Distribution of Aid in a Complex Environment: Humanitarian Assistance in the Line of Fire

A Case Study by

Albert Conley III

PKSOI

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Author Biographical Sketch

AL CONLEY is Training and Education Coordinator for the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Directorate of PKSOI. Professor Conley is also aligned with Stability Electives Courses with the United States Army War College. Prior to coming to PKSOI, he served as the Counter Terrorism Program Manager and International Affairs Sub Saharan Africa Desk Officer for United States Army Africa (2012-2018). From 2011-2012, lived and worked with the US Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania and traveled extensively throughout sub Saharan Africa in order to research regional and cultural items of interest. From 2008-2010, he was an Instructor and Director of the Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course at Ft Huachuca, Arizona. In 2007-2008, he was assigned as an embedded Intelligence Advisor to an Iraqi Intelligence Officer with an Iraqi Infantry Battalion stationed on the Syrian Border in northern Iraq. Al Conley will complete his Masters in Diplomacy (Terrorism) (MDY) from Norwich University, completed a Bachelor of Arts in Russian (BA) degree from the University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona and an Executive Certificate in Terrorism from Institute of Counter Terrorism in Herzlija, Israel. Al Conley speaks Russian, French and Serbo-Croatian and has completed French Officer Staff College (ESORSEM) in Paris, France as well as United States Army Command and General Staff College.
**Distribution of Aid in a Complex Environment:**

**Humanitarian Assistance in the Line of Fire**

**Introduction**

Through a series of exercises, this case examines Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations in a Complex Environment. It illustrates the implications of working in a contested area with a multitude of competing organizations with differing motivations whether they be altruistic or otherwise. Key to understanding the Humanitarian Assistance aspects of this case is reading Joint Publication 3-29 and understanding the authorities and funding requirements. This case also illustrates the objectives of the code of conduct for aid workers held in isolation as prisoners of war, detainees or prisoners of the host nation legal system. The mode of instruction is small group discussion, adult instructional method. There are four separate handouts, each used for group work and to generate discussion among participants.

The different short exercises presented in this case situate participants in the context of 2018 Syria and ask participants to critically reflect on the following questions:

- In the scenario(s) provided, at what point are the key requirements of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance operations met: permission or will of the host nation, the United States' best interest and exceeding host nation capacity?
- Which organizations are involved on the ground? NGOs? IOs? What are their motivations? Is everyone altruistic?
- How much aid has been provided? Is this aid getting to the necessary donor targets? If not, why not? If the American people knew about this, how do you think they would feel about the use of their tax dollars in this conflict?
- How would the commander on the ground respond? What are the parameters and under what authority? What is the best, what the legal response?

**Distribution of Aid in a Complex Environment: Handout ONE**

Prior to this fictional story, please read news articles provided as well as USAID information sheets from Crisis in Syria website as background information. Explain to the students that there are four humorous videos used in this case study. Humanitarian Assistance can be a sad topic and sometimes dry, the intent is not to make fun of Humanitarian Assistance or to make light of any situations but rather to make the classroom fun and interesting.

Video One - [Bill Clinton Aid to Somalia](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYt0khR_cj0)

On 3 March 2018, a United Nation World Food Program convoy consisting of two women and five men rolls slowly through the streets of Damascus on the way to deliver to a relief organization on the eastern side of town. The unarmed team comes upon a Syrian Army checkpoint and is asked to dismount while the Army inspects the vehicles. Upon closer inspection, the soldiers realize that the convoy is carrying local food items as well as medicine that is destined for a displaced civilian camp in East Ghouta.

Video Two - [39 Cents a day](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MEb_cpsuLqA)

Senior Aid Worker, “The civilians in East Ghouta have not received aid in months and are in dire need. They are attacked daily by rockets and artillery by the Syrian army. Please allow us to pass so that we may feed these poor people, the majority of whom are children and women.”
Syrian checkpoint soldier “This area is a stronghold of rebels. Any innocent civilians should have left the area before the fighting began. In any case, they have had at least a year to leave the combat zone if they do not wish to fight. Wait here for my commander.” Checkpoint Commander walks over to the group.

The Officer walks over to the Convoy and tells the driver in broken English…”Turn around and go back. There will be no delivery today.”

What do you do?

Distribution of Aid in a Complex Environment: Handout TWO

Video Three - Who Wants to Be an Aid Worker (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MEb_cpsuLqA)

SARG Checkpoint commander, “Why do you support the rebel groups? Why does the United States hate Muslims and the Syrian people? Shut up! Wait here while I contact my headquarters. The checkpoint commander calls his higher headquarters. Conversation can be overheard in Arabic and translated by aid workers.

SARG Checkpoint commander, “No, sir. They are not local people. They are from the United Nations and are probably spies feeding the rebels. Yes, sir. Medicine and food. Yes. Warehouse North. We have nothing. And money? No, sir. Of course, sir. No, sir. Not the Red Crescent or any Arab organization. They are infidels. God willing, sir.”

SARG Checkpoint commander returns to the group.

SARG Checkpoint Commander, “Why would western people from the United Nations be delivering supplies in Damascus? We will be keeping the supplies.”

Instructions to participants:

STOP! What do you do now? Why? What is the reaction of the Syrians to your actions?
You will be broken into small groups and discuss this for 5 minutes. After 5 minutes, you will back brief your options.

Distribution of Aid in a Complex Environment: Handout THREE

Two Syrian APCs arrive and escort the UN convoy to a military warehouse north of the city center to unload.

Syrian soldier, “you will be detained here indefinitely for offering aid and comfort to a terrorist organization. Women will go left and men will go to the right.” They are escorted to a holding room deep within the warehouse. All cell phones and personal equipment is removed from the aid workers.
Eight hours after being stopped on the road, a soldier enters the cell where the men are being held.

Syrian soldier, “Your women have confessed to providing aid to terrorists.” The soldier plays a recorded message of a woman crying and stating that yes, she was providing food, money and medicine to rebels.

Syrian soldier, “Here is your cell phone! Call your leaders and tell them that for your crimes you must pay a fine to the nation of Syria in the amount of 250,000 USD. This is not a bribe or kidnapping! This is the punishment for your crime of trying to give help to the terrorists in the area of East Ghouta as you have admitted guilt. Once you have provided
your fine then you will all be released. If you do not pay then you will be moved to the prison in Damascus to serve a life sentence for supporting terrorism.”

Instructions to participants:

STOP! What do you do now? Why? What is the reaction of the Syrians to your actions?
You will be broken into small groups and discuss this for 5 minutes. After 5 minutes, you will back brief your options.

Distribution of Aid in a Complex Environment: Handout FOUR

75 kilometers away a TACSAT beeps and the commander of the US Special Forces team in Syria, MAJ Jackson answers.

“Scorpion 6, go”

“Scorpion 6, Sandbox. Convoy compromised. Medical supplies will not make it on time, OVER”

“Ack, OUT”

Jackson turns to his team. “$%^& it, we do it ourselves. Grab your med kits. We move to Ghouta and treat the people before they die. When we get back, we will report to HQ what we did.”

Instructions to participants:

STOP! What is going on? Why? As a member of Jackson’s team, do you obey?

You will be broken into small groups and discuss this for 5 minutes. After 5 minutes, you will back brief your options.

Video Four Let’s Save Africa (Africans make videos spoofing aid videos)
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbqA6o8_WC0)
Distribution of Aid Reference Materials
**SYRIA - COMPLEX EMERGENCY**

**FACT SHEET #1, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018**

**OCTOBER 27, 2017**

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS**

- On October 20, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the recapture of Ar Raqqah Governorate’s city of Ar Raqqah from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); ISIS had taken control of the city in January 2014. SDF-led military operations to retake Ar Raqqah began on June 6 and culminated in intense fighting in the city’s centermost neighborhoods during the final weeks of the offensive, according to international media. As military operations concluded, SDF escorted the majority of civilians remaining in the city to nearby security screening sites, media reports.

- Despite the recapture of Ar Raqqah, extensive explosive hazards contamination is impeding civilian and humanitarian access to the city. To prevent the premature return of civilians to unsafe areas, the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continue to provide aid to conflict-affected populations in displacement sites, transit locations, and host communities throughout northeastern Syria. Relief agencies are reaching an estimated 330,000 people per month with assistance.

- With more than $1.5 billion in FY 2017 funding, the U.S. Government (USG) continues to support humanitarian assistance inside Syria, as well as relief efforts to support Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Cumulatively, the USG has provided nearly $7.5 billion in humanitarian assistance for the Syria complex emergency response since FY 2012.

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**HIGHLIGHTS**

- SDF recapture Ar Raqqah city following a four-month offensive

- Humanitarian organizations respond to influx of IDPs from Dayr az Zawr

- GoT announces major military operation against militant group HTS in Idlib

- WHO confirms 52 cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus to date in 2017

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**NUMBERS AT A GLANCE**

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria</td>
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<td>UN – December 2016</td>
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<td>IDPs in Syria</td>
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<td>UN – December 2016</td>
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<td>People Reached Per Month by USG Assistance in Syria</td>
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<td>USG – July 2017</td>
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<td>Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries</td>
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<td>UNHCR – October 2017</td>
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<td>Syrian Refugees in Turkey</td>
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<td>Government of Turkey – October 2017</td>
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<td>Syrian Refugees in Lebanon</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>UNHCR – June 2017</td>
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<td>Syrian Refugees in Jordan</td>
<td>654,600</td>
<td>UNHCR – September 2017</td>
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<td>Syrian Refugees in Iraq</td>
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<td>UNHCR – August 2017</td>
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<td>Palestinian Refugees in Syria</td>
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<td>UNRWA – May 2017</td>
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**HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012-2017**

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<tr>
<td>USAID/FFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>State/PRM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,482,883,984</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA)

2 USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP)

3 U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)
INSECURITY AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

- The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster—the coordinating body for humanitarian CCCM activities, comprising UN agencies, NGOs, and other stakeholders—has recorded nearly 1.1 million displacements from conflict-affected areas throughout Syria since October 2016, with approximately 62,000 new displacements, primarily from Dayr az Zawr Governorate, from early to mid-October. The overall figure includes nearly 998,900 displacements from northern Syria, including Al Hasakah, Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, Dayr az Zawr, Hamah, Homs, Idlib, and Latakia governorates, and approximately 35,000 displacements from southern Syria’s As Suwayda’, Damascus, Dar’a, and Rif Damascus governorates. There are an estimated 6.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria, while more than 5.3 million Syrian refugees have fled to neighboring countries since the start of the conflict, the UN reports.

**Northern Syria**

- On October 20, the SDF announced the recapture of Ar Raqqah from ISIS, which had controlled the city since January 2014. Findings from an early October assessment indicated that the city had no functioning bakeries and a single functioning market, no health care services, no electricity, and insufficient safe drinking water. In addition, the majority of houses in the city are unsafe due to damage resulting from the military conflict, according to the assessment findings.

- Military offensives in Dayr az Zawr continue to result in population displacement from and within the governorate. The CCCM Cluster registered nearly 52,400 displacements from and within Dayr az Zawr from early to mid-October; however, field reports indicate that the conflict has displaced as many as 115,600 people from October 9–16, according to Needs and Population Monitoring—an initiative of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). IDPs from Dayr az Zawr are transiting through three primary checkpoints, where they remain for up to 48 hours to undergo SDF-led security screenings before proceeding to IDP sites in SDF-controlled areas of Al Hasakah and Ar Raqqah.

- Humanitarian organizations are scaling up response efforts to address the needs of growing IDP populations throughout northeastern Syria. Through these efforts, relief agencies are reaching an estimated 330,000 people per month, including 56,000 people temporarily sheltering at nearly 50 IDP sites and settlements in Aleppo, Al Hasakah, Ar Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr.

- The Government of Turkey (GoT) announced support for a major military operation against militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib on October 7; since July, the militant group has expanded and consolidated control in Idlib. The operation, which will be led by the Free Syrian Army and augmented by Government of the Russian Federation (GoRF) military air support, follows a mid-September agreement between the GoT, the GoRF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to establish a de-escalation zone in the governorate, international media report. In a public statement, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan noted that GoT operations in Idlib aim to enable the return of displaced populations, including Syrian refugees in Turkey, to secure areas and mitigate safety and security concerns along the Syria–Turkey border.

**Southern and Central Syria**

- More than 393,000 people reside in the Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG)-besieged Eastern Ghouta region of Rif Damascus, where extremely limited commercial and humanitarian access is contributing to reduced availability of essential goods, increasing staple commodity prices, and deteriorating humanitarian indicators, international media report. Since January, bread and wheat flour prices in Eastern Ghouta have risen by 174 and 390 percent, respectively, and sugar and diesel prices have increased by more than 1,000 percent. Meanwhile, other basic food and non-food commodities—including cheese, eggs, meat, pulses, vegetable oil, and blankets—are reportedly unavailable in Eastern Ghouta markets. On September 23, a 42-truck interagency convoy delivered clothing, food assistance, health supplies, education materials, and nutrition items for 25,000 people in three besieged towns, representing the first humanitarian assistance to reach populations in Eastern Ghouta in more than three months. Despite the assistance, international media report at least one in four children in Eastern Ghouta is experiencing malnutrition, with the deaths of at least two children due to malnutrition reported as of October 23. The region’s deteriorating humanitarian situation is further exacerbated by the limited availability of health care services and safe drinking water in the region.
• On October 15, State/PRM partner the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) re-opened two of its six schools in the Baneinu Palestinian refugee camp, located approximately 14 kilometers south of Syria’s capital city of Damascus. The recently re-opened schools support nearly 550 students in grades one through nine; insecurity prompted the schools’ closures in December 2012.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

• In September, the UN and its partners dispatched 410 interagency convoys across conflict lines and through the UN-authorized border crossings of Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salama, and Ramtha, delivering multi-sector assistance to at least 852,000 conflict-affected people in Syria. In addition, the UN deployed nearly 80 trucks overland from several SARG-controlled areas of western Syria to Al Hasakah’s city of Qamishli, while concurrently transporting humanitarian supplies overland from these areas to the city of Dayr az Zawr, which the SARG recaptured from ISIS in early September.

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

• Food prices decreased slightly across most markets in Syria in September, with the average price of a standard food basket decreasing by approximately 1.3 percent compared to August, according to USAID/FFP partner the UN World Food Program (WFP). A standard food basket comprises dry food rations sufficient to sustain a five-person household for one month. Annual food price trends in Syria demonstrate an approximately 4 percent decrease in average food basket price from September 2016 to September 2017; the decrease is primarily attributed to a better harvest in 2017, WFP reports.

• The lifting of the siege on Dayr az Zawr increased food availability in the city as traders released products into the markets, resulting in decreased food prices in September. Within the city, the average food basket price decreased by more than 27 percent from August to September, although food prices in Dayr az Zawr Governorate continue to remain higher than the national average. Nonetheless, access to food remains a serious concern for populations in rural Dayr az Zawr, as well as the city of Ar Raqqah, where the average food basket price was 97 percent and 73 percent higher than the national average, respectively.

• Food and fuel prices in Eastern Ghouta continued to rise in September, with the price of a standard food basket increasing by approximately 50 percent since August and exceeding the national average food basket price by 239 percent, the Food Security Sector reports. As of September, the cost of a standard food basket in Eastern Ghouta was more than 107,700 SYP, or $209; WFP estimates the average monthly household income in Eastern Ghouta to be 25,000 SYP, or approximately $49. WFP notes that prices will likely continue to increase due to the October 3 closure of Eastern Ghouta’s Al Waideen checkpoint, which effectively suspended commercial access to the region, and rising taxes imposed on traders, which in recent months have increased by more than 471 percent. As a result, Eastern Ghouta markets have reportedly not received new supplies since early October, with the majority of available food commodities drawn from pre-October stocks, according to the Food Security Sector.

• In July and August, humanitarian agencies—including WFP—provided emergency food assistance to an estimated 286,400 people in various locations of Eastern Ghouta, which has a total population of approximately 393,000 people, the Food Security Sector reports. Additionally, three interagency convoys provided 5,000 food baskets and 5,000 bags of flour to beneficiaries in Eastern Ghouta’s East Harasta, Misraba, and Modira towns in September. However, immense humanitarian needs, particularly for food and malnutrition treatment supplies, persist in Eastern Ghouta. According to the Food Security Sector, the closure of Al Waideen checkpoint and prohibitively high fuel prices, which limit the functionality of bakeries, will likely continue to exacerbate the region’s poor food security and nutrition conditions.

• From July 23 to October 12, UNRWA distributed nearly 110,900 food parcels to an estimated 368,300 people across Syria. Food parcels are designed to meet approximately one-third of an individual’s daily caloric requirements and are adapted to address the specific needs of recipients.
**HEALTH**

- As of October 17, USG partner the UN World Health Organization (WHO) had confirmed 52 cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus in Syria, including four new cases confirmed since October 10. Health agencies recorded three of the new cases in Dayr az Zawr's Al Mayadin District, where 42 of the poliovirus cases confirmed in 2017 have originated, with the remaining case identified in Dayr az Zawr’s Abu Kamal District.
- In mid-October, the UN received reports of an attack that destroyed the only cold storage facility for vaccines, as well as other medical infrastructure, in Dayr az Zawr Governorate's Al Mayadin District. Facilities believed to be affected by the attack stored more than 100,000 doses of measles vaccine and 35,000 doses of polio vaccine, including some doses planned for use during an ongoing vaccination campaign in the area, as well as syringes and other immunization supplies.
- Health agencies completed the second round of a polio vaccination campaign in Ar Raqqah Governorate between October 7 and 13, reaching more than 144,400 children younger than five years of age, or approximately 96 percent of the campaign’s target population, with oral poliovirus vaccine. The beneficiaries included more than 4,500 children in 47 newly accessible settlements in western rural Ar Raqqah. By comparison, health agencies reached approximately 103,700 children during the first round of the campaign, which occurred in mid-August.

