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The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) facilitated the annual Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) to promote a comprehensive approach to Peace and Stability Operations through training and education. The PSOTEW brings together trainers, educators, and practitioners from the U.S. and international governmental/non-governmental organizations, military and civilian peace and stability training centers, and academic institutions to share current challenges and best practices toward improving civilian and military teaming efforts in support of Peace and Stability Operations. The goal of the workshop series is to produce material that can be used to train and educate the joint force and the community of interest on Peace and Stability Operations, by creating or enhancing existing organizational doctrine, training and exercises, based on the latest lessons learned and innovative industry trends.

Background

The PSOTEW workshop, which began eight years ago, focuses on providing a forum for educators, trainers, and practitioners to share best practices and work through identified challenges, while capitalizing on real world operations to build community relationships, share tools and methodologies, and increase awareness among stakeholders. The workshop is accomplished through senior leader forums and panels with follow-on workgroups led by subject matter experts, collaborating to identify potential solutions to identified peace and stability training and education challenges. The workgroups present the identified solutions to senior leadership within the community of interest in order to garner support in addressing training and education requirements to operate in complex and ever changing operational environments.

PSOTEW Objectives

The discussions across the six work groups focused on “Identifying and Implementing Peace and Stabilization Training and Education” as the overall theme for the workshop. The objective for the Workshop focuses on accomplishing the following:

- Providing a forum that addresses the equities of the community of practice and its activities;
- Fostering collaboration between the joint professional military education and academic communities;
- Informing and supporting senior leaders, to monitor progress, and to provide feedback on future recommendations.

Concept

The workshop is a three day event, beginning with a plenary session in the morning consisting of flag officers and civilian-equivalent leaders from both the government and non-governmental institutions, followed by final remarks from the keynote speaker. This year’s keynote speaker was General (Retired) Carter F. Ham, former Commander, U.S. Africa Command and Chair, National Committee on Future U.S. Army. General (Retired) Ham challenged workshop attendees to think about, “What role does peace and stability operations play or should play in our overarching National Security Policy and the objectives we want to achieve.” The keynote paved the way for working groups to roll up their sleeves and make key recommendations to senior leaders concerning the need for a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and stability operations training and education.

Working group composition is based primarily on attendee interest; however, the groups are structured with the aim to have diverse backgrounds across each group. A facilitator is assigned to each working group as the group addresses a specific challenge currently facing the community of interest. There were seven workgroups addressing the following issues:

WG 1: Developing a training strategy for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) was sponsored by PKSOI. The purpose of the WG was to analyze operations United Assistance (Ebola Support) and Haiti Earthquake relief operations in order to identify lessons learned and gaps in FHA operations. The group outlined procedures to integrate lessons learned in planning, training and education models. The deliverable was an FHA training strategy outline focused on both disaster preparedness and disaster response.

WG 2: Preparing Senior Leaders to Succeed in UN Peace Operations was sponsored by the International Association of the Peace Training Center (IAPTC). Focusing on the United Nations (UN) High Level Independent Panel Report, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, 2015 Presidential Memorandum, US Support to UN Peace Operations, and the US Presidential Summit on Peacekeeping, there is political impetus to improve UN Peace Operations. Educating leaders is identified as a key enabler. The WG presented the current state of education not only from a UN education perspective, but also from a US perspective on educating its own senior leaders. The deliverables from the working group are:

- Identify the key competencies for a senior leader in the areas of knowledge, skills, and attributes
- Identify the resources available or required to develop and deliver identified training needs
- Identify the optimal delivery methods
- Identify a community of practice to advance such education

WG 3: Developing a Methodology for Assessing and Countering Transnational Organized Crime was sponsored by PKSOI. The lack of an integrated analytic approach for differentiating
between criminal and ideological insurgent groups has led to ineffective mitigation efforts. Countering transnational criminal threats is different from neutralizing a terrorist network or ideological insurgency. The working group examined an existing terrorist/insurgent network using several analytic models to identify the key elements defining the network as an ideological or terrorist insurgency. The deliverables were an analytic model with indicators for differentiating transnational organized criminal and terrorist/insurgent networks, which can be incorporated into a software platform for integration into training modules. A subsequent WG objective was to establish a set of principles for countering/mitigating transnational organized threats.

WG4: Organizing the Generating Function of Security Force Assistance Institutions: Security and Justice, and the implications for Governance, Social, and Economic Institutions was sponsored by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). Lessons have shown that isolated U.S. train and equip approaches in partner nation (PN) operating forces have no parallel development in the PN security institutions negatively affect longer-term sustainability. The group explored factors and considered the doctrinal, training, and education needs the joint force requires to organize a generating function within a PN security force as part of Security Force Assistance (SFA). Deliverables will include an outline of recommendations and force development strategies for integration within doctrine, training, and education. The recommendations and force development strategies will serve to inform Security Force Assistance concept development and DOTMLPF-P solutions as part of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and joint force development (JFD) process.

WG5: Develop a common curriculum to improve interagency planning and collaboration in the area of Stability Operations, with an emphasis on design, level of planning (strategic/operational), ownership, delivery and assessment was co-sponsored by PKSOI and the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), Department of State. Whole-of-government solutions to current and future challenges are essential, yet a common educational and training methodology to developing and implementing whole-of-government approaches to stability operations does not exist. The group analyzed and assessed previous curricula, the availability and adequacy of relevant case studies, and effective measures for integrating interagency best practices into education and training. Deliverables included:
- Summary of the discussion
- Current best practices and gaps for interagency education
- Elements of a core curriculum and delivery recommendations
- Proposed way ahead with stakeholder leads

