Peace & Stability
Operations
Training and Education
Workshop
2018
Upcoming Strategic Stability Event!

PROJECTING STABILITY
SECURING NATO’S FLANKS BY HELPING ITS NEIGHBORS ACHIEVE STABILITY

Rapid Trident
2017

17 September 2018
Arlington, Virginia

Association of the United States Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
April 18th through the 20th the Peacekeeping and Stabil-ity Operations Institute (PKSOI) hosted its 12th annual Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This year’s workshop provided a forum for trainers, educators, planners and practitioners from U.S. and international governmental and non-governmental organizations, military organizations, military and civilian peace and stability training centers, and academic institutions to share current challenges and best practices toward improving civilian and military teaming efforts in the realm of peace and stability operations training and education.

The theme of this year’s workshop was “The Struggle for Legitimate Governance.” The goal of the workshop was to facilitate dialogue on collaboration opportunities and expand networking opportunities across shared communities of interest. 114 representatives from over 50 organizations across the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (PSO) training and education Community of Practice attended the workshop. This year’s event featured 5 separate workgroups that included Protection of Civilians, Operationalizing the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, Humanitarian Assistance in a Complex Environment, Civil Affairs’ Role in Stability, and Operationalizing Governance.

PKSOI Director COL Michael Rauhut provided the opening remarks for the workshop, which included an update from the 2017 PSOTEW. The remainder of the morning was dedicated to two plenary addresses and ended with a keynote address. During the first plenary address, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance, Mr. Mark Swayne gave an update on the state of the current Stability Policy for the Department of Defense. Mr. Swayne’s address gave the audience a current look at ongoing government policies and views on PSO with emphasis on the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.5 on Stabilization, and the recently released USG Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR). Mr. Swayne’s address was followed by an update on an ongoing initiative by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD P&R), which was represented by Mr. Andy Kostrub. Mr. Kostrub provided the group with an informative brief on their draft DODI, Training for Integrated Operations, which is seeking to streamline policies making it easier for the DoD to train with its external partners (Interagency, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), International Organizations). PSOTEW participants were able to influence this draft document during the question and answer session.

The morning session was capped off with a keynote address by Dr. Sarah Sewall. Dr. Sewall’s comments come from her vast experience as a distinguished scholar of PSO, but also from her time in holding senior positions in both the Departments’ of State and Defense shaping PSO policy. Her comments were the perfect stage setter for the participants to break into their separate work groups and address their specific problem sets.
The PKSOI led “Protection of Civilians” (PoC) working group worked on developing a plan for producing a multidimensional PoC Reference Guide. An inherent secondary objective included obtaining working group familiarity with existing UN, NATO, and US military approaches to PoC. Head Quarters Department of Army and the Joint Staff J7 joined with PKSOI to lead the second working group on “Operationalizing the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda.” The working group utilized the Army WPS Lead Gender Dynamics Handbook 1.0 to inform version 2.0, stressing the importance of gender analysis. The PKSOI led “Humanitarian Assistance in a Complex Environment and Civ-Mil Information Sharing” working group sought to begin the development of a set of readiness indicators in order to assist the Global Combatant Commands (GCCs) to be ready for execution of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) in their areas of responsibilities. The working group for “Civil Affairs’ Role in Stability” determined appropriate responsibilities and CA tasks in support of U.S. Army stability tasks in order to support CA capability enhancement efforts across the DOTMLPF-P domains. The United States Institute of Peace led a group on “Operationalizing Governance” and tried to determine how best to support and build capacity of civ-mil practitioners, including civil affairs and other key actors, in strengthening their capacity to engage effectively in these areas.

After a day and a half of dedicated working group time, the forum came together on the third and final day of the workshop. The day began with an update from Mr. Jonas Alberoth, who is a member of the Executive Staff of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC). Mr. Alberoth updated the forum on the work being done at the international level on many of the same topics discussed by working groups. In the fall, the PKSOI Director will update the members of the IAPTC at their annual meeting on the outcomes of PSOTEW 2018. This reciprocal exchange of work efforts allows for an open dialogue between the U.S. and the international communities of practice.

The final collective event of the PSOTEW was the working group out briefs. Each workgroup gave a 15-20 minute presentation highlighting key points of their discussion and working group’s findings, as well as a planned “way ahead.”

Along with the participants, the out briefs were monitored by PKSOI’s staff of Visiting Professors. This allowed for the group to receive feedback from this group of well-seasoned PSO experts, and also provides the opportunity for PKSOI to begin to shape its academic priorities for the upcoming year.

PKSOI will surely continue on with conducting the annual PSOTEW, and we are always looking for interested individuals and organizations to help shape the event and look to take a role in proposing and leading working groups. Please continue to monitor the PKSOI webpage for the development of PSOTEW 2019!

Keynote address speaker Dr. Sarah Sewall is the Speyer Family Foundation Distinguished Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs.

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance, Mr. Mark Swayne gave an update on the state of the current Stability Policy for the Department of Defense.
The Protection of Civilians (PoC) WG included representatives from the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), National Defense University, NATO’s Allied Command for Transformation, PKSOI, Protect the People, and the Department of State’s (DoS) African Affairs Bureau (ACOTA). The working group shared information on various PoC initiatives, including UN, NATO, and U.S. military approaches to PoC.

The working group’s main focus was discussing the advisability and content of a proposed reference on the protection of civilians. Unlike PKSOI’s recent Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide, the proposed document would also be intended to assist non-military readers. It would be a primer to orient unfamiliar audiences on PoC, and facilitate the perspective of a “PoC lens” by specialists in other areas. The guide would present a common framework and language, explain the roles of various protection actors, and identify different tools that can assist with civilian protection. The document can also assist such efforts as the development of PoC-related messages, themes, and narratives.

The document’s primary audience would be members of U.S. government organizations who need a working familiarity with PoC. These might include personnel in country teams whose duties overlap with the topic. A wide range of secondary audiences might find the document helpful as well. These could include officials from other governments and representatives from international organizations or NGOs. Instructors at training courses or in academia may use the document as a reading assignment for their students.

The working group’s consensus was that the document should be thirty-to-fifty pages so that a reader can adequately learn about PoC in a brief period. The document would be sufficiently comprehensive that most readers can obtain a good overview of PoC, and would include references to other more detailed sources for those readers that may need them.

The working group spent most of its time developing an outline for the document, which would include the following components:

**Preface and Foreword**
The preface would articulate the document’s purpose and intended audiences, as described above. If a foreword is included, a noted authority in the field would emphasize the wide-ranging importance of PoC and share insights on the subject.

**Part 1: Introduction to the Protection of Civilians**
The first part of the document will provide an overview of PoC, explain its background, and articulate the purpose and scope of the document. It will summarize recent institutional emphases on PoC including UN resolutions and initiatives such as the Kigali Principles. It will argue that PoC is important from a strategic and utilitarian perspective, in addition to the moral, legal, and ethical imperatives commonly cited. This section will offer a definition of PoC and present a framework that includes three dimensions:

- Understanding Civilian Risks
- Protecting Civilians
- Shaping a Protective Environment

These three dimensions, which conform to the PoC framework found in US military doctrine and PKSOI’s Protection of Civil-
ians Military Reference Guide, will be addressed in the subsequent sections of the proposed integrated resource. The document will explain the linkage of this framework to other PoC typologies, such as those offered by UN DPKO and NATO. It will also discuss linkages with other topical frameworks such as countering violent extremist organizations, stabilization, Women Peace and Security, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

**Part 2: Understanding Civilian Risks**

A sound understanding of civilian risks is essential for any protective efforts to be successful. This section will discuss information gathering and analysis and describe four main contexts in which civilians can be at risk including armed conflict, mass atrocities, situations of poor governance, and violent instability. Environmental factors such as geographical, political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural considerations will also be addressed.

This section will explain potential dynamics and likely risk types including sexual violence, impeded access to essential needs, child risks, human trafficking, displaced persons, targeted violence, predatory violence, collateral violence, terrorism, and other risks. The section will consider vulnerabilities, threats and resiliencies, and explain the importance of accounting for local perspectives.

The section will identify different actors including vulnerable populations, potential perpetrators, protectors, and others that may enhance or undermine civilian protection. This section will explain potential interests, roles, and means, and will highlight the importance of host nation ownership of civilian protection. It will examine early warning signs and indicators, and the significance of exigent circumstances and triggering events. It will identify potential indices, such as corruption and fragile state data, and explain assessment mechanisms. Finally, the section will conclude with a discussion of the challenges in understanding civilian risks.