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**REFUGEE ASSISTANCE**

- State/PRM partner the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had registered more than 5.3 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Egypt and other parts of northern Africa, as of October 19. Turkey continues to host the largest population of Syrian refugees, with nearly 3.3 million Syrian refugees registered in the country.
- On October 16, Lebanese President Michel Aoun convened the UN ambassadors of the five permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) member countries, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, as well as the E.U. Ambassador to Lebanon and the Deputy UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in Beirut, Lebanon, to discuss Syrian refugees in Lebanon and advocate for returns to relatively more stable areas of Syria. President Aoun urged the UN and international community to support the creation of conditions conducive to voluntary refugee returns to Syria, which he emphasized should occur regardless of a political solution to the crisis. Following the meeting, the USG, other participating governments, and the UN released a joint statement affirming the need for returns to be safe, dignified, and voluntary; however, the statement also noted that local integration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is not a viable long-term solution. As of June 30, Lebanon was hosting more than 1 million Syrian refugees.
- Between January and July, USG partner the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance to 1,550 informal settlements throughout Lebanon; each day, the assistance supported approximately 160,000 Syrian refugees, representing 60 percent of the settlements’ Syrian refugee population. In addition, UNICEF delivered more than 520,500 doses of routine vaccinations to refugee and host community children between January and June compared to approximately 429,000 doses administered during in the same period in 2016. In collaboration with its partners, UNICEF also continued to educate host and refugee communities about infant and young child feeding practices, reaching nearly 27,000 people since January.
- The Jordan International NGO Forum (JIF), which includes multiple State/PRM partner organizations, continues to support the implementation of the April 2016 Jordan Compact, an agreement between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and international community to respond to the economic and educational needs of Syrian refugees and host communities in Jordan. Between April and October, JIF members programmed more than $39 million in education projects, benefiting nearly 429,000 people, and $39 million in livelihoods projects, benefiting more than 408,800 people, in Jordan. Beneficiaries comprise approximately 70 percent Syrian refugees and 30 percent host community residents. As of September 18, UNHCR had registered approximately 654,600 Syrian refugees in Jordan.
OTHER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- On October 4, the Government of Japan (GoJ) announced $3.5 million to support life-saving assistance for conflict-affected populations in Syria. The funding will enable UNICEF to provide critical health care services, including immunizations, and nutrition support for Syrian children and women, while also supporting UNHCR to provide primary health care services and referrals, as well as cash-based assistance, to vulnerable populations. The GoJ had contributed $852.7 million to the Syria complex emergency response as of mid-October, according OCHA.

2017 HUMANITARIAN FUNDING*
PER DONOR

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<th>Donor</th>
<th>Funding (in USD)</th>
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*Funding figures are as of October 27, 2017. All international figures are according to the UN’s Financial Tracking System and based on international commitments during the current calendar year, while USG figures are according to the USG and reflect publicly announced USG funding for the fiscal year, which began on October 1, 2016.

CONTEXT

- Following the commencement of peaceful demonstrations against the SARG in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad pledged legislative reforms. However, reforms failed to materialize, and SARG forces loyal to President al-Assad began responding to demonstrations with violence, leading armed oppositions groups to retaliate.

- At a November 2012 meeting in Doha, Qatar, Syrian opposition factions formed an umbrella organization—the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Coalition. The USG recognized the coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people on December 11, 2012. On March 19, 2013, the Syrian Coalition established the Syrian Interim Government, which opposes the SARG and is based in decentralized locations throughout opposition-held areas of Syria.

- On July 14, 2014, the UNSC adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2165, authorizing UN cross-border and cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid to conflict-affected populations without SARG approval. The resolution permits the UN’s use of four border crossings from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq—in addition to other crossings already in use by UN agencies—for delivery of humanitarian assistance into Syria. The resolution also establishes a monitoring mechanism under the authority of the UN Secretary-General and with the consent of neighboring countries to ensure that deliveries across these border points contain only humanitarian items. The UNSC has subsequently adopted several resolutions renewing the mandate of UNSCR 2165, most recently in December 2016 with the adoption of UNSCR 2332, extending the authorities granted until January 2018.

- Prior to the start of the conflict, UNRWA had registered approximately 560,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, with more than 80 percent living in and around Damascus. Intense fighting in and around some Palestinian camps and neighborhoods has significantly affected Palestinian refugees in Syria. UNRWA estimates that approximately 60 percent of Palestinian refugees are displaced within Syria, with a further 110,000 Palestinian refugees displaced in neighboring countries. Syria also hosts an estimated 24,000 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers, primarily in the greater Damascus area, as well as more than 3,200 refugee persons of concern from other countries.
## USG Humanitarian Funding for the Syria Response in FY 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<td>$10,000,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Regional PRRO</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$10,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Regional PRRO</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$2,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Regional PRRO</td>
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<td>$51,900,000</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL USAID/FPF FUNDING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$401,785,681</strong></td>
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<td>NGO Partners</td>
<td>Capacity Building, Cash-Based Programming, Education, Health, Legal Services, Mental Health, Protection, Psychosocial Assistance, Shelter, WASH</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey</td>
<td>$75,219,328</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
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<td>Activities</td>
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**TOTAL STATE/PRM FUNDING** $811,853,417

**TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2017** $1,503,888,127

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1 Year of funding indicates the date of commitment or obligation, not appropriation, of funds. Funding figures reflect publicly announced funding as of September 30, 2017.

2 Award provided prior to January 23, 2017.

**PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION**

- The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for disaster responses around the world can be found at [www.interaction.org](http://www.interaction.org).
- USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as transportation routes, staff time, and warehouse space); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.
- More information can be found at:
  - Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int).

**USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Funding Amount</th>
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<td>TOTAL USAID/FFP FUNDING</td>
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<td>TOTAL STATE/PRM FUNDING</td>
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<td>TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2017</td>
<td>$7,482,883,984</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- On January 8, the UN commenced an operation to deliver a one-month supply of humanitarian assistance, via crane, for approximately 50,000 people at the informal Rukban settlement, located along the Syria–Jordan border berm. During the one-week operation, the UN plans to provide food and emergency relief commodities, including winter-specific items, for onward distribution by local leaders at the settlement.

- In early December, Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) and Government of the Russian Federation (GoRF) forces escalated attacks on northwestern Syria’s Hamah and Idlib governorates, prompting more than 71,500 people to flee the governorates in December and January, according to the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster—the coordinating body for humanitarian CCCM activities, comprising UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders. Relief agencies are addressing the priority needs of affected populations, including food, healthcare, shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) support, the UN reports.

- In late December, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) evacuated 29 critically ill patients from Eastern Ghouta, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports.

- As of December 19, an estimated 2.9 million people were residing in UN-identified hard-to-reach (HTR) areas of Syria, including nearly 417,600 people living in besieged locations. The figure represents a decrease of approximately 77,600 people since late September.

HIGHLIGHTS

- UN delivers assistance to 50,000 IDPs at the Syria–Jordan border berm for the first time in six months
- UNSC reauthorizes cross-border humanitarian access to Syria through January 2019
- Relief agencies evacuate 29 critically ill patients from Eastern Ghouta
- Relief agencies reach 810,000 people in HTR and besieged areas with assistance

NUMBERS AT A GLANCE

13.1 million
People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria
UN – November 2017

6.1 million
IDPs in Syria
UN – November 2017

4 million
People Reached Per Month by USG Assistance in Syria
USG – July 2017

5.5 million
Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries
UNHCR – January 2018

3.4 million
Syrian Refugees in Turkey
UNHCR – January 2018

997,900
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
UNHCR – November 2017

655,600
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
UNHCR – January 2018

247,000
Syrian Refugees in Iraq
UNHCR – November 2017

438,000
Palestinian Refugees in Syria
UNRWA – May 2017

HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2017

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Funding (USD)</th>
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<tr>
<td>USAID/FFP2</td>
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<td>State/PRM3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,482,883,984</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA)
2 USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FP)
3 U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)
INSECURITY AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

- An estimated 2.9 million people were residing in HTR areas of Syria, including nearly 417,600 people living in besieged locations, as of December 19—a decrease of approximately 77,600 people since September 27, when the UN estimated that nearly 3 million people resided in HTR areas, including more than 419,900 people in besieged locations. The UN removed 50 locations in Ar Raqqah Governorate—including Al Thawrah and Mansura towns, where an estimated 72,000 people reside—from the list of HTR locations in December, reducing the HTR population of the governorate by 40 percent, or 104,700 people. The UN also removed three locations in Quneitra Governorate and recognized 128 new locations in Aleppo Governorate; further, the UN removed Damascus’ neighborhood of Qaboun from its list of besieged areas, reducing Syria’s overall besieged population by approximately 2,400 people. As of December, the UN classified 30 locations in Syria as besieged, 28 of which are besieged by the SARG.

Central and Southern Syria

- Despite the inclusion of Eastern Ghouta as one of the four de-escalation zones established by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Government of Turkey, and GoRF in August, SARG aerial and artillery attacks have intensified significantly in recent weeks, with the UN reporting at least 85 civilian deaths and 183 injuries in the region since December 29. Additionally, airstrikes damaged at least two medical facilities in Eastern Ghouta, killing at least one medical staff member and rendering a facility inoperable.
- State/PRM partner the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and iMMAP’s Population Monitoring Initiative recorded nearly 4,700 returns to villages in Dar’a and Quneitra governorates in November, representing a decrease of approximately 22 percent compared to the nearly 6,000 returnees recorded during October. Relief agencies report that the onset of winter and intermittent conflict between the SARG and local armed groups have likely contributed to the slowed returns.
- In late December, armed opposition groups in Rif Damascus’ SARG-besieged villages of Bait Jan and Mazraet Bait Jan agreed to cede control of the villages to the SARG, local media report. According to local media, the agreement stipulates the evacuation of fighters and family members from the villages, located approximately 25 miles from Damascus, to locations in Dar’a and Idlib.

Northern Syria

- Persistent armed conflict in northern Hamah and southern Idlib, compounded by SARG and GoRF aerial attacks, continues to displace populations to areas of Aleppo, Hamah, and Idlib and increase humanitarian needs across northwestern Syria. Deteriorating security conditions in northern Hamah’s As-Saan, Hamra, and Oq carábat sub-districts and southern Idlib’s Sanjar and Tamanaah sub-districts displaced more than 99,500 people in December and early January, including more than 20,000 people from southern Idlib in recent weeks. More than 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), including nearly 273,400 IDPs in displacement sites, were residing in western Aleppo, northern Hamah, and Idlib as of January 9, the CCCM Cluster reports.
- Displacement has also increased in Ar Raqqah, with the CCCM Cluster registering approximately 330,900 primary and secondary displacements from or within the governorate since November 1, 2016. An estimated 48,000 people had returned to the city of Ar Raqqah as of early January, according to the UN. However, the UN reports that access to clean water and electricity is severely limited throughout Ar Raqqah Governorate; as of mid-December, one of 77 health facilities was fully functional in the governorate, according to the UN.
- The presence of explosive hazards continues to pose a risk to returning populations in northeastern Syria, notably in the city of Ar Raqqah. Despite messaging by humanitarian organizations and local authorities regarding the risk of explosive hazard contamination, displaced populations continue to return to the city. Between October and December, more than 200 people were reportedly killed and hundreds of people were injured due to explosive hazards in the city, according to the UN.
**HUMANITARIAN ACCESS**

- On December 19, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 2393, re-authorizing UN cross-border humanitarian access to Syria through January 10, 2019. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2165, adopted in 2014, provided the original mandate for UN agencies to access Syria through four approved border crossings with Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey; the UN Security Council has subsequently extended the resolution’s mandate on an annual basis. Humanitarian agencies assist an estimated 2.8 million people per month in Syria through cross-border operations, the UN reports.

- On January 8, the UN commenced an operation to deliver assistance to the informal Rukban settlement using cranes based on the Jordan border. The operation, estimated to last approximately one week, will provide food and emergency relief commodities, including winter-specific items, to approximately 10,000 households, or 50,000 people, at the site. As of January 10, the UN had delivered assistance sufficient for more than 5,700 households at the settlement. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had suspended regular access to the settlement after a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated at a Jordanian military outpost near the settlement in June 2016.

- On December 6, a 36-truck SARC convoy accessed the HTR towns of Talbiseh in Homs Governorate and Tlul Elhomor in Hamah, according to relief organizations. The convoy delivered nearly 18,600 food baskets, as well as medical supplies and winter-specific relief items—including plastic sheeting, thermal blankets, and winter clothing kits.

- On December 12, the SARC accessed Dayr az Zawr Governorate’s HTR city of Abu Kamal with emergency assistance for the second time since mid-2014; the first interagency convoy to Abu Kamal arrived to the city on November 22. The 15-truck convoy included 6,000 food parcels, 3,000 bags of flour, 4,500 bags of diapers, 3,000 hygiene kits, and 2,500 solar lamps provided by ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the UN.

- Despite strict access challenges, USG partner the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided emergency assistance to more than 340,000 people in HTR locations in Syria in November. UNICEF provided medical supplies for 237,000 people and reached 3,500 vulnerable youth with life skills classes and psychosocial support services in HTR areas countrywide during the month. The UN agency also distributed nutrition supplies for 24,000 children and 6,000 pregnant or lactating women in HTR areas of Hamah, Homs, and Rif Damascus. As of mid-December, the UN and humanitarian organizations had reached more than 810,000 people in HTR areas with multi-sector assistance in 2017.

- In December, the Logistics Cluster, with support from USAID and in coordination with the SARC and UN agencies, facilitated two interagency humanitarian convoys to HTR locations in Homs. Convoys transported life-saving food, nutrition, health, protection, and WASH assistance, as well as education supplies, on behalf of five humanitarian organizations. The Logistics Cluster also continued to coordinate the cross-border operations of five UN agencies and USG partner the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in December, facilitating the crossing of more than 200 trucks from Jordan and more than 450 trucks from Turkey into Syria.

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**HEALTH AND PROTECTION**

- From December 26–28, the SARC evacuated 29 critically ill patients from Eastern Ghouta, ICRC reports. More than 600 additional patients remained in need of urgent medical evacuation from Eastern Ghouta as of late December, according to the Syrian American Medical Society. Years of aerial bombardments and SARG-imposed access restrictions have damaged health infrastructure and depleted medical supplies, exacerbating the spread of preventable diseases and limiting the care that region’s few health care workers can provide. According to the UN, more than one-third of Eastern Ghouta’s health facilities are no longer functioning, with remaining facilities experiencing severe resource shortages.

- SARG and GoRF airstrikes damaged at least 10 health facilities in Eastern Ghouta in recent weeks, international media report. According to the UN and the Health Cluster, aerial attacks in late December damaged a local hospital and medical warehouse in northwestern Syria belonging to an international NGO, damaging medical and nutrition supplies.
In November, the Health Cluster recorded 19 attacks against health care facilities in Syria, including seven incidents in Rif Damascus, five incidents in Idlib, three incidents each in Aleppo and Hamah, and one incident in Damascus.

- As of January 9, USG partner the UN World Health Organization (WHO) had reported 74 laboratory-confirmed cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus in Syria, including four cases confirmed between November 21 and December 12 that originated from Dayr az Zawr’s Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin districts. Health agencies continue to support outbreak response activities, including planning upcoming vaccination campaigns in Al Hasakah, Ar Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr governorates and establishing a new environmental surveillance laboratory in Damascus.

- Early marriage—a practice often exacerbated by unsafe living and shelter conditions and economic vulnerability—is a protection risk for Syrian refugee girls living in Lebanon, UNICEF reports. From January to October, UNICEF provided approximately 104,000 youth and 100,000 adults with messaging regarding the negative effects of early marriage on girls’ education, health, and psychosocial well-being. Additionally, the UN agency provided more than 72,000 women and girls access to safe spaces that offered psychosocial services—through life skills, literacy, numeracy, and parenting classes; socio-economic empowerment opportunities; and emotional support groups—to enable adolescent girls to develop positive coping mechanisms and social networks.

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**AGRICULTURE, FOOD SECURITY, AND NUTRITION**

- The SARG siege on Eastern Ghouta continues to deteriorate nutrition conditions in the region, according to the UN. Results from a November UNICEF survey indicated that the proportion of children younger than five years of age facing acute malnutrition had risen to nearly 12 percent in November, compared to approximately 2 percent in January 2017, representing the highest levels of acute malnutrition recorded in Syria since the beginning of the conflict.

- In response to dire nutrition conditions in Eastern Ghouta, USAID/OFDA is supporting life-saving health and nutrition interventions, including malnutrition prevention and treatment services and infant and young child feeding activities, in the region. USAID/OFDA partners are also providing critical food security and livelihoods support to vulnerable Eastern Ghouta households. In November, a USAID/OFDA partner distributed fodder vouchers, coordinated a chicken breeding program, supported veterinary care visits, and led trainings on livestock breeding and care in northern rural Homs. The partner organization also distributed more than 13,000 pounds of fodder, as well as chickens and coops, to households in Eastern Ghouta during the month.

- Humanitarian organizations, including USAID/FFP partner the UN World Food Program (WFP), are responding to the urgent food security needs of displaced individuals across Syria, as security conditions allow. In early January, WFP delivered food rations to support 5,000 people in northern Idlib and provided food assistance to an additional 4,000 recently arrived IDPs in eastern Idlib.

