MINUSCA Deployment Map (October 2017)

MINUSCA/UNOCA Executive Summary

Although the 2016 elections were peaceful and President Faustin Archange Touadéra’s new government was confirmed, Central African Republic (CAR) remains one of the ten “most fragile” states, ranking third on the 2017 index. Almost two years since the installation of the new government, and over three years after its activation, MINUSCA is still struggling to have a significant impact on the situation. In October 2017, the UN Secretary General reported:
The political context continued to be marred by an upsurge in violence that began in May, contributing to a deterioration in the security situation throughout much of the country. Criticism of the Government became more pronounced, and several opposition figures openly challenged the leadership of the President, Faustin Archange Touadera, portraying the Government as incapable of ensuring stability. Some political and civil society actors criticized MINUSCA for not forcibly disarming armed groups, calling for the rearmament of the unreformed national armed forces. Rising divisive rhetoric, employed by some national actors, contributed to an increase in sectarian tensions, especially in the south-east, where Muslims in general, particularly Fulani, were targeted. Attacks were carried out along ethnic and confessional lines by increasingly fractured and unorganized armed actors loosely affiliated with anti-balaka or ex-Séléka factions. Lingering strains between the executive and legislative branches of government compounded the situation.

In response to this report, the UN Security Council unanimously renewed the MINUSCA mandate until 15 November 2018 while also increasing the troop levels for the mission by 900 additional soldiers [UNSCR 2387(2017)].

Major considerations include:

- The humanitarian and human rights situation in CAR has "deteriorated significantly," according to the UN Secretary General’s October 2017 report. In August 2017, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs warned that the violence in CAR indicated “early warning signs of genocide.” The high unemployment and continued “political marginalization” of Muslims concern many observers because it creates opportunity to radicalize Muslim youth.

- MINUSCA’s forces continue to have difficulty influencing regions outside of Bangui because of low troop density as well as a problematic reputation with the population. Allegations include: "partiality" (particularly among the UN’s Muslim contingents); sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA); corruption; and various other undisciplined behaviors. At the same time, some observers criticize MINUSCA for its passive self-protection posture rather than conducting an aggressive campaign against the armed groups: “They are in the countryside, but they do nothing…except harass our women!” Yet, despite its failings, most observers agree that MINUSCA is “the only semblance of governance and security in CAR.”

- While Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) groups’ violence continues to decrease, the most recent attacks (summer and fall 2017) are within the CAR. The October 2016 withdrawal of the French forces and the reduction in Ugandan forces in the region—all deployed separately from MINUSCA to “fix and fight” the LRA and other de-stabilizing armed groups—created additional security voids. Sectarian violence and crime committed by ex-Séléka, anti-balaka, and other armed groups continues. According to the Secretary General’s October report, MINUSCA elements have "exchanged fire with Anti-balaka [sic] forces on 29 occasions…between June and 1 October.” Other peacekeepers were killed in attacks in November and December 2017. This prevents progress across all sectors and poses challenges to conflict resolutions in neighboring South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Mission Overview

1. Background. The UN has several decades of history in CAR engagement missions, both peacekeeping and political. The first such mission was the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) (from the French name, Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine). It was established by UNSCR 1159(1998) as a 1350-troop force. After two peaceful elections, it was replaced in 2000 with the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

In 2007, BONUCA was still in CAR when the UN authorized a multidimensional mission called the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). MINURCAT’s mandate was in response to the ongoing violence in Darfur (a state of affairs that also led to the establishment of the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID). Given the estimated 230,000 Darfur refugees flowing into eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR, and the corresponding cross-border attacks by armed Sudanese rebel groups, a European Union (EU) force was swiftly put in place (the EUFOR Chad/CAR) to serve as a “bridge” until MINURCAT was fully operationalized. EUFOR Chad/CAR, which was comprised of approximately 3,000 soldiers, operated from 2007 until March 2009. At that point, the MINURCAT force of less than 500 police and military personnel were in place in both Chad and CAR. At the same time, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), another political mission, replaced BONUCA.

