the adviser possesses a sincere desire to understand his environment, which is a precursor to developing valid opinions and rendering any advice.

While the pre-deployment training course would provide the foundation of host nation understanding, Metrinko suggests advisors increase their knowledge further with books, internet sources, the U.S. embassy website, information from relevant government agencies and bureaus, current Department of Defense and Department of State policies and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and host nation command structures, chain of command and logistical system. Reports and continuity files from preceding advisors should also prove useful. Metrinko encourages the advisor to delve even deeper:

Another asset available to advisors is a plethora of country studies and intelligence, both unclassified and classified. Information available typically includes population studies, ethnographic studies, terrain studies, key personnel assessments, and reports from military units operating in the area. Other assets include studies about senior foreign officials developed by various agencies. This information is especially crucial as it may clarify what makes a foreign official “tick.” Such reports are difficult to access, but they are available and will help the advisor develop an under-
standing of the terrain. Information of this nature can be obtained from both the military headquarters and from the local U.S. Embassy. A wise advisor should seek out the military intelligence officer or Defense Attaché at the Embassy, explain his upcoming task, and ask for all information that is available.\[^{40}\]

Upon arrival in country, the first task of the advisor is the transition meeting with his predecessor to review his continuity file. Accordingly, the predecessor addresses existing policies, programs, and strategies. He apprises the successor on the counterpart’s ethnicity, religion, education, political connections, social standing, familial background, and reputation. His opinion of the counterpart’s leadership and executive skills is appropriate, but this is a subjective evaluation. The predecessor should address what he has accomplished and what remains outstanding, as well as what has worked, what has failed, and why. He should also highlight the strengths and weakness of those systems which impact on the ministry office (i.e., budget, supply, administrative, patronage, and so forth). In turn, the successor begins his own continuity file, which he will use to brief his successor.\[^{41}\] This transition meeting is essential for continuity of effort, so it is incumbent upon the ministerial advisory program to ensure it is preserved above all other considerations.

Once settled in his job, the advisor should seek out other available resources. “The advisor,” as Metrinko affirms, “is never alone in his new environment, and a variety of other players, from the American Embassy [including country teams], international organizations, the media, nongovernment agencies, and the local populace affect the advisory mission as well. Understanding the roles played by this variety of actors
is essential to the advisor, since they can provide support and cooperation as well as hinder his mission.”

Advisors should build positive relations with the media and cooperate with the embassy public affairs office for guidance on media relations. The media can provide the advisor with critical information on events or on the counterpart and help propagate programs or “good news stories” for public consumption.

If the advisory mission coincides with a U.S.-led coalition operation, the advisor should become acquainted with the combined/joint staff (or Office of Military Cooperation staff), since it can provide a wealth of information on current policies, strategies, programs, and other initiatives. The combined/joint staff can also verify information (or rumors) the counterpart has shared, or it can render staff assistance regarding specific problems plaguing the ministry. The advisor should understand that the counterpart and his staff may not be familiar with or understand the combined/joint staff products. Quite often, these products are ignored until the advisor brings them up.

In view of the limited time between call-up and deployment, the advisor should concentrate on knowledge central to the assigned ministry. Grdovic counsels that advisors should have the experience and background commensurate with the counterpart’s responsibilities, in addition to possessing thorough knowledge on the equipment and weapon systems of the host country. Once they prove useful to the counterpart, their credibility, trust, influence, and value will increase correspondingly.

While prevalent in U.S. circles, advisors should avoid using the terms “advisor” or “mentor” with host nation officials. In Grdovic’s view, “advisor” suggests the counterpart is not a professional. Metrinko writes
that “mentor” connotes, “a relationship between a superior and someone younger, or inferior in status and rank. In the world of strategic partnerships, and in a setting where expertise, experience, social status, political rank, and financial resources can be more heavily weighted on the foreign official’s side, ‘mentor’ is a misnomer.” As a substitute, the advisor should refer to himself as a special assistant to the counterpart.

Language Proficiency and Cultivating an Interpreter/Translator

The literature and expert opinions are unanimous regarding the necessity of language proficiency. Grdovic maintains that good language skills increases rapport, and T. E. Lawrence encourages advisors to “to speak their dialect.” Realistically though, mastering a language takes years of study and immersion in the culture, and even then, fluency can remain elusive. Regardless of the obstacles, the advisor should make a dedicated effort to speak conversationally in the local language since this accrues a plethora of benefits in terms of building rapport and influence. In the meantime, the advisor must optimize available resources to communicate effectively with the counterpart. One potential asset is the interpreter/translator (hereafter shortened to interpreter).

Cultivating the interpreter is one of the most important activities for the adviser. Ideally, the interpreter is assigned to the adviser for the duration of the mission. Thus, building a good working relationship with him is imperative. The adviser should suffer no illusions regarding the proficiency of his interpreter: “Who is an ideal interpreter?” Metrinko asks. “It would be someone who can accurately and quickly translate nu-
anced meaning, be thoroughly versed in both countries’ history, literature, culture, and politics, as well as in the technical subjects under discussion, and yet not allow his personality to shade the interpretation. This paragon does not exist, and if he did, the advisor would not be able to afford him.”

Hence, the advisor will need to work with his interpreter so they become an effective team.

The initial meeting with the interpreter is dedicated to learning his background. Foremost, the advisor should determine whether he and the interpreter are compatible since personality clashes can hinder effective communication and prove distracting for the counterpart. Identifying skills, such as education, vocation, prior jobs, and self-improvement activities, helps the adviser assess the interpreter’s level of English proficiency. Identifying the interpreter’s religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, family (i.e., social standing), and tribal associations helps the adviser identify potential points of friction with the counterpart, but are not necessarily disqualifiers for employment per se. What will disqualify an interpreter is any indication of “heavy emotional baggage, prejudice, or personal political motivation that conversations will be twisted in a way not intended by either advisor or official, leading to distrust and mission failure.” Thus, the advisor must remain alert to potential telltale problems during the interview.