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**WINTERIZATION ASSISTANCE**

- With the onset of winter, the UN remains concerned regarding the winterization needs of up to 13 million vulnerable Syrians, including recently displaced populations in northern Syria. Between September 1 and December 12, UNHCR distributed more than 837,000 winter-specific relief commodities—including plastic sheeting, thermal blankets, and winter clothing kits—to approximately 513,000 people in Damascus and As Suwayda’, Aleppo, Dar’a, Dayr az Zawr, Hamah, Homs, Latakia, Rif Damascus, Tartus, and Quneitra governorates.
**2017 HUMANITARIAN FUNDING**

*PER DONOR*

*Funding figures are as of January 12, 2018. All international figures are according to the UN’s Financial Tracking System and based on international commitments during the current calendar year, while USG figures are according to the USG and reflect publicly announced USG funding for the fiscal year, which began on October 1, 2016.*

### CONTEXT

- Following the commencement of peaceful demonstrations against the SARG in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad pledged legislative reforms. However, reforms failed to materialize, and SARG forces loyal to President al-Assad began responding to demonstrations with violence, leading armed opposition groups to retaliate.

- At a November 2012 meeting in Doha, Qatar, Syrian opposition factions formed an umbrella organization—the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Coalition. The USG recognized the coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people on December 11, 2012. On March 19, 2013, the Syrian Coalition established the Syrian Interim Government, which opposes the SARG and is based in decentralized locations throughout opposition-held areas of Syria.

- On July 14, 2014, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 2165, authorizing UN cross-border and cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid to conflict-affected populations without SARG approval. The resolution permits the UN’s use of four border crossings from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq—in addition to other crossings already in use by UN agencies—for the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Syria. The resolution also establishes a monitoring mechanism under the authority of the UN Secretary-General and with the consent of neighboring countries to ensure that deliveries across these border points contain only humanitarian items. The UNSC has subsequently adopted several resolutions renewing the mandate of UNSCR 2165, most recently in December 2017 with the adoption of UNSCR 2393, extending the authorities granted until January 2019.

- Prior to the start of the conflict, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had registered approximately 560,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, with more than 80 percent living in and around the city of Damascus. Intense fighting in and around some Palestinian camps and neighborhoods has significantly affected Palestinian refugees in Syria. UNRWA estimates that approximately 60 percent of Palestinian refugees are displaced within Syria, with a further 110,000 Palestinian refugees displaced in neighboring countries. Syria also hosts an estimated 24,000 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers, primarily in the greater Damascus area, as well as more than 3,200 refugee persons of concern from other countries.
### USG Humanitarian Funding for the Syria Response in FY 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
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<td>Support and Relief Commodities, Monitoring and Evaluation, Nutrition,</td>
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<td>Protection, Risk Management Policy and Practice, Shelter and Settlements,</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Lebanon,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Development Program (UNDP)</td>
<td>Livelihoods, Shelter and Settlements, WASH</td>
<td>Lebanon,</td>
<td>$9,422,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Population Fund (UNFPA)</td>
<td>Capacity Building, Health, Protection, Psychosocial Assistance, Youth</td>
<td>Iraq, Jordan,</td>
<td>$5,750,000</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Programs and Locations</td>
<td>Funding</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNHCR</strong></td>
<td>Camp Management, Education, Livelihoods, Protection, Relief Commodities, Shelter and Settlements, WASH</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Regional</td>
<td>$355,170,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNICEF</strong></td>
<td>Child Protection, Education, Health, Nutrition, WASH, Youth Programs</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey</td>
<td>$189,800,000</td>
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<td><strong>UNRWA</strong></td>
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<td><strong>WHO</strong></td>
<td>Health</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL STATE/PRM FUNDING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$811,853,417</td>
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**TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2017** $1,503,888,127

1 Year of funding indicates the date of commitment or obligation, not appropriation, of funds. Funding figures reflect publicly announced funding as of September 30, 2017.

2 Award provided prior to January 23, 2017.

**USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
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<td>TOTAL USAID/FFP FUNDING</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2017</td>
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**PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION**

- The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for disaster responses around the world can be found at [www.interaction.org](http://www.interaction.org).
- USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as transportation routes, staff time, and warehouse space); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.
- More information can be found at:
  - Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int).

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• On February 24, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution demanding a 30-day nationwide ceasefire in Syria to allow unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to conduct life-saving interventions. However, Syrian Arab Republic (SARG) airstrikes and bombardments continued in Rif Damascus Governorate’s SARG-besieged Eastern Ghouta region following the resolution, and the SARG launched a ground offensive in the region on February 25, according to international media. Conflict in Eastern Ghouta has killed more than 1,000 people and injured at least 2,500 others since February 18, international media report.

• On March 5, a joint UN, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) humanitarian convoy delivered life-saving assistance to Eastern Ghouta, transporting emergency food assistance, as well as health and nutrition supplies. According to the UN, SARG officials removed an estimated 70 percent of medical supplies from the convoy prior to arrival, and 13 of the 46 trucks were only partially unloaded due to an escalation in conflict during the initial delivery process. The convoys completed the delivery of the remaining commodities on March 9, reaching the planned caseload of 27,500 people.

• Operation Olive Branch—a Government of Turkey (GoT) military offensive in Aleppo Governorate’s Kurdish-controlled Afrin District and surrounding areas—continued through early March, relief organizations report. As of mid-February, the offensive had displaced an estimated 35,000–50,000 people, according to the UN.

• An ICRC and SARC humanitarian convoy reached Afrin on March 1, the ICRC reports. The convoy included approximately 430 metric tons (MT) of emergency relief commodities sufficient for 50,000 people.

HIGHLIGHTS

• Clashes continue despite February 24 UNSC resolution calling for 30-day ceasefire
• Conflict in Eastern Ghouta kills more than 1,000 civilians in 20 days
• GoT Operation Olive Branch displaces 35,000–50,000 people since January 20
• Humanitarian convoys arrive in Eastern Ghouta and Afrin
• WFP reaches nearly 2.4 million beneficiaries in January

NUMBERS AT A GLANCE

13.1 million
People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria
UN – November 2017

6.1 million
IDPs in Syria
UN – November 2017

4 million
People Reached Per Month by USG Assistance in Syria
USG – July 2017

5.6 million
Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries
UNHCR – March 2018

3.5 million
Syrian Refugees in Turkey
UNHCR – March 2018

995,500
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
UNHCR – January 2018

657,600
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
UNHCR – February 2018

247,400
Syrian Refugees in Iraq
UNHCR – January 2018

438,000
Palestinian Refugees in Syria
UNRWA – May 2017

HUMANITARIAN FUNDING
FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Funding (USD)</th>
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<td>USAID/FFP²</td>
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<td>State/PRM³</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$7,699,028,054</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA)
² USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP)
³ U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)
INSECURITY AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

Central and Southern Syria

- Despite the February 24 UNSC resolution demanding a 30-day ceasefire across Syria, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad reiterated on March 4 that the SARG military offensive in Eastern Ghouta will continue, international media report. Intensified SARG military operations in the region continue to kill civilians, displace populations, and compromise relief operations. Since an escalation in clashes on February 18, SARG airstrikes, bombardments, and ground assaults in Eastern Ghouta have killed more than 1,000 people and injured at least 2,500 others, according to international media.

- There are unconfirmed reports indicating increasing levels of internal displacement within Eastern Ghouta. Displaced and other vulnerable populations are primarily sheltering underground and reliant on humanitarian assistance, relief organizations report. The majority of households are only able to leave the safety of the underground shelters during early morning hours when airstrikes and bombardments are less frequent.

- On March 6, international media reported a suspected chlorine gas attack targeting Eastern Ghouta’s Hamouriyeh town; health facilities treated approximately 30 people in the town for respiratory distress and symptoms consistent with chlorine gas exposure. A February 25 suspected chemical attack in the region’s Sheifouniyeh town reportedly killed one child, and health agencies treated at least 17 additional civilians—including six children and two local emergency responders—for symptoms consistent with chemical exposure, local media report. To date in 2018, health authorities have reported at least eight suspected uses of chemical weapons in Syria, bringing the total number of suspected chemical weapons attacks in Syria to at least 198 since 2011.

Northwestern Syria

- Relief agencies report that Operation Olive Branch continued as of early March, resulting in civilian deaths, population displacement, and increasing humanitarian needs. The UN estimates that the GoT offensive had displaced an estimated 35,000–50,000 people from peripheral communities toward central areas of Afrin as of February 14, as well as caused additional displacement out of the district. Populations displaced by the offensive are residing with relatives and host communities; in public buildings, including mosques and schools; or informal settlements. Priority humanitarian needs among internally displaced persons (IDPs) include blankets, food, and health care services, the UN reports.

- Local authorities continue to prevent civilians from leaving Afrin, with exceptions for critically injured individuals, according to the UN. However, the UN reports that the Nabul–Ziyara route connecting Afrin to SARG-held areas in Aleppo remains open to commercial traffic. Despite the limitations on civilian movements, more than 4,100 IDPs reached SARG-controlled areas—including Aleppo’s Azaz District and Aleppo city—from Afrin through unofficial routes between January 20 and February 13, the UN reports.

- Intensified conflict between SARG forces and armed opposition groups in northern Hamah and southern Idlib continued to kill civilians and displace populations through February. Between December 25, 2017, and February 5, 2018, airstrikes and shelling killed more than 220 civilians, international media report. In mid-February, aerial attacks and shelling incidents in Idlib, primarily in eastern and southern areas of the governarote, killed more than 35 people, injured at least 70 others, and caused extensive damaged to infrastructure—including a grain storage facility, a health clinic, local government buildings, and a school—according to the UN.

- Meanwhile, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster recorded more than 353,700 primary and secondary displacements from northern Hamah, southern Idlib, and western Aleppo between December 15 and February 17, due to conflict between the SARG and armed opposition groups. According to the CCCM Cluster, recent displacement figures in the three governorates have stabilized to approximately 28,000–30,000 displacements per week following a spike of nearly 73,800 displacements recorded from January 7–13; however, displacement remains elevated since the surge in conflict commenced in December. Due to the influx of IDPs, most IDP camps in Idlib were operating beyond capacity as of mid-February, the CCCM Cluster reports.
Northeastern Syria

- As of February 12, military operations had displaced nearly 256,000 people from and within Dayr az Zawr Governorate and approximately 318,800 people from and within Ar Raqqah Governorate during the previous 12 months, according to the CCCM Cluster. In response, relief agencies—including USG partners—are providing emergency food, health care, shelter, and other support to affected populations.
- Although an estimated 61,000 individuals have returned to Ar Raqqah city—primarily in western parts of the city—since October 20, precise returnee figures remain difficult to verify due to security risks posed by unexploded ordnance. During a mid-January visit to the city, UN representatives noted that the pace and scale of returns continues to increase, despite the risk of explosive hazards and lack of basic services and economic opportunities. According to the UN, Ar Raqqah’s Mashlab neighborhood reached maximum capacity, with an estimated 8,000–10,000 households residing in the neighborhood as of January.
- Explosive hazard contamination continues to impede humanitarian access and pose risks to returnees in Ar Raqqah city. During the month of January, blasts from explosive hazards resulted in a weekly average of 50 casualties in the city, according to the UN. In total, explosive hazards killed more than 250 civilians and injured nearly 570 additional individuals between October 2017 and January 2018. Clearance operations continue in the city, focusing on key infrastructure such as main roads and administrative buildings.
- Humanitarian access in Dayr az Zawr remains limited due to military operations, particularly in areas under Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) control. In addition, airstrikes in Dayr az Zawr continue to kill and injure civilians. On January 24, airstrikes killed at least 15 civilians in the governorate’s Al Sha’fa town. Furthermore, approximately 13 civilians died due to explosive hazards in Dayr az Zawr during the week of January 29.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

- A 46-truck UN, ICRC, and SARC interagency humanitarian convoy reached Eastern Ghouta’s Douma town from the capital city of Damascus on March 5, delivering emergency food assistance to more than 13,700 people, as well as health and nutrition supplies, according to the UN. However, SARG officials removed an estimated 70 percent of medical supplies—including trauma kits, dialysis supplies, and insulin—from the cross-line convoy during inspection prior to arrival, the UN reports. ICRC notes that SARG authorities allowed some urgent care medical supplies and primary health care medicines to remain in the convoy. In addition, 13 of the convoy’s 46 trucks were only partially unloaded due to insecurity during the time of offloading; as a result, nearly 13,800 people did not receive food assistance, the UN reports. On March 9, the 13 trucks arrived in Eastern Ghouta and relief staff unloaded and delivered the remaining commodities to reach the planned caseload of 27,500 people, international media report.
- The early March delivery represents the first convoy to reach Eastern Ghouta since the February 24 UNSC resolution. The last humanitarian convoy allowed to enter the besieged region arrived on February 14, delivering food, health, and nutrition supplies for approximately 7,200 people to the region’s Nashabiyeh town. Combined, the contents of the two most recent convoys to Eastern Ghouta were sufficient to meet the needs of only 9 percent the region’s population of approximately 393,000 people. Prior to February, a humanitarian convoy last reached Eastern Ghouta in November 2017, according to the UN.
- On March 1, an ICRC and SARC convoy reached Afrin, according to ICRC. The convoy included approximately 430 MT of emergency relief commodities—including blankets, food, hygiene kits, mattresses, medical supplies, water purification tools, and winter clothing—sufficient for 50,000 people. ICRC notes that humanitarian conditions in Afrin and areas near the Syria–Turkey border have deteriorated since the January 20 launch of Operation Olive Branch. While international media report that the GoT does not intend to suspend Operation Olive Branch during the UNSC-mandated 30-day ceasefire, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock noted that GoT authorities have emphasized willingness to facilitate humanitarian access to Afrin and surrounding areas.
PROTECTION

- According to an early February Protection Cluster assessment, bombardments, the advance or expected advance of SARG forces, a lack of basic services, and concerns from unexploded ordnance represented the primary reasons newly displaced people fled areas of origin in Aleppo, Hamah, and Idlib to areas of relative safety in Aleppo and Idlib. IDPs reported leaving with little or no belongings and experiencing illness due to inclement weather and injuries due to conflict. The assessment indicated that IDPs chose their destinations based on availability of employment opportunities, proximity to friends and family, and access to humanitarian assistance and physical safety.

- From February 8–15, protection organizations distributed dignity kits, provided psychological first aid and psychosocial support, and conducted risk education activities to an estimated 5,300 people—including approximately 1,330 women and 3,100 children—in Aleppo and Idlib, the UN reports.

HEALTH AND WASH

- Intensified military operations, particularly in Afrin, Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, Idlib and Dayr az Zawr, have directly impacted health response activities, as more than 50 percent of public hospitals and public health care facilities in Syria are either closed or partly functioning, according to the Health Cluster.

- On March 5, armed actors entered a Syrian American Medical Society Foundation (SAMS)-supported hospital in Idlib’s Ma’arrat Al-Nu’man sub-district and took control of the facility. Health staff subsequently evacuated the hospital, although the group vacated the facility after several hours, allowing hospital staff to return. From February 18–25, SARG airstrikes hit at least 26 health facilities—destroying eight of the facilities and rendering additional five of the facilities inoperable—in Eastern Ghouta, according to a health organization. More than 1,060 critically ill people required medical evacuation from the region as of February due to limited health care services, the Health Cluster reports. Health organizations continue to advocate for unhindered access to provide life-saving assistance to conflict-affected populations, including the evacuation of critically ill patients.

- In early February, health facilities in Idlib’s Dana and Ma’arrat Al-Nu’man towns and Idlib city recorded 30–50 percent increases in patient caseloads, according to the Health Cluster. To reduce congestion at health care centers and reach additional patients, relief organizations—including USAID/OFDA partners—deployed mobile health teams to locations with significant IDP populations, providing an average of 500 consultations per day and vaccinating 700 children against diseases from January 31–February 7. During the same period, the UN World Health Organization (WHO) transported medical supplies, sufficient for more than 188,000 treatments, to be distributed across 70 health facilities in northwestern Syria. In addition, humanitarian organizations provided water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services—such as distributing hygiene kits; constructing latrines and showers; and conducting solid waste management, water storage, and water trucking activities—to approximately 74,000 IDPs in nearly 90 locations throughout northwestern Syria from January 14–February 7, according to the WASH Cluster.

- Relief organizations in Afrin reported the need for additional health care resources in mid-February, particularly in the district’s Robar and Al Shahba camps, in order to appropriately respond to the current and anticipated health needs of displaced populations. Health care capacity in Afrin remains a challenge amid increasing population displacement and humanitarian needs resulting from Operation Olive Branch. According to the UN, only five hospitals were operational in Afrin District as of mid-February, all of which are located in Afrin town.

- In January, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided water purification tools to more than 12.3 million people and 60 million liters of safe drinking water to approximately 153,000 people in six governorates—Aleppo, Dar’a, Dayr az Zawr, Al Hasakah, Latakia, and Ar Raqqah. In addition, the UN agency provided WASH items and emergency relief commodities to approximately 80,000 people. Moreover, through continuous efforts to improve and sustain access to water and sanitation infrastructure, UNICEF rehabilitated WASH facilities in six schools, benefiting more than 3,300 children.
FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

• The siege of Eastern Ghouta has increased basic commodity prices and limited the availability of bread and other staple foods in the region. From February 13–26, sugar prices increased by 34 percent, bread prices increased by more than 30 percent, and rice prices increased by more than 15 percent, according to a relief organization. On February 19, SARG airstrikes hit bakeries, dairy factories, and food commodity warehouses in Eastern Ghouta’s Hammoura, Kafr Batna, Mesaraba, and Saqba towns, the relief organization reports. USAID/FFP partner the UN World Food Program (WFP) notes that increased prices and dwindling availability of food commodities due to restricted commercial access and destruction of remaining stocks are diminishing purchasing power and reducing resilience capacity against future shocks.

