Complexities and Efficiencies in Peacekeeping Operations
FOREWORD

Welcome to the 37th edition of the SOLLIMS Lessons Learned Sampler – Complexities and Efficiencies in Peacekeeping Operations.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a small sample – thus the title “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Peacekeeping Operations available within the SOLLIMS data repository. Selected lessons may be shared as ‘food for thought’ for discussion among civilian, military and police practitioners throughout the ‘peacekeeping community’, planners, personnel involved in peacekeeping-related policy, doctrine, training, education, and so on.

Several links in this report will take you to specific resources in SOLLIMS or to the registration/login page. For those who do not yet have a SOLLIMS account, please take a moment to register for one. Then you will be able to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and view the various peacekeeping- and stability-related products that are referenced in this publication.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the Sampler as a resource for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box found at the end of each lesson in the SOLLIMS database – seen when you open the lesson in SOLLIMS – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson.

We welcome your ideas, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor to SOLLIMS.

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A. The UN has made noteworthy strides toward protecting its personnel on peacekeeping missions; however, deployments to operational environments with an array of asymmetric threats require continued vigilance and better protection measures. [Read More ...]

B. Comprehensive quantitative research shows four factors as being most contributory to the reduction of violence through peacekeeping missions. Many of these factors align with earlier subjective analysis of peacekeeping operations in Africa. [Read More ...]

C. International/regional/national efforts against terrorism in Mali that have had “ties” to MINUSMA have affected MINUSMA’s impartiality and its role as guarantor of the peace process. “Robustness” … in terms of a stabilizing presence – one that facilitates helping the host nation move toward reconciliation, conflict resolution, and stable governance with delivery of essential services – can generate greater legitimacy and cooperation. [Read More ...]

D. The United Nations endeavored to meet strategic communications requirements in Somalia through utilization of a consortium of private firms known as the AU-UN Information Support Team (IST), which planned and conducted strategic communications in support of AMISOM and against al-Shabaab. Although the IST played an innovative and important function for AMISOM, it suffered from multiple significant challenges beginning in late 2012 – which greatly reduced its effectiveness over the next several years. [Read More ...]

E. Dialogue and mediation have made a positive impact in Mali and Nigeria, in spite of prolonged periods of insecurity for local communities and for MINUSMA / Mali peacekeepers. Although mediation efforts have not yet resolved the conflicts, the ceasefire talks have helped in preventing outbreak of major violent conflict. [Read More ...]

F. Formulating an inclusive Peacebuilding Plan is an effective way to transition out of a United Nations Peacekeeping mission without losing gains in peace and stability. This was evident in Liberia when the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) successfully drew down in March 2018 after 15 years in the nation following a brutal civil war. [Read More ...]

G. Transition management along the civil-military nexus of mission coordination – from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, from security to development, and from military to civilian lead – is the central challenge and measure of success in the successful fulfillment of the mandate of a UN integrated field mission. [Read More ...]

H. United Nations peace operations have a substantial, and at times negative, impact on local communities and ecologies, which can exacerbate local conflict. As such, in recent years, the UN has increased efforts to address the environmental impact of UN peace operations. More work is needed to sustain these efforts, as emphasized in the International Peace Institute (IPI)’s recent April 2018 report “Greening Peacekeeping.” [Read More ...]
1. INTRODUCTION

In his most recent Protection of Civilians report, the UN Secretary-General honed in on a number of countries – highlighting the regrettably high civilian casualty counts for 2017:

In 2017, the United Nations recorded … some 2,600 [civilian casualties] in Somalia and approximately the same number in Yemen. In the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, attacks killed more than 1,100 and almost 2,000 civilians, respectively.

In each of these countries of seemingly endless violence, dedicated UN peacekeepers are steadfastly going about their business. And in one particular country – namely, Mali – UN peacekeepers themselves have been the targets of sporadic attacks while determinedly going about their business. Complexity abounds – within these environments, missions, mandates, planning, coordination, contingencies, and so on.

This SOLLIMS Sampler examines just a handful of the great many complexities found in peacekeeping operations, such as:

- protecting peacekeepers against an array of asymmetric threats
- figuring out keys to success in peacekeeping and violence reduction
- optimizing robustness to impact conflict resolution – Mali and beyond
- ensuring effective strategic communications – Somalia and beyond
- pursuing inclusive mediation at multiple levels with multiple actors
- managing transitions – peacekeeping to peacebuilding – Liberia and beyond
- addressing/improving environmental impact during peace operations

To its credit, the UN has gained various efficiencies in peacekeeping over recent years – through updates to policy, doctrine, training, etc. “Success” in the face of complexity has also proven possible: UNMIL / Liberia attests to this. That said, in the interest of gaining further efficiencies and successes, the lessons in this publication offer various thoughts and recommendations from researchers, analysts, and peacekeeping practitioners.
2. LESSONS

A. Asymmetric Threats – Need for Continuous Attention and Improvement  (Lesson #2645)

Observation.

The UN has made noteworthy strides toward protecting its personnel on peacekeeping missions; however, deployments to operational environments with an array of asymmetric threats require continued vigilance and better protection measures.

Discussion.

Over the 2001-2018 timeframe, peacekeeping operations have witnessed a noticeable increase in the total number of fatalities linked to actions from asymmetric threats. One mission in particular has seen an inordinate number of fatalities – namely, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). With asymmetric threats becoming common in peacekeeping environments, it is imperative that the UN continue to improve its preparedness, capacities, and capabilities to counter such threats.

Besides the responsibility to protect their own personnel and resources, numerous UN peacekeeping missions have also been tasked to protect civilians or stabilize the security situation – sometimes within environments of ongoing violence/conflict. Conflict parties and/or “spoilers” of the peace have been active in/around peacekeepers (MONUSCO/Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNMISS/South Sudan, others) and sometimes against peacekeepers (MINUSMA/Mali and AMISOM/Somalia). In such environments, peacekeepers have been confronted with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines, suicide bombings, mortar attacks, ambushes, armed riots, hostage situations, and other acts of violence.


“…where asymmetric threats are present in the operating environment, UN missions must be provided with the necessary capabilities and training. In addition, an appropriate concept of operations and rules of engagement are required to protect itself and deliver its mandate, including through a preventive and preemptive posture and willingness to use force tactically to protect civilians and UN personnel. Troop- and police-contributing countries must be fully appraised of the conditions of the operating environment and threat assessments and deploy with the requisite capability and political will to confront such contingencies with full respect for clear and unified UN command and control.”

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon concurred with the HIPPO findings. In his 2 September 2015 report on the implementation of the recommendations of the HIPPO report, he indicated that as peacekeepers deploy in asymmetric threat environments, they must be
capable of operating as effectively and safely as possible. “The increasing use of armoured vehicles and technology, improved communications, information gathering and analysis, training and quality medical care, as well as guard units, are some of the most effective ways to keep our personnel safe, and I will continue to pursue advances across all of those fronts.” For that pursuit, a small Strategic Planning and Monitoring Cell was established in the Office of the Secretary-General. Also, special missions and political missions would continue to receive guard units, such as in the Central African Republic and Somalia. The Secretary-General also emphasized the strategy of adopting widely-available and cost-effective technologies for improving the safety and security of peacekeepers and assets. Additionally, the UN has since ensured provision of on-demand specialized training and guidance to enhance protection, such as for the challenge of IEDs.

