
STATUS: Active **OPERATION:** _Stability Ops - General

SPONSOR: PKSOI **UNIT / AGENCY:** PKSOI Staff -PKM

EVENT DATE: 01 Jul 2012 **DOCUMENT DATE:** 30 Sep 2012

Topic:

Attending to the "Human Domain"

This record has implications in the following areas:

----- **---STABOPS Sectors** -----

GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

----- **--P/SO - SPECIAL FACTORS** -----

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS
GOVERNANCE - SUB-NATIONAL
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

----- **-PMESII-PT** -----

POLITICAL
MILITARY
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL/SOCIETAL
INFORMATION

----- **DOTMLPF-P** -----

ORGANIZATION
LEADERSHIP/EDUCATION

This record has the following UJTLs associated with it:

OP 2.2 COLLECT AND SHARE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION.

OP 4.7 PROVIDE POLITICO-MILITARY SUPPORT TO OTHER NATIONS, GROUPS, AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

ST 8 DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL RELATIONS.

This record has no Essential Tasks associated with it.

This record has no files associated with it.

Topic:

Attending to the "Human Domain"

Observations:

Attending to the “human domain” is vital to peacekeeping and stability operations. The following quotes are provided to illustrate what is meant by the “human domain” and why it is essential for planning and executing operations:

- “We must also remember that conflict is a human endeavor, ultimately won or lost in the human domain. The Army operates in this human domain, which is the most important factor in a complex environment.” (Ref 1)
- “Simply stated, the lesson of the last decade is that failing to understand the human dimension of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the Nation to bear.” (Ref 2)
- “A nuanced understanding of the environment [in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere] was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversaries and a neglect of information concerning the host-nation population. . . . Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions, it often neglected ‘white’ information about the population that was necessary for success in population-centric campaigns such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local commanders needed information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics.” (Ref 3)
- “Partnerships with host nation actors should be guided by impartiality, inclusiveness, and gender considerations based on a solid understanding of the local context (to include civil society; private sector actors; and, all ethnic, religious, and minority groups.).” (Ref 4)

Discussion:

Although the “human domain” is broad in nature – encompassing the full range of host nation populations, their values, their motivations, and their behaviors – recent stability operations highlight the importance of focusing attention on the following specific elements / population groups:

- **Local leaders/elders.** Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and peacekeeping and civil-military operations across Africa have shown the importance of engaging local leaders/elders and gaining their buy-in on stability and reconstruction efforts. Particularly effective approaches have been the implementation of an “itihad” (“unity”) strategy in OIF to influence

community leaders and build consensus, the use of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in OEF, and Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) with local officials in both operations. (Refs 5-9)

- **Women.** Recent stability operations have shown that engaging women in peace building efforts can pay significant dividends, even in societies where women have had little or no participation in governance. The deliberate inclusion of women's groups in Liberia and Kenya and the use and expansion of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan provide valuable lessons on engaging women/women's groups and the derived benefits for the mission. (Refs 10-13)

- **Youth/young adults.** With challenges ranging from disgruntled youths (lacking education and employment) to youths taking up arms (in militias and extremist groups), the need to address sizable youth populations has come to the fore in peacekeeping operations across Africa, as well as in OEF. Effective approaches have included: engaging established youth groups (Kenya), creating new youth groups/youth "shuras" (OEF), and implementing various post-conflict employment programs – e.g., public works programs (Liberia and Uganda). (Refs 11 and 14-16)

- **Religious leaders.** From the Balkans to Iraq to Afghanistan, religion has often played a role in fueling conflict between groups within the host nation. It has also been used by insurgents as a basis for violence against coalition/international forces. Engagement with religious leaders has shown to merit attention, particularly if the coalition/international force is resourced with subject matter experts/chaplains and places command emphasis on using them for this purpose, as per II Marine Expeditionary Brigade & the UK contingent in Helmand Province in OEF. (Ref 17)

- **Civil society groups.** Civil society groups have proven to be critical resources both for forging peace in a conflict-affected nation and for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The work of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in Afghanistan and the Riinvest Institute in Kosovo show that immediate engagement with civil society groups and investments at the local level can lead to host nation capacity for long-term growth and stability. Understanding local culture, societal groups, and how they interact is paramount for this engagement – which the Human Terrain System afforded to commanders/staffs during OIF and OEF. (Refs 11 and 18-20.)