• In January, WFP delivered emergency food assistance to nearly 2.4 million people—representing more than 80 percent of the UN agency’s January caseload—in 11 governorates, including via cross-border operations from Jordan and Turkey. Access constraints to besieged and hard-to-reach areas and a January 7–February 15 suspension of UN operations in northeastern Syria due to disputes between the SARG and the Autonomous Administration—a Democratic Union Party-affiliated governance body presiding over parts of northern Syria—contributed to deliveries falling below planned levels for the month.

• Between January 1–February 15, WFP and other food security organizations provided ready-to-eat (RTE) rations for approximately 125,000 people. WFP has also pre-positioned RTE rations in Idlib sufficient to meet the needs of approximately 200,000 people.

• In addition, WFP continued to provide nutrition support to children and pregnant and lactating women across the country. The UN agency transported nutrition commodities to prevent acute malnutrition for more than 52,500 children in January. Furthermore, WFP provided cash-based assistance to more than 20,000 pregnant and lactating women, enabling the purchase of fresh food, including dairy products, fruits, meat, and vegetables, in Aleppo, Hamah, Homs, Latakia, Rif Damascus, and Tartus governorates.

• During the first week of February, nutrition organizations mobilized eight mobile clinics and 46 teams of community health workers to camps and reception centers in Idlib districts with significant IDP populations. The teams screened more than 3,600 children younger than five years of age for malnutrition and treated 77 children for moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and 16 children for severe acute malnutrition. The health workers also provided approximately 3,100 children with specialized nutrition commodities. In addition, the teams reached nearly 1,000 pregnant and lactating women with counseling on infant and young child feeding practices and screened approximately 900 pregnant and lactating women for malnutrition, referring 139 MAM cases specialized health facility for further treatment.

2017–2018 HUMANITARIAN FUNDING* PER DONOR

*Funding figures are as of March 9, 2018. All international figures are according to the UN’s Financial Tracking System and based on international commitments during calendar years 2017 and 2018, while U.S. Government (USG) figures are according to the USG and reflect publicly announced USG funding for FY 2017 and FY 2018, which began on October 1, 2016 and October 1, 2017, respectively.
## Context

- Following the commencement of peaceful demonstrations against the SARG in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad pledged legislative reforms. However, reforms failed to materialize, and SARG forces loyal to President al-Assad began responding to demonstrations with violence, leading armed oppositions groups to retaliate.

- At a November 2012 meeting in Doha, Qatar, Syrian opposition factions formed an umbrella organization—the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Coalition. The USG recognized the coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people on December 11, 2012. On March 19, 2013, the Syrian Coalition established the Syrian Interim Government, which opposes the SARG and is based in decentralized locations throughout opposition-held areas of Syria.

- On July 14, 2014, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 2165, authorizing UN cross-border and cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid to conflict-affected populations without SARG approval. The resolution permits the UN's use of four border crossings from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq—in addition to other crossings already in use by UN agencies—for the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Syria. The resolution also establishes a monitoring mechanism under the authority of the UN Secretary-General and with the consent of neighboring countries to ensure that deliveries across these border points contain only humanitarian items. The UNSC has subsequently adopted several resolutions renewing the mandate of UNSCR 2165, most recently in December 2017 with the adoption of UNSCR 2393, extending the authorities granted until January 2019.

- The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has registered approximately 560,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, with more than 80 percent living in and around the city of Damascus prior to the start of the conflict. Intense fighting in and around some Palestinian camps and neighborhoods has significantly affected Palestinian refugees in Syria. UNRWA estimates that approximately 60 percent of Palestinian refugees are displaced within Syria, with a further 110,000 Palestinian refugees displaced in neighboring countries. Syria also hosts an estimated 24,000 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers, primarily in the greater Damascus area, as well as more than 3,200 refugee persons of concern from other countries.

### USG Humanitarian Funding for the Syria Response in FY 2017–2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Partners</td>
<td>Health, Logistics Support and Relief Commodities</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Administrative and Support Costs</td>
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### USAID/FFP

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<td>Regional PRRO</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>Regional PRRO</td>
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**TOTAL USAID/FFP FUNDING**: $599,615,937

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### STATE/PRM

<table>
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<th>NGO Partners</th>
<th>Services Provided</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Funding</th>
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<td>$355,170,000</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Child Protection, Education, Health, Nutrition, WASH. Youth Programs</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
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<td>Jordan, Lebanon, Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Lebanon, Turkey</td>
<td>$3,584,135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL STATE/PRM FUNDING**: $811,853,417

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**TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2017–2018**: $1,720,032,197

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**USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL USAID/OFDA FUNDING</td>
<td>$1,467,232,578</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL USAID/FFP FUNDING</td>
<td>$2,495,220,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL STATE/PRM FUNDING</td>
<td>$3,736,575,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2017</td>
<td>$7,699,028,054</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1 Year of funding indicates the date of commitment or obligation, not appropriation, of funds. Funding figures reflect publicly announced funding as of January 22, 2018.

2 Award provided prior to January 23, 2017.

3 Funding figures recently revised due to data reconciliation.
PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION

- The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for disaster responses around the world can be found at www.interaction.org.

- USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as transportation routes, staff time, and warehouse space); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.

- More information can be found at:
  - Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at www.reliefweb.int.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• As of May 7, Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) airstrikes, ground clashes, and shelling continued in Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-held southern areas of the capital city of Damascus, including the unofficial Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk, international media report. As of late April, an estimated 3,500 Palestinian refugees had fled the Yarmouk camp due to the conflict, according to international media. Those remaining in the camp are sheltering in basements with limited access to food, medicine, and safe drinking water, as the UN has been unable to access the camp since 2015.

• In April, the SARG and the Government of the Russian Federation (GoRF) reached local agreements with multiple armed opposition groups (AOGs) controlling territories in Homs, Idlib, and Rif Damascus governorates, international media report. The agreements have resulted in the evacuations of opposition fighters, their family members, and additional civilians from these locations to opposition-controlled areas in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. As of May 7, evacuations were ongoing in multiple locations and relief agencies were assisting newly displaced populations in Aleppo and Idlib.

• Nearly 2.1 million people were residing in UN-identified besieged and hard-to-reach (HTR) areas of Syria as of April 26, representing a decrease of approximately 12 percent since February. The April figure includes a 97 percent decrease in the population in besieged locations, from nearly 414,000 people to approximately 11,100 people, largely due to the recapturing of Rif Damascus’ Eastern Ghouta region by the SARG, the UN reports. Since March 9, approximately 158,000 people have fled Eastern Ghouta, according to the UN.

HIGHLIGHTS

• SARG and GoRF reach local agreements with AOGs to evacuate AOG-controlled areas in Homs, Idlib, and Rif Damascus

• SARG completes military offensive in Eastern Ghouta following the displacement of 158,000 people since March 9

• Relief agencies continue to assist an estimated 44,000 Eastern Ghouta IDPs sheltering in Rif Damascus collective centers

NUMBERS AT A GLANCE

13.1 million
People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria
UN – November 2017

6.6 million
IDPs in Syria
UN – January 2018

4 million
People Reached Per Month by USG Assistance in Syria
USG – July 2017

5.6 million
Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries
UNHCR – April 2018

3.6 million
Syrian Refugees in Turkey
UNHCR – April 2018

991,200
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
UNHCR – March 2018

661,900
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
UNHCR – April 2018

248,400
Syrian Refugees in Iraq
UNHCR – March 2018

438,000
Palestinian Refugees in Syria
UNRWA – January 2018

HUMANITARIAN FUNDING
FOR THE SYRIA RESPONSE IN FY 2012–2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>USAID/OFDA 1</td>
<td>$1,476,130,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID/FPF 2</td>
<td>$2,686,220,280</td>
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<tr>
<td>State/PRM 3</td>
<td>$3,936,067,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,098,418,373</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA)
2 USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FPF)
3 U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)
INSECURITY AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

Central and Southern Syria

Since April 19, SARG military operations against ISIS and AOGs in southern Damascus have killed at least 47 people, international media report. SARG aerial bombardments have also destroyed several homes and had rendered a Palestinian Red Crescent-supported hospital—the only hospital in Yarmouk camp—inoperable as of April 23, according to relief agencies. ISIS militants reportedly agreed to surrender ISIS-held areas of Yarmouk camp on April 20; however, attempts to broker the militants’ evacuation from the area failed in the days following, international media report. As of late April, an estimated 3,500 Palestinian refugees had fled the Yarmouk camp due to the conflict; those remaining in the camp are sheltering in basements with limited access to food, medicine, and safe drinking water, according to the UN. The UN has been unable to access the camp since 2015.

On April 30, militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered into a local agreement with the SARG, whereby HTS elements agreed to evacuate HTS-controlled areas of Yarmouk camp to northwestern Syria, according to international media. In exchange, HTS agreed to facilitate the evacuation of up to 5,000 people—including opposition fighters and family members—from the AOG-besieged towns of Foua and Kefraya in Idlib to SARG-held areas in Aleppo. As of May 1, more than 140 people had evacuated HTS-held areas of Yarmouk camp to northwestern Syria, while only 65 people, including five people in need of critical medical treatment, had evacuated Foua and Kefraya to Aleppo, according to the UN.

Similarly, on April 27, AOGs in Rif Damascus’ towns of Babella, Beit Sahm, and Yalda entered into an agreement with the SARG to evacuate 17,000 people from the three towns to northern rural Aleppo, Dar’a, and Idlib governorates, according to a relief agency. As of May 8, more than 8,000 people had evacuated the three towns to Euphrates Shield areas—parts of northern Syria controlled by AOGs affiliated with Government of Turkey (GoT) Euphrates Shield military operations—in northern Syria, the UN reports.

On April 20, the SARG and GoRF reached a local agreement with AOGs in Attna, Jirud, Mansura, Nasriyeh, and Raheiba towns in Rif Damascus’ eastern Qalamoun region, a relief agency reports. Terms of the agreement include a ceasefire, the disarming of AOGs, and the evacuation of opposition combatants and civilians from the area, according to the relief agency. Between April 20 and 25, more than 6,200 people evacuated from eastern Qalamoun to northern Syria, the UN reports. Local media report that the SARG had declared eastern Qalamoun free of AOG presence as of April 25.

On April 14, SARG military officials announced that remaining fighters of AOG Jaish al-Islam and their family members had evacuated Eastern Ghouta’s town of Douma, effectively declaring the SARG’s recapture of Eastern Ghouta from AOGs. More than 158,000 people had fled Eastern Ghouta—including 92,000 civilians displaced to collective centers in Rif Damascus and 66,000 opposition fighters, their family members, and additional civilians evacuated to northwestern Syria—since March 9, according to the UN.

Northwestern Syria

On May 3, AOGs in northern Homs Governorate reached an agreement with the SARG and GoRF to surrender weapons and evacuate the area to northern Aleppo’s Jarablus town and Idlib, international media report. Since May 7, nearly 6,000 people have evacuated Homs’ Ar Rastan and Talbiseh towns to northern Syria, according to international media.

Operation Olive Branch—the GoT-led military offensive in northwestern Syria—had displaced an estimated 137,000 people from Aleppo’s Afrin District to Aleppo’s Tell Refaat sub-district and Fafin, Nabul, and Zahra towns and surrounding villages as of April 24, according to the UN. As many as 50,000 people remain in Afrin town, while an additional 100,000 people remain in rural areas of Afrin District, the UN reports.

Northeastern Syria

As of April 16, an estimated 100,000 people had returned to Ar Raqqah city since October 2017; however, extensive unexploded ordnance contamination is hampering safe returns and impeding humanitarian response activities in the
city, the UN reports. Since October, explosive hazards have killed approximately 130 people and injured nearly 660 others, according to the UN.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

- Nearly 2.1 million people were residing in UN-identified besieged and HTR areas of Syria as of April 26, representing a decrease of approximately 12 percent—or 283,000 people—since February. The April figure includes a 97 percent decrease in the population in besieged locations, from more than 413,900 people to approximately 11,100 people, largely due to the recapturing Eastern Ghouta by the SARG, the UN reports. As a result, the UN no longer identifies Eastern Ghouta as besieged, but still identifies the region as HTR due to continued cross-line access challenges.
- Humanitarian access inside Eastern Ghouta remains limited to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), while commercial access and civilian freedom of movement remain restricted, according to the UN. The SARG had not granted the UN access to conduct multi-sector assessments in the region as of May 11, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports. The UN estimates that 120,000 people remain in Eastern Ghouta; however, population figures are difficult to verify while the UN is physically unable to access the region.
- While access to Eastern Ghouta remains restricted, the UN and other relief organizations continue to respond to the humanitarian needs of Eastern Ghouta internally displaced persons (IDPs) hosted at collective centers in Rif Damascus. As of May 1, approximately 44,000 IDPs remained at the sites, while 48,000 people had left the sites under sponsorship arrangements with host communities in surrounding areas, OCHA reports. Since early March, the UN has conducted approximately 22,000 medical consultations and provided more than 513,000 emergency relief items and 77,800 ready-to-eat (RTE) rations to IDPs at the collective centers. UN agencies have also constructed or repaired 1,200 latrines and showers at the sites and repaired shelters benefiting 41,000 IDPs.

HEALTH

- On May 2, GoRF and SARG airstrikes struck the specialized Kafr Zita hospital in northern Hamah Governorate, killing one person, wounding three people, and significantly damaging the hospital, according to a health agency. Prior to the latest incident, the health agency reported at least two other airstrikes impacting the hospital between February and April. The hospital provided services to a catchment area of 30,000–40,000 people and was the only hospital in the area that provided primary health care services, according to the agency.
- On April 15, the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) suspended operations at the Al Ma’ra National Hospital in Idlib’s Ma’arat al-Numan sub-district due to damage sustained from conflict. Armed clashes between HTS and the recently formed Syrian Liberation Front—known as Jabhat Tahrir Souria in Arabic and comprising at least four AOGs—damaged the hospital and destroyed its blood bank, according to SAMS. As a result of the attack, SAMS transferred all of the hospital’s patients to nearby facilities and temporarily suspended operations at the hospital from April 16–17; SAMS also suspended non-emergency services in northern Syria through April 20.
- USAID/OFDA partner the UN World Health Organization (WHO) continues to provide emergency health assistance to Eastern Ghouta IDPs sheltering at collective centers in Rif Damascus. From March 15–April 15, WHO screened more than 21,200 children younger than five years of age for acute malnutrition, vaccinated 12,900 children, and delivered nearly 36 metric tons (MT) of health supplies—sufficient for nearly 504,000 medical treatments—to nine collective centers in the governorate. In addition, during this period, WHO provided psychosocial support services to more than 6,400 people at the centers.
- As of April 28, health agencies had recorded more than 10,300 suspected cases of measles, including more than 900 confirmed cases, in northern Syria since January, the Early Warning Alert and Response Network reports. WHO anticipates a sustained reduction in the measles caseload beginning in May, when peak transmission season for the disease ends.
- Between April 5 and 12, WHO facilitated the delivery of medical supplies sufficient for more than 32,000 medical treatments to Afrin District, in addition to conducting more than 125,000 medical treatments since mid-March. As of
April 12, WHO has supported eight mobile medical teams, five mobile clinics, and six health facilities managed by local health authorities and the SARC to respond to the needs of Afrin IDPs. Further, WHO has facilitated more than 46,700 outpatient consultations since mid-March.

**RELIEF COMMODITIES**

- State/PRM partner the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided winterization assistance to nearly 1.3 million IDPs across Syria between September 2017 and March 2018. These activities included cross-border operations from Jordan and Turkey and focused on providing items for winter relief such as blankets, plastic tarpaulins, and winter clothing. The UN agency prioritized assistance to older people, children, single women, individuals with health issues, and newly displaced persons. UNHCR’s winterization program surpassed its 2017/2018 target of approximately 1.25 million IDPs.

**FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION**

- Between mid-March and April 26, USAID/FFP partner the UN World Food Program (WFP) provided more than 32,600 RTE rations and 5,000 general food rations, as well as nutrition supplies and fresh bread bundles, to areas surrounding Afrin town and rural areas of Aleppo.
- With support from USAID/FFP, an NGO distributed 140 MT of flour to 16 bakeries in Ar Raqqah Governorate in April; the bakeries produce bread serving approximately 200,000 people. The partner also continued to support grain mills in Ar Raqqah during the month, providing wheat to a mill in Ar Raqqah’s Ein Issa District, as well as continuing repairs on a mill in Ar Raqqah’s Tell Abyad sub-district as part of a project to rehabilitate three mills and 10 bakeries in the governorate’s Tabqa and Tell Abyad sub-districts by August.
- In northeastern Syria, a USAID/FFP partner distributed more than 7,300 food rations in Aleppo, Dayr az Zawr, and Ar Raqqah governorates to benefit nearly 37,500 people in March. Since October 2017, the partner organization has reached more than 262,000 people in Aleppo, Dayr az Zawr, and Ar Raqqah with food rations. In addition, the partner organization distributed nearly 1,100 food vouchers in March, benefiting nearly 3,600 people in Aleppo and Ar Raqqah.
- In March, a USAID/OFDA partner provided nutrition and protection support to vulnerable populations in Dar’a. The NGO provided nutrition education services, including training on infant and young child feeding practices, to more than 2,100 people in the governorate’s Moraba, Mosifra, and Nawa towns. The partner organization also conducted psychosocial support outreach visits and group sessions, reaching approximately 500 people during the month.