**Part 3: Protecting Civilians**

This section will discuss planning and preparation, including the formulation of a PoC strategy that continuously entails the prioritization of choices among ends, ways, and means. It will explain the importance of direct and structural prevention measures and specific multidimensional efforts including humanitarian action, military operations, and the role of police forces. Other topics will include human rights protection, child protection, conflict-related sexual violence, and the protection of cultural heritage. The section will include an explanation of the likely challenges that will be encountered while protecting civilians.

**Part 4: Shaping a Protective Environment**

This section will address the importance of formulating a comprehensive approach to PoC, messaging, and peacebuilding or stabilization activities to address root causes and reduce grievances that could result in conflict that threatens civilians. Other topics include managing expectations, coordinating civil-military activities, building host nation capacity, strengthening resilience, building local communities, and capitalizing on the potential of civil society. This section will explain the relevance of good governance, the rule of law, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. It will conclude with a discussion of the potential challenges to shaping a protective environment.

**Part 5: PoC Tradeoffs, Challenges, and Risks**

This section will describe potential challenges to be encountered, such as when PoC objectives are pursued while countering violent extremist organizations, or when security is balanced against the protection of human rights. Challenges will likely include resource gaps, corruption, harmonization of different protection actors, and constraints. One of these may be a limited ability to effect societal change when certain cultural traits may be detrimental to civilian protection. Expectations regarding such change will have to be managed and supplemented over time with laws and policies, institutional reinforcement, positive public discourse, and training and education. Risks include potential failure, conflict escalation, friction between the host nation and international actors, and other problems.

**References**

The document will include an annotated bibliography of PoC-related references that may be beneficial to the interested reader.

**Conclusions and Way Forward**

The working group concluded that such a project would be worthwhile, as many audiences would welcome a short, but comprehensive multidimensional overview guide on the protection of civilians. The WG members felt that the guide should be a collaboration, and not produced solely by a military organization such as PKSOI. Collaborative partners, including a lead agency for the project, have to be identified. Such partners could include US government agencies, research institutions, NGOs, or academic institutions.

The group drafted a production timeline including half-day sessions to be held in Washington DC and attended by others in the community of interest who were not present at this event. The timeline includes the drafting and review of three separate drafts of the proposed guide, and it is reasonable to expect publication by the next PSOTEW (April 2019) if the project receives sufficient interest and support.
Within the U.S. Government (USG) and Department of Defense (DoD) at the strategic policy level, Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) is not a foreign subject even as we seek to incorporate the new legislation on WPS. However, at the operational and tactical level, there exists a need for increased efforts towards incorporating WPS into military operations. The 2018 PSOTEW WG 2 tackled the challenge of Operationalizing the WPS Agenda. The working group consisted of member from across the DoD, OSD, GCC, HQDA, ASCCs, USMOG, JTF-B, Army University, WHINSEC, PKSOI, civil society and many more, including Senior NCO advisors. PKSOI’s Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS) representative also presented information on a Strategic WPS implementation plan to capture lessons learned. WG 2 split into two sub-working groups to maximize the convening power represented in the PSOTEW.

The first sub-group worked towards advancing and refining the Army lead for WPS PKSOI’s draft ‘Commander and Staff’s Guide to Integrating Gender Perspectives into Military Operations’ to assist Commanders in incorporating WPS into their operations. This guide will aid Commanders and their Staff to incorporate WPS into their operations, and assist with integrating gender perspectives throughout the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The guide also contains vignettes, sample checklists, and Operation Order templates to assist the Command team.

The WG focused on improving the guide to make it easier for Commanders and Staff to utilize. This led to a reorganization of the guide by shortening the main portion of the guide, while expanding resources available within the annexes and appendices. The goal is for a Staff officer to use the annexes as an exportable resource or reference for WPS. Another improvement included the recommendation to add a legal section to further expand on the Commander’s legal obligations towards WPS regarding universal human rights and applicable international laws. The WG also sought to draft a definition of what ‘Gender Advisory Function’ means to the uniformed service member and produced the following: “Gender Advisory Function: Provides an expert in the application of gender perspectives to advise and inform planning, execution, and assessment to achieve command priorities.” This definition highlights expertise as being the culmination of training and/or certification towards WPS, and nests it within achieving the Commander’s priorities. To date, the Guide draft has been circulated for a second round of comments and is undergoing further revision prior to planned piloting in the coming months.

The second sub-group, led by OSD/JS J5/J7, focused on the development of a DoD Strategy and Instruction to inform the WPS Act Strategy, due in October 2018. The WPS Cell Corner of the PKSOI Journal will provide future updates as possible.

In the broader context of the PSOTEW, and given the cross-cutting nature of the WPS agenda, the following talking points should be considered by all PSOTEW participants:

**Is WPS a priority for the Administration?**

WPS is a priority for the National Security Council (NSC) and broader USG because it touches on many regional and functional priorities. WPS success advances such priorities as countering violent extremism, stabilization, global peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. This year’s National Security Strategy stated that “governments that fail to treat women equally do not allow their societies to reach their full potential.” The NSC is
developing consensus on what it means to have an interagency process on developing a WPS strategy to do the following:

1) implement the 2017 WPS Act;
2) identify WPS priorities and objectives;
3) capitalize on opportunities for outreach and engagement with external stakeholders, including civil society groups. This includes coordinating messaging that highlights ongoing lines of effort; and
4) ensure appropriate alignment with other related processes and interagency strategies, including the NSS.

The U.S. is the first country to pass comprehensive WPS legislation.

Why is WPS important?
Nearly half of the conflict resolution agreements forged during the 1990s failed within 5 years. 90% of civil wars in the 2000s occurred in countries. A growing body of research suggests that standard peace and security processes routinely overlook a critical strategy that could reduce conflict and advance stability: the inclusion of women. A landmark study found that substantial inclusion of women and civil society groups in a peace negotiation makes the resulting agreement 64% less likely to fail, and, according to another study, 35% more likely to last at least 15 years.

Including women at the peace table can also increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement because women are often viewed as honest brokers by negotiating parties. Because women often operate outside existing power structures and generally do not control fighting forces, they are more widely perceived to be politically impartial mediators in peace negotiations compared to men. Further, work by WPS SME Valerie Hudson of Texas A&M shows that societal rates of gender-based violence are predictive of mass violence. She found that the single biggest predictor of whether a state experiences civil war or war with its neighbors is not its GDP, its predominant religion, or even its regional location, it is how women are treated.

Research shows that engaging women can improve the efficacy of early warning and conflict prevention strategies due to their central role in many families and communities, which affords them a unique vantage point to recognize unusual patterns of behavior and signs of impending conflict. Evidence suggests that incorporating women in strategies to counter violence extremism can help to mitigate radicalization as they are well placed to challenge extremist narratives in homes, schools, and social environments. Women also have particular influence among youth populations. In this vein, the week prior to PSOTEW a conference on this aspect of WPS was run in conjunction with Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) Operation Flintlock held in Niamey, Niger.

In June, PACOM sponsored a J7-led pilot Operation Gender Course with the aim of constructing an exportable course to be used across the community. As demonstrated by such initiatives, DoD has reaffirmed the U.S. commitment as a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as protection, post-conflict relief, and recovery efforts. DoD recognizes the goal of the WPS Act is critical to our national security. The efforts of PSOTEW WG 2 support these sentiments while proactively engaging stakeholders across the community.

Colonel Veronica Oswald-Hrutkay the working group leader conducts the WPS out brief to the PSOTEW participants but more importantly to the Director and the PKSOI staff of Visiting Professors. This allowed for the group to receive feedback from this group of well-seasoned PSO experts.
WG Tasks: COL Morgan O’Rourke and the newly formed Army FHA Team within PKSOI sponsored WG 3. The WG had two primary tasks. First, the WG conducted an informal DOTMLPF-P gap analysis by reviewing known gaps, and allowing the community of interest to provide observations on the Army’s ability to deliver unique capabilities and capacities in support of USG efforts to stabilize fragile states in a complex disaster. Second, the group aimed to review the Joint Staff, J6/7 efforts to enhance CIV-MIL Information Sharing (CMIS) through standardization within the Mission Partner Environment and Federated Mission Network. The WG conducted this assessment simultaneously with an assessment of the CMIS within the VIKING 18 exercise.

 Desired Outcomes: The desired outcomes were to refine the Army FHA Capability Development (CD) Program Objectives and Milestones (POAM) for FY18-19, and to inform the finalization of CMIS efforts between May and Oct.

 Representation: The working group had representation from OSD-Policy, Joint Staff, all four Services, interagency partners, and multiple senior service colleges. Rather than using a previous FHA scenario, the WG chose to leverage the PKSOI North Korean Post-conflict Case Study written by PKSOI’s DoS Advisor Tammy Fitzgerald to provide the context for the discussion. This case study allowed the working group to discuss some of the most challenging conditions in terms of organizational complexity, environmental factors, and scope of requirements.