The advisor should ascertain whether the job will endanger the interpreter due to his association with the United States or the host government. If a threat exists due to the location of the interpreter’s home, the advisor and interpreter should discuss personal security techniques, such as departing and arriving home at different times, frequently changing routes to work,
alterations of appearance during travel, and having a cover story if confronted.

If the advisor inherited the interpreter from his predecessor, they should discuss the interpreter’s impression of the counterpart, previous advisory discussions and points of contention, and likely challenges the advisor will face. The interpreter’s perspective will likely be imperfect, but it does provide the advisor with a baseline of comparison with the previous advisor’s viewpoints.

Perhaps just as important, the adviser establishes the ground rules for the interpreter (i.e., what is expected of him). Because the concept of time may suffer from cultural ambivalence, the advisor will need to stress the importance of punctuality for job performance. For meetings, the advisor should tell the interpreter to use first person (i.e., “I” not “he”) and adopt the advisor’s demeanor and verbal tone. The interpreter is only to translate the advisor’s exact meaning without interjecting his own viewpoints. He is never to usurp the advisor’s authority by giving orders to ministerial officials regardless of the circumstances. Last, as an extension of the advisor, he must maintain a professional appearance (i.e., tidy and properly attired).

For his part, the adviser must use simple words and short, simple sentences. The adviser should develop a rhythm of stopping every couple of sentences for translation. Consequently, the adviser must anticipate that meetings will take twice as long due to translation time and plan accordingly. Initially, the adviser must take care to avoid common translation pitfalls, such as the use of acronyms (e.g., JSOC), arcane vocabulary (e.g., arcane), terminology (e.g., mission command), slang/vernacular (e.g., hang tough),
euphemisms (e.g., collateral damage), and difficult conceptual terms (e.g., center of gravity). As the advisor and translator cultivate their working relationship, these usages can be introduced once they are discussed fully.

As part of the meeting preparations, the adviser must review with the interpreter those issues that will be discussed during the meeting, including terminology and concepts that the adviser must use. The adviser can check interpreter understanding by having him paraphrase key points to be made during the meeting.

By their nature, interpreters will not likely admit they don’t understand everything said out of fear of being fired or reprimanded (i.e., losing face), so they will skip over what was said or say what they think the adviser meant. The adviser can forestall a lot of confusion by telling his interpreter to speak up whenever he does not understand something, even in front of the counterpart. Similarly, the adviser should request the counterpart ask for clarification if the translation is confusing.

The adviser must provide the interpreter with a notebook and pen for note-taking . . . and ensure he has them for each meeting. Irrespective of the interpreter’s translation skills, a notebook helps him capture the salient points as he prepares to translate. Also, the notes help the adviser write the subsequent memorandum of conversation. The adviser should not take notes during the meeting, so as to maintain eye contact with the counterpart.

The adviser should develop the skill of looking at the counterpart while speaking rather than at the translator (a difficult habit to break in practice), so the location of the interpreter vis-à-vis the advisor and
counterpart must facilitate eye contact. The adviser should cue on the counterpart’s body language (i.e., facial expressions and other nonverbal cues) so as to alert him of misinterpretations as well as his acceptance or rejection of what is being discussed. Reading body language is an important skill for advisers, as the U.S. Army Research Institute has noted: “Advisors who spent more time interpreting nonverbal behavior also tended to report having counterparts who were more amenable to guidance.”

Likewise, the interpreter should be able to observe both the advisor and counterpart’s facial expressions. The advisor should have a prearranged nonverbal signal for the interpreter to stop talking if the counterpart takes issue with anything said. It is imperative for the advisor to control the discussion rather than having the counterpart and interpreter arguing over some point made. It is up to the advisor to settle the matter, not the interpreter.

The adviser must remain alert to English mispronunciations (e.g., ab road instead of abroad), mixing up words (e.g., constructing versus contracting), or making nuanced mistakes (e.g., training not education). If a translation does not make complete sense, it is likely due to one of these errors. As the advisor gains proficiency in the language, he should not hesitate to correct the interpreter for mistranslations in an unassuming manner. This has the added benefit of increasing rapport with the counterpart by demonstrating the advisor’s increased language proficiency.

It would be a grave mistake for the adviser to assume the counterpart speaks little or no English. He may not speak English well, but understand plenty. This may apply to other officials in the office as well. Incidentally, the adviser should query whether the counterpart and he have another foreign language
(e.g., French, Spanish, or Portuguese) in common and revert to it whenever a translation is not getting through.

At the end of a meeting, the advisor, referring to the translator’s notes, should repeat what has been discussed and what answers or products are expected for the next meeting. If new officials are at the meeting, the interpreter should ask for their contact information as well.

Once they have returned from the meeting, the advisor and interpreter should conduct a review session, addressing any translation difficulties, perceived verbal and nonverbal cues of the counterpart, meeting atmospherics, and ways to improve their teamwork.

The advisor is responsible for developing his interpreter. He should take the time to assist the interpreter hone his English. He should teach the interpreter new vocabulary, concepts, and terminology, especially those which are often used in meetings. He should loan the interpreter books, magazines, newspapers, and DVD movies to introduce common words and modern phrases. The English an interpreter has learned may not necessarily be the English which Americans speak. For example, he may have learned British English to include pronunciations. The interpreter should feel comfortable in asking the advisor about words not understood in the reading materials or the film. In this regard, the adviser should purchase an English-indigenous language dictionary for the interpreter, since it is unlikely he can afford one.

Often, the adviser will assist the counterpart’s office in the production of policy, strategy, and similar documents. With all written products, it is prudent to write English and the indigenous language in alternating paragraphs. This technique helps when proof-
ing and revising documents and helps the counterpart’s staff better understand the substance once they become more proficient in English. Ninety percent of problems with documents is due to poor translations, so the advisor will need to go over each paragraph with the interpreter to clear up any potential language barriers. The advisor will need to arrange a special meeting with the counterpart and his staff to review the document in question, which is a time-consuming but necessary task.