- **Insurgents.** OIF, OEF, and peacekeeping & stability operations across Africa have shown the criticality of understanding the mindset of insurgents, as well as how insurgents can sometimes be persuaded to change course. Regionally-tailored Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives (bolstered by command emphasis) were able to gain notable success in both northern Iraq and northern Afghanistan – and perhaps could have been used by host nation authorities as foundations for broader programs. Information operations targeting insurgents/combatants, amnesty provisions (temporary/conditional), and nationally-resourced employment programs were shown to be critical for DDR program success. (Refs 10 and 21-23)

Recommendation:

1. U.S./coalition forces engaged in future peacekeeping and stability operations should develop a comprehensive strategy upfront to address the "human domain." This strategy should target six key population groups – local leaders/elders, women, youth/young adults, religious leaders, civil society groups, and insurgents – and should consider use of the following elements:

- An "itihad" strategy ("unity" strategy)

- Village Stability Operations

- Key Leader Engagements
- Female Engagement Teams
- Youth group engagement programs
- Nationally-supported employment programs
- Chaplain/religious leader engagement programs
- Programs designed to engage, invest in, and mentor civil society groups
- The Human Terrain System
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs
- Information operations targeting insurgents/combatants

2. U.S./coalition forces should ensure that formations are sufficiently resourced and trained to operate in the “human domain.”

Implications:

N/A

Comments:

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:

- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G3
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

Event Description:

This lesson is based on the following REFERENCES:

(1) [“CSA Remarks at the George C. Marshall Leadership Seminar,”](#) Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Ray Odierno, 17 April 2012.

(2) [“Left of Bang: The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment,”](#) by Michael T. Flynn, James Cisco, and David C. Ellis, PRISM, vol. 3, no. 4, September 2012.

(3) [“Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,”](#) Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 15 June 2012.

- (4) "[Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction](#)," United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and PKSOI, October 2009.
- (5) "[Creating an Epidemic of Unity](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 709.
- (6) "[Village Stability Operations: Leveraging Elders and Building Local Police](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 768.
- (7) "[Preventing Conflict: Interagency Village Stability Operations Model](#)," by Matthew Denny, The Simons Center, June 2012.
- (8) "[Influencing the Population: Using Interpreters, Conducting KLEs, and Executing IO in Afghanistan](#)," CPT Michael G. Cummings, Infantry magazine, May-August 2010.
- (9) "[Rebuilding Schools and Communities in Post-conflict Kenya](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 772.
- (10) "[Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 703.
- (11) "[Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peacebuilding – Kenya](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 702.
- (12) "[Female Engagement Teams: The Case for More Female Civil Affairs Marines](#)," by MSG Julia L. Watson, Marine Corps Gazette, July 2012.
- (13) "[Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment](#)," by LTC Janet R. Holliday, Military Review, March-April 2012.
- (14) "[Youth Shura Innovation in Afghanistan](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 771.
- (15) "[The Youth Bulge in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities](#)," Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), October 2011.
- (16) "[Public Works Programs in Post-Conflict Economic Stabilization](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 690.
- (17) "[Religious Leader Engagement in Afghanistan through Military Chaplains](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 770.
- (18) "[The Balancing Act of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Need to Involve Local Groups](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 685.
- (19) "[Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 642.
- (20) "[Strategic Lesson Number 4: 'Social Mentoring' – Understanding the People, Engaging Local Groups](#)," PKSOI, 28 March 2012.
- (21) "[DDR Initiative in Northern Iraq](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 774.
- (22) "[Bottom-up Approach to Reintegration in Northern Afghanistan](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 778.
- (23) "[Strategic Lesson Number 6: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration \(DDR\)](#)," PKSOI, 30 April 2012.

MEMBER PERSPECTIVES ON THIS OBSERVATION:

26 Dec 2012 20:30:08

(U) Excellent and insightful perspective!

This post addresses a long-overdue topic that well deserves reading and heeding.

Regards

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