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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
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CHIEFS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES
CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
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DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: DoD Guidance for Security Cooperation

The attached guidance describes how security cooperation should be applied in support of the defense strategy. Security cooperation tools, when used strategically, effectively, and in concert are powerful means to help DoD advance its mission of defending the homeland; building security globally; and projecting power while remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary, should deterrence fail. The defense strategy emphasizes the importance of enabling partners to address shared security challenges and enhancing the interoperability of allies and partners with the U.S. joint force. Security cooperation resources must be prioritized and allocated in a strategic manner, however, to achieve these goals and maximize the return on investment.

This guidance prioritizes the outcomes that security cooperation efforts should seek to achieve and provides additional guidance to the security cooperation enterprise on Department-wide expectations for planning, assessing, monitoring, and evaluating security cooperation. This guidance complements existing guidance for the planning, programming, and implementation of security cooperation activities. In accordance with section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, this guidance will be updated on a biennial basis.

Robert O. Spide

Attachment:
As stated



OSD010545-16/CMD013343-16



**Department of Defense Guidance for
Security Cooperation**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

I. Introduction

This guidance informs Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation planning, implementation, and oversight to achieve defense strategy objectives, in accordance with Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016. It complements existing policy and guidance, including the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), the *Defense Planning Guidance*, the DoD Directive on Security Cooperation (DoD Directive 5132.03), and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 on Security Sector Assistance.

Security cooperation is a critical tool for achieving defense and foreign policy objectives. Security cooperation initiatives serve as means to achieve strategic ends, not as ends themselves. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) play the lead role in security cooperation planning for their Areas of Responsibility, and coordinate and integrate the priorities, plans, and activities of other stakeholders (e.g., Functional Combatant Commands, Military Departments, etc.) into their plans. GCC Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) serve as the primary vehicle for the development and articulation of integrated DoD security cooperation plans based on DoD strategic guidance. Likewise, TCP country-specific security cooperation sections (CSCSs) should serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and should inform and be consistent with corresponding Integrated Country Strategies. Security cooperation effectiveness is maximized when planning and activities are synchronized, integrated, and transparent across DoD components as well as among interagency stakeholders.


II. Guidance on Prioritization

Security cooperation initiatives must be prioritized in order to direct limited resources toward achieving objectives with maximum impact on the defense strategy. Accordingly, security cooperation priorities will be derived from regional and functional campaign objectives stated in the GEF. Not all GEF campaign objectives require security cooperation to the same extent in order to achieve the objective; therefore, the Security Cooperation Prioritization Framework in Figure 1 is designed to help guide prioritization of security cooperation resources and activities. To be clear, the Framework is subordinate to the GEF.

The Security Cooperation Prioritization Framework is a decision support tool to assist GCCs and other stakeholders in prioritizing security cooperation resources and activities in alignment with the defense strategy. The Framework also assists in accounting for risk and other considerations related to the likelihood of achieving successful outcomes. It is a model to help Components formulate security cooperation priorities in support of meeting GEF-directed objectives. Some security cooperation initiatives are planned in response to emergent requirements and senior policy-maker direction; in general, however, all GCCs should strive to apply this framework to their partner set.

The framework is constructed as a matrix with variables along the X and Y axes. Definitions and descriptions of the intent of each axis and variable follow. As the framework suggests, security cooperation resources and activities should be prioritized not by partner, but by specific outcome. For example, building the maritime security capacity of a key partner's naval forces in Southeast Asia may be a high priority, although building the infantry capacity of that partner's Army for internal security may be a low priority. Furthermore, pursuing security cooperation efforts with a partner that respects the rule of law and human rights, exhibits the political will to achieve a shared objective, is politically stable, and has sufficient absorptive capacity to sustain the assistance into the future should be prioritized over pursuing efforts with a partner that is missing one or more of these characteristics. The two-by-two graphic is an oversimplification of the multiple variables that go into planning and is therefore not meant to produce discrete solutions. Rather, it is meant to drive analysis and deliberation to inform security cooperation planning and resourcing decisions to achieve GEF-directed objectives.

