Executive Summary

In the past two decades, the total number of peacekeeping operations led or partnered by the United Nations has not increased substantially, while the number of field-based special political missions has almost tripled. What has significantly changed in the peace operations missions are the context, environment, and resources applied. The most noticeable change is in the amount of military personnel participating in missions. As of January 2018, nearly three times the number of “troop” peacekeepers are currently deployed than in 2000 (from almost 28k to approximately 80k), not including the corresponding number of police and civilians. These escalated personnel numbers—with the corresponding “footprint” of resources demanded to support the peace operations missions—contribute to some of the most significant concerns with UN peace operations missions today. These are essentially the lack of effectiveness and efficiency, accountability (particularly, but not exclusively, regarding conduct and discipline issues), and leadership at all levels.

Concerns regarding UN peace operations’ ineffectiveness and inefficiencies start from the highest levels of UN policy development—“the strategic alignment among the Council, the Secretariat and TCC/PCCs, as well as some of the Council’s working methods that frame (and limit) the Council’s authorisation [sic], design and oversight of peace operations.” Incomplete understanding of the missions’ operating environments (and influencing factors of those environments, such as its people and the natural elements) contribute to often inadequately developed mandates, containing tasks that are not prioritized, unnecessarily complex, and unrealistic in their aims and timelines. Ineffectiveness and inefficiencies are further perpetuated in the persistent non-standard training, equipping, and deploying of uniformed personnel (despite the UN’s espoused training and education programs and manuals and directed equipment requirements); and the existence of national caveats, which impacts the employment of contributed forces to the missions.

Other ongoing discussions about the status—and future—of UN peace operations focus on the following concerns:

- **Perceptions of Partiality.** While “impartiality” remains one of the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping, there is an increasing perception of partiality by peacekeepers, particularly in missions
where the supported government has meager legitimacy in the eyes of the population or when actions of peacekeepers result in harm to (or lack of protection of) the population.

- **Perceptions (and Reality) of Peacekeepers “Doing Harm.”** Reports of sexual violence and exploitation, mission-related environmental damage, disease transmission, and the alleged rise of violence due to peacekeepers' presence all contribute to growing sentiment that UN peace deployments are not as helpful to resolving conflict situations as intended by the Member States.

- **Safety and Security of Peacekeepers.** The continuing rise of casualties among UN peacekeepers are, perhaps, due to deployments to countries and regions with “no peace to keep,” as groups intentionally target UN personnel.

To address these challenges and concerns, the UN commissioned several studies in the past three years, in addition to its usual reporting cycle. Most significant among them are:

- The [High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report (June 2015)](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/hippo/hippo.html) with over 100 recommendations;
- The [Secretary-General (SG) report on UN peacekeeping future (September 2015)](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/reports/unpfr.html);
- The [Peacebuilding Architecture report (2015, and more recently the 2017 report, as well as the 2018 work plan)](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/reports/architecture.html);
- An update of [Peacekeeping Reform (September 2017)](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/reports/peacekeeping_reform.html);
- The Security Council President’s Statement on [UN Peacekeeping Operations (December 2017)](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/reports/peacekeeping_operations.html);
- "[The Cruz Report](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/reports/cruz_report.html)," also known as “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business” (December 2017); and

**Overview**

1. **Background.** [UN peacekeeping](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/) began with the deployment of military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and the regional Arab countries in May 1948. That mission, known as United Nations Truce Supervision Organization ([UNTSO](https://www.un.org/peacekeeping/nts.html)) is still in effect, making it
the longest lasting UN peace operation. In the 70 years since its inception, the UN has participated in 56 missions, acknowledging both successes and failures:

The UN has helped end conflicts and foster reconciliation by conducting successful peacekeeping operations in dozens of countries, including Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia and Tajikistan.

UN peacekeeping has also made a real difference in other places with recently completed or on-going operations such as Sierra Leone, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Haiti and Kosovo. By providing basic security guarantees and responding to crises, these UN operations have supported political transitions and helped buttress fragile new state institutions. They have helped countries to close the chapter of conflict and open a path to normal development, even if major peacebuilding challenges remain.

In other instances, however, UN peacekeeping – and the response by the international community as a whole – have been challenged and found wanting, for instance in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. These setbacks provided important lessons for the international community when deciding how and when to deploy and support UN peacekeeping as a tool to restore and maintain international peace and security.

2. Purpose. According to the UN’s publicly-accessible website, peacekeepers are deployed to provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. There are three basic principles to UN peacekeeping: Consent of the parties; Impartiality; and Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Yet, some of the current mission mandates, as well as a few emerging or evolving concepts for the use of peace operations, challenge these basic principles. Examples of peace operations’ conceptual challenges include:

- Peacekeeping as conflict-prevention, particularly within sovereign states’ verging on civil war (protecting civilians from their own government, e.g.)
- Peacekeeping as counter-terrorism (or alongside such operations), such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
- Peacekeeping as peace enforcement, with assertive action against violators of recognized peace agreements.