This work by the UN to protect its peacekeepers is indeed a good news story – but one that merits continued attention, goal-setting, and tracking.

**Recommendations.**

The author of “Asymmetric threats to peace operations,” which is the primary source of this lesson, makes the following recommendations:

1. **Strengthen the integrated approach:** A more integrated approach at the strategic level for the UN system as a whole is required to move beyond short-term, security-focused counter-terrorism in peace operations. Synergies could be sought between peace operations and other organizations and instruments, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, as well as the newly established UN Counter-Terrorism Office.

2. **Deepen understanding of operating environment:** The Secretariat and member states could further improve and integrate information and intelligence gathering and sharing within missions before deployment and at a tactical level during the mission. This requires, among other things, foot patrols and increased contact with the local population.

3. **Generate more sophisticated and predictable uniformed capabilities:** Peacekeepers in asymmetric threat environments require different kinds of equipment, training and posture. For example, their vehicles need to be IED resistant and their personnel need to have counterinsurgency rather than conventional warfare training, focused on winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

4. **Improve coherence and implementation of existing policies:** Many documents and policies are not being implemented because, for example, the responsible person has moved on. It is important that UN policies are implemented and taken on board by police- and troop-contributing countries in a more systematic way. In the long term, this will increase the interoperability of countries deploying in peace operations.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on information in the following sources:
B. Keys to Reducing Violence through Peacekeeping Missions
(Lesson #2647)

Observations:

Comprehensive quantitative research shows four factors as being most contributory to the reduction of violence through peacekeeping missions. Many of these factors align with earlier subjective analysis of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Discussion:

A lesson report posted to SOLLIMS in February 2016 – based on various sources and developed through subjective analysis – cited the following factors as keys to success for peacekeeping operations in Africa:

1) An effective political strategy and peace process is a prerequisite.
2) Strategic coordination with actors working in the same environment is crucial.
3) Good relations with the host nation government must be maintained over mission duration.
4) “Ends” and “means” must be in synch – no shortfalls in “means” (especially transportation, medical, engineering, intelligence, communications, logistics).
5) Robust operations are imperative – achieved via doctrine, training, force posture, and ROE.
6) Contingents must have keen situational awareness of threats/spoilers.
7) Information gathering & analysis must be continuous and driven by prioritized requirements.

8) Protection of Civilians should be at the forefront of every operation.

9) Legitimacy matters – PK presence/operational necessity must be communicated/understood.

10) The conduct/behavior of peacekeepers must be good/ethical.

11) Peacekeepers need to be respectful of the culture, traditions, and sensitivities of local people.

12) Good public relations must be achieved – with local authorities, local people, and the media.

13) Senior Leadership matters – for relationship-building and ensuring unity of effort.

14) Training is paramount – especially on security, ROE, Code of Conduct, and cultural awareness.

15) Female peacekeepers enhance operational effectiveness & open channels with local women.

16) Missions must plan & be prepared to appropriately respond to refugee and IDP scenarios.

Notably, quantitative analysis published in a recent Stability journal article (March 2018) identifies many of the same factors as keys to reducing violence in peacekeeping operations. Four factors of prominence are:

1) Deploying into continuing armed conflict as it is the case in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan or the DRC, and to some extent also in CAR and Mali, thwarts the chances of establishing comprehensive peace ... Indeed, during the deployment of [such] stabilization missions the number of battle deaths, domestic unrest and refugees is increasing, while scores for personal safety are decreasing. In the long-run, such a situation is unsustainable. However ... If there is a working peace agreement, the chances of a positive impact are significantly higher. Burundi, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone have responded fairly well to international peacekeeping by displaying mostly stable positive trends ... The impact of peacekeeping depends to a fair degree on the end or at least control of violent conflict prior to deployment. [This aligns with (1) above.]

2) What brings down non-lethal forms of violence might be less related to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and more about the quality of security governance in a country. ... Higher scores in the quality of security governance are positively related to lower numbers of domestic unrest [and violence]. If peacekeepers aim at reducing violence, a stronger focus on security governance issues is needed. [To affect the quality of security governance, (3) above is necessary.]
3) Higher degrees of official developmental assistance (ODA) have a moderately positive influence on governance scores and the number of conflict events. This highlights the importance of the integrated and comprehensive approach the UN endorses combining military security instruments, such as peacekeeping with developmental assistance. Curbing violent conflict is not only a question of peacekeepers deployed, but also wider context conditions among which ODA plays a role. [To have an integrated and comprehensive approach, (2) and (3) above are necessary.]

4) Underlying causes of conflict must be resolved – the earlier, the better. If the underlying causes for conflict remain prominent, it is difficult for peacekeeping missions to reduce violence significantly. Interestingly, countries with a large income from natural sources such as oil, gas, and minerals display a high level of violence. The deployment of peacekeepers is not changing this situation immediately, nor any related grievances / causes of conflict. [Although this does not align with subjective factors above, it matches the SOLLIMS lesson on “Mediation for Enhancing Peacekeeping and Addressing Grievances.”]

Of significance, quantitate research & analysis shows that peacekeepers do not make a difference toward reducing violence in the initial years of deployment: “The number of violent deaths increases in the initial years of deployment. Other forms of violence, measured in terms of in the number of conflict events, domestic unrest and violence against civilians, remain unchanged. … These are rather sobering findings. Peacekeeping missions struggle to deliver in their core field of competence on the promise of pacifying conflicts and creating conditions for a peaceful post-conflict environment.” This is not to say that peacekeeping itself does not make a difference … Rather, it implies that violence reduction does not happen right away. Violence reduction takes time, patience, commitment, persistence.

Recommendations:

Based on the quantitative data/analysis presented, it is recommended that:

1. As the early years are the most dangerous/prone-to-violence, deploy greater than required numbers of peacekeepers upfront, as feasible and appropriate to the context.

2. Rather than deploying peacekeepers into continuing armed conflict (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, DRC), first pursue a comprehensive, working peace agreement (e.g., Burundi, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone) – to gain an end to, or at least control of, violent conflict prior to any deployment.

3. In designing peacekeeping and partnering with the host nation, include a strong focus on helping the host nation with the quality of security governance.

4. Continue to ensure an integrated and comprehensive approach – combining military security instruments (including peacekeeping troops and police) with developmental assistance.
5. Work hard to address the underlying causes of conflict. This involves: inclusive mediation to bring out the grievances, compromises/concessions to address the grievances, and timelines/milestones to track actions and assess progress. Again, violence reduction does not happen right away. Violence reduction takes time, patience, commitment, persistence.

**Event Description:**

This lesson is based on information in the following sources:


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**C. MINUSMA’s Robustness and Impact on Stabilization – Mali (Lesson #2648)**

**Observation:**

International/regional/national efforts against terrorism in Mali that have had “ties” to MINUSMA have affected MINUSMA’s impartiality and its role as guarantor of the peace process. “Robustness” linked to the counterterror nature of the French Operation Barkhane tends to be counterproductive for MINUSMA, whereas “robustness” in terms of a stabilizing presence – one that facilitates helping the host nation move toward reconciliation, conflict resolution, and stable governance with delivery of essential services – can generate greater legitimacy and cooperation.