**REFUGEE ASSISTANCE**

- In late April, UNHCR commenced preparations to formally register Iraqis living in Al Hol, Newroz, and Roj camps in northeastern Syria’s Al Hasakah Governorate. The registration will provide all Iraqis residing in the three camps who wish to continue seeking UNHCR protection with an identity card to allow for their formal recognition as asylum seekers in Syria. UNHCR has conducted an information sharing campaign to raise awareness of the registration process and plans to commence registration in late May in Newroz, where nearly 1,600 Iraqis are located.
- UNHCR provided winterization assistance to Syrian refugees in neighboring countries from September 2017 and March 2018. In Turkey, more than 483,000 Syrian refugees located in camp and non-camp settings received cash assistance, and additional Syrian refugees received heaters. In Lebanon, more than 828,000 Syrian refugees benefited from the winterization program, mainly through cash assistance, as well as the distribution of fuel vouchers, kits to weatherproof shelters, and other relief commodities. In Jordan, UNCHR provided more than $40 million in cash assistance to 235,000 Syrian refugees outside of camps and to 115,000 Syrian refugees in Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps to address winter needs. The UN agency provided cash assistance to more than 121,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq, approximately 30,600 of whom received complementary relief commodities. In Egypt, more than 94,000 Syrian refugees received winter cash assistance.
2017–2018 HUMANITARIAN FUNDING*
PER DONOR

*Funding figures are as of May 11, 2018. All international figures are according to the UN’s Financial Tracking System and based on international commitments during calendar years 2017 and 2018, while USG figures are according to the USG and reflect publicly announced USG funding for FY 2017 and FY 2018, which began on October 1, 2016 and October 1, 2017, respectively.

CONTEXT

- Following the commencement of peaceful demonstrations against the SARG in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad pledged legislative reforms. However, reforms failed to materialize, and SARG forces loyal to President al-Assad began responding to demonstrations with violence, leading armed oppositions groups to retaliate.

- At a November 2012 meeting in Doha, Qatar, Syrian opposition factions formed an umbrella organization—the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Coalition. The U.S. Government (USG) recognized the coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people on December 11, 2012. On March 19, 2013, the Syrian Coalition established the Syrian Interim Government, which opposes the SARG and is based in decentralized locations throughout opposition-held areas of Syria.

- On July 14, 2014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted UNSC Resolution 2165, authorizing UN cross-border and cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid to conflict-affected populations without SARG approval. The resolution permits the UN’s use of four border crossings from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq—in addition to other crossings already in use by UN agencies—for the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Syria. The resolution also establishes a monitoring mechanism under the authority of the UN Secretary-General and with the consent of neighboring countries to ensure that deliveries across these border points contain only humanitarian items. The UNSC has subsequently adopted several resolutions renewing the mandate of UNSC Resolution 2165, most recently in December 2017 with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2393, extending the authorities granted until January 2019.

- The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has registered approximately 560,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, with more than 80 percent living in and around the city of Damascus prior to the start of the conflict. Intense fighting in and around some Palestinian camps and neighborhoods has significantly affected Palestinian refugees in Syria. UNRWA estimates that approximately 60 percent of Palestinian refugees are displaced within Syria, with a further 110,000 Palestinian refugees displaced outside of Syria. Syria also hosts an estimated 24,000 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers, primarily in the greater Damascus area, as well as more than 3,200 refugee persons of concern from other countries.
## USG Humanitarian Funding for the Syria Response in FY 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Partners</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>$4,500,000</td>
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<td>UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</td>
<td>Health, Nutrition, Protection, WASH</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
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<td>Program Support</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL USAID/OFDA Funding</strong></td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>Cash Transfers for Food, Food Vouchers, Local and Regional Food Procurement, and Complementary Services</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>Food Vouchers</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>Food Vouchers</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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<td>$13,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL USAID/FFP Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$388,830,256</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO Partners</td>
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<td>Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey</td>
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<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Camp Management, Education, Livelihoods, Protection, Relief Commodities, Shelter and Settlements, WASH</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey</td>
<td>$95,400,000</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Child Protection, Education, Health, Nutrition, WASH, Youth Programs</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey</td>
<td>$61,200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL STATE/PRM Funding</strong></td>
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<td><strong>$199,492,255</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL USG Humanitarian Funding for the Syria Response in FY 2018</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$615,534,390</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Funding figures recently revised due to data reconciliation.

### USG Humanitarian Funding for the Syria Response in FY 2012–2018

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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- More information can be found at:
  - The Center for International Disaster Information: www.cidi.org or +1.202.661.7710.
  - Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at www.reliefweb.int.

USAID/OFDA bulletins appear on the USAID website at
ONGOING USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
SYRIA - COMPLEX EMERGENCY

The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. Government.
Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies

- An IASC Reference Paper -

28 June 2004

Introductory note:

This paper was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) as an IASC Reference Paper at its 57th Meeting of 16-17 June 2004. It complements the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.

The paper was drafted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with members of the IASC, the UN’s Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and the Advisory Panel of OCHA’s Military Civil Defence Unit (MCDU-AP), as well as academic reviewers and field colleagues in a number of organizations.

The paper will serve as a non-binding reference for humanitarian practitioners, assisting them in formulating country-specific operational guidelines on civil-military relations for particular complex emergencies. It will be updated as the environment in which we work changes and as new guidance on related issues becomes available.

Part 1 of the paper reviews in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Part 2 lists the fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military, and Part 3 proposes practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.
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Annex: Related Documents and Web-page Address
PART 1 INTRODUCTION

A. Initial Remarks

1. Traditionally in complex emergencies, there has been a distinction between the military and the non-military domains: an approach built upon the principles of international humanitarian law that make a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, protecting the latter from armed attacks. In recent history, however, military forces have become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including provision of relief and services to the local population. At the same time, due to the changing nature of modern complex emergencies, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges as well as greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some of them to seek the support or protection by military forces on a case-by-case basis\(^1\). Thus, practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.

2. These developments, together with cases of military interventions claimed to be for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, have led to an erosion of the separation between the humanitarian and the military space\(^2\), and may threaten to blur the fundamental distinction between these two domains. It also raises significant concerns associated with the application of humanitarian principles and policies as well as operational issues. Furthermore these developments necessitate increased communication, coordination and understanding between humanitarian agencies and military actors, and require knowledge of each other’s mandates, capacities and limitations.

3. The humanitarian community therefore felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from civil-military relations, and to come up with a reference paper that extends beyond the individual guidelines already developed, which cover either particular aspects of civil-military relations\(^3\) or civil-military relationship in a specific complex emergency\(^4\).

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\(^1\) In the last two years alone, military support and/or protection for certain humanitarian operations has been provided in various complex emergencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Northern Uganda, and Sierra Leone.


B. The Goal and Purpose of this Paper

4. This paper has thus been prepared, following the request of the Working Group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)\(^5\), with the overall goal of enhancing the understanding of civil-military relations, including the difficulties and limitations of such relations. While numerous complicated questions arise out of this relationship, what remains vital for the humanitarian community is to develop a clear awareness of the nature of this relation, as well as a common understanding on when and how as well as how not to coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives.

5. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it attempts to highlight, in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Secondly, it reviews some fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military. Thirdly, attention is given to practical key considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

6. The paper will serve as a general reference for humanitarian practitioners: a tool to which they can refer when formulating operational guidelines that are tailored specifically for civil-military relations in a particular complex emergency, such as the ones developed for Iraq and Liberia during 2003\(^6\). Any situation-specific set of guidelines requires sensitivity to the special circumstances of the particular operation and hence has to be developed on a case-by-case basis.

7. The focus of this paper is the relationship between humanitarian organizations and official military forces (i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command), be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. Such military presence may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

8. The different mandates, characteristics and nature of these diverse military actors may necessitate that the humanitarian community relate to different groups with varying degrees of sensitivity or even with fundamentally different approaches at times. For example, interaction with an occupying force\(^7\) would have to entail different considerations from that required vis-à-vis national forces, unarmed military observers, or UN commanded peacekeeping operations. The most important distinction to be drawn is whether the military group with which humanitarians are interacting is, has become, or is perceived to be a party to the conflict or not. Separate specific papers will be required to address and advise on the particular circumstances and requirements of the relationships between humanitarians and any of these individual categories of military actors. Such

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\(^5\) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG), at its 52nd Meeting in March 2003, requested OCHA to prepare “...a concept paper on the issue of military and humanitarian interface upon analysing thoroughly the current state of interface.”

\(^6\) For details, see footnote 4 above.

\(^7\) For example, such as the Coalition Forces of the Occupying Powers currently deployed in Iraq.
policies may be formulated through various mechanisms. The present paper, however, is an attempt to address the subject of civil-military relations at a generic level. Therefore, it will not distinguish between the various military actors.

9. The relationship between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups\(^8\), private military, security companies and mercenaries, as well as any national or international police presence, although highly relevant in today’s conflict situations, are excluded from the analysis of this paper to avoid dilution of focus. Issues of general security, including operational challenges faced under increasing threats of global terrorism, are also excluded for the same reason.

C. Definition of Key Terms
10. In order to facilitate the understanding of the concepts elaborated herein and to avoid confusion arising out of a variety of possible definitions entailed in terminology, some key terms used in this paper are defined as follows:

*Civil-Military Coordination:*\(^9\)
The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

*Complex Emergency:*
A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.”

*Humanitarian Actor:*
Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian activities.

*Military Actor:*
Military actors refer to official military forces, i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to an hierarchical chain of

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\(^8\) Field practices on engagements with non-state actors will be collected in the forthcoming ‘Manual on Field Practices on Negotiations with Armed Groups’. The Manual will be published in summer 2004 and relevant conclusions and principles from the Manual may be used to update this paper as appropriate.

\(^9\) The definition of ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ is identical to that used in the “Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses a different definition of Civil-Military Coordination; see DPKO’s paper on ‘Civil-Military Coordination Policy’ dated 9 September 2002.
command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multinational forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

D. Background
11. The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, characterised by the distinct chain-of-command and clear organisational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community. The two groups have different mandates, objectives, working methods, and even vocabularies. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, which includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian action is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict. Most of the local actors engaged in humanitarian work are present on the ground long before the arrival of international personnel and will continue their functions after their departure. Susceptibility towards local sensitivities and adherence to the actuality and perception of impartiality and independence are therefore pivotal assets of any humanitarian operation, and this should be made known to the military. For humanitarian actors, on the other hand, it is important to be aware of the varied reasons and motivations why the military may undertake actions that can encroach on humanitarian space.

12. Within the context of civil-military relations, there are a number of situations where some level of coordination between the humanitarian and military actors may become necessary. As defined in paragraph 10, civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side. Such a relationship may be best described as one of co-existence, in which case civil-military coordination should focus on minimizing competition and conflict in order to enable the different actors to work in the same geographical area with minimum disruption to each other’s activities. When there is a common goal and agreed strategy, and all parties accept to work together, cooperation may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives.

13. In any circumstances, however, it is important to maintain a clear separation between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by distinguishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility. This approach is implicit in and builds on the principles of international humanitarian law, and is crucial to maintaining the independence of humanitarian action. The need for the humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an occupying power. Any coordination with a party to an armed

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10 As an example of principles and practical considerations including specifics on permissible and impermissible action when interacting with an Occupying Power, see the “General Guidance for Interaction
conflict must proceed with extreme caution, care and sensitivity, given that the actual or perceived affiliation with a belligerent might lead to the loss of neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization, which might in turn affect the security of beneficiaries as well as humanitarian staff, and jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. Thus, cooperation – the closer form of coordination - with belligerent forces should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.

14. However, the emphasis on distinction should not be interpreted as a suggestion of non-coordination between humanitarian and military actors. The particular situation on the ground and the nature of the military operation in a given situation will play a determining factor on the type of coordination that may take place. Possible features of civil-military coordination include the sharing of certain information, a careful division of tasks, and when feasible and appropriate, collaborative planning.

15. The military often have the capability to help secure an enabling environment on the ground in which humanitarian activities can take place in relative safety. The military may also have practical means to offer in the delivery of assistance, such as rapid deployment of large numbers of personnel, equipment, logistics and supplies. However, humanitarian expertise – including beneficiary identification, needs and vulnerability assessment, impartial and neutral distribution of relief aid, and monitoring and evaluation - will remain essential to an effective and successful humanitarian operation.

16. The nature of the relation between one or a group of humanitarian organization(s) and the military as well as the conduct of these actors in this relationship may also have an effect on other humanitarian agencies working in the same area and even beyond, possibly affecting the perception of humanitarian action in general. For example, the use of armed escorts by one humanitarian organisation may negatively influence the perception of neutrality and impartiality of other humanitarian organisations in the same area. Coordination amongst humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations in a given complex emergency, is therefore desirable.

PART 2 PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

17. All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. This section outlines these cardinal humanitarian principles as well as other important principles and concepts that must be respected when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination.

A. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality

18. Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity – i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.

B. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations

19. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. Coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access.

C. Perception of Humanitarian Action

20. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be neutral and impartial – it must come without political or military conditions and humanitarian staff must not take sides in disputes or political positions. This will have a bearing on the credibility and independence of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must also be mindful not to jeopardize the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies have created and maintained.

11 For example, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are stipulated as guiding principles for humanitarian assistance in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.
D. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination\textsuperscript{12}

21. Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the basis of needs of those affected by the particular complex emergency, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The assessment of such needs must be independent and humanitarian assistance must be given without adverse discrimination of any kind, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex/gender, religion, social status, nationality or political affiliation of the recipients. It must be provided in an equitable manner to all populations in need.

E. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action

22. At all times, a clear distinction must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants \textit{i.e.}, between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict (including the sick, wounded, prisoners of war and ex-combatants who are demobilised). International humanitarian law protects non-combatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus, humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.

F. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action

23. In any civil-military coordination humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities. The independence of humanitarian action and decision-making must be preserved both at the operational and policy levels at all times. Humanitarian organisations must not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies. Basic requisites such as freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media, must not be impeded.

G. Security of Humanitarian Personnel

24. Any perception that humanitarian actors may have become affiliated with the military forces within a specific situation could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, humanitarian actors operating within an emergency situation must identify the most expeditious, effective and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. This approach must be balanced against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety, and therein a consideration of any real or perceived affiliation with the military. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.

\textsuperscript{12} A similar provision on needs-based assistance is articulated as Principle 2 in “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”. The principle of non-discrimination is expressed in a multitude of human rights instruments, including the \textit{Universal Declaration of Human Rights} of 1948; \textit{International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights} of 1966; \textit{International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights} of 1966, etc.
H. Do No Harm
25. Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to ‘do no harm’. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

I. Respect for International Legal Instruments
26. Both humanitarian and military actors must respect international humanitarian law as well as other international norms and regulations, including human rights instruments.

J. Respect for Culture and Custom\textsuperscript{13}
27. Respect and sensitivities must be maintained for the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries where humanitarian activities are carried out. Where possible and to the extent feasible, ways shall be found to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and/or local personnel in the design, management and implementation of assistance, including in civil-military coordination.

K. Consent of Parties to the Conflict\textsuperscript{14}
28. The risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances. Negotiating such acceptance entails contacts with all levels in the chain of command.

L. Option of Last Resort\textsuperscript{15}
29. Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military must be the option of last resort. Such actions may take place only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need.

M. Avoid Reliance on the Military\textsuperscript{16}
30. Humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on resources or support provided by the military. Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel/means. Resources provided by the military are often only temporarily available and when higher priority military missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support.

\textsuperscript{13} For example, see Principles 5 and 7 of “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”.
\textsuperscript{14} For example, see UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.
\textsuperscript{15} For example, see Paragraphs 7, 26, 30, 33 and 38 of “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.
\textsuperscript{16} For example, see Paragraph 29 of “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.
PART 3 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

31. This section outlines the main practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

A. Establishment of Liaison Arrangements

32. Liaison arrangements and clear lines of communication should be established at the earliest possible stage and at all relevant levels, between the military forces and the humanitarian community, to guarantee the timely and regular exchange of certain information, before and during military operations. However, these activities should be conducted with caution. Either mentioning or concealing to the public the existence of direct communication between the humanitarian and military actors could result in suspicion and/or incorrect conclusions regarding the nature of the communication. Due to its possible impact on the perception of humanitarian operations, at times, it may be reasonable not to disseminate or publicize the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military. Obviously, such a decision has to be balanced with the need to ensure accountability, transparency and openness towards the local population and beneficiaries.

33. There are a number of initiatives within the UN system that focus on preparing humanitarian personnel on civil-military issues and practical liaison arrangements in complex emergencies. This includes the UNCMCoord induction courses, organised by OCHA’s Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU). This unit also conducts pre-deployment training and workshops tailored to a particular content and mission.

34. In addition to UNCMCoord Officers deployed by OCHA, UN agencies may deploy Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) to focus on specific sectoral and operational civil-military issues and DPKO may deploy Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLOs). Where established, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), an inter-agency facility, also provides a civil-military coordination function on an operational logistics level.

Issues arising\(^{17}\):

- How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted: in confidence or in transparency?
- What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison arrangements on the perception of the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities?
- How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian actors?
- How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?

\(^{17}\) These are questions to be addressed when drafting guidelines for civil-military relations in particular complex emergencies.
Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to maintain liaison on an *ad-hoc* basis?

What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?

When, if ever, should the liaison officers of the humanitarian and military communities be co-located in the same facility?

### B. Information Sharing

35. As a matter of principle any information gathered by humanitarian organisations in fulfilment of their mandate that might endanger human lives or compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organisations should not be shared.