These emerging and evolving concepts have both adherents and detractors and consequently stimulate much debate within the peacekeeping and security communities. Regardless of one’s position, it is true that current peacekeeping operations are much more complex and multidimensional. Peacekeepers are not only expected to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law.

There are essentially four types of UN deployment missions:

- **Traditional Peacekeeping.** Traditional peacekeeping can also be referred to as the “original” peacekeeping mission type. While the longest-standing UN missions are included in this type, traditional missions are intended as interim measures to ensure peaceful conditions while other political activities occur—by other agents—to ensure long-term political solutions and peace. Tasks may include: observation, monitoring and reporting, supervision of ceasefire, support to verification mechanisms, creation of buffer zones, and other confidence-building measures.

    - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
    - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
    - United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
    - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, Syria
• **Multidimensional Peacekeeping.** Multidimensional peacekeeping operations are now the most common UN peacekeeping mission type. As titled, the multidimensional mandate is broader than the traditional mandate in that deployment includes military, police and civilian personnel, and conducts activities across a wide-range of themes, such as governance and economic development. While usually deployed in support of a comprehensive peace agreement, these operations are “generally more involved in peacemaking activities than traditional missions…”

• **Transitional Authority.** Considered a rarity, the transitional authority mission is essentially a multidimensional mission with the mandate to meet a State’s legislative and administrative functions in the short-term. This may be implemented: “in order to resolve sovereignty questions, such as the transfer of authority from one sovereign entity to another, or until sovereignty questions are fully resolved (as in the case of transitional administrations), or to help the State to establish administrative structures that may not have existed previously."

• **Special Political Missions (SPMs).** While not strictly peacekeeping, the UN deploys personnel in support of SPMs under the authority of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA). SPMs include: political field missions, Special Envoys, and Expert Panels monitoring sanctions. They may include tasks to support conflict prevention, peacemaking or peacebuilding. Consequently, they may be deployed prior, during, or after conclusion of a peacekeeping mission. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provides personnel support and selected equipping and functional expertise to SPMs as directed.
3. Deployment. Peacekeeping operates within a changing physical, social, economic, and political environment. The Security Council determines the deployment of a new UN peacekeeping operation after considering many factors. As the UN does not maintain a standing military or police force, it depends on the contributions of Member States as well as a small cadre of professional civilians or volunteers to serve in various capacities.

The number of Troop (and Police) Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) has almost doubled in the past two decades. In 1998, only 77 countries contributed personnel to the existing missions. In 2018, 124 countries are currently engaged in peacekeeping with the UN. At the same time, the geo-regional source of the participating countries has significantly changed. A 2015 report highlighted this evolution:

While developed states were significant troop contributing countries over the decades from the U.N.’s inaugural mission in the Middle East in 1948 through the mid-1990s, the paradigm has shifted since then. There is a clear cleavage between “financial contributors” and “troop contributors,” especially in more complex and violent settings…developed countries, particularly from the Western world, gradually shied away from sending troops and scaled back their role to paying for peace. Humanitarian crises in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the early-to-mid 1990s, largely ended Western contributions of peacekeepers to complex or conflict-ridden U.N. missions. European countries in this century have mostly dispatched troops under NATO or E.U. banners, rather than the U.N. flag, to directly serve their own national interest. Some countries, such as the U.S. and France, show a preference for unilateral and regional operations outside the U.N.

There are many reasons for this dichotomy amongst countries contributing uniformed personnel for missions. As the 2015 report suggested:
Less developed countries — mostly from Africa and South Asia — have compelling reasons to send their troops. Among others, peacekeeping operations serve as an opportunity for their soldiers to gain training and field experience and for countries to burnish their image and acquire a source of revenue. Moreover, the African Union has advocated “African solutions to Africa’s problems,” including problems of peace and security. With nine out of sixteen U.N. peacekeeping operations situated in Africa, it may sound reasonable for the countries in the region to contribute the bulk of U.N.’s troops. And, consistent with the U.S. nationwide public antipathy towards “American boots on the ground,” the U.S. channels its efforts to training local troops and training troop contributing countries rather than deploying American soldiers.

Although certain European countries have contributed combat ready forces to current U.N. peacekeeping operations...the bulk of European deployments with the U.N. remain in more traditional settings. Relatively capable East Asian countries, such as China, Japan and South Korea likewise contribute sizable numbers of troops to U.N. missions. However, troops from those countries usually stay confined to non-combat situations and their troop contributions are subject to their domestic politics with dissonance for peacekeeping operations.