 Discussion Summary: The discussion highlighted the lack of a pre-existing NGO foothold within North Korea, which would challenge typical methods of delivering USG support to provide humanitarian assistance. The typical UN cluster system would take far longer than normal to establish itself given the limited access prior to an event. The level of destruction to infrastructure would not only place the already tenuous distribution of essential services at risk, but would significantly slow the re-establishment of basic social well-being in a system that lacks much resiliency. The array of stakeholders, including Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Russia also highlighted the potential challenges to sharing information and coordinating relief efforts. The expectation was that the remnants of the North Korean regional and local governance structures would be minimally effective or cooperative, and highly suspicious of external intervention.

 The combined effect of these conditions would likely result in a tremendously high demand on military capabilities and capacities that could be delivered in the inherent security and environmental conditions. However, an increased military presence might play into the long-term propaganda about foreign aggression. The scope of the relief effort would likely exceed our ROK allies’ capacity, as they focus on internal requirements south of the current demilitarized zone (DMZ). US policy states that the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is usually the lead implementer for DoS, while DoD is in support. However, in this scenario, DOD should expect and anticipate to assume a larger role, and initially may be the U.S. lead federal agency due to the scope, complexity, and extended duration of the required engagement.
The task to review the CIV-MIL Information Sharing was degraded by the lack of technical subject matter experts from the JS J6/7 due to competing exercises and emerging situations. Much of the discussion centered on the work the JS J6/7 has completed from 2014 to present on CIV-MIL information sharing improvements within the Mission Partner Environment and Federated Mission Network efforts by US DOD and NATO Allied Command Transformation. The group acknowledged that the primary efforts have been to develop information sharing protocols and standards, rather than attempting to develop new hardware or software solutions that were unlikely to be universally adopted by stakeholders. OSD-Policy reminded the group that the current DOD system of record is the All Partner Access Network (APAN), and there are a number of improvements planned for this collaboration suite. There are case studies available which demonstrate best practices from the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan Relief, the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, and the Japan Tsunami Relief Operations.

Conclusions: It was very clear from the group discussion that doctrinal references at the Army and Joint-level do not adequately convey the complexity of FHA in a modern complex environment. In a post-conflict scenario such as North Korea; DOS and USAID may have neither the access nor the capacity to manage the magnitude of the humanitarian response within North Korea, likely requiring alternative organizational structures and processes. The UN may also find itself challenged in establishing an interim government, while also responding to a major humanitarian crisis without the “cluster system” leads being underpinned by the typical array of pre-existing NGOs in the country. In this situation, much like the 2010 Haiti response, the US Military may need to initially lead the humanitarian effort, or appear to take on a much larger portion of the FHA efforts for a longer duration. This additional stability task will compete with high priority security sector missions for existing DOD forces. Given this volatile, uncertain, complex, and adaptive environment, a more collaborative approach is required to develop viable FHA plans and procedures for existing DOD forces. Given this volatile, uncertain, complex, and adaptive environment, a more collaborative approach is required to develop viable FHA plans and procedures for a post-conflict North Korean scenario. Senior interagency leaders must understand the established policies and procedures in order to develop effective, scalable, adaptive solutions. The community of interest should identify key leaders within the HA process and evaluate leader education to deliver the right training, at the right time, to the right audience. The intent of this senior-leader training and education would be to develop strategic thinkers capable of delivering results within the international framework, budgetary constraints, and regulatory guidelines, to achieve stability conditions and advance US interests in a responsible manner. The FHA community of interest will require a periodic forum for collaboration and coordina-

Way Ahead (Lead Organization):

- (OSD-P) Revise DODI to better capture funding, authorities, and direction for DOD FHA support in complex environments
- (PKSOI) Organize a quarterly teleconference starting Aug 2018, to aid in the coordination of FHA capability development with an annual update during the POSTEW 2019
- (PKSOI) Develop a POAM for Army FHA capability development for approval by DA G-3/5/7 DAMO-SS with input from OSD-P
- (PKSOI Lead) Publish a functional capability assessment of Army FHA capabilities within each domain (DOTmLPFP) and coordinate follow up actions
- (CFE-DM) Collaborate with PKSOI to determine exportability/scalability of existing curriculum and best placement within Army PME
- (SSCs) review current FHA training within existing curriculum and exercises in order to find opportunities to collaborate and inform policy
- (CFE-DM / PKSOI) Identify research requirements and opportunities within KSIL, Visiting Professor Program (VPP), RES, DDE, or Integrated Research Project (e.g. FHA in post conflict nK)
- (PKSOI) Coordinate doctrine revision with stakeholders in FY18-19 (ADRP 3-07 Stability, JP 3-29 FHA, and NATO AJP 3.4.3)
- (PKSOI) Inform CMIS working group on outcomes from PSOTEW and VIKING 18 with respect to Stability and FHA tasks

References

Websites
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Training and Education Working Group (PSOTEW), http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/conferences/psotew/index.cfm
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM), https://www.cfe-dmha.org/

Selected Publications
Bruce W. Bennett et al, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/re-

Search Reports


Doctrine
The Civil Affairs' (CA) Role In Stability Work Group gathered to address the fact that both the Army and CA lack clarity on exactly what CA’s role is in stability. The group consisted of individuals from the following organizations: CENTCOM, AFRICOM, USAID, NDU JSOMA, USACAPOC, AR-SOUTH, IIID, USAJFKSWCS Army CA Proponency, SOCOM Joint CA Proponency, HQDA 3/5 SSSC, 18 ABC, 353 CACOM, 304 CA BDE, 415th CA BN, the Civil Affairs Association, PKSOI, and the US Army War College staff. The mix of CA and non-CA personnel and experience levels of the participants resulted in deep, honest discussion on the problem.

The working group reviewed and discussed current USG policy and relevant Army and Joint Force Doctrine. Discussions included past and recent experiences with CA operations and stability activities and objectives, with the focus of the discussion on how CA conducted or supported stability activities from the tactical to strategic levels. Based on doctrine and operational reality, it became clear that CA is unmistakably the Army and Joint Force’s most optimal force provider with the capabilities that most appropriately align with stability activities, a point that many in CA and the Army previously did not recognize. The group agreed that the lack of clarity on CA’s role in stability resulted in shortfalls in doctrine and training for CA personnel, and that a coherent, agreed upon description of CA’s role in stability was required as the starting point for addressing these shortfalls.

The group collectively developed and agreed on the following description of CA’s role in stability. **CA is the lead military planning element for stability activities, lead integrator/coordinator of military stability activities with unified action partners, mission command element for entities executing stability tasks, primary force provider to execute stability tasks, and initial preparation of the environment provider to illuminate, understand, and share the political, economic, social, and infrastructure elements of the civil operational environment.** Using this description as a base, the group established a post-PSOTEW continuation plan consisting of doctrinal change recommendations within Stability and Civil Affairs doctrine as manuals come up for review, while also focusing efforts on developing opportunities to increase stability planning capability.
Too often, Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) is siloed as a separate issue instead of understood as a different way to approach all of our work in the U.S. security sector. As such, PKSOI’s Lessons Learned (LL) Branch is making an effort to do things differently. Lessons Learned Analyst (contractor) Katrina Gehman recently drafted a strategy which outlines a practical way forward to integrate WPS throughout all PKSOI LL activities - from database management to LL products. Accompanying this strategy is an evaluation/metrics grid which could be used annually to track our progress.

Practical efforts to streamline WPS as a cross-cutting issue throughout LL include: regularly incorporating lessons and photos into PKSOI LL publications that pertain to women's varied experiences and gender considerations; ensuring that routine lessons discuss actions of women as well as men (with sex-and-age-disaggregated data); engaging with women experts as well as men to contribute as guest authors; uploading WPS-related material to the SOLLIMS database; and collaborating with the WPS Cell at PKSOI in these efforts.

From the Army’s Lead’s Desk:
Department of Defense (DoD) Operational Gender Advisor (GENAD) Course (OGC) hosted by US Indo-Pacific Command Panel, 4-8 JUN 2018 - DoD conducted its first OGC with LTC Marci Hodge representing the Army as a participant, panelist and observer. The OGC aims to train personnel to serve as GENADs in support of operations and exercises. It also supports the WPS mandate for training as required by the WPS Act signed into Public Law last year, as well as the U.S. National Action Plan on WPS. LTC Hodge participated in the Role and Duties of the Gender Network panel, highlighting her time as the Division Female Engagement Team Program Manager in Afghanistan from 2011-2012. Other panelists included DoD, SOCPAC (IO), and Retired USMC Colonel Sheila Scanlon.

Highlights of the course included a Korean Women's NGO called Women Cross DMZ, which gave a moving presentation on how DoD can support and facilitate their efforts to include a 2015 march where women from North and South Korea were able to cross the DMZ. The course also featured the unique Indo-Pacific civil picture to target the participants who work in the area of responsibility. Future classes are being scheduled now for other COCOMs. Overall, the course was very well received with 10-trained GENADs for the Army to add to the ranks. For more information, [see link to news article](#) related to the course.

USNWC 6th Annual Women, Peace, and Security Conference at Brown University from 30 MAY-1 JUN 2018. Panelists representing military, government, academia, NGOs, and private sector organizations spoke about topics such as geographic-specific developments (Latin America and the Caribbean, Pacific Region, International Themes), as well as broader leadership perspectives, cyber, organizations and substructures, education, genocide, and ideas worth considering regarding the advancement of the WPS agenda. Presented papers will be compiled into a document for distribution in the Fall of 2018. PKSOI took away further network development, SOLLIMS contributor agreements, and continued discussion of the Commander and Staff Guide to Integrating a Gender Perspective Into Military Operations (GPMO).
WPS in the News

Children and Extreme Violence: The Recruitment and Use of Children by Non-state Armed Groups in Contemporary Conflict. In today’s civil conflicts, children are being coerced, recruited, and used by non-state armed groups at alarming rates. Children are increasingly being used for extreme violence, including to conduct suicide attacks and perform executions. The extent and depth of the trauma children suffer at the hands of non-state armed groups, or within their ranks, threatens to create a lost generation in parts of Syria, Iraq, Mali and Nigeria. The scale of this tragedy demands our attention — and our response. (United Nations University)

Coca-Cola Program Empowered More Than 10,000 Nigerian Girls to Secure Employment and Build Self-Confidence. The Coca-Cola Company, together with the UK Department for International Development, Mercy Corps, and local partners, undertook a multifaceted effort to educate and economically empower marginalized Nigerian girls who face significant social and cultural barriers to realizing their potentials. (Georgetown Institute for WPS)

Key Findings: More than 10,000 out-of-school participants (out of 13,024) were linked to employment as a result of the program, with more than half joining the Coca-Cola value chain.

Program participants were more likely to:
• run their own business or manage a business
• hold a savings account
• report higher levels of self-confidence
• report better knowledge of the skills required to run a small business

Upcoming Dates of Note
► 21 June 2018 – WPS Synch VTC
► 1-3 October 2018 – FVEY Conference in Sweden
► 15 October 2018 - International Day of Rural Women
► 25 November - 10 December 2018 – 16 Days of Activism to End Gender-Based Violence
► 25 November 2018 - International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (IDEVAW)
I can count on one hand the number of times that I have met someone in an elevator or similar space and had them instruct me to pitch them on Gender in the time that I have been working in the WPS/Gender space. The odds that you will have a transactional “ok give me the WPS pitch” engagement with someone that you want to influence are low. Though you should prepare for them, preparing yourself to communicate interdisciplinarily and spontaneously will help you make opportunities to have a conversation about WPS, and ensure that you get that follow on meeting or seat at the table, which is essential for WPS to continue to propagate the WPS agenda to the widest audience possible.

The ability to clearly and concisely describe not only the skills and responsibilities of a Gender Advisor (GENAD), but the value a GENAD brings to the fight, is absolutely key. Recognizing the moment to ‘pitch someone’ and seizing it could make the difference between a meeting a week from now, and a meeting six months from now. The following are a few tools and techniques to consider when preparing to pitch WPS. These tools are based on experience from progress made in the informal meeting that are never scheduled and are largely spontaneous.

Become a student of the command

A lot of the success of a pitch depends on preparation and “thought experimenting” prior to engagement. “Thought experiments” consist of going through a series of ‘what if’ scenarios and determining how to address specific priorities based on the tenants of the command; this is why it is essential to know the organization inside and out. In the top-down driven world of military, it is safe to say that every person is going to be concerned with the commander’s priorities and what they can affect within that structure.

Spending time becoming familiar with the command is not only a good use of time, it will also enhance familiarization with the organizational language used to describe the functions of the command. Pay attention to this language and integrate it into thought experiments. In order to do this well, read the strategic documents, take careful notes of what are the main lines of effort and memorize them, know the theater priorities of each commander. What keeps a commander up at night, then crosswalk those command imperatives and identify the opportunities where WPS/gender perspective can help. Do this at least as a mental/verbal exercise, or write it down (this process could be used when developing talking points) and practice articulating it!

Try the talking points out on someone who is lower level, but deeply involved in the command’s lines of effort. Test out the tie-ins and arguments with these folks and, if they have an adverse reaction, invite them to help change the narrative to wording that will resonate with the command. How can WPS be explained better to emphasize the WPS agenda synergy with the command lines of effort? Make appropriate changes, then pitch again--iterate!

Know your (potential) audience(s)

This can be the most important aspect of whether or not the intended audience is successfully reached. In a general sense: know the senior leaders in the command; read their biographies. Know what their roles and responsibilities are within the command and determine their specific responsibilities from an organizational perspective. This will drive the topics and language when engaging with them.

This involves a certain fluidity, changing vocabulary in order to fit the audience. This interdisciplinary communication reduces the cognitive load on the receiving party and enables them to immediately see the value and synergy of WPS with their organizational interests. Leveraging language as an entrée to new audiences takes skill—but exercising this skill set like a muscle improves its delivery.

No idea where to start? Talk with someone who is in uniform that previously served with the senior leaders, who are the intended audience. As uniformed counterparts, what language resonates with Intelligence Officers, for example, to better describe a clearer operational environment. An unanticipated side effect of this interaction might be the creation of an ally while determining the best way to phrase WPS in a Combat Arms/Fires/Maneuver/Intelligence etc way.
ACCESS: Know when to approach…and if it is possible

Sometimes an individual can be casually approached with a simple introduction, however, often times, senior leaders will have a protective entourage. Here are two techniques that can potentially lead to a casual discussion.

Wait in line to talk to the senior leader. Did this leader just give a keynote? Distill a point out of their narrative that ties to WPS. Take something that they mentioned as a problem or potential equity, hint that WPS can solve that problem and request a sit down. Most likely they will be eager to get on to the next person, and will agree for a later meeting coordinated through their XO, or send them an information paper over.

Key leader connections, can also be used to gain entrée to other key leader in their peer network? Ask for introductions when both are in the same location. Having a peer or someone of equal status to a key leader initiate an introduction will provide a degree of support for the WPS agenda and its credibility. The introduction as a GENAD often results in an amused or confused facial expression, which is a perfect opportunity for a practiced elevator pitch. This pitch should emphasize the synergies between the WPS agenda and the senior leaders command interests and lines of effort, highlighting an in-depth understanding of the senior leader’s organization!

Knowing when to approach and what is a “good time” requires intent listening and awareness of who is in the room, in order to leverage a self-introduction or an introduction from another connection. The key is to tie WPS/ Gender into something that will solve a state’s problem, making the senior leader’s job easier, or improve the potential outcome.

Example: A Gender Advisor’s job to advise the commander on how analyzing the specific challenges and opportunities of men, women, girls and boys in conflict can save the US Forces time and lives on the battlefield by reducing risk.

BUILD: a few hooks

Hooks are more traditional elevator pitch territory: What is the main message to be conveyed? That depends on all of the above.

- Operations specific: Mission effectiveness; better operational picture; more resilient populations
- Function Specific: better intel; less disrupted, more efficient logistics networks; more flexible and practical infrastructure

Be able to justify the operations and functions specifics with examples.

Example for EUCOM

Line of Effort (LOE) 1: Deter Russia
WPS Benefit/ hook: In an age of competition short of conflict, the WPS program can help US Forces build the resiliency of partner nations--and that resilience is deterrence to Russia.

The above example is based in the National Security Strategy dictating that the US compete with Russia Short of Conflict (hybrid warfare). The ultimate goal of WPS is to build societal/state/regional resilience (EUCOM training WPS model), therefore an application of WPS is a deterrent of Russia.

Example An Air Force General, who is currently in the J5, Balkan head, whose previous assignments included logistics units.

Pitch: With US efforts to sure up the Balkan region against Russian maligned influence, the WPS program can help build the resiliency of the region through better crisis action planning--and that regional resilience will not only strengthen interoperability, but will also act as a deterrence to Russia.