The advisor should optimize other uses of the interpreter. In the role as an assistant, the interpreter should request the telephone numbers and emails of key officials at the end of meetings. For the initial meeting with the counterpart, the adviser should arrange the regular meeting schedule so the counterpart can set aside time for discussions without interruptions. In this manner, the interpreter acts as the medium for normal or emergency communications. The advisor should teach the interpreter time management, basic planning, note taking, and other skills as needed for the mission. Interpreters are likely to occupy an office pool so the adviser should make daily visits to ensure the interpreters are gainfully employed. If the adviser is not attentive, interpreters may spend the workday playing games on the computer or watching TV.

The adviser should use the interpreter as a local language teacher (including dialects) for common terms, phrases, and idioms. Most important, the adviser should practice pronunciations with the interpreter so as to develop a native patois. The instruction should include reading the local newspaper together for reading comprehension as well as reading articles aloud to practice pronunciation.
The interpreter should serve to alert the advisor of special events (e.g., holidays), significant incidents (e.g., death of a family member), cultural norms or taboos, religious events (i.e., Eid and Ramadan), ministry work hours, and political sensitivities. The interpreter can prove invaluable in assisting the advisor with the appropriate courtesies as well as table and social etiquette. Moreover, the interpreter should alert the advisor of the latest rumors, conspiracy theories, and breaking news stories circulating in the society. The interpreter should advise on how specific religious practices, such as fasting during Ramadan, impact on the people’s temperament, sleep, and energy. Hence, Ramadan is not a period for productive activities nor should the adviser eat, drink, smoke, etc. in front of observers.

The interpreter should advise on the propriety of gifts to the counterpart for special holidays, departures, family events, and other occasions. The interpreter must be prepared to explain to the counterpart the reason for the gift. Similarly, whenever the counterpart provides a gift, the interpreter must explain to the advisor the reason for the gift and the appropriate response beyond a mere thank you. For a more delicate matter, the advisor should discuss appropriate ways to refuse counterpart requests for favors (i.e., TVs, stereos, Visas, etc.) or offers of inappropriate gifts. While a firm, polite refusal is the correct course, the interpreter can provide advice on how to do so without embarrassing the counterpart or without the advisor losing face, particularly if others are present.

The adviser should discuss with the interpreter the connotations regarding religion, justice, culture, as well as the country’s historical narrative, all of which will differ from the American context. For example,
the understanding of what constitutes a criminal act or corruption may not be viewed as such in the local society.

The interpreter should assist in route planning for trips to other locales in order to avoid dangerous places. Additionally, the interpreter should alert the advisor of any anomalies in local settings which might pose a danger. It is not an understatement to view the interpreter as the adviser’s barometer for danger. Ultimately however, the advisor is responsible for his own personal security. He must remain vigilant of operational security and take notice whenever an interpreter makes queries on security issues beyond his need to know or attempts to access classified or confidential information. If the interpreter persists in this behavior after being warned, the advisor should inform the security office and dismiss him.53

Although never explicitly addressed in the literature, advisers should conduct counseling sessions for both bad and good performance. The advisor must point out poor performance and expected corrective measures. If the adviser needs to fire the interpreter later, written counseling sessions with specific instances and dates make it easier to justify termination. In regards to incentives, interpreters treasure certificates of appreciation and of training since they often serve to pad the interpreter’s portfolio/resume. Moreover, certificates are an excellent way to gain loyalty.
Essential Advisor Personality Traits and Attributes

As the U.S. Army Research Institute notes, “The heart of the advisor mission is to teach, coach, mentor, train, and guide counterparts to better performance and self-reliance.” As previously noted, not everyone, no matter how intelligent and accomplished, is suitable for advising. It bears emphasizing that a poor adviser is worse than no adviser at all, so the following passages are designed to underscore those traits an advisor should try to master. These traits are mutually reinforcing, serving to establish the advisor as a valuable partner for the counterpart and the advisory mission. Accordingly, the basic course should embed these attributes in the curriculum.

Patience. A critical component for building rapport, patience is a trait consistently identified in advising literature. T.E. Lawrence suggested patience was a strategy: “Have the patience to bear with them. The
less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.”

Metrinko cautions that host nation officials are not compelled to complete tasks on the same timeline as newly assigned advisers (who usually have one-year tours). They do not share the same sense of urgency and action as advisers. In short, the counterpart will not change his work habits to suit the adviser. Thus, the advisor must allow time for his recommendations to germinate, allowing the counterpart to consider the advice at his own pace. Except in extreme cases, patient counsel gives the counterpart the freedom to fail, underscoring that failure is often the best teacher. As T. E. Lawrence pointed out, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

Perseverance. As a complement to patience, persistence helps nurture the relationship with the counterpart. It forms the foundation of negotiation, serving to engage the counterpart in a dialogue regarding acute policy challenges and decisions. No advisor should allow a decision to stand which he believes is detrimental to essential goals and strategy. Naturally, patience, tact, and respect must accompany persistence to have the desired effect.

During the Vietnam War, advisors were instructed:

If a problem area is discovered, continue efforts to solve it, recommend appropriate measures to be
taken, and then follow through; again, remembering that patience is of utmost importance. But, the matter must be continually brought to your counterpart’s attention until he is sold on taking the measures necessary to solve the problem or correct the deficiency as the case may be. The ultimate in good advising is to advise your counterpart in such a way that he takes the desired action feeling that it was through his own initiative rather than yours.60

Vietnam advisors were encouraged to take frustration in stride: “Don’t become discouraged. All of your advice won’t be accepted. Some of it will be implemented at a later date.”61