4. Casualties. At no time in UN peacekeeping history were missions free of casualties/fatalities. However, the number of UN peacekeeper fatalities continues to rise. The most accepted reason for this growth is that UN members are deliberately targeted by increasingly capable armed groups while, at the same time, there is significant growth to the overall numbers of peacekeepers, combined with the ever-riskier environments in which they are deployed.

Focusing on fatalities, the current cumulative estimate among the ongoing UN peacekeeping operations is 1,579. As of January 2018, cumulative fatalities of all missions from 1948 until present is 3,700. The single most deadly mission event for peacekeepers was the 2010 Haiti earthquake, where 102 peacekeepers died. At this time, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) appears to be the most lethal mission with 158 casualties. The UN’s dependence on the TCC/PCCs’ contingents to report incidents in a timely manner challenged accurate tracking of casualties. In 2016 the UN’s Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations charged peace missions to report all incidents involving the safety and security of UN personnel and contractors, including sickness, injury, accident, death, violations of status-of-forces agreements, and misconduct. One of the results of this directive is the improved—and publicly

In the first decade of UN peacekeeping (1948-1957), there was a total of 36 UN peacekeeper deaths (of all personnel categories). Of that number, 17 died as part of the UN Emergency Forces (UNEF I), established in 1956 to address the Suez Crisis as the first of the UN’s armed peacekeeping operations. By the time of the mission’s conclusion in 1967, it had included over 6,000 peacekeepers, and over 100 peacekeepers fatalities.

UN peacekeeper deaths numbered 386 during the period of 1958-1967, of which 249 were serving as part of the UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC). ONUC was the first of the UN’s large-scale missions—almost 20,000 personnel at its height—established by UNSCR 143(1960) for four years “to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance.”

In the decade of 1968-1977, UN peacekeeper deaths numbered 139, of which 74 were serving with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Established by UNSCR 186(1964), it was intended to keep the peace between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 17 of the 74 personnel were killed following the Greek Cypriot coup d’état and the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. Now in its fourth decade, UNFICYP remains one of the UN's current missions with over 1000 personnel assigned and a total of 183 fatalities to date.

From 1978-1987, 261 UN peacekeepers died on mission; 163 of them were serving in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL was established by UNSCRs 425/426(1978) after an Israeli invasion into Lebanon. Its purpose was to confirm Israeli withdrawal of forces and restore a legitimate governance in Lebanon. The Mission suffered an average of ten peacekeeper deaths per year in the security chaos that characterized Lebanon in the 1980s, with peaks in 1981 (23) and 1986 (24) that corresponded to surges in violence in the region. Similar to UNFICYP, UNIFIL remains a current mission for the UN, comprised of 11,317 personnel (of the 15,000 authorized). There are 312 total UNIFIL fatalities, making it the “deadliest” mission to date.

The UN’s fifth decade of peacekeeping, 1988-1997, saw the doubling of UN peacekeeper fatalities in a ten-year period. At the same time, the number of peacekeeping missions increased from an average of four in a decade to over 30. Of the 792 deaths, over one quarter of them (213) were from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)—established by UNSCR 713(1991) to address the violent “break up” of the former Yugoslavia—and another fifth (159) were incurred in the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)—established by UNSCR 733(1992) to address the humanitarian crisis and assist in developing governance in Somalia. The remaining 50% of the peacekeeper fatalities in this period were spread across the other 28 missions of varying sizes, locations, and purposes.

The amount of UN peacekeeping missions did not reduce during the period of 1998-2007. Considering all 31 missions, the UN had 850 peacekeeper deaths. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)—established by UNSCR 1270(1999) to implement a peace accord that ended the extraordinarily brutal Sierra Leonean civil war—accounted for 192 (20%) of the peacekeeper fatalities of this decade.

The most recent decade of UN peacekeeping (2007-2018) saw another increase in both fatalities and number of missions. Across the 33 missions, the UN peacekeeper fatalities numbered 1,268. The current UN–African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) accounts for almost a fifth (243) of the deaths, while the ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) each accounted for 10% of the fatalities in this same period. The recently concluded UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) accounted for yet another 10%, but that number also included the 102 peacekeeper deaths resulting from Haiti’s earthquake in 2010.

There have been seven peacekeeper fatalities in the first two months of 2018; almost 50% were in MINUSMA.
accessible—UN’s statistical database. Not all fatalities are a result of "malicious acts" (targeting) against peacekeepers. In the almost 70 years of peacekeeping operations, over 70% of peacekeeper fatalities are due to “accident,” “illness,” or “other.”

The UN defines “malicious acts" as fatalities as a result of “war; invasion; hostilities; acts of foreign enemies, whether war be declared or not; civil war; revolution; rebellion; insurrection; military or usurped power; riots or civil commotion; sabotage; explosion of war weapons; or terrorist activities.” In contrast, “accidents” is defined to include “stray bullets, friendly fire, and road accidents” and other incidents, such as natural disasters.