In 2010, the UN did not reauthorize MINURCAT, leaving the political mission, BINUCA, to operate alone in CAR. In March 2013, a rebel Muslim coalition known as the Séléka (“coalition”) upset the government. Conflict escalated between the Séléka and a predominantly Christian movement known as the “anti-balaka” (“anti-machete”). UNSCR 2121(2013) strengthened BINUCA’s mandate, but it was not able to deter or mitigate the ongoing violence. By December 2013, the situation devolved to the point that the UN authorized an African-led Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite Africaine, or MISCA (also known as “International Support Mission in the CAR”) with UNSCR 2127(2013). Near-simultaneously, the French deployed troops in Operation Sangaris. In July 2014, mediation efforts supported by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) resulted in the signing of the Brazzaville Cease-fire Agreement. In September 2014, MINUSCA subsumed both BINUCA and MISCA with UNSCR 2149(2014).

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is a Special Political Mission, headquartered in Gabon, with a regional mandate to help prevent conflict and consolidate peace in Central Africa. It was established through an “exchange of letters” in March 2011 and it coordinated the UN’s support for the operationalization of the African Union (AU)-led Regional Cooperative Initiative for the elimination of the LRA and the African Union Regional Task Force (AURTF) (which was withdrawn in 2016). UNOCA is also the Secretariat to the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Issues in Central Africa (UNSAC). The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is also conducting operations in CAR, and works in concert with MINUSCA to dispose of ammunition and explosive devices and provide mine-avoidance education.

2. Mandate(s). On 17 November 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously renewed the MINUSCA mandate until 15 November 2018 while also increasing the troop levels for the mission by 900 additional soldiers “to provide greater capabilities in protecting civilians and other mandated tasks” [UNSCR 2387(2017)]. Specific “greater capabilities” include mobility and “data-gathering.” The authorization for French forces to act in support of MINUSCA was also renewed, even though the French Operation Sangaris officially ended over one year ago.

French soldiers are still in Central Africa as part of the EU Training Mission (EUTM) and are in MINUSCA.
The 2016 MINUSCA strategic review emphasized three main pillars: Political (supporting government dialogue with armed groups, addressing the root causes of the conflict, and establishing state authority); Security (emphasis on protection of civilians, and support for security sector reform, or SSR, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and DDR programs); and Justice and Reconciliation. The current mandate version retains three pillars, but with modifications: Political process; Human rights, including child protection and sexual violence in conflict; and Peacekeeping Operation.

The renewed mandate also maintains the taxonomy of “priority” tasks, but discontinues the use of the phrase “core priority tasks.” The priority tasks are identified as: Protection of civilians; Good offices and support to the peace process (including national reconciliation, social cohesion and transitional justice); Facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance; and Protection of the United Nations.

MINUSCA is also authorized to:

- (Provide) Support for the extension of State authority, the deployment of security forces, and the preservation of territorial integrity;
- (Conduct) Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- (Conduct) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR);
- Promote and protect human rights;
- (Provide) Support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity, and the rule of law; (and)
- (Address) Illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources

In January 2017, UNSCR 2339(2017) renewed the sanctions on individuals and entities in CAR until 31 January 2018 and extended the Panel of Experts authorization. It added some new provisions, and recognized sexual violence allegations as a distinct “asset-freeze listing criterion”, the first of its kind.

The mandate of UNOCA expires on 31 August 2018. A recent UN special report points out that regional offices, such as UNOCA, are a “particularly effective innovation” and “credible though (a) discreet facilitating role in addressing emerging or incipient conflict.”

3. Deployment. The Secretary General’s October report highlighted the deployment adjustments for MINUSCA in order to “address the security vacuum in the east following the withdrawal of the African Union Regional Task Force” as well as replacing a contingent that was repatriated.

The top Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for MINUSCA are primarily from Asia and Africa and include (as of December 2017): Pakistan (1,105); Egypt (995); Bangladesh (990); Rwanda (959); and Zambia (929). Other major troop contributors are: Morocco (756); Cameroon (750); Burundi (748); and Mauritania (744). The largest of the European contingents is Portugal’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of 159 troops. The largest of the American contingents is Peru’s engineering unit of 204 troops. The U.S. has only eight troops deployed to MINUSCA.

Women comprise just over 2% of the total military force and are nearly 8% of the total police force.

Authorized Strength:
11,650 military personnel, including
480 military observers and military staff officers
2,080 police personnel and
108 corrections officers
An appropriate significant civilian component

In early December 2017, Brazil announced the future deployment of 750 troops to MINUSCA (there are currently three military members deployed there). Brazil concluded its activities in the UN’s MINUSTAH (Haiti) in October 2017. It currently has 250 personnel in various UN missions, but its largest contribution currently is just over 200 troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
The largest of the Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) is Rwanda (416). While the Rwandan police peacekeepers have been commended for their professionalism and inclusion of women police officers, they are also alleged to have individuals that participated in sexual assault. In the summer of 2017, the UN demanded the repatriation of the entire military contingent (but not the police contingent) from the Republic of Congo, after the Force Commander conducted a review of its performance and behavior:

The review of the deployment of uniformed military personnel from the Republic of Congo found that the nature and extent of existing allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, in their totality, point to systemic problems in command and control. These problems have also been compounded by issues related to the preparedness, overall discipline, maintenance of contingent owned equipment, and logistical capacity of these troops.

