AFRICOM
10 YEARS IN THE MAKING
AS A MODEL FOR STABILITY ACTIVITIES
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AUSA Panel Discussion on AFRICOM: 10 Years of Stability Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Adopting Anti-Terrorism Measures: Experiences and Lessons in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Familiar Faces: Identity Activities in Recurring Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>The Importance of Controlling and Preserving Cultural Heritage Sites in Complex Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Supporting the Peace – U.S. Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Strategic Blind Spot: The Navy’s Stability Gap in the Littorals of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Book Review on Nadia Schadlow’s “War and the Art of Governance”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also Inside: Women, Peace, and Security Info Paper
Introduction

PKSOI sponsored a 2017 AUSA panel discussion entitled AFRICOM: 10 years in the making as a model for Stability Activities, held on 18 September at AUSA. The two panels addressed Whole of Government (WoG) progress in the Peace and Stability Operations environment with a focus on AFRICOM. To kick off the discussion, PKSOI presented their IRP findings, which were used as a template for comparison with some of the emerging challenges within the AFRICOM theater, while applying a WoG approach to fulfill national interests. A second panel applied the IRP principles to a Lake Chad Basin (LCB) case study to determine whether they would alter the existing strategy for that region. A third panel explored the opportunities and challenges awaiting AFRICOM and its partners in the coming decade and beyond. The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) held an all-day event on September 18, 2017 to discuss 'AFRICOM; 10 Years in the Making as a Model for Stability Activities'. The event was sponsored by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and had 2 keynote addresses and three panel sessions.

The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. The operating environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. government (USG) response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners, and supported by the affected nation in order to achieve their own national goals. Since 1947, the national security system has struggled to handle effectively the range and complexity of the existing global threats and opportunities. A paper for the incoming Administration’s transition team prepared in November 2016 by the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense (DoD) summarized the issues as follows:

The US Government is lacking a number of critical mechanisms to formulate and execute stabilization efforts, and does not systematically empower and integrate important capabilities into existing processes. The Fragility Study Group of the National Security Council attributes these performance shortfalls to “…bureaucratic politics; the pursuit of maximalist objectives on unrealistic timelines; the failure to balance short-term imperatives with long-term goals; the habit of lurching from one crisis to the next; and missed opportunities to act preventively.”
The PKSOI IRP found that a whole-of-Government approach is necessary to achieve US national security goals. Some of the primary frictions to whole-of-government collaboration are the nature of various agencies cultures; resource, authorities and funding mismatches; and differing processes, such as timelines and tools. Some key collaboration considerations to overcome these friction points are: clear, achievable purpose and vision shared by all stakeholders; operational scope is small, focused, discreet, and empowered by the appropriate resources and authorities; and support emanated from the highest levels and was reflected throughout the Government.

Africa’s complex environment is a critical continent in which the US Army must selective engage with partner nations. Even after 10 years of AFRICOM operations, challenges still remain to achieve peacekeeping (PK) and stability objectives. Beth Cole, an author and expert on civil-military cooperation, stabilization and countering violent extremism, chaired the second panel on AFRICOM in the LCB. The panel consisted of AMB(r) Dan Mozena, Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram for the Department of State (DoS), GEN(r) David Rodriguez, former commander of AFRICOM, Christopher Runyan, acting Deputy Assistant Administrator of the USAID Bureau for Africa, and Alexis Smallridge, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for West Africa at the National Intelligence Council in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Beth Cole highlighted the importance of interagency cohesion, knitting together the efforts of DoS and DoD in Africa. The first significant collaborative effort occurred when then AFRICOM commander GEN(r) Ham assigned a strategic planner to USAID to further synchronize planning efforts. GEN(r) Rodriguez continued these efforts by walking lock step with USAID on Boko Haram (BH) and the ebola crisis. He afforded the USAID senior development advisor complete access to AFRICOM’s senior leadership, and created the innovative Africa strategic dialogue, bringing together senior leaders from across the agencies to discuss collective response to problems on the African continent.

BH was initially composed of robbers and thugs with AK weapons and sandals, but the Nigerian government failure to address political corruption, a common root cause of extremism, fomented BH’s transformation into a terrorist organization. BH’s power grew in the northeast of Nigeria around Maiduguri by looting banks for money and the military and police for weapons. As BH’s activities began to spill over into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, prompting the US with the assistance of the French and Brits, to focus on mitigating BH’s strengths, in order to stop BH from further eroding the largest economy in Africa. AMB Mozena was critical in bringing together the regional and interagency partners to ensure all efforts were fully aligned with the DoS vision. The four main efforts were theater security cooperation, engagements, exercises and operations. Nigeria was the biggest impediment to assistance and the root cause for BH growth. Cameroon and Chad units were easy partners based on long standing training relationships with the U.S., while Niger was a newly formed unit with a U.S Army War College graduate as a commander, which greatly facilitated synchronization of efforts. When BH abducted the Chibok schoolgirls, the U.S. established an interdisciplinary team in the U.S. embassy in Nigeria to coordinate efforts and communication. From an operational standpoint, AFRICOM established a coordination liaison cell in N’Djamena, Chad, at a French long-term base.

Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and the African Union established a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the LCB commission to combat BH. The MNJTF focused on intelligence sharing, an essential part of the operational effort. The US worked with two of the MNJTF units to develop their own intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to build their capacity and synergize efforts. Initially, the MNJTF headquarters consisted of only one military officer. As the mission grew, AFRICOM expanded the communications network and intelligence sharing between all four countries. However, the fight against BH was managed out of the four presidential palaces because the presidents and senior military staffs wanted to remain personally involved in guiding their nations’ actions. Therefore, the U.S. country teams needed to be intrinsically involved in coalescing the disparate intentions of all four nations. AFRICOM did have BH advise and assist missions at each country’s command center. The stratified advising mission elements maintained continuous contact to understand all of the operational initiatives and maintain a common understanding of the BH fight.
The U.S. senior BH advisor coordinates with the DoS’s African Bureau, the European Union, the Washington interagency, which includes AFRICOM and all the posts in Africa. From a DoS perspective, the order of U.S. efforts should be Diplomacy, Development and Defense, commonly referred to as the 3Ds. Interagency coordination has never been as cohesive and effective as the efforts against BH. The Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, as well as development agencies from France and the United Kingdom, have regular coordination meetings with the US on BH efforts, which includes a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) defections action group. One reason for the unprecedented interagency coordination is that an imploded Nigeria is not in the U.S. national interests of economic prosperity, diplomatic objectives and humanitarian imperatives. A critically important concept in the counter BH initiative is “by, with and through” as this is not a U.S. war. Interagency partners agree that bombing is not a way to victory. Any strategic approach must address the underlying drivers of conflict in the areas. Decades of discrimination and neglect from the central government, the failure of the civil and religious local leaders, as well as the 2009 security forces’ campaign of abuse against BH, which killed 7800 followers, led to BH’s rise. Other drivers of conflict are a lack of investment in the human and physical infrastructure, a female literacy rate of 7%, a global religious zeal movement, and an influx of arms from Libya, and a lack of economic opportunities. BH’s affiliation with ISIS heightened the threat to the U.S., which led to a Congress mandated strategy to counter the BH threat. Even LCB partners are briefed on the strategy, which is to degrade and contain the BH threat. Even LCB partners are briefed on the strategy, which is to degrade and contain the BH threat. To achieve these objectives, the military must strengthen partner nations’ capacity, as well as assist in developing a counter narrative program to encourage fighters to leave the BH ranks through effective DDR and defection policies, while also discouraging the recruitment of new members. The goal of the program is to weaken BH and ISIS in West Africa by cutting off money and fighters. This strategy affords partners the ability to bolster success on the battlefield with civilian security, effective governance, delivery of essential services (water, sanitation and education), and economic policies to revive the failed economy. The strategy will also meet the humanitarian needs of almost 2.5 million people, who have been displaced or are suffering food insecurity. The military dramatically increased its efforts to enhance security in the region by assisting in police training and rebuilding police facilities. The MNJTF, along with its U.S. partners has greatly reduced the area under BH controls. However, more is needed as BH and ISIS West Africa continue devastating asymmetric attacks against the population. Nigeria has also succeeded at reducing BH controlled areas, but cannot maintain control of the ground. For long term strategic and tactical successes to occur, it must be led by Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad.

The USG legislative branch appropriates discretionary funds with specific earmarks and directives. Due to the earmarks, USAID is unable to prioritize funding for the most important development work, and thus essential projects go unfunded. From a USAID perspective, the USG still has challenges breaking out of traditional and comfortable silos of excellence to truly cooperate and engage bilaterally, especially when determining when and how each organizations should respond. Although much USG collaboration has occurred in LCB, more cross border development initiatives and diplomatic efforts are necessary to bring about the dissolution of BH. The MNJTF should have a civilian equivalent for DDR, as well as defections and deradicalization. However, the LCB countries must designate this civilian equivalent, otherwise the initiative will fail as evidenced by the numerous demarches of US-developed policies. Knowledge management and knowledge transfer at the sub-national level to governors and other civil leaders in order to enhance their understanding of the programs from Abuja is essential for the success of the region. Without a clear demand signals from our African counterparts, it is difficult for the USG to develop effective programs that are acceptable to the LCB governments. Regional Institutions are vital to convene, deconflict, align and even compel good LCB efforts with a balanced hard and soft security approach. These regional elements, an often underdeveloped USG area, require a lot of capacity building support. Focusing on these intertwined problems will increase the likelihood of fully effective, long-term sustainable solution and strategic success. DoD often is well ahead on strategy, which causing a desynchronization with DoS and USAID, thus hindering a well-balanced and articulated policy approach. LCB’s informal Rule of Law process and ineffective legal system is a challenge to the reintegration process, where in an individual must be certified as having renounced memberships in an extrem-
nist group. USAID is conducting many community efforts focused on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in hotspots. At present, the sense of political will to energize CVE efforts is absent. BH is an existential threat to the way African states governed these marginalized regions. The population witnessed BH’s challenges to the government, and they will force change over years, potentially creating a generational humanitarian crisis. Government response to extremist actions often becomes the tipping point for many to join extremist groups, thus partners must be synched in their messaging to quell future extremist recruitment.

Counterterrorism (CT) targeting and intelligence (intel) sharing are two primary roles of the Intelligence Community (IC) in WoG efforts. However, the IC is uniquely placed to identify responsible leaders and decision-makers, especially when elected and appointed officials are only figure heads, which is extremely important for WoG capacity building efforts. In Nigeria, interagency cooperation is limited and intel service operates totally separately from the military on CT cases. The Nigerian military and the Department of State Services (Nigerian intel) needs to regularly share CT intel, which was highlighted by the two agencies recently capturing a West African ISIS operative. U.S. assistance is needed to coordinate the efforts of the fractured and unpredictable bureaucracies of the Lake Chad countries. IC intel products and briefs to Washington and policymakers are essential for providing context for decision-makers to understand the BH and ISIS challenges. The IC’s framing of the problem focuses on the bigger picture, such as how challenges in Nigeria affect the entire region. IC assessments may be the only time policymakers actually focus on Nigeria, and thus this input influences the guidance and strategic direction of WoG efforts. The IC conducts largely impartial assessments and examines data from a distance, rather than a field operator’s view, as the IC has sufficient capability to broadly assess problem sets from a regional perspective. The IC plays a valuable role in small incremental changes in the environment, which have a more regional affect, thus potentially precipitating a change in the U.S government approach. The IC has brought a Whole of Intelligence Community (WoIG) effort to bear on the BH problem, for example, Treasury focusing on sanctions and terrorist finance. The U.S. effort pressures Nigeria to follow suit. The MNJTF responses are adaptive to similar conflicts in Africa, such as Somalia and Mali, as these responses are distinguished by the forward leaning partners in the region.