A 2014-published study of UN peacekeeper deaths analyzed mission fatalities from 1948 to 2012 and determined that illness caused most of the deaths, replacing accidents (which had caused the majority of deaths in all previous years):

In summary, we found the preoccupation with malice and the idea of UNPKs occupying hostile spaces is indeed accurate and disturbing. However, it is neither novel, nor the most pressing threat facing the lives of UNPKs. We should not ignore the more pervasive evidence here, that the UNPK may fall victim to accident and more strikingly illness. These problems we argue have been more responsible for death than the enemy and are in need of greater study.

The study also noted the positive impact of pre- and concurrent mission training on the earlier accident-related fatalities and suggested similar measures to address illness-related deaths in the future.

Another study of UN peacekeeper fatalities, published in 2016, concurred with the previous studies and other casual analyses that “overall UN fatalities are trending slightly upward,” indicating:

This trend is particularly noticeable for illness-related fatalities, which follow a sharp upward trajectory that is strongly statistically significant. The trend does not apply to fatalities caused by accidents and malicious acts. (Yet) If we control for UN deployment numbers and calculate fatality ratios (i.e., UN fatalities relative to UN peacekeepers deployed), these findings change. Overall UN fatality ratios are trending sharply downward, whether calculated at the national contingent, UN mission, or global level. The only exception to this trend is fatality ratios due to illness: at the national contingent and global level, these illness-related fatality ratios are increasing, though the increase is not statistically significant.

The deaths of 195 peacekeepers in only four years (2013-17) due to “malicious acts” steered yet another review of the subject. In January 2018,
the UN released its "Cruz Report" which argues that “a lack of leadership and a reluctance to move aggressively against potential attackers are responsible for the worst spate of United Nations peacekeeping fatalities in the organization’s history.” The report identified four broad areas where the UN "must take actions to reduce fatalities”:

1. Increase personnel awareness of the risks and empower them “to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks”;
2. Equip and train personnel “to operate in high-threat environments”;
3. Achieve a “threat sensitive mission footprint,” aligning mission mandates to limit threat exposure; and
4. Ensure leadership accountability to prevent fatalities and injuries.

While many observers applauded the report for its candor, critics highlighted that the report “explicitly sidesteps the fundamental discussion of whether peacekeeping should deploy to such dangerous and problematic environments in the first place.” The International Peace Institute's Global Observatory summarized criticism as follows:

The report is correct that UN peacekeepers have died because of deficiencies in training, equipment, and performance. But this ignores the underlying political issue, which is the UN Security Council’s decision to deploy peacekeepers into high-risk environments and to take on specific spoilers. Nor does the report tackle the politics of why and whether the UN should authorize such operations with mandates to degrade specific spoilers or support the consolidation of weak and sometimes illegitimate governments. On the other hand, it does call for updating the basic principles of UN peacekeeping, but does not clarify how.

A review of the deceased peacekeepers’ nationalities provides additional insight to UN peacekeeper fatalities—and, by extension, all UN peacekeeper casualties. As of January 31, 2018, the largest number of fatalities from any geo-regional groups were African, with almost 1,500 peacekeeper deaths to date, or nearly 40% of the total. Asia and Europe reflect almost one-quarter each of the peacekeeper deaths to date. However, most of the European fatalities occurred in the earlier decades of UN peacekeeping history, while most of the Asian fatalities are from the most recent decades. The Americas account for less than 400 of the total fatalities to date. Of that number, 76 were U.S. personnel, and 30 of those fatalities occurred during UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

For the purpose of this Estimate, T/PCCs are grouped in accordance with the UN's Geoscheme, which was designed "to classify countries into regional and subregional groups." Formulated by the UN's Statistics Division (UNSD), it does not account for any political, social, economic, or ethnic identifications. The geo-regional groups are: Africa (the entire continent); the Americas (from North to South); Asia (including the countries commonly referred to as "the Middle East"); Europe (including Russia and Turkey); and Oceania (which includes Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and other island countries).

While this number-based fatalities review does not consider other factors, such as density of deployed personnel by nationality, it does illustrate some concerns regarding “burden-sharing.” In the simplest calculation, it appears the African countries’ troop and police contributions—and, thus, their fatalities—are much greater in comparison to the contributions from the other geo-regions. However, that assessment does not take into account any country’s myriad of reasons to contribute personnel to a UN peacekeeping mission, from the intangible (“a responsible stakeholder on international peace and security”) to a tangible number of “country-specific benefits.” Specific to African casualties, other

There does not appear to be a common definition of the phrase “burden-sharing.” In some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) parlance, it has been defined it as "the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal.”
observers have noted “...that African troops have been deployed to more risky areas and taken on more offensive military tasks, often without the necessary training and equipment for self-protection...”