**Tact.** Having two meanings, tact is the faculty to speak appropriately for the occasion, as well as the ability to use good judgment when faced with complex situations. Like patience, tact is regarded as an essential trait in advising literature.62 Gerspacher and Shtuni note that “an effective advisor must be tactful and able to turn a hostile situation into one in which all parties come out with a degree of satisfaction. While it may not be a win-win outcome, it should allow everyone to move forward without acrimony or losing face.”63 Certainly, the interpreter can provide some guidelines regarding appropriate expressions, but for the most part, the advisor should try to anticipate trouble ahead. For example, the MODA program strives to inculcate “humility, empathy and respect” in its students, particularly during the capstone exercise. One of the scenarios involves a meeting with a minister, whose relative, unbeknownst to the student, has been killed in a U.S. airstrike. The minister lashes out at the student, who is evaluated on how tactfully he/she handles the situation.
Professionalism. While building rapport is essential for building a relationship with the counterpart, professionalism creates the balance to sustain it. As professionals, advisors must remember that success is the domain of the host nation, but the advisors are always held accountable for failure. Nevertheless, while the advisor wants his counterpart to succeed, it cannot be at all cost. Professionalism acts as a necessary buffer to protect the advisor from charges of “going native” or sycophancy. The advisor should keep in mind that the counterpart may leave his position as a result of promotion, relief, or retirement, so the advisor should not be perceived as being so close to his counterpart that his successor views him with mistrust.

The advisor sets a personal example, comporting himself with integrity, presenting a groomed and appropriately dressed appearance, and maintaining both physical and mental fitness. He practices “military courtesy and protocol appropriate to the counterpart’s rank and the advisor’s level of operation as a member of the counterpart’s personal staff.” He knows his job and the job of his counterpart, to include the organization, personnel, and equipment (i.e., property book), as well as higher strategies and policies. He demonstrates empathy for his counterpart’s concerns and takes the time to discuss them in private.

The advisor, as Metrinko observes, is always in the spotlight: “Remember that a foreign advisor is always under observation, from servants, other guests, and the eyes of scores of nameless security guards, drivers, other staff, and even the beggars sitting outside along the road (who may be reporting his activities to the local security service). His reputation and his actions will be discussed and analyzed in circles of whose existence he is not even aware. He will be tested re-
peatedly to gauge his reactions and standards, and his character and professionalism judged accordingly. People he has never met will judge him from afar, and be ready to deal with him or refuse him access based on word on the street about his behavior.”

The advisor will likely be confronted with an ethical dilemma, with perceived corruption heading the list. Metrinko warns that American perceptions of corruption may clash with accepted local practices. Advisors must understand the difference between corruption in Western parlance and cultural norms in society. Fees for service may be socially acceptable. Since officials may be supporting family members (and extended family members), the extra income is needed to supplement a meager salary. Also, government organizations may not have retirement benefits and the like. If the advisor does discover real corruption (i.e., “the misuse of power for personal gain”), it becomes a test of his professionalism. The adviser must remain an ethical role model, leveraging his rapport, persuasion, and quiet counsel regarding the potential consequences to the counterpart’s country, his family, and his reputation. Using analogies and conversational subtleties rooted on honor, integrity, and justice will likely be more effective than a direct approach.

The advisor should suffer under no illusion that he will change centuries of corruption, and a confrontation with the counterpart might result in marginalization or dismissal, so the advisor must weigh the severity of the activities with mission success—without rationalizing away the problem. Nevertheless, if the corruption is egregious, the advisor must not shy away from the final recourse, which is to inform his superiors of the evidence. Even so, the counter-
part may still retain his position, so the advisor and his superior may need to consider the next step. As Metrinko notes, “it is counterproductive to remain in a relationship which is so sour that the American advisor is ignored, disregarded, or seriously misused. Breaking the relationship with U.S. mission concurrence is not a sign of failure on the advisor’s part, but a sign of good sense.” 70 Regardless of the outcome, the advisor retains his professional standing within the ministry. On the extreme end of the spectrum, if the advisor learns of any atrocities and other violations of the Geneva Convention, he informs the counterpart immediately that both he and the counterpart are obliged to report them to their superiors respectively.

Knowledge of the Human Terrain. Viewed as a vital trait, Metrinko suggests advisors must seek proficiency in the culture, linguistics, social customs, and beliefs of the society in which they are immersed. “The advisor will rarely have had the luxury of years of study about the country, and so the process of knowing in itself becomes important. He should strive to learn as much as he can, and show interest, enthusiasm, and commitment to the learning process, because knowledge of the local human terrain will determine the nature of his advice, the way it is presented, and the likelihood that it will be received and implemented. It will impact directly on the relationship between the advisor and the foreign official, and make all the difference between success and failure in his mission.” 71

On a related note, an understanding of organizational cultures will help the advisor anticipate occurrences of interagency parochialism, unhealthy competition, and jealousies, which explains resistance to reforms, policies, and initiatives. Alerting the counterpart of these common organizational behaviors will serve to
mitigate frustration and to help him devise stratagems to overcome obstacles.

_Self-Reliance._ As the second vital trait to Metrinko, advisors must demonstrate the ability to function in a foreign environment without a great deal of supervision. Advisors must feel comfortable dealing with uncertainty and independence. “Advisors should understand all situations will not be black and white,” as current U.S. doctrine notes. “They are caught between two cultures, systems, and narratives. They must live in the proverbial gray area while maintaining legal, moral, and ethical standards. Advisors will likely find themselves isolated with great autonomy and no supervision. Under these conditions, they will face moral and ethical dilemmas on a daily basis. Advisors will have to grow mentally to be comfortable in this environment. . . . An honest self-assessment should be encouraged. Thus, the advisor mission calls for leaders of enormous character, moral courage, and sharp intellect.”

Advisors must feel comfortable resolving problems at their level without the need to check with superiors beforehand. Such delegation of authority requires good judgment so the advisor is not perceived as a rogue operator. Good judgment requires intimate knowledge of policies, strategies, and agreements, which set the parameters of advisory activities. The advisor is duty-bound to inform his superiors of his decisions and the rationale behind them. The superiors in turn are obligated to act as a firewall against impulsive criticism from higher agencies.