In this instance, the pitch was modified to the current position of the officer, so they understand how WPS can meet their intent and organization goals in the region. As an entrée, a GENAD can comment on when the general mentioned the challenge their organization is having with increasing NATO interoperability, highlighting that the WPS/Gender program could help fill some of those gaps with a high return on investment for the work it would take. Establish a time and date for a more in-depth discussion on the topic.

So, a GENAD must be well versed on the command--knowing the key lines of effort and how WPS weaves into them. Learn the leaders with which a GENAD would want to engage--ask fellow service members who know them about the key leader’s service history, then modify the WPS pitch language to increase their understanding. Perhaps most importantly, know when is a good time to engage them and ask for help from other allies that might have the ability to provide an introduction. Having a well-practiced elevator pitch is a good policy. Use the above mentioned tools to build custom elevator pitches that will resonate with the target audience, with the right message that helps the WPS/Gender community move forward, faster.
Purpose. The purpose of the EUCOM Executive coaching program is to empower senior leadership with the ability to understand, support and enforce the key tenants of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. This ensures that EUCOM WPS program reinforce existing command lines of effort, and encourages leaders to treat WPS and Gender as a tool that will save the command time, money, and lives.

This training consists of four phases:

1. **Baseline Survey**
   Gathers a baseline from senior leaders and assess their understanding of WPS and help inform which learning objectives need special emphasis.

2. **Custom Training**
   Gives custom, executive level training on: history of the US WPS Program, key vocabulary, and tools on how to recognize, understand, and support WPS equities as a senior leader in EUCOM.

3. **Implementation Planning**
   Conducts a collaborative planning effort facilitated by the Gender Advisor and the owner (executive participant) by defining how the senior leader sees WPS concepts best fitting into their organization. Builds a plan for implementation that highlights three ways the organization will integrate gender equities into existing plans and programs.

4. **Monitoring and Reporting**
   Advises on the implementation of the plan developed in phase 3. Allows for the owners of the plan to implement and iterate, while maintaining contact with the GENAD in order to ensure that any data gathered is being captured and lessons learned are recorded, compiled, and shared with the community of interest.

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USEUCOM Executive Coaching Program
Women, Peace, and Security

Background
In 2017, the United States signed the WPS Act that states: “the US should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.” The Department of Defense is charged with working with the interagency in order to ensure that this law is implemented fully and functionally. This guidance provides a strategic opportunity for DoD to lead interagency efforts on implementing the WPS Program. USEUCOM Executive Coaching provides context and helps work with senior leaders and their staff to build solutions that improve interoperability and continuity with the interagency and partner nations.

Method
This phased, custom training respects the time constraints of the senior leaders within USEUCOM while giving them the tools that they need in order to understand and advocate for an innovative WPS program implementation. The one-on-one design enables the trainer to customize delivery to the trainees and allows for open and honest conversation about the challenges and opportunities that come with implementing WPS within an organization. The delivery is meant to be transformative and adult learning centered in nature-to help build leader understanding of the strategic opportunities of WPS.

Training Audience (GO/FO/SES)
The training audience for this is executive level senior military and civilian leaders at the general office senior executive service level.

Time Commitment (~3.5 hours+ Follow on Coaching)
The initial time commitment for this training averages out to a little over an hour a phase and can be continued as needed depending on the implementation plan.

Strategic Fit
This Coaching program is the first, and most important training step that will help senior leaders identify where WPS best fits into their organizations, and who is best suited to receive follow on training in order ensure success within the command.
In the past several years, scholarly and practitioner communities have been focusing on female participation in violent non-state groups, like terrorist and insurgent organizations. Seeking answers to “why women rebel” is important for not only building secure communities and stable countries, but may also contribute to international peace. To help build fuller answers, however, we need to include female participation in militias as part of the conversation as well.

Conceptually, women in conflict have been understudied almost as much as militias. Militias, as a type of violent non-state actor, have not warranted the same amount of attention as terrorist, insurgent and organized crime groups. In many ways, paramilitaries have been consigned to the “remainder bin” of sub-state groups. Militias are local guardians that view themselves in a defensive light, protecting a specific political, ethnic, tribal, religious or familial group from harm due to gaps that the state is believed to be unable or unwilling to bridge. As local guardians, militias act to provide political power, public safety, or social autonomy for their particular communities.

Crucially, militias are linked to an important portion of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda--the connection between security for women, state security and international stability. Empirical studies have demonstrated that countries with higher rates of gender equality are less likely to use military force to settle disputes. Simply put, a nation’s respect for women’s rights also makes it more pacific in its foreign policy. Militias, like other violent non-state actors, have been connected to high levels of violence against women. However, as the WPS agenda makes clear, women must also be viewed as active agents, rather than solely as passive victims, in conflicts. Female participation in militias complicates the links between women, state security and international peace. Women have served as key mobilizers for militia recruitment. For example, older female community leaders controlled youth’s access to marriage-
able women as a way to recruit young men into the White Army militia of South Sudan. Women have also compensated for shortages in militias personnel; in Peru’s countryside, women joined the ronderos campesinos militias as losses among male militiamen rose. In another well-known case, the Women’s Defense Units (YPJ) in the Kurdish region of Syria is an all-female militia that has fought alongside its all-male counterpart, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), against ISIS.

However, female militia participation has not translated into female empowerment in the political realm. Women still remain as adjuncts to male dominated militia movements, while militia activity in a country has not shown to increase respect for the human rights of women. Rather, militias destroy women’s sense of security, while weakening the ability of a state to create needed structures for gender equality. As a result, militias reduce both the advancement of gender equality and the potential for international peace.

To contribute to the advancement of the WPS agenda, greater research should be directed at understanding women’s roles and motivations in defending their communities from rebels, terrorists and criminals. Female participation in self-defense groups supplements the question of “why women rebel” with the question of “why women repel.” Finding linkages between female understandings of collective self-defense and the path to political power may help scholarly and policy-making communities create political arenas that are genuinely dedicated to female well-being. After all, international peace may depend on it.

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Notes:

3 Noel Stringham and Jonathan Forney, “It Takes a Village to Raise a Militia: Local Politics, the Nuer White Army and South Sudan’s Civil Wars,” Journal of Modern African Studies 55 no.2 (2017), 179.
The U.S. military has several different lessons learned organizations/systems to collect and identify lessons and best practices, including the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL). The Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System (SOLLIMS), established in 2008 by PKSOI, is unique in that it focuses on peace and stability topics and is outside the DoD firewall, allowing access to international practitioners, non-governmental organizations, and academia.

Many of the U.S. military LL systems, especially CALL, have an impressive capability to send teams to collect vast amounts of information. Once recommendations from these lesson observations are implemented and/or systematically reviewed, they are validated as lessons that have been learned. CALL, MCCLL, and others systematically validate tactical lessons. However, given the American cultural propensity to ahistoricism, there is serious question as to how often strategic stability lessons, while faithfully recorded, are actually learned or applied to future endeavors. More research is needed to examine to what extent strategic lessons are consistently incorporated into decisive future action.

This disconnect is evident in current and ongoing political discussions. Proposed budget cuts to the DoS and USAID, for example, run counter to two decades of lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, where inadequate resourcing of USG civilian agencies resulted in DoD personnel being tasked to perform development activities, which they were not prepared to accomplish. Even when senior DOD leaders advocated not to reduce the DoS and USAID budgets, this did not necessarily translate into concrete Congressional action. The disconnect between lessons identified and lessons learned thus remains vast.

The function of Lessons Learned is not just to record the past, but to influence the future, ideally avoiding repetition of the same mistakes in order to more effectively consolidate gains in peace and stability. On a large scale, the disconnect between lessons identified and lessons learned must be addressed with systematic mechanisms to incorporate lessons into strategic decision-making through policy, which will then effect doctrine, education, and training. This, however, is not the only key to bridging the gap. Lessons must be written and shared in such a way that connects with people to influence/implement change. Lessons cannot achieve their function unless they are communicated effectively.

SOLLIMS occupies a unique space in the U.S. military lessons learned community because its lessons are about broader concepts of peace and stability, not tactical military procedures (which are captured by CALL). As discussed in PKSOI’s recent lessons learned publication on Peacebuilding, in order to achieve peace, peace must first be visualized as a tangible possibility. As such, imagination is a key initial step in improving consolidation of gains in peace and stability. Strategic lessons must be communicated in a way that allows people to visualize

**Sample Vignettes.**

Have you ever considered the role of rumors in exacerbating election violence? Women in Kenya did - and used innovative technology to verify and question rumors so that they would not escalate, successfully preventing post-election violence in 2013. ([Operationalizing WPS](#))

Have you considered how the identity of a researcher can affect the quality of information gathered? In Syria, recruitment of women as field specialists has been vital to implement monitoring, evaluation, and research tools in order to achieve accurate societal assessments. ([Monitoring & Evaluation](#))

Did you know that when victims have a chance to tell their stories, and perpetrators acknowledge the impact of their actions, there is a possibility for healing from the damage of war? Victims and perpetrators of Sierra Leone’s civil war talked together about the past and forgave each other around bonfires through the community-level Fambul Tok transitional justice program. ([Peacebuilding](#))

Read these lessons and more in PKSOI’s quarterly SOLLIMS Lessons Learned Samplers.
tangible courses of action. A lesson well-articulated can enable people to imagine potential solutions to complex and intractable problems common in war-to-peace transitions.

One of the best ways to inspire people to imagine possible actions that could lead to peace is to illustrate broader principles with short stories or vignettes from personal experience. Stories connect to people on a human level. Statistics are important – but repeating them in mind-numbing lists does not necessarily influence cultural change. So, incorporating a personal story or anecdote to illustrate a broader, research-verified theme is an important component of writing an effective lesson.

This is especially evident in the case of WPS. Efforts to integrate women more fully into the U.S. military and to incorporate gender considerations throughout all endeavors have increased with the passage of the WPS Act of 2017, signed into law by the President in October. However, there is still a great deal of cultural resistance in much of the U.S. military. A key method of breaking through this resistance is to communicate stories which illustrate the necessity for WPS. Such vignettes can be found in PKSOI’s Operationalizing WPS publication, which was developed in collaboration with the WPS Community, including input from PSOTEW’s WPS WG.

For example, studies have indicated that peace processes which meaningfully include women are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years without returning to armed conflict. In a lesson, this broader research-verified principle can be illustrated by describing a specific situation, such as the women’s nonviolent movement in 2003 which brought an end to Liberia’s brutal civil war.

One consistent lesson learned in the peace and stability arena is that inclusivity is a prerequisite for sustainable peace. As such, it is important for lessons learned organizations/systems to incorporate lessons from diverse stakeholders (U.S. military, USG civilian agencies, civil society, academia, partner nations, etc.) with diverse identities (gender, age, race, culture, socioeconomic background, abilities, etc.).

In recent issues, PKSOI’s quarterly SOLLIMS Samplers have included lessons from a variety of guest contributors, and we would like to continue to do so.

And that’s where YOU come in!
You have a unique perspective from your own identity, background, and experiences.
You have ideas that can lead us towards peace and stability.

Have you had experiences pertaining to any of these topics listed below? If so, consider contributing to the SOLLIMS database (pksoi.org) for potential inclusion in an upcoming issue of PKSOI’s quarterly lessons learned publication. Use this opportunity to share your story, crafting a lesson to influence change.

About the Author: Katrina Gehman is a Lessons Learned Analyst (Contractor) at PKSOI. She has served as an Editor for PKSOI’s quarterly lessons learned publication, producing issues on UN Peacekeeping, refugees, Civil Affairs, WPS, monitoring & evaluation, and peacebuilding, and has written over 50 strategic analyses of peace and stability for the SOLLIMS database, as well as producing the Female Engagement Team and Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Blueprints per Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) Task 12. She has also drafted Inclusivity and WPS Integration strategies for use in PKSOI Lessons Learned.

Notes:

1 This cultural theme was expounded in more detail by Dr. Sarah Sewall in her Keynote Address for PSOTEW 2018.
2 This has also historically been an issue with the U.S. military, as shown through the report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), “Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped,” Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, (August 1995).
3 For example, see the letter written in February 2017 by over 120 Retired Generals and Admirals encouraging Congress to continue to provide resources for USAID and DOS.
5 For more information on these statistics, see UN women: http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security/facts-and-figures#notes
6 See UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s remarks on “Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace” at the UN Security Council (10 Jan 2017), as well as the remarks of Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, at “Peace Now, More Than Ever,” Day One of the Alliance for Peacebuilding 2017 Conference at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), emphasizing the need for inclusivity, starting at 40:30. A 2018 UN-World Bank report, “Pathways for Peace, Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” affirms that exclusion is a major driver of violent conflict and must be addressed in order to build peace.

Upcoming SOLLIMS Lessons Learned Samplers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Topics</th>
<th>Submission Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Public Security</td>
<td>1 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization/Reconstruction (SSR/DDR)</td>
<td>1 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>1 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning for Peace &amp; Stability</td>
<td>1 August 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This article addresses the Protection of Civilians (POC) strategy at the Brigade level, as developed during the Viking Exercise 2018 by the military component of the Brazilian site. After describing the Viking Exercise 2018 and operations at the remote site in Brazil, the article will discuss considerations about the military component, notably the POC planning activities of the Commander and staff officers. The article explains the POC strategy, its doctrinal bases, and inherent operational activities, while also assessing its potential effectiveness if applied in real conflict situations. Finally, the article attests to the validity of the simulation training, as experienced by all participants in the Viking exercise.

Introduction

In a statement to the American Holocaust Museum in 2002,^1^ Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, Commander of the small military component of the United Nations mission established in Rwanda during the genocide, raised a few questions that remained in his mind years after the tragic event. "Did I do all that I could? Did I have all the necessary tools?"

After interacting with participants in the Viking exercise 2018, it was apparent that similar questions permeate the minds of several military, police and civilians with experience in peacekeeping missions and / or conflict areas. Unfortunately, it is quite common to witness at least one situation in which POC could not be fully or partially ensured. This fact raises similar questions to the ones posed by the Canadian general in the minds of other observers.

In this context, and taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the Viking exercise 2018 to deepen the understanding of peacekeeping operations in a simulated environment with emphasis on POC, this article intends to address POC-related procedures developed in the scope of the military component at the Brazilian exercise site.

Viking Exercise 2018

The Viking exercise 2018 (logo above)^2^ was the eighth edition of the multinational, multidimensional and integrated simulation exercise of peacekeeping operations organized by the Swedish Armed Forces. This exercise is recognized as the largest in the world, bringing together military, police and civilians from over 60 countries. The Viking exercise also included the institutional participation of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) among some 80 other governmental, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations.

The simulation in which the participants of the exercise were trained was contextualized in a framework of employing Peace Forces under the direction of the UN and the NATO in the fictional country "Bogaland". The actions taken to pacify and stabilize the hypothetical country were carried out from six remote sites established in Brazil, Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland, Serbia and Sweden. All sites were interconnected under the coordination of the simulated UN mission headquarters in Sweden.

In line with real mandates of current UN peacekeeping missions, POC was one of the central subjects of the exercise. The main documents that supported the simulation addressed the POC issue emphatically, making it a priority for the mission and one of the central tasks mandatory for all components of the exercise. In this regard, some relevant sections are reproduced below.
**Mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peace Mission in Bogaland**

United Nations Security Council Resolution 5207 (2017) recognizes that the situation in certain regions in the territory of Bogaland remains a threat to international peace and security. At the same time, the Security Council of the United Nations considers that the security situation in Bogaland is appropriate to a progressive transfer of security responsibilities between the Interim Security Assistance Force of the Republic of Bogaland, the Bogaland Force (BFOR) (established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 5019 - 2017 para. 3) and a United Nations Peace Mission acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council decides that the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Bogaland shall be as follows:

(a) Protection of civilians, including protection of children, protection of women, and conflict-related sexual violence.

**Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategy for the United Nations Mission in Bogaland**

“Protect civilians in a United Nations peacekeeping mission is a highly complex challenge that requires coordination of efforts by all mission members and the members of UN agencies / foundations established in the country. In this context, each component or agency should be aware of its unique contribution to the implementation of POC mandate.”

As a result, the exercise activities at all sites incorporated POC to some extent, and the cross-cutting subject was a critical feature at the Brazilian site of Exercise Viking 2018.

**Viking Exercise 2018 Brazilian Site**

The Brazilian site of Viking Exercise 2018 was established in the capital of the country, Brasilia - Federal District, by the Brazilian Army through its Land Operations Command (COTER in Portuguese). Civilians, military and police officers from over 20 countries developed their skills during actions integrated with the other remote sites of the exercise, especially the Swedish site, the Viking Exercise 2018 headquarters.

Daily video conferences, in addition to frequent telephone discussions and a dedicated computer network, maintained permanent connections and ensured the Brazilian site’s participation was within the scope of the operation.

As a preliminary activity to Viking Exercise 2018, the Brazilian Army Land Operations Command organized pre-training for the Viking exercise that included a short course specifically on POC. About 45 days before the beginning of Viking 2018, PKSOI, a world renowned expert on the subject, provided specific POC, along with all the learning materials, including its most recent publication on the subject. For two days, civilians, military officers and police officers received instruction and discussed strategic, operational and tactical aspects of POC, highlighting the relevance and timeliness of the issue.