This contingent had consisted of more than 600 troops. In 2016, 120 troops from the same contingent were repatriated for similar reasons.

In 2015, the UN’s Independent Review identified other peacekeeping contingents for similar illegal behaviors, the largest of which include: Morocco, the Congo, Burundi, and Cameroon.

5. Casualties. Often attributed as one of the “most dangerous” of the UN’s current peacekeeping missions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (and Head of MINUSCA) Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon) recently observed:

In some places we have a peace to keep. Here we have no peace to keep. Groups are not only fighting each other, but they are fighting us. This place has become the most dangerous for peacekeepers – we lost [13] just this year. It’s also the most dangerous place for humanitarian workers ... It’s just a brutal war ... It’s just inhumane...Some of our soldiers were killed in a way that is so awful, cut in pieces, savagely. There’s no safe haven any more. These groups are violating hospitals, violating humanitarian space, going into schools and hospitals to kill people, it’s very brutal.

Although MINUSCA’s own website indicates 73 fatalities since 2014, the UN’s monthly report for October 2017 indicates only 56 fatalities for MINUSCA in the same time period. (The remainder of this analysis is based on the lower number.)

Over 48% of the fatalities are attributable to “malicious acts.” Of that number, just over 30% (or 17) of the total fatalities occurred in 2015, the Mission’s first full year of operations. The second year, 2016, saw a slight decrease in fatalities with 14 (or 25% of the mission’s total fatalities to date). There has been a sharp increase in fatalities, however, for 2017. In just under one year, there are already 23 fatalities (over 40% of the total). Over half of these 23 fatalities were due to malicious acts (14), which makes 2017 the “most deadly” year of the mission thus far.

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The UN Development Program, Malicious Acts Insurance Policy, February 4, 2003, defines “malicious acts” as fatalities as a result of “war; invasion; hostilities; acts of foreign enemies, whether war be declared or not; civil war; revolution; rebellion; insurrection; military or usurped power; riots or civil commotion; sabotage; explosion of war weapons; or terrorist activities.” In contrast, “accidents” is defined to include “stray bullets, friendly fire, and road accidents” and other incidents, such as natural disasters.

Additionally, the October 2017 statistics does not include the peacekeepers’ deaths due to attacks in both November and December 2017.

In May 2017, anti-balaka groups killed six peacekeepers, making it the deadliest month in MINUSCA’s three year history.
Of the T/PCCs, Rwanda and Morocco have each suffered over 16% of MINUSCA’S total fatalities to date. Burundi, Cambodia, and Cameroon have each suffered between 9-12% of the total. Of course, none of these numbers account for other Central Africa military engagements, such as the French army fatalities and casualties in Operation Sangaris; or the Ugandan casualties engendered in their operations against the LRA. Nor do they include the fatalities from either MINURCA (2) or MINURCAT (9).

**Situation**

5. Drivers of Conflict. There has been an alarming increase in violence since democratically elected President Faustin Archange Touadéra took office, in contrast to the relative calm of the election period. There are many reasons for this escalation, but four explanations appear significant. First, the proliferation of armed groups in itself, coupled with the ease of arms acquisition, makes it difficult to address all discontented organizations comprehensively through either political or security methods. Second, the new government appears to be comprised of many—if not most—officials that had served in the pre-2013 government. This creates disgruntlement among the armed groups that participated in the overthrow of the same government only three years ago. Third, some observers suggest the government’s failure to satisfy the armed groups’ demands for amnesty and political inclusion motivates continued violence. Finally, the pre-election (and previous years) intercommunal violence between Christians and Muslims continues in reprisal form while efforts to reform the national army are inadequate.

Meanwhile, “divergent agendas, institutional rivalries and differing approaches have led these various actors to propose remedies that are at times contradictory, especially concerning amnesty of rebel leaders, the integration of combatants into the army or the return of former presidents.”

Underlying all the above is a continual conflict regarding land and water rights; determination of citizenship; the general lawlessness of numerous armed criminal groups, to include poaching and smuggling; and the pervasive poverty of a population in crisis.