Figure 1. Security Cooperation Prioritization Framework



Y-Axis: Security Cooperation Outcomes

The Security Cooperation Prioritization Framework highlights that security cooperation be prioritized based on the intended outcome of the effort and its relationship to defense objectives. All security cooperation efforts will be nested within U.S. foreign policy objectives, as described in the National Security Strategy, relevant DoD strategic guidance, and Integrated Country Strategies (ICSs).

In accordance with defense strategic guidance, security cooperation efforts that (a) enhance the ability of the United States to conduct or support current operations, and/or (b) enhance the ability of the United States, in cooperation with key partners, to prevail in future contingencies, should be the primary focus of security cooperation and should be highly prioritized. The Y-Axis of the Framework is designed to guide security cooperation prioritization based on this focus. With rare exceptions, relationship building should be considered a means to achieve other outcomes, rather than an outcome in itself. This axis identifies, in priority order, seven outcomes that security cooperation activities may aim to achieve. Each outcome is defined as follows:

1. Build capability and/or capacity of key partners to support current operations. The highest priority for near-term planning and execution should be security cooperation efforts that enable key partners to participate in current operations, whether alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces. Such efforts may include, for example (a) building the capability and/or capacity of partners to assume mission responsibilities within a coalition; (b) providing or replenishing key materiel, such as munitions; (c) providing logistics support to partners conducting operations, and/or (d) enhancing interoperability among coalition partners. Common security cooperation tools used to achieve this outcome include train-and-equip programs, operational support authorities (such as global lift-and-sustain or the Coalition Readiness Support Program), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, and security assistance programs (such as Foreign Military Sales).
2. Develop and exercise interoperability with key capable partners to support potential specific contingency operations. Based on analysis of concept and operational plans, security cooperation efforts should be planned and executed to enable key capable partners to play critical roles in the execution of contingency operations that either (a) are required to enable U.S. forces to prevail, or (b) mitigate risk to U.S. forces. Such roles may include assuming specific missions within an operation, contributing forces to coalition operations, or providing access and infrastructure necessary to enable U.S. or coalition operations. This category refers to activities with partners who, in most cases, are already capable of such contributions; such activities should seek to deepen interoperability, develop and exercise joint operational concepts, and demonstrate capabilities, including for the purposes of deterrence or reassurance. Common security cooperation tools used to achieve this outcome include combined exercises and training, military staff talks, subject matter expert exchanges, education, security assistance programs, and cooperative research and development.
3. Build capability and/or capacity of key emerging partners to support potential specific contingency operations. This category includes security cooperation efforts planned and executed to enable certain

less capable partners to play roles in the execution of contingency operations that either (a) are required to enable U.S. forces to prevail, or (b) mitigate risk to U.S. forces. Distinct from the previous category, this category encompasses efforts to develop critical military capabilities of emerging partners to enable them to play such roles and sustain those capabilities. These efforts may also be pursued for deterrence purposes. Such efforts should draw upon the full range of security cooperation tools, including train-and-equip programs, security assistance programs, combined exercises, defense institution building, and education.

4. Build capability and/or capacity of partners to conduct specific targeted missions. As part of global steady-state operations, DoD seeks to enable partners to carry out specific missions, such as counterterrorism operations, disruption of drug trafficking and other illicit trafficking networks, countering weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations, atrocity prevention, and stability and peace operations, in order to promote regional stability and prevent localized threats from growing to require direct U.S. involvement. In support of this approach, security cooperation may be used to develop military capabilities of partners to enable them to conduct missions that are defense strategy priorities. Such efforts should draw upon the full range of security cooperation tools, including train-and-equip programs, security assistance programs, combined exercises, defense institution building, and education.
5. Secure access in support of U.S. posture. U.S. military posture and access (e.g., physical, intelligence, cyber) support both current and potential contingency operations. Security cooperation may be an effective tool in supporting continued posture and access as well as for expanding access, including by enhancing partner nation infrastructure supporting basing or access; building partner capabilities to support basing or access, such as facility security or air traffic control; or securing access for U.S. training and establishing agreements for access. Common security cooperation tools used to achieve this objective include combined exercises with exercise related construction, military staff talks, train-and-equip programs, security assistance programs, subject matter expert exchanges, and cooperative research and development.
6. Mitigate risks assumed in U.S. force structure for steady-state activities. Security cooperation may be an effective tool to enable partner militaries to carry out steady-state activities and functions in areas where the U.S. joint force operates with reduced capacity. For example, given that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) demands will outpace U.S. ISR capacity well into the future, security cooperation efforts may build partner ISR and other intelligence capabilities and enable information sharing so that partner intelligence can supplement U.S. capacity. Common security cooperation tools used to achieve this objective include train-and-equip programs, security assistance, subject matter expert exchanges, and cooperative research and development.
7. Defense support to other foreign policy objectives. Although all security cooperation will support U.S. foreign policy objectives, in most cases its focus will be to advance specific defense objectives. In some cases, however, security cooperation can contribute to the advancement of foreign policy objectives