36. However, to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to populations in need, information sharing with the military forces may at times become necessary. In particular, information that might affect the security of civilians and/or humanitarian workers should be shared with appropriate entities. Information sharing between humanitarian and appropriate military actors may include:

- **Security information**: information relevant to the security of civilians and to the security situation in the area of operation;
- **Humanitarian locations**: the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside military operating theatre;
- **Humanitarian activities**: the humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations, to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to warn of any conflicting activities;
- **Mine-action activities**: information relevant to mine-action activities;
- **Population movements**: information on major movements of civilians;
- **Relief activities of the military**: information on relief efforts undertaken by the military;
- **Post-strike information**: information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities.

**Issues arising:**

- What kind of information should/could be shared, with whom and when?
- How can information that may be important for humanitarian purposes be differentiated from information that is politically, militarily or economically sensitive?
- How do we determine which information might serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian? For example, how do we ensure that information on population movements or aid beneficiaries will not be misused for military purposes?
- Should information that is shared with one military group be shared with all other military and/or political groups as well? How should we ensure that no side is favoured over another while being mindful of sensitivities involved in information?
When and how should we verify information provided by the military?

C. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations

37. The use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be exceptional and only on a last resort. It is recognized, however, that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs, military and civil defence assets, including military aircraft, may be deployed in accordance with the “Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines”) of March 2003. In addition to the principle of ‘last resort’, key criteria in the MCDA Guidelines include: (1) unique capability – no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist; (2) timeliness – the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action; (3) clear humanitarian direction – civilian control over the use of military assets; (4) time-limited – the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale.

38. As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities. While there are ongoing hostilities, it will be necessary to distinguish between operations in theatre and those outside. In theatre, the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes should generally not be undertaken. Only under extreme and exceptional circumstances would it be appropriate to consider the use, in theatre, of military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations. Specifically, this situation may occur when a highly vulnerable population cannot be assisted or accessed by any other means. Outside the theatre of operations, military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations may be used in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and guidelines. However, preference should first be given to military assets of parties not engaged in combat operations.

39. Any humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation. Military and civil defence assets that have been placed under the control of the humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis purely for humanitarian purposes must be visibly identified in a manner that clearly differentiates them from military assets being used for military purposes.

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18 For the full text of the MCDA Guidelines, see internet address in the Annex at the end of this paper.
19 Last resort is defined as follows: ‘Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.’ (See paragraph 7 of the MCDA Guidelines.)
20 See Paragraph 25 of the MCDA Guidelines.
Issues arising:
  o Who defines last resort and what are the exact criteria for last resort?
  o How can we ensure the credibility and security for a humanitarian operation that uses military assets and how can we maintain the confidence of the local population for such operations?
  o How can we make sure that humanitarian actors retain the lead role and direction of humanitarian efforts even when military assets are used as the only means available?

D. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

40. The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria. In case the situation on the ground calls for the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, any such action should be guided by the principles endorsed by the IASC in September 2001.21

Issues arising:
  o Who should provide the escort (UN forces, other international forces, government forces, forces of non-state actors, armed guards provided by security services companies)?
  o How can we ensure that humanitarian operations will not become dependent on military escort - to the extent that it becomes impossible to operate without them?
  o How can the capability, credibility and deterrence of an escort be determined?
  o How do we determine if the escorts themselves are a potential source of insecurity?
  o How do we ensure that short-term gain in access by using armed escorts would not result in long-term loss of losing actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, independence and even credibility of the humanitarian operation?

E. Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations

41. Any operations undertaken jointly by humanitarian agencies and military forces may have a negative impact on the perception of the humanitarian agencies’ impartiality and neutrality and hence affect their ability to operate effectively throughout a complex emergency. Therefore, any joint civil-military cooperation should be determined by a thorough assessment of the actual needs on the ground and a review of civilian humanitarian capacities to respond to them in a timely manner. To the extent that joint operations with the military cannot be avoided, they may be employed only as a means of last resort, and must adhere to the principles provided in the above-mentioned “MCDA Guidelines”.

42. One must be aware that the military have different objectives, interests, schedules and priorities from the humanitarian community. Relief operations rendered by military

21 See IASC Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001. This paper was approved by the IASC and reviewed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs.
forces could be conditional and could cease when the mission of the military forces changes, the unit moves or if the assisted population becomes uncooperative. Such action by the military can also be conducted primarily based on the needs and goals of the force and its mission, rather than the needs of the local population.

**Issues arising:**
- How can the impartiality and neutrality of a humanitarian action be preserved when it is carried out as a joint civil-military operation?
- What are the implications of a joint civil-military operation regarding access to all civilians in need and the safety of humanitarian staff?
- What happens if the military is suddenly redeployed to another mission or location, after the start of the joint operation?

**F. Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes**

43. Relief operations carried out by military forces, even when the intention is purely ‘humanitarian,’ may jeopardize or seriously undermine the overall humanitarian efforts by non-military actors. The other parties to the conflict and the beneficiaries may neither be willing nor able to differentiate between assistance provided by the military and assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. This could have serious consequences for the ability to access certain areas and the safety of humanitarian staff, not to mention the long-term damage to the standing of humanitarian agencies in the region and in other crisis areas if humanitarian assistance is perceived as being selective and/or partial. Assistance provided by the military is susceptible to political influence and/or objectives and the criteria used in selecting the beneficiaries and determining their needs may differ from those held by humanitarian organizations.

44. For these reasons, military forces should be strongly discouraged from playing the role of the humanitarian aid providers. Their role in relation to humanitarian actors should be limited to help create a secure operating environment that enables humanitarian action. If need be, diplomatic efforts should be used to explain and reiterate to political and military authorities the concern of the humanitarian community in this regard.

45. However, there may be extreme and exceptional circumstances that require relief operations to be undertaken by the military as a last resort. This might be the case when the military are the only actors on the ground or the humanitarians lack the capacity and/or resources to respond to critical needs of civilians.

**Issues arising:**
- What are the means and possibilities of humanitarian agencies to discourage separate military operations for relief purposes?
In what circumstances should exceptions be recognized? For example, if belligerent forces were the only ones who could reach vulnerable populations and therefore alleviate extreme human suffering? Should the humanitarian community advocate for the involvement of military forces in such cases?

If the military engages in relief activities, what kind of coordination arrangement should be established with the humanitarian community?

G. General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff

46. The independence and civilian nature of humanitarian assistance should be emphasized at all times. A clear distinction must be retained between the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and those of military forces – i.e., travel in clearly marked vehicles, clearly mark offices and relief supplies, etc. Weapons should not be allowed on the premises or transportation facilities of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian personnel should not travel in military vehicles, aircraft, etc., except as a last resort or for security reasons. Humanitarian workers should not wear any military-uniform-like clothing. Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities and thereby negatively affect the safety and security of humanitarian staff.

Issues arising:

- How should differences of opinion regarding civil-military coordination be settled between humanitarian and military actors? Who decides?
- How should public appearances (TV, radio, ceremonies, events, social functions, events sponsored by the military, etc.) be handled, in view of the sensitivity required in fostering the appropriate public images and perceptions?
ANNEX: Related Documents and Web-page Address

Related Documents


Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys - Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (14 September 2001)


Guidance On Use of Military Aircraft for UN Humanitarian Operations During the Current Conflict in Afghanistan IMTF (7 November 2001)

Civil-Military Coordination Policy by Department of Peacekeeping Operation (9 September 2002)

All the above documents as well as this reference paper, Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, can be found at the following website address:

http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines
Guidelines On

The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - “Oslo Guidelines”

Updated November 2006

(Revision 1.1 November 2007)

The “Oslo Guidelines” were originally prepared over a period of two years beginning in 1992. They were the result of a collaborative effort that culminated in an international conference in Oslo, Norway, in January 1994 and were released in May 1994. The following States and Organizations were involved in this effort:

Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, AFDRU, Brown University's Watson Institute, DHA, European Union/ECHO, ICDO, ICRC, IFRC, INSARAG, NATO, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, UNHCR, UN Legal Liaison Office, University of Naples, University of Ruhr, WHO and Western European Union. Over 180 delegates from 45 States and 25 organizations attended the conference.

The unprecedented deployment in 2005 of military forces and assets in support of humanitarian response to natural disasters, following an increasing trend over the past years, confirmed the need to update the 1994 “Oslo Guidelines”. The Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), at its annual meeting in December 2005, tasked OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) with this facelift, to reflect current terminology and organizational changes, following a layout similar to the 2003 “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines”).

The Oslo Guidelines were re-launched at an event hosted by the Government of Norway, in Oslo, on 27 November 2006, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA. Norway, Switzerland and Sweden took the lead in the update, facilitated by OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination Section / Emergency Services Branch.

Changes in this Revision 1.1 concern the addition of the word “foreign” in the title, as well as additions for clarification to paragraph 5, as per consensus in the Extraordinary Session of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA, on 28 November 2007.
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**Introduction**

**Key Terms and Definitions**

The following terms are essential for establishing a common understanding of the terminology used by the guidelines as set out in this document.

1. **Humanitarian Assistance**: Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. For the purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

   - **Direct Assistance** is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
   - **Indirect Assistance** is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.
   - **Infrastructure Support** involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

2. **International Disaster Relief Assistance (IDRA)**: In the context of the present Guidelines, international disaster relief assistance means material, personnel and services provided by the international community to an Affected State to meet the needs of those affected by a disaster. It includes all actions necessary to grant and facilitate movement over the territory, including the territorial waters and the airspace, of a Transit State. IDRA delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles identified above is humanitarian assistance.

3. **Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)**: MCDA comprise relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for IDRA. Further, for the purpose of this project, civil defence organization means any organization that, under the control of a Government, performs the functions enumerated in paragraph 61 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. When these forces are under UN control they are referred to as UN MCDA.

4. **Other Deployed Forces**: These are all military and civil defence forces deployed in the region other than UN MCDA. They include the forces deployed by the Affected State and any foreign forces deployed under bilateral agreements or under the auspices of organizations other than the UN.
5. **Last Resort**: Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military or civil defence asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability. However, foreign civil protection assets, when civilian in nature and respecting humanitarian principles, can provide an important direct and indirect contribution to humanitarian actions based on humanitarian needs assessments and their possible advantages in terms of speed, specialisation, efficiency and effectiveness, especially in the early phase of relief response. The use of civil protection assets should be needs driven, complementary to and coherent with humanitarian aid operations, respecting the overall coordinating role of the UN.

6. **Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator**: The Resident Coordinator (RC) is the head of the UN Country Team. In a natural disaster emergency, the Resident Coordinator or another competent UN official may be designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). In large-scale emergencies, a separate Humanitarian Coordinator is often appointed. If the emergency affects more than one country, a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator may be appointed.

7. **Emergency Relief Coordinator and Inter-Agency Standing Committee**: The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and coordinates the international response to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is chaired by the ERC and has the membership of all UN operational humanitarian agencies, with standing invitation to ICRC, IFRC, IOM, UNHCHR, the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, the World Bank and the three NGO consortia (ICVA, InterAction and SCHR). The decision whether to and who to appoint as Humanitarian Coordinator is made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

8. **UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)**: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

**Aim**

9. The aim of the present Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (hereinafter referred to as "Oslo Guidelines") is to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in international disaster relief operations.

**Scope**
10. The “Oslo Guidelines” address the use of MCDA following natural, technological and environmental emergencies in times of peace. The principles, mechanisms and procedures concerning military forces participating in peacekeeping operations or the delivery of humanitarian assistance in situations of armed conflict are not encompassed by this document. The use of MCDA in armed conflict situations is covered in the “Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines” - March 2003).

11. These guidelines cover the use of United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) -- military and civil defence resources requested by the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities -- as well as other foreign military and civil defence assets that might be available. These other forces on other missions are referred to as “other deployed forces”.

12. Principles, concepts, and procedures are provided for requesting and coordinating military and civil defence assets when these resources are deemed necessary and appropriate, and for interfacing with foreign military forces who are conducting activities which impact on UN humanitarian activities.

13. These guidelines are primarily intended for use by UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN MCDA commanders and commanders of other deployed forces performing missions in support of the UN humanitarian agencies and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian activities with foreign military forces. All humanitarian actors should also be familiar with the principles, concepts and procedures set out herein and encouraged to adhere to them, as appropriate.

14. They could also be used by decision-makers in Member States and regional organizations when considering the use of military and civil defence assets to provide assistance to civilian populations in natural disasters and technological or environmental emergencies in times of peace.

15. This document focuses on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief operations. The foundation for effective coordination of military and civilian assistance during reconstruction and rehabilitation is often established during the first phase of an international response. However, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are beyond the scope of this document.

Status

16. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN humanitarian agencies have agreed to these guidelines. Implementing and operational partners are encouraged to follow this guidance. Member States and regional organizations engaged in relief or military operations in response to natural disasters are also encouraged to use the principles and procedures provided herein. While a significant number of Member States have participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their use, they are not binding on Member States. The guidelines are considered a living document and may be reviewed as appropriate in the future.
17. These guidelines will not, in any way, affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of States and individuals under international law. This includes, but is not limited to, the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded delivery of relief consignments, equipment and personnel, protect such consignments, and facilitate their rapid distribution. Nor will these guidelines affect the obligations of States that are parties to the United Nations Conventions on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, or the Charter of the United Nations.

Organization

18. The remainder of the document is divided into two parts. The first section contains principles that guide the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief operations. The second section describes the tasks and responsibilities of key actors in situations where UN MCDA are used and in situations when other deployed forces are requested by the United Nations to support humanitarian activities. Three Annexes are attached to the document:

   Annex I: Model Agreement Covering the Status of MCDA
   Annex II: Example of CMCS Request for MCDA
   Annex III: Abbreviations

Comments, Recommendations and Future Changes

19. This document was prepared under the auspices of the UN MCDA Project. It complements the existing “Guidelines On the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines” - March 2003). The Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides the Secretariat for the UN MCDA Project and is responsible for maintaining these guidelines. Comments should be directed to the Chief, CMCS, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA (Geneva), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, or cmcs@un.org. Proposed changes will be brought forward annually in the Consultative Group On The Use Of MCDA and incorporated in consultation with the Advisory Panel to CMCS, and when necessary referred to the ERC and IASC.
Principles and Concepts

Core Principles

20. As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

**Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

**Neutrality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

**Impartiality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

21. In addition to these three humanitarian principles, the United Nations seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of States. As also stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182:

“The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.”

22. The United Nations humanitarian agencies involved in humanitarian activities subscribe to these principles and have incorporated these concepts in their respective mandates and operational guidelines.

23. As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of forces that may be perceived as belligerents or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat in the affected country or region shall not be used to support UN humanitarian activities.

Complementarity

24. Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.
Responsibility and Management

25. MCDA can be mobilized and deployed bilaterally or under regional or alliance agreements as “other deployed forces” or as part of a United Nations operation as “UN MCDA”. All disaster relief, including MCDA, should be provided at the request or with the consent of the Affected State and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal for international assistance.

26. All relief actions remain the overall responsibility of the Affected State and are complemented by foreign MCDA operating bilaterally or within an international relief effort.

Costing and Funding

27. Foreign MCDA assistance should be provided at no cost to the Affected State, unless otherwise agreed between concerned States or regulated by international agreements.

28. An Assisting State deciding to employ its MCDA should bear in mind the cost/benefit ratio of such operations as compared to other alternatives, if available. In principle, the costs involved in using MCDA on disaster relief missions abroad should be covered by funds other than those available for international development activities.

Identification and Security

29. In principle, foreign military and civil defence personnel deploying on disaster relief missions will do so unarmed and in national uniforms. The overall responsibility for providing adequate security for authorized foreign MCDA support remains with the Affected State.

Legal Status

30. On the basis of Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, individual UN MCDA personnel, alerted, mobilized and deployed at the request of OCHA may be granted the status of experts on mission for the United Nations according to article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946.

31. Most foreign MCDA deployed in a natural disaster will be deployed based on bilateral agreements or multilateral treaties. These agreements should address the status of forces deployed on relief operations. If such agreements have not been concluded, it is recommended that States, wishing to act bilaterally, should make use of the Model Agreement covering the Status of MCDA set out in Annex I of this document.
In addition and in the framework of the above-mentioned principles, the use of MCDA by UN agencies in response to a natural disaster shall be guided by the six following standards:

i. Requests for MCDA to support UN agencies must be made by the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator, with the consent of the Affected State, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.

ii. MCDA should be employed by UN humanitarian agencies as a last resort, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.

iii. A UN humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While MCDA may remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.

iv. Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.

v. Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.

vi. Countries providing MCDA to support UN humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the UN Codes of Conduct and the humanitarian principles.

Implementing and operational partners and members of international civil society, are expected to adhere to these core principles and have been encouraged to adopt the "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief".

Avoiding Reliance on Military Resources

Most MCDA provided by Member States explicitly for UN use are diverted from other missions and are only temporarily available. When higher priority military missions emerge these assets and/or forces may be recalled by the Member States or regional organizations concerned. Therefore, as a general principle, UN humanitarian agencies
must avoid becoming dependent on military resources and Member States are encouraged to invest in increased civilian capacity instead of the ad hoc use of military forces to support humanitarian actors.

35. However, there are circumstances when most requirements or security conditions are such that military assets provide the means of last resort for addressing the needs in a timely, effective way. In such cases, military resources, when available, may be appropriate for use. In general these assets can be divided into two categories: United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) and resources from other deployed forces.

36. The principal distinctions between these two types of resources are that UN MCDA have been placed under the control of the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis specifically to support UN humanitarian activities. Only a limited number of these resources are normally available for most emergencies. Other deployed forces are under the direction, and/or support of other entities, including foreign forces stationed in the Affected State or region, military resources provided under bilateral or multilateral agreements, and UN peacekeeping forces.