6. Significant Events.

a. Recent Events.

- **4 December 2017.** An anti-balaka group attacked a UN police checkpoint at the gates to an IDP encampment, which killed a peacekeeper from Mauritania and wounded three others.
- **27 November 17.** UN Security Council condemned an attack on MINUSCA on 26 November 17, which killed one Egyptian peacekeeper and injured three others.
- **15 November 17.** UN Security Council adopted a resolution [2387(2107)], renewing the mandate of MINUSCA until 15 November 2018.
- **21 August 17.** Anti-balaka faction of Maxime Mokom stated that it would take “necessary action if MINUSCA did not expel foreign mercenaries” from the country. The declaration was publicly condemned by the Government.
- **August 17.** The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien highlighted indicators of “early warning signs of genocide” in CAR.
- **23 and 25 July 17.** Anti-balaka elements attacked a MINUSCA convoy, killing three peacekeepers and injuring four others.
21 July 17. 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee met on 21 July to discuss the six-monthly report of the committee’s Panel of Experts.

19 July 17. The AU announced adoption of a new “Roadmap for Peace and National Reconciliation.” It was intended to “promote dialogue between the CAR government and the armed groups, as well as members of the DDRR Advisory and Monitoring Committee” and it referred to the Sant’Egidio efforts as well.

21 June 2017. European Union (EU) held a round table in Brussels, aiming to relaunch a coherent and credible international mediation.

13 June 17. François Loucény Fall, the Special Representative and head of UNOCA, warned:

…that the “continued threat of the [LRA] to regional stability should not be underestimated” in light of the withdrawal of Ugandan and South Sudanese forces from the AU Regional Task Force, along with US special forces. He added that he was concerned about the LRA possibly exploiting the security vacuum created by the disengagement of the forces.

June 2017. The Roman Catholic Sant’Egidio peace group mediated a peace accord in Rome between the CAR government and “13 of the 14 armed groups in the country.” The accord called “for an immediate end to hostilities and recognition of the results of last year’s presidential elections.” However, subsequent violence suggested the accord was not successful.

17 May 17. The 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee approved targeted sanctions against a former Minister identified as “engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR”.

10 and 15 May 17. UN Security Council condemned the anti-balaka attacks on 9 and 14 May 17 that resulted in the deaths of five peacekeepers and the wounding of ten others.

15 February 17. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous presented the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in the CAR.

2 February 2017. MINUSCA and UNOCA representatives called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities between FPRC (Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique)’s coalition and UPC (Mouvement pour l’Unité et la Paix en Centrafrique)” after several clashes resulted in civilian deaths and displacement.

27 January 2017. UNSCR 2339(2017) was adopted which renews the CAR sanctions regime until 31 January 2018 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 February 2018.

January 2017. MINUSCA suffers the deaths of three peacekeepers (Bangladesh and Morocco) in separate malicious attacks.

b. Upcoming Events.

- 31 January 2018. CAR sanctions expire.
- 30 June 2018. Peacekeeping funding decisions renewed.
- 31 August 2018. UNOCA mandate expires.
Operational Environment (GPMESII)

7. Geographic. CAR is a tropical country with over 5 million people. It is slightly smaller than Texas, with hot, dry winters and hot, wet summers. A central plateau is bounded by the Bongos Mountains in the east and the Karre Mountains in the west. Rainy seasons last from June to September in the north and May to October in the south.

8. Political. CAR celebrates its independence from France on 13 August (1960). It has a presidential republic type government with a constitution adopted by referendum in December 2015. Suffrage is universal at 18 years of age. One of the most controversial issues of CAR politics is citizenship rights. At this time, citizenship is recognized only if one parent is already a recognized CAR citizen. (The residency requirement for naturalization is 35 years.) The several decades of population displacement—combined with the essential absence of functional government offices—makes citizenship determination problematic. Missing documentation—and probable ethnic and religious discrimination—leaves much of the population without inherent citizenship rights, such as voting.

CAR politics are dominated by a small number of families. The final two candidates for the presidential election had both been ranking position holders in the previous government’s cabinet. Even the candidates in the earlier voting rounds were family of previous political leaders.

Faustin Archange Touadéra, a former prime minister and math professor, was declared the winner of presidential election in February 2016. He won 62.71% of the run-off vote, campaigning as a peacemaker. The second round of the parliamentary election was held on 31 March 2016 with 17 parties winning seats, but none of them with more than 13 seats. Independent candidates won a total of 56 seats.

The election concluded a multi-year process which began after the Brazzaville Cease-fire Agreement signing in 2014. By May 2015, a national reconciliation forum (the Bangui Forum) led to a constitutional reform. That reform was approved by almost 90% of CAR citizens voting in December 2015.

Despite the peaceful presidential elections of last year, the government is still a limited presence in vast areas of the north, west, and increasingly in the east as well. The nationwide process of demobilizing and disarming militias, pledged at 2015’s reconciliation forum, had not begun prior to the 2016 presidential election. After the election, disarmament became a condition required to allow armed groups to participate in political negotiations. However, since no national-level security apparatus could secure the safety of the various armed entities and their communities, those groups delayed—or refused—to disarm. Consequently, it is one year past a peaceful election process, and political and justice-related reconciliation remains essentially non-existent.

Some observers point out “the president took on one of the hardest jobs in the world,” implying their understanding for the government’s delay in meeting the Bangui Forum’s goals. It certainly appears as if the international community is still supportive of Touadéra and his government, despite the past six months’ violence escalation in CAR. In summer 2017, the AU’s African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic was announced and touted as “the main framework for a political solution in the country under national leadership.” This framework, coupled with the UN’s renewal of the MINUSCA mandate in November 2017, are both examples of this continuing international support. However, other observers suggest that the international community should question “where the president is coming from politically” and “whether his supporters are truly committed to peace,” citing several instances where the Touadéra government may be insufficiently committed to the peace process.
9. Military/Security. The security situation in CAR remains fragile. CAR’s main security threats include non-state armed groups, unpolicing borders with neighboring countries, intercommunal conflict, and civil unrest which may increase due to unmet expectations after the recent elections. Muslim-dominated ex-Séléka and Christian anti-balaka factions still control vast parts of the country, and some of their elements have been unwilling to engage in dialogue with government authorities. The national forces are still a weak institution and are not present in vast areas of the country.

a. Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armées Centrafricaines, FACA). Prior to the 2013 crisis, successive governments weakened the FACA to mitigate coup threats and it was subsequently disintegrated along with the country’s other institutions.

When MINUSCA arrived in CAR in 2014, it began the process of building the new FACA, first by investigating the assigned soldiers to determine if any had human rights violations allegations against them. By 2016, the EU began a training program to support the development of a "modernized, effective, ethnically balanced and democratically accountable FACA." 650 soldiers finished their training by May 2017, with another 1,800 expected by the end of 2018. (One in four “former combatants and rebels” is programmed to be integrated into the army after disarmament and demobilization.)

The FACA currently numbers approximately 5,000 personnel divided between an Army, an Air Force, and paramilitary outfits. There is no navy (as CAR is land-locked) but there is one riverine patrol boat squadron. The 800-strong Presidential Guard Battalion is also known as the Special Forces for the Defense of the Democratic Institution (FORSDIR).

Not only is the military still too small in size to be a viable force, but it also lacks equipment and weapons due to the on-going arms embargo levied by the UN Security Council. However, in 2017 the U.S. provided the first disbursement of $8 million worth of nonlethal assistance (trucks and communications equipment).

b. Non-State Armed Groups. In 2014, there were two prevailing rebel groups, the Muslim-dominated ex-Séléka and the predominantly Christian anti-balaka. In the last four years, however, the rebel groups and militias have splintered into other armed factions that often target each other—despite religious commonalities. In addition, these splintered factions may also support other armed groups in alliances of convenience—despite religious differences. Few of the armed groups are inclined to permanent disarmament and reconciliation, although most of them had representatives at recent peace negotiations. In some parts of the country, local communities support neither ex-Séléka or anti-balaka armed groups, but have formed their own “self-defense” groups in lieu of government-provided security.

- Ex-Séléka (or, Séléka). “Séléka” is the Sango word for "coalition" (or “alliance” or “union”). While Séléka was not originally a religious movement, it was dominated by persons of Muslim faith. Séléka was comprised two major groups based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), but it also included the lesser known Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Two other groups based in northern CAR were considered allied with Séléka: the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) and the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR).

The Séléka overturned the CAR government in spring of 2013, committing atrocities across the country, but mostly against former government members and Christian communities. In the fall of the same year, Michel Djotodia (the installed post-rebellion president) allegedly dissolved Séléka. However, the various militia groups, then called ex-Séléka, continued their atrocities against government and Christian communities, sometimes in conjunction with Muslim herders known as the Fulani.
Today, among the various ex-Séléka groups, the most well-known are the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), consisting mostly of ethnic Peuhl, and the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). Following the election cycle, the FPRC tried to reestablish the Séléka coalition, merging with other groups such as the Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and the Assembly for the Renaissance of Central Africa (RPRC). However, the UPC refused to join them, and the groups have been in conflict with each other since then. These groups were accused of several atrocities in November 2016. In particular, many Fulani—previously aligned with some ex-Séléka groups—were killed in door-to-door assassinations by the FRPC, which had aligned itself with anti-balaka elements.

In recent months, some observers have, once again, labeled these particular armed groups as “Séléka”—dropping the “ex”—in recognition of their reemergence as a coalition.

- **Anti-balaka.** “Balaka” is the Sango word for “machete”. “Anti-Balaka” has come to mean, also, “invincible”—in part to the power allegedly bestowed by the charms that hang around the necks of most members. The anti-balaka are predominately Christian and were initially designed for self-defense against bandits and cattle raiders. However, the “anti-balaka” phrase has since become a generic term for the people resisting the ex-Séléka/ Séléka.

According to some observers:

The anti-Balaka [sic], meanwhile, have intensified their activity in the past few months…composed of a new generation of self-defense groups, even more disorganized and brutal. These acephalous groups have been clashing with ex-Séléka groups, targeting Muslim civilians, as well as UN peacekeepers. Their modus operandi has been based on the manipulation of local communities, by instilling fear of Muslims and inciting preparations for war with “foreigners.”

- **Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).** The LRA is active in the country's east, far from Bangui and the majority of MINUSCA’s operations. In spring 2017, the U.S. and Uganda forces ended their six-year long partnership to capture the group’s leader, Joseph Kony, by withdrawing approximately 2,500 Ugandan troops (although some reports suggest the number of troops was never more than 1,500 in total) and 100 U.S. Special Forces soldiers.

The partnership between Uganda and the U.S. against the LRA was known as the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF). It was intended to be 5,000 troops from South Sudan, the DRC, the CAR, and Uganda. However, the other nations either failed to provide troops, or provided only a few (such as South Sudan), or withdrew them early due to their own internal security concerns. Therefore, the resultant force was essentially a Uganda-only continent. Uganda also provided much of the funding—with U.S. assistance—as other donors did not meet their commitments.

Despite its limitations in size and funding, the AU-RTF appears to have been successful in reducing the LRA from over 2,000 in number to “less than 120 armed men,” with a corresponding decrement of the LRA’s operational territory. However, the remote eastern areas of CAR appears to be “the perfect hideaway” for the remainder of the LRA. Notwithstanding its alleged “disarray,” most of the LRA attacks against the population in the past six months—which includes kidnappings—have occurred in CAR.

- **Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational):** Organized crime exists in many forms, the most prevalent being poaching, extortion, and illegal control of the country’s natural resources. Much of the poaching and looting of CAR’s natural resources is by transnational terrorists or other armed elements, such as the LRA and even the Janjaweed militia from Sudan’s Darfur region. According to one observer: “They are involved in looting food, looting gold, diamonds, killing elephants in [Congo’s]
Garamba national park and Zemongo national park in CAR…It is a revenue stream that could keep them armed for years."

c. Other International Actors.

- **Regional Neighbors.**

  **Chad.** Chad has long sought to influence the fortunes of its southern neighbor, CAR. During the coup period of 2012-2013, then Chadian President Idriss Deby sent troops to support the Séléka-backed new government of Djotodia. Many of the CAR population still perceive their northern citizens as more “Chad” than CAR in loyalties.

  **DRC.** CAR has important historical connections to the south. For over twenty years, from its mid-1960s independence through the 1980s, two of Africa’s most notorious and flamboyant dictators, Zaire’s President Mobutu and CAR’s Emperor Bokassa, reigned over the Central African sub-region ruthlessly, while eating at each other’s table regularly as self-professed brothers.

  **South Sudan.** In the spring of 2017, South Sudan offered to assist in training the FACA, “with a view to enabling them to better contribute in the fight against the LRA.” This is an ironic offer, as the South Sudanese military forces are, themselves, in need of professionalism and training.

  **Uganda.** Uganda had between 1,500 and 2,500 troops operating in eastern CAR as part of the AU-RTF to terminate the LRA. Although Uganda withdrew from CAR because of its “mission completion,” or—depending on perspective—due to a lack of international community support for the mission, it has indicated a willingness to contribute to MINUSCA or support “capacity-building” of the FACA for “counter-LRA operations”.

- **Other International Countries.**

  **China.** While China does not provide troops to MINUSCA, it is a TCC for MINUSCO and other African peace missions. It also provided the African Union with US$100 million in military assistance for its peacekeeping operations. China certainly has significant—and increasing—business interests in Africa. Some observe that:

    In essence, China deploys peacekeeping troops because it needs to protect its multi-billion investments and numerous assets, enterprises and citizens abroad. Through its peacekeepers, Beijing can also elevate its status as a responsible stakeholder and security provider in the international community and improve operational capabilities of Chinese military and police forces.

  **France.** In October 2016, France ended a three-year military peacekeeping operation, called Operation Sangaris. France’s presence in the country, which eventually grew to 2,500 soldiers, provided a stabilizing force and enabled Samba-Panza’s transitional government to take over from Djotodia, who had been incapable of asserting his government's rule. France still has some forces in CAR.

  **Russia.** Russia may be re-emerging as an important relationship for CAR. As the President Touadéra stated in 2016: “We have very good relations with Russia…But we’d like our relationship to become more robust to increase cooperation because we used to have very good cultural ties in the past in terms of educating students and teachers.”

- **Other International Organizations.** There are many other international agencies operating in CAR, beyond those of the UN. Some examples are:
European Union (EU). Since 2014, the EU has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to CAR, in addition to launching the EUFOR RCA, a military operation to help restore stability to CAR. The EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) assists CAR with security sector reform and still conducts a military training mission designed to “reform the FACA into multi-ethnic, professional, and representative armed forces.” In the summer of 2017, the EU held a round table in Brussels, aiming to relaunch a coherent and credible international mediation for CAR.

African Union (AU). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, at its May 2017 meeting, renewed the mandate of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA, which was one of the authorization sources for the AU-RTF), despite the withdrawal of the Ugandan and U.S. forces. It acknowledged, in part:

…the LRA has not yet been eliminated and still maintains the potential to rejuvenate itself, particularly, if the security vacuum following the withdrawal of the Ugandan People’s Defence [sic] Forces (UPDF) and the US Special Forces is not urgently filled, and…Reiterates its deep concern over the continued criminal activities of the LRA, as well as over the negative impact of those conducted by CAR armed groups, notably the ex-Seleka [sic] (Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic or FPRC, and l’Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique or UPC),and Anti-Balaka [sic], which undermine the peace process in that country and cause displacement of civilians, loss of lives and destruction of property, in the same theatre of LRA operations. In this regard, Council reaffirms its commitment to the elimination the LRA and all negative forces operating in the region, as well as to stabilize areas affected by the activities of this terrorist group…(therefore) Decides to renew the mandate of the RCI-LRA for further twelve (12) months until 22 May 2018, taking into account the need to realign the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the RTF with the latest developments on the ground, mainly the withdrawal of the UPDF and US Special Forces…

It is not yet clear how the CONOPs for the RCI-LRA—or the funding for it—has been realigned.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 2017, the AU announced adoption of a new “Roadmap for Peace and National Reconciliation,” intended to “promote dialogue between the CAR government and the armed groups, as well as members of the DDRR Advisory and Monitoring Committee.”

Roman Catholic Church. In summer 2017, the Roman Catholic Sant’ Egidio community peace group mediated an agreement in Rome between the CAR government “and 13 of the 14 armed groups.”

The accord directed acceptance of the democratically elected government, as well as “free movement of non-governmental organizations.” Unfortunately, the peace the agreement engendered did not last beyond one week before violence once again occurred.

The Sant’ Egidio group is backed by the Vatican and Italy. It also mediated the peace agreement that ended the Mozambique civil war in 1992.

10. Economic. CAR’s economy relies heavily on agriculture and natural resources. Ongoing conflict, poor infrastructure, and an unskilled workforce contribute to CAR having the world’s 175th-lowest GDP. Diamonds and lumber comprise most of CAR’s exports, but illegal economic activities are rampant including illicit mining, human trafficking, and “tax” collection by armed groups. Much of the illicit economic activity is funded by international corporations, particularly in the diamond and lumber industries. Years of insecurity will exert a heavy toll into the near future. Livestock availability is less than 50% of the pre-crisis levels, and infrastructure damaged the fishing industry to 40% of its previous capacity. The formerly lucrative cotton and coffee sectors are now essentially non-existent. Disrupted markets led to food prices
soar, resulting in purchasing power decreasing about one third in 2015. Unemployment is high and the north population is particularly marginalized.