WG6: Pilot Sections of a New Civ-Mil Relations Course was sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). A previous working group convened at the 2015 PSOTEW was designed to develop the central themes for a new Civ-Mil Relations Course to meet the needs and challenges identified by policy, strategy experts, and practitioners that are not being addressed in other courses. Based on those efforts, USIP designed the course and piloted it during the workshop. Deliverables are a revision of the course content based on group participation with the first course scheduled to be taught in 2016.
Developing a Training Strategy for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: What’s needed? How do we get there?

by PKSOI's Dr. James Schear and COL Iraj Gharagouzloo
Introduction

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) is fundamentally about saving lives and relieving human suffering. While these core goals are foundational for any FHA mission, the drivers of need in specific cases – whether chronic deprivation, sudden-onset natural disasters, complex emergencies or ongoing conflicts – may vary enormously, as will the range of actors who play key roles in these challenging missions – be they planners, logisticians, host nation officials, civilian relief organizations, UN field agencies, affected local communities or US congressional appropriators. In addition, the sheer complexity of the tools for performing key tasks poses enduring challenges for orchestrating FHA operations in an effective, efficient manner.

PSOTEW Work Group (WG) 1 drew together an impressively wide range of civilian and military experts to consider how best to craft a training strategy focused on disaster preparedness and humanitarian response.

Drawing upon their experiences from diverse operating venues, while also gleaning lessons from FHA responses to West Africa’s Ebola outbreak in 2014-15 and Haiti’s catastrophic earthquake in 2010, our skilled participants generated valuable grist for crafting a comprehensive training pedagogy that will benefit future practitioners and, indeed, the communities whose survival will depend on timely humanitarian action as a crisis unfolds.

With these purposes in mind, the WG’s discussion focused particular attention on three interconnected challenges that future practitioners will definitely need to study as part of their training repertoire:

• First, there’s the “situational” challenge – in essence, rigorous risk mapping. What types of geological (e.g., earthquakes) or meteorological (e.g., typhoons) events are most prevalent in various global regions, and how might anthropogenic (e.g., industrial waste) or biological risk factors (e.g., communicable disease) as well as socio-cultural violence, result in so-called “hybrid” hazards and/or massive human displacement?
• Second, there’s the “instrumental” challenge – that is, understanding the tool box. What kinds of capabilities are vital in mounting effective FHA operations; how should their use be sequenced; and which actors have the requisite legal authorities, resources, and responsibilities for acquiring, maintaining and utilizing these instruments?
• Third, there’s the “interactional” challenge – specifically, forging mutually beneficial partnerships in meeting humanitarian goals. How should various stakeholders seek to coordinate their FHA efforts – both at the headquarters and field levels – in order to plug critical gaps, avoid duplication, and more generally to improve the overall effectiveness of a given response?

Explicating each of these challenges and how they might be overcome must be a key deliverable in any overall training strategy designed to educate future practitioners in the best modes of planning, resourcing, designing and executing complex FHA missions that are surely in our future. Accordingly, WG1 fleshed out recommended ways-ahead in each of these areas, while also addressing ways to strengthen institutional capacities to track FHA competencies and to forge productive engagements with existing course offerings in both the governmental and non-governmental spheres.

Mapping Vulnerabilities and Preparedness

The task of anticipating urgent humanitarian needs is never easy, and clairvoyance is never a good safeguard. To be sure, countries in disaster-prone regions are very conscious of hazards, but future predictions based entirely upon the legacies of the recent past are not always sufficient for scoping preparedness (e.g., Haiti’s earthquake vulnerability was not widely understood, either in country or regionally). In this domain, FHA training should stress the value of:

• Base-line vulnerability assessments by host-nations, as well as current assessments conducted by country teams, to include sharing information and close coordination with Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs) in every area of responsibility (AOR) to ensure share understanding and unity of effort;
• County and regional-level reviews of disaster preparedness and response plans, to include identifying priority needs as well as areas where risks have, or can be, reduced through national resilience programming;
• Appreciation of, and preparedness for, hybrid hazards, to include foreign consequence management as well as infectious disease outbreaks.

The FHA training program of instruction (POI) in this area should identify the best USG sources for such assessments. The POI should also highlight cases where positive steps toward rigorous assessments have already been taken while also explicating the sensitives and challenges that may arise in partnering with host nations on mapping out these hazards and/or preparing for their onset.

Studying the Actors and their Tools

While rigorous hazard mapping is essential, FHA practitioners also need a more detailed understanding of the responder community at the national, international and non-governmental levels – specifically, what are each entity’s core expertise; resources that can be brought to bear; preferred modus operandi; and demonstrated strengths and limitations? To these ends, the training curriculum should emphasize:
A comprehensive baseline review of activities and tasks critical for FHA missions;
- Internationally, a clear delineation of IO/NGO roles and responsibilities during an international crisis response;
- Nationally, a detailed mapping of authorities, resources and capabilities for actors throughout the USG that play a lead or supporting role in FHA missions;
- At the GCC level, a more rigorous regional assessment of the national/international and non-governmental humanitarian organizations which operate in their (AOR).

The insights drawn from these topics could be extremely valuable in understanding how various actors operate, what assets they bring to the FHA mission and where gaps may need to be filled. That in turn can help inform and energize more inclusive planning and execution processes within the DoD, given the array of DoD actors – both civilian and military – who will need to be engaged at the strategic and operational levels.

Mastering Coordination Complexities

Whenever urgent humanitarian needs flare-up, effective coordination is absolutely essential in mounting successful response missions. The key framing questions here are all quite logical: What types of assistance are needed? How quickly can this aid be lifted into theater? Is the host-nation willing to accept this assistance? Who’s footing the bill? Who’s going to be on the ground to orchestrate aid delivery to those in greatest need, and are there any unintended consequences we need to anticipate? For policymakers as well as operators, the key objective here is a clearly-defined, mutually-agreed upon division of labor among a wide range of national, international and governmental actors, which is aligned with their respective operational strengths.