The Joint Brazilian Peace Operations Center (CCOPAB in Portuguese), the only Brazilian institution certified by the UN to prepare civilians and military personnel to be deployed in conflict areas, along with some independent observers from the Peace and Security field of studies, also participated in the short course. This wide array of participating organizations confirmed the great interest and the multidisciplinary character of the theme, providing a multiplier effect to the event.
The POC theoretical framework at the Brazilian site was the basis for plans and actions of the civil, police and military components during the exercise. The military component is highlighted below due to their previous POC experience during real conflict situations of many of its members.

The Military Component of the Brazilian Site in the Viking Exercise

Faithfully reproducing the structure of an actual UN peacekeeping mission, a Regional (Sector) Headquarters of the fictitious "United Nations Mission in Bogaland" (UNMIB) was established at the Brazilian site. The three basic components of UN missions (civilian, police and military) were fully furnished and operated throughout the Viking Exercise site established at Brasilia.

The Military Staff at the Brazilian site played the role of the 1st United Nations Multinational Brigade (1st UNMNBDE), which was commanded by a Brazilian Major General, and included military personnel from North American, Central American, South American, European and Asian countries.

The staff included Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Planning, Logistics, Civil-Military Coordination, and Social Communication cells, as well as gender and legal advisors.

1ST UNMNBDE's units included three infantry battalions (two Brazilian and one Uruguayan), an engineer company, and an aviation unit. These were manned with their own staffs at the Viking Exercise. The link between the 1st UNMNBDE and the subordinate units was accomplished with a Brazilian Army simulation system named “Combater” (“to fight” in Portuguese), which was harmoniously integrated into the Swedish simulation system during the Viking Exercise 2018.

Regarding the integration of POC in the exercise, it would be useful to highlight the relevant experience of the military personnel, beginning with the Commander.

The Commander of the 1st UNMNBDE, in addition to his previous field experience in the UN peacekeeping mission in Angola, was previously an instructor at the Argentinian Peacekeeping Operations Center and Commander of the Joint Brazilian Peace Operations Center. Moreover, he spent four years at the UN Headquarters in New York as Head of the Military and Police Training and Support Team to Member States of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In this role,
he worked on the publication of the UN’s initial POC concept and training materials that specified measures by military components to enhance protection of civilians.

The five officers in the Planning Cell, who were assigned to work on the POC theme, were all experienced in POC, having served in UN peacekeeping missions deployed in Cyprus, Kuwait, Liberia, Haiti, Congo and Central African Republic.

Finally, the military units subordinated to the 1st UNMNBDE increased the dynamic realism for the plans and actions to be executed at the tactical level. The feedback from the subordinate units enhanced the POC planning process within the 1st UNMNBDE Plans Cell, and ensured the resultant POC strategy emphasized proactive and practical actions for maximum effectiveness.

1st UNMNBDE PoC Strategy

Current doctrine advocates establishing successive POC levels of security. For example, the UN doctrine on the subject, found in the document Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of UN Peacekeeping Missions states that POC is provided through three different tiers: Protection through Dialogue and Engagement, Provision of Physical Protection, and Establishing a Protective Environment.

In its primary reference on POC, PKSOI identifies four POC layers (see diagram). The first layer is physical protection against imminent threats of violence. The second is the provision of basic human needs, such as food and health. The next level is characterized by the promotion of human rights. Finally, the last layer includes enabling conditions for POC. The theory can be understood like one nucleus enveloped by successive layers of protection depicted in the following image.

The UN DPKO/DFS POC implementing guidance, mentioned earlier, addresses military tactical actions in the context of four phases to ensure the protection of civilians: prevention, preemption, response, and consolidation.

This collective theoretical foundation was the basis for the 1st UNMNBDE’s POC strategy, and enabled the military component’s proactive initiative during the exercise. Strategy formulation was initiated by the Brigade Commander’s written guidance, which specified the main topics to be addressed, with special attention to the conflict situation, ultimately resulting in practical orders for immediate execution by the Brigade’s units.

From this conceptual framework, the Planning cell began its work. Based on the exercise situation, the vulnerable populations were identified with the support of all the military staff cells. In addition, a specific study about possible factors that could threaten the civilian population within the Brigade’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) was carried out. This data was analyzed, informing the tasks assigned to subordinate military units during all four phases discussed earlier.

As an example, in the prevention phase, emphasis was placed on patrolling roads and key locations, as well as the establishment of links with local stakeholders (e.g., community leaders, local security forces, humanitarian organizations, etc). In the pre-emptive phase, the pre-positioning of troops was recommended in strategic regions. In the response phase, the Brigade deployed quick reaction forces with aerial and land mobility. Finally, in the consolidation phase, the Brigade used quick impact projects to support stabilization, thus enhancing POC.

Once the 1st UNMNBDE’s initial POC strategy was prepared, incorporating the practical knowledge of the Planning Cell members, the theoretical bases discussed earlier, and humanitarian doctrine of Protection of Civilians, the civil and the police components were consulted to improve the planning. This civil and police integration enhanced the effectiveness of 1st UNMNBDE’s POC strategy, which was fully achieved through coordinated actions among civilians, military, police, local authorities, humanitarian agencies, community leaders, and other protagonists in civil society.

The final step was to issue a Brigade Operation Order (OPORD) on POC, which was still in development at the end of the exercise. Nevertheless, the strategy was an important tool
as a general guide for operational and fragmentary orders to deal with specific situations during the exercise.

**Final Considerations**

The Viking Exercise 2018 was a very successful event. Among other accomplishments, it achieved its main objective: to promote the training of military, civil and police staff personnel from different nationalities and organizations in peacekeeping operations. The remote sites in six different countries intensified the multinational environmental flavor, and accurately replicated the UN system. The Brazilian site was characterized, among other aspects, by the outstanding attention paid to POC, especially as it was addressed during the pre-exercise training activities. The 1st UNMNBDE POC strategy was a proactive tool that ensured robust security for the civilian population.

Finally, it is imperative to point out that the simulation accurately reproduced the situations experienced in actual peacekeeping operations, constituting an excellent training opportunity for all the participants. It was particularly important for the work related to POC matters by the continuous development of the subject without any actual civilian suffering or threat to any vulnerable populations.

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**Notes:**

8. Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of UN Peacekeeping Missions. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS - 2015).
9. Ibid.
The ease of movement afforded by our increasingly globalized and connected world means that large numbers of refugees can travel great distance and create an expanding burden on States far removed from their own homeland, thus impacting the global community. The Western consciousness is well aware of these immigrants and refugees through news reports and political repercussions, such as Brexit. Adding to the refugee crisis is the large increase in people who are classified as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). IDPs are migrating/moving in response to conflict, violence, and hate, and have not managed to cross an international border. Thus, while IDPs are not classified as refugees yet, they are likely to cross borders if possible in the future, further adding to the humanitarian crisis.

Today, as a result of IDPs from, e.g. ISIS-controlled areas or the Syrian Civil War, the Mediterranean basin is seeing steadily in-

Start of Rainy Season Floods Bor, South Sudan
Flooding in the town of Bor at the start of the rainy season destroyed the homes of over 2000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Protection of Civilians site located on the base of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UN-MISS) and affected many others in the town.
14 May 2018 / UN Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis
IDPs are currently a challenge primarily affecting concentrated geographic regions. In 2015, roughly three-quarters (30 million people) of IDPs globally were located in 10 countries with half of them (Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Sudan, and South Sudan) having posted the largest IDPs ‘every year since 2003’. The IDP growth trend is indicative of a lack of solutions to the causes of displacement in these areas, and further compels displaced populations to cross borders in order to flee the situations in their home countries. Of the top five countries with high IDP numbers, four of them are in Africa or the Middle East. Thus, the Mediterranean poses an enticing opportunity for IDPs ultimately to cross over into European Union countries that offer far better standards of living, economic opportunities, and freedom of movement within the EU countries.

IDPs are currently at a distinct disadvantage, in comparison to refugees for example, in the protections guaranteed to them under international law. Though the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a set of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 2005, they are not legally binding. In general, internally displaced populations face the dilemma that in cases of displacement due to armed conflict, violence, or human rights violations, their displacement is being propagated by their own government or groups allied with their government, which makes the delivery of humanitarian assistance extremely difficult. The United Nation’s Principles on Internal Displacement defines IDPs as (emphasis added by the author):

“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence... as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”

15. Principle 15 states that IDPs have the right to leave their country, seek asylum in another country, and be protected against forcible return or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, and/or health would be at risk. Thus, this Principle confuses the definition of an IDP once they have crossed an international border. In this manner, all refugees are IDPs, but not all IDPs are refugees. In general, the UN does not closely follow Principle 15, leaving IDPs, who have not crossed a border, in international legal limbo.

Without a United Nations agency specifically mandated to assist IDPs before they can cross a border, the international community must turn to several international organizations that monitor, advocate, and write policy for IDPs but with the majority mainly pertaining to refugees for guidance on standard practices. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), based in Geneva, was established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council. It is responsible for running an online database which provides information and analysis on internal displacements in over 50 countries. The IDMC monitors internal displacement caused by ‘armed conflict, generalized violence, and human rights violations’. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the UN’s agency with primary responsibility over issues of maritime safety. Although not tasked directly with IDP issues, IOM has become involved because of the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean. Taken together, IDMC and IOM combine international mechanisms for policy and monitoring with the customary humanitarian tradition of rescue and maritime international law (The United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea). As such, they allow the international community to construct the framework through which the humanitarian crisis of migration on the Mediterranean can be examined.

In February of 2005, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in conjunction with the European Commission, started a yearlong joint project aimed at gathering information on mixed migration trends in the Mediterranean. The need for this can be clearly seen through the end of 2015 statistics highlighting that North Africa and the Middle East made up roughly one-third of the world’s IDPs (13.2 million people). UNHCR sought to identify the gaps in the protection of refugees, and examining maritime rescue and interception policies. The project highlighted the need for internationally recognized clear definitions of interception, rescue, refoulement (forcible return of refugees to a country liable to persecute them), and disembarkation. If solutions are to be effectively proposed and enacted to alleviate the fatal passage across the Mediterranean, then it is necessary to identify the shortcomings and conflicts that make these bod-
Interception plays a key role in maritime migration across the Mediterranean for the States who are trying to mitigate the flow of IDPs, who are attempting to become refugees by crossing borders. Interception is an action that carries with it three main concerns in terms of maritime migration. The first being States primarily using interception as a tool to enforce their domestic immigration laws. This can be seen in the IOM’s observation that State’s, “which have the ability to do so, find that intercepting migrants before they reach their territories is one of the most effective measures to enforce their domestic migration laws and policies”. Secondly, the delineation between interception and rescue are ambiguous at best and can be distorted to meet the circumstances at hand. Lastly is the distinction between physical and administrative interception, which distinguishes between physical maritime interception of vessels versus administrative interception which deals with the credentials of the vessel and those on board in regard to meeting national or international standards (visas, document screenings, asylum, etc.).

The difficulty in distinguishing and defining interception with these three main aforementioned concerns is best seen within the definitions put forth by international governing bodies on the issue. In 2000 the UNHCR proposed to define interception as,

“All measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt, or stop the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination.”

Then in 2003 the Executive Committee (ExCom), a body consisting of 70-member-states under the UNHCR, defined interception as,

“One of the measures employed by States to: Prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey; Prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their journey; or assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law; Where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not have the required documentation or valid permissions to enter; and that such measure also serve to protect the lives and security of the traveling public as well as persons being smuggled or transported in an irregular manner.”

The point where these two definitions diverge on is the extraterritorial element of interception, with ExCom’s 2003 definition leaving out any specific mention of extraterritoriality.

When examining the Mediterranean basin, as well as for human migration in general, extraterritoriality plays a key role in the behavior of States. States are concerned with acquiring the burden of care over persons whom they do not wish to, or did not intend to gain under the prerogative. This becomes notably significant in such a relatively small but densely inhabited body of water such as the Mediterranean, which connects 13 countries, 4 of which are European Union members (excluding those in the Adriatic). The United Nation’s Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which defines a nation’s territorial waters, legal rights, and duties within their maritime territory sets a State’s maritime territory as reach 12 nautical miles from their sovereign shores, with economic rights extending up to 200 nautical miles.

The focal point of UNCLOS pertaining to maritime migration is the immigration control permitted within contiguous zones, which are areas of the high seas that States are given jurisdiction over for particular purposes. Within this contiguous zone, States are allowed to execute the authority necessary to “prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea” as well as set punishments for the above infringements. The Strait of Gibraltar serves as an example of this conundrum with the European and North African continents situated just 7.7 nautical miles apart. This area, where maritime territorial boundaries, and therefore rights and responsibilities, are so densely interconnected, challenges which State has the duty to handle maritime migrants.

Rescue is a powerful tool that could be employed to decrease the number of fatalities in maritime migration across the Mediterranean. As with all interactions between vessels, rescue carries with it a unique set of challenges and intricacies in the eyes of international law. The duty to rescue vessels in distress is a commonly held maritime practice. UNCLOS requires all States that are party to the convention to enforce the rescue duty “for all ships flying its flag including both commercial and state vessels”. Rescue as a practice is further defined under the Search and Rescue (SAR) Treaty and the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, both of which are drafted and amended by the IOM. SAR defines rescue as “an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety”. Rescue is differentiated from interception in that hypothetically vessels are responding or intervening to persons in distress rather than acting.
to intercept the vessel for verification of its criterion. UNHCR’s ExCom goes on to expressly delineate this discrepancy by saying that, “when vessels respond to the persons in distress at sea, they are not engaged in interception”.18 The issue that is raised here is the risk of interceptions being characterized as rescue operations and therefore allowing States to potentially prevent the escape of IDPs and refugees from the circumstances from which they are fleeing.

The legal concept of refoulement is notably applicable to IDPs and refugees in that it carries with it the risk of being returned to a State where the person’s safety is at risk. “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.19 Without clear concrete procedures on the protection duties of States doing interception and rescue, refoulement will continue to pose a potential safety risk for those making a maritime migration. The United Nations makes clear the gravity of IDPs and refugees in that it carries with it the risk of being returned to a State where their safety is at risk. “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.19 Without clear concrete procedures on the protection duties of States doing interception and rescue, refoulement will continue to pose a potential safety risk for those making a maritime migration. The United Nations makes clear the gravity of IDPs and refugees in that it carries with it the risk of being returned to a State where their safety is at risk. “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.19

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Both the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID) and the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons outline the end state of IDPs, as ultimately being the return, integration, or resettlement of these persons. The UN GPID makes reference to the end of displacement in two places; Principle 6 Section 3 and Principles 28-30. In summary, these stipulate that displacement should not last longer than the circumstances compel and that competent authorities have the obligation to ensure that IDPs are able to voluntarily return, resettle, or reintegrate without fear of discrimination.21 IASC goes into more specific detail, outlining 8 basic criteria that determine whether the solution for the IDP is durable. These are:

1) Long term safety, security and freedom of movement.
2) An adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, healthcare, and basic education.
3) Access to employment and livelihoods.
4) Access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with compensation.
5) Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation.

6) Voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement.
7) Participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population.
8) Effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations.22

Under these criteria it is evident that for the majority of IDPs, returning to their place of origin does not meet these criteria in a reasonable timeframe. As such IDPs will continue to place a strain on the international community as they seek resettlement elsewhere to places offering safety and access to means of economic prosperity.

Given that the criteria for durable solutions for IDPs are objectives that will not be met in the reasonably foreseeable future for the countries creating the largest numbers, IDPs will continue to pose a humanitarian challenge on the international community for years to come. Therefore, the ways that the international community can help IDPs is twofold. Firstly, IDPs, particularly those that have crossed a border, should have their own set of rights and protections that are legally binding, such as those that are afforded to refugees under the UNHCR. This could be accomplished by either creating a separate body of law or incorporating IDPs into the preexisting body of law on refugees. Secondly the inconsistencies in international law when defining the duties and responsibilities of states dealing with maritime migration, need to be clarified so that migrant’s rights are protected and States are acting appropriately. For the Mediterranean, the issue of extraterritoriality is essential for defining States responsibilities for the care of migrants. The European Union undoubtedly wants to limit the number of people arriving on their borders, but returning migrants back to conditions where their safety is at risk is objectionable. Finally, the issue of whether IDPs are or are not treated as refugees under international law should be clarified. By making the rights and responsibilities of States and migrants clear, the international community can begin to holistically combat the humanitarian crisis posed by IDPs.

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Notes:


5 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Principle 15)

6 Smith Ellison, Christine and Alan Smith. Education and Internally Displaced Persons. (14)


10 Miltner. "Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception." (83) (UNHCR Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM)

11 Ibid. (79)

12 Ibid. (80) (ExCom Conclusion No.97)


16 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982

17 Miltner. "Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception." (87)

18 Ibid (82) (ExCom Conclusion No.97 Preamble)


20 Miltner. "Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception." (97) (Convention Against Torture)

21 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998

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