One question posed by the audience dealt with the causality of BH being restricted to such a smaller location, while Al Shabaab has been more expansive in its reach? BH rose out of the inequities of Nigerian society and is largely ethnically based. Although BH has brought other ethnic groups into the conflict, the BH focus is devoted to solving these inequities, which are not of interest to outside groups. ISIS West Africa is likely the longer term strategic threat, especially since ISIS West Africa is focused on recreating an alternative governance structure, so more of a threat to the viability of the Nigerian government. ISIS West Africa also distributes justice and humanitarian assistance.

Another question dealt with why the USG decided to ultimately by into the MNJTF concept, and how can this be replicated to create a similar civilian agency? One of the greatest challenge was the capacity of the MNJTF to actually receive capacity building support. MNJTF evolved into a venue for sharing intel and coordination and cooperation. A civilian entity does not have a vested interest from the NCB partners, and focus more on sub-re-
USAID is focusing on building a regional counter violent extremism (CVE) strategy. Since the civilian architecture is not in place for large scale refugee and displaced person returnees, if catastrophic success were to occur, expectations for essential services would not be met, the grievances grow exponentially. Such an instance, might be the impetus to establish a civilian multi-country task force.

Colonel Ken Adgie, the Deputy Commandant of the US Army War College introduced the last panel entitled "US interest in Africa for the next 20 years". This panel expanded on the USG options for the future, based on past accomplishments and programs. USG plans should coincide with national interests, often defined as security, geopolitical, economic and humanitarian. However, plans could align more functionally like the migrant issues facing our European partners or China’s growing influence on Africa. 19 of the top 25 countries in the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index are from Africa, making any strategy, a challenge. The first panelist was ABM(r) Philip Carter III, former Ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire and current president of the Meade Hill Group, as well as the Executive Vice President of the Washington-based international advisory firm of Jefferson Waterman International. The second panelist was Kate Knopf, the Director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The future of Africa is a challenging topic on its own. The security space will not be shaped by how the African nations will grapple with the terrorist threat, instead it will depend upon the development of infrastructure. This development structure will rely on the continent’s ability to marshal resources for massive investment in resilient infrastructure that improves connectivity, such as roads, railways, ports, power generation distribution, and fiber optic cables. No society can achieve sustained economic growth without investing in their infrastructure. The African governments must implement an aggressive private-sector economic growth strategy for a sustained period in order to create jobs for their burgeoning populations, which will require an urgent and daunting shift in governance and economic policy, as well as regional and continental cooperation. A major challenge facing Africa is climate change, which has caused desertification, rising oceans affecting the coastline, changing temperature which alters the flora and fauna. Infrastructure development is the only factor for mitigating climate impacts. Climate change will also drive rural to urban migration, and raise the prospects for greater pandemics. The developed world is getting smaller, while the African population grows to encompass nearly 25% of the world’s population. This dynamic increase is compounded by a burgeoning youth bulge with an average age of 22-23 years of age, thus creating the largest labor pool. Millions are moving within the continent to cities in the hope of better economic opportunities and reduced violence, creating the fastest urbanization rates on the planet. Many of the migrants move into slums, where a lack of infrastructure exacerbates the problems. To counter this dynamic, African nations must invest in their own societies and neighbors. However the illicit outflows currently exceed the development assistance inflows. Africa will need to invest 1.5 trillion in infrastructure over the next 10-15 years, but state institutions are currently losing about 100 billion per year to illicit outflows, which is a huge governance challenge. Technically, these states have the ability to reinvest in their own infrastructure. The youth migration to cities creates a hyper-connectivity to each other, but there is still limited inter-governmental connectivity. This connectivity is changing expectations, as youth become cognizant of opportunities throughout the world, they demand more services (clean water, electricity, education and jobs), which places a heavy burden on governance. Cities and states/provinces will become the focal point for governance development. For example, a mayor may be the most important political partner over a head of state. The US most focus security and stability efforts at the sub-provincial level. Democracy is a culture, not simply elections, as has become the common implementation strategy. The USG must focus on the principles of good governance, where in governments are responsive to the needs of the population. Enhancing state security does not ensure stability, as the administration, police and military may not care populace viewpoints. Enhancing urban security and policing capabilities will be paramount in Africa over the next 10 years. AFRICOM may be the only entity capable of enhancing this civilian security by engaging with DoS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), FBI, Homeland Security and Congress to free up the necessary resources to provide security in urban centers. African nations, whose economies are oil based and not focused on their populations, are more likely to
become impoverished. Therefore, USG solutions must ensure the effective leveraging of natural resources. The focus for the security sector is inherently Defense Institution Building (DIB). DIB encompasses functional recruitment, retention and retirement strategy, which includes encouraging African governments to develop their own capacity for interagency, inter-ministerial conversations. The USG had to compel African governments to collaborate on the regional threats, such as BH and ebola. The USG’s greatest challenge is defining the transition point when the US has built sufficient resilience and capacity to manage the security sector, while ensuring it is aligned with an iterative transition strategy to partner nation authority in the security sector. Terrorism has been around as long as humanity, so simply eliminating terrorist elements does not mitigate the threat, and even potentially creates further instability. As the dominant military force in the region grows to counter the terrorist threat, it becomes disassociated from the population it is designed to protect. Urgency exists, as crises continue to compound at nearly the same rate as the relentless African demographic growth. The US needs to accept risks, and not continue deliberations to ensure every activity is a resounding success. As the networks continue to mature, the US must be postured to enable and enhance good networks over bad ones. Africa is not a high tech solution, basic communication and administration are urgent requirements to ensure communities truly understand the challenges. AFRICOM is in a unique position to raise the issue of police training to further emphasize the need for citizen security over state security. The US must deal with conflict in such a way that it does not derail economic growth, and this is a discussion where AFRICOM can show real leadership.

Another perspective is that AFRICOM is really not essential in Africa as there is little need for armies, where in police forces, gendarmerie and border security, and other forms of citizen security are far more important for maintaining stability. AFRICOM is not currently designed to meet the challenge of developing police forces and maintaining citizen security. Looking at megatrends confronting the continent, Africa is ill-equipped economically to keep pace with its demographic growth. With Africa’s exploding population growth, its strategic importance increase exponentially. State to society relationships in Africa requires DoS to focus on countries that really do not register on AFRICOM's agenda, as they may pose no direct threat to US interests. These different institutional mandates and equities creates a disconnect within US priorities in Africa. The annual strategic dialogue at the assistant secretary, assistant director, Combatant Commander-level enables the synchronization of defense, development and diplomacy efforts and determines the efficacy and inadequacy of capacity building measures. One recurrent themes is a need for a shared analysis and understanding of the environment, which is a platform that AFRICOM can bring to the interagency to truly look at a comprehensive analysis of national dynamics down to sub and trans-regional issues that are really posing challenges. Nearly 20 million people on the continent are currently internally displaced persons (IDP), with only 1% of those IDP’s flowing to Europe. The vast majority of the IDPs are handled internally by African states, creating great pressure on the government and the economy. However, the majority of the U.S. security assistance funds are allocated to partner nations, who are countering direct threats to the U.S. Many of these partners are the least democratic governments in Africa. The 3Ds need to develop a cross cutting strategy to achieve strategic success on the continent. Not all sectors and objectives are mutually supporting, and often gains in one area, drives failure in another. Democracies need to be the emphasis on the continent as public opinion polls have shown such a representative-style government structure is the desired system, however, currently only 11% live in full or even flawed democracies. The population may not completely understand the principles of a democracy, but they want to engage their government officials and move toward a democratic structure.

The panel addressed the issue of AFRICOM not being an acceptable platform for reforming the police, specifically due to a lack of authority to do so. Which is in contrast to the African dynamic where policing is conducted by national, not local structure, so why would not the U.S. military be a viable training option? AFRICOM with its leveraging of other interagency assets, when armed with the appropriate authorities would be a viable training option. AFRICOM forces could also be leveraged to assist in the training process as a capacity builder for other agencies. African police are national assets, and are the predominant security providers in the country, as the military is designed to defend the sovereign state from its own people.
AFRICOM should be the convening authority to bring all parties together to discuss a way forward for civil security on the continent. However, policing is a civilian function, as highlighted by the separation of policing and military responsibilities in the west. Security forces can complement one another, but should have separate objectives, to include an inherent capability to hand off security services from one force to another depending on the type of threat. States need to define principal security threats and needs through discussions with their citizenry. The population needs to determine which organization they will trust from a security standpoint in different environments. The building of policing institutions must be a long term commitment, and AFRICOM’s bureaucracy might not support such an engagement. The day-to-day daily security of a state largely relies on a policing force, and is therefore not under a military purview. Terrorist threats are not a daily concern, but state violence against the population often is a primary concern.

The audience inquired about the need for increased capacity building of police throughout AFRICA for civil security forces. Since AFRICOM possesses the capacity to fulfill a police development mission, but does not have the authority to conduct police development, why is AFRICOM not considered a viable headquarters to lead such an effort. The panel opined that the authorities need to be considered, and AFRICOM, with its large headquarters interagency components, should be part of a leveraging process to deal with civilian security. African countries have national police forces focused on civil security, while the military is not focused on protecting the sovereign nation, but instead the government from its people. Police usually outnumber military personnel. The African people want to have a democratic style government, but do not know exactly what that means, and are starting to demand more of their government. This change of perspective will likely result in more unrest, and thus more requirements for civil security and policing. AFRICOM is the only U.S. governmental agency that is looking at the continent as a whole from a civilian security perspective, thus they become the natural convening body for such a discussion. However, policing is a civilian function, and while the west maintains a separation of military and civilian security responsibilities, these two security elements can complement and support each other. In some instances, there may be a coordinated hand-off between military and policing security elements, depending on the size and type of threat. African states need to have a frank discussion with the population to determine the actual security threats, and popular opinion on which type of security force would be trusted by the population against specific threats. DoD leading such an effort may provide a military perspective for each type of threat. Any long term development policing solution will not likely align with AFRICOM’s strategies and objectives. Terrorism is a minor daily concern to the African population, but state violence against civilians is a significant threat. In that light, countering violent extremism (CVE) will be largely ineffective without developing an effective police force. Intelligence and information gathering is the number one tool to counter the CVE threat. Militaries do not have the level of community interaction and trust to gain that type of information. High-tech interdictions is not a winning CVE proposition. Local police are best suited for this interaction, especially with their intelligence gathering capabilities within the communities. The best strategy for countering terrorist threats is at the grass roots, community-level utilizing local police. The character of PK in urban settings is increasing, commensurate with the roll of formed police units.