even when no specific defense equities are at stake. For example, in line with foreign policy guidance and in accordance with ICSs, security cooperation may seek to present to partner militaries concepts associated with security sector governance, military professionalization and civilian control; maintain or build relationships in the midst of challenging political conditions; or reassure key allies and partners. Such activities should directly support concrete foreign policy guidance and objectives. Common security cooperation tools used to support broader foreign policy objectives include military staff talks; subject matter expert exchanges; defense institution building; training and education, including human rights training; and security assistance programs.

X-Axis: Feasibility of Success

The X-Axis guides prioritization of security cooperation according to likelihood of achieving successful outcomes. Research into security cooperation best practices and lessons learned suggests that security cooperation efforts are far more likely to be successful where certain partner nation conditions are present or, if such conditions are not present, where coherent mitigation plans are developed. Threats and geostrategic interests may in some cases override these considerations. As a general rule, however, security cooperation should be prioritized according to the following feasibility considerations and optimized to address these considerations to the greatest extent possible. Recognizing that most partners do not fall neatly at either end of the spectrum, but somewhere in the middle, reflecting a mix of the conditions described below, the feasibility axis is meant to drive greater deliberation and acknowledgement of where risk exists and potential ways to mitigate it.

- Partner willingness. The extent to which a partner has demonstrated or indicated a desire or commitment to undertake a security cooperation effort. Security cooperation efforts should not be pursued with partners that are not willing to provide the necessary political direction and support (including national funds, when appropriate) to ensure sustained commitment to, access for, and participation in such efforts. The partner should want to achieve the outcome as much as, if not more than, the United States.
- Absorptive capacity. The extent to which a partner can support, employ, and sustain U.S. assistance or cooperation, especially in relation to capability and capacity building efforts. When security cooperation with partners with low absorptive capacity is necessary, challenges associated with poor absorptive capacity should be analyzed and addressed through mitigation plans prior to initiating such efforts. If a partner exhibits a poor record of effectively employing and sustaining security cooperation outcomes, extra attention should be given to planning support to enhance sustainability, especially through defense institution building tools. Analysis of absorptive capacity should also consider the capacity, including security cooperation resources, of the U.S. to undertake and sustain specific activities and initiatives.
- Political stability. The extent to which political conditions in a potential partner are conducive to the successful execution of a security cooperation effort. Specific considerations may include the risk of

near-term political instability, the presence of large-scale corruption, and the strength of defense sector institutions, including their civilian oversight. Although security cooperation with partners always carries some political risk, significant political instability is likely to undermine or prevent successful security cooperation outcomes.

- Respect for rule of law and human rights. The extent to which a partner is committed to and capable of ensuring respect for the rule of law and human rights. Insufficient commitment to rule of law and human rights is not only a concern with regard to personnel vetting, but also creates challenges for achieving desired security cooperation outcomes. Furthermore, inattention to risks associated with commitment to rule of law and human rights potentially places DoD security cooperation, as a whole, at risk. If a partner or certain partner military units have demonstrated behaviors inconsistent with international standards for the rule of law and human rights, security cooperation should prioritize activities, in line with relevant policy guidance, that seek to address and improve partners' capabilities for ensuring adherence and accountability to the rule of law.

As previously noted, successful outcomes are more feasible with stable, well-governed, willing allies and partners who respect the rule of law and human rights. Unfortunately, some partners do not meet this ideal. Therefore, activities that aim to improve such factors, such as defense institution building, are the foundation of long-term security cooperation effectiveness, and should be integrated throughout security cooperation planning.