**Discussion.**

This lesson does not call into question the French Operation Barkhane or the deployment of the Joint Force of the “Group of Five for the Sahel” (G-5 Sahel). Both operations are well purposed. This lesson instead examines MINUSMA, its ties, perceptions, and effectiveness.
“Stabilization” is at the core of the MINUSMA mandate.

“… in stabilization, the theory of change is to restore and maintain order by managing or containing aggressors and spoilers. … in peacekeeping the aim is conflict resolution, whilst in stabilization the objective is limited to conflict management or containment. … The typical UN peacekeeping missions, and the units, trained, prepared and equipped to do consensual peacekeeping, are not capable of the kind of ‘robust’ operations these stabilization mission require.” (1)

In the case of stabilization for Mali, MINUSMA’s “robust” posture is largely provided by the French Barkhane force. In fact, the French Barkhane force is addressed within MINUSMA’s mandate, but without placing the force under UN command. MINUSMA’s mandate does not permit MINUSMA to conduct joint operations with the French Barkhane force; however, it does authorize Operation Barkhane’s support to MINUSMA while “Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.” (2)

“OPERATION BARKHANE: Global Sub-Saharan Anti-Terrorist Mission
Operation Barkhane, spanning five countries in the Sahel region of North Africa, started in the beginning of August 2014 after the completion of Operation SERVAL. With its main base in the Chadian capital N’Djamena, it is actively present in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger. … Through operations in the region of the three borders in coordination and alongside the Malian armed forces, operation Barkhane maintains the pressure on armed terrorist groups. In just over two months [Feb-Mar 2018], some 60 terrorists have been put out of action. In addition, pick-ups and motorcycles, individual and collective armaments, as well as a large quantity of equipment necessary for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices were seized or destroyed. These operations are systematically accompanied by actions to help the local population.” (3)

The arrangement between French Barkhane forces and MINUSMA, however, sometimes results in problematic situations. One example is MINUSMA’s mandate/action to support the redeployment of Mali’s defense and security forces. Mali’s defense and security forces cooperate on a regular basis with the French Barkhane force, particularly in efforts against terrorism. These cooperative activities between parties (MINUSMA, Malian, and French) give the perception that all three are working together against terrorism … which can cause HN groups to questions MINUSUMA’s impartiality and legitimacy. In a similar way, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process supported by MINUSMA involves verification of participants (some of whom may have terrorist affiliation), which often relies on local information to aid verification; however, locals may not be as forthcoming if they view MINUSMA as not being impartial. To complicate matters, in Mali, the associations between the armed signatory groups (to the ceasefire) and the armed terrorist groups are not clear and are topics of debate. The Bamako government does not always clearly differentiate between Tuareg rebels and jihadists, for instance, implying possible connections and/or similarities.
Essentially, the French Operation Barkhane operation manages the use of force (against “terrorists”) in order to create space for MINUSMA (and international partners) to work toward conflict resolution. That being said, as evidenced in a great deal of peace and conflict literature, “conflict management” is often an obstacle to “conflict resolution” – as use of force can often counter non-lethal instruments/ influences on actors to peacefully resolve their grievances/conflicts. This “competing” approach can create an unending continuum of “non-stabilization” – as witnessed in Mali and numerous other environments (Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.). “It is not surprising that French generals claim that they will be in Mali and the Sahel for the next 15 to 20 years.” (2)

In truth, MINUSMA has not achieved the desired impact of “stabilization” for Mali. Operation Barkhane is well aimed, but its separation from MINUSMA is possible and perhaps needed. As for MINUSMA, rather than peacekeeping “robustness” that can be perceived as working to contain terrorists and perpetrators of violence, it seems more prudent to have peacekeeping “robustness” designed, resourced, and focused on providing an impartial presence that helps the host nation move toward reconciliation, conflict resolution, stable governance, and security services seen as legitimate and supportive of society.

“Establishing a strong, sustainable civil-military relationship that institutionalizes the primacy of civil authority and takes a more strategic, peacebuilding approach to security sector development will be the key component of national reconciliation and addressing the main drivers of conflict, as will be the professionalization and capacity-building of Malian security forces. ... This includes the military leadership level and the gendarmerie and police as well as regular military forces in ensuring the security of the civilian population and communities rather than the security of state instrumentalities, as well as inclusion of reconcilable armed groups. Inculcating a public service ethic among these personnel as integral to their professional ethic will, over time, help temper their behavior towards civilians and thus improve the civil-military relationship.” (4)

Recommendations.

1. MINUSMA’s “robust” posture should be directed towards the objective of a stabilizing presence – one that actively helps the host nation move toward reconciliation, conflict resolution, and governmental delivery of services for the safety and security of Mali’s people. For the latter, inculcating a public service ethic among the host nation’s security personnel is of utmost importance.

2. The author of the article “The Dilemmas of International Intervention in Mali” specifically recommends:

   - MINUSMA must be disassociated from Operation Barkhane, or the French forces must be integrated into the UN command. The integration of the French forces into the UN command, although unlikely at this point, would serve to limit war operations.

   - MINUSMA and its partners must stop emphasizing the war against terrorism in order to focus on the fundamental political questions at the core of the conflict. The groups
and individuals identified as “terrorists” can be considered as *spoilers*. The issue of spoilers is complicated, but the UN has experience in this regard and the concept is not as prejudicial as that of terrorist.

- MINUSMA’s capacities for preventing or mitigating the effects of terrorist *acts* must be reinforced but must not participate in a war against terrorism. In the latter case, if the French and African forces continue this war, an exit strategy for MINUSMA must be considered.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on information from the following sources:

2. *The Dilemmas of International Intervention in Mali*, by Bruno Charbonneau, Chaire Raoul-Dandurand, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) [University of Quebec at Montreal], October 2017.

D. Key Elements for Effective Strategic Communication in Peace Operations (AMISOM Experience) *(Lesson #2623)*

**Observation:**

The United Nations endeavored to meet strategic communications requirements in Somalia through utilization of a consortium of private firms known as the AU-UN Information Support Team (IST), which planned and conducted strategic communications in support of AMISOM and against al-Shabaab. Although the IST played an innovative and important function for AMISOM, it suffered from multiple significant challenges beginning in late 2012 – which greatly reduced its effectiveness over the next several years.
Discussion.

When the African Union Hybrid Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed to Somalia in March 2007, it did not possess resources/capabilities to wage an effective strategic communications campaign. For the first 2½ years, AMISOM had virtually no media presence whatsoever. To remedy this issue, in November 2009, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) contracted a consortium of private firms that established the AU-UN IST. The IST had a core of 20 employees and up to 50 personnel dedicated to running a radio station (Radio Bar-Kulan). Throughout the 2010-2012 timeframe, the IST effectively delivered strategic communications, actively countered al-Shabaab’s strategic narrative, and helped build confidence and trust in AMISOM among the local population. However, beginning in late 2012, various changes occurred – mostly external to the IST – which adversely affected the IST’s operating procedures and performance, as well as the entire strategic communications effort.