_Ability to Negotiate._ Metrinko considers the ability to negotiate as the last vital trait because much of what the advisor does is rooted in persuasion, deliberation, and logic in a patient but firm manner. If a topic is
likely to encounter resistance, the advisor must have a strategy, outlining background, pertinent facts, the likely multi-ordered effects of each option, and the benefits afforded to the counterpart. The advisor should explain an issue from differing angles, using different words to help the counterpart understand it fully. The counterpart will not admit he does not understand something, so it is incumbent on the advisor to explain the issue without sounding patronizing. At some point, the advisor will need to assess the counterpart’s capacity because he needs to understand his limitations and no amount of negotiations will overcome that.

Regardless, discussions are never one-sided. The advisor must conscientiously engage his counterpart in private when possible, asking for his thoughts and advice, listening actively and showing through verbal cues and body language that his input is valuable. As T.E. Lawrence counseled,

> Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

The counterpart is not obligated to accept the advice, either immediately or ever. The political climate or timing may not be right for a policy recommendation or initiative, so the advisor should try to infer the
reasons for the counterpart’s rebuff and explain this to his superiors. As Metrinko notes, “If the foreign official is personally sensitive to his country’s weakened status or to the implication that the U.S. advisor is a ‘watchdog’ or a ‘spy’ with authority over the official’s activities, he will resent the American’s presence, and others in the office will be certain to feed the official’s paranoia by slanted reports of what the American is doing and who he is seeing.” As an alternative, the advisor can float ideas to the counterpart to gauge receptivity but without the risk of rejection.

During meetings, the advisor should limit the number of issues, perhaps to three, for discussion, nor should they prolong undue discussion on one topic. If it is important, it can be discussed further in other meetings, allowing the counterpart to digest the various points. Moreover, the advisor should not present advice requiring an immediate decision. “Leave sufficient room for your counterpart to exercise his prerogative. One of his greatest fears is that he will appear dependent upon his advisor to his [subordinates].”

*Preservation of Value to Counterpart.* Perceived value is an amalgam of partnership, pleasant personality, and the benefit to the counterpart. Mark Grdovic avers that closely shared and aligned goals are integral to maintaining value. Because the environment and norms in the host nations are unique from the American experience, the advisor must adapt, demonstrating a “greater degree of flexibility, adaptability and initiative.” For Vietnam War advisors, comportment was integral to preserving value: “to sell one’s self, you must prove your values—an advisor must present a favorable personality in the eyes of his counterpart. This can be accomplished in due time by a gradual demonstration of your ca-
pabilities in an unassuming but firm manner. Be positive but not dogmatic in your approach to any subject; however, if you are not sure of the subject matter, it is better to say so and take timely measures to obtain the correct information. To attempt to bluff through a problem will only result in irreparable loss of prestige.”

Metrinko takes a more utilitarian view: “The advisor must show that he has qualifications that complement the official’s skill set, and that he can add value to the official’s performance and provide useful advice and assistance. If he cannot show he is of value, he will be ignored, relegated to the role of foreign staff aide, or at best be only a liaison between the official’s office and the local U.S. military bureaucracy.”

To Grdovic, the bottom-line is influence: “The amount of influence an adviser attains will be directly proportional to the sum of three factors: the rapport between the adviser and the host-nation commander or counterpart; the credibility of the individual adviser; and the perception by host-nation forces of the continued value of the relationship.”

The U.S. Army Research Institute characterizes this approach as impression management: “Advisors may engage in activities to promote their credibility and competence, such as role modeling and explicitly informing counterparts of their expertise and experience. Once a counterpart views an advisor as someone with expertise, it increases the likelihood a counterpart will accept an advisor’s guidance and mentorship.”

**Affability.** Because building relationships is pivotal to success, the advisor must have a pleasant personality, stressing the importance of teamwork. Since advisors are not commanders or even remotely in charge of the ministry offices they are advising, their person-
alities become a critical component for success. The advisor must be everyone’s respected associate—not solely the counterpart’s special assistant. He should show consideration and respect to junior officials, office workers, even the janitors and tea servers, because they may be relatives of the counterpart and they most definitely will report on how the adviser treats them when out of earshot from the counterpart.

Cultivating this image is a demanding task, with the advisor anticipating how he will interact with others in any given situation. Metrinko warns that “the advisor must look at himself through local eyes and the local culture. If the American officer’s ‘can do’ attitude is too highly developed, he may just seem ill-mannered and abrasive to the official and his staff, who often operate at a different tempo than that in U.S. military circles. If he appears to be too young and lacking in authority, the American may be regarded simply as a decorative foreign staff aide who tags along to add luster to the official’s entourage.”

A sense of humor is essential, and selective self-effacement has a way of disarming captious people. Accordingly, Vietnam War Advisors were urged to “study your counterpart to determine his personality and background, exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. Learn something about the personal life of the Vietnamese with whom you work and demonstrate this interest.” T. E. Lawrence advised, “Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable,
but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour.”

Vietnam advisors were urged to limit criticism when first assuming their duties. “If there is criticism, it should be couched tactfully, but the advisor must not be reluctant to criticize when criticism is in order. Failure to do so may leave the counterpart with the impression that the advisor does not know or care. Appropriate, timely, and tactful criticism can engender respect. If it is necessary to make a recommendation which might imply criticism of HC [host country] policy, advisors should do so in private.”

**Intellectual Curiosity.** As the section on gaining capabilities specifies, an advisor must arrive on the job with diverse expertise, over and above that required for the advisory position. Metrinko contends that the advisor must have a thorough understanding of U.S. history, civics, and political structures in order to correct misunderstandings or interpret U.S. actions/statements. Furthermore, “the advisor must understand American policy, and know the limits of what he can and cannot say or do. He cannot exceed the parameters established by his commander or the Ambassador. Exceeding his authority may leave the advisor in a position where his credibility disappears, and thus he will no longer be able to perform his duties.”

A demonstrated enthusiasm to learn about the host nation’s history, language, and culture, as well as its political, legal, military, police, and logistical systems will impress the counterpart and his staff, as long as the advisor does not appear to be lecturing. At times, the counterpart may not be familiar with certain policies, systems, strategies, and directives, so the advisor must devise methods to enlighten him without embarrassment.
T. E. Lawrence’s guidance is still applicable: “The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.”