For future FHA practitioners, the training POI should give high visibility to coordination challenges and opportunities via the following steps:
- Explicating coordination dynamics both at the “upstream” (i.e., Washington, other donor countries) and “downstream” (operating venues) levels, spanning the full range of contingencies from natural disasters to conflict-prone situations.
- Distilling and sharing insights for selected scenarios on best practices for establishing early and effective coordination with the US lead federal agency (i.e., USAID) and other partners;
- Expanding joint interagency coordination efforts at the GCC level to conduct planning reviews for US responses,
which include conducting FHA exercises in coordination with interagency partners to have a shared understanding of capabilities available during disasters;

- Prioritizing information sharing – specifically, the development of DoD policies to address this requirement during FHA missions, as well as determining which communication systems would be most widely available to non-DoD partners;
- Ramping-up the participation of DoD planners and operators in currently-available FHA courses, to include those offered by USAID, the UN, the academic community as well as DoD entities (e.g., CFE/DM);
- And leveraging existing exercise programs to foster greater interagency coordination and training.

Clearly, there are no magic bullets here, but an effective training strategy can certainly plant the right questions for a freshly-minted practitioner, while also providing them with a credible repertoire of best practices to apply whenever duty calls.

Building the Talent Pool

While WG1 focused rigorously on the scope and content of the training curriculum, it also looked at ways to insure FHA training can be well absorbed and utilized. To this end, the WG proffered up four specific recommendations:

- Look for ways to integrate existing US and international FHA training curricula into professional military education (PME) at all appropriate levels;
- Clearly identify FHA training requirements and competencies for service members filling FHA mission activities and tasks;
- Add these skill identifiers to service members' individual records based upon their education, training and deployment experiences;
- Insure that service personnel systems can identify service members with FHA experience for rapid access, to meet future spikes in demand.

Within the defense community, these initiatives would help to better align the supply of talent and expertise at a time in history when FHA is an increasingly vital mission for the US military and a key element in supporting civilian authorities. Given the broad swath of military specialties that potentially contribute to FHA – from transportation and logistics to engineering, medical support, communications, reconnaissance, civil affairs, military police, and light infantry – it is vital to infuse FHA training into these domains as a way to develop a more common operating picture before the next disaster hits.

Notes:


2 Admittedly, predictive capacity is not our strength. Take, for example, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reflections about US military operations: “And I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more -- we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.” Speech at West Point, February 25, 2011. http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1539.

3 Foreign Consequence Management (FCM) includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) hazards.
Preparing Senior Leaders to Succeed in Peace Operations

by David T. Lightburn
Introduction

UN senior mission leadership development is a key strategic issue highlighted by both the 2015 UN High Level Panel Report on all aspects of Peace Operations and the 2015 Presidential Memorandum on ‘US Support to United Nations (UN) Peace Operations’ and was the principal topic addressed by Working Group 2.

The US Presidential Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015 and the 2014/15 UN Training Architecture Review were also reviewed as discussion points to address training deficiencies.

The Training Need

The Multicultural (involving civilian, military, and police components), Multidimensional (with multiple objectives and lines of activity) and Multinational aspects of today’s peace operations require an integrated comprehensive approach. Moreover, the complexities and challenges of such operations require that the international response be, to the degree possible and practical, an effective multinational effort. Peace operations leadership is not something that can be learned ‘on-the-job’ while in the heat of a multitude of challenges and tasks and in a difficult security environment. The leaders selected for these operations, however, arrive with varying degrees of preparation, experience and understanding of the various dimensions and components required to achieve mission success.

A fundamental requirement for all involved in peace operations, especially senior leaders, is a firm understanding and ability to execute effective coordinated civilian-military-police activities. It is only through the integrated education and training of civilian, military and police components that many challenges and impediments to civilian-military-police relations can be overcome, fostering closer cooperation and coordination.

In addition to the education and training of senior leaders, the WG also considered much of the knowledge, skills and attributes of senior leaders need to be enhanced among key staff, advisors and mid-level management - uniformed and civilian personnel.

Work Group Objectives and Deliverables

Against this background and understanding of peace operations, WG#2 addressed the subject of educating and training (senior) leaders from four perspectives: an identification of the key competences for a leader with regard to knowledge, skills and attributes (KSA); identification of the resources available or required to deliver training needs; identification of optimal delivery methods; and, identification of a community of practice to advance such education and training. From there the Working Group developed ten recommendations to further the development and training of UN senior leaders. These recommendations will be shared with International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers and the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations.

I – Leader Key Competencies

The heart of the requisite knowledge competency was deemed to be understanding civilian-military-police relations and the multi-dimensional facets of peace operations. A senior leader must also be knowledgeable of key current challenges, such as Protection of Civilians (PoC), while promoting the highest standards of conduct, especially in the field of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).

Key attributes for senior leaders were adaptability (across organizations and cultures); building partnering relationships; and problem solving collaboration techniques. Other highly valued leadership attributes were flexibility, charisma, integrity, courage, patience, character, vision, tenacity and inspiration. Other ‘desirable’ skills in a peace operations leader might be: communication, team building, diplomacy, adaptability, time/resource/financial management, negotiation and mediation, and proficiency in the common mission language.

The WG suggested packaging the KSAs into a desirable leadership traits ‘profile’, which would act as a template for selecting leaders and senior staff. The profile could be a baseline for institutes involved in the development of professional education and training programs.

II – Leadership Training Resources Available

The WG acknowledged that the UN Senior Mission Leaders course (SML) is the principal mechanism for the education and training of senior leaders. Variants of the UN SML course were developed by the African Union, European Union (EU) (EU crisis management missions), and the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR).

The UN should develop and maintain oversight of SML content, especially if participants are to be qualified for leadership in UN missions. The WG concluded the UN could SML program could benefit from:

- More systematic funding from UN Member States and/or donor organizations
- Identification of qualified subject matter experts and course facilitators
• Updating the SML Scenario on Carana

Many training centers can develop and deliver SML-like international programs, such as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and PKSOI to extend the SML training capacity globally. The WG also recommended developing a continuing education and training component for Peace Operations leadership competencies.

III – Optimal Delivery Methods

Distance learning and blended learning models (distance and courses/exercises) offer viable alternatives to classroom instruction. In addition, leaders can learn through effective ‘mentoring’ programs from an integrated perspective of mixed military, civilian and police training mentors.

Simulations and scenario-based ‘Table Top’ exercises learning are good ‘team-building’ options in dealing with specific situations in a mission area. A proven integrated training concept is the Swedish-led, US supported, multinational Viking exercise series, which is planned, conducted and evaluated by a balanced team of civilians, police and military. The concept of ‘integrated training’ requires a true partnership – from conceptualization, through development, and on to implementation and evaluation.

IV – A Community of Practice

The UN, Regional and Defense Organizations, national and regional training organizations, distance-learning systems (such as POTI), the US Combatant Command training system, donor programs and nations, and educational and training associations such as IAPTC and its four regional variants, are all potential members of such a community. UN DPKO should consider conducting an inventory SML existing programs, and establishing regular information exchange among relevant institutions regarding calendars, content, methodology, participants, as well as improving communication with Member States and potential course participants. The WG encouraged closer collaboration between interested parties in developing training continuum, improving the level and amount of integrated training aimed at mid-level leaders and key staffs.

It was further suggested that the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), and its Regional Associations take up the leadership training topic at their 2016 annual conference, specifically focusing on framing TCC integrated leadership, peace operations training requirements.

A comprehensive and more detailed 15-page report of the Work Group’s deliberations is available through PKSOI.
To view full report click here
Analyzing and Mitigating Transnational Organized Crime in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

by PKSOI's Diane Chido
Participants of Working Group 3 were tasked to analyze and devise mitigation strategies for transnational organized crime (TOC) within peace keeping missions. Although the workshop theme is training and education, as this was the first time this group had been assembled, there was much groundwork to be laid to provide a sound foundation for the way ahead.

TOC refers to those self-perpetuating associations operating across borders for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means. TOC networks protect their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or through a transnational organizational structure that exploits legal transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.

Dr. Karen Finkenbinder provided the group with an overview of the tasking context, which resulted from a high-level United Nations (UN) Panel meeting in 2015 that reinforced concerns about the impact of TOC upon peace operations. The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations asked PKSOI to conduct research on the potential role of UN peace keepers in identifying and mitigating TOC.

Though TOC is recognized as a global problem, it is addressed only to a small degree in a few UN mandates and is not institutionalized in their headquarters planning process. It is generally dealt with in a fragmentary manner and the response is incongruous with the critical importance of integrated planning and execution occurring at the mission level.

TOC mitigation is usually planned for in isolation from corruption and terrorism, but the three are intertwined in complex missions. Mission success is thus predicated upon a multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach in the planning stages, as well as finding or establishing complementarity relationships, goals, and objectives among the various stakeholders, particularly when deployed to complex environments.

Similarly, the Global Initiative against TOC, a network of law enforcement, governance and development practitioners serving as a platform to create a global strategy to counter organized crime published an input paper to the UN High Level Panel in February 2015. The paper stated that the UN system appears to “lack the ability and determination to respond to organized crime” and recommended the UN “build analytical capabilities that include conflict threat assessment and other tools that
allow for proactive and preventative approaches to organized crime and its impact upon governance, development, and the state.”

Once the context was established, the participants received an outline of the specific workgroup task and a brief scenario to begin the discussion. The scenario was based on the al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) and Ansar al Dine groups operating in the Tuareg-populated areas of northern Mali.

While initially discussing the optimal approach to defining whether given violent groups (AQIM and Ansar al Dine) operating in Mali in 2012 were terrorist/insurgent or criminal in motivation, the working group determined that this was not the most important question. As the fall of the Soviet Union led to a multipolar world in which state sponsorship of terror/insurgent groups is less common, most groups use or become criminal networks to fund their operations and attract adherents.

Therefore, the working group determined that it is more important at the analytical stage to start from Department of Defense doctrine and use a number of tested analytic methodologies to identify other elements of these groups, including:

- Operational design
- Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE)
- Military decision making process
- Applied intelligence for irregular warfare
- Civil vulnerability assessment
- Counter-threat finance
- Social network analysis
- Geospatial analysis

Starting from the list of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) tasks, the working group determined that the social networks must first be understood and/or appreciated. Then, strategic peacekeeping mission planners should apply the following considerations to determine their potential to mitigate or support mitigation of the destabilizing effects of the networks:

- Ensure unity of effort
- Resource the force with robust information collection and analysis
- Identify required/existing capabilities (including those of the host nation)
- Integrate civil-military considerations into mission planning effort
- Promote rule of law and a responsive government
- Develop/execute strategic communications plan
- Identify/address underlying causes of violence

The working group will continue these discussions via an online wiki-based community with weekly discussions prompted by the PKSOI group moderator. The goal of the wiki group will be to refine and test analytic methodologies and mitigation strategies for increasing specificity of TOC network products, as well as identifying optimal online tools and training approaches. The community will also meet quarterly via video conference to finalize the agenda and tasking for PSOTEW 2017.

The ultimate goal is to develop methods tailored to a mission’s ability to identify, analyze and investigate organized crime, and to differentiate these networks from terrorism and insurgency, while considering the interplay of corruption in both types of networks. These tested methodologies will determine the appropriate responses to fill a very real gap in knowledge and capabilities. This approach should enhance peacekeeping effectiveness.
Organizing the Generating Function of a Security Force Institution: Security, Justice, and Implications to Governance

by JCISFA’s Mr. Keith D. Smith
Security Force Assistance Background and History

In 2006, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, chartered an organization called the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) to work with the Joint Staff J7 (Joint Force Development Directorate) to integrate Security Force Assistance (SFA) lessons and best practices from Iraq and Afghanistan across the Joint Force and the services. In 2012, Secretary Panetta updated the charter to more broadly look at these issues around the world and incorporate them along the pillars of Joint Force Development: doctrine, training, exercises, education, lessons learned, and concepts. JCISFA’s research has led its analysts to the conclusion that, while the U.S. military has experienced success training foreign forces to fight, they have had far less success helping partner nations develop their own capability to build and field forces, i.e., a generating function. Considering U.S. national security interests within the context of diminishing defense resources and an increasingly complex operational environment makes clear that an organic generating function capability in our foreign security partners is important to gaining and maintaining relative peace and security around the world in the future.

Generating Function and the “Five Strategic Threats”

Generally, there are three functions essential to viable security forces, thereby necessitating assessments and possibly assistance in one or all three functional areas. The first is the “executive function.” This is where policies, laws, and regulations are created. Next is the “generating function.” Here, the force recruits, trains, and equips itself. Finally, the “operating function” is where the work of the security force is done; this is the function with which most military members, regardless of rank, are most familiar. Today’s operations tempo, resourcing challenges, and increasingly complex operational environment make it critical for the United States to have security partners with enduring capabilities to contribute to global security efforts. Current U.S. Defense Leadership, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, indirectly highlighted these requirements when they recently identified the “Five Strategic Threats” to U.S. National Security: Iran, China, North Korea, Russia, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Partner nations with their own generating function could help deter aggression from state threats and disrupt non-state violent extremist organizations. Fighting the Taliban in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan taught the U.S. a number of important lessons, not the least of which was that VEOs often find safe-haven in areas beyond the reach of government rule and the rule of law. In 2007, RAND produced a monograph appropriately titled “Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.” The mono-

graph describes in great detail why some environments are more attractive to terrorist organizations than others, what some of those more attractive environments might look like, and how to make those environment less fertile for terrorist inhabitants. In short, assuming the terrorist activity is not state sponsored, many of the problems, as suggested by the monograph’s title, results from either no government influence and oversight or not enough of it—the terms coined by RAND in this study are “ungoverned” and “undergoverned.” Developing a generating function not only gives the partner nation security forces greater capability (i.e., they learn how to perform tasks they could not previously perform), but it also gives them greater capacity (i.e., they have more forces to perform those tasks vital to local and regional security). This increased capacity could be used to patrol, monitor, and police those parts of a territory that might otherwise be perfect training areas for terrorist, outside of the view of forces who might disrupt their efforts. With more forces and more capable forces, U.S. foreign security partners will be better equipped to root out terrorist organizations in those remote parts of their country that they could not previously reach. Once found and dismantled, the terrorist organizations could be kept out with regular security patrols. Further, more capable foreign security partners who can disrupt VEOs could also help deter aggression from those more violent, most dangerous, and most unstable malign state actors, i.e, North Korea and Iran.

Working Group 4 Findings

Stakeholders from the SFA community of interest and practice in small discussion groups collectively identify approaches to institutional development in foreign security forces. The subgroups focused on the implications that such development might have for the security, justice, and economic sectors of the partner nation (PN). WG 4’s objective was to find techniques to encourage PN ownership of development and maintenance of their own generating function. The identified techniques were aligned to DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendations (DCRs) (i.e., non-materiel solutions) that might assist the Joint Staff J7 (Joint Force Development Directorate) with this problem. The goal was to provide recommendations as to how the U.S. can better equip its forces to build institutional capability and capacity in foreign security partners resulting in the development of their own generating function. If U.S. commanders and military planners are provided with training and planning constructs that drive their efforts toward leaving the PN with an organic generating capability, the U.S. will have a powerful tool for protecting its interest through “security surrogates.” This approach is not only in the U.S.’s interests, but also benefits PN citizens with a more peaceful and stable environment in which to live and work. The likely PN candidates would be those with
a viable and stable government, and whose security enhancement would have a direct impact on U.S. national interests.

Based on detailed discussions between this experienced group of practitioners and researchers, WG 4 strongly believed the following considerations must be incorporated into policy, strategy, doctrine, training, education, and exercises to enable the U.S. to better conduct SFA-type missions:

- Conduct thorough assessments of the PN’s most effective practices in safety, public security, and justice, and develop around those existing capabilities, while also taking into consideration the second and third order effects of any SFA development initiative.

- Incorporate as many different perspectives as possible in the planning for SFA missions, especially from disenfranchised groups (e.g., increase diversity to include women, different ethnic groups, and social/psychological/anthropological professionals). There must be demographic appropriateness; the approach must be inclusive of all interested stakeholders.

- Legitimacy must be contextualized to local and regional norms, i.e., identify the historical/sociopolitical nuances of the society; learn the PN’s “experience of justice,” develop/enhance their systems of accountability, i.e., transparency, accountability, and oversight (TAO). The concept of legitimacy can be greatly accelerated by introducing rule of law and human rights early in the process, and by ensuring unity of command for all SFA missions with the understanding that each development initiative effects all other programs.

- Take into account the diversity of tempo/synchronization of development between echelons of command, and between the levels of assistance being provided to the partner nation, i.e., between the Executive, Generating, and Operating (E-G-O) functions. There must be symbiotic relationships and communication feedback loops between the Executive/Generating/Operating functions as well the Strategic/Operational/Tactical levels.

- Develop and initiate the PN’s approach to vetting their internal security forces, and establish guidelines for reconciling or prosecuting security force members involved in crimes against the populace. The PN must consider whether justice development is a viable option, or maybe a “justice and reconciliation commission” that exposes atrocities is more appropriate.
- Have strategic patience; the reason Plan Colombia worked was the U.S. made small and incremental investments over a long period of time. Success has to be measured in terms of integrated and holistic measures of effectiveness/measures of performance. Leaders must be mindful of the fact that success will not happen overnight.

- Help develop a military justice system; the host nation military must be able to investigate and adjudicate offenses committed within their ranks. The PN military members understand that they are accountable to international law, and understand that by following international human rights standards, they will improve their way of life.

- Work to facilitate sound logistics practices, policies, and training, otherwise, PN military might feel pressure to steal from their military supply distribution chain to sustain themselves.

- Consider changing the moniker “security forces” to “security services providers,” as this might create a better public perception of the PN military as being force for the protection of their own people.

- Ensure the generating institutions train the security service providers to follow the PN law (i.e., constitution, tribal law, customary law, traditional law etc.)

- Train practitioners and senior policy makers to recognize the early warning signals of instability. USAID and DoS can help DoD recognize these early warning signals and their implications. Preventative measure can be taken earlier and at a much lower cost than total invasion/state take-over. A more formalized interagency communications and network integration is essential for early warning success. Two examples of such signals might be the recruitment of foreign security force from one ethnicity, or an increase in executive powers or protection for the Prime Minister or President.

- Establish funding transfer authority for U.S. national authorizations and appropriations to ensure the agency carrying out these SFA-type missions are allocated the appropriate funding associated with them. In some cases, USAID or DoS might be better suited for the SFA fund distribution.

- Rebalances national security mission objectives to reflect a more proactive SFA strategy for PNs with fragile security institutions in order to prevent the need for those large-scale interventions, specifically those PNs aligned with our national security interests; not everything is phase three.

**Conclusion**

History suggests the U.S. might enhance protection of its vital interests from malign state actors as well as violent extremist organizations by helping partner nations develop their own organic security force generating function. Where that is true, steps can and should be taken to better equip leaders with improved policy, doctrine, training, education, and experience to carry out these SFA-type missions. This document contains some thoughts and recommendation for improving the SFA generating function. For the full report on the Work Group findings see, https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Members/Portal/view_in-sight.aspx?Insight=2791&status=PUBLISHED.
Developing a Common Curriculum to Improve Interagency Planning and Collaboration in the area of Stability Operations

by PKSOI Intern Simon Aborn
Working Group (WG) 5 focused on developing a common curriculum to improve interagency planning and collaboration in the area of Stability Operations, with an emphasis on design, level of planning (strategic/operational), ownership, delivery and assessment. The diverse WG members consisted of representatives from the U.S. Military, Foreign Service, Academic Institutions, and NGOs. The WG objective was to establish an introductory program and continuing education initiative that benefits all participants regardless of branch or governmental background, while improving collaboration in the interagency space.

All WG participants acknowledged weaknesses in interagency collaboration, most frequently the result of stove-piping, differing organizational concepts of development, and a lack of adequate communication and collaboration. Many WG members indicated solutions to some interagency challenges already exist, but that the knowledge and products are not being adequately propagated, endorsed and communicated to intergovernmental partners. Intergovernmental trainers do not yet have access to a central catalogue of all interagency collaboration policies, doctrine, education, and training resources.

The WG agreed that the new course and curriculum should teach communication strategies for lateral interaction across agencies, and include information about agencies or other organizational actors in the collaborative space, such as their motivations, cultures, capacities, methodologies, and tendencies. The course should also address varied approaches to interagency and intergovernmental collaboration. One potential method for understanding the capabilities and operational capabilities of another organization is to participate in a reverse identity role play scenario. In such an exercise, each learner plays the role of another interagency partner, and they are expected to represent that organization’s equities. These mutually reinforcing elements will provide participants the opportunity to immediately practice new skills learned from baseline material.

In designing curriculum, WG participants also agreed on the need for training via multiple touchpoints over a career, but focused on making immediate progress via establishing a curriculum guide and one course on interagency collaboration. The WG chose mid-level practitioners (5-12 years of experience working in or with government) as the initial target audience—an audience with sufficient experience and background to both contribute to others’ learning and absorb others’ knowledge.

During the PSOTEW workshop, the group expanded its intended outcome to include “creating an enduring and expanding community of interest for interagency collaboration,” focusing not only on designing a new course, but also establishing longer-term channels for collaboration, education, and training. The group produced a proposal for a week-long course, which focuses on introductory planning at the interagency level. The group also decided to use monthly virtual seminars as a continuing education component, furthering the foundational planning concepts presented in the interagency curriculum. The seminars can be accessed remotely by all members in the enduring community.

Several group members committed to delivering monthly seminars, with wide-ranging topics related to interagency collaboration in stability operations, such as:

- Borneo Case Study
- Political Transitions (including armed actors)
- Role of Country Team in Interagency Planning
- Gender and Peacebuilding
- Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan

Dr. Volker Franke conducted the first monthly virtual seminar on June 28th, providing participants guidelines and insights on writing and teaching case studies. Video of the lecture and accompanying slides are available on WG5’s Blackboard site, which serves as a repository of information and a communication venue for the community moving forward.
Lessons Learned for Developing a Civilian-Military Relations Course

by Marc Falkner, Kelly Mader, Ann Phillips and Jim Ruf
At the 2016 PSOTEW, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) tested sections from a new course being developed for the institute’s on-campus curriculum titled “Dealing Effectively with Uncertainty: Civ-Mil Relations in Shared Spaces”. The new course is designed to develop the knowledge and skills necessary for mid-level practitioners in the U.S. Government (USG), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and International Organizations (IO) to work more effectively with each other and with host country actors. Since 2001, civilian and military actors have been required to operate together through all stages of the conflict cycle to a degree unheard of since post World War II reconstruction. The results have been mixed at best. Nevertheless, this interaction is only likely to increase, even as resources diminish, underscoring the importance of improving common understanding, effective communication, and when desirable, collaboration.