One change that took place involved leadership – i.e., the leadership/direction/tasking over the IST. In late 2012 and early 2013, the UN and AU had begun to compete over which of their organizations should be politically in the lead in Somalia. Detrimental “fallout” from this began when the UN deployed its UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in mid-2013. Then, various UNSOM civilian staff members began to heavily engage/task the IST – which was then pulled in multiple, sometimes contradictory directions from both AMISOM and UNSOM. Competing leaders & staffs from AMISOM and UNSOM failed to ensure one clear vision, policy, and tasking & reporting chain for the IST and for the overall strategic communication effort. To compound this issue, certain TCCs of AMISOM began to pursue their own agendas/ national communication goals, as opposed to AMISOM’s goals and the advice of the IST.

From the outset, when the UN established the IST (a commercial entity) in 2009, the UN shifted from its standard approach of deploying a UN Public Information Unit (PIU). Essentially, the UN transferred risk of operating in an insecure environment from itself to a commercial entity. The IST, though, itself took very little risk and conducted the bulk of its activity in secure locations in Mogadishu – operating initially at a contractor facility and then moving in 2012 to a secure compound within AMISOM’s main base at Mogadishu International Airport. Due to security concerns, the IST conducted minimal activity outside of Mogadishu (except for radio broadcasts and web-based messaging). AMISOM was not helpful; AMISOM did not generate or support “access” into other areas/sectors for the IST – due to the risks of terrorist and criminal attacks. To its credit, the IST established a “Mogadishu Media House” complete with computers and Internet access, which served as a safe house for journalists to meet, stay, and work – a common location for public information activities and information-sharing.

Also to its credit, the IST incorporated local Somali personnel into its organization – ensuring cultural awareness and attention to local dynamics in strategic communication activities. The IST was able to craft its many efforts (24-hour radio broadcasts, radio dramas, video documentaries and other material for AMISOM’s website, newspaper articles, etc.) to appropriately target/influence Somali audiences (political leaders, clan leaders, displaced people, local civilians, and rebels). This knowledge/ incorporation of local dynamics for messaging paid significant dividends. Whereas opinion polls in January
2010 showed that 33% of Somalis believed AMISOM was in Somalia to cause harm, 23 months later, in December 2011, polling saw a notable drop in this negativity – only 9% of respondents thought poorly of AMISOM. Months later, March-April 2013 polling revealed that now nearly 60% of Somalis considered AMISOM effective at providing security, with most respondents viewing AMISOM as a friendly force. Despite this remarkable progress in just three years of IST/AMISOM operations, the AU-UN strategic messaging campaign soon took a downward turn. The major external factors for this decline were: (1) new tasking procedures from the UN that stifled IST's ability to generate its own work plans; (2) new focus on outputs (T-shirts, bags, calendars, etc.) rather than on effects (from messaging); and, (3) new coordination arrangements whereby the IST could no longer advise AMISOM but could instead only respond to AMISOM requests. As a result, the decline in messaging effectiveness was sharp. June-July 2016 polling showed only 28% of Somalis in support of AMISOM, 55% viewed AMISOM as an unfriendly force, and 48% wanted AMISOM to leave immediately. Besides the stifled messaging activities, criticism over human rights abuses by AMISOM personnel was frequent/prominent, and, to a degree, AMISOM shot itself in the foot due to its own misconduct.

Besides the three external factors, other major challenges to the IST's work emerged in 2013 and continued for several years – reversing the gains made by the IST in its early years. Those major, perpetual challenges were: (1) the hostile operating environment in Somalia (and lack of AMISOM risk-taking for messaging access/outreach); (2) reluctance on the part of AMISOM's leaders – particularly senior civilians – to shoulder their responsibilities listed in the strategic communication plan; (3) TCCs of AMISOM pursuing their own national communication goals over the larger AMISOM goals and routinely ignoring IST advice/expertise; (4) TCCs of AMISOM putting out false information (lies) – thereby damaging AMISOM’s credibility; (5) lack of initiative or urgency by AMISOM to counter al-Shabaab messaging or exploit al-Shabaab missteps; and, (6) IST organizational challenges, including limited resources and high personnel turnover. Because of these major challenges and leadership failure to address them, the AU-UN strategic messaging in Somalia was handicapped for years.

Recommendations.

The author of the article upon which this lesson is based makes the following four recommendations:

1) Deploying a peace operation without the capabilities to wage an effective strategic communications campaign would be a major error. The precise nature of the strategic communications capabilities should be constituted in accordance with the needs on the ground.

2) Leadership must ensure coherence between a clear vision and sound policy – to guide strategic communications. Leadership should clearly articulate the desired effects and clarify how particular audiences can be influenced to support the mission’s goals. Moreover, as seen in AMISOM’s case, it is not enough to devise a coherent policy; it must also be followed and implemented by the countries contributing to the mission.
3) Effective strategic communications in an insecure and fluid environment, such as Somalia, requires an expeditionary mindset and a willingness to take risks, including to generate and support media access in difficult circumstances.

4) Knowledge and understanding of local conflict dynamics are critical for planning and execution of the strategic communication campaign. The need for expertise about local conflict dynamics means that IST-like operations probably need a predominantly local team in order to ensure sustainable success.

**Implications.**

Failure to provide sufficient strategic communication capabilities from the outset, to have the mission’s leadership involved in guiding the strategic communications campaign, to get the message and the messengers out in insecure environments, and to incorporate local expertise into the strategic communications activities could result in inappropriate, insufficient, and inconsistent messaging – to the detriment of whole strategic communications campaign and the mission itself.

**Event Description.**


**Additional Information.**

Additional observations, insights, and lessons on strategic communication can be found in “Strategic Communication / Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations,” SOLLIMS Sampler, by David Mosinski, PKSOI, November 2016.

E. Mediation for Enhancing Peace Operations and Addressing Grievances (Lesson #2646)

**Observation.**

Dialogue and mediation have made a positive impact in Mali and Nigeria, in spite of prolonged periods of insecurity for local communities and for MINUSMA/Mali peacekeepers. Although mediation efforts have not yet resolved the conflicts, the ceasefire talks have helped in preventing outbreak of major violent conflict.
Discussion.

In Mali, although sporadic attacks continue to occur, there is no wide-scale threat to the peace thanks in part to: (a) military interventions [by France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)], (b) international mediation, (c) UN peacekeeping, and (d) various other factors.

“In response to the crisis, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a dual-track approach: dialogue with the MNLA, as well as adopting military intervention. In December 2012, representatives of the Mali government met with both the MNLA and Ansar Dine, where a ceasefire was achieved. During these talks, both groups agreed to drop calls for independence and the imposition of Sharia law. It should further be noted that as a result of the mediation, legitimate demands by the MNLA were met to an extent, through the Algiers Accord, and the MNLA now has more autonomy in the northern region of Mali. Thereafter, French military intervention was implemented through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 to push back insurgent groups who continued to pose a threat to the country. The intervention was successful to some extent, but sporadic attacks continue to take place.” (Ramdeen, p. 53)

Key points are: Early mediation efforts were instrumental in preventing further outbreaks of large-scale violence; major population centers/cities within Mali are no longer threatened; and, there is room for continued mediation – arguably at the lower levels, targeting various societal groups with unmet grievances.