III. General Guidance for Security Cooperation Planning and Execution

Security cooperation initiatives are most successful when they are deliberately planned and executed to ensure alignment with defense objectives; consist of coherent and integrated efforts, including those of interagency partners and other partner countries; mitigate potential risks; and include systematic monitoring and evaluation of activities. The following guidance is based on best practices and addresses key elements of deliberate planning and execution.

1) Assessing

Security cooperation will be informed by, and planned in accordance with, initial assessments and, as appropriate, follow-on assessments over time. Initial assessments should precede all major security cooperation initiatives to inform initiative design, and should detail the extent to which a partner shares relevant security objectives, its current ability to contribute to addressing the shared objectives, and the feasibility of achieving outcomes. GCCs are responsible for ensuring completion of such initial assessments and should work with appropriate DoD component stakeholders to ensure that initial assessments draw upon relevant subject matter expertise throughout the DoD enterprise in order to augment resident expertise. Multiple assessments within a particular country should be de-conflicted, coordinated, synchronized, and shared to reduce duplication of effort and engender a common understanding.

Although the scope and nature of assessments will vary, certain characteristics, described below, are best practices and should be addressed in all initial assessments:

- Shared interests. Assessment of the extent to which a partner shares relevant security objectives with the United States. The assessment should include identification of shared interests (e.g., actions, published strategies, and policies) and relevant areas in which interests diverge. Ideally, security cooperation efforts should focus on areas where there is shared interest, i.e., where an objective is a priority to both the United States and the partner. Host nation commitment to a potential initiative is paramount to success.
- Gaps in partner ability to contribute to shared interests. Assessment of a partner's capability shortfall holistically, i.e., an assessment of all relevant elements of a capability, rather than exclusively focusing on materiel or training aspects. For example, when building U.S. Service or joint capabilities, DoD applies the "DOTMLPF-P" (Doctrine, Organizational structure, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy) framework to ensure that a capability under development is viable and sustainable. Security cooperation assessments should adopt a similar approach when analyzing partner capabilities. (For further information on the DOTMLPF-P framework, see CJCSI 3170.01, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and the accompanying JCIDS manual. Figure 2 also provides a related model to guide holistic approaches to capability assessment and development.) In order to ensure effective holistic analysis, assessments should elicit input from across GCC functional directorates (e.g., directorates for logistics and intelligence), relevant subject matter experts from across DoD and other relevant USG agencies, and relevant analysis and reporting from across the Intelligence Community.
- Feasibility of Success. Assessment of the feasibility of achieving successful, sustainable outcomes, as outlined in Section II of this guidance: partner willingness, absorptive capacity, political stability, and respect for rule of law and human rights.
- Other ongoing, related efforts. Assessment of relevant DoD, interagency, international, and non-governmental activities already underway. In countries where there are other active security cooperation contributing nations and/or organizations, initial assessments should account for any related efforts that are planned or underway, identifying opportunities for collaboration or areas for de-confliction.

2) Planning

Planning will be undertaken as a shared effort led by GCCs to set clear objectives for security cooperation efforts in support of defense strategy and to synchronize the authorities, programs, and resources available to achieve those objectives. GCCs will establish planning mechanisms that involve key stakeholders—including Functional Combatant Commands, relevant Combatant Command staff directorates (e.g., Directorates for Strategy and Plans, Intelligence, and Logistics), the Joint Staff, the Military Departments |

and Services, country teams, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, subject matter experts from across the defense enterprise, the Department of State, and other interagency stakeholders—throughout planning and implementation. Where DoD directives and instructions assign lead planning responsibility to entities other than GCCs, those entities are responsible for coordinating with GCCs to ensure integration of their objectives into GCC plans. In all cases, GCCs and other implementing organizations will maintain close coordination with components with policy oversight responsibilities to ensure activities are planned in accordance with policy guidance and priorities. Finally, the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS) should be used to identify appropriate links among campaign objectives and de-conflict campaign plan activities.