**Background**

The USIP Civilian-Military Relations team, part of the Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding within the Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, has spent years developing relations and increasing understanding among civilian and military actors.

In a comprehensive needs assessment of knowledge and skills required to work effectively in peacebuilding, many respondents cited the importance of improved interagency and interorganizational coordination, communication and relations. We then undertook a review of existing civ-mil courses to ensure that any new USIP course would not duplicate efforts, but rather fill remaining gaps in knowledge and training.

An examination of over 80 courses held at 16 different institutions including civilian government agencies, military institutions, IOs and NGOs revealed that the majority of courses surveyed (55%) were only available to internal audiences. The remaining were available to external students; however, only one explicitly sought to ensure a balanced roster from both civilian and military entities. Approximately half of all courses surveyed were aimed at entry-level professionals or practitioners unfamiliar with civ-mil issues. From these findings, we concluded that a new course directed at mid-level practitioners across the peacebuilding community was needed.

At the 2015 PSOTEW, USIP facilitated a discussion on whether or not others in the peacebuilding community saw this need, and if so, what would the contents and appropriate audience of such a course be. Participants agreed that such a course was
needed and they would be interested in participating in the course. The workgroup jointly developed a basic format as well as preliminary topics for the course. USIP’s Civ-Mil team built upon that work to develop and refine the course with assistance from subsequent working groups. We then tested several portions of the new course at the 2016 PSOTEW.

**Intended Audience**

While the material presented in the course will improve the skills practitioners need to operate effectively, another major benefit will accrue from the active and mutual learning among participants from across the peacebuilding spectrum. Getting the correct balance of civilian and military, and governmental and non-governmental participants will be essential to the success of the course.

The appropriate professional level of participants is also important. Many courses are offered for senior mission leaders and entry-level professionals; middle management is often overlooked in civ-mil relations training. Therefore, the USIP civ-mil team crafted a course directed at a mid-level actors with a cross-sector focus, which presents a challenge due to the wide range of years and experience for mid-level peacebuilders.

This year’s working group was composed of a mix of around 25 civilian and military personnel that included participants from the Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID, NGOs and academia. Each individual had relevant experience as a practitioner and/or as an educator. The group provided helpful feedback for sections of the course for final development.

**Methodology / Structure**

Using the inputs from the 2015 PSOTEW working group, USIP Civ-Mil team organized a new course around four following modules: Environment, Actors, Communication and Leadership. A variety of teaching methods, including speakers, facilitated discussions, small group work, and exercises, as well as required readings will be used to enhance learning on these critical themes.

**Work Group Outcomes**

The PSOTEW working group focused on portions of two of the course’s modules: communication and leadership. We began the session with an overview of the full course structure, noting that the modules will build on each other. The first two modules (Environment and Actors) were not previewed due to time constraints. The first session on communication was a facilitated discussion on communication and information sharing mechanisms. The second day continued the communications block, and addressed different types and purposes of communication, including active listening techniques. The session on leadership discussed leadership criteria within an organization and the limits on transferability to an interorganizational setting. The condensed preview was sufficient to all the attendees to provide valuable feedback on the proposed content and delivery. Particularly helpful was feedback that disproved some assumptions regarding content and base level of knowledge of the target audience.

One assumption that proved incorrect was that mid-level practitioners would have a common baseline knowledge of certain civ-mil topics. Follow on discussions helped the Civ-Mil team incorporate material to fill the identified gaps. Additionally, it allowed the civ-mil team to tailor the list of materials to be included in the course’s required readings list.

Other important feedback from the participants was that in some cases the application of the content needed further refinement, with greater emphasis on case studies and scenarios, confirming the Civ-Mil team’s intent to rely heavily on case studies. In addition, participants provided useful suggestion on cases. The group agreed that threading one or two cases, other than Afghanistan or Iraq, throughout the course would be most effective.

The USIP civ-mil team is continuing to refine the new course. As a collaborative process, the team will continue to reach out to partners to finalize the structure and content of the course. Ultimately, USIP aims to pilot “Dealing Effectively with Uncertainty: Civ-Mil Relations in Shared Spaces” on July 11-15, 2016 at USIP’s headquarters in Washington, DC. For further engagement opportunities or to share comments or thoughts, please contact Jim Ruf at jruf@usip.org.
In April 2016, the Lessons Learned Division at PKSOI hosted Female Engagement Team (FET) Subject Matter Expert (SME) LTC Kristine Petermann to contribute to building a FET “Blueprint.” After serving in Afghanistan in 2011 as the Program Manager (PM) for the FET program in Regional Command-East (RC-E), LTC Petermann continued her involvement in gender issues as the Gender Advisor for the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC(A)). She will soon begin her next posting working at PKSOI on the Department of Defense's Implementation Guide on Women, Peace & Security (WPS), as PKSOI is being designated as the lead for WPS proponency. LTC Petermann is pictured above with PKSOI’s Lessons Learned Analyst Katrina Gehman, evaluating effectiveness of the FET program and discussing ideas for expanding awareness of gender dynamics throughout the chain of command.

The FET Blueprint is one of several tasked as part of the JROC Memorandum (JROCM) 172-13 Task 12 concerning Change Recommendations for Stability Operations Joint DOTmLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities – Policy). The creation of blueprints under JROCM Task 12 is meant to “enable regeneration and expansibility […] for organizations and functions developed in response to Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF).” Each blueprint for programs as diverse as Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and FETs, provides a capability overview, organizational construct, lessons learned, training, implementation, and recommendations for future employment of the capability.