Nigeria is a different case, yet having one similarity – mediation towards a ceasefire, to prevent further major acts of violence, and to provide space for further dialogue. “Due consideration should also be given to mediation attempts in Nigeria. Indirect peace talks were considered in 2012, during which Boko Haram considered a ceasefire. As Reuters reported: ‘It is the first time a ceasefire had been mentioned, so it is a massive positive, but given the lack of trust, a resolution is still a way off.’ Talks resumed in 2015, when President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria met with Boko Haram members … with hopes that it would lead to further peace talks in the future.” (Ramdeen, p. 53)

In the cases of Nigeria and Mali, where a ceasefire discussion was part of mediation efforts, the conflict may not have been resolved, but at least an outbreak of major violent conflict was prevented. Certainly, a major issue/challenge of mediating with an armed group (or spoiler, or extremist actor) is that it may give the impression that the mediators or host nation authorities are somehow conceding to the armed group or showing weakness. On the other hand, this challenge can be met by emphasizing that the mediation seeks to first acknowledge the parties having grievances, but also by conveying a strong/ultimate will to end/resolve the conflict, putting ideology aside.

Acknowledging that no two mediation situations are alike – with each one having its own unique history, stakeholders, armed groups, grievances, etc. – the case of Colombia is, however, proof of what can be achieved through persistent, long-haul, and “inclusive”
mediation. Notably, the “inclusivity” of representation from all societal groups and segments that had been involved in, or affected by, conflict was key.

**Recommendations.**

1. Regional/international organizations should consider the dual-track approach of operations and mediation – with emphasis on mediation. Mediation should be expanded across all levels, beyond the higher / major stakeholder level.

2. At local levels, mediation should ultimately include representation of local parties having grievances (to include ‘spoilers’), local officials, women, youth, and others, as appropriate. Such inclusive mediation can provide vital information on how the various groups have been affected by conflict. It can also provide opportunity for spoilers/perpetrators to raise their grievances – providing insights on root causes that led/lead to violence. Local mediation teams/leaders should pass such vital information up to higher levels to broaden understanding and to gain decision-making on resolution of grievances, issues, etc. The UN/international community should consider authorizing and resourcing peacekeeping missions to not only engage in – but also prioritize – mediation at the local level.

   “And, we can see this, today, in Abyei. UN personnel in this border region, between Sudan and South Sudan, are doing innovative work. They are engaging closely with local communities, to prevent conflict. And this has allowed the area to remain relatively stable, despite the volatility surrounding it. We need to see even more of these best practices. We need a stronger prevention focus throughout all missions. This will mean ensuring that they can rapidly deploy, and adapt, in response to warning signs of conflict. It will mean developing tools for conflict mapping and analysis, including at the local-level. And it will mean strengthening capacity for prevention and mediation, across the board.”

   - H.E. Mr. Miroslav Lavcak; President of the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly

3. As written by the UN DPKO-DFS/DPET/PBPS Civil Affairs Team:

   1) Missions need to engage more systematically with civil society at all levels.
   2) Missions need to appreciate the impact that conflict had on society.
   3) Missions need to engage with a broader spectrum of civil society actors.
   4) Community engagement should be continuous and systematic rather than ad hoc and sporadic.
   5) Missions require operational guidance to better map and understand the value, roles and risks involved in engaging with civil society.
   6) Missions should invest in building civil society capacity to contribute to the peace process.
7) Peacekeepers should work in partnership with civil society to bridge the gap between missions and local communities.

8) Missions should encourage constructive engagement between government and civil society actors both at the national and local levels.

9) The United Nations needs to engage communities more constructively.

10) Missions need to develop suitable tools based on more rigorous contextual analysis to identify and map civil society actors.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on information in the following sources:


- “Address by H.E. Mr. Miroslav Lavcak, President of the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly, to Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34),” 12 February 2018.

- “Mali Case Study,” January 2015, found in the “Mali Community of Practice” on the SOLLIMS Africa Portal.


- “Understanding and Improving Engagement with Civil Society in UN Peacekeeping: from Policy to Practice,” by the UN DPKO-DFS/DPET/PBPS Civil Affairs Team: Aditi N. Hate, Lisa Moore, and Dirk Druet, May 2017.

**F. Effective UN Peacekeeping Transitions: Liberia Peacebuilding Plan (Lesson #2640)**

**Observation.**

Formulating an inclusive Peacebuilding Plan is an effective way to transition out of a United Nations Peacekeeping mission without losing gains in peace and stability. This was evident in Liberia when the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) successfully drew down in March 2018 after 15 years in the nation following a brutal civil war. Though Liberia still
facing many challenges, the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan created prior to UNMIL’s departure laid the groundwork for ongoing efforts to sustain peace in the years to come.

Discussion.

Brutal civil war in Liberia raged from 1989 to 2003, with a brief respite in 1997 after which violence resumed. During the course of the war, estimates indicate that as many as 1.5 million people were displaced, as many as 250,000 people killed, over 20,000 child soldiers participated in the fighting, and an estimated 80% of girls/women suffered from conflict-related sexual violence. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in August 2003 in Accra, Ghana, after several failed prior agreements. Women in Liberian civil society proved crucial to bringing an end to the violence and successfully negotiating an end to the war through the Mass Action for Peace campaign which mobilized women from all levels of society, including Christians and Muslims and those displaced.

After the peace deal was finalized, UN Security Council Resolution 1509 established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to support implementation of the peace process. During UNMIL’s decade and a half in Liberia, the mission assisted in the disarmament of over 100,000 combatants, supported capability development to protect human rights and rebuild the security sector, and facilitated humanitarian assistance provision. The mission also supported the government through three peaceful elections, including the peaceful transfer of power from two-term President and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to her political rival George Weah after the December 2017 elections.

UNMIL began preparing for its eventual closure a decade prior to its departure from Liberia. January 2008 marked the beginning of a transition of UN activities from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, as UNMIL began shifting efforts to assist other UN agencies. UNMIL’s civil-military coordination (CIMIC) bore the responsibility for this transition management – reducing the dependency of the host nation on the mission, in part through confidence-building measures and joint patrols. UNMIL officially transferred security responsibilities to Liberia in 2016. On 30 March 2018, the last UNMIL peacekeepers left Liberia.

Prior to UNMIL’s departure from Liberia, the UN Country Team (UNCT) took stock of what UN capabilities would be needed after UNMIL’s final drawdown. The Liberian Peacebuilding Plan was developed in spring 2017 by UNMIL through consultation with the Government of Liberia and international partners as well as Liberian civil society and political parties. As a joint project, several UN agencies, including the UN Development Programme, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and the Department of Political Affairs, assessed their capacities as compared to priorities in the Peacebuilding Plan. This highlighted which efforts and continued investment would be needed in Liberia from the UNCT following UNMIL’s departure.

It is important to formulate a peacebuilding plan based on a good understanding of the root causes and drivers of violent conflict. Root causes of conflict in Liberia, as identified through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), included poverty, over-centralized governance, lack of access to justice, dual legal systems, politicization, and land disputes, among others. As such, priorities in the Liberian Peacebuilding Plan included access to justice, security sector reform, reconciliation, local governance decentralization, and cross-
cutting issues, ensuring full participation of women and of youth. Long-term goals for Liberia included governmental accountability and countering corruption.

