Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening an Insurgency through a National Reconciliation Program
Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq

Raymond A. Millen, Ph.D.
PKSOI Paper

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening an Insurgency through a National Reconciliation Program
Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

May 2020

Raymond A. Millen, Ph.D.
Author
# Table of Contents

Foreword ................................................................. v
About The Author ................................................... x
Introduction ............................................................ xii

Chapter One – Observations from the Malaya Insurgency
  Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation .................... 1
  Malay Government Commitment to the Reconciliation Program ................... 2
  Information Operations ........................................ 6
    Crafting the Reconciliation Policy ...................... 7
    The Means of Dissemination ............................. 8
    Instructions on How to Defect ......................... 10
  Repatriation Process ......................................... 12
  Utilization of Former Insurgents ......................... 14
  Conclusions ....................................................... 16

Chapter Two – Observations from the Vietnam Insurgency
  Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation .................... 18
  South Vietnamese Government Commitment to the Reconciliation Program .......... 21
  Information Operations ...................................... 24
    Inducement: Reconciliation Policy .................... 26
    The Means of Dissemination ......................... 30
  Chieu Hoi Reception Centers .............................. 33
    Reception Centers ......................................... 33
    Interview Process ......................................... 36
    Political Rehabilitation .................................. 39
    Vocational Training ...................................... 41
  Military Service of Ralliers ............................... 43
    Kit Carson Scout Program ............................... 44
    Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) ....................... 45
  Rallier Resettlement ......................................... 48
  Follow-up System of Ralliers ............................ 49
Foreword

*Death by a Thousand Cuts* explores the application of national reconciliation programs to undermine insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national reconciliation programs. Such programs have received little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study provides insights of particular interest for US assistance to countries suffering from an insurgency.

The insurgency in Malaya served as a testbed for a national reconciliation program, providing astute observations on the character of the insurgency. In this case, the British and Malayan authorities studied insurgent motivations for surrendering and adapted information operations and the reconciliation program accordingly. In time, they incorporated the reconciliation program into the counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately proved efficacious. The allies employed the voluntary services of former insurgents in information operations, intelligence collection, and military operations, with great success. Of interest to enduring stability, reconciliation allowed former insurgents to atone for their misdeeds and reintegrate into society.

As most Americans are aware, the Vietnam conflict was an acute threat to South Vietnam’s sovereignty. Following the example and advice of British efforts in Malaya, US and South Vietnamese authorities adopted a national reconciliation program called Chieu Hoi (Open Arms). Also noting Viet Cong disaffection in the ranks, the allies designed information operations and the Chieu Hoi program to encourage surrenders.
Moreover, the Republic of Vietnam government established scores of reintegration centers throughout the country, which provided care, education, and vocational skills for ralliers. As in Malaya, the allies employed former Viet Cong in extensive information operations, intelligence exploitation, military operations, and local security. While former Viet Cong successfully reintegrated into society, the long-term effects are unknown, in view of the North Vietnamese invasion and occupation of South Vietnam in 1975.

The insurgency in Iraq is relatively fresh in most American minds. Fortunately, a number of books and the official history of the conflict provide detailed observations of the conflict. From these sources, it appears that US officials initially focused on trying to avert an insurgency, which proved unavailing. Despite the lack of a formal national reconciliation program, Sunni insurgents (and some Shi’a) began making overtures to coalition commanders in 2005, which bore fruit in 2007. Of interest to this study, the use of reintegration programs in detention facilities provides insights for including reconciliation opportunities for incarcerated insurgents.

As Dr. Millen reveals in this study, some telling observations from these case studies are worth noting. First, insurgent cohesion is more friable than assumed, so a reconciliation program must provide a way out for the insurgent’s predicament. Information operations and national reconciliation programs must be designed to inform insurgents of the program, help them surrender safely, assure them of good treatment, and provide opportunities to reenter society as a productive citizen.

Second, host government commitment to the reconciliation program is imperative. Since long-term legitimacy and credibility of reconciliation rests on
the host government’s buy-in, allied patrons must devote considerable energy early to that end. Host nation management, resources, and linguistic/cultural acuity make the reconciliation program viable. While a counterinsurgency strategy without a reconciliation program is possible, long-term stability with such a program will not likely endure.

Third, a national reconciliation program requires time, resources, and funding. For counterinsurgency strategists, such an effort may appear inappropriate given the exigencies of the emergency. However, by their nature, insurgencies average ten years, so they are marathons, not sprints. In terms of potential military costs, casualties, and damage, the benefits of a national reconciliation program are worth the investment. The construction of reintegration centers during the insurgency can serve the same purpose for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the aftermath of conflict. Again, the value of the investment provides a variety of dividends.

*Death by a Thousand Cuts* provides a roadmap for assistance to countries embroiled in prolonged insurgencies. The Malayan and South Vietnam case studies provide practical details for the establishment and implementation of a national reconciliation program. The Iraqi case study adds to this knowledge with the use of reconciliation programs as part of detention operations. The defense community would find this PKSOI study profitable for extending global stability.

Scot N. Storey
Colonel, Civil Affairs
Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
29 April 2020
About The Author

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen (retired) is currently the Professor of Security at the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA. A 1982 graduate of the US Military Academy, he was commissioned as an infantry officer, and later served as a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States: 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 7th Infantry Division (Lt), the US Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. At the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, he served as the Director of European Security Studies, producing studies on NATO, Afghanistan, and counterinsurgency. Dr. Millen served three tours in Afghanistan first, from July through November 2003 on the staff of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army and the General staff; second with Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan from August 2006 to August 2007 establishing police coordination centers in northern Afghanistan; and third from September 2008 to September 2009 as an MPRI Senior Mentor for the Afghan Assistant Ministry of Defense for Strategy and Plans. Dr. Millen has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include Parameters, Military Review, Joint Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars Journal, Comparative Strategy Journal, Infantry Magazine, and the Swiss Military Journal. The second edition of his book,
Command Legacy, was published by Potomac Books in December 2008. In February 2019, he published the PKSOI book, Bury the Dead, Feed the Living, a history of Civil Affairs and Military Government during the Second World War. Professor Millen is a graduate of the US Army’s Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, as well as an M.A. degree in World Politics and a Ph.D. in Political Science from The Catholic University of America.
Introduction

National reconciliation programs have the potential to weaken an insurgency significantly and set the conditions for enduring stability after the conflict. As this study emphasizes, reconciliation is not a substitute for a counterinsurgency strategy but it is a vital component. It follows the counterinsurgency axiom that the military cannot kill its way to success. Rather, national reconciliation programs focus on soft power: psychological motivations of insurgents, a path to amnesty, ways to surrender safely, provision of medical, educational, and vocational services, and the reintegration of former insurgents into society.

This study recounts the use of national reconciliation programs during the Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq insurgencies. As with all insurgencies, the context was unique, but each shared commonalities which portended the potential of reconciliation as an enabler to success. While the literature on these insurgencies provides ample space to reconciliation, its import is often understated, almost as if to say, “While the military was doing the heavy lifting, these other activities also took place.” This study probes the proposition that national reconciliation programs should be one of the prominent pillars of a counterinsurgency strategy.

This study touches on the interaction of national reconciliation programs, counterinsurgency operations, and pacification programs. For reconciliation to work, insurgents wishing to surrender need both the opportunity to defect and the assurance of good treatment. Clear and hold operations are designed to deprive insurgents of territory and separate them from the populace. Pacification programs consolidate and build on the military successes, providing local security, policing, reconstruction, and essential services
to local communities. Ideally, these activities provide the space and opportunities for insurgents to surrender safely. This study explores whether a relationship existed between the expansion of government control of territory and the rate of surrenders.

The cost-benefits of a national reconciliation program came into play in Malaya and South Vietnam, but not so much in Iraq. A predominately military approach to counterinsurgency was costly in terms of combat power, casualties, and funding. National reconciliation programs were expensive as well. Resourcing information operations, reconciliation centers, educational and vocational facilities, and reintegration programs required a substantial investment. So, the mid- and long-term payoffs had to be high enough to justify the investment. Accordingly, the aggregate cost of killing an insurgent versus processing the same insurgent through a reconciliation program was an important factor. Further, whether or not the depletion of insurgent ranks through voluntary surrender would result in substantially fewer friendly casualties required due consideration. Since the insurgencies in question averaged ten years, the amount of time to establish and manage such a program was not a key determinant. Lastly, considerations of post-conflict stability made national reconciliation programs an attractive investment.

This study explores insurgent motives for reconciliation in each insurgency. A prevalent presumption was that insurgent cohesion remained unbreakable, that insurgents were committed to the united cause, and that only victory or death would end the struggle. Allied interviews of insurgents suggested that unit cohesion was not as tight as assumed. As such, understanding which factors compelled an insurgent to remain in the ranks or to surrender was
critical to the design of the reconciliation program and the prosecution of the counterinsurgency strategy. If personal reasons to defect predominated ideology and the insurgent cause, then the reconciliation program needed to address them. Psychological factors, such as fear, exhaustion, demoralization, and disaffection, were therefore important to the program’s information operations. The reconciliation program needed to offer ordinary insurgents a way out of their predicament safely, alleviate their uncertainty regarding their treatment upon surrender, and meet their aspirations. Further, the reconciliation program had to consider possible counteractions by the insurgent leadership to thwart reconciliation. Finally, the reconciliation program needed to acknowledge that the hard-core insurgents would likely remain irreconcilable. So the central question was whether they or the rank and file was the center of gravity to the insurgency.

In each insurgency, the commitment of the host nation government to the reconciliation program seems paradoxical. In Malaya, Britain was in the process of granting independence to a new government. In South Vietnam, the United States was the powerful benefactor to the government. In Iraq, the United States was the transitioning authority to the new government. In each insurgency, the great powers had the theoretical capacity to manage reconciliation without host government commitment. However, in Malaya and South Vietnam, Britain and the United States respectively invested substantial time and resources to gain host government commitment to reconciliation. Host government legitimacy was certainly a principal reason. But, since the reconciliation program was oriented to insurgent psychology, only the host government possessed the linguistic and cultural credibility to offer amnesty and craft messages which resonated with insurgents. Host
government personnel needed to manage the program to maintain this credibility. The great powers could provide advisors, resources, and funding, but the face of the national reconciliation program needed to rest on the host government.

The Iraqi government had no national reconciliation program, nor did the US coalition, due to the exigencies of the emergency, insist on one. Instead, reconciliation between Iraqi tribes and coalition forces occurred in an ad hoc, plodding manner. In spite of Iraqi government ambivalence, once reconciliation gained momentum, over one hundred thousand tribesmen allied with coalition and Iraqi security forces against al Qaeda and anti-coalition insurgent groups. Nonetheless, as this study points out, the failure of the Iraqi government to commit to a reconciliation program had detrimental consequences for Iraq during the post-conflict period.

US detention operations during the Iraq insurgency deserve special attention because they instituted reconciliation with the “COIN inside the wire” program. This novel approach physically segregated the hard-core from the general detention population, empowered moderate inmates to stand up to extremist inmates, and focused on the “battlefield of the mind.” Detention officials provided the moderates with educational and vocational training, religious instruction by traditional Islamic clerics, stipends, and family visitations. Although a contentious issue at the time, the detention transition (release) program provided a way for former insurgents to cleanse their past and reintegrate into society. Therefore, the detention reconciliation program provides practical insights, which complement the observations of the Malayan and South Vietnamese national reconciliation programs.
On one level, a national reconciliation program was a zero-sum gain, meaning a loss of an insurgent was a gain for the host government. While the majority of former insurgents chose to return home and lead peaceful lives, the Malayan and South Vietnamese governments took the program one step further by offering interested, qualified volunteers the opportunity to serve in the military or the government. Some served in the information operations and psychological warfare services, helping to craft sophisticated, resonating messages; several served as interrogators in military units and at reconciliation centers to glean perishable intelligence and to identify insurgent infiltrators; scores served on propaganda teams inside insurgent-controlled areas, where they provided information on the reconciliation program and shared their personal stories with local communities; they also made secret contact with insurgents to encourage defection; hundreds served as administrators and provided security at reconciliation centers; and thousands served in the South Vietnamese and US military as instructors on insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures, as scouts, and as counter-guerrillas.

A telling feature of the Malayan and South Vietnamese reconciliation programs was the totality of the effort. Public information services provided short documentaries at movie theaters, displayed posters and paraphernalia everywhere, published newspaper and magazine articles, provided media interviews from government officials and former insurgents; and dispatched theatrical troupes to villages. These information efforts served to inform the public of the reconciliation program and the need to accept former insurgents back into society. Further, most insurgents remained in contact with relatives and friends, which
used the proffered information to encourage them to enter the program.

This study only touches on the counterinsurgency strategies employed in Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq in order to provide historical context. To reiterate, national reconciliation programs are not a substitute or a silver bullet solution to an insurgency. If applied as such, it would likely fail because the other aspect of counterinsurgency operations are essential to sustain reconciliation.

and detention operations during the Iraq insurgency, the most comprehensive to date is the US Army War College’s two volume set, *The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006* and *The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011*. Finally, Anthony Lieto’s PKSOI article, “Rule of Law and Justice in Security Sector Reform,” and Conrad C. Crane’s *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* are exceptionally perceptive in understanding the reconciliation programs inside the detention facilities.

The intent of this study is to provide a roadmap for best practices in designing and implementing a national reconciliation program for future conflicts. For practitioners and advisers of counterinsurgency, host nation government commitment to a national reconciliation program is an imperative to success not only during the conflict but also to enduring stability in its aftermath.
Chapter One – Observations from the Malaya Insurgency

The Malaya insurgency (1948-1960) provided useful insights into the use of reconciliation programs. Since the insurgents were ethnic Chinese and land squatters, the British and Malayan authorities had a somewhat easier time separating them from the rest of Malayan society. However, the Chinese minority was large, so a concerted counterinsurgency strategy was necessary. While historians have devoted significant attention to the “New Villages” program, the reconciliation program received less notice. The reconciliation program was not a substitute for the larger counterinsurgency strategy, but it was a vital enabler and influenced the post-conflict period. This chapter recounts the main features of the Malayan reconciliation program: 1) insurgent motives for reconciliation; 2) government commitment to the program; 3) information operations; 4) repatriation process; and 5) utilization of former insurgents. Given Britain’s limited resources, the reconciliation program featured an approach beyond military action.