Where security cooperation objectives involve building partner capabilities or capacity, planners should invest sufficient attention to ensure that security cooperation efforts address supporting requirements needed to ensure that the capability is employed as desired, sustained independently, and integrated into the broader partner force. Ultimately, security cooperation initiatives intending to build a partner's capability or capacity should enable that partner to attain an ability to achieve a specific military operational objective that is supported, enabled, and sustained by all relevant defense systems at the institutional, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The following figure illustrates a holistic approach to capability development, identifying the range of inputs necessary to ensure that a military capability is effectively employed, sustained, and integrated.

As the figure suggests, building capability will often involve multiple lines of effort, ranging from the tactical to the strategic or ministerial levels. Building capabilities within individual military units may be complemented by operational-level activities such as combined exercises and by institutional capacity-building. Moreover, building capability may involve working with partners in non-traditional or specialized areas of cooperation, such as cyber security, space capabilities, and intelligence. Although it is unrealistic to expect that security cooperation initiatives will address all of the represented inputs simultaneously, planners should ensure that capability development efforts are sufficiently holistic to ensure successful integration and sustainment within a partner nation's defense sector, and should identify and address non-traditional or specialized areas of cooperation necessary to achieve desired outcomes.

Figure 2. Holistic Capability Development



Security cooperation objectives should be developed in coordination with relevant subject matter experts; clearly demonstrate a linkage to priorities identified in DoD strategic guidance, such as the GEF; align with Chief of Mission-approved ICSs; and be entered into and monitored using G-TSCMIS.

Insofar as possible, security cooperation objectives should be designed and articulated according to the “SMART” objective framework: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results-oriented, and time-bound. SMART objectives serve to ensure that security cooperation efforts are achievable, unambiguous, and specifically linked to defense strategy; they also facilitate monitoring progress and evaluating outcomes. Figure 3 provides a reference for assessing an objective according to SMART criteria.

Figure 3. SMART Objective Framework

Criteria	Definition	How to Assess (Illustrative Questions)
Specificity	Objective is discrete; describes what is expected and by whom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the objective indicate what specifically needs to be done? • Does the objective indicate who has the responsibility to achieve the objective? • Has a measure of effectiveness been established?
Measurability	Success is clearly defined; articulates an observable method of measurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a baseline for measurement been established? • Does the objective indicate “how much” units should increase or decrease?
Achievability	Partner agrees with specific objective; executor empowered to implement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the partner agree on how to achieve the objective? • Do the authorities and programs to achieve the objective exist?
Relevance and results-oriented	Contributes to strategic goals; focused on outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the objective aligned with higher-level planning goals? • Is the objective framed in terms of partnership outcomes rather than process level inputs?
Time-bound	Establishes a deadline for completion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is there a deadline or timeframe for completion of the objective?

Adapted from RAND (Research Report “SMART Objectives,” Michael McNemey, Jefferson Marquis, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Ariel Klein, RR-1430, OSD Dec 2015)

Security cooperation planners should ensure that security cooperation activities are appropriately diversified, integrated, and sequenced. Ensuring security cooperation initiatives are appropriately *diversified* depends on the recognition that a single type of activity, or a series of activities with a single unit or element of a partner force, is unlikely to achieve enduring results. Security cooperation initiatives should use a range of tools aimed at a common objective in order to address capability gaps, build partner commitment and knowledge, and develop operational experience at multiple points in a partner force. Such diversified activities should also be *integrated* to ensure that the combined impact of relevant activities is coherent, targeted, and effective. Finally, such activities should be *sequenced* according to a strategic concept for achieving results. A well-conceived implementation plan for developing a partner military capability will sequence activities according to order, duration, and intervening time to maximize success of the overall effort. It is helpful to capture in

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a single document the elements of an initiative, including the range of security cooperation tools and activities to be employed and how they will be integrated and sequenced toward achieving an outcome. In addition, ensuring all activities are properly entered into G-TSCMIS as the authoritative security cooperation database is essential for effective prioritization, synchronization, and sequencing of all security cooperation activities.

Figure 4 offers an illustration intended to facilitate the application of combinations of security cooperation tools in a diversified, integrated, and sequenced manner, enabling planners to visualize the application of multiple types of security cooperation activities in a sequenced, integrated manner in order to achieve a single overarching objective. In practice, planning is rarely, if ever, this linear. The illustration is intended to demonstrate how various tools may be applied toward common effect.