The Liberian Peacebuilding Plan laid the groundwork for continued engagement with international partners such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as civil society. The Plan was also linked to Liberia’s national priorities, including pro-poor policies. Inclusive dialogues and international partnerships will be necessary to effectively go forward with this plan, as well as coordination of sustained funding. The plan includes a timeline of priorities for Liberia’s transition, including Phase I from April 2017 through the mission drawdown in March 2018. The first phase of the peacebuilding plan (including peaceful elections and transfer of power) is now complete with the second phase under implementation with the Weah administration.

Many challenges remain in Liberia, including addressing corruption and economic diversification. Despite remaining challenges, UNMIL’s successful transition and the Liberian Peacebuilding Plan have laid the ground work for sustaining peace in Liberia.

**Recommendations.**

1. For effective transition management, UN peacekeeping missions should partner with national stakeholders years in advance of the anticipated transition, incorporating patience into the transition strategy. UN peacekeepers can use CIMIC transition management to build confidence as well as capacity in the host population.

2. UN missions drawing down should involve all stakeholders (including national government, international partners, political parties, civil society organizations, women’s groups, etc.) in a consultative process to outline a plan going forward to transition activities from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, using the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan as a best practice. A Peacebuilding Plan is a best practice for UN transitions since it is based on a wide consensus of stakeholders, conflict-sensitivity, and strategic analysis of the context and requirements for peace.

3. Internally to UN missions transitioning, the UN Secretary-General recommends that “a mapping capacity of the United Nations country team against peacebuilding priorities be undertaken and discussed with Member States through the Peacebuilding Commissions” (p. 9). This will ensure the capabilities necessary to sustainably implement a Peacebuilding Plan.

**Implications.**

Without patience, there may be a rushed transition and inadequate confidence within the population to sustain gains made by the mission. Without a good transition plan to draw-down a peacekeeping mission, there is risk that a host nation could lapse back into conflict and not build on gains in peace and stability made by the mission. If a peacebuilding plan is created without wide consultation with regional, national, and civil society stakeholders, it is less likely to be sustainable. To be effective, a peacebuilding plan must be inclusive.
Event Description.

This lesson was based on the following sources:


Comments.

1. For more details about the 2008 transition of UN activity in Liberia from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, see this lesson in SOLLIMS (#773): “Enabling Transition in Liberia through Civil-Military Coordination,” (D. Mosinski) (18 November 2011).

2. For more information about how women in Liberia brought an end to the war, see this lesson in SOLLIMS (#2546): “Liberian Women’s Mass Campaign for Peace Secures Women’s Interests in Peace Process,” (K. Gehman) (22 December 2016).

Lesson Author: Katrina Gehman, Lessons Learned Analyst (Ctr), PKSOI.
G. The Criticality of Civil-Military Transition Management in UN Peace Operations (Lesson #2651)

Observation.

Transition management along the civil-military nexus of mission coordination – from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, from security to development, and from military to civilian lead – is the central challenge and measure of success in the successful fulfillment of the mandate of a UN integrated field mission.

Discussion.

Perhaps among the most impactful lessons from the recently-closed UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) experience is the centrality of transition management along the civil-military nexus of mission coordination – from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, from security to development, and from military to civilian lead – to the successful fulfillment of the mandate of that UN integrated field mission. Related to that is the need to have a clear and well understood concept of civil-military management of that process.

The core obstacle to UNMIL’s stabilization process to end the peacekeeping consolidation phase and start the drawdown phase (transitioning to peacebuilding) in January 2008 was “the increasing dependence of the Government of Liberia on the assets of the Force,” highlighted in numerous UNMIL Force Command reports, as the greatest risk to security and stability there. There are copious discussions of this central transition management challenge in numerous UN Security Council Reports (including UNMIL and other multi-dimensional mission reports and especially UNSCR 2086 and the “HIPPO Report”). I also go into depth to explain this challenge in my Conflict Trends article and the UNMIL case discussion in the POTI civil-military coordination course handbook. Additionally, in my March 2018 UN Dispatch podcast, I discuss how UNMIL needed to “work itself out of a job” by transitioning from military-dominated peacekeeping to civilian-dominated peacebuilding. (“References” section below provides links to article, handbook, and podcast.)

In order to tackle this challenge at this critical juncture at UNMIL, however, as Chief of CIMIC and the only person trained in civil-military operations in the mission, I realized the need to overcome numerous handicaps and mission capacity gaps. For one, the role of the Force in building civil authority and enabling this transition management process was not well understood by most of either the mission leadership as well as the majority of operational leaders from most components (civilian, police, and military). In particular, most troop contributing countries had little or no civil-military doctrinal, operational, or human capital. Second, the UN lacked an overarching concept of civil-military operations that went beyond “CMCoord” (the UN concept for humanitarian civil-military coordination) to synchronize such a comprehensive and complex effort.

To address these shortfalls, a two-pronged effort emerged. First, drawing on the experience of my U.S. predecessors in the job as well as some progress in other UN missions (e.g., MINUSTAH), I drafted and published the UNMIL Force CIMIC Directive, which provided a conceptual guideline as well as operational instruction function. Highly cognizant of the just-
published “UN Capstone Doctrine,” it became much of the basis for the 2010 UN-CIMIC policy, still in effect today.

The other main effort was in training and education of key operational and tactical leaders (civilian and police as well as primarily military) in the development and delivery of an UNMIL CIMIC course that taught civil-military mission coordination and transition management along the lines of the concepts laid out in the Force CIMIC Directive. In addition to the course provided quarterly at the Integrated Mission Training Center in Monrovia, the J9 CIMIC team provided adaptive instruction at tactical locations through mobile training teams. I also provided many planned and impromptu sessions with key component leadership on this more strategic understanding of CIMIC as well as changed the way the mission reported CIMIC activities to emphasize transition management over “winning hearts and minds.”

Among the essential tenets of the new concept was that the two core tasks of UNMIL (and eventually UN) CIMIC were civil-military interaction and transition management. Another critical conceptual component was “civilianizing” and “localizing” the effort, for example, by shifting the use of military assets away from direct assistance to the population and more to enabling efforts led by UN agencies, NGOs, and other civilian “external actors” as well as build the capacity of Government of Liberia entities to perform civil administration functions in essential public services – among them security, governance, the rule of law, and economic infrastructure and social development for especially youths vulnerable to spoiler exploitation.

While it did not always go smoothly and took some time to take effect, this fundamental shift to the civil-military management culture at UNMIL paid dividends and contributed the mission’s eventual success as a model for other UN complex peace operations.

**Recommendation.**

1. UN DPKO should update its 2010 UN-CIMIC Policy to incorporate many developments and new realities (discussed in Reference 2) and the lessons of other UN missions, especially those featuring stabilization and protection of civilians.

2. U.S. forces conducting Security Force Assistance, Building Partnership Capacity, State Partnership, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), U.S. Military Observer Group or other security cooperation missions involving partner military forces from UN troop contributing countries should become conversant with UN operational frameworks, especially with regard to civil-military coordination, rather than reference U.S. doctrine. This will have the additional benefit of improving U.S. situational understanding of, and when necessary, interoperability with those forces in shared regional spaces and tangential mission sets.