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation

From his experiences in the Malaya Emergency, Sir Robert Thompson observed that regardless of their reasons for joining an insurgency, an array of rebels will wish to defect to the host government. A contemporary of Thompson, Major General Richard L. Clutterbuk judged that disillusionment set in as the conflict persisted and victory remained elusive. The principal contributing factors included the abiding hazards of combat, heavy casualties, and hardships of living in the jungle. Their dejection increased as
popular support for the cause ebbed, with villagers regarding them as burdens rather than as liberators.³

Paradoxically, the insurgent leadership’s fanatical application of communist doctrine depressed morale and created desperation. While communist indoctrination and “self-criticism” sessions kept insurgents under control, they also created a sense of mutual suspicion, paranoia, and loneliness. Feeling misled and duped, guerrillas grew to hate their communist leaders, but they remained in the ranks out of a fear of summary execution if betrayed by their comrades, and thus a sense of fatalism set in.⁴

Fortunately, British authorities learned of the average insurgent’s plight through interviews with surrendered and captured insurgents. Consequently, they began developing a program which would offer a way for guerrillas to defect and subvert the insurgency from within. They also recognized that the Malayan government needed to take the lead on the reconciliation program.

Malay Government Commitment to the Reconciliation Program.

The Malayan government’s commitment to the defection program was part of a larger reconciliation process with the Malayan ethnic-Chinese community. The roots of the insurgency coincided with Britain granting statehood to Malaya in 1948, thereby creating the Federation of Malaya. Even before independence, relations between the ethnic Malay and the ethnic Chinese communities were dismal. While the ethnic Chinese represented 38 percent of the population (two million out of 5.3 million), they remained politically
disenfranchised, primarily due to long-standing ethnic discrimination and competition for jobs.\(^5\)

During the Second World War, Japanese occupation forces had expelled approximately 500,000 ethnic Chinese from their villages. Settling as squatters in jungle clearings, many of the ethnic Chinese formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) under the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which the British supported with weapons and equipment.\(^6\) With the return of the British after the war, the MPAJA morphed into the anti-British Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).\(^7\)

As the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party, the MRLA numbered 7,000 guerrillas with thirty to forty thousand cohorts providing “money, food, intelligence, and communications support.” Almost entirely ethnic Chinese, the MRLA operated in small groups (up to 50 guerrillas), launching raids and ambushes against British troops, as well as intimidation and murder against the ethnic Chinese communities. As is often the case, insurgents resorted to coercion and terror of the local populace to garner needed resources and acquiescence.\(^8\)

Slowly adapting their counterinsurgency tactics and strategy to the MRLA threat, British authorities conferred with the Malayan government to embrace a reconciliation program wholeheartedly, along with other political reforms, as a way to draw away rank and file insurgents from the MRLA.\(^9\) Gaining Malayan government commitment to the program was essential for three reasons. First, the government would need to manage and resource the program (i.e., a Malayan rather than a British face). Second, the government would need to assure ordinary insurgents that reconciliation was in earnest. Third, the government
would need to convince the population—many of them victims of communist atrocities—that reconciliation was in everyone’s best interests.\textsuperscript{10}

The British logic behind a reconciliation program rested on a firm foundation. Foremost, encouraging defections was to be less costly and easier than killing insurgents. Second, information gleaned from former guerrillas would yield accurate, expeditious intelligence on insurgent organization, locations, and tactics. Accordingly, precise intelligence would only require small unit actions rather than large, unwieldy military operations. Finally, once the humane treatment of surrendered insurgents became well-known, desperate insurgents under the communist tyranny would feel encouraged to defect.\textsuperscript{11}

According to Sir Robert Thompson, humane treatment of repatriated insurgents is essential to a reconciliation program. A policy of humane treatment signals the government’s genuine commitment to reconciliation. In turn, the government needs to inculcate humane treatment of surrendering insurgents in the security forces and the public.\textsuperscript{12} Of course, securing popular acceptance of this policy is difficult because such conflicts engender widespread hatred of insurgents. Consequently, the government must make a concerted effort to dispel hatred towards insurgents for moral and pragmatic reasons:

First, it leads to ill-treatment by the armed forces of captured insurgents and suspects, and encourages bullying of the population in insurgent-controlled areas. This is degrading to the troops themselves and is bad for their morale and discipline. It also creates a completely wrong impression of the government which they represent. Second, those who are hated become too scared to surrender to their
haters, even when cornered and wounded in battle. It takes a long time to build up in the minds of people subject to daily communist indoctrination and propaganda that they will be well treated if they surrender, and any case in which a person is not well treated is liable to do irreparable harm to the reputation of the government. (Just think what a superb line it is if the government can say and get across to the insurgent: “Leave your wounded behind after a battle: we will look after them”). Third, if the government is going to win, it is going to have to live with the after-effects. If there is a hate campaign, which will involve more than just the insurgents who live in insurgent-dominated areas, the government will find it very difficult to bring these persons back into the body politic as loyal and useful citizens ready to play their part in the future progress of the country. The sooner wounds can be healed the better.¹³

Major General Clutterbuk believed the Malayan government’s commitment to reconciliation had a salutary effect. Guerrillas learned over time that the government honored its promises of amnesty and that no guerrillas—with the exception of notorious terrorists—were prosecuted. Whether surrendered or captured, any guerrilla who cooperated with the government was classified as Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP), which encouraged other guerrillas to surrender and cooperate.¹⁴

Clutterbuk also assessed that persistent counterinsurgency operations and reconciliation were mutually supporting. Well-treated SEP provided relevant intelligence which permitted national security forces to pinpoint guerrilla bases. Operations became more effective, which harried insurgent
groups, inflicted more casualties, and prompted more surrenders. Clutterbuk concluded that this increased operational tempo created “a kind of galloping consumption that was fatal” to the insurgency.\textsuperscript{15}

**Information Operations**

British and Malayan authorities established a sophisticated information apparatus to promote the national reconciliation program. Sir Thompson recounted that the information campaign required synchronization of effort, a well-crafted plan, and astute, devoted personnel. The information services was the executive agency, ensuring that the various supporting efforts were integrated holistically. The information services had two audiences—the insurgents and the public. Coordinating its messages with the information services, the psychological warfare section focused on undermining insurgent will and encouraging surrender. For its part, the Malayan government sought to bolster public support for the war effort.\textsuperscript{16} The British recognized the powerful message of Malayan independence, so they made sure that the Malayan government was in charge, albeit with British support.\textsuperscript{17}

Two organizations managed the propaganda effort. As an executive agency, the information services concentrated on policy formulation and timely production of propaganda. It sought professional directors and editors to craft effective messaging. It coordinated closely with all government departments, including the military, to stimulate timely, effective dissemination of policies and events.\textsuperscript{18}

The psychological warfare section comprised about thirty personnel, the majority of which were former Chinese insurgents.\textsuperscript{19} Major General Clutterbuk noted
that the section’s team leader was ethnic Chinese, “who spent much time talking to surrendered guerrillas and studying captured documents. He was adept at forecasting their policies and reactions, and his psychological-warfare approach was based on the understanding gained from this constant contact with current Communist thinking.” British involvement was limited to organization and supervision so as to curb corruption and potential treachery. They left “the intellectual contacts with Chinese guerrillas and villagers—both in the police Special Branch and psychological warfare—to other Chinese.”

While contemporary societies view propaganda pejoratively as disinformation, the British at the time viewed it positively as a means of persuasion. To be credible, propaganda must state facts truthfully and without exaggeration (understatements are more effective than overstatements). Propaganda should be tailored to the various localities of the country since local communities focused mainly on parochial issues. Of great import, propaganda should be “interesting, and entertaining, as well as informative,” in order to establish and maintain an audience.

Thompson maintained that a genuine free press is a potent instrument for political legitimacy. The government needed to accept certain realities. One, insurgent agents would likely penetrate the press to distort facts. Two, the press would often engage in biased and irresponsible reporting, particularly sensational stories built on rumors and gossip. Government censorship, however, would prove counterproductive, sowing suspicion among the populace. Instead, the government should concentrate on confident, optimistic, and dignified messages. When mistakes are made, it should focus on corrective
actions and compensation rather than denial or cover-up.22

Crafting the Reconciliation Policy

As an integral component of the psychological warfare effort, Thompson articulated three objectives of the government reconciliation policy: “(1) to encourage insurgent surrenders; (2) to sow dissension between insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders; and (3) to create an image of government both to the insurgents and to the population which is both firm and efficient but at the same time just and generous.”23

In close collaboration with the government, the psychological warfare section rigorously crafted the explicit terms of the government reconciliation offer. Care was taken to make the offer appealing, reasonable, charitable, and clear. The scope of the initial offer required scrutiny since the government could always improve the terms but could not backtrack without damaging its sincerity. The Malayan government refrained from offering amnesty early since insurgents could interpret it as an indefinite offer covering future atrocities and as a sign of government desperation. Additionally, the communist leadership likely would have used it as a bargaining chip for political recognition as a legitimate party.24

The timing of the offer was important since the government had to make it from a position of strength, specifically after a major success. The offer intentionally distinguished between the leadership and the rank-and-file in order to promote discord. The government reiterated the offer occasionally, with subsequent overtures to specific local insurgent groups and even named individuals. The psychological warfare section intentionally avoided the terms “surrender” and “prisoner of war” for the purpose of sowing discontent.
between the leadership and the ranks, thereby promoting the theme, repatriation with honor.\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{The Means of Dissemination}

The information services utilized practically every means of dissemination imaginable. Commercial radio and newspapers were common media for encouraging reconciliation. Aircraft broadcast messages with loudspeakers and dropped leaflets. Vehicles with loudspeakers also broadcast messages, and ground patrols distributed leaflets in villages. Volunteer repatriated rebels provided voice recordings for broadcast messages and personally visited their home communities to tell their stories. The participation of repatriated insurgents in the information campaign proved most effective since active insurgents were more receptive to hearing from former colleagues than from government channels.\textsuperscript{26}

Propaganda films for cinemas and for mobile troupes visiting villages enjoyed great appeal. Repatriated insurgents provided testimonies as part of the film circuit, and they acted in anti-communist plays written by the information services. The novelty of films and plays was particularly effective for illiterate audiences.\textsuperscript{27} Clutterbuk mentioned an effective propaganda method:

Leaflets were dropped carrying two photographs of a guerrilla—one taken at the time of his surrender, scrawny and exhausted; another taken a few weeks later, plump and smiling, with his mother and his girl friend, standing in front of the family table stacked high with food. Apart from the suggestion that the Communists had misled them into wasting their lives, politics was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{28}
The omission of politics was insightful. The British likely concluded that trying to change individual beliefs was futile since they are part of one’s core values. Reintegration into society had greater significance as long as the repatriated insurgent remained a peaceful citizen. Essentially, whatever someone’s political beliefs, even radical beliefs, being a peaceful citizen counted most.

Instructions on How to Defect

The psychological warfare section disseminated leaflets, signed by the Malayan Chief Minister, throughout insurgent-controlled areas. These leaflets served as safe conduct passes and guaranteed food and medical attention to rallying insurgents. An example of an early leaflet stated:

TO ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE JOINED THE INSURGENTS

Many of your comrades, realizing that they have been deceived and misled by their communist leaders, have rallied to the Government during the past few months and have been well treated. The government now makes the following offer to all those bearing arms against the Government and those who support them:

1. If you now come in and co-operate with the government, you will be given fair treatment and the opportunity to “self-renew” and to join your families.
2. If you have committed murder or other brutal crimes against civilian members of the population, you may be required to stand your trial but your sentence will depend upon the
manner in which you subsequently co-operate with the Government.
3. This offer does not apply to those who are captured in operations, but if such persons subsequently co-operate with the Government, then they may be accorded the same terms as those who “rally” voluntarily.\textsuperscript{31}

Following Malaya’s independence in 1957, the government included amnesty in its offer. The front of the leaflets featured the terms, and the reverse side served as a safe passage pass in English, Malay, Tamil, and Chinese:

1. Those of you who genuinely desire to give up the armed struggle may come out of the jungle and may ask any individual to help to do this.
2. You must bring your arms with you or be prepared to state where they are so that they can be recovered by the Government.
3. You will NOT be prosecuted for any offense connected with the emergency which you have committed under Communist direction before this date.
4. Those who show that they genuinely intend to be loyal to the elected Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal life and to be reunited with their families, if they so wish.
5. As regards the remainder, they will be repatriated to China (with their families if they so wish) and will not be made the subject of any investigation but will be given fair treatment while awaiting repatriations.\textsuperscript{32}
In addition to the promises of good treatment, the government offered monetary rewards to insurgents who provided information which led to the apprehension or death of senior communist leaders. In terms of best practices, the comprehensive integration of military operations, genuine government commitment to reconciliation, and astute information operations enervated the communist insurgency.33

Repatriation Process

The British interrogated all insurgents in custody for intelligence and categorization. Those who rallied were classified as Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) and processed for reintegration. The British interrogated captured insurgents as well to ascertain the circumstances behind their captivity. For example, sometimes insurgents exhausted their ammunition as a matter of honor before surrendering. Therefore, the attitude of the insurgent during interrogation determined his status. For those who cooperated and expressed a desire to be a loyal citizen, the British classified them as SEPs. Those who remained recalcitrant were classified as Captured Enemy Personnel (CEP). CEPs were treated as criminals, brought to trial, and punished. Active insurgents quickly learned of both categories, which influenced their decision to defect as well as their attitude during interrogation.34

The British interrogated both SEPs and CEPs for intelligence, at times over extended periods. Regardless of the insurgent’s status, the British provided good treatment. Thompson observed that insurgents divulged a plethora of information over time. Interrogators often used known intelligence to verify information and to prompt an interviewee to provide
greater details. “This [technique],” in Thompson’s view, “shocks the truth out of him far more effectively than torture.”

If defectors had no useful intelligence, they at least provided information on their former colleagues and leaders still in the jungle. Quite a few brought in photographs and daily journals, which the intelligence services studied. As a result of this intelligence exploitation, local police stations had useful personal information on guerrillas operating in their districts.

As a result of the interrogations, the British processed SEPs and CEPs as follows:

(a) Those who are harmless, are of no further use to the government and can safely be allowed to rejoin their families immediately.
(b) Those who are of no further use to the government either in intelligence or in propaganda work, and who can be given such employment with the government.
(c) Those who are harmless and of no further use to the government, but who either have no employment or whose families are unable to support them. These should be sent either to a local rehabilitation camp, or to a specially selected village where they can be given further education, taught a trade or usefully employed. These camps and villages should be sited in a safe area, and the surrendered personnel should preferably be unguarded other than by themselves. (The ‘unguarded’ is important because the risk of one backslider is well worth the feeling of faith and confidence in the government which is built up in the remainder.)
(d) Those who may have to stand trial for their crimes. In fact, no one should be prosecuted
because it is most unlikely that the more brutal types will surrender. However, there may be borderline cases which require continued detention for at least a period. They should be sent to a special rehabilitation camp (unless satisfactory local facilities can be provided) where there are facilities for education and learning a trade, but the camp should be guarded. They should be eligible for promotion to (c).  

Remarkably, repatriated insurgents peacefully reintegrated into Malayan society with no accounts of recidivism. While reconciliation helped to weaken insurgent ranks, the British employed volunteer, repatriated rebels to assist the counterinsurgency effort.