Cultural Astuteness. MODA defines culture as “socially transmitted knowledge, behavioral patterns, values, beliefs, norms, and lifestyles of a particular group that guides their world view and decision making.” Achieving cultural competence is a multiple stage process: 1) cultural awareness—“understanding your own cultural identity, its influence on your beliefs and practices, and your own stereotypes and biases;” 2) cultural knowledge—“understanding similarities and differences between your culture and others’;” 3) cultural sensitivity—“demonstrating empathy, respect, and acceptance of others’ cultures;” and 4) cultural competence—“a synthesis of the previous stages. It also includes continuous self-monitoring, adaptation, and the active avoidance of discrimination and prejudice.” Paradoxically, as linguistic expert Amy Heaton discovered, language proficiency is not nearly as important as making the attempt, struggling even, because it demonstrates humility. The U.S. Army Research Institute concludes that “advisors
who invested more effort in understanding the counterpart’s perspective, suppressing cultural biases, and comparing cultures also tended to have counterparts more willing to accept their advice.” In this regard, the advisor will often need to serve as an interagent, reconciling U.S. policies, programs, and systems with the host nation’s traditional practices and procedures. To make the merge work, the advisor must identify the disconnects and explain the reasons to each party.

On a practical level, Metrinko explains that the advisor should be acutely aware of cultural norms regarding time (i.e., *inshallah*), timeliness (e.g., appointments, meetings), holidays, and religious practices. Additionally, decisions may be made informally rather than in formal meetings. “Everything takes time.” Relaxed expectations of time-based milestones and patience are called for. Metrinko contends that achieving cultural competence requires hands-on experience:

The American advisor should seek local guidance on cultural and social custom and etiquette, watch others around him, and ask questions about proper norms of behavior from local sources . . . . Every country has its own set of “do’s and don’ts,” and various practices or prohibitions may even change from town to town. Differences between foreign and American etiquette are endless, and ignorance of local customs will harm the advisor’s effectiveness. No one can possibly know everything about a foreign culture—or even his own culture—but some basic humility, an open mind, intellectual curiosity, and the ability to laugh at himself will carry the advisor a very long way. He must be aware of what is merely permissible, what is recommended, and what is prohibited in the local environment, because if local norms are not respected, the advisor’s best efforts to present ideas and influence foreign offi-
cials will be frustrated or even counterproductive. The learning process can be a lengthy one, and everyone makes mistakes along the road, but the more an advisor is versed and feels comfortable in the foreign social setting, the more effective his presentation of advice will be. Some social settings may be difficult for the advisor, but he will adapt quickly if he wants to be successful. After all, decisionmaking is a continuous process, and final decisions are often made far from the office setting.  

While cultural empathy helps insulate the advisor from being labeled as an “Ugly American,” advisors must also acknowledge their limitations regarding any mastery of culture. They must be careful not to over-generalize culture as representative of the country as a whole since regions and even small villages will have distinct cultures and traditions which differ nationally.

Conduit for Resources. By his position, the advisor often serves as a conduit for funding, equipment, and supplies. Metrinko does not believe this service is necessarily harmful: “He can reach back to the U.S. government on the official’s behalf to harness and help direct resources—in training, material, and financial terms—that will have great impact on the country’s stability and prosperity.” However, the counterpart must not perceive that this is the advisor’s main function or sole source of value. As T. E. Lawrence warned, “Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow to milk.” This perception is particularly acute for U.S. advisors as Metrinko counsels: “The American advisor must take care not to let himself be regarded as just another person who has come to pass out gifts in order to curry favor. He must not be regarded as sim-
ply a source of material assistance, supplies, high tech presents, and trips abroad under the rubric of training.”

Often, the advisor might be less guilty of this than senior U.S. officials who succumb to the pleas of host nation officials for ever more funding, equipment, and supplies—all of which are outside of the established supply procedures and often not on ministry office property books. Should this pernicious practice occur, advisors must voice their opposition to their superiors. The practice creates an unhealthy dependency on the largess of the United States; it encourages the host nation officials to ignore their own established supply system; and it damages the advisory relationship once the counterpart learns other ministerial offices are receiving off-the-books goods and services. Advisors must point out that flooding a country with money and resources often contributes to inflation, the black market, kleptocracy, and political corruption. Moreover, when the funding source dries up, as it inevitably does, the country lacks the revenue to sustain well-meaning but expensive programs.

Health Consciousness. Working in a foreign culture is often disconcerting and stressful, so the advisor must have the temperament to adapt. MODA counsels that health fitness is an essential trait: “Expert advisors are reflective practitioners who attend to their own mental, emotional, and physical health and continuously endeavor to improve themselves by monitoring their own progress and reflecting on their motivations, thoughts, behaviors, and goals.”

A MODA program goal is to train a professional advisor who “develops habits and practices for effectively operating in a foreign, stressful, austere, and complex environment, including adaptability, resil-
ience, self-reflection, and healthy lifestyle behaviors. Stays aware and maintains personal safety and security while deployed; actively prevents espionage, malicious elicitation of information, and surveillance.”

Taking a holistic approach to “mental, emotional, and physical well-being,” MODA counsels advisors to practice total fitness through eight areas: psychological, behavioral, social, spiritual, physical, nutritional, medical, and environmental.

Accordingly, the MODA course instructs advisors to recognize the signs of stress:

- Difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep.
- Unusual fatigue.
- Difficulty concentrating.
- Unexplained physical illness.
- Apathy or carelessness.
- Unusual irritability or anger, sometimes with little provocation.
- Repeated disturbing dreams.
- Pounding heart, sweating or shortness of breath for no reason.
- Isolation from other people.
- Feeling or appearing sad or angry much of the time.
- Lost interest in hobbies or work.
- Neglecting personal hygiene.