3. Continue to increase the placement of U.S. military personnel in key operational staff positions in UN field missions through the US Military Observer Group (USMOG) program. This lesson also serves as a case study of how a small signature of well-placed and well-qualified U.S. military expertise can help raise the operational level of play, as discussed in my articles: "U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement," Small Wars
Implications.

The above recommendation, separately or collectively, stands to generate the following major benefits:

1) It will increase the effectiveness of U.S. initiatives designed, directly and indirectly, to enhance partner national military force effectiveness in UN peace operations in particular and of UN peace operations in general.

2) It will enhance U.S. effectiveness in security efforts tangential to UN and partner nation mission sets.

3) It will enhance U.S. interoperability and effectiveness in multilateral operational environments.

4) It will maintain or improve influence among those partners as well as in the UN in the fact of competitor efforts (e.g., China and Russia) to gain influence in those same regional, national, or institutional spaces.

5) It will help the U.S. better understand its own challenges in civil-military transition management (i.e., conflict management, war termination, stabilization, and conflict prevention) as well as civil-military interagency coordination at operational levels (using the UN field mission model as a point of reference).

Event Description.

This lesson is based on experience as Chief of Civil-Military Coordination, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 2008-09, and as Senior Course Author, “Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations,” Peace Operations Training Institute.

References.


3. "The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia is Coming to a Successful End," 21 March 2018 podcast interview with Mark Leon Goldberg on UN Dispatch (www.undispatch.com)

Lesson Author: Christopher Holshek, UN Association of the United States, Colonel, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.).
H. Improving the Environmental Impact of UN Peace Operations
(Lesson #2643)

**Observation.**

United Nations peace operations have a substantial, and at times negative, impact on local communities and ecologies, which can exacerbate local conflict. As such, in recent years, the UN has increased efforts to address the environmental impact of UN peace operations. More work is needed to sustain these efforts, as emphasized in the International Peace Institute (IPI)'s recent April 2018 report "Greening Peacekeeping."

**Discussion.**

As more large-scale operations and multidimensional missions have been deployed with increasing numbers of headquarters, bases, and facilities constructed in urban and rural settings around the world, it has become clear that UN peace operations can potentially leave a large environmental footprint in host nations. In 2016, UN peace operations were hosted in over 170 municipalities across the continent of Africa, affecting at least a total population of 31 million people. Data from that same year showed that field missions produce over half of the entire UN system's greenhouse gas emission.

Local communities are often already under stress from limited resources; the presence of large peace operations further stresses local ecosystems. Host nations in these fragile and conflict-torn environments do not always have infrastructure that can support waste management. In these contexts, UN operations may overwhelm weak local capacity already under strain from climate change pressure and population growth. Great disparities between peacekeeper patterns of consumption and waste and those of the local population can exacerbate tensions. In Mali, for example, a peacekeeper produces approximately three times the waste than a local. This is complicated by the fact that natural resources are often a source of conflict in the regions where peacekeepers deploy.

Various UN missions have been criticized for failure to adequately address environmental concerns, which can have severe consequences for the host nation. For example, wastewater mismanagement in Haiti by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) led to a cholera epidemic in 2010, killing 9,000 people and affecting 100,000s more. In Darfur, the demand for wood in the region by the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) led to vast deforestation.

Despite the evident need for improvement in UN environmental practices, there are three main challenges to implementing better environmental policies in UN missions: 1) uneven implementation due to disparities between missions (staff, budgets, leadership, local context); 2) lack of oversight; and, 3) culture and laws about equipment sourcing which are exacerbated by wasteful global commodity flows. Missions typically deploy initially only for short-term 1-year mandates, although the average UN mission stays in a host nation for 6.5 years. The rapid timeline for mission deployments influences procurement procedures that are not always designed to minimize environmental footprint. For example, the MINUSMA operational base in Mali did not source materials locally. Instead, pre-fabricated structures
were flown in from elsewhere in the world. The materials used in these structures (metal, wood) were not well adapted to the hot climate, requiring additional energy consumption for heating/cooling, which augmented carbon consumption and overall environmental impact. If a strategy of regenerative sustainability had been pursued instead, the missions would be able to contribute more to the nearby cities (in this case, Bamako and Gao) instead of draining limited resources.

In recent years, especially as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change have put more global focus on environmental issues, the UN has spearheaded several initiatives to address the environmental impact of its operations. The United Nations did not focus on the environmental impact of its operations until the 2000s. In 2009, an Environmental Policy was developed, requiring each UN peace operation to appoint an environmental officer and establish an environmental policy. The UN mission in Mali in 2013 was the first UN peacekeeping mission given a direct mandate to address the environmental impact of its operations. In 2017, the UN Department of Field Services created an Environment Strategy, focusing on improving sectors of energy, water and wastewater, solid waste, wider impact, and environmental management systems (EMS). By January 2018, there were environmental units in ten UN missions (including MINUSCA, UNSOS, MINUJUSTH, MINUSMA, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNAMID, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and UNIFIL).

In accordance with the DFS Environment Strategy, several missions have had positive environmental successes in recent years, as noted in “Environmental Good Practice” (DFS, November 2017):

- **Energy:** The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) began a program in 2015 to reduce its environmental impact by insulating 80% of its office buildings in Erbil, upgrading 60% of air conditioning units and 70% of lighting to more energy-efficient models. In ten months, as much as $500,000 was saved and as much as 2-3 years for energy demand reduction.

- **Water and wastewater:** In January 2017, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) implemented an injection well connected to a wastewater treatment plant. This style of well reduces risks of disease from standing water. Furthermore, given the scarcity of water in this region, this well helps minimize waste of water because excess water goes to recharging tree plantations instead of evaporating.

- **Solid waste:** UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has supported the local economy through recycling solid waste. Local companies were contracted to recycle the waste, dividing it into different products (cardboard vs. plastic, etc.) that are used to produce toilet paper and PVC pipes which are then sold at the market.

- **Wider impact:** As the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) drew to a close on 30 June 2017, the mission attempted to restore the environment prior to departure. It remediated and treated contaminated soil from mission generators as well as improved a waste disposal site used by the mission and local community in the municipality of Daloa, extending the life of a landfill by over a decade.
• **Environmental Management Systems (EMS):** Based on the UN Department of Field Support (DFS)’s 2009 Environmental Policy and 2017 Environment Strategy, DFS implemented a global environmental management system for all field missions in 2017. As a result, a common template for planning and budgeting for the five environmental sectors was created, and each mission has now included environmental management in their budgets.

**Recommendations.**

While gains have been made in environmental stewardship, it is important that they be sustained by continuing to implement the Environment Strategy, collecting data to support implementation, and addressing the impact on local communities. The following are short-term, medium-term, and long-term goals articulated in the International Peace Institute (IPI)’s report “Greening Peacekeeping: The Environmental Impact of UN Peace Operations,” (April 2018):

**Short-term recommendations:**
- “Increase financial and human resources dedicated to the implementation of the Environment Strategy and to planning.
- Implement mandatory training on environmental management for all personnel in missions.
- Systematically collect data on environmental management from all missions and disseminate lessons learned and best practices.
- Use local capacities where feasible.”