**Utilization of Former Insurgents**

The British welcomed the services of repatriated rebels in a variety of capacities. To prevent potential treachery or insurgent infiltration, candidates were initially assigned tasks which seriously undermined the insurgent cause. Such tasks proved necessary to compromise candidates in the eyes of the communists.

The British Special Branch employed defectors at interrogation centers. Some select defectors served as interviewers to wheedle information from SEPs and CEPs. Some served as informants among the inmate population. And others provided background information on active combatants for psychological warfare leaflets and broadcasts. Partly out of gratitude for their good treatment and partly out of secure employment, these defectors served for months if not
years.\textsuperscript{40} Even after resettlement, former rebels could assist the intelligence services with their insights when needed.\textsuperscript{41} Since intelligence from the interrogation centers was perishable, the intelligence services needed to disseminate it to the operational forces immediately following interrogations in order to capitalize on the fervor of volunteers and before the affected communist bands displaced.\textsuperscript{42}

The psychological warfare section publicized the good treatment of defectors and captured rebels to encourage more defections. Propaganda also highlighted the rewards of payments and gainful employment of repatriated rebels.\textsuperscript{43} Of course, once they appeared in propaganda features, repatriated rebels were compromised, so they were beholden to the government for their safety and were unlikely to rejoin the insurgency.

The British military paid bounties to volunteers to guide patrols to insurgent bases. Irrespective of financial rewards, volunteers willingly led patrols to jungle camps to avenge the mistreatment by their despised communist leaders. Some of the volunteers were adept trackers, which British commandos used to track down senior communist leaders in raids or ambushes.\textsuperscript{44} One enterprising tactical commander employed former rebels as advisors on guerrilla tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as evaluating his units’ tactics, techniques, and procedures.\textsuperscript{45} This part of the reconciliation program was so effective, that American and Vietnamese militaries employed repatriated volunteers in various ways during the Vietnam War.
Conclusions

In comparison with other insurgencies, the twelve-year Malayan Emergency was relatively innocuous. British and Malayan security forces suffered 4,436 casualties, and civilian casualties were slightly higher at 4,668. The communist casualties were around 16,171, including 2,980 SEPs and CEPs. Yet, the contest of wills was difficult and protracted.

The reconciliation program reflected the British and Malayan adaptation to the character of the conflict, thereby exploiting the weaknesses of the communist revolutionary war. British and Malayan authorities displayed an amazing ability to learn and an openness to try different approaches as the conflict evolved. As became apparent, military operations alone were not pivotal to success. The reconciliation program was a reflection of that realization.

A key feature of the reconciliation program was its contribution to post-conflict adjustment. There was no need to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in the aftermath of the conflict because it was an ongoing program of the counterinsurgency strategy. Malayan government commitment to the reconciliation program significantly assisted in the reintegration of former insurgents into society. This feature accounts for the enduring stability of Malaya.
Chapter Two – Observations from the Vietnam Insurgency

The US counterinsurgency strategy in the Vietnam War was needlessly complex, costly, and protracted. From 1961 to 1962, numerous advisors within the John F. Kennedy administration recommended the creation of a fortified line along South Vietnam’s border with North Vietnam, through Laos’ southern panhandle, and anchored on the Mekong River (Thailand’s border). Such a fortified line would have prevented North Vietnamese infiltration of proxy troops and supplies along the nascent Ho Chi Minh Trail. Behind the safety of the fortified line, the Republic of Vietnam government would have crushed the Viet Cong insurgency with existing resources. The precedent for this strategy was the recent counterinsurgency experiences during the Korean War.

President John F. Kennedy rejected this course of action in favor of a counterinsurgency strategy confined to South Vietnam. Kennedy’s strategy failed because the rate of North Vietnamese infiltrations exceeded South Vietnam’s capabilities. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration ultimately opted for military intervention to avert the collapse of South Vietnam.

The allied counterinsurgency effort was prodigious, signifying the ingenuity and perseverance of the American military. One of the most inspired and successful initiatives was the reconciliation program from 1963 to 1972. This chapter examines the South Vietnamese reconciliation program: 1) insurgent motives for reconciliation; 2) government commitment to the program; 3) information operations; 4) reconciliation reception centers; 5) military service of ralliers; 6) Rallier resettlement; and 7) the follow-up system of ralliers. As this chapter details, the South
Vietnamese reconciliation program substantially expanded and improved upon the Malayan reconciliation program.

**Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation**

Vietnamese insurgent (Viet Cong) motives for defecting to the Republic of Vietnam government (RVN) were diverse and invariably personal. The protracted nature of the conflict (1961 to 1972), the military effectiveness of allied operations, and the ruthless behavior of the communist leadership created a feeling of anxiety, weariness, and alienation among the rank and file insurgents. Irrespective of individual reasons for joining the Viet Cong, the unremitting realities of fighting proved mentally debilitating. Most telling was the myth that the average guerrilla was ideologically motivated.

From the beginning, the communist leadership at all levels assured the proletarian ranks that the insurgency would achieve victory swiftly, and the populace would hail them as patriots. When these promises proved illusory and the conflict continued unabated, the average Viet Cong became disheartened and doubted the insurgency would prevail, especially once US military forces intervened. Adding to their despondency was the aloofness of villagers to the communist cause. As a matter of survival, villagers refused to take sides, became unsympathetic to the communist revolution, and avoided the Viet Cong to the point of even leaving their ancestral villages.

The effectiveness of US and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) operations had multi-ordered effects on insurgent psyches. Unremitting combat demoralized the Viet Cong. The fear of inevitable death, of abandonment on the battlefield, of never
seeing their families again, and of not having a proper burial was pervasive. Evading allied forces required constant movement in a harsh environment, which deprived them of adequate food, medical care, and rest.52 While few insurgents credited defeat on the battlefield as the reason for rallying, the loss of territorial control and severance from the succor of villages multiplied their hardships.53 The 1968 Tet Offensive debacle was a particular blow to their morale as hopes for a quick victory became forlorn.54 The US/RVN pacification program (1968-1972), which featured the clear and hold strategy, further isolated Viet Cong forces from their indispensable control of villages.55 Paradoxically, US/ARVN military successes provided excellent opportunities for Viet Cong soldiers to defect since communist leadership control was temporarily severed.56

Remarkably, US air and artillery strikes on villages did not alienate villagers or even prompt voluntary enlistment into the Viet Cong. Villagers fatalistically viewed their predicament as being caught between two warring powers (“a fly caught between two fighting buffaloes”) but harbored no reported animosity to the US or RVN governments. Villagers were not angered by the impersonal nature of air and artillery strikes; however atrocities and mistreatment by ARVN forces did incur their wrath, which prompted many to join the Viet Cong. Moreover, villagers appreciated US warnings of pending airstrikes and took the opportunity to depart the village, defying Viet Cong attempts to keep them in place as shields. A distinct majority of villagers blamed the Viet Cong for endangering their lives with their presence.57

The severe discipline and policies of the Viet Cong leadership engendered hostility, revulsion, and desperation among the rank and file. As the conflict
became prolonged, the Viet Cong leadership resorted to coercion of the populace (e.g., threats, intimidation, terrorism, and violence), so as to levy heavy taxes and to impress young men, women, teenagers, and even children into service, two issues which further alienated villagers. Some insurgents harbored deep resentment and revulsion over Viet Cong atrocities on family members. As they lacked motivation, impressed Viet Cong lowered unit morale and combat effectiveness, lacked commitment to the communist cause, and deserted at the earliest opportunity.58 In an effort to exert greater control and staunch desertions, the Viet Cong leadership exacted draconian discipline and punishment on their soldiers, which in turn further lowered morale and led to even more desertions and defections.59 A vicious cycle of desperation and recrimination pervaded the average Viet Cong’s miserable life.

Both conscripts and volunteers grew to loath Viet Cong cadre indoctrination and discipline. Typically, the Viet Cong leadership exercised stringent control over guerrillas using the three-man group system and the close scrutiny of political officers. The leadership prohibited fighters from visiting relatives, marrying, and raising a family. Since Vietnamese revered close family ties and the fighters suffered from homesickness, these restrictions were particularly vexing. Discontent also arose from the denial of leave for insurgents wishing to check on their families’ safety or contribute to their livelihood. Among other grievances, the reasons for defecting or deserting were overwhelmingly personal, and no amount of indoctrination could maintain devotion to the cause or to fellow colleagues.60

The major deterrents to defection were uncertainty of RVN government treatment upon surrender, separation from their families, the opportunity to
escape, and fear of Viet Cong retribution on their families. Surrendering in battle is always hazardous, and fear of mistreatment by RVN security forces created anxiety. Consequently, without a clear commitment of the RVN government towards reconciliation and the means of safe passage for defection, many Viet Cong insurgents would remain in the ranks.\textsuperscript{61}

In recognition of the insurgent’s dilemma, British and American advisors with counterinsurgency experience recommended the development of a reconciliation policy. While these advisors were the inspiration for the program, the RVN government needed to manage it for reasons of popular legitimacy, trust, and acceptance.\textsuperscript{62}

**South Vietnamese Government Commitment to the Reconciliation Program**

Like the British in Malaya, American officials in Vietnam recognized that it was more cost effective in terms of military manpower, money and casualties to offer reconciliation to Viet Cong insurgents. As such, the average cost of persuading an insurgent to defect was $125 as opposed to $400,000 expended to kill one. In short, expenditures associated with reconciliation—inducement, reception, vocational training, and resettlement—were far less than using military power to kill insurgents. Not only would a reconciliation program deprive the Viet Cong apparatus of manpower, food, and revenue, but it would also furnish the government with much needed skilled manpower for the economy and military.\textsuperscript{63} In essence, reconciliation was a zero-sum game.

Designated as Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) in April 1963, the Great National Solidarity program took several years before it became fully functional in
1967—fundamentally at the insistence of the United States. Still, it was not until the 1968 Tet Offensive that the RVN government fully embraced the Chieu Hoi program. Its haphazard development and effectiveness were the result of hardline attitudes, inattention, and the turbulence caused by the frequent changes in government and internal political struggles from 1963 to 1967. Many ARVN commanders and provincial chiefs passively resisted Chieu Hoi because they believed the program rewarded traitors. Thus, convincing sceptics of the program’s value was a constant struggle.

The nature of the conflict in South Vietnam reflected a prolonged insurgency, abetted by North Vietnam through trained Viet Cong cadres and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units. Having consolidated his political base in South Vietnam (1954-1958), President Ngo Dinh Diem launched an effective counter-guerrilla campaign in 1958 with the goal of eliminating residual Viet Minh cells. Diem’s campaign prompted Ho Chi Minh’s government in North Vietnam to render support to the Viet Cong (formerly Viet Minh), using infiltration routes through Laos into Cambodia and South Vietnam. Eager to showcase its theory on counterinsurgency in an appropriate setting, the John F. Kennedy administration abandoned Laos in early 1961 in favor of South Vietnam. From 1961 to 1965, the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations ultimately dispatched over 20,000 advisors, as well as a plethora of military assistance, to bolster the RVN military and counterinsurgency programs.

The war entered a new stage with the US military intervention in mid-1965. Along with the graduated escalation of airstrikes in North Vietnam, along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and in South Vietnam, US and RVN military forces waged largescale operations
as part of the attrition strategy (search and destroy). In the wake of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in early 1968, the Richard M. Nixon administration and senior military leaders adopted a pacification counterinsurgency strategy (clear and hold). The purpose of pacification was to separate insurgents from population centers using a combination of military operations (clear) and local paramilitary (popular and regional forces) to control all urban areas (hold). In the later stages of the war, US and ARVN forces launched raids into Cambodia and southern Laos to destroy North Vietnamese staging and logistical bases. The success of pacification coincided with Vietnamization of the war effort, both of which permitted a US military withdrawal from Vietnam. The failure of the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972 demonstrated the ability of ARVN to repulse North Vietnamese aggression when backed by US airpower and logistical support. Consequently, North Vietnam and the United States signed the Paris cease-fire agreement in January 1973, ending the war.\textsuperscript{67}

It was in this setting that the RVN government implemented the Chieu Hoi program. At its inception in April 1963, the RVN government ran the program in Saigon, constructing reception centers in provinces and districts with US funding and material. Starting in 1967, the RVN government extended reception centers to the village level. The program encouraged Viet Cong insurgents to “rally” in exchange for amnesty, guaranteed political and civil rights, vocational training, and job opportunities.\textsuperscript{68}

As the Chieu Hoi program evolved, the RVN government established the Chieu Hoi Ministry in April 1967 to signify its importance. Underscoring the government’s commitment to the program, Prime Minister Nguyen Gao Ky announced the Policy of
National Reconciliation in an April 1967 proclamation. In the wake of the 1968 Tet offensive, President Nguyen Van Thieu issued a July 1968 joint communique with President Lyndon Johnson reaffirming the RVN’s commitment to the Chieu Hoi program.\(^{69}\)

US authorities managed the Chieu Hoi program with three organizations. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program provided executive authority. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) furnished funding, logistical resources, and personnel. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) managed Chieu Hoi psychological operations. Accordingly, US authorities assigned American Chieu Hoi advisors to each of the four regions and 44 provinces. Additionally, US authorities issued pamphlets to American commands, explaining the Chieu Hoi program, its practical contribution to the war effort, and the guidelines for processing ralliers. To be clear, the United States remained the prime mover for the Chieu Hoi program. Without US persistence, the program would have likely floundered due to RVN skepticism of its value.\(^{70}\)

**Information Operations**

The persuasion (propaganda) campaign was multifaceted and tailored to appeal to several audiences: rank and file insurgents, the national government and sub-government leadership, local communities and families, the allied militaries, and the police. Due to the negative implications of the terms “defection” and “surrender,” US and RVN authorities sought a name which would strike the right cord with insurgents. Hence, Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) conveyed a sense of “welcome back,” and surrendered insurgents were called Hoi Chanh, which meant rallier or returnee. In contrast, the RVN government did not recognize as ralliers those insurgents who had deserted for home
or surrendered during combat. In effect, this approach sought to persuade insurgents to rejoin their families rather than to switch sides.\textsuperscript{71}

An important component of reconciliation was the RVN government’s recognition of economic and social grievances among rural peasants and workers, which the ruling establishment had ignored for years.\textsuperscript{72} The Viet Cong were adept at exploiting popular resentments to garner revolutionary support, so the pacification program sought, in part, to redress these core grievances.\textsuperscript{73} However, pacification would take substantial time and depended on successful counterinsurgency operations, which for the rural communities meant the ability of the government to seize and hold territory, thereby providing enduring security, as well as greater opportunities for insurgents to defect.\textsuperscript{74} In this sense, pacification and reconciliation were mutually supporting.

The effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi program depended on an intimate linguistic and cultural understanding of Vietnamese society, which the Americans obviously lacked. Communist soldiers regarded American-derived propaganda as laughable and ignored it. Only the Vietnamese, particularly ralliers, could provide these qualities for information operations. Thus, the Chieu Hoi program needed sufficient numbers of ralliers to provide advice and assistance in crafting messages that resonated. Initial coordination of the propaganda program among the various organizations operating in Vietnam was deficient as well. The first order of business was creating an effective organization for the effort.\textsuperscript{75}

The establishment of the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) coincided with the US military intervention in mid-1965. JUSPAO served as the
clearing house for psychological operations vis-à-vis the Chieu Hoi program. As such, JUSPAO established a unity of effort for propaganda efforts among pertinent organizations, such as the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command—Vietnam, US Information Agency, USAID, CIA, and RVN government agencies. Due to the success of the Chieu Hoi program in the late 1960s, the Ministry of Chieu Hoi assumed complete responsibility of the JUSPAO in July 1971 and continued all programs associated with its psychological operations.

As the Chieu Hoi program matured, US and RVN officials crafted a program strategy, which consisted of five phases: 1) Inducement; 2) Reception and Interrogation; 3) Training; 4) Resettlement and Employment; and 5) Follow-up. This strategy built on the existing Chieu Hoi program (and the similar British program in Malaya), but with greater sophistication, resources, funding, and focus.

**Inducement: Reconciliation Policy**

Based on interviews of ralliers, the propaganda effort focused on the “personal” motivations for rallying. Since morale problems within insurgent ranks were almost entirely personal—viz. hardships and deprivations, danger and high combat losses, grievances with Viet Cong leaders, repugnance of Viet Cong practices, elusive victory, and villager animosity—allied propaganda offered a way out of the insurgent’s dilemma. Messaging avoided ideological arguments because insurgents generally remained steadfast to the ideals of the communist movement (just as in Malaya).

Foremost in insurgents’ minds were ways to surrender safely, the economic well-being of their
families, and Viet Cong retaliation against their families after they rallied. Throughout the war, the Chieu Hoi program promised amnesty, political rehabilitation training, vocational training, a livelihood, and reintegration into society. Approximately 27,789 insurgents had rallied from 1963 to 1965, which did not represent a substantial drain on Viet Cong numbers. After the US military intervention, JUSPAO officials devoted greater attention to the Chieu Hoi program.

Prime Minister Nguyen Gao Ky’s 1967 proclamation articulated the government’s promise to prospective ralliers:

(1) All those who decide to leave the ranks of the Communists and reintegrate in the national community will be warmly welcomed as citizens with full rights of citizenship. All returnees will be protected by the government, which will also provide them facilities to build a new life. In other words, every citizen who abandons the Communist ranks will enjoy the rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right to have the law protect his freedom, his life, his property, and his honor, the right to vote and to run for office, the right to go back and live with his family, the right to choose his place of residence and the right to enjoy the national assistance in the pursuit of his profession.

(2) The citizens who rally to the national cause will be employed in accordance with their ability so that every Vietnamese without distinctions will have the opportunity to contribute positively to the reconstruction and development of the country.

(3) The citizens who rally to the national
cause but who have violated the law under Communist coercion or deception, whether they have been convicted or not, will enjoy all the guarantees set forth in the Constitution. The country will be tolerant to the utmost so they have the opportunity to put their ability and determination to serve and redeem themselves.\textsuperscript{84}

The RVN government offered further inducements for ralliers as well:

(1) Payment of weapons rewards, for weapons brought in, or a cache that the defector leads military forces to.
(2) Payment for inducing other Viet Cong or NVA [North Vietnamese Army] to defect.
(3) A government grant of 2,000 piasters (about $16) for clothing, and 300 piasters a month spending money during the orientation period, as well as 50 piasters a day for food.
(4) A departure gift of 1,290 piasters when the defector leaves the reception center.
(5) A six-month draft deferment commencing at the end of the orientation period.\textsuperscript{85}

While the original Chieu Hoi program permitted limited numbers of ralliers to enter the armed services, to include Armed Propaganda Teams, the Americans expanded this opportunity to include service with the US Army, specifically as Kit Carson Scouts and Provincial Reconnaissance Units.\textsuperscript{86} By late 1960s, these volunteers provided immense service for the allied forces.
Greater opportunities for rallying were tied to the ability of the RVN government to expand its control of territory through military operations and pacification. Moreover, JUSPAO officials learned that their propaganda campaign needed some improvements: 1) a greater variety of “communication channels and techniques;” 2) prompt “exploitation of local developments;” 3) tailored messages to address local insurgents’ concerns; 4) the design of leaflets with authoritative imprimatur to serve as safe conduct passes; and 5) greater specificity regarding the Chieu Hoi program. Although many insurgents were aware of the RVN government’s appeals to rally, they remained ignorant of the specific details of the Chieu Hoi program.

Based on interviews with ralliers, JUSPAO officials recommended that RVN government messages parallel the propaganda campaign by striking a tone of sympathy of the insurgent’s plight and the promise of good treatment upon surrender. They advised the government to advertise military successes, progress in the pacification effort, the attitudes of villagers towards the Viet Cong, and the poor conditions of villagers in Viet Cong controlled territories. They urged the government to highlight the desertions of North Vietnamese Army soldiers in order to create internal rifts and demoralize the Viet Cong. Finally, they wanted the government to encourage rural communities and refugees to complain to relatives serving in the Viet Cong about their own hardships.

**The Means of Dissemination**

The dissemination of JUSPAO propaganda to the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), the populace, and refugees was prodigious and varied. Aircraft dropped millions of leaflets and newspapers.
Ground patrols and Armed Propaganda Teams (ralliers) distributed by hand millions of leaflets, newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, calendars, and comic books. Government officials displayed Chieu Hoi posters prominently and everywhere. Radio, television, and movie productions, in addition to loudspeaker broadcasts (aircraft, vehicles, boats, and outposts), were widespread. Chieu Hoi symbols and slogans were ubiquitous, on banners in schools, and printed on match boxes, bars of soap, and market bags. Information service teams, medical teams, Armed Propaganda Teams, Chieu Hoi Advisory Teams, and culture-drama teams (female ralliers) conducted Chieu Hoi rallies, lectures and conventions, as well as movie, theater, and music programs with local communities. As a note of interest, Chieu Hoi Advisory Teams (3-5 men) operated in each of the four regions. Individual Chieu Hoi advisors (American or Filipino) were assigned to each of the 44 provinces.

Since family members and friends remained in contact with those serving in the Viet Cong, JUSPAO outreach to local communities and refugees served as an indirect means of encouraging insurgents to rally. Many ralliers acknowledged that pleas and information on the Chieu Hoi program from relatives and friends were influential factors in their decision to defect.

The Safe Conduct Pass proved the most effective means for rallying. Disseminated as leaflets, Safe Conduct Passes were multilingual (Vietnamese-Korean-Thai-English) and signed by President Nguyen Van Thieu, with instructions on how to surrender. US and RVN authorities ensured that military and police units, as well as advisors and civilian authorities, were knowledgeable of the Chieu Hoi program and the purpose of the Safe Conduct Pass. Typically, insurgents preferred to rally through civilian channels because it
was less risky. Accordingly, 70 percent surrendered to police stations or Chieu Hoi Reception centers, whereas the remainder surrendered to military units.\textsuperscript{93}

As the Chieu Hoi program evolved, JUSPAO-trained ralliers crafted propaganda themes and messages since they “knew the modus operandi of the enemy, their erstwhile comrades, and were themselves a part of the indigenous culture and social and political environment.” Rallied interviewees also provided crucial feedback on making the Chieu Hoi program more appealing, the design of Safe Conduct Passes more impressive, and propaganda messaging more effective. They also advised that JUSPAO characterize “defection as a courageous and patriotic act that will benefit the country.”\textsuperscript{94} Hence, ralliers served an important role in the propaganda program.

While the Chieu Hoi program concentrated on drawing off lower-level Viet Cong soldiers, by the last three years of the war, higher ranking Viet Cong began to defect, representing about seven percent of all ralliers. These defectors included company commanders, district and provincial committee members, and other officers with long service in the Viet Cong apparatus. This occurrence was surprising since JUSPAO had concluded early that committed Viet Cong would never rally. Nevertheless, it was an indicator that Viet Cong insurgents at all levels were losing faith in the communist cause.\textsuperscript{95}

An additional anomaly was an increase of North Vietnamese Army defectors near the end of the war. Most NVA soldiers, however, remained in the ranks because they did not think the Chieu Ho program applied to them. While the number of deserters was small, about 800, ten percent were senior officers. Reasons for defecting included despondency over never seeing their loved ones again, US military
effectiveness, and little desire to suffer and die in South Vietnam. Irrespective of the original intent of JUSPAO propaganda, the targeting of NVA soldiers was worthwhile if for no other reason than lowering morale.

In 1966, one enterprising US psychological warfare company disseminated a hand-written appeal from a captured North Vietnamese soldier to his comrades:

I was sick and abandoned by my unit. I was left without food or adequate clothing. I was left to die. The Americans found me and gave me food, shelter, clothing, and medicine to cure me of my sickness [malaria]. They have treated me well in all my request. I urge all of you, my comrades, to cease this useless fight that will only lead to a dishonorable death far from the homeland and our loved ones. Before it is too late rally to the Allied Forces. Come to the main highway with your shirt off and your weapon over your right shoulder, muzzle down. Wave your shirt over your head. The Allied Forces will help you. Do not fear them, they did not harm me.

Airdropped over the NVA battalion’s area of operation, thousands of copies included pictures of the soldier enjoying a meal and receiving medical treatment. No record exists as to the effectiveness of the appeal, but it does show the US military did attempt to persuade NVA soldiers to defect.

Because allied information operations proved effective, Viet Cong leaders took measures to prevent propaganda from reaching the lower ranks. They directed all propaganda leaflets and safe conduct
passes gathered immediately and destroyed; they took measures to drown out aerial broadcasts; and they threatened punishment of Viet Cong soldiers and villagers caught listening to forbidden radio programs or holding propaganda leaflets. Viet Cong propaganda warned that the RVN government used the reconciliation offer as a ploy and would punish defectors. Aside from intense indoctrination measures, Viet Cong leaders restricted freedom of movement to prevent defections, which caused animosity among the fighters. Hence, the existence of the Chieu Hoi program had an indirect effect on weakening Viet Cong cohesion.99

Chieu Hoi Reception Centers

As an integral part of the national reconciliation program, Chieu Hoi Reception Centers evolved slowly in scope and quality. Originally, the RVN government envisaged establishing the centers in every province, district, and village. Whereas the Saigon national center focused mainly on political indoctrination training and rehabilitation for senior Viet Cong and NVA ralliers, the other centers devoted greater attention to medical care and about eight weeks of vocational training.100 The indoctrination course aspired to instill the social and political ideals of the RVN government.101

When the Chieu Hoi Ministry came into being, reception centers existed in every province and most districts, but only in a few villages.102 Naturally, the expansion of reception centers was tied to progress in pacification, so as the government liberated more territory, the number of village reception centers increased. While the RVN government’s misgivings over the Chieu Hoi program hampered rapid progress, by late in the war, the Chieu Hoi Ministry oversaw
the Saigon national center, four regional centers, 44 provincial centers, and three autonomous city centers. District centers remained small, temporary facilities for later transport to provincial centers.103

The Chieu Hoi Reception Center exemplified the sincerity of the government’s promise of reconciliation, so the rallier’s first impression of the facility was momentous. The reputation of the Chieu Hoi program rested on ralliers’ experiences because insurgents in the field were well-informed of rallier treatment at the centers—if instances of poor treatment occurred, insurgents knew about them quickly. Since provincial chiefs managed the provincial centers, their enthusiasm and competence were important factors. Some provincial centers were so poorly managed and overcrowded that ralliers departed in frustration. However, most provincial centers were well-run and closely aligned with JUSPAO propaganda, which attracted the most ralliers.104 Hence, it behooved government officials to visit all reception centers to ensure uniform good treatment of ralliers.

The major appeal of the reception centers was an opportunity for ralliers to receive amnesty, a vocation, and an opportunity to return home. The Chieu Hoi Ministry provided additional incentives as well. Ralliers received immediate medical treatment at reception centers. The government widely publicized monetary rewards for turned-in weapons, for information which led to the capture of Viet Cong weapons caches, and for persuading other Viet Cong or NVA soldiers to defect. The establishment of reception centers in each province attracted those ralliers who wished to remain close to their home villages. During their stay at the reception center, ralliers received a stipend and vocational training. Moreover, their families received a small allowance and accommodations at the centers,
and their children received a basic education. For those ralliers who could not return to their original homes, the RVN government, using US resources and rallier labor, constructed Chieu Hoi villages for them and their families. Additionally, resettled ralliers received a regular stipend, food, and other assistance.\textsuperscript{105}

In the early years, reception centers were poorly managed and subject to corruption due to poorly trained, motivated, and paid employees. While overcrowding remained an issue, conditions and management improved significantly with the employment of ralliers as administrators. This proved an astute decision since ralliers empathized with defectors and sought to meet their expectations. While local police vetted defectors initially, rallier-administrators at reception centers scrutinized newcomers for Viet Cong infiltration. Ralliers also built or improved reception centers using US-provided materials. Finally, Armed Propaganda Teams (ralliers) provided security for reception centers.\textsuperscript{106}

Upon reporting to a reception center, ralliers were fingerprinted and registered into the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP) by personnel from the Chieu Hoi Ministry. The National Police also issued them identification cards. While this procedure helped thwart Viet Cong infiltrators, the initial interview proved the most effective.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Interview Process}

The immediate interview of new ralliers at reception centers was a crucial component of in-processing. The purpose of the initial interview was to determine the ralliers’ motives for surrendering and to extract perishable intelligence they could offer.\textsuperscript{108} The interview process sorted ralliers into the following
categories: refugees, marginal ralliers, activist ralliers, and Viet Cong prisoners of war. Chieu Hoi officials further segregated former Viet Cong and NVA officers from the average fighters.  

Refugees were victims of Viet Cong coercion and sought to escape their control. Reporting to Chieu Hoi Reception Centers signaled that they were no longer noncommittal (fence-sitters) to the conflict and were active supporters of the RVN government. They viewed the Chieu Hoi program as a way to support the RVN government in safety, thereby contributing to psychological operations and political warfare. Accordingly, they would either join the refugee program or shift into one of the other categories.  

Ostensibly, they would return to their homes once the government had pacified the area.

Marginal ralliers represented the largest group of ralliers who had joined the Viet Cong movement. They were simple, apolitical peasants who possessed few technical skills and education of military or political use. The government would treat them as citizens who had strayed and now sought only security and peace. Since they had limited aspirations, they would remain content with leading a peasant lifestyle in the future (i.e., farmers and herders). After interviewers gleaned any intelligence of value, they were free to return home (if pacified) or be categorized as refugees.