The question of the US role in supporting UN PK missions in Africa arose. International and regional organizations are working to resolve and prevent conflicts in Africa, which is echoed in the current UN Secretary General’s theme of preventing violence. The UN Development Programme and the World Bank are producing a report on preventing violence based on recent experience. Ambassador Haley has been very pragmatic in looking at efficiencies and effectiveness of UN PK efforts in Africa. PK missions tend to be more focused on stabilizing the region, and less on resolving conflict. As political strategy and process are matched with the PK efforts, these missions may actually be prolonging conflict. African nations value highly the principle of subsidiarity, in which the UN Security Council defers to the African Union, which defers to the sub-regional organizations involved or responsible for a specific conflict situation. Subsidiarity has limited the UN input into some of these crisis, which has led to success in the west, and tragic misses in addressing violence against civilians in the east. There needs to be a pragmatic solution when it is not reasonable for a sub-regional orga-
nizations to take the lead because of conflicting interests with neighboring countries, such as in South Sudan. PK operations usually last 14-17 years, then restart as the drivers of conflict are rarely addressed through a diplomatic effort to staunch the bloodshed. The US has a humanitarian response to stop the fighting and killing of innocent civilians, but in the end, only the political economy of the conflict has changed, after being subsidized by the PK operation. There needs to be a constant evaluation as to why PK mission continue. Governments become dependent upon UN PK operations to provide security for the region, or as something that can be leveraged against their opponents. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) are hollow organizations. The AU is only now developing a formula to pay for itself. Up until 4 years ago, only 4 countries of the 54 AU contributors were paying for their membership, so now they are levying a tax to maintain their Chinese-built facilities. These organizations are aspirational, but have a lot of political challenges. These regional organizations are definitely where the U.S. needs to focus their resources, ECOWAS functions well when Nigeria is strong, but falters when they do not understand their resources and capabilities. The U.S. needs to play a greater role in PK operations to effectively enhance their capabilities. Providing funding alone is inadequate, and does not connote an ability to be openly critical of the mission without participation. The Chinese view participation in such operations as a worthwhile investment, thus to keep pace the U.S. should as well.
INTRODUCTION

The last decade or more, terrorism has become a major security challenge confronting most African countries. Although the causes of terrorism may vary from country to country or region to region, they are largely attributed to issues of unemployment, poverty, poor economic opportunities, hopelessness, regime repression, corruption, injustice, inequality, and massive violations of human rights against women and minorities. The manifestations of terrorism include: suicide bombings, car bombings, kidnapping of humanitarian aid and foreign workers and school children, attacking mosques, churches, transport terminals and hotels among others.1 Although state and non-state actors employ anti-terrorism measures, the threat of terrorism continues to undermine the sanctity of most African states, and as a consequence, slows the pace of socio-economic development. This paper examines three issues: intelligence gathering, training, and border security management. These issues are perceived as key anti-terrorism measures in Africa and the paper argues that the adoption and strengthening of these measures can reduce the threat terrorism poses to the continent. The paper first employs the theory of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as an explanatory model that underpins the recent upsurge in terrorism in Africa. Although Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have largely advanced the ‘greed’ component of the theory as an underlying reason for the emergence of civil wars,2 it is argued that grievance factors are increasingly becoming motivations for the evolution of terrorist groups in Africa. To understand these issues, the second section of the paper places in context and examines the experiences and lessons learned from implementing anti-terrorism measures after key terrorist incidents in Africa. The final section examines three anti-terrorism measures as a way forward to preventing and responding to terrorism in Africa.

‘Greed’ and ‘Grievance’ and Terrorism in Africa

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) first introduced the theory of ‘greed and grievance’ under the title, On Economic Causes of Civil War3. Essentially, ‘greed’ refers to the economic opportunity of groups to engage in conflict which thus makes looting a key motivation for civil wars. This suggests that there is a degree of correlation between abundance of natural resources and the possibility of conflict outbreak. For instance, income from natural resource predation such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone were cited as important sources of finance for the rebel movements. Earnings from natural resources was a motivating factor for the emergency of many warring factions in the Liberia Civil War.4 On the other hand, ‘grievance’ model examines inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious divisions as causes of conflict, with ethnicity being the root cause for conflict in Liberia.5 However, among the many proponents of these contrasting theories, greed trumps the grievance argument as the cause of conflicts. To this end, scholars such as Mats

---

On 17-18 October 2017, Brigadier General (Dr.) Emmanuel Wekem Kotia, Ghana Deputy Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Commandant visited the U.S. Army War College & PKSOI as part of a four US institution (National Defense University, Army War College, Air War College - AY18 and Kennesaw State University) tour designed to gather facts and information on best practices and potential lessons learned for the establishment of a new National Defense University in Ghana. BG Kotia also took this opportunity to strengthen KAIPTC’s relationship with PKSOI.
Berdal and David Malone (2000) argued that measures of social grievance, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions, have little systematic effect on the risk of civil war. They assert that it is primarily financial viability; that is greed, which motivates rebel groups.

Indeed, while the ‘greed’ factor is largely true in perpetuating conflicts such as the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo, this paper argues that unlike with civil conflicts, social grievances are greater contributing factors to the growing threat of terrorism in Africa. In most cases, an individual or groups’ frustration regarding perceived deprivation (although relative), fosters aggression within an individual or group, which can then manifest itself in the form of political violence and terrorism.

Reflecting on the African situation, most religious groups, ethnic minorities, lower and middle income earners and other social groupings feel marginalized relative to the distribution of state resources. In other words, those in authority such as political elites control state resources, and the creation of social classes. For instance, the Touregs in Northern Mali and Northern Niger feel marginalized and neglected as they benefit little from state resources such as gold and uranium. In Senegal, the Casamance region feels alienated from the mainstream political administration of the state. In Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has persistently waged attacks against the Nigerian state for not benefiting from the rich oil resources in the Niger Delta. While the Boko Haram (BH) terrorist group in Nigeria appears to be waging a religious war, part of BH’s grievances are the growing inequality, poverty and marginalization perpetuated by ‘corrupt’ political elites. Libya’s uprising in 2011 resulted in the emergence of multiple terrorist groups, which was promulgated by grievances such as lack of democratic space and human right abuses by the Gaddafi regime. These examples attest to the fact that grievances cannot be downplayed as key motivations that can engender groups to engage in terrorist acts.

EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS

Experiences

There is no doubt that terrorism continues to pose enormous security challenge to most African states. Since the 1998 simultaneously coordinated bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a series of deadly attacks were recorded in Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, and recently in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire among others. The effects of these attacks have been devastating, killing scores of innocent people and destroying key infrastructure and buildings. This has created panic and fear among the population in Africa. In response, states as well regional organizations made conscious efforts at developing frameworks and devising anti-terrorism strategies. In most cases, however, strategies become obsolete or counter-productive because of the rapidly changing nature of terrorist group’ strategies and tactics. Admittedly, many terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab, BH, Ansar Dine, and Ansaru are operating across Africa with new tactics and sophisticated equipment, which African security agencies cannot match with outmoded techniques and strategies. It is instructive to note that BH, for example, engaged in proselytization (dawa), which included recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalization of its members before 2009. These were non-violent approaches to pursuing their ideological agenda.

However, in July 2009, the Nigerian military adopted radical counter-terrorism measures, leading to the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the BH moderate leader. In response, and to demonstrate resilience, BH adopted rather violent and desperate measures to achieve their political and ideological goals. Nigerian authorities failure to prosecute those who were responsible for the extra-judicial killing of the BH leader Yusuf, constituted one of the principal grievances of the members of the sect.

Consequently, the group became more violent and as noted by Campbell:

Boko Haram [has become] brutal, fully exploiting the propaganda value of violence. Its murder methods are grisly, featuring throat-slitting and beheadings, which it sometimes captures on video for propaganda purposes. Initially, most of its victims were members of the security forces, persons associated with the government, and Muslims who actively opposed the group. Now, however, victims include women, children, and Muslims who merely do not actively support its agenda.

As Nigeria introduces more anti and counter-terrorism measures, including amnesty negotiations, the introduction of emergency law and the massive deployment of security forces, Boko Haram also continues to change its tactics and strategies causing more havoc to human lives and property in North-Eastern Nigeria.

Kenya’s role in fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia attracted reprisal attacks in Kenya, resulting in the 2013 attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi that left at least 65 people dead. In April 2015, al-Shabaab killed 147 students in Garissa University in Kenya.
Intelligence is information that is analyzed and converted into a product to support a particular cause. Intelligence has taken a centre stage of importance. While intelligence alone cannot stop the next terrorist attack in Africa, it is the critical first step in identifying and possibly preventing one. Intelligence gathering at the strategic level is used for long-term planning and for assessing the capabilities of potential opponents at the operational level. With good analysis and the production of clear evaluations, security agencies could have an effective tool to use in an effort to identify potential terrorist operations and targets within their community. Good intelligence has the ability to predict when and where future terrorist operations might occur, based on the probability of their most advantageous targets for their cause. Therefore through intelligence gathering, state security forces are in a better position to successfully preempt future terrorist attack.

The use of intelligence in preventing all forms of crimes is very important. However, with regards to terrorism, coordination of intelligence gathering efforts and information-sharing between and among states on the one hand, and the regional organizations on the other, is absolutely imperative because of the increased movement of terrorist groups across borders. Therefore, intelligence gathering should not be limited to only a state, but should be coordinated across states, and similarly among regional groups and communities. It should be noted that France has already adopted an anti-terrorism strategy in Africa and the Sahel in particular. Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and La Cote d’Ivoire also have anti-terrorism strategies. While similar anti-terrorism measures exist in the region, there is a need for the coordination of efforts to ensure effective management and monitoring of terrorist threats and radical groups. However, the effectiveness of these measures will be optimized when locals are involved in information gathering and sharing through an active monitoring process. Such an effort calls for measures to educate and create awareness among the population on the need for timely and accurate sharing of information on the activities of suspicious groups suspected to be terrorists.

The threat of Boko Haram has encouraged Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon to coordinate efforts to create a multi-national force to fight the threat. Together with Benin, five leaders within ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have resolved to speed up the creation of a headquarters for the multi-national force and have deployed military battalions "to [their] respective borders". The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has also been created for the Lake Chad Basin countries supported by the AU.

But the coordination efforts in information gathering should not be limited to the core security agencies alone. Issues of

Lessons

It is evident from the experiences of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism measures adopted against Boko Haram and al-Shabaab by Nigerian and Kenyan governments respectively that, the use of hard security or a military approach will not always be an effective measure in addressing terrorist threats. Kenya has seen reprisal attacks from al-Shabaab from Somalia. BH, originally a less violent terrorist organization, was transformed into a more formidable violent group as a consequence of the unsanctioned killing of their leader Yusuf. BH’s operational focus over time has changed from attacks on churches and mosques to detonating bombs indiscriminately, kidnapping civilians for ransom, improving the effective employment of improvised explosive devices and the capturing and retention of territory. The capture of over 200 girls in Chibok, Nigeria and their ill-treatment, including forcing them into sex and forcible marriages is a consequence of changes in tactics, arguably emanating from Nigeria’s hard counter-terrorism measures. This should serve as a lesson to states and regional forces, as well as continental organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) that, the fight against terrorism should be multi-dimensional, and in some instances, context specific. But more importantly, intelligence sharing, border security management and training are key elements of anti-terrorism in Africa.

ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES

Anti-Terrorism actions are defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts or activities. Anti-Terrorism actions may include limited response and containment of local security forces. Other anti-terrorism measures include instituting awareness programs for the populations, as well as proactive measures adopted to prevent terrorists from carrying out their activities, and collaboration among security agencies within a particular state and between nations-states in Africa. Anti-Terrorism measures are therefore aided by good intelligence training for security agencies, and sound border security management.

Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence is information that is analyzed and converted into a product to support a particular cause. Intelligence is both a process and a product, and has played an important role in diplomacy and warfare throughout history. In the information age and with the emergence of terrorism, intelligence has taken
security are more complex, broad and interconnected, hence the involvement of other identifiable non-core security agencies and local communities is of paramount importance. Perpetrators of terrorist acts in Somalia, Kenya, Mali and Nigeria, for instance, have been identified in local communities. In this regard, Nigeria introduced a community initiative known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which emerged first as a community effort, and later as a joint effort with the security forces to help detect and combat Boko Haram. Such an intelligence group may be located within communities, facilitating its ability to detect suspicious activities by groups planning to carry out terrorist attacks. The Civilian JTF members in Nigeria have successfully prevented many attacks through community surveillance and have assisted the security agencies to arrest Boko Haram members. This example of civilian and police interaction in Nigeria could be replicated in various countries within Africa as an anti-terrorism measure. Such a construct with proper coordination and structures could serve as an early warning system against terrorism.

The population should be trained to identify and report anything out of place or out of the ordinary, such as new people in the neighborhood who avoid security agencies, or changes in behavior of people you have known for some time. As terrorism continues to emerge as a security threat, Africa will continue to serve as a critical target. Through patience and vigilance, terrorists continue to further their cause through the cultural understanding of society and known population grievances. It is therefore important to continue to learn about those who choose to attack the peoples’ freedom and way of life. Security agencies will have to take the lead in this organized war against terrorism in Africa. Security agencies must develop transparent communication and intelligence links. Intelligence collection training will prove invaluable in these efforts.

Training

Individual countries, the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) should invest in training at two levels. The first level of training would focus on continuous security force training to remain current on the constantly evolving nature of terrorist groups in Africa. It should be noted that the military in many African countries does not have the requisite modern training to confront the evolving threat of terrorists in Africa. In other words, the changing dynamics of terrorists continue to defy and resist conventional, unilateral approaches, counter-measures and classical tactics of warfare. This is manifested in Nigeria, where Boko Haram, on many occasions, has been able to outwit the Nigerian security forces, and put into question the capability of the MNJTF. The security forces in Africa have not been adequately equipped to confront the asymmetric nature of tactic adopted by modern terrorist groups. Intelligence agencies in various states continue to adopt obsolete methods of intelligence collection and analysis, and are easily outwitted by modern-day terrorist groups. Apart from the intelligence agencies, other security institutions in Africa continue to adopt conventional measures as tactic for anti-terrorism activities, which are always outpaced by emerging terrorist groups using asymmetric tactics.

The second training area concerns the AU and member-states, which should focus attention on training the youth, especially Muslim youth on the misconceptions of ‘jihad’, which has become a springboard for engaging in radicalization and militancy across many countries in the region. It has been argued that the concept of ‘Jihad’ has largely been misunderstood, misinterpreted by some Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and as a consequence “hijacked” and misapplied by extremists and terrorists to achieve ideological and political goals. Efforts at disabusing the minds of the youth about misconceptions should be comprehensive, including impartial religious, moral, secular, as well as peace education.

To prevent terrorist attacks in Africa, it is important that the strategies of the security agencies are reformed to conform to current emerging threats facing the continent. Training for intelligence agencies for instance will need to be re-focused towards emerging security threats confronting the continent. The recruitment and deployment of intelligence operatives should be re-designed to meet modern challenges of intelligence gathering. Intelligence as a key element of anti-terrorist efforts could then contribute significantly to the prevention of terrorism in Africa. The fight against terrorism will fail without the refocusing of intelligence agencies from regional protection to a more progressive and human-centered approach. Equally important, regular security agencies comprised of the Armed Forces, the Police, Gendarmeries and others would need to be re-equipped and retrained to confront well-motivated and well-trained terrorists. In addition, most of the forces in Africa are still adopting conventional warfare tactics while the terrorist are using asymmetric strategies, causing a mismatch of outdated strategies and training methods. The newly created division in Nigeria was largely unsuccessful in preventing Boko Haram activities due to the type of equipment and tactics deployed in the northeast at the onset of the fight against BH. Africa nations need appropriate equipment and modern strategies in order to combat terrorist tactics.
Border Security Management

Although the concept of borders has historically shifted in definition due to globalization and increased technology, nonetheless, borders still define the territorial sovereignty of states and play a pivotal role in global peace and security. Consequently, the consolidation of borders remains one of the key factors in building stable states, and more importantly the fight against the increasing threat of terrorism in Africa. This means that, all governments or member-states across Africa should aim at maintaining secure borders, not only as a requirement for national sovereignty, but also as a measure for ensuring terrorist groups do not exploit existing border weaknesses to perpetrate acts of terrorism. In this regard, there is the need to adopt comprehensive normative frameworks on border security management, properly demarcate various borders, and provide adequate infrastructure to enable border managers to be able to detect and prevent possible entry of terrorists. Indeed, the fluidity of African borders has facilitated the movement of terrorist networks across the region, especially with the increasing radicalization and growth of violent extremists groups.

With the possible exception of SADC, the other four regions of Africa continue to grapple with the threat of terrorism. There is no doubt that the continued destabilization of Libya with multiple terrorist groups operating with relatively impunity, inherently implies that other North African states need to collaborate for effective border security management. In West Africa, the persistent insurgency of BH in Nigeria, and isolated attacks in neighboring states such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad, has called for more collaborative efforts. The establishment of the MNJTF within the Lake Chad Basin is significant in this regard. The repeated attacks of al-Shabaab in Kenya acts as a forcing function for collaborative border security measures among the East African states. Similar effort is needed in the Central African states, with the development of the ‘anti-balaka’ militia in Central African Republic, which occasionally attacks AU peacekeepers.

The AU in part developed the AU Border Programme (AUBP) based on the requirement for collaborative border security. The AUBP was established on four pillars: delimitation and demarcation; cross border cooperation; capacity and partnership; and resource mobilization. Efforts should be made at implementing this landmark policy document for effective border management.

Border Security and Terrorism

Africa experienced significant level of terrorist activities over the past two years. The continent is facing daunting tasks of managing its borders in ways that secures their territorial sovereignty and integrity, ensuring bridges rather than barriers exist between states. States are recognized under international law for their capability to maintain their boundaries, secure their territories, and protect their citizens. The ability to secure national borders is one of the criteria used to classify states as strong, weak or failed. Terrorist have been crossing porous and poorly secured borders in Africa with ease, often armed with weapons, bomb making material and radical ideology. One particular area of note for the case of terrorist movements is the Sahel region.

CONCLUSION

This paper argued that terrorism constitutes a major security challenge in Africa, notwithstanding the fact that legal frameworks and anti-terrorism measures and strategies exist across the continent. As evidenced in this paper, most measures adopted by states in responding to terrorist threats have been at best less than effective, and at worst, counter-productive. In Nigeria, for instance, the adoption of hard core military anti-terrorism approach emboldened BH, changing its tactics to become even more daring and violent in killing innocent civilians in unimaginable proportions. The AU’s coordinated attacks on Al-Shabaab in Kenya precipitated reprisal attacks, killing many people in Kenya. The question then is how do states and regional organizations in Africa prevent and respond to terrorist attacks? Intelligence gathering, regular training and effective border security management are all important aspects of an anti-terrorism campaign. Regional and continental organizations such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and the AU should ensure there are sustained efforts at addressing governance challenges such as corruption, inequality, marginalization, youth unemployment among others, which are drivers of violent extremism.

Notes:


5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
12 Richard Hughbank,Intelligence and Its Role in protecting Against Terrorism', Journal of Strategic Studies Number 1, Volume 3, No1, March 2010.
16 Ibid.
19 Ibid
Summary

The Department of Defense has gathered biometric and biographic data on millions of individuals in past military operations, largely, but not exclusively in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Although named operations may conclude, history and statistical analysis indicate identity data accumulated from each operation will remain useful for decades as unstable states fail to achieve enduring peace agreements, return to conflict, and invite international responses. Data from past conflicts will assist warfighters and peacekeepers with identifying friends and foes in new operations, support international counterterror efforts, and – speculatively – may deter enrolled members of the population from becoming combatants in a renewed conflict.

For more than two decades now, United States service members have conducted foot patrols through repetitive urban environments and maritime operations in unchanging seas encountering the same individuals innumerable times. Often, what is true at the tactical level may be true at the strategic one, as well. A brief survey of post-Cold War conflicts around the globe will reveal certain names again and again – names like Liberia, El Salvador, Sudan, Yemen, Mali, or a better-known one like Afghanistan. Anecdotally, military operations, from major combat to humanitarian relief, often cluster in certain regions or countries. Rigorous academic studies of the topic make the same case.

If U.S., allied or partner military forces operate in the same countries repeatedly, it is likely they will interact with many of the same inhabitants. To prepare for such future contingencies, armed forces must retain biometric and biographic information about the encountered individuals in order to recognize known threats and vet trusted parties. The burgeoning field of Identity Activities – and in particular, forensics and biometrics – will help ensure the U.S. is able to meet this challenge.

Recurring Conflict

Depending on how one organizes the data (such as post-Napoleonic, post- World War II, between states or within states), rates of conflict recurrence range anywhere from one third of all conflicts to three quarters. Of conflicts in progress today, it is near certainty at least one will flare back up within a few years, with South Sudan as a recent example.

The dominant aggravating factor is a lack of settlement from the initial conflict. If one party declares victory, but other parties remain strong enough to contest it, then renewed war is very likely. The most stable outcome involves an unambiguously stronger side imposing a settlement on its weaker peers. However, the very nature of peacekeeping operations implies this is not the case. If a conflict’s outcome was truly stable, no peacekeepers would be needed. A peacekeeping requirement implies at least one side is both strong and motivated enough to disrupt the peace, absent the outside force. Thus, when peacekeepers leave – as the United States, United Nations, and other foreign forces almost always do – there is a good chance the peace will degrade and conflict will return.

In fact, some studies put a timetable on the resumption of war from uncertain peace. Stephen L. Quackenbush and Jerome F. Verlicher (2008), observed:
...the predicted duration of peace following imposed settlements/decisive outcomes is about 260 months (over 21 years). This is nearly seven years longer than negotiated settlements/decisive outcomes, with a predicted duration of about 180 months (15 years), and over nine years longer than no settlement/decisive outcomes, with a predicted duration of about 150 months (less than 13 years).\textsuperscript{7}

Inconveniently, the same study notes the vast majority of interstate conflicts between 1816 and 2001 ended in stalemate, the least stable outcome.\textsuperscript{8} Though this study mainly reviewed conflicts between states, it hints that the principle holds true within states as well.

This supposition is borne out by Barbara F. Walter (2010), who reviews civil conflicts between 1945 and 2009, finding 57 percent of all civil wars had at least one sequel.\textsuperscript{9} She adds that by the 2000s, 90 percent of then-ongoing internal conflicts had recent precursors. In an earlier paper, Walter (2004) notes that with the growing frequency of recurring civil wars, such conflicts not only involve the same territory, but often the very same people. For a variety of reasons, “the soldier who enlists in one war is likely to be the same soldier who enlists again and again.”\textsuperscript{10} The propensity of past combatants to become future combatants has clear implications for Identity Activities, and its sub-fields of biometrics and forensic exploitation.

**Identity In Theater**

Every one of us is a practitioner of biometrics, whether we realize it or not. Each time we see a familiar face or hear a voice we know, we perform basic biometric functions. The sequence is simple – our eyes or ears identify a unique biological characteristic of another individual, the brain matches that characteristic with our catalogues of acquaintances, and we access contextual information on the individual, such as a name, leading to recognition.

Modern biometric technology supplements human capabilities by adding extra modalities – such as fingerprint, iris and DNA scans – and retaining identity information in an electronic form accessible to any authorized individual, so recognition of a friend or foe does not require prior personal acquaintance. Forensic exploitation amplifies this by allowing recognition of unknown individuals who left their biological traces – generally fingerprints or DNA – at a site or on an object. Years may pass between encounters, but the fusion of biometrics and forensics allows any soldier to identify individuals enrolled by other forces, even if that soldier was unacquainted with those individuals before.

Criminal investigators employ this principle every time they solve a “cold case” – or overturn convictions – by analyzing DNA from decades-old evidence. The Department of Defense routinely does the same thing in support of its own missions. In an extreme case, a former Iraqi soldier from Saddam Hussein’s army, fingerprinted and photographed after surrendering in 1991, was identified in 2012 – by algorithms, not acquaintances from 21 years before – when applying to work on a U.S. installation in Iraq. This particular individual was not a threat, but his case highlights the longevity of such biometric records and the value of data going back decades. More routinely, individuals linked to entities such as ISIS or the Taliban today are often matched to their biometric enrollments from the mid-2000s, providing important clues to their histories and networks.
From the perspective of force protection and prevention of insider threats, identity information is an invaluable screening tool. Persons known to have connections to hostile groups or activities can be identified and kept out of positions of trust. If U.S. or Coalition forces return to a country in which they have previous biometric records, they can immediately identify individuals from the past. This will assist in determining who is safe to work with, who should be questioned, and who should be considered hostile. It is likely that some past enemy combatants will have risen over the years to positions of influence, but this time on the side of the government, and vice versa. Identity Activities will assist coalition forces in sorting through who is whom and how loyalties have changed, which can be used to create association matrices to better understand alliances, and assist in planning stability activities in the theater.

A complex interplay of reasons contributes to each individual’s decision to fight, while a core goal of peacekeeping and stability activities is to mitigate those factors. Walter (2010) speaks of the “micro-level motives” driving scattered individuals to evaluate the potential rewards of fighting as worth the risk. "Civil wars have little chance of gaining momentum to get off the ground unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and workers voluntarily choose to enlist in the armies that are necessary to pursue war, and it is the underlying political and economic conditions that make enlistment attractive that are likely to drive a second or third civil war." Identity Activities can play a role in revealing these motives at the individual level. If disproportionate numbers of combatants hail from certain towns, have certain social connections, or possess some other shared character-istic, such knowledge may go a long way toward identifying core grievances or finding points of agreement. Identity Activities is not a solution in and of itself, but it could point the way to one.

As individuals weigh taking up arms versus staying home, Identity Activities may have a more direct, albeit unexamined role. Here we pose a question: does biometric enrollment reduce the chances of an individual returning to the fight? If a former combatant knows he is enrolled in a biometric database, could this deter him from joining a future fight, or, if he must, to do so on the side of the recognized government? After all, the loss of anonymity dramatically changes the risk/reward calculation for a prospective terrorist or insurgent. If this supposition is accurate, it would be reflected by lower recidivism rates for enrollees compared to non-enrollees, however data is sparse. The recidivism of former Guantanamo Bay inmates (every one of whom is biometrically enrolled) is known to a degree, but arguably the Guantanamo population is not representative of the typical combatant. This would make for an excellent future study.

Identity Abroad

People leave their home countries every day for opportunities abroad. Most are simply trying to make a better life for their families; others wish to cause harm to those whom they blame for their troubles. A country with recurring conflict is apt to produce more of the latter than a more stable state. Thus, identity data from past conflicts can protect the U.S. and its allies at their borders.

This has been borne out on numerous occasions in recent years as U.S. border authorities have biometrically identified and stopped a slow, but steady stream of individuals connected to terrorist and criminal networks. Source countries range from Colombia to Kosovo to Afghanistan, with many others represented. Further investigation may reveal innocent motives for their travel, as people with unsavory pasts can become benign over time, but identifying these individuals is required before one can even begin to evaluate their intentions.

With the coming collapse of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, thousands of former combatants – with not-so-innocent intentions – will flee Iraq and Syria. Many were former members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and a large subset of those – including their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – were once detained in U.S. camps, where they were biometrically enrolled. As they disperse, some will attempt to continue their struggle abroad, or at least find a measure of solace in revenge. The post-ISIS wave will continue to validate the need for older identity data, dating all the way back to 2003 and the roots of the Iraqi insurgency. Speaking more broadly, as future conflicts end in stalemate, and
renew in still-unstable countries, combatants may find the best way to gain their desired leverage is to attack their countries’ neighbors and allies, as opposed to institutions within. Every conflict is different, but it is not uncommon for insurgent groups to conclude their countries’ governments would fall without Western support, and that attacking Western targets is the best way to hasten this outcome. In such a situation, an individual known formerly as a domestic insurgent may become an international terrorist. Sharing identity data from the earlier conflicts will be vital to identifying such individuals during their travels.

Concerns

Although a conflict may recur in a given country, the international response to it will not necessarily repeat. Different states, organizations and coalitions will respond to each crisis according to their interests. With this degree of fluidity, identity data must be shared if information from past stability operations is to assist with planning future ones.

Ultimately, the level of trust between partners will determine the level of information sharing. One state may fear sharing identity data with an authoritarian state out of fear it would be used to oppress the enrolled population in some way. Other states might fear losing control over the distribution of their data. Cybersecurity presents another concern; a state known to be frequently hacked may not be able to obtain information from partners fearful of data theft. The decision to share or not to share, with its potential effect on military operations and border security, can be interpreted as a subtle, but pointed “soft power” tool in which identity information is analogous to a trade agreement or technology exchange. Sharing of identity data between international partners exemplifies the degree of trust between partners.

Though they may disagree on policy, international partners are generally stable countries. Host nations with recurring internal conflict cannot say the same. Sharing identity data with such unstable states introduces the risk of reprisals, both from the government and the armed opposition. An unscrupulous state may use identity data from its foreign partners to single out minorities or political opponents for unequal treatment. If such a state is toppled and the opposition gains access to the database, it may use identity data to identify former members of the defunct government and exact revenge.

As Glenn Voelz (2016) indicates from past U.S. experience, “Counterinsurgency strategy... called for U.S. forces to help reestablish rule of law and support local governance. This included the transfer of biometric information and technologies to local partners, as well as training on the utilization of these tools as part of legal proceedings.”15 Taking full advantage of identity capabilities to this degree requires trust which may not initially exist. The refusal to share may protect the integrity of identity data, but the host nation may interpret such reluctance as a perception of the host’s weakness or incompetence. In future actions, the host nation may perform down to this level of expectation. However, sharing of sensitive identity information with a host government is not just an operational decision, but a strategic one signaling international political commitment to ensuring stability, thus policymakers must choose wisely.

Conclusion

Conflict recurrence is not a desired outcome, but history shows it is sadly a probable one for which military planners must be prepared. As such, the absence of a major ground operation does nothing to devalue accumulated identity data. Significant evidence indicates the conflicts of tomorrow will be fought in largely the same places as today, and identity data from those areas will be vital for future conflicts. That same data provides an additional tool to protect the borders of our own country and those of our partners, and the ability to distribute this data to or withhold it from partners supplements our soft power arsenal. Additionally, enrollment in a biometric database may deter past combatants from taking up arms again.

While not exactly mature yet, the technological foundations for Identity Activities are far from new. Biometric devices and global information networks are now commonplace in the private sector, and forensic disciplines are well established in law enforcement. Military doctrine though, is still evolving. Today’s
leaders will ultimately determine the place of Identity Activities in military operations of all kinds.

Notes:

6 Ibid., p. 725.
7 Ibid., p. 737.
8 Ibid., p. 728
11 Ibid., p. 372.
12 Ibid.
As one might expect, these narratives are not the thorough, evidence-based stories that historians aim to create. Rather, they are selective or fabricated accounts that give insurgencies the legitimacy they desire. Therefore, the insurgent groups must eliminate the historical accounts that would invalidate their own evidence by demonstrating the existence of multicultur-al communities in the Middle East. ISIS’s aim of altering the historical record to eliminate challenges to their legitimacy has wreaked havoc on historical sites throughout the Middle East. Not only is this destruction fulfilling an ideological goal, but antiquities trafficking of artifacts from these sites provides funding and material support for ISIS. The destruction of cultural heritage sites threatens the preservation of local and world history, and endangers the work of thousands of historians, archaeologists, conservationists, and museum experts who have dedicated their lives to preserving and sharing history. Furthermore, the destruction of cultural heritage sites hurts the local communities by threatening the memory of their culture and their legitimacy to continue their way of life in their communities. As the United States continues military involvement in the Middle East and other areas with rich archaeological identities, we must be aware of the important role that history plays in controlling narratives and legitimacy and work towards prevent-ing further destruction.

The destruction that ISIS is perpetrating is not an original tactic. Iconoclasm - the destruction of religious icons or monuments - has been used for centuries by those who wish to erase evidence for beliefs that contradict their own. In the Byzantine Empire, iconoclasm became a topic of concern during the 8th and 9th centuries. Although iconoclasts cited the Old Testament in their arguments against idolatry, artistic representations of Christ and the saints continued. In 726 CE, Byzantine emperor Leo III publicly denounced the use of icons. His successor, Constantine V, undertook a rigorous mission against idolatry. He summoned the Council of Hieria to focus on his fight against idolatry. During the French religious wars of the sixteenth century, the use of icons continued to be a concern for followers of the church, particularly Calvinists. The Calvinist’s Institutes of the Christian Religion specifically denounced the use of icons, leading to the attacks and destruction of Genevan churches.

Europe would see destruction based on religious ideol-ogies again centuries later via the destruction of Jewish temples by Nazis during World War II. The most infamous incident of this era was Kristallnacht, a night that saw the destruction of well over 1,000 German Jewish synagogues.
with the intent of intimidating Jewish communities and erasing any trace of the existence of Jewish people in Germany. However, Nazi destruction did not stop at objects that represented Jewish religion; even secular art created by Jewish artists was targeted. In 1937, the Nazi party created an art exhibit of “degenerate art” that was shown across Germany and Austria. The art was divided into categories which included art that was blasphemous, art by Jewish or Communist artists, art that criticized German soldiers, and art that offended the honor of German women. The exhibit was created specifically to demonstrate “wrong” art. Many of the paintings were crowded together and hung askew, making them unappealing to audiences. The criticism and ridiculing of this art was an attempt by the Nazi party to claim authority over artistic culture and support the Nazi claim that they were somehow superior to others. Iconoclasm has been widespread not only over time, but also across geography. During the Chinese cultural revolution in the 1960s and 70s, the call to “sweep away monsters and demons” inspired the destruction of artwork that appeared to be supporting capitalistic values. This art was replaced with images of farmers, laborers, and revolutionaries which supported the ruling party’s ideals.

Since the turn of the century, Islamic extremists have taken the lead in the destruction of historic sites and artwork. ISIS possesses much more efficient means for destroying historic sites due to their employment of modern equipment such as bulldozers and high-explosives. In fact, many of the places, especially religious shrines that ISIS destroyed were targeted in the past, such as the Temple of Baalshamin and the Palmyra temple dedicated to Ball, which were targeted by the Romans in 273 AD. However, the most important change in ISIS’s destruction compared to historical cases of iconoclasm is the cultural aspect of the destruction. Attacks on churches, such as in Mosul, and the destruction of statues of Mary and Jesus follow historical Islamic iconoclast practices, but the destruction of secular museum artifacts and archaeology sites is different. ISIS goes beyond destroying idols, the worship of which is forbidden in Islam, as they also destroy statues that, as Abbas Shouman, under-secretary of al-Azhar University in Egypt noted “are nothing but stone and no one believes they are gods.” James Noyes, an iconoclast expert, discussed another important characteristic of ISIS’s actions, such that, if these were purely “devotional acts of destruction,” there would not be a need for the viral videos of the destruction; they could be performed in private. However, these videos demonstrate the effective destructive power of ISIS, provoke international outrage, and, according to Noyes, dis-credit their holy principles. While there is certainly still claims of religious ideals behind much of ISIS’s destruction, the insurgent group has also molded the destruction into a “deliberate weapon of war” to eliminate the history of local communities.

The list of sites that have been destroyed includes Khorsabad, the Assyrian Lion Statues, the winged bulls at Nineveh, Jonah’s Tomb, the city of Nimrud, the Mosul Museum, the city of Hatra, the city of Mari, and the Buddhas of Bamiyan. Many of these sites were thousands of years old and had been declared World Heritage sites by UNESCO as all of them held important pieces of history. The Buddhas of Bamiyan were towering statues, the tallest of which was 55 meters high, carved out of the sandstone cliffs of central Afghanistan in the sixth century. Initially, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban leader, wanted to preserve the Buddah statues. Since there were no Buddhists in Afghanistan anymore, he felt that the statues were not icons, but simply historical artifacts. However, Omar was overruled and in 2001 the Taliban declared the Buddhas to be idols and destroyed them. Another example of destruction for the purpose of “cultural cleansing” is the ancient fortress city, Hatra, Iraq. The site of Hatra had existed for 2,000 years until ISIS destroyed it in 2015. The loss of historic architecture and artifacts led UNESCO to declare this destruction as a war crime. UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova took this stance based on the argument that “there is absolutely no political or religious justification for the destruction of humanity’s cultural heritage. Another ISIS victim is that of Nimrud, Iraq, founded 3,300 years ago and once the capital of the Assyrian empire. ISIS captured the city in June of 2014 and by March of 2015 most of the citadel, palaces and tombs of Assyrian kings, Assyrian temples, statues, and frescoes had been destroyed with the use of bulldozers and other heavy vehicles. In an interview with Layla Salih, one of the archaeologists who inspected the site after its destruction, concern was expressed for what remains of the site, since the lack of security amid the destruction made it easy for looters to enter the site and cause more damage before archaeologists and conservationists had time to fully inspect the damage and take measures towards preserving it. Experts frequently have to face the challenge of accessing and protecting these sites after destruction, a task which can only be difficult, but also dangerous. For example, many of the sites are rigged with explosives, rendering the sites unstable for people to enter.

One of the most prominent examples of the damage that ISIS has done to historic sites is found in the ancient city of Palmyra in Syria. Palmyra was an important cultural center during the first and second centuries A.D, and served to link multiple cultures both in function and design. This grand city served as a meeting place for caravans traveling between Persia, India, China, and the Roman Empire, thus connecting the ancient world. Its architecture also contained multi-cultural influences, combining Greco-Roman architectural and artistic techniques with local Persian traditions. This unique combination of influences, noted especially in the Temple of Ba’al, dedicated to the ancient Palmyrene god of the same name, was part of the creation of a distinctive aesthetic and artistic style. This temple started as a mud-brick structure, constructed during the first millennium. Over time as the city grew the temple was modified and updated. The final layout of the temple with a stepped platform, main hall, and surrounding colonnade clearly demonstrate Greek influences and made the temple appear very similar to other traditional Greek temples. However, there were also elements of traditional Palmyrene architecture, such as the off-centered entrance, pedimented windows, and special chambers called thalamos to house divine statues. The rediscovery of this site by European travelers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed to a revival movement of classical artistic styles in the West.

The artistic and historical significance of the city of Palmyra to our world history was officially recognized when it was added to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) list of World Heritage Sites in
In September of 2015 ISIS destroyed the Temple of Ba’al, and in October they destroyed Triumph’s Arch (Arc du Triomphe). In March of 2016, Syrian forces retook Palmyra with the aid of Russian air power and special forces. However, ISIS retook Palmyra in December of that year. Over the course of ISIS’s control of Palmyra, the Tetrarogon, theater, and museum also suffered enormous amounts of damage.

The destruction of these historic sites occurs at the expense of local populations, who not only facing the destruction of their homes and community infrastructure, but also the destruction of the visual history of their people. UNESCO Director-General Bokova explained the goal of the Islamic State’s destruction of historic sites: “You deprive [the targeted groups] of their culture, you deprive them of their history, their heritage, and that is why it goes hand in hand with genocide. Along with the physical persecution they want to eliminate - to delete - the memory of these different cultures.” In circumstances where people are being killed and communities torn apart, most people would assume that foreign intervention should prioritize humanitarian assistance and put the task of protecting historic sites as a secondary priority. However, in these circumstances, supporting a community’s efforts to protect their heritage is one of the most important types of international support.

In order to counteract ISIS’s advancements in Syria and Iraq, the United States led a coalition of air strikes and ground operations beginning in 2015 that continues on today. As previous engagements in the Middle East have shown, the United States’ military has not always prioritized the preservation of historic sites in war zones. Peter van Buren, former US Foreign Service Officer for the State Department, who worked with the US Army in Iraq in 2009, recounted that during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, US Marines built a helicopter pad on the ruins of Babylon and filled sandbags with crushed pieces of ancient pottery which are important elements of the archaeological record. He clarified that while the destruction caused by US military personnel was much less drastic than the deliberate and targeted destruction at the hands of the Islamic State, it nonetheless contributed to the loss of cultural heritage in the Middle East. Another well-known example is the Iraq National Museum, which was looted in 2003, supposedly with the knowledge or even support of US military forces. Matthew Bogdanos, a Colonel in the US Marine Corps Reserves, led the investigations into the looting of the museum and has published a book, Thieves of Baghdad, detailing his work there. In this book Bogdanos proposes a four-part strategy to combat antiquities trafficking. Perhaps the most important part of this strategy is his proposal to increase cooperation between law enforcement and the art and archaeological communities. There is not a need to re-invent the wheel when it comes to saving historic sites; there are already experts who are familiar with these sites, with their historical significance, and with methods to continue to preserve them. What does need to happen is for the knowledge and capabilities of these experts to be utilized.

Many museums played a significant role in raising awareness for the importance of cultural history and the danger that the preservation of this history is in. An excellent example of this approach was the exhibit entitled “Cultures in the Crossfire,” at the University of Pennsylvania’s Cultural Heritage Center in Philadelphia until November 26, 2018. The entrance to the exhibit explains the significance of the Middle East to the history of the world, referring to this area as the “cradle of civilization” because so many important developments such as agriculture and writing originated in the Middle East. The entrance included a quote from Andre Parrot, a well-known French archaeologist and the former director of the Louvre Museum, eloquently explaining the importance of Middle Eastern history: “Every person has two homelands...his own and Syria.” This exhibit displayed a lot of the excellent work that is being done by the Safeguarding the Heritage of Syria and Iraq Project, which aims to provide training and empowerment to Syrian cultural heritage professionals, so that they can work towards saving their own heritage.

The Penn Museum is not alone in raising awareness about Middle East History to the public. “Eternal Sites: from Bamiyan to Palmyra,” displayed from December 14, 2016 to January 9, 2017 at the Grand Palais museum in Paris, utilized footage taken from drone cameras to create 3-D reconstructions of Palmyra. In an interview about this museum exhibit, former Chief of Staff for President Hollande of France, Sylvie Hubac discussed the urgent need, “For all of us to become aware of the major disasters that have hit our universal heritage over the last few years.” This perspective, that the history of the Middle East belongs to all of us, is necessary if there is going to be advancements made in the global community towards stopping the destruction of historic sites.

Conclusions

Understanding the way that the Islamic State has used the destruction of cultural heritage as a weapon of war is essential
to our ability to effectively counteract their efforts to intimidate and demoralize a community through the erasure of that community’s history. While experts in archaeology, curation, and preservation make efforts to preserve the historic sites and artifacts that remain, the people who are in the midst of the destruction can help to ensure that there is minimal damage inflicted upon cultural heritage in the future. It is also important and beneficial for US military personnel working in these areas to acknowledge and utilize the expertise of local professionals, who are already knowledgeable about the historical significance of the sites and collections that they work with regularly.

Notes:


5 The prohibition against worshiping idols appears in Exodus and Deuteronomy: “You shall have no other gods before me.”;


9 “IS and Iconoclasm.” Atlas Obscura.

10 “IS and Iconoclasm.” Atlas Obscura.

11 “IS and Iconoclasm.” Atlas Obscura.

12 “IS and Iconoclasm.” Atlas Obscura.

13 “IS and Iconoclasm.” Atlas Obscura.


Matthew Bogdanos, Thieves of Baghdad, p.274.


http://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1350/

In cases such as Palmyra, it can be very dangerous for experts to be able to enter the site to inspect the damage because ISIS rigged the area with explosives. The drone cameras were sent into Palmyra by a Syrian group called Iconem, founded by architect Yves Ubleman, who is hoping to use the footage to share the beauty of the city with more people as well as to prepare for restoration of the site in the future; “The effort to save Syria’s Palmyra gets help from a drone and an algorithm.” PRI’s The World, 03 January 2017. https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-03/effort-save-syria-s-palmyra-gets-help-drone-and-algorithm. Accessed 23 March 2017.
From 14-15 November 2017, over 500 delegates from more than 70 countries and international organizations convened in Vancouver for the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial conference. Alongside representatives from the African Union, the European Union, NATO, and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, these delegates worked to coordinate and improve UN peacekeeping operations, as well as secure new pledges from Member States.

While there has been no shortage of commentary about U.S. contributions to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions since the transition to the new administration, much of this discussion has been at the level of strategic engagement and governmental commitment to fulfilling the expectation of the US as a UN member. However, when it comes down to brass tacks, there is less public awareness of who, rather than what, the US dedicates to these peacekeeping missions.

The US currently contributes 55 personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions, including 4 UN Headquarters (UNHQ) staff, and 51 peacekeepers from the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. These personnel are deployed to 8 countries within 3 Combatant Command AORs, with representation outside of New York in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Israel (UNTSO), Liberia (UNMIL), Mali (MINUSMA), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Tunisia/Libya (UNSMIL). U.S. contributions to the United Nations are primarily supported by two DoD entities, the U.S. Military Observer Group out of Arlington, VA, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, out of the U.S. Army War College at the Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania.

The U.S. Military Observer Group (USMOG) is a joint organization that provides oversight of all DoD personnel assigned or allocated to the UN and Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to ensure that mission requirements are met. USMOG provides command oversight and administrative control over all DoD personnel serving with the UN as well as administrative and logistical support before and during their assignments. They also coordinate with the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN (USUN) to process nominations and coordinate Mission placement, while also providing comprehensive pre-deployment training for all personnel before deploying to their assignments.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) has resided at Carlisle Barracks for over two decades. PKSOI promotes the collaborative development and integration of peace and stability capabilities across the United States Government (USG), international organizations, and the community of interest in order to enable the success of peace and stability activities and missions. PKSOI focuses on peace and stability operations (PSO) at the strategic and operational levels, and supports PSO via policy development, the design and review of civilian and military training programs and education, collection and dissemination of lessons learned, and advises the development of requirements and capabilities to plan prepare, and execute PSO. With a footprint of 50 interagency personnel
and contractors, PKSOI offers a breadth of subject matter expertise including Protection of Civilians (PoC), Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response, Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law, Governance, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, amongst other topics.

In early 2017, USMOG and PKSOI executed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to cooperate on a number of efforts to improve the overall effectiveness of the United States’ peacekeeping capability. USMOG and PKSOI support mutual leader education development via visits of foreign troop contributing countries (TCCs) and UN officials. They also cooperate on shared training support for UN staff officers and Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) peacekeeping pre-deployment training. While USMOG focuses on preparing DoD personnel to serve in UN Missions through both classroom instruction and tactical training, PKSOI provides academic and operational resources through the execution of high-level research and the provision of subject matter experts (SMEs).

Most recently, USMOG undertook a 4-week pre-deployment training session to prepare 31 future peacekeepers to deploy to the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and South Sudan. These troops – including 4 females, for a total of 6 female peacekeepers deployed, just shy of the UN goal for Troop Contributing Countries to field 15% female peacekeepers within missions – are prepared for deployment via both UN-mandated classes and briefings, as well as USMOG/DoD specific training and Mission-specific preparation.

In addition to providing subject matter expert Staff Officers to enhance the effectiveness of UN Missions, the U.S. also offers logistics and technology support to enhance the capabilities of its military trainers and subject matter experts. The U.S. also offered specialized expertise to strengthen the counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capabilities of UN missions – a particularly valuable offering to the MINSUMA and AMISOM peacekeepers. Further, the commitment of $2 million to augment pre-deployment training for African police peacekeepers facing violent extremist threats across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will help enhance the operational effectiveness of these forces.

Contributing more than $1 billion since 2005, the United States is the largest contributor to policing and military capacity building efforts in support of international peacekeeping, including both support to the United Nations and other complementary training initiatives. In FY2017 alone, the U.S. also funded over $160 million to the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) and the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support (IPPOS) programs. These concerted efforts, represented by Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan at the Canadian Defence Ministerial, seek to use all instruments of U.S. national power to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape environments to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. With no shortage of complex environments emerging across the globe, the skills and capabilities of the USG in building peace will continue to be a key contribution of the United States to global order.
American soldiers would tell a story during the Vietnam War about the mythical North Vietnamese Army recruit Nguy-en-Nguyen who, after being drafted from the rice paddies of North Vietnam and spending three months in basic training, was assigned the important task of transporting four 82 millimeter mortar rounds to his comrades in South Vietnam. Nguy-en spent four months traveling the Ho Chi Minh Trail suffering monsoon rains, malaria, scorpions, leeches, the odd B-52 strike, and artillery barrages, to reach his comrades near Saigon. Then, much to his chagrin, he watched as his precious cargo was instantly fired off by his new squad mates in less than a minute. After which the squad leader turned to him and said “Good job Nguyen, now go back for more.”

While apocryphal, the difficult, months long journey it took to traverse the route is historically accurate, and illustrates how inefficient the Ho Chi Minh trail was, especially in its early days. While extensive efforts to interdict the trail were a hallmark of the war in Vietnam, with reluctance and even disdain, the U.S. Navy approached the important task of closing maritime routes into South Vietnam demonstrating its persistent hesitancy to become entangled in the messy littoral and riverine environment that frequently harbors nascent threats.

In 1961 North Vietnam established Military Transportation Group 759. Its mission was to exploit South Vietnam’s unguarded coast by delivering supplies to the insurgency by sea. South Vietnam had no capability to interdict this traffic, despite having identified the need to its U.S. partners. Group 759 used small coastal junks and ocean going trawlers to deliver supplies. The manifest of one of these trawlers, captured in 1965, included 1,100 small arms, 50 light artillery pieces, 1,800 of those mortar rounds Nguyen-Nguyen so laboriously transported to his comrades, and over 300,000 rounds of ammunition. By comparison, it took a North Vietnamese transport battalion of 500 troops five months to carry 1,600 rifles, 800 knives, and a mere 400 pounds of explosives to the south in 1959. The land route was very inefficient, with up to one third of dispatched supplies being consumed by the transporters in route. During these crucial early years of the revitalized insurgency, coastal and ocean transport was far more effective than the still developing Ho Chi Minh Trail. In its first 15 months, Group 759 delivered over 1,400 tons of weapons and ammunition to the south. By 1964, a fleet of 20 cargo ships were making twice weekly deliveries to the south, totaling 4,000 tons that year. By early 1965, small junks and the trawlers completed hundreds of trips. Seizure of one of these trawlers, coming on the heels of a damning report circulating in Washington, became a (too late) turning point in the U.S. Navy’s involvement in the Vietnam War.

Vung Ro Bay

In February 1965, a camouflaged trawler was found surreptitiously offloading its cargo in South Vietnam’s Vung Ro Bay. Airstrikes quickly disabled her and boarders found nearly 100 tons of weapons and ammunition along with documents indicating this was the vessel’s 23rd smuggling mission.
Discovery of the Vung Ro trawler followed right on the heels of, and seemed to validate, what is known as the Bucklew Report. The Pacific Fleet Commander commissioned the study to investigate infiltration activity within the Mekong River Delta. The study noted South Vietnam’s inability to secure its coast, and that “Viet Cong operations… can feasibly infiltrate personnel and equipment by land, sea or air at times and areas of their own choice.” The report made several recommendations on intercepting coastal traffic, but stopped short of calling for U.S. involvement in riverine interdiction, noting that “There were many of our top level people who were determined that the Navy would never become involved in muddy-water operations.”

With the Vung Ro incident and the Bucklew report coming in quick succession, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and the Pacific Fleet (PACFLEET) staffs quickly planned for joint U.S./Vietnamese patrols. The Navy’s sudden motivation came, in part, because the Army Chief of Staff knew about the findings in the Bucklew report and was “out raising hell” about North Vietnamese ships supporting the insurgency, while also berating the Navy for “not doing anything about it.”

By April 1966, a Task Force of sixteen vessels, supplemented by patrol aircraft, and networked with five joint coordination centers, effectively ended voyages by the ocean going trawlers from North Vietnam. But the 5 years North Vietnam exploited this maritime route were essential to sustaining the insurgency. This grace period allowed the overland route, commonly known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to be expanded and improved to the point that loss of the sealift support was not decisive. But even this expanded land route owed more to mobilization of labor than efficiency. A two month campaign in the summer of 1965 used 140,000 man days of labor to logistically support the trail improvement effort. Also, the lightly referenced river passages continued to be ignored until 1967 and were not fully secured until 1969, allowing North Vietnam to fully exploit that gap. Estimates after the war alleged that up to 80% of material delivered to the southern provinces came via the waterways of the Mekong River Delta.

Vung Ro Aftermath

The irrefutable evidence uncovered on the trawler in Vung Ro Bay, reinforced by the findings in the Bucklew Report, unmasked a blind spot the Navy had refused to acknowledge, but this revelation was only partially addressed and the solution was framed within its strategic priorities. The Navy’s reluctance to implement a more comprehensive riverine and littoral blockade was influenced by the Navy’s larger strategic challenges. The emergence of the USSR as a developing global naval power, and the threats China posed to Taiwan focused the navy on these blue water challengers. This muted interest in supporting what was assumed to be a land based counter insurgency effort in Vietnam. While the events of 1965 were impossible to ignore, they resulted in using the tools at hand, such as ships and skills developed to operate in the open ocean. This task force did shut down transits by larger ocean going vessels, but development of light craft that could have been so useful in coastal and inland waterways, was put in a much lower category when compared to the modernization and new construction of aircraft carriers, their escort vessels and amphibious assault ships. Without a platform to conduct littoral and riverine missions, doctrine and training on these concepts was similarly relegated within the Navy. The joint Army-Navy River Assault Force effectively cleared and secured the Mekong river delta, but this occurred after the strategic turning point of the Tet offensive.

The 21st Century

The unchecked maritime infiltration into South Vietnam during the early to mid-60’s allowed the insurgency to flourish prior to the full mobilization of the Ho Chi Minh trail. The continued exploitation of river traffic throughout the war assured the insurgencies success. This lesson should not be forgotten today. Properly governed littorals are essential to stability ashore, and their unique complexity demand specialized approaches. In order to meet these challenges today the Navy must make modest investments in forces specifically trained and organized to operate in, and understand, the dynamics of the interplay between land and sea, which is endemic to the littoral environment. If not, current and future insurgencies, extremist groups, and criminal organizations will continue to exploit this environments’ special attributes with relative impunity.