Advisors are encouraged to watch over each when deployed. If left unattended, the effects of stress become more pernicious:

- Revenge fantasies or dehumanizing comments or behaviors.
- Acting recklessly or engaging in risky behaviors.
• Sudden changes in behavior—acting out of character.
• Fighting.
• Disobeying orders.
• Any cruelty.
• Unusual weight loss.
• Lack of basic hygiene.
• Giving away property or comments about wanting to die.
• Panic attacks.
• Flashbacks that do not seem to be related to reality.

These aberrant behaviors require immediate attention, either with support groups, doctors, religious figures, or mental health officials. Again, once deployed, this responsibility will fall on advisor peers, so maintaining vigilance is a necessity.

Naturally, the advisor can take positive action to counter stress. The resilience mechanisms and strategies are separated into four categories.\textsuperscript{109}

Cognitive Resilience Factors:

• Adaptability.
• Spirituality and/or religion.
• Confidence, self-esteem.
• Strong decision making abilities.
• Sense of humor
• Insight
• Positive attitude, control over negative thoughts.
Tips for Cognitive Factors:

- Lifestyle (eating, alcohol, smoking, etc.).
- Get adequate sleep.
- Maintain a schedule.
- Take positive action to resolve stressors or feel less stressed.
- Professional cognitive behavioral therapy.
- Maintaining control of personal decisions.

Lifestyle Factors:

- Exercise.
- Lifestyle (down time, sleep, eating, alcohol, smoking, etc.).
- Reaching out for social support.
- Being a “good shepherd” to your peers who are stressed.
- Professional inoculation training.
- Unit cohesiveness.
- Education about stress and about deployment environment – *Those who are forewarned are also forearmed.*
- Stress management skillset.

Tips for Lifestyle Factors

- Find exercise you like.
- Strengthen support system.
- Perform good deeds; be reliable and supportive to peers.
- Participate in structured resilience training programs.
- Communicate positively with peers.
- Educate with the news, books, TED talks, YouTube videos.
• Build stress management tactics; try different approaches.
• Recognize areas for improvement.

On a related issue, MODA students learn to conduct predictive threat profiling so as to raise situational awareness. Here, instruction on reading body language achieves a dual purpose. This training achieves two results—the advisor becomes more attuned to the immediate environment, spotting things out of place; and the advisor feels more in control of the situation, which fosters greater self-confidence.¹¹⁰

Maintaining one’s health is usually the first casualty of the advisory mission because of the pace of the mission and pressures accumulate. The advisor is his own best physician, so taking time to exercise, sleep, socialize, and relax is essential. Advising is a marathon, not a sprint. An advisor who implodes during the mission is of no use to anyone, especially the counterpart.

Principles and Guidelines

The MODA program encapsulates the art of advising in a set of guiding principles, titled “The Code of Conduct,” designed to “support U.S. missions and overseas contingencies . . . strengthen the security ministries of partner states . . . [and] forge long-term relationships” with counterparts. Together, these tenets (left column) provide the guideposts for advisers navigating through the shoals of their mission, linking them to the broader purpose (right column).¹¹¹
Complementing the MODA principles, Metrinko offers seven general guidelines for advisors: “Although Muslim countries and cultures differ from one another, and methods of approach will change depending on locale, there are certain generalities that define the relationship of an advisor to foreign officials in this world:

1. The advisor can assist and consult, but he cannot command. It is, after all, not his house and not his own country. He is a counselor, not a colonial administrator.
2. The advisor should have expertise, but he does not have the last word. Policy direction and limits are set by his commander and by the American Ambassador, and policy will shift to conform to political shifts within the United States, the local population, and among local elected officials. Final decisionmaking is in the foreign official’s hands.

3. The advisor must cooperate with other players, both foreign and American. Working alone does not mean being alone. The other players can enhance—or dilute—the officer’s influence.

4. The advisor must be a true American, but not an Ugly American. Whatever his own religious and political convictions, the advisor must show respect for local culture and tradition to be successful. He is not a judge.

5. The advisor should not be a hypocrite. If he is not prepared to live by his own advice, he should not expect others to follow it.

6. The advisor should be humble. He should always remember that his audience may not have his resources, his background of living in a peaceful, orderly society, or his confidence in a good future and a guaranteed pension following retirement.

7. And finally, the advisor must be helpful, but also credible. He should never promise what he cannot deliver.”112

Advisors should keep these principles and guidelines for quick reference (i.e., above their desk and in their toolkit notebook), particularly when making difficult decisions or when under stress. They will help keep the advisor centered and focused on the essentials of advising. Over time, the advisor can add to these principles and guidelines as he develops a deeper appreciation of the local culture, perhaps adding them to his continuity file.
Conclusions

In view of the evolving security environment and commitments, the United States will find an investment in professional advisors will reap benefits exponentially above the costs. The investment requires organization, planning, and leadership however. The old ways of creating advisors in the midst of a conflict reveals a history of too much misunderstanding, irrelevance, and missed opportunities, resulting in excessive expenditures, waste, redundancy, and ultimately suboptimal results.

The initiation of such a program requires the attention of the National Security Council, because the requisite interagency cooperation, consensus, and coordination will not occur without presidential authority. For the President, the creation of a ministerial advisory corps would prove an enduring legacy. In order to establish the needed authorities, Congress will need to provide the legislation to preserve the advisory institution through successive presidential administrations.

The creation of a ministerial advisory corps is an investment in human capital, but without extraordinary expense. The consolidation of the training programs into one facility along with faculty, equipment, and administration would reduce redundancies, streamline operations, and produce uniform training standards. The basic course provides the fundamentals of advising not only for ministerial advisors, but also for those involved in security sector reform and security force assistance. Since basic course graduates return to their normal jobs, they would remain gainfully employed until mobilized, thereby making the program both cost effective, dynamic, and sufficiently
large to sustain a number of advisory missions simultaneously.