Operational Standards for the Use of UN MCDA

37. To be effective, the direction and coordination of the overall humanitarian effort requires the leadership of professional humanitarian staff. As such, UN MCDA should always remain under civilian control. However, humanitarian agencies making use of MCDA must understand that ultimately the safety and security of these assets is the responsibility of the designated military or civil defence commander, and Assisting States will normally direct their commanders to decline missions they view as unnecessarily risky or inappropriate.

38. In principle, unarmed UN MCDA, accepted as neutral and impartial, and clearly distinguished from other military units, can be used to support the full range of humanitarian activities. However, their involvement in direct assistance should be weighed on a case-by-case basis and only if it satisfies the criteria of last resort. Their activities should focus on indirect assistance and infrastructure support missions.

39. Military and civil defence personnel employed exclusively in the support of UN humanitarian activities should be clearly distinguished from those forces engaged in other military missions, including the military component of peacekeeping missions, peace operations and peace support, and accorded the appropriate protection by the Affected State and any combatants.

40. Acceptable means for distinguishing UN MCDA from security and forces engaged in military operations are the markings of the supported UN humanitarian agency or the use of civil defence markings accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions. When UN MCDA are from military organizations the appropriate white markings and UN symbols may be used. When civil defence assets are employed they should be marked in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
41. Military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. Guidelines for the security of UN personnel are set by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UN DSS).

42. Under no circumstance will the request for UN MCDA be construed as an endorsement of any military operations or be used as a justification for undertaking combat operations, resorting to the use of force, or the violation of State sovereignty.

43. Under no circumstance will UN MCDA be used to provide security for UN humanitarian activities. A separate security force may, however, be used to ensure security in areas where humanitarian personnel may be attacked while delivering humanitarian assistance. Such assistance, however, is not addressed in this document. Further reference can be found in the Non-Binding Guidelines on The Use of Military and Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (text of 14 September 2001 approved by the IASC Working Group).

**Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces**

44. Military forces deployed by Member States or regional organizations may also provide support to UN humanitarian agencies when requested by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or other designated officials. When these forces undertake activities in support of UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, this support will be on a case-by-case basis, subject to a request. These military assets will remain under the control of the military force commander.

45. Military or civil defence forces undertaking missions to support UN humanitarian activities should reconcile their *modus operandi* with the circumstances of the operating environment. Under these conditions only, and provided the *modus operandi* in question respects all appropriate humanitarian principles, should the Humanitarian Coordinator, or other responsible UN authority, authorize the mission.

46. Military and Civil Defence units, other than UN MCDA, performing assistance missions are in principle not granted any special protection other than those granted by the Affected State, nor are they authorized to display the emblems of the supported UN humanitarian agencies.

47. As with UN MCDA the use of other deployed forces by UN agencies should be coordinated with the Affected State.
48. In response to most major natural disasters the United Nations will deploy a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team. When there are major international search and rescue operations to be coordinated, this team will establish an On-site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC). These relief coordination tools are deployed in support of the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA), normally at the request of the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator. Civil-military coordination will often take place within this framework and in close coordination with the local and national authorities.

49. Critical areas for coordination include security, logistics, medical, transportation, and communications. In these areas, the steady flow of timely information is essential for the success of humanitarian missions. Within these areas there will often be opportunities for task division and planning at both senior levels of the UN and the military and at the field level.

50. One of the effective ways to share information, and when appropriate share tasks and participate in planning, is through the exchange of liaison personnel from the appropriate UN humanitarian agencies and the military at the necessary levels. OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) offers training to military and civilian actors in civil-military coordination and liaison in both natural disasters and complex emergencies. Several UN humanitarian agencies have built up cadres of personnel experienced in liaising with military personnel. Trained liaison personnel are also available through the CMCS to UN humanitarian agencies and other actors responding to natural disasters and complex emergencies.
Tasks and Responsibilities

Affected State and Transit States

51. The Affected State has primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance on its territory. The Affected State has the right to decline the use of MCDA on a case-by-case basis, even though UN humanitarian agencies may have been requested by the Affected State or the UN Secretary General to provide assistance.

52. States adopting a specific policy on the use of foreign MCDA within its borders may consider making this position known to the UN Resident Coordinator and/or UN Humanitarian Coordinator (if present), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

53. National authorities in potential Affected States are responsible for disaster preparedness plans, which should include the receipt of international assistance, procedures for receipt and use of foreign MCDA, and training for the coordination and employment of these assets.

54. The Affected State should provide to the international community timely and accurate information on the nature and magnitude of the disaster, in order to enhance the effectiveness of external assistance. (If necessary, OCHA can assist the Affected State in this task through its UNDAC programme.)

55. Disaster-prone States that are potential recipients of foreign MCDA should advise OCHA of their anticipated relief assistance needs, appoint a single national point of contact to facilitate the receipt of these resources, and confirm their policy and point of contact at the onset of an emergency.

56. States that permit UN humanitarian agencies to call on MCDA already deployed by other nations within their borders should make any restrictions on the use of these forces known to OCHA and should include these restrictions in the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) established between their governments and the governments or responsible alliance/coalition which have forces stationed in their country. This does not preclude States from imposing restrictions on the use of military forces deployed within its borders on a case-by-case basis.

57. Affected States should provide security for UN MCDA operating in support of UN humanitarian activities in the same manner that they would provide security for other UN humanitarian personnel and resources. UN MCDA shall have at least the same freedom of movement, immunities, privileges, and exemptions afforded the UN humanitarian agencies when working in support of these activities, including when en route and returning to their units or stations.

58. If international assistance is necessary, it should be requested or consented to by the Affected State as soon as possible upon the onset of the disaster to maximize its effectiveness. It should also provide Assisting States with information on how to tailor
international assistance to its particular customs and traditions. (OCHA can assist the Affected State through the dissemination of situation reports and emergency appeals.)

59. Affected States should also inform OCHA and any Assisting States of the structure of the Local Emergency Management Authority and how they intend to manage any foreign MCDA. This information as well as points of contact should be as widely disseminated as possible.

60. Affected States should advise the necessary ministries and local governance structures of the impending arrival of foreign MCDA and facilitate their deployment by ensuring:
   o Overflight and landing permission
   o Waiver of commercial documentation
   o Exemption from customs duties
   o Waiver of visa requirements
   o Free access to disaster zones
   o Recognition of certificates
   o Authorization of transport and communication usage
   o Security of MCDA

61. Affected States that are signatories of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations should extend the provisions of this treaty to include the foreign MCDA deployed on their territory.

62. The Affected State should notify the Assisting States, OCHA and other assisting parties when relief operations are to cease and facilitate the withdrawal plans for the foreign MCDA and other assisting organizations.

63. Transit States are those States whose national borders, territorial waters, and airspace are crossed by foreign MCDA moving to and from and conducting operations in the Affected State. Transit States, especially those bordering the Affected State, will facilitate the movement of MCDA requested by the Affected State in the same manner that they facilitate the movement of relief goods and personnel.

64. Transit States should confirm to OCHA and concerned States the transit facilities and assistance available, as well as possible preconditions.

65. The Transit State should confirm to States involved the government organ having the responsibility for the monitoring, facilitation and coordination of foreign MCDA in transit and notify OCHA immediately.

66. The Transit State is responsible for the safety of the UN MCDA while in transit of its territory. It should fully recognize their status and grant appropriate privileges and immunities, and provide security during their transit.

67. If procedures have not already been established for resolution of claims and disputes they should be settled in accordance with the Model Agreement covering the Status of MCDA provided in Annex I.
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) / Resident Coordinator (RC)

68. When a Humanitarian Coordinator has been designated, he or she is responsible for initiating requests for UN MCDA or approving the use of other military and civil defence resources. If a HC has not been appointed, the decision to request UN MCDA or use other military and civil defence resources rests with the Resident Coordinator, after consultation with the UN Humanitarian Country Team. The individual charged with coordinating the UN effort will ensure that Affected State clearance is obtained prior to processing the request at the country level.

69. Before requesting these assets the HC/RC will consult with the appropriate authorities of the Affected State and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), as appropriate. If the Affected State is capable of and willing to provide the coordination structure for a natural disaster, this arrangement should be used.

70. In the absence of a HC or RC, the decision to use MCDA to support UN humanitarian activities, will be made by the ERC, in consultation with the IASC.

71. The HC or RC will ensure that the coordination mechanisms and specific guidelines are in place to effectively employ these by the UN humanitarian agencies responding to the natural disaster, to include means for the sharing of information and, where appropriate, the exchange of liaison personnel.

72. The HC/RC will plan for the earliest possible release of MCDA and ensure that UN humanitarian activities do not become dependent on these or any other military and civil defence resources, once the natural disaster has passed.

73. In circumstances where there is likely to be a protracted emergency and relief conditions are likely to re-emerge, the supported UN humanitarian agencies will make arrangements for these needs to be met with resources available from the Affected State or other civilian sources.

74. When MCDA are used by UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, the HC/RC will ensure that procedures, consistent with these Guidelines and UN policies/regulations, is put in place to control the use of UN MCDA.

75. When other deployed forces are providing support on a case-by-case basis to UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, the HC/RC will ensure that the provision of humanitarian assistance by military forces does not compromise the humanitarian actors and that the military forces performing these missions understand the importance and humanitarian purpose of such missions. The HC/RC will also seek to ensure that assistance activities carried out by other deployed forces on their own behalf do not compromise UN humanitarian efforts.

76. The HC/RC or the designated UN authority requesting the MCDA, should review regularly, with MCDA commanders, the modus operandi of supporting forces and offer appropriate advice and guidance. This review should include such considerations as: the types of task that can be performed, how the unit is armed and its rules of engagement, types of uniforms and equipment, the chain of command, use of liaison officers, exit criteria for the mission or task, status of the forces to include privileges or immunities, claims and insurance matters such as damage compensation.
77. UN humanitarian agencies will request the use of UN MCDA through the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator that has coordination responsibilities for the disaster.

78. Except in situations where there is imminent loss of life or acute suffering, UN humanitarian agencies will avoid ad hoc local requests for MCDA and the uncoordinated use of other military and civil defence resources. If in exceptional situations UN MCDA or other military and civil defence resources are used, UN humanitarian agencies will report this use to the responsible coordinator, including when they expect the assets to be released and how they intend to minimize their use in the future.

79. UN humanitarian agencies supported by MCDA will respect the integrity and chains of command of the supporting units. They will clearly state what they want the unit to accomplish and leave the unit commander as much latitude as possible in determining how he or she will accomplish the desired outcome, provided that core humanitarian principles are fully respected.

80. MCDA supporting UN humanitarian activities will normally not be used in the direct delivery of assistance. When possible the supported UN humanitarian agencies will try to use MCDA in a manner that does not call into question the neutrality or impartiality of the agency, implementing and operational partners or other humanitarian actors.

81. UN humanitarian agencies should acknowledge the MCDA support being provided, but avoid making any public statements on behalf of the UN MCDA units.

82. UN humanitarian agencies making use of MCDA will report the arrival, departure and status of these assets to the Civil-Military Coordination Section of OCHA, through the Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator, to ensure that the assets are properly tracked and the contribution is recorded and acknowledged by the United Nations.
83. Within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) has the primary responsibility for the mobilization of UN MCDA and civil-military coordination in an emergency.

84. CMCS will process the request for UN MCDA, make the necessary arrangements with the Member States, and track the use of these assets by the UN humanitarian agencies. A sample CMCS Request for MCDA can be found in Annex II.

85. CMCS, with donor support, will maintain a training programme for those involved in the use of military and civil defence assets to support UN humanitarian activities, with special attention to the training of liaison personnel and the procedures and methods for UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord).

86. On behalf of the Member States, CMCS will maintain a roster of UN-CMCoord trained liaison personnel and assist in mobilizing these personnel to support the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and the UN humanitarian agencies.

87. If a UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) is established, CMCS will coordinate the UN MCDA used to support logistics with the UNJLC, which is a primary tool for humanitarian logistics in most large-scale emergencies. Likewise, CMCS will assist OCHA Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC) in obtaining relevant information from the military where a HIC or similar information-sharing activity has been established.

88. CMCS will maintain the necessary tools to facilitate UN-CMCoord and the mobilization of MCDA, to include databases and communications capacity.

89. General Assembly Resolution 46/182 mandates OCHA to establish and maintain a central register of all specialized personnel and teams of technical specialists, as well as relief supplies, equipment and services, including MCDA, available within the United Nations system and from Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, that can be called upon at short notice by the United Nations.

90. CMCS maintains the Directory of MCDA of the Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities. Based on information provided by States, this Directory enables OCHA to match resources and assets to the needs of specific disasters. States and organizations owning military-related disaster relief capabilities will be contacted on the basis of the information provided in their answers to OCHA questionnaires and included in the MCDA Directory of the Central Register database.

91. If requested by Member States, OCHA and CMCS will facilitate the mobilization and deployment of MCDA, especially those assets registered in the Central Register.

92. At the request of the HC/RC, or at the direction of the ERC, CMCS will deploy UN-CMCoord Officers, either independently or as a part of the UNDAC Team, to facilitate foreign MCDA requested or approved by the Affected State.
93. States or regional organizations and peacekeeping forces involved in military operations beyond their borders should include in the guidance or orders issued to force or contingent commanders the parameters for the use of their resources to support relief operations. Commanders should establish their force *modus operandi* taking into account the operational circumstances, International Law, and core Humanitarian Principles and consult with the Affected State, ERC and Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator or cognizant humanitarian authority, including the OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) for further technical advice, before deploying into the disaster area.

94. In an emergency, prospective Assisting States with military resources deployed in the affected area, or in reasonable proximity, should take appropriate action to facilitate relief operations. This could include information on any assets available to support essential humanitarian functions including the transport of relief goods, the movement of persons at risk, and the reestablishment of basic human services, including medical care.

95. The commanders of UN MCDA assigned specifically to support UN humanitarian activities, and other deployed forces performing humanitarian support missions at the request of the UN, will avoid compromising the neutrality and impartiality of these agencies, their implementing and operational partners and other humanitarian actors responding to a natural disaster. Likewise, all supporting activities will be conducted in a manner that respects the dignity, culture, religions, and laws of the affected population.

96. Military or civil defence organizations dispatched to support relief activities should be self-supporting for the duration of their mission in terms of transport, fuel, food rations, water and sanitation, maintenance and communications, in order to avoid placing additional stress on overburdened local authorities or the supported humanitarian actors.

97. Unless specifically exempted, UN MCDA will abide by the security and movements procedures set by the UN Department of Safety and Security to ensure the safety of UN personnel and be prepared to provide non-security related assistance in the relocation or evacuation of UN personnel, should the need arise.

98. States providing UN MCDA will not exploit these missions for the purpose of intelligence collection, propaganda, or psychological operations.

99. When military forces have assumed responsibility for vital civilian functions, such as delivery of water, provision of power, or the safe operation of an airfield, regardless of how this responsibility was acquired, they will facilitate a smooth transfer of these functions to the appropriate civilian authority, in coordination with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and/or Local Emergency Management Authorities (LEMA), and as soon as possible. This will be done in a timely manner, well prior to terminating this support, to ensure that any disruption of services will not have an adverse impact on relief and recovery activities.
100. All Member States are requested to make known to OCHA their MCDA, which could be made available for relief operations, and complete the necessary records in the MCDA Directory of the Central Register maintained by OCHA. At a minimum, the following information should be provided: national points of contact, the type and quantity of resources and services that may be made available, and criteria, preconditions and limitations (cost, deployment time, geographical range of action, etc.) for the use of its MCDA. Providing this information does not obligate the government to make available these or any assets in case of a disaster.

101. Assisting States intending to deploy MCDA should prepare adequate contingency plans addressing the functional disciplines of disaster relief and ensure that their forces are adequately equipped and trained.

102. States should, immediately after receiving a request for assistance, indicate to OCHA their capacity to assist. Any preconditions and operational requirements should also be confirmed.

103. The Assisting State should provide, in respect of its MCDA contribution, appropriate information to the Affected State and OCHA, if appropriate, in accordance with the standard movement certificate proposed in the Convention On Temporary Admission (Istanbul, 26 June 1990).

104. The Assisting State should ensure that international standards for the quality, packaging and marking of relief supplies are met, bearing in mind the needs, customs and traditions of the Affected State.

105. The Assisting State should ensure that its military and civil defence personnel act in accordance with the status agreed upon with the Affected State. UN MCDA deployed at the request of and cooperating with OCHA will conform to the provisions of article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946.

106. The Assisting State should notify in a timely manner the Affected State, OCHA and other assisting parties of the duration of its assistance and withdrawal plans for its MCDA.

107. If procedures have not already been established for resolution of claims and disputes they should be settled in accordance with the Model Agreement covering the Status of MCDA provided in Annex I.
ANNEX I - MODEL AGREEMENT
COVERING THE STATUS OF MCDA

Basing itself upon established practice, the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA has prepared a model agreement covering the status of MCDA, which appears below. The model is intended to serve as a basis for the drafting of individual agreements to be concluded between States or the United Nations and States on whose territory MCDA in IDRA operations are deployed. As such it is subject to modifications that may be agreed upon between the parties in each case.

The model, mutatis mutandis, may also serve as the basis for an agreement with an Affected State in operations where no OCHA personnel are deployed.

I. DEFINITIONS

1. For the purpose of the present Agreement the definitions contained in the United Nations Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief shall apply. Also for the purpose of this Agreement the employment of military and civil defence/protection teams, units and/or experts in IDRA, will be referred to as the “MCDA operation”.

II. APPLICATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

2. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the provisions of the present Agreement apply only in the territory of the Affected State.

III. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

3. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 (hereafter referred to as “the Convention”) shall apply to the MCDA operation if the military and civil defence personnel are alerted, mobilized and deployed at the request of OCHA and operating within the field coordination mechanisms, subject to the provisions specified in the present Agreement.

or

4. The Affected State grants to the MCDA operation, including its property, funds, assets and members, the privileges and immunities specified in the present Agreement, as well as those provided for in the Convention to which the Affected State and the Assisting State are Parties.

IV. STATUS OF THE MCDA OPERATION

5. The MCDA operation and its members shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the humanitarian nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of the present arrangements. The MCDA operation and its members shall respect all local laws and regulations. The Head of the MCDA operation shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the observance of these obligations.

A. Identification And Vehicle Markings

6. The Government of the Affected State grants to the MCDA operation the right to display the national flag or other suitable identification at its headquarters, camps or other premises, and on its vehicles and vessels. Military and civil defence personnel deployed under the auspices of OCHA and holding the status of experts on mission for the United Nations will wear an appropriate marking.

B. Communications

7. The Government of the Affected State grants to the MCDA operation the right to use the facilities with respect to communications as may be required for the performance of its task. Issues with respect to communications, which may arise and which are not specifically provided for in the present Agreement shall be dealt with pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunications Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations.

8. Subject to the provisions of the Tampere Convention:

   a) The MCDA operation is given the right to install and operate radio sending and receiving stations as well as satellite systems to connect appropriate points within the territory of the Affected State, with each other and with its national telecommunications network. The telecommunication services shall be operated in accordance with international telecommunication conventions and regulations and the frequencies on which such stations may operate shall be decided upon in cooperation with the Government of the Affected State.

   b) The MCDA operation is given, within the territory of the Affected State, the right to unrestricted communication by radio (including satellite, mobile and hand-held radio), telephone, telegraph, facsimile or any other means, and of establishing the necessary facilities for maintaining such communications within and between premises of the MCDA operation, including the laying of cable and land lines and the establishment of fixed and mobile radio sending, receiving and repeater stations. The frequencies on which the radio will operate shall be decided upon in cooperation with the Government of the Affected State.

   c) The MCDA operation is allowed to make arrangements through its own facilities for the processing and transport of private mail addressed to or emanating from members of the MCDA operation. The Government of the Affected State shall be informed of the nature of such arrangements and undertakes not to interfere with or apply censorship to the mail of the MCDA operation or its members. In the event that postal arrangements applying to private mail of members of the MCDA operation are extended to transfer of
currency or the transport of packages and parcels, the conditions under which such operations are conducted shall be agreed with the Government of the Affected State.

C. Travel And Transport

9. The Government of the Affected State grants to the MCDA operation and its members together with its vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom of movement within the disaster zone of the Affected State and any other area necessary for the fulfillment of its task. The Government undertakes to supply the MCDA operation with any information which may be useful in facilitating its movements.

10. Vehicles, including all military vehicles, vessels and aircraft of the MCDA operation shall not be subject to registration or licensing by the Government of the Affected State provided that all such vehicles shall carry third-party insurance required by the relevant legislations.

11. The MCDA operation may use roads, bridges, tunnels, canals and other waterways, port facilities and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls or charges.

D. Privileges And Immunities Of The MCDA Operation

12. The Government of the Affected State grants the MCDA operation the status, privileges and immunities as provided for in the present Agreement and in particular grants to the MCDA operation the right:

   a) To import, free of duty or other restrictions, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, which are for the exclusive and official use of the MCDA operation;

   b) To clear ex customs and excise warehouse, free of duty or other restrictions, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods which are for the exclusive and official use of the MCDA operation;

   c) To re-export or otherwise dispose of equipment as far as it is still usable, all unconsumed supplies, and other goods so imported or cleared ex customs and excise warehouse which are not transferred or otherwise disposed of, on terms and conditions to be agreed upon, to the competent local authorities of the Affected State or to an entity nominated by them.

13. To the end that such importation, clearances, transfer or exportation may be effected with the least possible delay, a mutually satisfactory procedure along the lines recommended by the Oslo Guidelines, including documentation, shall be agreed between the MCDA operation and the Government of the Affected State at the earliest possible date.

V. FACILITIES FOR THE MCDA OPERATION

14. The Government of the Affected State undertakes to provide without cost to the MCDA operation and in agreement with the Head of the MCDA operation such areas for headquarters, camps or other premises as may be
necessary for the conduct of the operational and administrative activities of the MCDA operation and for the accommodation of its members. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain the territory of the Affected State, the Government of the Affected State undertakes to treat them as being subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Head of the MCDA operation.

15. The Government of the Affected State undertakes to assist the MCDA operation as far as possible in obtaining and making available, where applicable, water, electricity and other facilities free of charge, or, where this is not possible, at the most favourable rate, and in the case of interruption or threatened interruption of service, to give as far as possible within its powers the same priority to the needs of the MCDA operation as to essential government services. Where such utilities or facilities are not provided free of charge, payment shall be made by the MCDA operation on terms to be agreed upon with the competent authority. The MCDA operation shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of facilities so provided.

16. The MCDA operation shall be given the right, where necessary, to generate electricity for its use and to transmit and distribute such electricity.

A. Provisions, Supplies, Services And Sanitary Arrangements

17. The Government of the Affected State undertakes to assist the MCDA operation as far as possible in obtaining equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods and services from local sources required for its subsistence and operations. In making purchases on the local market, the MCDA operation shall, on the basis of observations made and information provided by the Government of the Affected State in that respect, avoid any adverse affect on the local economy. The Government of the Affected State shall exempt the MCDA operation from sales taxes in respect of all official local purchases.

18. The MCDA operation shall cooperate with the Government of the Affected State with respect to sanitary services and matters concerning health, particularly with respect to the control of communicable diseases, in accordance with international conventions.

B. Recruitment Of Local Personnel

19. The MCDA operation may recruit locally such personnel as it requires. Upon the request of the Head of the MCDA operation, the Government of the Affected State undertakes to facilitate the recruitment of qualified local staff by the MCDA operation and to accelerate the process of such recruitment.

VI. STATUS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MCDA OPERATION

A. Privileges And Immunities

20. The Head of the MCDA operation and other members, as may be agreed upon with the Government of the Affected State, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities, in accordance with sections 19 and 27 of the Convention, provided that the privileges and immunities referred therein shall be those accorded to diplomatic envoys by national or international law.
21. If MCDA operate within the OCHA field coordination mechanism as UN MCDA, as provided for in the Oslo Guidelines, members of the MCDA operation shall be considered as experts on mission within the meaning of article VI of the Convention.

22. In any other case, members of the MCDA operation shall enjoy the privileges and immunities specifically provided for in the present Agreement.

23. Unless otherwise specified in the present Agreement, locally recruited members of the MCDA operation shall enjoy the immunities concerning official acts carried out within the MCDA operation.

24. Members of the MCDA operation shall be exempt from taxation on the pay and emoluments received from an Assisting State and any income received from outside the Affected State. They shall also be exempt from all other direct taxes and from all registration fees and charges.

25. Members of the MCDA operation shall be granted the right to import free of duty their personal effects in connection with their arrival in the Affected State. Special facilities will be granted by the Government of the Affected State for the speedy processing of entry and exit formalities for all members of the MCDA operation.

26. On departure from the Affected State, members of the MCDA operation may, notwithstanding the above-mentioned exchange regulations, take with them such funds as the Head of the MCDA operation certifies were received or represent a reasonable residue thereof.

27. The Head of the MCDA operation shall cooperate with the Government of the Affected State and shall render all assistance within his or her power to ensure the observance of the customs and fiscal laws and regulations of the Affected State by the members of the MCDA operation, in accordance with the present Agreement.

B. Entry, Residence And Departure

28. The Government of the Affected State grants to the members of the MCDA operation the right to enter, reside in and depart from the Affected State.

29. The Government of the Affected State undertakes to facilitate the entry into and departure from its territory of the members of the MCDA operation and shall be kept informed of such movements. For that purpose, the members of the MCDA operation shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection and restrictions on entering or departing from the Affected State. They shall also be exempt from any regulation governing the residence of aliens in the Affected State, including registration, but shall not acquire any right to permanent residence or domicile in the Affected State.

30. For the purpose of such entry and departure, members of the MCDA operation shall be required to have:

   a) An individual or collective movement order issued by or under the authority of the Head of the MCDA operation or any appropriate authority
of the Assisting State;

b) A personal identity card issued by the appropriate authorities of the Assisting State.

C. Identification

31. The Head of the MCDA operation shall issue to all locally recruited personnel an identity card, which shall contain the following information: full name; date of birth; service (if appropriate); date of issue and date of expiration, and a photograph.

32. Members of the MCDA operation, as well as locally recruited personnel, shall be required to present, but not to surrender, their identity cards upon demand by an appropriate official of the Government of the Affected State.

D. Uniforms And Arms

33. Members of the MCDA operation shall be permitted to wear the national military or civil defence uniforms of their State. Those military and civil defence personnel deployed as UN MCDA shall be identified by appropriate markings.

34. The Affected State will determine as part of this Agreement if Members of the MCDA operation may carry arms for their own protection, while performing official duties.

E. Permits And Licenses

35. The Government of the Affected State agrees to accept as valid, without tax or fee, a certificate provided on request by the Head of the MCDA operation in respect of the technical and professional qualifications of any of its members practicing a profession or similar occupation in connection with the MCDA operation.

F. Maintenance Of Discipline And Mutual Assistance

36. The Head of the MCDA operation shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of discipline and good order among its members, as well as locally recruited personnel. To this end personnel may be designated by the Head of the MCDA operation to police its premises as well as such areas where its members are deployed. Elsewhere such personnel shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the Government of the Affected State and in liaison with it in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among members of the MCDA operation.

37. The personnel mentioned in paragraph 36 above may take into custody any unauthorized person found on the premises of the MCDA operation. Such a person shall be delivered immediately to the nearest appropriate official of the Government of the Affected State responsible for dealing with any offence or disturbance on such premises.
38. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 20 and 21 above, officials of the Government of the Affected State may take into custody any member of the MCDA operation:

a) When so requested by the Head of the MCDA operation;

b) When such a member of the MCDA operation is apprehended in the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence. Such a person shall be delivered immediately, together with any weapons or other items seized, to the Head of the MCDA operation.

39. The MCDA operation and the Government of the Affected State shall assist each other in carrying out all necessary investigations into offenses in respect of which either or both have an interest.

40. The Government of the Affected State shall ensure the prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation to the MCDA operation or its members, which, if committed in relation to the officials of the Government of the Affected State, would have rendered such acts liable to prosecution.

VII. JURISDICTION

41. The Government of the Affected State grants to all members of the MCDA operation, including locally recruited personnel, immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. Such immunity shall continue even after they cease to be members of, or employed by, the MCDA operation and after the expiration of the other provisions of the present Agreement.

42. Should the Government of the Affected State consider that any member of the MCDA operation has committed a criminal offence, it shall promptly inform the Head of the MCDA operation and present to him any evidence available.

43. The Government of the Assisting State gives its assurance to the Government of the Affected State that it will exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences, which may be committed by members of the MCDA operation.

44. If any civil proceeding is instituted against a member of the MCDA operation before any court of the Affected State, the Head of the MCDA operation shall be notified immediately, and he or she shall certify to the court whether or not the proceeding is related to the official duties of the member:

a) If the Head of the MCDA operation certifies that the proceeding is related to official duties, such proceedings shall be discontinued and the provisions of paragraph 41 of the present Agreement shall apply.

b) If the Head of the MCDA operation certifies that the proceeding is not related to official duties, the proceeding may continue. If the Head of the MCDA operation certifies that a member of the MCDA operation is unable, because of official duties or authorized absence, to protect his or her interests in the proceeding, the court shall, at the defendant's request,
suspend the proceeding until the elimination of the disability, but for not more than ninety days. Property of a member of the MCDA operation that is certified by the Head of the MCDA operation as necessary for the fulfillment of the member's official functions shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision or order. The personal liberty of a member of the MCDA operation shall not be restricted in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision or order, to compel an oath or for any other reason.

VIII. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

45. Except as provided in paragraph 47 of this Agreement, any dispute or claim of a private law character to which the MCDA operation or any member thereof is a party and over which the courts of the Affected State does not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement, shall be settled by a Claims Commission to be established for that purpose. One member of the Commission shall be appointed by each Government and a chairperson shall be appointed jointly by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Governments (or the Governments only if the MCDA operation is not deployed under the provisions of UN MCDA). If no agreement as to the chairperson is reached within thirty days of the appointment of the first member of the Commission, the President of the International Court of Justice may, at the request of either the Secretary-General of the United Nations, if appropriate, or of any of the Governments, appoint the chairperson. Any vacancy on the Commission shall be filled by the same method prescribed for the original appointment, provided that the thirty-day period there prescribed shall start as soon as a vacancy occurs. The Commission shall determine its own procedures, provided that any two members shall constitute a quorum for all purposes (except for a period of thirty days after the occurrence of a vacancy) and all decisions shall require the approval of any two members. The awards of the Commission shall be final and binding, unless the Governments permit an appeal to a tribunal established in accordance with paragraph 47. The awards of the Commission shall be notified to the parties and, if against a member of the MCDA operation, the Head of the MCDA operation or the Government of the Assisting State shall use its best endeavours to ensure compliance.

46. Disputes concerning the terms of employment and conditions of service of locally recruited personnel shall be settled by the administrative procedures to be established by the Head of the MCDA operation.

47. Any other dispute between the MCDA operation and the Government of the Affected State, and any appeal that both of them agree to allow from the award of the Claims Commission established pursuant to paragraph 45 shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, be submitted to a tribunal of three arbitrators. The provision relating to the establishment and procedures of the Claims Commission shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the establishment and procedures of the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties.

48. All differences between the Government of the Assisting State and the Government of the Affected State arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Agreement, which involve a question of principle concerning the Convention, shall be dealt with in accordance with section 30 of the Convention.
IX. SUPPLEMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS

49. The Head of the MCDA operation and the Government of the Affected State may conclude supplemental arrangements to the present Agreement.

X. LIAISON

50. The Head of the MCDA operation and the Government of the Affected State shall take appropriate measures to ensure close and reciprocal liaison at every appropriate level.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

51. Wherever the present Agreement refers to the privileges, immunities and rights granted to the MCDA operation, the Government of the Affected State shall have the ultimate responsibility for the implementation and fulfillment of such privileges, immunities, rights and facilities by the appropriate local authorities.

52. The present Agreement shall enter into force on the date specified in this Agreement or in an accompanying exchange of letters between the Assisting State and the Affected State.

53. The present Agreement shall remain in force until the departure of the final element of the MCDA operation from the Affected State excepting paragraphs 41, 43, 44 in section VII, paragraphs 45, 46, 47, 48 in section VIII and paragraph 50 in section X which shall remain in force until all claims have been settled that had arisen prior to the termination of the present Agreement and had been submitted prior to or within three months of such termination.
To: (see attached distribution list)
A: (see attached distribution list)
Fax: (see attached distribution list)
Date: [date / month / year]
From: [name]
De: Chief
Civil-Military Coordination Section
Emergency Services Branch
Subject: Request for Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)
Ref.: [emergency title] - MCDA Request No. [insert].

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE ... PAGES (including cover sheet)

URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT

In connection with the emergency: [emergency title and date of emergency].

The OCHA Civil Military Coordination Section (CMCS) has received a request from [requesting organization] in [location] for:

[MCDA MODULE - X]
Details [example]:
Movement of 4 (four) snow clearing vehicles and associated snow clearing equipment from [departure location] to [destination]. Specifications as follows:

**VEHICLES**

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<th>Model</th>
<th>Length (mm)</th>
<th>Width (mm)</th>
<th>Height (mm)</th>
<th>Weight (kg)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>2 x Unimog, U1650</td>
<td>5100</td>
<td>2170</td>
<td>2855</td>
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**ACCESSORIES**

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<th>Height (mm)</th>
<th>Depth (mm)</th>
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<td>1200</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1200 (each)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 x Snow blowers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1066 (each)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background [example]:
The delivery of critical humanitarian aid to the remote mountain villages is being delayed through impassible roads resulting from heavy snowfall. These heavy-duty vehicles are urgently needed to provide immediate snow clearing capability to ensure aid reaches these vulnerable populations.

Timing:
Immediate.

Contact Information:
Please inform CMCS NLT COB [insert deadline] if your country/organization is interested in supporting this operation, entirely or partly. Please also indicate if your country is willing to provide these assets free of charge. For further information please contact the Action Officer, coordinates detailed below.

**Action Officer:**
[name]
CMCS, ESB, OCHA - Geneva
Tel. +41 (0) 22 917 […]
Mobile phone: +41 (0) 79 […]
Fax. +41 (0) 22 917 0023
Back-up tel. nos. +41 (0) 22 917 5755/1394
Back-up fax no. +41 (0) 22 917 0363
E-mail: cmcs@un.org

PLEASE REPLY TO THIS REQUEST NO LATER THAN CLOSE OF BUSINESS [INSERT DEADLINE].
## ANNEX III – ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>Allied Forces Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDRU</td>
<td>Austrian Forces Disaster Relief Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCS</td>
<td>Civil Military Coordination Section (Part of ESB, OCHA (Geneva))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCoord</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs (now OCHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>UN Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>Emergency Services Branch (Part of OCHA (Geneva))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Civil Defence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRA</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRA</td>
<td>International Disaster Relief Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSARAG</td>
<td>International Search and Rescue Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterAction</td>
<td>American Council for Voluntary International Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEMA</td>
<td>Local Emergency Management Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Formerly DHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>On-Site Operations Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-CMCoord</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>UN Department of Safety and Security (formerly UNSECOORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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