**Situation**

5. Significant Events

a. Recent Events.

- **September 2017.** UN published an update of Peacekeeping Reform.
- **October 2017.** The Secretary-General’s completes the “Report on Restructuring of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar.”
- **December 2017.** The Security Council President’s provides a “Statement on UN Peacekeeping Operations.”
- **January 2018.** UN releases "The Cruz Report," also known as “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business” (December 2017).
- **March 2018.** The UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations approved its draft Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

b. Upcoming Events.

- **March 2018.** Security Council will have an open debate regarding “Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations” in order “to discuss how to reform peacekeeping operations to make them respond better to challenges on the ground.”

6. DOTMLPF-P. DOTMLPF-P is the Department of Defense (DoD) acronym that pertains to eight elements involved in solving mission capability gaps.

a. Doctrine. Doctrine, for the purpose of this estimate, refers to the standardization of procedures and training in the preparation for and conduct of mission operations. Since the early 2000s, the UN had made great strides in developing “doctrine” in the form of manuals and guides, although some training (especially leadership, professional ethics, and standards of conduct) remains non-standard.

[Note: The UN peacekeeping resource website is not current. The most recent list of handbooks and guides is dated 2013. The most recent annual “Year in Review” posted on the website is dated 2012. See [http://dag.un.org/](http://dag.un.org/) for full list; may require special permissions to access.]

b. Organization. Each peacekeeping or SPM mission is configured uniquely, depending on the mandate’s tasks and the operational environment. There is an increasing use of mission-specific Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) and Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) in support of missions.
One example of a mission organization is as follows:

Current organization at the UN Headquarters is as depicted here:

**c. Training.** The UN’s peacekeeping curriculum is provided by the Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET) with its units: Policy and Best Practices Service, the Integrated Training Service, and the Evaluation and Partnerships Units. In 2013, further assessment identified additional training needs for mission personnel, service centers, and at the UN Headquarters. Many manuals, training programs, and other training resources are available both on line and with physical delivery.

The UN standards for pre-deployment training (PDT) is encapsulated in its Guidelines on Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions (December 2016). However, Member States remain ultimately responsible for the PDT to all their personnel provided to peacekeeping operations, to include conduct and discipline education. They are also the certifying authorities for their own units/personnel. Consequently, while PDT
curriculum is based on UN peacekeeping pre-deployment training standards and materials, there are currently limited mechanisms to ensure that is the case or to ensure the quality and quantity of topics are met as intended.

Staff training is outlined in the UN’s guide dated October 2017. It addresses topics that reflect common mission operational challenges and/or unique mission situational concerns. There is ongoing discussion to have specialized training for mission senior leaders, that but it is not yet mandated.

An additional task for UN peacekeeping training is the recruitment and inclusion of women members. With some targeted funding, training for policewomen continues.

d. Materiel (and Financial). The UN supplies its missions and field operations by use of the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) system—originally adopted in 1996—in which countries are reimbursed for providing equipment, personnel and self-sustaining support services. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UN and the T/PCC serves as the basis of the equipping agreement, with rates of reimbursement reviewed every three years by a COE Working Group (an extension of the General Assembly). The current system was revised in the Letter dated 8 February 2017 from the Chair of the 2017 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment to the Chair of the Fifth Committee (February 2017) and outlined in the updated Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) (August 2017).

The COE manual also describes the reimbursement as “wet” or “dry” lease arrangements. As defined:

A wet lease arrangement is a reimbursement system for contingent-owned equipment whereby the troop/police contributor assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The troop/police contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this maintenance support; (whereas)

A dry lease arrangement is a reimbursement system for contingent-owned equipment whereby the troop/police contributor provides equipment to a peacekeeping mission and the United Nations either assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment or arranges with a third party for maintenance of the equipment.

There are two major drawbacks to the COE system. First, reimbursement to the T/PCCs is slow (or non-existent), hampered by both incomplete or vague MOUs and inaccurate accounting of equipment and
supplies in actual use. Second, the majority of T/PCCs cannot provide the sophisticated equipment and technology much needed in support of most missions, such as medical, aviation, and intelligence assets.

The UN’s DFS provides the field support for all missions and operational entities, with offices throughout the globe.

In April 2016, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations met to discuss ways that technological improvements can enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers, strengthen communications within missions, improve situational awareness, reduce the environmental impact of peacekeeping operations, while ensuring confidential and secure management of information within peacekeeping operations. One observation suggested the drop in available high-tech, robust equipment corresponded with the decreasing share of Western countries’ participation in UN missions. If the relationship between Western nations’ mission participation and use of high tech equipment is correct, it also reinforces some enduring concerns and resentments between less-affluent (in this example, “non-Western”) countries and the West—which is also perceived as the traditional colonial powers. When only the Western countries have the technology, especially in the intelligence arena, then there may exist a lack of trust between the non-Western countries that serve as peacekeeping partners as well as the non-Western nations that are often the host for peacekeeping missions.