Activist ralliers were the most valuable to the government cause due to their exceptional level of education, abilities, and aspirations. Because they had held positions of responsibility, interrogators sought to glean their extensive knowledge of Viet Cong organization, military tactics, operations, and communist ideology. Activist ralliers had originally joined the Viet Cong for political, social, and military advancement, so the RVN government would need
to offer the same opportunities to gain their loyalty. While some political rehabilitation was in order, Chieu Hoi program officials took care to avoid debate on core beliefs. Since activist ralliers responded positively to trust and greater responsibility, they proved invaluable for propaganda and military efforts. Once officials recognized their acumen and ambition, they made beneficial contributions to society.112

US military, ARVN, and RVN government officials offered Viet Cong prisoners of war the opportunity to volunteer for the Chieu Hoi program. With an understanding that insurgents may have not defected earlier due to uncertainties regarding their treatment or fear of punishment, Chieu Hoi officials introduced this option, provided the candidates had committed no crimes. This discretionary approach appealed to the Vietnamese perceptions of fairness and justice. While the initial number of prisoner of war ralliers was modest, it did increase over time.113 Naturally, once prisoners of war entered the program, interrogators could elicit intelligence and employ their knowledge of Viet Cong tactics and methods.

The interview process was pivotal to the Chieu Hoi program. Due to personal and political sensitivities, Chieu Hoi officials used the term “interview” with ralliers instead of “interrogation.” Since surrendering was a voluntary act, ralliers were quite forthcoming regarding any intelligence they had. Vietnamese interviewers were the most effective in extracting essential information, not only due to their inherent linguistic abilities, but also their understanding of cultural subtleties (i.e., “politeness, respect, and even deferential treatment”). While US agency and military personnel were involved in the process, the principal interviewers came from the National Police Special
Branch, local regional forces/people forces (RF/PF), the ARVN, and the Phoenix Program (after 1968).\footnote{114}

The initial interview served two purposes. First, interviewers needed to verify that a rallier was bona fide and not a Viet Cong infiltrator. The Viet Cong certainly tried to infiltrate agents into Chieu Hoi Reception Centers, so the threat was not speculative. Over time, interviewers became more skilled and sophisticated, a hallmark of a learning organization. However, the interview process did breakdown whenever reception centers were overwhelmed by throngs of ralliers. In these instances, interviewers failed to catch infiltrators and even missed opportunities to exploit perishable intelligence. Paradoxically, plenty of infiltrators were impressed by the RVN government’s commitment to reconciliation and the opportunities afforded in the reception centers. Won over, they informed Chieu Hoi authorities of their original intentions and informed on other infiltrators.\footnote{115} Second, interviewers needed to assess the value of the perishable intelligence and pass it to the various police branches and assorted intelligence services for immediate action. Additionally, interviewers shared feedback to the psychological warfare agencies to help them hone propaganda messages.\footnote{116}

Aside from the services rendered for the war effort, employing ralliers allowed them to prove their loyalty to the RVN government cause and also compromised them from the perspective of their former communist comrades. Irrespective of their original intentions (i.e., communist agents or saboteurs), once the RVN government entrusted them with responsibility and publicized their contributions, ralliers were loath to defect back to the Viet Cong. Ralliers were encouraged to serve in the military or the government if they qualified, but it had to be completely voluntary, and ralliers had to prove their sincerity. This approach
proved beneficial. During the Viet Cong 1968 Tet Offensive, no reported ralliers defected to the Viet Cong, and many distinguished themselves in the defense of the reception centers (prime targets during the offensive). Provincial Armed Propaganda Teams (ralliers) fought so valiantly during the Tet Offensive that the ARVN later incorporated them into military operations.\textsuperscript{117}

**Political Rehabilitation**

As with other initial Chieu Hoi programs, political rehabilitation (reeducation or indoctrination) at Chieu Hoi Reception Centers suffered from inadequacies, viz., poorly trained instructors, unsuitable facilities, and small budgets. Additionally, early indoctrination courses emphasized eliminating the Viet Cong and annexation of North Vietnam rather than “peace and prosperity” themes. Learning from these mistakes, the RVN government instituted formal training of instructors at the National Training Center located in Vung Tau (southeast of Saigon). By 1969, the selection and training of instructors, particularly qualified ralliers with Viet Cong indoctrination experience, strikingly improved.\textsuperscript{118}

Once interviewers categorized ralliers, Provincial Chieu Hoi Reception Centers transported former mid-level Viet Cong and NVA leaders to Regional Chieu Hoi Centers and former senior Viet Cong and NVA leaders to the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon. Viet Cong rank and file remained at the provincial reception centers. In this manner, Chieu Hoi authorities segregated communist ideologues from those less committed.\textsuperscript{119} The intensity of reeducation at the provincial, regional, and national Chieu Hoi Centers conformed to the education levels and
leadership positions that ralliers held in the Viet Cong apparatus. Reeducation courses averaged 72 hours in duration and focused particular attention to explaining government policies and goals in order to cultivate a sense of citizenship.\textsuperscript{120}

At each reception center, Chieu Hoi officials sought to place new ralliers immediately at ease. Some enterprising US advisers provided “Welcome Wagon” plastic bags with Chieu Hoi logos, containing soap, stationary, and propaganda materials. Newcomers were welcomed by resident ralliers and were free to mingle and converse with everyone in the center. Some newcomers were assigned a sponsor, who was a well-established rallier. Employing veteran ralliers as reeducation instructors was effective since they understood Viet Cong political indoctrination, shared common experiences with newcomers, and could proficiently explain RVN government social and political goals, that is rebuilding Vietnam and providing economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{121}

Ralliers at the regional and national centers were of particular interest in support of the war effort. Nonetheless, RVN government, ARVN, and US officials asked ralliers in all the centers to volunteer their services for political warfare, psychological operations, advising, training, and other activities commensurate with their knowledge and skills.\textsuperscript{122} As this study reveals, these services contributed significantly to the defeat of the Viet Cong.

\textit{Vocational Training}

The primary purpose of vocational training was to provide gainful employment for the rallier and his family, thereby forestalling potential recidivism to the Viet Cong. The training enhanced the promise of
the Chieu Hoi program and signaled to insurgents that they too could enjoy employment opportunities once they defected. Ideally, the courses reflected those skillsets which contributed to a growing economy.\textsuperscript{123}

During the initial years of the Chieu Hoi program, vocational training suffered shortfalls which did not fulfill the expectations of ralliers. In view of the brief stay at the centers (60 days) and the dearth of qualified instructors, much of the vocational training was limited to low-level skillsets, such as “sewing, barbering, brickmaking, carpentry, and basic mechanics.” Few ralliers wanted to return to farming, and many saw little practical use in the offered vocational programs. Thus, these ralliers refused to participate in vocational training and sought their own way upon leaving the centers.\textsuperscript{124}

Numerous South Vietnamese had originally joined the Viet Cong out of ambition and as a means to escape the peasant lifestyle. They were self-motivated and aspired to higher positions of responsibility. The original lure of the Viet Cong was an opportunity to gain greater responsibilities, financial success, and social advancement.\textsuperscript{125} Once Chieu Hoi officials understood these motivations, they established formal vocational training centers, which offered expanded training for advanced skills. By 1970, USAID employed contractors to provide training in “automotive repair, electrical house wiring, plumbing, furniture-making, refrigeration, TV/radio repair, and other technical skills.” Select ralliers attended advanced training at the Government Agricultural Development Center on “the new ‘miracle rice,’ fish culture, and poultry and swine raising.” Moreover, provincial hospitals provided nursing training for interested ralliers.\textsuperscript{126}

Vocational training was only part of the equation. Gainful employment required access to prospective job
positions. The Chieu Hoi program actively sought to honor the implicit promise of the rallier’s reintegration into society. Regional Chieu Hoi officials and provincial authorities established job placement programs, in which they matched on-file job qualifications with prospective employer needs. Statistically, 50 percent of the ralliers opted to return home as farmers in government-provided plots; 27 percent served in the government or the military; and 20 percent worked in private industry.127

By 1972, the Ministry of Labor had assumed responsibility of the vocational training centers, employing USAID-trained ralliers as instructors. The evidence suggests that these centers were self-sufficient, efficient, and effective in preparing ralliers for careers. Of significance, the police-issued ID cards indicated to prospective employers that ralliers were reliable and loyal citizens. The vast improvements in vocational training demonstrated that the Chieu Hoi program sought to meet rallier ambitions, thereby depriving the Viet Cong of intelligent and motivated insurgents.128

**Military Service of Ralliers**

Suitable candidates had the option to serve in the military, and it was completely voluntary with no compulsion. Approximately twenty percent of ralliers elected to enlist in the various military services. The relatively low percentage of volunteers reflected a general weariness of military life and a desire to return home. For those opting for active duty military service, volunteers received the promised six-month deferment and the choice of service branches. Of interest, most ralliers had no reservations about fighting their former colleagues. Many volunteers with families chose to
serve in militia forces (regional forces/people forces) in order to remain near their homes. As a snapshot, approximately 20,863 ralliers were serving in the ARVN and militia forces by mid-1971.129

The ARVN frequently employed ralliers and refugees as guerrillas against the Viet Cong. Operating in squads, ARVN guerrillas (some in communist uniforms) conducted special operations, employing their knowledge of guerrilla tactics and Viet Cong methods.130 Some served as scouts in regional forces reconnaissance companies uncovering enemy improvised explosives, weapons caches, and bunkers, as well as seeking out potential ralliers in the Viet Cong.131 Others even served in long-range reconnaissance patrols in North Vietnam and Laos.132 A select group, sometimes called “Road Runners,” conducted surveillance operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia under the command and control of US Army Special Forces (MACV-SOG), the CIA, and the Vietnamese Special Mission Service.133

Kit Carson Scout Program

Established in the spring of 1966, the Kit Carson Scout program recruited ralliers from provincial Chieu Hoi centers to serve under US military command. Reaching a peak of around 2,500 in 1970, Kit Carson scouts served with tactical units and intelligence staff sections. In view of their knowledge of local terrain and the Viet Cong, they provided training on Viet Cong tactics and techniques, served as guides, assisted in locating equipment sites, weapons caches, mines, and explosive devices, and contributed to propaganda messaging. They provided an invaluable service by identifying Viet Cong infiltrators at checkpoints as well as dead and wounded Viet Cong. The US military used them
as tactical interrogators of suspected and identified Viet Cong and NVA soldiers, who often divulged information once they realized a Kit Carson Scout was questioning them. As one American military advisor astutely observed, 90 percent of a counterinsurgency effort is devoted to pinpointing guerrillas, and the most effective counterinsurgent is a former guerrilla (“it takes a guerrilla to catch a guerrilla”).

Serving with the US military provided numerous benefits for rallier recruitment. The US military provided salaries, clothing, gear, accommodations, rations, medical care, dental care, and deferment from ARVN service. Those disabled in the line of duty received vocational training and resettlement in Chieu Hoi villages. Death benefits included a formal military funeral, a new uniform for burial, and transportation to his ancestral family plot. The family also received a sum of the scout’s annual salary.

US divisions recruited ralliers from Chieu Hoi centers located in their area of operations. Recruiters based their selection on good health and endurance, attitude, and family location. Recruiters preferred ralliers with families in government controlled areas in order to forestall possible Viet Cong retribution or blackmail. Recruits attended a thirteen-day probationary course, received a uniform with special insignia, were taught rudimentary English terms, and issued a MACV identification card. US units maintained a record on each scout, which included a picture, fingerprints, family history, and progress reports.

Kit Carson Scouts repaid the US military with loyalty and dedicated service. They fought valiantly, with hundreds killed and wounded in the line of duty. Many gave their lives protecting American soldiers and marines, and as a sign of mutual respect,
many American soldiers and marines gave their lives protecting Kit Carson Scouts. In terms of investment, the Kit Carson Scout program paid substantial dividends.

**Armed Propaganda Teams (APT)**

Standing up the Armed Propaganda Unit (APU) program in October 1964, USAID employed especially trained ralliers (male and female) to promote the Chieu Hoi program in Viet Cong-dominated areas. USAID selected ralliers with demonstrated leadership, patriotism to the government, and strong communication skills. Starting in February 1968, Armed Propaganda Team personnel attended a formal four-week training course on psychological warfare and basic military tactics. Accordingly, provincial Chieu Hoi chiefs exercised operational control of Armed Propaganda Teams.

While the basic unit was a platoon of 35 ralliers, Armed Propaganda Teams (three ralliers) functioned as agents for disseminating Chieu Hoi propaganda in villages. As former Viet Cong, they embodied the government’s promise of reconciliation, thereby effectively countering Viet Cong propaganda. Lightly armed for self-protection, APT ralliers conversed with villagers about their experiences, the reality of communism, Viet Cong injustices, the Chieu Hoi program, and RVN government goals and reforms. Since many villagers had relatives and friends in the Viet Cong, these personal interactions served to encourage defections through trusted associations. In this regard, one Chieu Hoi adviser considered APTs as the most potent propaganda service for the war effort.
As the war progressed, the number of Armed Propaganda companies surged from two in 1964 to around 84 in 1970, totaling 5,400 male and female ralliers. In addition to their propaganda and counter-propaganda activities, APTs directly contacted Viet Cong insurgents to persuade them to defect, assisted with psychological warfare operations, and used their knowledge of Viet Cong practices to uncover caches. As noted previously, APTs also provided security for Chieu Hoi centers and resettlement hamlets. In support of the Phoenix Program from October 1970 onwards, APTs reported to District Intelligence Operations Control Centers for the specific purpose of encouraging defections among Viet Cong political cadres.\textsuperscript{141}

By 1969, all four regions and 44 provinces contained Armed Propaganda Companies. Armed Propaganda Companies deployed to provinces to conduct special operations with provincial companies (regional forces/popular forces). Provincial chiefs retained the prerogative to deploy Armed Propaganda Platoons to districts for independent operations or as part of larger military operations. However, since they were lightly armed they focused on psychological operations. The task organization was as follows:

- **Armed Propaganda Company**: three platoons (74 ralliers, including company commander, assistant company commander, administrative clerk, supply clerk, and medic).
- **Armed Propaganda Platoon**: three squads (23 ralliers, including platoon leader and assistant platoon leader).
- **Armed Propaganda Squad**: two Armed Propaganda Teams (seven ralliers, including squad leader).
- **Armed Propaganda Team**: three ralliers.\textsuperscript{142}
In 1971, the role of APTs expanded in support of the counterinsurgency strategy. They assisted the National Police as interrogators and uncovering itinerant Viet Cong, as well as providing instruction on Viet Cong tactics and techniques to People’s Self-Defense Forces (RVN guerrilla forces). Seven special APTs (five ralliers) provided lectures on Viet Cong methods to academic institutions, business industries, and military commands.143

In 1971, Chieu Hoi authorities established an effective program, with NVA ralliers formed into APTs. Because of their expertise with NVA doctrine and psychological operations, they were assigned to political warfare companies in ARVN infantry divisions. The crux of their instruction concerned ways to encourage defection with NVA soldiers.144

Rallier Resettlement

For those ralliers who declined government service, reintegration into society was no simple matter: suspicious villagers shunned them and feared they would invite trouble. The Chieu Hoi program had trouble finding villagers willing to sponsor them, and civilian employers were reluctant to employ them. The stigma of being a former Viet Cong caused mistrust. Further, resettled refugees resented ralliers because they competed for jobs. However, for those ralliers originally from villages under RVN control, reintegration was easier.145

For those ralliers from Viet Cong controlled areas, the Chieu Hoi program constructed special hamlets, to include providing a plot of land for a house and farming. The program provided money for lumber and materials for ralliers to clear the land and build their homes, though USAID provided roofing material
and cement for the foundation. Chieu Hoi authorities provided an allowance to purchase tools and furniture, as well as subsistence food for six months. Thereafter, ralliers were to provide their own livelihood.\footnote{146}

The 38 Chieu Hoi hamlets proved problematic and no permanent solution. The hamlets were divorced from ralliers’ ancestral homes and isolated from the rest of Vietnamese society. The relative luxury of the homes caused resentments among other Vietnamese. Under these circumstances, societal integration remained sketchy. Because Chieu Hoi villages were conspicuous, the Viet Cong frequently attacked them, although Armed Propaganda Teams provided some security.\footnote{147} Consequently, resettlement proved problematic for the Chieu Hoi program during the war but might have improved over time. This is unknowable since North Vietnam’s 1975 invasion and occupation wiped out the benefits of the Chieu Hoi program.