Notes:

2. In 1961 a 500 man unit took 3 months to transit the Ho Chi Minh Trail, fully loaded troops could take 5-6 months to transit the 2000 kilometer trail. For more information see, Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. by Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 89 and 175.
3. By 1965 General Westmoreland believed up to 70% of the insurgencies supplies were arriving by sea, while the 7th Fleet commander thought less than 2% were, when crafting the initial costal surveillance operation, 7th Fleet arbitrarily divided up the coast of South Vietnam into zones designed to demonstrate its validity mathematically to “those damned DoD guys in McNamara’s outfit.” Admiral Blackburn later admitted that “This
is absolute crap, but it was the best we could do,” See Schreadly, From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 85.


5 Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets: Costal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam, 93. Problems with this maritime paramilitary police force were caught up in a larger debate about South Vietnam’s initiative to establish a Civil Guard, which the U.S. considered a private palace guard loyal to the president and not a legitimate police force.


7 Commander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, “Monthly Historical Summary: June 1966,” Appendix III.


11 Ibid, 127.


15 John D Sherwood, War in the Shallows, (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 2017),

16 Commander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, “Monthly Historical Summary: June 1966,” Appendix III.

17 Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 83.


20 Victory in Vietnam, 146.


Nadia Schadlow’s book “War and the Art of Governance” comes with an impressive set of accolades, notably Retired General, now Defense Secretary James Mattis’ endorsement on the back cover, and Scholar-General cum National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, as a reviewer of the pre-publication draft. Such endorsements make the book not only timely, but notably relevant to anyone wishing to gain insight into the views of today’s most senior national security leaders as they relate to the military’s role in governance.

Analyzing a range of cases from Mexico in the 1840s to Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st Century, Schadlow convincingly argues that the U.S. Army must look beyond merely fighting and winning our nations wars. Arguing that “in all its significant military interventions in the past, the U.S. Army has faced the need to shape the political outcome of the war.” (P3) In other words, victory is not assured through signing a surrender document, armistice, or peace treaty; the most important work comes after that, and the army should be prepared, and tasked, to do the bulk of it initially, as it has done so many times in the past. Nested in this argument is the well supported assertion that successful post conflict governance is the role of the entire force, not simply a few specially trained civil affairs experts.

America’s enduring debate about the role of the military in governance is a result of what the author terms a “denial syndrome,” rooted in the country’s founding, where discontent over the use of British troops to control the colonies led to codifying the subordination of the military to civil control in the U.S. Constitution. This manifested itself as a consistent reluctance to embrace the use of military governments in occupied territories. The denial syndrome worked both ways with many in the U.S. Army viewing military government as merely a necessity to control the rear area, so as not to be a distraction to the main effort on the battlefield. Compounding these factors, governance tasks became increasingly pigeonholed under the purview of civil affairs experts, and considered detached from combat. As the author points out, the civil affairs community reinforced this perception, in that it advocated and emphasized how unique these skills were. “Their emphasis on the ‘specialness’ of civil affairs strengthened the prevailing view of governance operations as separate and distinct from conventional war and the regular army.” (P21)

The preponderance of the book details the many governing experiences that the U.S. Army had throughout history. The five recommendations that track from the cases are all certainly valid, some more feasible than others given current army force structure, fiscal constraints, and political realities. Three proposals largely argue the necessity of military control of governance in post conflict environments, the other two go to the enduring need for a presence on the ground (which cannot be wished away by leveraging technology) and maintaining intellectual capability (writ large, not simply as a niche capability) to plan for and execute governance tasks.

But more surprising are some of the observations that do not directly follow through to the recommendations, for example, a consistent thirst for better guidance from Washington, which was seldom quenched, left commanders in the field to figure it out on their own. Given adequate authority however, they generally governed satisfactorily. The extent to which the U.S. Army successfully participated in governance tasks beyond public order and security is surprising, as was its effectiveness. For example, the rehabilitation and/or institution of compulsory education, that often had to strip away xenophobic or ultranationalist traditions, is consistently demonstrated as a key element to success. Schadlow notes that, in the case of Japan, the ministry of education became one of “the most zealous proponents of democracy.” (P131) The Army’s role in rebuilding the local economy is also noteworthy in many occupations. In Post WWII Italy for example, the military instituted price controls to control inflation, reformed the tax code, and rebuilt transportation infrastructure to restore economic activity. (P108) These aspects get at the fundamental reform and stabilization of a society which leads to true political victory. Noteworthy by its absence, is a Vietnam case study. Perhaps the most salient Cold War experience is only briefly touched upon as a step in the bifurcation between winning the conventional fight and “the other war.” (P274)

Also, while the case studies are excellent, there were events, perhaps symptomatic of Army and U.S. Government changes writ large, which possibly shaped the evolution of post conflict governance across time. Highlighting and connecting those dots may have better illustrated the system of denial, and better explained how we found ourselves with the unsatisfying Iraq and
Afghanistan results. For example, the massive reconstruction and development operations involved in occupying Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea, after which the U.S. shunted much of these capability into the reserves, leading to the Civil Affairs Branch, now with enough critical mass and patrons, to develop and promote the sense of specialness touched upon earlier. Perhaps most curious, and related to the absence of a Vietnam Case Study, is the selection of the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965, followed by the 1989 invasion of Panama. The stark difference between the two leaves the reader wondering if the Vietnam experience caused this system of denial to shift dramatically, not simply from the U.S. Army perspective, but perhaps also driven by the growth of broader U.S. Government, international government, and non-governmental organizations role in supporting post-conflict governance. What becomes evident to the reader is a misunderstanding of the roles between and among them as they relate to supporting or reforming governance institutions. Indeed, the author tangentially makes the case of a substantial shift from the 60’s to the 90’s by citing Panama as the first example of the Powell doctrine, but this aspect could be more fully developed.

This observation notwithstanding, War and the Art of Governance is an excellent read and any national security practitioner would do well spending time digesting it and considering the recommendations made as they relate to issues today and in the future.
“Above all, we value the dignity of every human life, protect the rights of every person, and share the hope of every soul to live in freedom. That is who we are.” President Donald Trump, July 2017.


“There can be no moral equivalency between nations that uphold the rule of law, empower women and respect individual rights of those that brutalize and suppress their people... Governments that respect the rights of their citizens remains the best vehicle for prosperity, human happiness, and peace. In contrast, governments that routinely abuse the rights of their children do not play constructive roles in the world. For example, governments that fail to treat women equally do not allow their societies to reach their potential... We must empower women and youth. Societies that empower women to participate fully in civic and economic life are more prosperous and peaceful. We will support to advance women’s equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and youth empowerment program.”

When President Trump signed the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017 into law this past October, he led the United States as the first state to enact the United Nations Security Council’s Women, Peace, and Security agenda into national law.

A WPS Strategy is due by October 2018

The DOD Implementation Guide outlines the following Actions to be taken and reported on annually by the U.S. Military:

1. Incorporate NAP objectives into guidance and planning documents.
2. Ensure appropriate training for personnel.
3. Designate personnel responsible for coordination of implementation.
4. Assist improving recruitment and retention of women in ministries and incorporation of women’s perspectives into peace and security policy.
5. Provide common guidelines and training to integrate women and their perspectives into security sectors.
6. Mobilize men as allies in support of women’s leadership and participation in security-related processes and decision-making.
7. Utilize public diplomacy and engagement to advocate for women’s leadership and participation, and to overcome barriers.
8. Assist building capacity to develop, implement, and enforce policies and military justice systems that promote and protect women’s rights.
9. Increase attention to the needs of male survivors, particularly boys, in GBV prevention and response programs.
10. Support demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs, including sustainable livelihood alternatives, that address the distinct needs of male and female ex-combatants and those associated with forces in other capacities.
UNSCR 1325 Pillars as reflected in the U.S. National Action Plan on WPS (2016)

**Institutionalization**: Through interagency coordination, policy development, enhanced professional training and education, institutionalize a gender-sensitive approach... in conflict-affected environments.

**Participation**: Improve inclusive, just and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women’s rights and effective leadership and substantive participation in peace processes, conflict prevention, peace-building, transitional processes and decision-making institutions in conflict-affected environments.

**Protection**: Prevent and protect women and children from harm, exploitation, discrimination, and abuse, including SGBV and TIP, and to hold perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments.

**Prevention**: Promote women’s role in conflict prevention, improve conflict early warning and response systems through the integration of gender perspectives, and invest in women and girls’ health, education, and economic opportunity to created conditions for stable societies and lasting peace.

**Access**: Access to Relief and Recovery (includes DEMOB, Disarmament and Reintegration Program) in order to respond to the distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected disasters and crisis, including providing safe, equitable access to humanitarian assistance. i.e., Ex-combatants

---

**Different Security Needs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women:</th>
<th>Men:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape &amp; Sexual Assault</td>
<td>Abductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking</td>
<td>Forced Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Marginalization</td>
<td>Gang violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping/Bride-napping</td>
<td>Organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of legal protection</td>
<td>Stress due to inability to protect family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honor-related threats</td>
<td>Alcohol abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of health services</td>
<td>Sexual Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Girls:</th>
<th>Boys:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape/sexual assault</td>
<td>Abductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced marriage</td>
<td>Forced Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early pregnancies</td>
<td>Lack of access to education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of access to education</td>
<td>Rape/sexual harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Recruitment</td>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Conflict affects women and children disproportionately**

**Current online training available on JKO:**

- “Improving Operational Effectiveness by Integrating Gender Perspective”
- “Role of Gender Advisors”

---

**WPS Agenda**

- UNSCR 1325 (2000) Women in peacebuilding*
- UNSCR 1820 (2008) Sexual Violence as a war crime*
- UNSCR 1888 (2009) Strengthen efforts to end sexual violence*
- UNSCR 1960 (2010) Violence against men, women and children*
- UNSCR 2106 (2013) Sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict, includes men*
- UNSCR 2122 (2013) Women’s role in conflict prevention/resolution*
- UNSCR 2422 (2015) Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (CVET)*
- UNSCR 2272 (2016) Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations
- UNSCR 2331 (2016) Human Trafficking

---

**The following publications include WPS content:**

- Joint Publication Stability (JP 3-07)
- Joint Publication Peace Ops (JP 3-07.3)
- Protection of Civilians (ATP 3-07.6)
- PKSOI SOLLIMS Lessons Learned Sampler. “Operationalizing WPS” (NOV 2017)
- Multinational Force SOP (PACOM)
Please provide your comments / remarks / thoughts / articles / proposals to help us improve the value of the PKSOI Journal!

Please send an email to Chris Browne, usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.pksoiresearchandpublications@mail.mil

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of PKSOI, the U.S. Army, , the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This journal is published quarterly by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. Content is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to the original author.