The UN finances its missions as one of the UN’s four main financial categories (the four categories are: regular (operating) budget, peacekeeping operations, international tribunals, and the Capital Master Plan), as approved by the General Assembly. Peacekeeping activities are tracked in a fiscal year (1 July to 30 June) offset from other categories, complicating budget assessments. In addition, mandate periods are issued uniquely throughout the year. The UN’s approved budget for peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 1 July
2017-30 June 2018 is $6.8 billion, which represents an average of 7.5% reduction against the approved budget for 2016-17. (This is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures.)

e. Leadership. Leaders of the top positions in the UN and its directorates are generally found from career UN personnel. As an exception, the current Secretary-General, António Guterres (Portugal), is the first Socialist former head of government to hold the top UN post, and the first who was the chief executive of his country (as Portugal’s prime minister from 1995-2002). However, he also served as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2005-2015). The recent selection process was intended to be more transparent and more consultative with the member states. The candidates participated in public debates that were globally televised. The member states conducted several “straw polls” to arrive at a consensus.

In peace operations missions, the T/PCC with the largest contingent of personnel assigned to the peacekeeping mission is often, but not always, the provider of the Force Commander and/or Police Commissioner. This usual practice essentially precludes experienced personnel from the smaller T/PCC contingents from achieving senior mission leadership status.

The Secretary-General considers nominations and is normally the appointment authority for those positions and the senior civilian staff. DPKO and the DFS are responsible for staffing the remaining civilian components of a peacekeeping operation. The Head of Mission, also appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, is usually a Special Representative.

Improving the “life cycle” (from selection through training to replacement) of UN peacekeeping mission leaders has been part of the ongoing UN reforms. One report (2017) submitted:

…a number of factors can be identified that currently undermine the leadership agenda including: i) the lack of a consistent application of existing merit-based selection processes; ii) the challenge of finding candidates with both political and managerial skill sets; iii) weak gender and geographic representation among senior mission leaders; iv) poor induction and continued support for newly appointed senior mission leaders; v) weak performance management and accountability systems; and vi) failure to grow the capacity of those with leadership potential.

The report provided several recommendations, to include (but not limited to), “diversify the candidate pool and institutional memory with regards to senior mission leadership appointments…(by) catching of potential leaders already in the system” and “become better at holding (the leaders) to account through robust performance management systems.”

In recent years, the Secretary-General has invoked the right to remove mission leaders that are operationally ineffective or negligent in discipline of mission personnel, but that remains a rare occurrence.

f. Personnel. As of January 2018, there are 124 countries that contribute uniformed personnel to peacekeeping missions, in contingents as small as one person—and as large as a few thousand. One area of overall uniformed capacity growth is in the employment of women. Gender parity amongst UN staff is a priority for the UN Secretary-General. In the field, women are currently less than 5% of the uniformed personnel, while 22% of the civilian staff. Despite the small representation, women have an outsized impact on peace operations, particularly for assisting the most helpless of the population.
The **DPKO-DFS Gender Forward Looking Strategy (2014-2018)** outlines the vision and the campaign towards greater inclusion of **women** in both the peacekeeping and the field support of UN missions.

UN peacekeepers’ misconduct—from the minor discipline infractions to the major categories of fraud and sexual abuse and murder—is not a new phenomenon. As an example, in 1993, UN peacekeepers (Canada and Belgium) **abused and murdered local civilians**—to include children. In addition, fraud and theft has been a recurring concern throughout the history of UN peacekeeping missions. Yet, the past decade brought forth a significant increase in both number and **nature** of peacekeeper misconduct allegations. While the increase in allegations may be correlated to the significant increase in deployed personnel, such correlation does not reduce the detrimental impact to UN peace operations when “protectors” become “predators”.

**According to the UN**, its “Standards of Conduct” apply to all categories of deployed personnel and are based on three key principles:

1. Highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity;
2. Zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse; and
3. Accountability of those in command and/or leadership who fail to enforce the standards.

The United Nations has a three-pronged strategy to address misconduct: prevention of misconduct, enforcement of UN standards of conduct, and remedial action. The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) is part of the DFS and provides overall direction to peacekeeping operations and SPMs. Most peacekeeping missions and many SPMs have a **Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT)** as part of the mission or region staff. (Some field missions have only a “focal point.”) The teams or focal point are responsible for training personnel, developing outreach to host countries’ populations, advise the Heads of Missions, and receive/assess/and track misconduct allegations. They also coordinate for victim assistance. They do not conduct investigations. Instead, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) or investigative entities in the mission, including the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), Military Police, United Nations Police and ad-hoc panels, may conduct investigations. Since military contingent members “remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of their national government...The responsibility for investigating an allegation of misconduct and taking subsequent disciplinary action rests with the troop-contributing country...” In February 2018, the UN announced its **24-hour helpline for UN staff to report allegations of sexual harassment**.