**Medium-term recommendations:**
- “Continue to reinforce oversight by systematically monitoring performance indicators and fostering data ownership and accountability.
- Extend DFS’s partnership with UNEP.
- Advocate for member states to support sustainable environmental management in peace operations.”

**Long-term recommendations:**
- “Develop comprehensive indicators and an integrated approach to environmental concerns.”

**Implications.**

If the UN fails to implement environmental policies, UN missions could have severely detrimental long-term consequences to local communities and ecologies. Further, it could damage the UN’s reputation as an organization which would give it less negotiating leverage to work for peace in the community. Finally, since tensions over natural resources often fuel conflict, the impact of the UN missions on the environment could exacerbate security
concerns and instigate local conflict. The more sustainably a peace operation can deploy, the more this can contribute to conflict prevention instead of exacerbating a situation.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is primarily based on:


Other useful resources include:


**Lesson Author:** Katrina Gehman, Lessons Learned Analyst (Ctr), PKSOI.

3. CONCLUSION

The lessons in this publication offer recommendations from researchers, analysts, and peacekeeping practitioners to address various complexities. Key among them:

For protecting peacekeepers against an array of asymmetric threats:

- **improve and integrate information and intelligence gathering and sharing within missions before deployment and at the tactical level especially during operations**

- **provide equipment and training appropriate to the operational environment; for example, consider IED-resistant vehicles, counter-IED and IED awareness training, and counterinsurgency training**
For figuring out keys to success in peacekeeping and violence reduction:
  o work hard to address the underlying causes of conflict
  o ensure an integrated and comprehensive approach – security, development, humanitarian, etc.
  o include a strong focus on helping the host nation with its security governance, and encourage inculcation of a public service ethic among HN security personnel

For optimizing robustness to impact conflict resolution:
  o design “robustness” towards objectives of supporting state authority, an inclusive peace process, and the safety and security of the people

For ensuring effective strategic communications:
  o incorporate knowledge and understanding of local conflict dynamics into the planning and execution of strategic communications
  o ensure unity of effort in messaging through clearly articulated senior leader’s vision and policy, and mechanisms to ensure contingents’ understanding and compliance

For pursuing inclusive mediation at multiple levels with multiple actors
  o expand mediation across all levels
  o at local level, include representation of local actors having grievances, local officials, women, youth, and others as appropriate

For managing transitions – peacekeeping to peacebuilding – Liberia and beyond
  o involve all stakeholders (HN government, international partners, political parties, civil society organizations, women’s groups, etc.) in a consultative process years in advance to outline a plan going forward to transition activities from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, using the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan as a best practice
  o incorporate civil-military management lessons from recent operations into UN CIMIC policy and mission planning.

For addressing/improving environmental impact during peace operations
  o increase resources dedicated to implementation of the DFS Environment Strategy
  o systematically collect and analyze data on environmental management; develop and disseminate lessons learned and best practices

Not to be seen as a panacea for success, but rather as considerations for the planning process, factors above may help gain greater efficiencies – certainly context- and mission-dependent – for the highly complex business of peacekeeping operations.
Annex A. Additional Peacekeeping Lessons Meriting Attention

- **How Small Efforts by Peacekeepers Can Make a Big Difference for the Local Community**  
  **Author:** CPT Andrew J. Madden (Drew)  
  “Small efforts that peacekeepers may take on a mission with regard to local people may seem small or completely irrelevant, but these personal gestures may improve conditions for local people and positively influence interactions and views between locals and the peacekeepers.” [Read more…](#)

- **Trends in UN Peacekeeping: Increasing Numbers of Peacekeepers from Neighboring Countries**  
  **Author:** Katrina Gehman  
  “Increasingly over the last decade, United Nations peacekeepers have been deployed to host nations that are more proximate geographically. This has several potential political implications for future policy and decision-makers at the UN …” [Read more…](#)

- **Ensure Deployment of Women Police Officers in UN Peace Operations to Combat Gender-Based Violence, Including Female Gender Mutilation**  
  **Author:** Katrina Gehman  
  “Female Genital Mutilation is a human rights violation that continues to affect millions of women and girls around the world, posing severe short and long term consequences to health, life, and emotional wellbeing. During protracted conflict, the risk of gender-based violence, including FGM, increases. As such, UN peacekeepers deployed on missions in post-conflict settings must be aware …” [Read more…](#)

- **UNAMID Initiatives Contribute to Decreasing Child Soldier Recruitment in Darfur**  
  **Author:** Katrina Gehman  
  “As conflict has continued in the Darfur region of Sudan, many children have been recruited to be used as child soldiers. A March 2017 report from the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan … demonstrates how initiatives from the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) have decreased child soldier recruitment in Darfur.” [Read more…](#)

- **Leadership Challenges with Multi-Continental Troops – UNIFIL Case**  
  **Author:** David Mosinski  
  “Leadership on UN peacekeeping missions – with troops from many different nations and cultures – presents an array of challenges for commanders, as experienced by an officer assigned to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). His advice for becoming an inter-culturally effective leader: integrate differences, bridge differences, and tolerate differences.” [Read more…](#)
• **Enabling Transition in Liberia through Civil-Military Coordination**
  
  Author: David Mosinski

  “With an eye toward transition, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) shifted the role of the UN peacekeeping force from "leading" the delivery of services (security, reconstruction, social services, etc.) to "enabling" the Government of Liberia to take lead. The primary measures used by the UNMIL Force in this "enabling" approach were: encouraging all external players to help the host nation (HN) take lead, inserting civilian agencies and HN officials into the approval process and into the full life cycle for all projects and services, and conducting comprehensive information operations to improve the public’s perception of the HN government.” [Read more…](#)

• **“Blue” and “Green” Forces Operating in Tandem**
  
  Author: David Mosinski

  “Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a ‘Blue’ Force (UN peacekeeping force) and a ‘Green’ Force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are operating in tandem. Various operations have shown that if/when these two forces are not aligned under one command, their operations must be planned, coordinated, and synchronized through other means.” [Read more…](#)
Annex B. Additional Peacekeeping References (listed newest to oldest)

- “Engagement with Civil Society (Guidelines),” UN DPKO-DFS, 1 May 2017.
- “The UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo,” by Conor Foley, Guest Professor at the International Relations Institute, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio De Janeiro (PUC-Rio), 16 February 2016.

U.S. Doctrine / Reference Guide Update:


2018
- Complexities and Efficiencies in Peacekeeping Operations
- Inclusive Peacebuilding: Working with Communities
- Monitoring & Evaluation for Peace and Stability

2017
- Lessons on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
- Operationalizing Women, Peace, and Security
- Leadership in Crisis and Complex Operations
- Civil Affairs in Stability Operations

2016
- Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Strategic Communication/Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations
- Job Creation Programs – Insights from Africa and Conflict-affected States
- Stabilization and Transition
- Lessons from the MSF Hospital (Trauma Center) Strike in Kunduz
- Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations
- Building Stable Governance
- Lessons Learned – Peacekeeping Operations in Africa
- Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

2015
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief]
- Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Security Sector Reform

2014
- MONUSCO Lesson Report
- Reconstruction and Development
- Veterinary Support, Animal Health, and Animal Agriculture in Stability Operations
- Women, Peace and Security
- Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
- Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”
- Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces