IMPP Guidelines

Role of the Field

Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

Approved by: The Secretary-General
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Contact: DPKO Office of Operations
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A. PURPOSE

1. These guidelines outline the minimum standards for integrated strategy, planning, and coordination to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s peace consolidation efforts at the country level. They further explain and operationalize the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006 and integrate additional principles as prescribed in the Secretary-
General’s Decision on Integration (24/2008). These guidelines should also be read in conjunction with the Secretary-General’s Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005) and the Secretary-General’s Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions. Finally, these guidelines are part of the IMPP guidance package, which also includes (1) UN Strategic Assessment and (2) the Role of the Headquarters in Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences.2

B. SCOPE

2. These guidelines apply to UN field presences with both a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT)3. This includes, but is not limited to, Missions that are “structurally integrated” through the appointment of a DSRSG/RC/HC and the UN country presences subject to the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration (24/2008) of 26 June 2008.4 Integration refers both to internal integration of components within the field mission (e.g. civilian and military) as well as the strategic partnership between the UN field mission and the UNCT.

C. RATIONALE

3. The aim of the guidelines is to assist multi-dimensional UN field presences in the establishment of integrated field coordination structures and an integrated strategic framework (ISF) reflecting common priorities for peace consolidation. Such guidelines are required given the increasingly complex and interdependent nature of work of the United Nations system in conflict and post-conflict environments. In this context, the guidelines promote a strategic partnership between Missions and UNCTs in support of common peace consolidation objectives.

4. The guidelines are not overly prescriptive but rather spell-out the minimum requirements and provide further operational advice on the implementation of the IMPP at the field level. It is recognized that each country situation requires a unique and tailored response and, therefore, it is expected that the UN’s Senior Leadership in country will guide field teams in the application of the IMPP tools described herein. As the implementation of the IMPP guidelines is also required in some UN presences that are not structurally integrated with a DSRSG/RC/HC, it is important to underline that undertaking the IMPP will not alter existing structural relationships between Missions and UNCTs. While these guidelines remain relevant throughout the life-cycle of a UN presence, the processes described herein are particularly important for UN field presences undertaking a transition in institutional arrangements (e.g. start-up or drawdown of a peacekeeping operation or special political mission).

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2 These guidelines are available on the UN Peace Operations intranet (http://intranet.dpko.un.org ) and to the entire UN system and its partners through the IMPP Community of Practice. To join the IMPP community of practice, please visit http://cop.dfs.un.org or contact Maria Regina Semana (semana@un.org).

3 In these Guidelines, the UN field mission (either a peacekeeping mission or a Special Political Mission) and the UN Country Team are jointly referred to as the “UN field presence.”

4 Burundi (BINUB), CAR (BONUCA/MINURCAT), Chad (MINURCAT), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUC), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Somalia (UNPOS), Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID), Iraq (UNAMI), Israel/OpT (UNSCO), Lebanon (UNSCOL), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Nepal (UNMIN), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Kosovo (UNMIK), Haiti (MINUSTAH)
D. GUIDELINES

5. These guidelines provide advice, examples, and templates useful in the implementation of IMPP at the field level. They are organized into two sections as follows:
   o integrated field coordination
   o integrated strategic frameworks (ISF)

Integrating Field Coordination

6. Each UN field presence should have a standing coordination body or bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction and planning oversight to the joint peace consolidation efforts of the UN field presence. These coordination bodies assist with the requirement in the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration (24/2008) for the development and implementation of an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission and UNCT to “ensure that all components of the UN mission/office and the Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.”5 The field-based integrated field coordination structures also serve as partners to headquarters-based IMPP structures, in particular the Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs) (see also paragraph 23, below).6

7. The configuration and composition of integrated field coordination mechanisms will vary from country to country based on the scale of the UN’s operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required in keeping with the principle of “form follows function.”7 The integrated field coordination architecture should be as light as possible while fulfilling the following core functions at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels.

8. Strategic Direction
   • Develop the joint vision and peace consolidation priorities of the UN system based on a common conflict analysis and the comparative advantage of the UN system
   • Delineate roles and responsibilities among the UN actors ensuring complementarities between Mission and UNCT and minimizing overlap
   • Review progress on an integrated strategic framework (see paragraphs 24-54) and provide direction to UN components/agencies on implementation challenges
   • Facilitate interaction with non-UN actors where there is interdependence related to common peace consolidation priorities

9. Coordination
   • Coordinate the development and implementation of joint strategic planning processes including ISFs
   • Guide and review the work of thematic working groups

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5 These guidelines update the 2006 IMPP Guidelines, which called for an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) at the working level comprised of “peacekeeping operation and UNCT planners and other relevant actors.” While the 2006 Guidelines delegated integrated planning responsibilities to the working level, these guidelines stress the direct role of senior managers, notably SRSG/ERSGs, DSRSGs (including DSRSG/RC/HCs), and RC/HCs. Thus, the terminology “Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT)” has been retired in favor of more generic terms (e.g. Strategic Policy Group and/or Integrated Strategy and Planning Team). Tailored terminology and approaches, which may be particularly useful for non-structurally integrated mission environments, are also encouraged.

6 See IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters for more details on the role and functions of the IMTF/ITFs.

Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF) and other HQ-based bodies as required, to take stock of major changes and/or new requirements (e.g. transition and drawdown)

Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by promoting the development of UN system-wide thematic strategies (e.g. protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform)

10. Planning

- Provide secretariat services to integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, or similar, see below), including preparation of agendas, background papers, and actual drafting of integrated strategies, plans, and monitoring frameworks
- Compile inputs and draft shared strategies and plans and related monitoring reports
- Provide coordination support to thematic working groups and facilitate linkages between UN-internal mechanisms and coordination frameworks that involve national stakeholders, civil society and/or donors
- Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for headquarters and facilitate linkages between field-based integrated coordination structures and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF

Leveraging Existing Coordination Structures

11. Before new structures are constituted, a mapping of existing structures should be undertaken to identify structures that could be leveraged or adjusted, either permanently or periodically, to fulfill the functions outlined above. For instance, a Strategic Policy Group (see figures 1 and 2) could be formed by expanding the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) periodically and according to an agreed schedule to include the RC/HC (for non-structurally integrated missions) and members of the UNCT. Likewise, meetings of the UNCT could be periodically expanded to include Mission representatives to create an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT), and humanitarian clusters could be expanded to comprise integrated thematic working groups.

Models

12. These guidelines provide two possible models building on current field practice (see Annex 1: Examples of Integrated Field Coordination in Liberia and DRC). These configurations and titles are not required, but rather, provide an example methodology for fulfilling the minimum requirements described herein. The first, as depicted in Figure 1 below, could be applied for smaller UN field presences with integrated peace building offices. It has a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group which is supported by the shared analytical and planning capacity and thematic working groups.

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8 According to the Peacekeeping Mission Start Up Guide, the Mission Leadership Team generally includes: SRSG/HOM, DSRSGs, Head of the Police Component, Head of the Military Component, Director/Chief of Mission Support, and the Chief of Staff. The MLT’s key tasks include: providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to mission components and approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect.

9 Leveraging humanitarian clusters should be handled on a case-by-case basis. Any decision to leverage humanitarian clusters into an integrated field coordination structure should be taken after consultations with the humanitarian partners through the Humanitarian Coordinator.
13. The second, below, may be appropriate for UN field presences with large multidimensional peacekeeping operations (including military and police components). It has three layers: a Strategic Policy Group at the Principals level, an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT)\textsuperscript{10} at the senior officer level, and thematic working groups. The Strategic Policy Group provides the strategic direction; the ISPT translates that strategic direction into concrete deliverables and coordinates implementation. Thematic working groups (standing or ad hoc) are also recommended and should be formed based on the key peace consolidation objectives of the UN presence. (In many cases, these thematic working groups may already exist). Template Terms of References for both a Strategic Policy Group and an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team are provided in Annexes 2 and 3, respectively.

**Figure 1: Example Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT**

![Diagram of Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT]

**Figure 2: Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT**

![Diagram of Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT]

**Leadership and Composition**

14. SPGs and ISPTs should include representative members of the UN field presence including peacekeeping/political, rule of law/justice, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should typically be represented, where present. UN DSS may also be included, particularly in volatile environments. SPGs should be chaired by SRSGs or ERSGs, taking into consideration the importance of strong partnership with the DSRSG(s), in particular the DSRSG/RC/HC and/or RC/HC for non-

\textsuperscript{10} It may be advisable to use the term “Joint Strategy Team” for UN presences that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.
structurally integrated missions. The Mission Chief of Staff and the Head of the RC/HC’s Office are recommended co-chairs for ISPTs in large UN presences (e.g. those with peacekeeping operations). Senior planners from the Mission and UNCT may chair ISPTs in smaller UN presences.

15. Missions and UNCTs vary, so the composition of integrated field coordination structures will be context-specific. Composition should ensure adequate coverage of the priorities identified in an integrated strategic framework and should also take into consideration the capacity of mission components and agencies to participate. There are pros and cons to constituting larger or smaller groups. For example, a broader representation of Mission and UNCT actors has the advantage of promoting wide ownership, transparency, and inclusion. Such broad representation in ISPTs (e.g. with all mission components and all UNCT members) may be appropriate, while SPGs may need to be smaller to allow for confidential deliberations.

16. The RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representation in integrated field coordination bodies and is responsible for keeping the entire UNCT informed of developments. In addition, the SRSG/ERSG and RC/HC should also consult the World Bank Country Director regarding the inclusion of World Bank representatives.

Thematic Working Groups

17. SPGs and ISPTs may also develop and/or monitor implementation of their joint strategies through thematic working groups (see Figures 1 and 2, above). In establishing thematic groups, care should be taken to leverage existing groups (e.g. humanitarian clusters), as appropriate. UN field presences are encouraged to involve non-UN actors (e.g. humanitarian NGOs) in thematic working groups on a case by case basis. For instance, an existing intra-Mission working group on Rule of Law could be expanded to include UNCT and Humanitarian Country Team representatives. Likewise, partners could decide that UNDAF outcome group or humanitarian cluster be expanded with Mission representatives.

18. The SPG and/or ISPT should provide strategic direction to these groups and regularly review progress against their commitments, as reflected in the integrated strategic framework, to promote mutual accountability. Moreover, each thematic working group is responsible for consulting relevant government officials as per their usual planning or programme development process. Functional (resource mobilization, management, communications, monitoring and evaluation, programming, contingency planning) or cross-cutting (gender, human rights, HIV/AIDS, natural resources) thematic groups may also be convened on an ad hoc or standing basis. An example Terms of Reference (ToR) for an integrated outcome group in Liberia is attached in Annex 4.

Planning Capacities

19. Integrated field coordination structures require the direct support of a “shared analytical and planning capacity.” This takes the form of dedicated strategic planning resources in both Missions and UNCTs. Strategic planners are provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), which maintains a roster and funds strategic planners in the Offices of Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) in conflict-affected countries. On the Mission side, planning capacity is funded through the Mission’s Results Based Budget. Analytical capacity within Missions is typically provided through Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) as well as political and civil affairs offices.
20. The actual structure of a planning capacity may vary according to the field requirements, but there should, at a minimum, be at least one permanent planner representing the peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and one for the UNCT. Multidimensional peacekeeping environments usually have an expanded team of three-five planners on the Mission budget with at least one planner on the UNCT side. Figure 3, below provides example staffing allocations for Mission and UNCT planning capacities in Sierra Leone, Sudan (UNMIS), DRC, and Somalia.

Figure 3: Examples of Planning Staff in Sierra Leone, Sudan (UNMIS), DRC, Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint UNIPSIL/UNCT Strategic Planning Unit</td>
<td>1 P5, 1 P4, 2 UNVs (UNMIS)</td>
<td>1 P5, 2 P3s</td>
<td>1 P4, 1 P3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>1 P4 (Strategic Planning), 1 P4 (Peacebuilding Coord), 1 P3 (Coordination), 3 NPO</td>
<td>1 P5, 1 P4</td>
<td>1 P4 (Integrated Office DSRSG/RC/HC)</td>
<td>1 P5, 1 P4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. The “shared analytical and planning capacity” should be comprised of strategic planners drawn from the planning teams of the Mission and UNCT, respectively. Missions and UNCTs with more than one planner should identify focal points for integration-related strategy and planning to be part of the shared analytical and planning capacity. Although some UN field presences may decide to create a structurally-integrated planning unit, this is not a requirement. This has been done, for example, in Sierra Leone between the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL) and the Sierra Leone UNCT.

22. The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team, and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a Terms of Reference. Although each ToR will be adjusted to specific country realities, a template is attached in Annex 5 as a useful reference point. All members of the shared analytical and planning capacity should have some or all of these tasks reflected in their annual performance appraisals. Finally, it is also advisable to have planners located in the same building to ease communication and help build personal relationships.

Link between Field Coordination Structures and the Headquarters IMTF/ITF

23. In keeping with the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration and further guidance from the Integration Steering Group (ISG), headquarters-based Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs) are required for all UN presences with a Mission and a UNCT. Their

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11 Smaller integrated peacebuilding offices may have one planner in the integrated office of the ERSG/RC/HC covering both the Mission and UNCT.
12 In most peacekeeping Missions, the analytical and planning capacities are designed as separate work units. However, as strategic planning processes require both analytical and planning capacities, the contribution from the Mission to the “shared analytical and planning capacity” will typically extend beyond the planning unit and reflect contributions from a diversity of mission components (e.g. JMAC, political affairs, civil affairs). Key inputs from these other mission components (e.g. conflict analysis for an ISF) should be reflected in the ToR of the joint analytical and planning capacity.
13 The Integration Steering Group is a Principals-level body charged with ensuring implementation and progress on integration-related issues. It is chaired by DPKO and consists of DPA, DFS, OCHA, OHCHR, DOCO, PBSO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, and EOSG.
purpose is to ensure coherent and consistent policy support and guidance. These task forces should be co-chaired by the field or benefit from alternate chairing arrangements between the field and headquarters. Thus, UN field presences should designate standing representatives from their integrated field coordination structures (e.g. ISPT chair(s) and/or selected ISPT members, mission and UNCT planners) to participate in Task Force meetings by telephone or VTC. Field participation in IMTF/ITFs may also be tailored based on the specific agenda of the meeting. The field participants in the IMTF/ITF should be actively engaged in the development of IMTF/ITF agendas and ensure adequate follow-up to action points. Field-based strategic planners should also ensure an exchange of action points or meeting notes between the ISPT and/or SPG and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF.

Integrated Strategic Framework

Policy Framework and Background
24. The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration of June 2008 requires UN field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have an integrated strategic framework (ISF) that reflects:

- “a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives” and,
- “a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace”

25. The purpose of an ISF is to:

- Bring together the Mission and the UNCT’s combined mandates and resources around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities
- Prioritize and sequence agreed elements
- Facilitate an appropriate shift in priorities and/or resources
- Allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers

26. The ISF is meant to be a short document (e.g. 10-15 pages) at the strategic level. Unlike planning tools of the Mission (e.g. Results Based Budget, RBB) or the UNCT (CHAP/CAP, UNDAF, Transition Plan), an ISF does not reach the level of programmatic interventions or outputs. In addition, the ISF is, first and foremost, an internal UN document. If UN field presences would like to produce a version of the ISF as a public information tool or for consultation purposes, it should be adapted from the original internal document. In this

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14 Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration, para iii. See also IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters.
context, it might be necessary to exclude sensitive annexes and/or conflict analysis in the public versions.

27. These guidelines present suggested methodologies for diagnostics/preparation, content development, and consultation/approval of an ISF. The ISF is meant to be a light and flexible exercise, so these guidelines may be broadly applied depending on the capacities and circumstances in country. They may also be applied for the development of an “early ISF” at mission start-up (see text box below, right). It should be noted that with the coming into effect of the ISF requirement, DPKO and DFS decided to eliminate the requirement to elaborate a “Mandate Implementation Plan” (MIP) in order to streamline the planning requirements and reduce duplication.

**Preparation/Diagnostics**

28. The Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration (24/2008) established the requirement for an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), but gives scope and flexibility for different types of vehicles or tools to fulfill this requirement.

29. The decision to begin an ISF exercise should be taken at the field level in consultation with the IMTF/ITF based on developments in country (e.g. mission start-up, peace agreement, elections/new government). It is also strongly recommended that an ISF exercise be undertaken with a view to harmonizing and adding coherence to UN system planning cycles. For this reason, an ISF should come **before** the annual development of a Mission’s RBB, an CCA/UNDAF review, or a CHAP/CAP review. **15** (See also Annex 6: ISF Diagnostic Phase: Key Questions in Preparing to Develop an ISF).

30. A UN field presence (Mission and UNCT), in close consultation with the IMTF/ITF, may propose that an existing strategy/framework corresponds to an ISF. If this is the case, the framework should be reviewed against these guidelines, and a short evaluation should be sent to the headquarters-based IMTF/ITF for discussion. (See also Annex 7: Evaluating Existing Frameworks Against ISF Minimum Standards).

31. Where no existing strategy or framework corresponds to an ISF, this diagnostics phase lays the analytical basis for the ISF development process and maps country strategies among the UN actors in country. If capacity gaps for the preparation, kick-off, or development of an ISF are identified, the UN field presence may request an ISF support

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**“Early ISF” at mission start up**

These guidelines may also be used to support the development of an “early ISF” or “early strategy and action plan” at Mission start up as called for in the recent **Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict**. An “early ISF” may require an abbreviated development process and would address a smaller number of immediate priorities, with clear roles and responsibilities. Thus, achieving an early ISF will require even more involvement of the senior leadership team, more direct support from headquarters (including surge capacity), and be shorter in its duration (e.g. 6-9 months). The aim of an early ISF is to speed delivery of an early peace dividend. The content of an early ISF may also prove useful for the development of resource mobilization plans for the programmatic elements of a peace consolidation plan that are not funded by the assessed budget of a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and may be presented to the various multilateral sources of pre-positioned pooled funds (e.g. UN Peacebuilding Fund, World Bank Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund, EU Stabilisation Fund, UNDP/BCPR Trust Fund).

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**15** According to the 21 October 2009 decision of the Integration Steering Group, all 18 countries required by the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration to produce an ISF should have ained approval for an existing framework against the minimum standards described herein or undertaken an ISF exercise by the end of 2010. All ISFs should be in place by mid-2011.
mission be mobilized through the IMTF/ITF. An example Terms of Reference for the ISF support mission to Cote d’Ivoire is included in Annex 8 as an example of the types of assistance and deliverables that an ISF support mission may provide.

Linkages between the ISF and other Planning Tools
33. The purpose of an ISF process is to achieve an overarching strategy for the UN’s role in peace consolidation in a given country. Therefore, the focus should not be on ascertaining whether the ISF can or should replace other planning processes\(^\text{16}\), but rather the need for a case by case analysis and design for each country as described in the “preparation/diagnosis” section above. Whereas existing UN planning processes (e.g. UNDAF for development, CHAP/CAP for humanitarian action, RBB for the Mission) are specific to development, humanitarian, or peace and security, the ISF is unique in that its primary purpose is to reflect the collaborative objectives of the UN system for peace consolidation at the strategic level. In order to foster synergies and avoid duplications, whenever possible, a coherent process should be used for the different UN planning tools and instruments.

34. If the ISF follows other planning processes and instruments it should draw upon existing analysis, while allowing senior managers to step back and have a strategic discussion about current peace consolidation priorities. The ISF process is likely to reveal gaps and suggestions regarding how current plans could be revised in order to contribute more effectively to peace consolidation. Different processes will have different scopes and different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so long as there is an overall coherence among them.

35. When examining the linkages between the ISF and existing UN system planning tools, some UN field presences may consider whether an existing in-country tool, such as an UNDAF or an integrated peacebuilding strategy, could be adapted to fulfill the minimum standards for ISFs described herein (see also preparation/diagnostics section above). However, in certain situations adapting a current tool may not be sufficient. For instance, complex UN architectures with multiple mandated presences would benefit from developing an ISF (as described in these guidelines) that effectively brings together the UN presence around a set of agreed priorities. Likewise, multi-dimensional operations (e.g. that include police and/or military components) would require an ISF so as to adequately reflect the scale of mission resources and/or allow for a short-term planning horizon suited to these typically volatile environments.

36. An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. It therefore, should not reach the level of programmatic interventions. That said, an ISF will need to be translated into concrete resources and actions, by updating (or developing from scratch where they do not exist) the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF, and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF’s objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within existing UN system planning tools (e.g. UNDAF, CHAP/CAP, RBB).

\(^{16}\) With the coming into effect of the ISF requirement, DPKO and DFS decided to eliminate the requirement to elaborate a “Mandate Implementation Plan” (MIP) in order to streamline the planning requirements and reduce duplication. Missions are required, however to produce a Mission Concept that provides political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles to Mission components for priority activities to achieve the mission’s mandate. (See also IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters and DPKO-DFS guidance on the development of Mission Concepts).
37. **Conflict Analysis:** According to the overall IMPP methodology, an ISF would ideally be elaborated after a Strategic Assessment has taken place, in particular the conflict analysis and strategic options for the UN. However, if no Strategic Assessment has taken place, conflict analysis will need to be consolidated from existing strategies or reports (e.g. Common Country Assessment, humanitarian CAP/CHAP, Reports of the Secretary-General, work products of the Mission’s JMAC, political affairs division, civil affairs, human rights, child protection, and gender units). Work that identifies immediate conflict drivers is particularly pertinent, as an ISF addresses short to medium-term priorities.

38. In some circumstances, conflict analysis will need to be developed. In such cases, the recommended methodology is contained in Annex 9, which provides the authoritative guidance as per the guidelines for Strategic Assessment. These guidelines, which are part of the IMPP guidance package, describe how to conduct and apply conflict analysis and comparative advantage methodology (problem tree and SWOT analysis, respectively) to identify strategic options for UN engagement (see figure 4, below).

**Figure 4: Methodology for Conflict Analysis and Development of Strategic Options**

39. **Mapping of Strategies:** Mapping of existing planning frameworks and strategies is a useful element of the preparatory phase and aims to: (1) assist stakeholders to determine the level of strategic discussion required to foster enhanced collaboration and prioritization; and (2) provide a useful first step towards achieving a coherent overview of the planning architecture in country. A mapping of existing planning frameworks serves the following purposes:

- **Identifies the different analytical and strategic frameworks that are in place** at both national level and within the international community including the UN family;
- **Provides an overview** on how the various frameworks complement and build upon each other (or not);
- **Assists in identifying any inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps** amongst the existing planning processes and the results articulated therein;
- **Allows planners to use the planning process as an opportunity to build or enhance complementarity between different processes** and address gaps that might exist.

A short guidance note on how to carry out a streamlined mapping of country level frameworks is provided in Annex 10.

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17 UN Strategic Assessment Guidelines, Approved by the Secretary-General in May 2009
18 The mapping should build on any tools or mapping exercises already undertaken in country. For example, in some countries UNDP assists the government in operating a Development Assistance Database (DAD) that captures information of a wide range of government, UN, national and international actors’ activities in country that can be disaggregated by various parameters.
Developing the ISF Content

40. **Roadmap**: Field teams should develop a road map for the development of the ISF that delineates key steps/outputs, sets deadlines, identifies roles and responsibilities, and reflects how all stakeholders will be included in the ISF development process, including the non-UN members of the Humanitarian Country Team.

41. **Retreat of senior managers**: A retreat of the Strategic Policy Group (or similar) may be held to (a) identify three-four strategic priorities for peace consolidation that are achievable in the envisaged time frame (e.g. 1-2 years) and (b) establish clear leads and/or co-leads for each of the strategic priorities. (A note on preparing an ISF retreat is contained in Annex 11).

42. **Design and Scope of an ISF**: Figure 5 demonstrates that cross-cutting issues carried out by the peace and security, humanitarian, and development actors are at the heart of the ISF. At the same time, as indicated by the dotted-line, some elements of an ISF may primarily be carried out by one of these mandated bodies.

**Figure 5: Example ISF Scope (1)**

43. The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. Figure 5, for example, represents the possible scope of an ISF in a peace consolidation or peacebuilding context. In that regard, a review of current ISFs reveals the following thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state authority, protection of civilians, return and reintegration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.

44. The scope of an ISF may vary greatly in highly volatile environments (e.g. Sudan, Afghanistan, eastern DRC). For example, Figure 6 demonstrates how the scope of an ISF may shift and narrow considerably in such cases. Such a shift is appropriate as the UN would be obliged to prioritize the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian

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19 Reflects the thematic priorities in ISFs under development in Chad, DRC, and Cote d’Ivoire.
assistance in these environments. In countries with pockets of conflict, it may also be necessary to tailor the scope of an ISF to account for regional differences.

Figure 6: Example ISF Scope (2)

45. In this regard, principled humanitarian action remains an important element of the UN system’s response. However, even though humanitarian response often supports peace consolidation, its primary aim is to respond to needs. Accordingly, many humanitarian activities (as reflected in a CHAP) are likely to remain outside the scope of an ISF. Key exceptions may be activities related to protection of civilians, return and reintegration, and early recovery.

46. It is also important to recall that certain subjects, including human rights, must be mainstreamed into the work of all UN bodies. For example, according to the decision of the Secretary-General No. 2005/24 on Human Rights in Integrated Missions, ‘all UN entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected through and within their operations in the field’. In addition, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 requests “all entities of the United Nations system should institute mechanisms for gender mainstreaming in their planning and programming for example, through participation of gender specialists in these processes.” Within the IMPP process at the field level, the form and structure of integration – and how this is captured in the ISF – should enable the human rights and gender components to further mainstream human rights and gender across UN peace consolidation priorities.

47. **Dialogue with Headquarters:** Field teams should maintain a dialogue with headquarters through the IMTF/ITF throughout the ISF development process to ensure consensus around the key peace consolidation priorities (strategic objectives) before elaborating the full strategy. For example, a schedule of VTCs between the IMTF/ITF and its field counterpart could be elaborated as part of the ISF development road map.

48. **Methodology and Key elements of an ISF.** The presentation of an ISF should typically follow the results framework methodology (see Figure 7 below). Recalling that an ISF is at the strategic level and does not reach the programmatic level, an ISF result is equivalent to “expected accomplishment” (RBB) or “UNDAF outcome”. An example end state, strategic objective (with narrative) and result are provided in Annex 12 as adapted from existing strategies in Somalia and eastern DRC.
49. **Thematic working groups and the elaboration of results:** Once basic decisions are taken about the three-four strategic peace consolidation priorities (the strategic objectives) that will be addressed by the ISF, it is useful to further develop the ISF content through thematic working groups. In most cases, this will involve senior working level staff from Mission components and the members of the UNCT. In this context, it is important to involve those with a direct understanding of programming and budgetary allocations (e.g. cluster leads, outcome group leads, Mission heads of components) to ensure that commitments in the ISF can be adequately resourced (through RBB, CPAPs, etc). These thematic working groups should report to the ISPT or SPG and benefit from the coordination and facilitation support of the strategic planners of the Mission and RC Office. Thematic working groups should be engaged in the development of ISF content including the political and operational strategy, risk analysis, sequencing of priority results, linkages to other elements of the ISF, and the partnerships strategy (with World Bank, bilaterals, etc).

**Consulting non-UN actors:**
Unlike an UNDAF or PRS, an ISF does not require the direct endorsement of national authorities. That said, each contributor to an ISF is responsible for consulting the appropriate national authorities, non-UN actors (e.g. NGOs, bilateral donors, other multilateral actors) throughout the ISF development process and should be able to articulate how the ISF’s priorities contribute to national peace consolidation strategies (e.g. PRSPs, Transitional Results Frameworks, National Recovery Strategies, etc).

The nature of consultations with national actors will vary depending on the context. For instance, consultations on an ISF being developed in a peacebuilding context may be extensive and an ISF may be explicitly linked to existing national peacebuilding and development strategies. However, consultations with national authorities for ISFs in conflict situations will require more care, and may involve non-state actors and civil society.

50. To aid field teams in the preparation of an ISF, a generic ISF outline is provided below and reflects the **minimum standards for the ISF content**.
Consultation and Finalization: The SPG (or similar) should receive regular updates on the development of the ISF and review drafts as they are finished. The SPG’s validation of the ISF means that the Mission and UNCT agree to pursue the results, timelines, and responsibilities as described and will be mutually accountable for achieving the results. This concept of mutual accountability takes into consideration that the contributors are also pursuing other mandated priorities outside the scope of the ISF. Following the endorsement of the SPG, the SRSG/ERSG and UNCT (represented by the RC/HC) should present the document for discussion at a Director-level meeting of the Headquarters-based IMTF/ITF. At this stage, IMTF/ITFs may call upon the expertise of the IMPP Working Group to assist with quality assurance in the ISF process and product. Following these discussions, the SRSG/ERSG, RC/HC, and IMTF/ITF should formally endorse an ISF. The USG of the lead Department should also sign-off on the ISF as a demonstration of support.

Monitoring and Evaluation
52. Each ISF must contain a monitoring and evaluation when it is presented for endorsement. This monitoring framework should leverage existing data collection and
monitoring capacity and experience within the Mission and UNCT (e.g. UNCT monitoring and evaluation working group, Mission JMAC, RBB performance monitoring reports).

53. Unlike purely quantitative monitoring tools, the ISF’s tracking tool should provide scope for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The target audience of the monitoring tool is the senior leadership team and the Strategic Policy Group (or similar), who should review the monitoring reports regularly, identify strategies to further progress, define strategies to mitigate risks, allocate responsibilities for remediating lags in implementation, and adjust strategies as required in light of the evolving situation on the ground. As the monitoring tool is designed to be discussed by groups such as the SPG, it is an important tool for promoting teamwork and ensuring mutual accountability for results under the ISF.

54. As the ISF is a new requirement, there are currently no best practices for monitoring and tracking progress. However, the scorecard from the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UN SSSS) for eastern DRC offers a good methodology for reference and is unique in that it includes proposed management interventions for results deemed “yellow” or “red” (see UN SSSS Scorecard, Annex 13). In addition, it is advisable to engage the thematic working groups in the monitoring process to maximize thematic expertise and minimize overlap in reporting. Additional ISF monitoring frameworks will be posted on the IMPP community of practice as they become available and future updates of these guidelines will include additional examples.

E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans

Integrated Mission: generally refers to structurally integrated field missions, e.g. UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/Head of Mission. However, structural integration is no longer the key trigger for applying an “integrated approach” as required by the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration (24/2008) and as indicated in these guidelines. Rather, the collaborative principles of integration are to be applied in UN field presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office working alongside a UN Country Team.


F. REFERENCES

Normative or superior references

20 To join the IMPP community of practice, please visit http://cop.dfs.un.org or contact Maria Regina Semana (semana@un.org).
Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General, June 2006

Note of Guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators, and Humanitarian Coordinators (30 October 2000)

The Secretary-General’s Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions (9 February 2006)

Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005)

Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision on Integration (24 June 2008, 24/2008)

**Related Policies**


United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the “Capstone Doctrine”)

The Report of the Secretary-General on the concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation

Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment

Guidelines: IMPP Role of the Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

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**G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE**

The IMPP Working Group will track compliance with these guidelines and provide regular status reviews to the Integration Steering Group. This will include quality assurance on the development and implementation of integrated field coordination structures and integrated strategic frameworks. The Integration Steering Group (ISG) will also monitor compliance with these Guidelines and report to the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee.

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**H. CONTACT**

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**I. HISTORY**

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22 See A/56/870 particularly para. 35
These guidelines were undertaken by an inter-departmental and inter-agency IMPP Working Group convened by DPKO including DPA, DFS, OCHA, DOCO, PBSO, OHCHR, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR. They were approved by the Integration Steering Group (ISG), a Principals-level body at headquarters with the same institutional representation as the IMPP Working Group, in December 2009 and subsequently endorsed by the Secretary-General.