**Uniformed peacekeeping personnel** have carried pocket cards of the **Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets** since 1998—or, for 20 years. Since 2017, an open accounting of misconduct allegations has been available on a **publicly-accessible database**. The database separates misconduct into two areas: Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA) and Other Misconduct. The “Other” is further divided into two categories (1 or 2) based on severity of the misconduct. While the data may be sorted by category of personnel and/or mission and/or year (since 2007), it does not always include nationality of the alleged perpetrators.
The UN's "other misconduct" database provides statistics since the past decade. In that period, the 2008 was the year with the largest number of "other misconduct" allegations (1,778, of which only 14% were category 1—the most severe). There are 19 “other misconduct” allegations (all category 2) thus far in 2018.

The UN’s Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) database also tracks statistics since 2007, to include by nationality (when known) since 2015. According to this database, there were 834 SEA allegations from 2007-2016, averaging 83 per year. Another 62 SEA allegations were recorded in 2017. There are eight allegations thus far in 2018, with 15 perpetrators charged. With the exception of 2012, the majority of alleged perpetrators each year were uniformed personnel.

Paternity claims are increasing each year, perhaps due to the UN’s outreach to victims. Fifty-six claims were recorded for 2017. There are already four claims for 2018.

g. Facilities. Facilities for UN peacekeeping missions are not standard, with issues of sub-standard security, building materials, sanitation, and hazardous waste management. The Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016 substantive session (New York, 16 February-11 March 2016), stressed the importance for implementing sound environmental practices to reduce the mission footprint. The Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2017 substantive session (New York, 21 February-17 March 2017) acknowledged some improvements in those areas, but also emphasized the “important role of troop-contributing and police-contributing countries in providing for the welfare and recreation of contingent personnel and believes that the provision of facilities relating to welfare and recreation should be adequately prioritized during the establishment of peacekeeping missions.”

The UN does its own inspections of facilities and provides reports intended to highlight issues and give recommendations. However, it is not certain how much credence is given to the reports, or how much scope the UN has in improving the facility conditions, given its small mission budgets and general dependence on the resources of the host-country.

Given the international attention to the cholera outbreak in Haiti (2010-2017)—which was reportedly due to poor sanitation conditions in the UN peacekeeper camps—it is prudent for the UN to attend to the details in these reports and fund and adjust accordingly.
h. Policy. The past decade saw the publication of several manuals, directives, and guidelines. These documents are intended to standardize the UN’s routine business and its missions—from medical, logistics, and operations (to include policing), to human rights, gender equity, protection of civilians, and other concepts.

7. Ongoing Issues. There have been several reviews and studies regarding the issues for UN peacekeeping, addressing a wide array of topics and trends. The UN self-reports the following as issues for UN peacekeeping:

- Military
- Police
- Civil affairs
- Rule of law
- Electoral assistance
- Security Sector Reform
- Mine action
- Gender and peacekeeping
- Field support
- Conduct and discipline
- Protection of civilians
- Environment and sustainability
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
- Children in conflict
- Human rights

Other issues include:

Ineffectiveness and Inefficiency. There are many studies and arguments both commending—and condemning—the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations. While a 2016 Gallup survey found just 38 percent of respondents judge the UN as effective, the survey did not further describe any actions or activities on which the effectiveness determination was based.

At its most basic, the cost per uniformed member of the current UN peacekeeping missions is extraordinarily economical, as compared to the cost of most European or North American unilateral interventions. The UN pays T/PCCs $1,410 per month per soldier, an amount intended to cover monthly salaries, equipping and training costs, and a portion of the missions’ facilities (depending on mission and agreements). This amount is substantially lower than the average monthly salary ($8,000) of U.S. soldiers (which includes non-cash compensation, such as benefits).

Expanding on this theme, a February 2018 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Officer (GAO) compared the costs of a current UN mission (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, or MINUSCA) to a hypothetical U.S. operation in the same area and with the same tasks. In this comparison, the GAO estimated that the same mission “would have cost the U.S. more than twice as much.” However, the GAO also acknowledged that the U.S.-provided technology, equipment, and facilities would not be sufficient to sustain a UN peacekeeping mission.

**UN peacekeepers are not paid directly by the UN. Instead, each T/PCC pays their uniformed personnel some amount based on their own pay scales—if they are paid at all. As example, recent news reports highlight allegations of internal T/PCC corruption and theft of some Nigerian peacekeeper allowances by their own officers.**

The GAO published a similar result in their February 2006 report, comparing the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to a hypothetical U.S. operation.
have contributed to part of the cost increase. Further, the report concludes that “while U.S. peacekeeping operations would have greater military capability, the UN would have greater international acceptance.”

The economic advantages of UN peacekeeping operations as compared to U.S. unilateral operations only addresses one aspect of effectiveness and efficiency. Another aspect to consider is the supply and support processes, which are subject to "arcane and cumbersome tools" of the UN’s Department of Management. In addition, when logistical support actually reaches the mission, it can be a target for fraud, theft, and corruption throughout the supply system.

While certainly not a new concern, one of first serious allegations of UN peacekeeping mission bribery occurred in 2007, when a UN Task Force submitted reports “charging that corruption has spread from U.N. headquarters…to the far reaches of its growing peacekeeping efforts.” Further, the reports highlighted the UN’s “repeated failure to take action against officials long suspected of wrongdoing, allowing them to carry out criminal schemes in one U.N. mission after another.”

In the decade since those reports, the UN established additional processes and staff training to eliminate corruption and ensure accountability at all levels. Yet, much more needs to be done, as demonstrated by a 2017 report which indicated “UN-backed peacekeepers have lost enough guns and ammunition in sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades to arm an army.” While some of the losses were determined to be “unavoidable”:

There have been many hushed-up cases of peacekeepers handing over weapons to rebels rather than risk a shoot-out, of failing to guard caches properly, or uncovering rebel groups’ arsenals and selling them on the black market...

At its most complex, the determination of peacekeeping effectiveness and efficiency can be described in terms of successful completion of mandate tasks (mission performance) and/or sustainable peace (post-conflict quality of life). As advanced in a 2017 study of peacekeeping operations’ effectiveness:

...peacekeeping is deemed successful or effective according to whether it curbs conflict in several dimensions. Each mission, however, is deployed in different contexts and operates under variable conditions that affect the operation’s capacity to influence conflict...If effectiveness is a function of a mission’s mandate, then there are as many standards as there are types of mandates...Researchers are just beginning to focus on the long-term impacts of peacekeeping. Instead, evaluations of peacekeeping are framed in relation to absence of violence (negative peace) rather than building peaceful societies (positive peace).

Given that over a third of UN peacekeeping operations today were originally deployed before the end of the Cold War, one could decide that those missions are ineffective. On the other hand, the relative non-violence (negative peace) in those particular missions’ areas indicate they are successfully accomplishing their few mandated tasks—essentially observation of cease-fires and borders. Other research points out that peacekeeping missions “typically reduces the numbers of civilians killed by more than 90 percent, compared to before the deployment.”
Considering post-conflict quality of life (positive peace), the research is divided on peacekeeping operations’ effectiveness. As examples, the host population's health care (quantity and quality) is often improved through the auspices of a peacekeeping mission—directly, or indirectly through facilitation of access to other humanitarian actors. Yet, at the same time, peacekeepers themselves can be a “health threat.” Peacekeepers may directly contribute to local population educational opportunities, yet not improve literacy rates. One study of peacekeeping operations effect on host country economic development determined a 2.4% national growth rate during the first three years of a UN operation, but also the appearance of “peacekeeping economies.” Lastly, regarding political development, “the presence of peacekeepers may or may not translate to UN-led democratization.” In summary: “Peacekeeping may reduce conflict and stop wars without creating conditions that reduce risk of recurrence.

Perceptions of Partiality. While “impartiality” remains one of the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping, there is an increasing perception of peacekeeper partiality. This perception is mainly found in missions where the supported government has meager legitimacy in the eyes of the population or, conversely, when the host country government is obdurate and only grudgingly grants consent for the mission.

Also contributing to the perception of peacekeeper partiality is the “regionalization of peace operations.” While peacekeeping regionalization is widely considered a positive trend (i.e., “African solutions for African problems”), it can also be a detriment to peace operations when regional states contribute troops “with a strong self-interest in the outcome of the conflicts they engage in...” Further, a 2015 study argued that the UN only allocates peacekeeping resources to those countries in which the Security Council members have economic interests in most (but not all) cases.

8. Selected References. References for this estimate include, but are not limited to, the following:

- The Center for International Peace Operations (Zif), Background Paper, Making Reform Reality (April 2016)
- Challenges Forum, Strengthening the Selection Preparation Support and Appraisal of Senior Leadership in UN Peace Operations (April 2017)
- Clingendael Report, Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform (October 2017)
- The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Blessed are the Peacekeepers? (2017)
- Global Peace Operations Review, Fixing UN Peacekeeping Operations (May 2016)
- Global Observatory, Cruz Report Peacekeeping Trilemma (February 2018)
- Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations (September 2017)
- Security Council Reports, Research
- UN Peacekeeping Resources and Reports