Figure 4. Application of Combinations of Security Cooperation Tools

Security Cooperation Objective:				
Contacts				
Exchanges				
Training and Equip. Security Assistants				
Education				
Exercises				
Operational Support				
Defense Institution Building				
Activities by Other SC Providers				
	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Milestone 3	Milestone 4

The above illustration identifies seven broad categories of commonly used security cooperation tools, described below. It also includes a row for activities by other security cooperation providers; although DoD does not control how third parties will pursue security cooperation with a common partner, synchronizing, complementing, and avoiding duplication whenever possible should be a prominent consideration in security cooperation planning. These categories are not exhaustive; less common tools, such as cooperative research and development and infrastructure construction, should also be considered as applicable.

- 1) Contacts. Contacts enable defense and military leaders to engage with partner counterparts for discussions, exchanges of tactics, joint planning, and other purposes. Contacts are largely conducted between U.S. military and civilian defense personnel and the military and civilian defense personnel


of a partner nation, but may also include non-defense personnel of partner nations who play key roles in security missions. Examples include key leader engagements, port calls, planning conferences, subject matter expert exchanges, and military staff talks.

- 2) Exchanges. The DoD maintains a variety of options for conducting exchanges of military and civilian defense personnel with partner counterparts. Exchanges may be used to develop familiarity with partner nation systems and processes, promote interoperability, and embed technical experts to mentor and train partner counterparts. Examples include the Military Personnel Exchange Program and the Defense Personnel Exchange Program.
- 3) Training and Equipping/Security Assistance. Title 22 security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing, provide materiel assistance and related tactical and operational training to partners to develop specific defense capabilities. Title 10 train-and-equip programs, such as the Section 2282 Global Train-and-Equip program, similarly provides materiel assistance and related training. Training may also include the deployment of mobile training teams (MTTs). With regard to materiel assistance, security cooperation planners are encouraged to plan as far in advance as possible to facilitate technology security and foreign disclosure (ISFD) review processes that support the protection of critical U.S. technologies and ensure that release considerations are balanced with security cooperation objectives.
- 4) Education. Education includes participation in U.S. professional military education (PME) programs, supporting participation of partners in relevant multilateral education and training programs, and deploying mobile training teams (MTTs) to educate partners on specific topics. Examples include both Title 10 programs, such as the Regional Defense Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CDTFP), and Title 22 programs, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET).
- 5) Exercises. Combined exercises enable U.S. forces to meet training requirements and improve readiness with the secondary benefit of helping partners develop skills; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and operational concepts in line with U.S. interests. Exercises are often a valuable tool for assessing the progress of partners' capability development as well.
- 6) Operational support. Operational support includes targeted assistance designed to enable partners to participate in coalition operations, including by developing specific capabilities necessary for such operations (e.g., force protection), by enhancing interoperability among coalition partners, and by sustaining partner operations in cases where partners cannot sustain operations on their own. Examples include the Global Lift-and-Sustain authority and the Coalition Readiness Support Program.
- 7) Defense Institution Building (DIB). Providing assistance to partners' efforts to develop more effective defense institutions, including organizations and processes that can ensure effective

oversight, management, and execution of logistics, personnel, budgets, and policy, strategy, and doctrine, is critical to the effective development, employment, and sustainment of defense capabilities. Examples include the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative and the Ministry of Defense Advisors program.

Figure 5 provides an illustrative example of how security cooperation tools and activities may be applied toward a single, specific objective. In the example, a security cooperation effort is planned to build the capability of a partner nation military to perform a specific mission effectively in support of current contingency operations: specifically, the special operations forces (SOF) of Country X will conduct (# number) counterterrorism missions independently (i.e., without embedded U.S. support) within (# number) months in contested territory in Afghanistan. As the effort begins, key leader engagements and military staff talks are planned in order to assess partner strategic interests and obtain partner commitment to the proposed objective. Next, a program is initiated to train and equip specific partner SOF units to perform counterterrorism missions. Simultaneously, a DIB program begins work with the partner Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff to facilitate the development of doctrine to guide counterterrorism operations. Key leader engagements are maintained throughout the DIB and train-and-equip programs to maintain senior leader commitment, assess progress, and discuss integration of the partner SOF units into coalition operations. As the train-and-equip effort progresses, a military personnel exchange enables a U.S. SOF leader to embed within a partner SOF unit, providing direct mentoring to the developing unit. As the units mature, a series of joint combined SOF-focused exercises enables U.S. SOF units to assess progress and impart additional operating concepts. Ultimately, each unit is sent to a NATO training school to develop concepts for interoperability and understand coalition operating procedures. As a capstone event to their training, the units and staff undergo a SOF certification event (U.S. or NATO led). Once the units are prepared to deploy to Afghanistan, operational support programs provide targeted logistical support to enable the still-developing unit to operate independently.