Follow-up System of Ralliers

The Ministry of Chieu Hoi monitored ralliers for around six months after reintegration. The National Police Command placed them in an automated tracking system, maintaining their fingerprints and data on file. Ministry of Chieu Hoi village officials remained in personal contact with ralliers. The tracking system and local Chieu Hoi officials monitored their status even when ralliers moved to other provinces.\footnote{148}

The Ministry of Chieu Hoi used the follow-up system for statistical analysis of the program only. After six months, ralliers were considered fully integrated and no longer monitored. Since the act of defecting compromised ralliers from the perspective of the communists, especially their participation in government propaganda activities, less than two percent returned to the Viet Cong. This low
recidivism rate was confirmed by captured Viet Cong documents.\textsuperscript{149}

Even though reintegrated ralliers were basically inactive citizens, the government could employ their expertise whenever needed. Armed Propaganda Teams called upon them as part of their operations in provinces.\textsuperscript{150} Aside from informal intelligence and knowledge of the Viet Cong, reintegrated ralliers proved that they were loyal citizens, which bolstered the government reconciliation offer and caused dissension among the ranks in the Viet Cong.

Conclusions

The tempo of US/ARVN military operations and expansion of pacification had a direct relationship on the rate of Viet Cong defections. South Vietnam’s early commitment to the Chieu Hoi program laid the groundwork, which expanded in scope once the United States intervened directly. Two distinct surges occurred with the US military intervention in 1965 and in the wake of the failed Tet Offensive in 1968. Thus, as pacification advanced, rates increased from hundreds per month to thousands per month. While defection numbers varied among studies, upwards of “194,000 former VC, NVA, and Communist sympathizers” rallied under Chieu Hoi from 1963 to 1973.\textsuperscript{151} Certainly, some corruption occurred in the program from South Vietnamese officials skewing the statistics or pocketing money.\textsuperscript{152} However, as oversight and management of the program improved, the opportunities for corruption declined.

A 1973 RAND study noted that ralliers represented about twenty percent of all Viet Cong casualties. Had these Viet Cong remained in the fight, the allies would have suffered thousands of additional casualties.\textsuperscript{153}
Further, the costs of funding the Chieu Hoi program compared to the estimated costs of killing 194,000 Viet Cong meant a savings of hundreds of millions of dollars. In both cases, the program was well worth the investment.

The long term benefits of reintegrating former Viet Cong into society is only a matter of speculation due to North Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of South Vietnam in 1975. One shudders to think what happened to all the ralliers. Nevertheless, combined with the effective counterinsurgency strategy and pacification program, the Chieu Hoi program was instrumental in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency. North Vietnam recognized the futility of the insurgency and therefore turned to conventional warfare as witnessed by the failed 1972 Easter Offensive but the successful 1975 Spring Offensive. The US abandonment of South Vietnam in 1975 fed the convenient narrative that the counterinsurgency effort was a failure. For historians, such a conclusion is a false analogy. To take such a false analogy further, one could conclude the Allies lost the First World War because Germany defeated France in 1940.
Chapter Three – Observations from the Iraq Insurgency

With its occupation of Iraq in April 2003, the United States found itself enmeshed in a full-scale insurgency not experienced since the Moro Insurgency in the Philippines a century earlier. That the United States was caught completely by surprise is a paradox. In occupied Germany, the Allied policies of Denazification, demilitarization, and deindustrialization were draconian. But, with Germany completely exhausted and occupied by millions of Allied soldiers, an insurgency was out of the question. While occupation policies in Japan were somewhat less harsh, it too was exhausted and devastated by the war. Insurgencies during the Cold War were mostly proxy conflicts with communist and democratic powers supporting client states and/or non-state actors (the Algerian insurgency, 1954—1962 was the exception). The US occupations of Grenada in 1983 and Panama, 1989—1990, could have triggered insurrections, but they did not, even though the United States was largely neglectful of stability and dedicated few troops to the conflicts. The NATO peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 could have triggered a proxy guerrilla war by Bosnian Serbs and Serbians respectively, but the overwhelming number of occupation troops likely served to deter such attempts. With the exception of the Balkans venture, the NATO/ISAF occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 followed past patterns, though a low-level insurgency would emerge a few years later. Hence, while apprehensions did exist regarding the difficulties of occupation, the historical experience suggested that Iraqis would welcome the liberation and work with the occupation authorities
in rebuilding the country. Hindsight might provide perfect clarity, but it does not help practitioners navigate through the fog of uncertainty.

It was in this context that US officials struggled to understand the nature of the insurgency. Decades of Ba’athist rule had created a system of social and economic dependence on the central government. A multitude of wars, international sanctions, and regime policies had devastated the economy and infrastructure. The regime had persecuted the Shi’a majority and Kurdish minority communities. Every institution was corrupt in some manner. Given these factors, reconstruction and stability would take more time and resources than originally forecast. Time was the one commodity in shortest supply.

When Sunni Ba’athist loyalists and foreign paramilitary groups (Fedayeen) created unrest in the summer of 2003, senior US policymakers and commanders deduced they were the dying fleas of a dead regime. The capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 seemed to support that theory, but a resumption of the resistance with an influx of foreign fighters (al Qaeda) a few weeks later blossomed into a full-fledged insurgency by the spring of 2004. Once the insurgency gained momentum, neither a new Iraqi government nor elections would suffice. Ample ground forces would have created the necessary security for reconstruction and stability to progress, but the US active component Army and Marines were too small for a proper occupation, and too few countries contributed ground forces for the coalition. Hence, the US-led coalition had to improvise with available resources and without the basis of a counterinsurgency doctrine.

This chapter explores the main features of the US coalition reconciliation initiatives: 1) insurgent motives
for reconciliation; 2) Iraqi government commitment to the program; and 3) US detention operations. Whereas reconciliation was largely extemporaneous, US reintegration programs within detention facilities provide useful insights.

**Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation**

During the initial stages of the insurgency in the fall of 2003, Sunni insurgents formed an alliance with al Qaeda foreign fighters to compel the withdrawal of US coalition forces from Iraq and to reestablish Sunni control of the government. In the spring of 2004, Sunni uprisings across Iraq, aided by al Qaeda fighters, sparked heavy fighting with coalition forces, which persisted over a period of years. While Shi’a insurgents likewise rose up, the US coalition command (Multi-National Force-Iraq) and the subsequent Iraqi government did not perceive them as a major threat, at least initially, since they were generally supportive of the coalition and government.

While US coalition forces had inflicted a number of defeats and heavy losses on Sunni and al Qaeda insurgents from 2003 to 2006, these factors alone did not prompt Sunni overtures for reconciliation. The principal factor was the behavior of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which had alienated several Sunni tribes by the summer of 2005. From the onset of its presence, the al Qaeda network in Iraq seized control of the traditional Sunni smuggling trade and imposed its fanatical brand of Islam on the populace. The al Qaeda leadership replaced rule of law with its own laws, exacted brutal punishments for perceived vice and venality, and imposed forced marriages between Sunni females and Islamic fighters. Further, al Qaeda terrorized the Iraqi populace, tribal leaders, and government security
forces through murder, assassination, and desecration of bodies, virtually against anyone who opposed its rule or betrayed its cause. Al Qaeda’s incessant disruptions of essential services and local economies also antagonized the populace. As one tribal sheik declared, al Qaeda in Iraq “had gone too far,” and the leaders of al Qaeda in Pakistan were not representative of Iraqis.¹⁵⁴

Coalition military operations not only caused heavy causalities on insurgents but also depressed their morale. As one insurgent seeking amnesty confided, “I’m tired of being a target and running.” Additionally, incessant fighting against Shi’a militia, Iraqi security forces, and al Qaeda fighters took a heavy toll on Sunni tribes. Local coalition offers of amnesty, reintegration, and stipends persuaded tens of thousands of Sunni insurgents to surrender peacefully, fight against al Qaeda, and contribute to security in general. As other Sunni tribes noted the fair treatment afforded Sunni reconcilers, they too switched sides.¹⁵⁵

**Iraqi Government Commitment to Reconciliation**

Coming to power in January 2005, the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government never fully embraced reconciliation with Sunni minorities, and until the US “Surge” in 2007, senior US commanders remained cautious and skeptical regarding the reconciliation overtures from local Sunni tribes.¹⁵⁶ Instead, for the first three years of the insurgency, senior US commanders focused on reconciliation negotiations with expatriated tribal chieftains in Jordan, though Multi-National Force—Iraq commander General George Casey Jr did pursue better relations with Sunni tribes in Anbar province in 2005.¹⁵⁷ This approach delayed coalition reconciliation with local sheiks and created tensions. Further, coalition
recognition of local sheiks and the rise of tribes as security guarantors threatened the political legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Other than favorable Iraqi media reporting on the Sunni “Awakening,” a comprehensive information operations campaign for reconciliation failed to materialize. However, once General David Petraeus assumed command of the Multi-National Force—Iraq, he instructed commanders at all levels to encourage reconciliation with Sunni tribes.

The nature of the insurgency influenced the attitude of the Iraqi government and the US perplexed response to it. The virulence and scope of the insurgency came as a shock to the United States and created deep mistrust of Sunnis within the Iraqi government. Irrespective of Iraqi and American expectations, assumptions, and designs for the post-war period, the fundamental flaw in the occupation was the inability to provide security throughout Iraq. Certainly, the widespread breakdown of law and order, the complete collapse of the Ba’athist government, the extensive de-Ba’athification policy, and the dissolution of the military created grievances against the US occupation. However, it was the lack of country-wide security that spawned economic, political, religious, and ethnic instability, as well as a breakdown in essential services. Into the security vacuum poured Sunni and Shi’a militias, various armed groups, criminal gangs, and foreign fighters (al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam), all with different motivations but united in creating mayhem. Syria and Iran bolstered the insurgency, with Syria rendering assistance to the Sunni resistance and foreign fighters, and Iran supporting the Shi’a political and militia forces. In addition to combating the US coalition, al Qaeda in Iraq strove to provoke a civil war by attacking Shi’a
communities. In effect, Iraq epitomized the Hobbesian world of “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” From 2003 through 2006, the US-led coalition sought to restore essential services, establish democratic political institutions, promote a free market economy, and organize Iraqi security forces (military and police), all for the purpose of creating the necessary stability for a coalition withdrawal. Throughout this period, coalition forces launched recurrent military operations to quash insurgent outbreaks while at the same time suffering from continuous isolated attacks everywhere. While a couple of military operations involved effective counterinsurgency techniques, the coalition command did not adopt a uniform counterinsurgency strategy. Thus, without sufficient ground forces and a counterinsurgency strategy, stabilization initiatives could not flourish. The 2007—2008 Surge blended sufficient security forces (coalition and Iraqi) with an effective counterinsurgency strategy to pacify Iraq and foster political and economic development—initially in Baghdad and its environs, and then to other cities and surrounding provinces. With the onset of countrywide stability, the US-led coalition withdrew incrementally from 2009 to 2011. Unfortunately, the Iraqi government alienated the Sunni minorities, which led to a resurgent insurgency in 2014 under the aegis of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Despite the Shi’a-dominated government’s indifference, Sunni tribes began to coalesce incrementally against al Qaeda fighters and reach out to coalition tactical commands from 2005 to 2008. Wherever US forces increased combat power in provinces and tactical commanders became receptive to local tribal reconciliation overtures, Sunni tribes slowly but increasingly began to denounce al Qaeda and view the coalition as an ally to expel al Qaeda.
from Iraq. Over time, tribal loyalties among Iraqi military, police, tribesmen, and other Sunni insurgent groups increased the breadth and depth of the Sunni Awakening. Not only did reconciliation provide tens of thousands of militia forces for the coalition effort, but it also resulted in actionable intelligence on al Qaeda activities and cells. Equally important, these tribes provided recruits for the Iraqi police and army, and the number of attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces declined substantially. Further, reconciled Sunni groups filled the security vacuum where coalition troops were sparse. As Sunni tribes allied with coalition and Iraqi security forces, progress against al Qaeda in Iraq proceeded unabated, which substantially bolstered the effects of the Surge from 2007 to 2008.

Increasingly jaded by extremist Shi’a and Iranian militia excesses, Shi’a communities also requested assistance and provided intelligence to coalition and Iraqi security forces. As important, the Iraqi government recognized the danger of these militias, and along with US coalition forces, actively quashed them in 2007. In 2008, the US coalition command sought to create an Awakening among Shi’a tribes as well. While not as extensive as the Sunni Awakening, Shi’a cooperation with the US coalition reflected a dissatisfaction with Shi’a militancy and a rejection of Iranian influence.

During the 2007-2008 Surge, senior US commanders strove to gain the Iraqi government’s acceptance of the Awakening and eventual reconciliation with Sunni tribes. Faced with the ambivalence of the Iraqi government towards Sunni reconciliation, senior US commanders authorized subordinate commands to continue fostering local reconciliation, perhaps hoping it would gain momentum and eventual government institutional acceptance. Accordingly, subordinate
commanders arranged ceasefires, the surrender of weapons, employment in the police, and local alliances against irreconcilable insurgents. Moreover, using Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding, the coalition employed 100,000 Iraqi volunteers (Sons of Iraq) to fight against the insurgents.¹⁶⁶

As a part of reconciliation, US commanders required local sheiks to vouch for the loyalty of their tribesmen, who in turn had to renounce al Qaeda and swear allegiance to the tribe. This stipulation obligated reconciled Sunnis to ally with the coalition and become avowed enemies of al Qaeda. In view of their intimate knowledge of al Qaeda operatives, former Sunni insurgents proved invaluable in identifying fighter cells and weapons caches, thereby helping the coalition separate insurgents from the population. Under pressure by senior coalition commanders in the spring of 2007, the Iraqi government agreed to allow reconciled Sunnis to comprise twenty percent of the Iraqi security forces and to serve in the government. Ultimately, once Sunni tribes joined forces with the coalition against al Qaeda in Iraq, they proved instrumental in re-establishing stability.¹⁶⁷

While the Iraqi government established the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) in June 2007 to vet reconciled Sunnis for police and civil service positions, senior US leaders and advisors experienced difficulties convincing IFCNR members and government officials to embrace reconciliation fully. The main obstacle stemmed from the Iraqi government’s lingering suspicions of Sunni loyalties and a fear that Sunnis in the Iraqi security forces would pose a future threat to the government. Senior US commanders warned that if the Iraqi government did not take advantage of this
window of opportunity, then enduring reconciliation would founder. As US forces withdrew from 2010 to 2011, the Iraqi government ignored the earlier warnings and reneged on its promise to incorporate fully reconciled Sunnis in the Iraqi security forces as well as participation in the government.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, the subsequent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became a foregone conclusion.

\textbf{Detention Operations}

US detention operations ultimately proved the most successful in reintegrating moderate insurgents into Iraqi society. After a rough start, detention operations leaders recognized that detention facilities were serving the interests of Islamic extremists, turning the camps into “Jihad Universities.” Similar to the procedures of the Chie Hoi Reception Centers, US detention centers instituted procedures to separate moderate inmates from the Islamic extremists and to provide them rehabilitation opportunities.

\textit{The 2003—2007 Period}

Coalition detention facilities experienced almost insurmountable challenges from 2003 to early 2007. Coalition operations generated an unceasing flow of detainees daily, resulting in serious overcrowding. The US policy decision to categorize enemy combatants as civilian detainees rather than prisoners of war subject to the Geneva Conventions created legal complexities and loopholes, which extremist insurgents exploited. The dearth of properly trained interrogators and prison guards resulted in criminal misconduct and deaths of detainees, with the Abu Ghraib internment facility sparking a scandal in early 2004. The notoriety
of Abu Ghraib abuses reverberated around the world, fomenting recruitment and support for the Iraqi insurgency. Predictably, “the number one recruiting tool used to recruit Foreign Fighters, Al Qaeda membership, and suicide bombers was the five minute Abu Ghraib video and pictures from the abuse at Abu Ghraib. These pictures were posted throughout Iraq, especially in the volatile Al Anbar Province.”

Established in early summer 2004, Task Force 134 sought to enhance management of detention operations and rectify earlier problems. Overcrowding at the three main detention facilities—Abu Ghraib, Camp Cropper, and Camp Bucca—remained a persistent challenge because Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resolved to transfer detention operations to the Iraqi government and refused to authorize the construction or expansion of facilities. Eventually, the Task Force 134 commander, with support of senior US commanders, persisted and gained authorization in late 2005 to expand facilities, which provided a total capacity for 18,000 detainees.

Even with the expansion of detention facilities in 2006, overcrowding continued to plague Task Force 134. The establishment of Combined Review and Release Boards in August 2004, together with multinational division and brigade legal reviews, sought to alleviate the problem. While the reviews resulted in the release of thousands of detainees after a relatively short captivity, the discharges could not keep pace with the number of incoming detainees. Further, the “catch and release” process created frustrations with tactical commands because around eight percent of released detainees returned to the insurgency (even this reported low recidivism rate was likely optimistic). Problems with verifying identities and biometrics
of recidivists exacerbated these frustrations, which “created moral-ethical dilemmas for junior leaders” (i.e., shoot or release). In effect, detention facilities unintentionally served as rest and rehabilitation camps for insurgents.171

Aside from the heightened probability of escape attempts, rioting, and human rights violations due to overcrowding, Islamic extremists in the detainee population took advantage of the disorder to radicalize and train moderate Iraqis as jihadi insurgents and suicide bombers. They essentially took control within the facilities, making guard oversight hazardous. Detained insurgent leaders from various parts of Iraq had the opportunity to “exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures,” as well as network with one another within the safe confines of the facilities. Ironically, detention facilities served as both rest and training camps for insurgents, who were often released within months. Consequently, coalition troops derisively began to describe detention facilities as “Jihadist Gladiator Training Camps.”172

Successive Task Force 134 commanders instituted a number of countermeasures against “jihadi radicalization and recruitment” within the detention facilities. Integral to the task force’s “counterinsurgency in the compounds” program, counterinsurgency teams (intelligence personnel) identified Islamic extremists through an informant network. The counterinsurgency teams segregated detainees into five categories: al Qaeda, takfiris (apostate accusers), Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM—Shia militia), moderate Sunnis, and moderate Shi’a. From inmate interviews, the counterinsurgency teams assessed that most moderates had joined the insurgency for money or had been incidentally detained during a military operation. So, Task Force 134 began a reintegration program within the facilities
for moderate Sunni and Shi’a inmates. Teachers within the detainee population provided educational instruction; external organizations provided vocational training; and moderate Islamic clerics gave temperate sermons.\textsuperscript{173}

\textit{The 2007—2008 Surge Period}

The deployment of additional US ground forces and expanded counterinsurgency operations in 2007 resulted in a sharp influx of detainees. Since detention facilities already stood at 88 percent capacity, the expected influx of 2,000 detainees per month threatened to overwhelm detention facilities once again. The Iraqi corrections system could provide no immediate relief, and the Iraqi government proposal for a mass amnesty of detainees (90 percent) would undermine the Surge counterinsurgency strategy. Unable to deploy nine additional military police companies into Iraq promptly, Multi-National Force-Iraq command augmented Task Force 134 with an artillery battalion. To improve the care and custody of inmates and optimize the number of corrections personnel available, Task Force 134 closed two detention facilities (Fort Suse and Abu Ghraib) and consolidated detainees in Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca. In the interim, engineers built temporary facilities while they modernized the facilities in both camps, with an objective capacity of 30,000 inmates.\textsuperscript{174}

Nevertheless, detention facility expansion could not keep pace with Surge operations, so a renewed overcrowding crisis arose. Once again, Islamic extremists exploited the confusion to intimidate and recruit inmates for the insurgency. As such, Task Force 134’s control of detention facilities and the “counterinsurgency inside the compounds” programs
suffered a significant setback. This loss of control became evident in April 2007, when a massive riot involving 10,000 inmates erupted in Camp Bucca. With great effort, the guard force managed to quash the riot, using nonlethal munitions and sequestering ringleaders into a separate part of the compound. This was a momentary respite to the larger inmate problem, which required immediate attention.\textsuperscript{175}

During this crisis, USMC Major General Douglas Stone assumed command of Task Force 134 and revitalized detention operations with “COIN inside the Wire” programs. Continuing the initiatives of his predecessors and tying detention operations to the larger counterinsurgency strategy, Major General Stone viewed reconciliation as a way for moderate Iraqis to disassociate from the insurgency. This entailed wresting the stranglehold of violent extremists on other inmates, rehabilitating the reconcilable detainees, and reintegrating them into Iraqi society, once they had demonstrated a desire to live a peaceful, productive life. Of significance, Major General Stone enjoyed the full confidence and support of General David Petraeus, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander, and the new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.\textsuperscript{176}

“Coin inside the Wire” required a change in attitude regarding detention operations. Major General Stone believed the coalition had used detention operations excessively, using numbers of detainees as a goal and reporting metric of counterinsurgency progress. On the one hand, 8,000—10,000 Iraqis should not have been in the detention facilities. On the other hand, the detention of questionable Iraqis relieved soldiers of the moral dilemma of shooting or releasing them during military operations. Since insurgents were virtually indistinguishable from ordinary citizens, soldiers naturally erred on the side of precaution and placed
suspects in the detention system. Coalition troops normally detained Iraqis observed conducting illegal activities or considered an imminent security threat. While twenty-five percent of the inmates warranted detention, seventy-five percent had engaged in insurgent activities because they were unemployed and needed the money.\textsuperscript{177}

In support of the overarching counterinsurgency strategy, detention operations had to deal with a host of diverse issues: innocent Iraqis detained during military operations; Iraqis serving the insurgency for money; hard core insurgents requiring continued incarceration and eventual judicial proceedings; fair and humane treatment of all inmates; insurgent propaganda regarding detention of innocent Iraqis and mistreatment of inmates to bolster the insurgency; and extremist cells intimidating, radicalizing, and recruiting moderate Iraqis within detention facilities. In short, detention operations policy needed to avoid any activity or perception that abetted the insurgency’s cause. To address these demanding tasks, Task Force 134 instituted a structured process for detention operations, called DART—detention, assessment, rehabilitation, and transition.\textsuperscript{178}

\textit{Detention In-Processing and Assessment}

As part of in-processing, all detainees received a full medical examination for disease, injuries, eyesight problems, and dental issues. For administrative purposes, detention personnel assigned each inmate an identification number. Trained interrogators interviewed new inmates and assigned a risk level to each. Inmates lived in improved accommodations and received “culturally appropriate meals.” As before, segregating the violent extremists was essential but
difficult since they used anonymity to infiltrate into the general population. Hence, constant monitoring was essential to protect moderate Iraqis from intimidation and violence. A key objective of detention operations was winning the “battlefield of the mind.” As the reconciliation program matured, inmates felt empowered to expose the “irreconcilables” during morning sick call. Accordingly, moderate Iraqis became more assertive against extremist inmates, and in one case at Camp Bucca, inmates turned on the takfiris in an ad hoc “Awakening,” rounding them up and shaving off their beards. Ultimately, through continual vetting and monitoring, detention personnel succeeded in segregating around 5,000 violent extremists from the general population.179

Rehabilitation Programs

Task Force 134 built a Theater Internment Facility Reintegration Center in each detention compound to provide educational and vocational opportunities for males, females, children, and the mentally challenged. Basic education instruction focused on literacy, math, and religion. Due to the popular demand, the program added courses on “history, science, civics, and geography.” Camp Cropper was fortunate to have a National Guard officer who was a former school administrator. He based classes on the Iraqi education model, with three hours of instruction and one hour of sports (e.g., soccer) per day. Up to thirty moderate clerics taught religion, and literacy courses enabled inmates to read the Koran personally instead of relying solely on cleric sermons. Graduates of the religion courses attended a ceremony with the top student receiving a personal Koran. Practically all Iraqis were grateful for the educational opportunities offered in the centers.180
Vocational training provided basic skills for employment, thereby empowering inmates to lead productive lives and giving them an alternative to life as an insurgent. Major General Stone initiated a “Lion’s Pride” program which paid inmates a small stipend for their acquired skills and products. The work program became quite popular because inmates provided their families with their salaries during visitations. Further, families received money to defray their travel costs to the detention facilities. Consequently, several thousand detainees participated in the “Lion’s Pride” program. Altogether, the improved detention processes and rehabilitation programs instilled calm within the detention facilities.\textsuperscript{181}

\textit{Transition Programs}

The intent of the transition program was to reduce overcrowding by vetting and releasing detainees, deemed ready for reintegration into Iraqi society. At first blush, Major General Stone considered that 25 percent of detainees represented no threat, while 30 percent required indefinite detention (the “truly evil detainees”). The remainder would require intensive review before release. By August 2007, the release program had reduced the number of detainees to 23,000 (well within facility capacity), and the goal of the release program was to limit the detainee population to 15,000 or less by the end of the Surge.\textsuperscript{182}

To avoid earlier perceptions of “catch and release,” Task Force 134 established a Multi-National Force Review Committee Process, which comprised American and non-American personnel. Like a prison parole board, three committee arbitrators reviewed detainee files, noted their progress, and allowed inmates to present their case in person. Inmates were
allowed to review their files as a demonstration of transparency. For those who failed the parole board, the committee would revisit the case in six months. As a final step for release, inmates had to swear before an Iraqi judge that they would not engage in insurgent or criminal activities, and a guarantor, such as a tribal chief, was responsible for a paroled inmate’s continued good behavior. Lastly, the committee provided the list of proposed releases to the relevant multinational divisions for final approval. The main goal of the program was to safeguard Iraqi society from truly evil criminals and transfer them to Iraqi corrections or an international organization for repatriation at the conclusion of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{183}

The process suffered from some frustrating shortfalls however. Committee members and the inmates were not authorized to read the classified justifications for detentions, and Task Force 134 lacked sufficient translators for converting the files into Arabic. Further, committee personnel could not verify the veracity of informant assertions against prospective parolees. Finally, irrespective of multinational divisions’ vetoes of specific inmates, some extremist insurgents were released, which caused tensions between tactical commands and Task Force 134, and caused an uproar in Iraqi communities.\textsuperscript{184}

Establishing an accurate record of recidivism among former detainees proved problematic. Throughout 2007, TF 134 had released 7,510 detainees and reported a recidivism rate of 1.4 percent (70 returnees). However, TF 134 could not account for those who had returned to the insurgency but had evaded capture or died in combat. Coalition forces believed the reported recidivism rate was fanciful, and it remained a source of friction with TF 134. Regardless of the dispute, General Petraeus deemed that the release process
ultimately reduced grievances and served the larger counterinsurgency goals. Ideally, “empowered and emboldened” former inmates would convince friends and family to reject extremist ideology. The release program, combined with the rehabilitation program did create calm in the detention facilities, though that did not necessarily mean extremist activities “inside the wire” had stopped.\textsuperscript{185}

\textit{Transitioning Detention to Iraqi Authority}

Although the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in April 2004 (and later provincial courts), rampant insecurity and instability disrupted its functions. To protect judges, investigators, and witnesses, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) established a Rule of Law “Green Zone” in Baghdad on 2 April 2007, which comprised “a court, detention facility, and training academy as well as house judges and investigators along with their families.” With more FBI-training investigators and trained judges, the courts system began to operate more fully by the end of 2007.\textsuperscript{186}

From 2008 to 2011, Task Force 134 released 12,000 detainees, transferred 8,000 to the Iraqi corrections system, and repatriated 400 foreign fighters through the International Committee of the Red Cross. To meet UN standards, Task Force 134 improved the Iraqi corrections system with training, education, and mentorship programs, as well as inspecting prisons with Corrections Assistance Transition Teams, consisting of military police, engineer, medical, and legal officials. As transitions progressed, Task Force 134 slowly downsized into a detention directorate, closing Camp Bucca in September 2009 and transferring Camp Cropper to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice in July 2010. Unfortunately, Iraqi corrections mismanagement and
corruption resulted in the release of a great many inveterate insurgents who later contributed to the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).\textsuperscript{187}

**Conclusions**

The lapse in counterinsurgency doctrine and attention following the Vietnam War had a serious impact on the initial period of the Iraq insurgency. While some tactical commanders applied counterinsurgency operations with success (e.g., Colonel H. R. McMaster at Tel Afar and USMC Lieutenant Colonel Julian Alford in Anbar), and Multi-National Force—Iraq created a COIN Academy in 2005, a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy did not materialize during the initial four years of the conflict.\textsuperscript{188} As Conrad Crane in *Cassandra in Oz* and Peter Mansoor in *Surge* recount, the intellectual underpinnings for counterinsurgency did not solidify until late 2006, resulting in Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (December 2006).

Many of the barriers to implementing a full-fledged counterinsurgency strategy stemmed from the belief that the unrest would dissipate once reconstruction, essential services, and government elections bore fruit. However, by 2004 insurgents were ensconced in the population and created pernicious insecurity. Ironically, ad hoc reconciliation preceded a counterinsurgency strategy, so a formal reconciliation program with a firm Iraqi commitment to amnesty, information operations, and reception centers failed to materialize.

Because reconciliation preceded the counterinsurgency strategy, senior US policy makers and commanders did not have the political leverage to secure meaningful Iraqi government commitment to reconciliation. The presence of coalition forces likely
convinced the Iraqi government that the survival of the regime was not imperiled, so earnest reconciliation was unnecessary. Iraqi government prejudicial behavior towards Sunni tribes after the conflict certainly corroborate this conclusion. Thus, reconciliation was short-lived and the primary reason for instability in Iraqi.

US detention operations demonstrated great potential for reconciliation indirectly. Detention facilities provided a way for moderates to escape from extremist control, provided an education and job skills, and helped cleanse them from the stigma of being an insurgent. Surprisingly, a similar judicial process occurred in Germany in mid-1946 to restore former Nazi members to society.\textsuperscript{189} For this reason, detention operations deserve a role in reconciliation programs as part of a counterinsurgency strategy.
Conclusions

As the three case studies signify, a reconciliation program is an important component of a counterinsurgency strategy. In Malaya, it was the principal cause of the communist insurgency’s demise. Its effects in South Vietnam were not as decisive, but it deprived the Viet Cong infrastructure of sorely needed manpower. Along with the counterinsurgency strategy’s clear, hold, and build (pacification) operations, the Viet Cong insurgency ultimately collapsed, despite the flow of North Vietnamese reinforcements. In Iraq, despite the absence of a formal program, Sunni reconciliation did manifest, primarily due to the abhorrent behavior of al Qaeda fighters (though high casualties were a factor too). At any rate, the volte-face of Sunni insurgents accelerated the success of the Surge.

Counterinsurgency practitioners in each case study recognized early that a predominately military approach would be incredibly costly in terms of combat power, casualties, and treasure. Their cost-benefits analysis suggested that killing an insurgent was exponentially more expensive than processing the same insurgent through a reconciliation program. The depletion of insurgent ranks through voluntary surrender resulted in substantially fewer friendly casualties as well. Since the three insurgencies averaged ten years, no fast solution was possible. So, while a national reconciliation program required a substantial investment in funding, resources, and people, the benefits in the long term far outweighed the costs.

Host government commitment to the national reconciliation program is a prerequisite. As the case studies suggest, the government and populace harbored intense hostility towards insurgents. Not only were insurgents traitors to the country, they also
committed untold atrocities and wanton destruction. British and American officials successfully convinced their government counterparts in Malaya and South Vietnam relatively early. Since these governments provided the authority, managed the constituent parts, and provided the resources, reconciliation became a true national effort. Ultimately, cultivating an environment of forgiveness and generosity convinced insurgents to surrender. The Iraqi government never committed to reconciliation, which accounts for the breakout of a renewed insurgency in 2014.

In Malaya and South Vietnam, the information operations campaign was magnificent and worthy of emulation. The means and variety of media dissemination ensured that practically everyone was aware of amnesty and the reconciliation program. Malayan and Vietnamese personal involvement in messaging was critical because only they possessed the linguistic and cultural expertise to make themes resonate with insurgents. The inclusion of former insurgents in the operations bolstered the credibility of the information among insurgents as well. Along with the commitment of the government, information operations are essential to the success of the national reconciliation program.

Reconciliation centers were tangible proof of the government’s promise of amnesty and rehabilitation. For surrendering insurgents, first impressions of the centers were meaningful. In South Vietnam, insurgents were surprisingly well-informed of reception center conditions, so good management served to bolster the program’s image. As in Vietnam, the US detention facility reintegration centers in Iraq provided an opportunity for detainees to gain an education, vocational skills, and a pathway back into society as a trustworthy citizen.
Fundamentally, reconciliation was a zero-sum game for the insurgency movement. The loss of fighters had greater impact on the insurgency because it had far fewer resources and manpower to draw upon. Thus, recruiting and impressing new insurgents were persistent challenges. The effectiveness of the program depended on the government’s sincerity to address grievances, which were the wellspring of the insurgent cause. The allied patrons took reconciliation a step further by actively enlisting the services of qualified former insurgents into the counterinsurgency effort. The selective employment of former insurgents as interrogators, instructors on guerrilla practices and structures, intelligence analysts, scouts, and counter-guerrillas immeasurably helped allied militaries pinpoint and eliminate insurgent groups without incurring high casualties in the process. The insight that “it takes a guerrilla to catch a guerrilla” is relevant to all insurgencies. In Malaya and South Vietnam, they served to disseminate government messages in insurgent-controlled areas and contacted former colleagues to encourage surrender. As security for reintegration centers, special government villages, and local forces, they allowed the government to devote more conventional units for military operations. While reconciliation in Iraq provided fighters for the counterinsurgency efforts, their potential use in other categories was limited. Simply put, reconciliation turned the insurgency on itself.

The abiding value of reconciliation was in the post-conflict period. Malaya and South Vietnam enjoyed tranquility due to government efforts to impress on the populace the need to accept former insurgents as citizens. While suspicions and anger in communities likely lingered towards former insurgents, hostilities never arose within the countries. North Vietnam’s
invasion of South Vietnam in 1975 does not detract from the success of the counterinsurgency strategy and national reconciliation program. In Iraq, the US administration and the US coalition sought to avert an insurgency through the establishment of a legitimate government, elections, economic reform and reconstruction. As those efforts proved fruitless, they pursued accelerated training programs for the Iraqi military and police. The dearth of institutional knowledge on counterinsurgency likely hindered any thoughts of a national reconciliation program. Commitment of the provisional Iraqi government in 2004 might have created momentum for the permanent Iraqi government in 2005. By then, government mistrust and fear of Sunni intentions conspired to prevent true reconciliation.

For current and future insurgencies in the world, a national reconciliation program would have a marked impact on the resiliency and duration of a conflict. The challenge for foreign advisors would be a host government commitment to the program, particularly if the insurgency has been long-standing. Once a host nation committed to the reconciliation program, it would provide a solid foundation for post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former warring factions. Accordingly, a reconciliation program would expedite peace negotiations. Regardless of the final outcome of the peace agreement or surrender terms (if it comes to that), the country would need to demobilize both the rebel forces and downsize its military forces. With the assistance of external organizations (e.g., UN, NGOs, etc.), existing reconciliation centers could serve as reintegration centers for both government and rebel forces. Hence, the investment in a national reconciliation program would make the transition to DDR seamless.
Endnotes


7. Under the communist leadership of Chin Peng, the MRLA was originally called the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MMPA-BA) and briefly the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform;” Ladwig, 58.

8. Ladwig, 58; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform;”
Nagl states that the MRLA organization was “3,000 insurgents into eight regiments and 7,000 into the self-Protection Corps.” Nagl, 63-64.

9. After a few years of frustrating failures, the British adopted a mutually supporting counterinsurgency strategy: the “New Villages” program, the reconciliation program, coordinated information operations, precise intelligence fusion, small unit counter guerrilla operations, a permanent police presence in cleared areas, and Malayan political-economic reforms. A national reconciliation program alone would not have succeeded. Nagl, 71-75, 91-100; Ladwig, 59, 60-61; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform.”

10. Thompson, 91, 95; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform.”

11. Nagl, 93; Clutterbuk, 105.

12. Thompson, 92-93.

13. Thompson, 94.


17. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform,” Ladwig, 64.

18. Thompson, 97-98.


20. Clutterbuk, 106.

21. Thompson, 96.

22. Thompson, 97-98.

23. Thompson, 90.

24. Thompson, 90-91.

25. Thompson, 92.


27. O’Brien, 24; Nagl, 93-94;

28. Clutterbuk, 105-106.
29. Thompson, 96.
31. Thompson, 91.
32. Clutterbuk, 104-105.
33. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 19; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform.”
35. Thompson, 87.
37. Thompson, 93-94.
41. Thompson, 88.
42. Clutterbuk, 107.
44. Nagl, 92, 98, 105.
46. Ladwig, 65.
49. While a hardcore of dedicated revolutionaries remained, many more individuals were impressed into service or joined out

50. O’Brien, 34.


56. Koch, 6; Goure, Russo and Scott, 23.

57. Goure, Russo, and Scott do make the point that “despite their dislike of VC taxes and policies, most of the farmers are reluctant to leave their lands unless their lives are immediately threatened by military activities.” Goure, Russo and Scott, 9-11, 24-26.

59. Goure, Russo and Scott, 20, 23.

60. Koch, 1, 6, 9, 50; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xi-xiii; Goure, Russo and Scott, 23-24; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.


62. Sir Robert Thompson and his advisory group, as well as American advisors with experience in the Philippine Huk rebellion, promoted the Chieu Hoi program. Koch, 20.

63. Koch, 18, 26, 35; O’Brien, 23; Goure, Russo and Scott, 19; Herbert A. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.


66. The Kennedy administration sought a policy to counter Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s Wars of National Liberation policy. See the books referenced in the next citation.


70. Koch, vi-vii; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

71. An alternate spelling was Quy Chanh. O’Brien, 11; Koch, v, xix, 6; Pye, ix, 1; Sorley, 76; Army Digest, 40; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, vii, ix; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.


73. Koch, 59, 66.

74. As Sorley and Komer attest, the pacification program did not begin to yield positive results until 1969 onwards. Komer, 116-117; Koch, 9, 28; Goure, Russo and Scott, 35.

75. Koch, vii. 60; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

77. Koch, 70.

78. O’Brien, 18.


82. J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, ix; Koch, v, vii; Army Digest, 40.


84. Quoted in O’Brien, 21-22.

85. O’Brien, 22.


87. The increased effectiveness of regional forces and popular forces (RF/PF) to control local communities was particularly important. Koch, vii, 44, 49; Goure, Russo and Scott, 24-25; Sorley, 76; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; Pye, 2; Komer, 116-117.

88. Goure, Russo and Scott, 34.

89. Pye, 9; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xv, xvii; Goure, Russo and Scott, 35.

90. Leaflets were a more effective media than aerial loudspeakers, which insurgents claimed were inaudible. Goure, Russo and Scott, 24; O’Brien, 25-26; Koch, 24, 47, 64, 66, 70; Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xiii; Donald S. Travis, US Progress Reports for Vietnam, 1967-68, A Study of the Hamlet Evaluation System and the Enemy Order of Battle (M. A. diss., University of Louisville, August 1990), 34-35; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

91. Koch, 47.


94. Koch, 18, 65, 70; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xv-xvi; Goure, Russo and Scott, 34.

95. Koch, 51; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, x, xii-xiii.

96. They also feared government retaliation on their families if they deserted. Goure, Russo and Scott, ix-x; Pye, 12. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; O’Brien, 47; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.


98. “Psy War Idea,” Army Digest, 40.


100. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; “The Chieu Hoi Program,” Army Digest, 40; Pye, 4; Koch, 81.


102. In 1965, most of the provinces featured reception centers. Koch, 74-76.

103. The four regional centers were in Danang, Binh Dinh, Bien Hoa, and Cantho, and the autonomous city centers were in Danang, Camranh, and Vung Tau. O’Brien, 28; Koch vii.

104. Koch, viii, 35, 52, 74, Pye, 3-5; O’Brien, 27.

105. Pye, 3-4; Koch, 27, 71, 73-74, 76, 78; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; “The Chieu Hoi Program,” Army Digest, 40; O’Brien, 19, 21; Ralliers received rewards, ranging from $1000 to $50,000, depending on the type of weapon turned in. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

106. Koch viii; 15, 21, 35, 74, 76, 78.

107. Koch, 15, 78.

108. Koch, viii, 73.


110. Pye, 16-17, 28-29.

111. Pye, 18.


113. Pye, 26; Koch, 13, 53-54.

114. According to O’Brien, “The National Police have the responsibility of verifying the curriculum vitae and origin of the defector. The National Police of Vietnam have detailed to each Region-

82
al and Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers at least two policemen, and a larger, more experienced police group conducts interviews at the National Center in Saigon. If at any time during these interviews it is determined that the defector has knowledge of weapon or supply caches, he may be borrowed to assist tactical operations. The essential fact is that he must volunteer for such operations.”

O’Brien, 29-30; Koch, 74, 77; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.


117. Pye, 28-29; O’Brien, 30; Koch, 15-16, 77-78.


119. O’Brien, 29; Koch, 78, 80.

120. Koch, 78-79; O’Brien, 33.

121. Koch, 78-79; O’Brien, 33; Pye, 17; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

122. Pye, 4; Koch ix.

123. O’Brien, 33-34; Koch, ix, 33.

124. Koch ix, 53, 81; O’Brien, 34.

125. Pye, 24; Koch, 81.

126. Koch, 53, 81.

127. Koch, 85, 87; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70.


130. Pye, 21-22.


134. Aside the US Army, Kit Carson Scouts served with Navy and Marine units as well as Thai and Australian military units. O’Brien, 39; Koch, 58, 102-105; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

136. Koch, 103.
137. Koch, 103-104.

139. Called Project Takeoff, the formal training was a joint US/ARVN endeavor by psyops battalions. Koch, 24, 93-94, 98.

140. Koch, 24, 93-95; Pye 20-21, 28.


142. Koch, 95-96.

143. Koch, 95; The RVN government established the People’s Self-Defense Forces after the 1968 Tet Offensive. All eligible males (16-17 and 39-50 years of age), excluding those on active duty, served in these guerilla militia forces. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 323.

144. Koch, 95.

145. O’Brien, 38; Koch ix.

146. Koch, 84.

147. Koch, ix, 84; O’Brien, 40.


149. Koch, 88, 90; O’Brien, 43.

150. O’Brien, 43.


152. Travis, 47-48; Koch viii, 35.

153. Koch, 35.


177. Because of this dilemma, Stone estimated that 160,000 Iraqis had passed through detention facilities since 2003. Crane, 204-205, 208; Lieto, 13, 15.

178. Lieto, 13-14; The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 331; At Camp Bucca, 16,800 Iraqis were Sunni and 1,650 Shi’a militia; the remaining 1,900 were al Qaeda foreign fighters. Crane, 204-205.


190. For more on a DDR program, see Raymond A. Millen, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Primer for Military Practitioners* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, October, 2019).