Professionalization of the advisory corps occurs as a result of advance degrees, the deployment course, and advisory experience. These professionals could serve as training course instructors, facilitators, and lecturers. They could also participate in outreach by lecturing at Senior Service Colleges and interested institutes. They could contribute articles to professional journals as well as studies to think tanks. These activities would serve to inspire service in the ministerial advisory corps from college students, federal, state, and city civil servants, and the military.

In order to attract quality advisors, the ministerial advisory corps must offer salary and career enhancing incentives. At the same time, the vetting of advisory candidates is essential to ensure they are suitable for service. For continuity of effort, advisory tours should be at least two years since the historical evidence suggests one-year or shorter tours do not achieve the desired effect.

The use of best practices captures those skills, character traits, and attributes which produce outstanding ministerial advisors. Past literature on advising often laid these out as a laundry list with little explanation. Internalization of these skills and traits requires explanation, illustrations, and discussion. Without this teaching method, learning becomes too passive and without due self-reflection and understanding.

It should be noted that best practices skills and character traits are difficult to master, so advisors will make mistakes as part of the learning process. Humility, respect, and a sense of humor will help advisors weather mistakes without alienating their counterparts.
In the long term, an investment in the ministerial advisory corps increases the prospect for fragile states to adopt needed reforms, which in turn increase stability. In this manner, effective advising serves as a preventative measure, mitigating the root causes of instability and conflict. To this end, it is more beneficial for the United States to deploy an advisory corps than an Army corps.

Endnotes

1. Eisenhower wrote the Filipino defense plan, and after gaining permission, personally visited U.S. depots and armories for equipment, weapons, and munitions for the army. As his last duty upon returning to the United States in December 1939, Eisenhower rendered a report to Quezon on the defense of the Philippines should Japan invade. His advice was that a strong defense of the beaches was the best chance of defeating a Japanese invasion. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company INC., 1967), 221, 228-229, 246-247.


13. Specifically, the Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), US Department of the Treasury (DOT); International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), US Department


15. 6,000 additional specialists from tactical unites were also trained to assume occupational duties as well. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, Army Historical Series, Center of Military History, United States Army (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 8, 17; Coles and Weinberg, 17.

16. The universities were Yale, Harvard, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Michigan, Stanford, Northwestern, Boston, Wisconsin, and Western Reserve. Ziemke, 18-20, n 63, n70; Coles and Weinberg, 14-15, 17.

17. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy initiated the MODA program in 2009. I would like to thank George Dryden of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as well as Jim McKellar and Andy Kostrub of the McKellar Corporation for sharing the details of the MODA program.


19. MODA Program Course Overview, 12.

21. MODA Program Course Overview, 4.

22. MODA Program Course Overview, 5-6.

23. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit.

24. MODA Program Course Overview, 10-14.

25. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit.


29. Potter, 34


34. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.


36. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 5.

37. Metrinko, xii.


40. Metrinko, 72-73.

41. MATA Handbook, 213; FM 31-73, 51-54; Metrinko, 52-53.

42. Metrinko, xii, 65.

43. Metrinko, 68-69.


46. Metrinko, 2.
47. Metrinko, xii, 22; Hausrath, 3-4; Ramsey, 22, 46, 93; Lawrence; Grdovic also believes adopting some of the appearances of the indigenous forces/people (i.e., grooming, dress, and accessories), demonstrates a greater appreciation of the culture and customs. Grdovic, 24-25.


49. Metrinko, xii.

50. Metrinko, 41.

51. Metrinko, 41-42.

52. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 6.

53. Most of these techniques and procedures emanated from the author’s time as an advisor in Afghanistan; Others sources include Metrinko, 41-51; Ramsey, 147; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 56-57; Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 6; Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 91-100; Potter, 8; Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Advisor Guide (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, May 2014), 6-4—6-5.

54. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 3.


56. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

57. Metrinko, 12-13.

58. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.


60. MATA Handbook, 216.
61. MATA Handbook, 213.

62. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles; Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3; MATA Handbook, 215; Ramsey, 18, 20, 159.

63. Gerspacher and Shtuni, 82.

64. Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 15-16; Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 34.


67. According to the U.S. Army Research Institute, “contending with ethical dilemmas and challenges are a pervasive component of the performance context in which advisors operate.” Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 7.

68. Metrinko, 55-57.

69. MODA instructs that all societies have corruption. “Forms of corruption vary but may include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement.” MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 34-35; ANSF Advisor Guide, 6-7—6-8.

70. Metrinko, 61-62.

71. Metrinko, 17, 35.

72. Metrinko, 17.

73. Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 35.

74. Metrinko, 17; Also noted in FM 31-73, 51-54.

75. The U.S. Army Research Institute identifies this type of negotiating as proactive influence tactics. “The most used proactive influence tactics were offering support, rational persuasion, and apprising counterparts of the benefits of taking action.” Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 5.
76. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles; MATA Handbook, 212-213; Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3; FM 31-73, 51-54.

77. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 4.

78. Metrinko, 8-9.

79. MATA Handbook, 212; FM 31-73, 51-54.

80. MATA Handbook, 212.

81. Grdovic, 26-27.

82. MATA Handbook, 216.

83. Metrinko, 26.

84. Grdovic, 23.

85. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 5.

86. Metrinko, 5; Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 15; Ramsey, 11; FM 31-73, 51; Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 4; Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 35.

87. Metrinko, 53-54.

88. Metrinko, 10.

89. Ramsey, 18, 159; MATA Handbook, 213.

90. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

91. FM 31-73, 51-54.

92. Metrinko, 34-35.

93. Metrinko, 36-37.


95. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.
96. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 12-13; Current U.S. doctrine calls this cross-cultural competence. Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 79.

97. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 6.

98. Metrinko, 11-12.


100. Metrinko, 7.

101. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

102. Metrinko, 10.

103. Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3-4; Ramsey, 18, 20; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 61.

104. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 4.

105. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 7.


107. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-1; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 76-77.

108. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-1; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 77.

109. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-1; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 78-79.

110. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-2; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 66-69.

111. MODA Program Course Overview, 4; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 5.

112. Metrinko, 5.