Figure 5. Illustrative Example of Combination of Security Cooperation Tools



3) Monitoring

Monitoring, which involves the collecting and reporting of data, is required for all significant security cooperation initiatives. Monitoring enables DoD to track how initiative implementation is progressing toward the stated objectives. Security cooperation initiatives should include output monitoring and, where feasible, outcome monitoring tied to stated objectives and performance indicators. Output monitoring assesses whether implementation is on track, including whether programmatic milestones are achieved;

within anticipated timeframes. Outcome monitoring assesses whether desired results or effects are occurring within the timeframe anticipated. GCCs, in coordination with other appropriate DoD component stakeholders, will monitor execution to maintain accountability and identify where course corrections may be needed. Monitoring should address, at minimum:

- Performance Management: Assess progress against SMART objectives, identify and track indicators with targets, and determine results achieved within anticipated timeframes.
- Challenges for Implementation: Where appropriate, note what unforeseen challenges may have impacted execution.
- Financial Accountability: Track what funds have been spent and whether the security cooperation activity remains on budget.

GCCs should ensure the dissemination of monitoring data to all relevant stakeholders, including security cooperation program managers, relevant Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), and country teams.

4) Evaluating

Evaluations analyze the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of all security cooperation efforts contributing toward meeting a functional (e.g., CT), country-specific, or regional objective. Evaluation is the independent, rigorous, and systematic collection and analysis of information about outcomes of security cooperation initiatives in order to improve the effectiveness of future security cooperation efforts and inform decision makers, particularly with regard to resource allocation. Evaluations should, at a minimum, address:

- Effectiveness: Determine whether the security cooperation initiative achieved the desired outcome(s) in an efficient manner.
- Sustainability: Assess whether the partner is able to sustain the outcome.
- Lessons Learned: Identify lessons for future security cooperation planning, supporting a culture of organizational learning.

Evaluations should be disseminated to all relevant stakeholders, including security cooperation program managers, relevant Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), and country teams.

IV Expectations for Theater Campaign Plans

The primary means for reviewing adherence to this Defense Guidance for Security Cooperation will be theater campaign plan reviews conducted by OUSD Policy. Each TCP and subordinate CSCSs will be assessed according to adherence to the GEF and JSCP as well as the guidance herein, including whether security cooperation efforts are prioritized and reflect SMART objectives.

As directed in the GEF, GCCs are required to describe how they plan to use security cooperation in their campaign plans. The following attempts to clarify existing guidance. Specifically, each TCP will include a concept of security cooperation that clearly and concisely expresses what the Combatant Commander intends to accomplish through security cooperation and how it will be done using available resources. Specifically, the concept should:

1. Identify the TCP lines of effort (LoE's) and intermediate military objectives (IMOs) for which the Combatant Commander intends security cooperation to play a leading role.
2. Prioritize those LoE's and IMOs in accordance with the Command's analysis of how the Security Cooperation Prioritization Framework applies to its area of responsibility (AOR) and inform, as needed, development of CSCSs.
3. Identify risks to executing the concept, including key gaps in authorities, personnel, and resources.
4. Instruct Service Components, SCOs, command staff directorates, and others, as appropriate, for supporting or executing the concept.

Additionally, for each significant security cooperation initiative within a country, the CSCSs will specify the objective(s), describe the process by which planned activities will lead to the stated objective(s), provide guidance to relevant stakeholders on how their security cooperation tools and activities should contribute to the initiative, and include performance monitoring plans that address measures of performance and effectiveness, challenges for implementation, and financial accountability, as described in Section III. Additionally, performance monitoring plans will identify an office of primary responsibility for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating performance monitoring information relevant to the CSCS.