The FET capability was implemented in Afghanistan from roughly 2009 – 2014 by both the U.S. Army & Marine Corps as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While most teams performed a variety of activities from Cordon and Search operations to development initiatives, the primary purpose of the program was to engage the female portion of the population under counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. These ad hoc teams of female Soldiers and Marines received widely mixed reviews (See the article “Female Engagement Teams: An Enduring Requirement with a Rocky Start” by Colonel Ellen Haring in the October 2012 Volume 3, Issue 1 of the PKSOI Journal) – and building a FET Blueprint provides an opportunity to pull together these varied lessons learned. Blueprints completed by the Lessons Learned Division at PKSOI, including the FET Blueprint, will be posted on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) and made available upon request.
PKSOI's Chief of Stability Operations visits the Nigerian Armed Forces and Conducts a Lecture at their National Defence College

During the 1st week of June 2016, PKSOI’s Chief of Stability Operations, COL Raymond "Boz" Bossert conducted a lecture and site visits to the Nigerian Armed Forces. His initial meeting was with MG Shonduke and BG Azez, the commandant and deputy of the Nigerian Engineer school in Makuda, where he provided a stabilization update and a training assessment to the Engineer School staff, and conducted site visits to local civic projects: a bridge, a water tower and a road project.

COL Bossert subsequently provided a lecture to the entire National Defence College class and many Nigerian interagency partners, as well as invited guests from the government and ministry of defense (about 800).

The lecture was followed by an impromptu office call with the 4th highest ranking general of the Nigerian military, LTG Ojumbi, where COL Bossert received a brief on Nigerian operations in the north and delta regions from their respective commanders and key ministry staff. LTG Ojumbi was interested in learning whether Nigerian operations aligned with doctrine, while also gaining insight into applicable lessons learned. The next meeting was with the Ministry of Defense campaign planning team, led by MG Okono, to discuss the formation of a strategic plan to address the fight for the next few years. COL Bossert applied his stability expertise to assist in validating the planning efforts.

The final phase of the visit was a roundtable discussion composed of over 40 members of the civilian ministries, military and NGOs. BG Bashir, the Deputy Commandant of the Nigerian Defence College, headed the committee. An impromptu visit by the Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the Nigerian Vice President, and Ambassador Danjuma Sheni, the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Defence, opened the session and highlighted the importance of the roundtable. An in-depth discussion revolved around the need for phase 0, steady state stability activities to be a joint and interagency effort with all participants receiving the same training. The roundtable turned into a question and answer period on how the US implemented stability activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, and can any of these activities be incorporated into Nigerian efforts.

The three ending points made and agreed to were:
- Successful stability operations must be conducted early, often and always, and cannot be limited to a single phase or portion of an operation.
- Stability activities must be a whole of government and interagency approach.
- Stability must follow a strategic campaign plan and not be fought one year at a time.
A delegation of African senior military and police advisors to the United Nations visited Carlisle Barracks 7-8 July, to gain familiarity with PKSOI and discuss topics related to peace operations. The delegation included representatives from Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

Discussion topics included an overview of PKSOI, U.S. Support to Peacekeeping, a demonstration of PKSOI's Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS), the U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Rebalance, Transitional Public Security, Transnational Organized Crime, the Protection of Civilians, and Women, Peace, and Security. The delegation also received an orientation on the Gettysburg campaign, which was followed by a staff ride to the Gettysburg Battlefield.

PKSOI works extensively with the United Nations and other international organizations, and frequently participates in training and other events that are conducted in African countries. The delegation’s visit helped to strengthen PKSOI’s ties with these important partners.
On 14 June 2016, PKSOI hosted Major General Nagmbou Commandant of Cameroon War College. The General headed a delegation of 60 students and faculty from his school representing 20 African nations and France. Dr Betros, the U.S. Army War College Provost, provided an overview of the War College Curriculum and COL Greg Dewitt, PKSOI Director, discussed the mission and ongoing efforts of PKSOI as an institute under the US Army War College. The War College Center For Strategic Leadership and School of Strategic Landpower also briefed the group.

At the conclusion of the day long visit the delegation visited seminar rooms as well as the Root Hall Library.

On 21 June, PKSOI participated with senior staff members from the Pentagon on Transitional Public Security organized for the International Academy for Security Forces in Cameroon.
PKSOI Support to Training and Education

**PKSOI Supports the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa**

13-14 July 2016 - PKSOI's Japanese Officer Lt. Col. Norihisa Urakami rekindles a strategic relationship with the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) while presenting at their training and capacity building workshop. Egypt has an increasingly influential regional role in peace operations, and recently committed to a leadership position within the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC).

**PKSOI Supports CoESPU and the Italian Post Conflict Operations Center**

13-19 June 2016 - PKSOI's COL Carter Oates and Mr Tony Lieto conducted coordination meetings with the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, Italy. They also provided course instruction at the Italian Post Conflict Operations Study Center (IPCOSC) in Turin Italy. PKSOI provides instruction on Stability Operations twice a year to the Italian post Conflict Operations Center as directed by the US-Italian staff talks.

**PKSOI provides instruction at the Peace Support Training Centre, Addis Ababa Ethiopia**

1-16 June 2016 - At the request of the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) and the request of the Joint Staff Office, Japan Ministry of Defence (MOD), PKSOI's Lt. Col. Norihisa Urakami supported the Conflict Prevention Course at the PSTC and provided technical assistance and instruction on the Rule of Law and other various UN peacekeeping related tasks. Through a continued lasting relationship with the PSTC PKSOI receives situation updates on the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and reviews on stability in East Africa.
Please provide your comments / remarks / thoughts / articles / proposals to help us improve the value of the PKSOI Journal. If you would like to contribute an article to the next Peace & Stability Journal, please send an email to Chris Browne at usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.pksoiresearchandpublications@mail.mil.

Any comments?

Please let us know

The next quarterly journal will feature articles from the AUSA Panel event titled, “Peace and Stability: Operating in a Complex World.”

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