The wildlife in CAR is in danger. According to one observer:

Commercial poaching and wildlife trafficking, committed by heavily armed groups moving across borders as well as local actors, has greatly impacted the area. Significant pressures from transboundary pastoralism and local mining were documented…(yet) The vast magnificent savanna, forests, wooded savannas, and deep rivers habitats remain largely intact with potential for recovery of wildlife populations if urgent and robust conservation security measures are taken in this strategic area...

11. Social. Sangho and French are the official languages, but the country has over 80 ethnic groups, each with their own. Approximately 15% of the population are Muslim, 25% Catholic, 25% Protestant, and 35% have indigenous beliefs. Magic and other mysticism co-exist with more formal belief systems. The country is essentially partitioned into a predominantly Christian south/west and a predominantly Muslim northeast; some factions favor a permanent separation of the two regions.

Life expectancy at birth is only 52 years, and the infant mortality rate is the third worst in the world. With 72 percent of the population under 29, youth is not just the country’s future, but its present. For too long, youth’s chief role has been as rank and file fodder for the militia groups. Now, however, new, youth-led organizations like Uru (Take Off), Association Pour la Jeunesse de Centrafrique (Association for Central African Youth) and Kode Ti Kwa (Value of Work) have emerged to give youth a positive voice and played a vocal role in the election process. Still, only one third of the population is considered literate.

a. Rule of Law. Lack of Rule of Law processes and institutions delays the improvement of the country across all its sectors. However, in November 2016, a Brussels international donors’ conference requested over US$105 million to “operationalize” the Special Criminal Court (SCC) (a ‘hybrid’ court of national and international judges and staff). The SCC was intended to bring to justice those individuals suspected of having committed crimes under international law during the conflict.

The UN’s “Mapping Report”, which highlights the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law from 2003 to 2015, provides a roadmap for the SCC. However, the SCC needs full funding and procedures to protect witnesses and to secure court personnel.

b. Humanitarian Assistance. CAR ranks 188 out of 188 countries on the UN Human Development Index. The humanitarian and human rights situation in CAR has “deteriorated significantly,” according to the UN Secretary General’s October 2017 report. An estimated 1.1 million people are food insecure, with almost 25% of children under the age of 5 underweight. Yet humanitarian activities are still underfunded, with just over 30% of 2017’s Humanitarian Response Plan financed.

Less than 25% of the total population has access to improved sanitation (compared to the 65% of the population with improved drinking sources). Consequently, the degree of risk for major infectious diseases is defined as “very high” and includes the food or waterborne diseases of bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever, as well as the water contact disease of schistosomiasis. The CAR population is also susceptible to malaria, dengue fever, and meningococcal meningitis.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) recently reported:

Violence in northwestern and southeastern Central African Republic (CAR) has increased the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by nearly 50 percent since January, bringing the total to more than 601,000 IDPs in CAR as of October 31, the UN reports.
Increasing insecurity and targeted attacks on humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel and assets continue to negatively impact relief operations across CAR. Attacks by armed actors have resulted in the death of 13 aid workers and 14 UN peacekeepers to date in 2017. In addition, insecurity prompted relief organizations to evacuate 240 aid workers from 10 villages between January and September, according to the UN.

Despite favorable agro-climatic conditions during the 2017 growing season across CAR, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization projects below-average aggregate crop production—similar to that of the previous four years—due to ongoing conflict and reductions in planted land.

c. Human Rights. Respect for human rights has long been deficient in CAR, and extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, harassment, and physical assault continue. In August 2017, the UN reported “early warning signs of a genocide” in CAR. The sexual violence against women and children is unabated, with Human Rights Watch reporting in October 2017 that armed groups in CAR "used rape and sexual slavery as a tactic of war across the country during nearly five years of conflict."

Where there is stability, it is “maintained by separation” in that many towns and communities have become homogeneous due to the displacement of either its Muslim or Christian populations.

One of the most important programs in CAR is the reintegation of child soldiers—most from the LRA—into society.

12. Information. Given the shortage of electricity, remote locations rely on word-of-mouth and messengers. Newspapers are privately owned, and their reach is limited by low literacy levels and a lack of distribution in rural areas. Around 3.4% of the population is online and approximately 20% of the population has cell phones. As in many African countries, radio stations are the most effective means to reach large segments of the population. The country has one government-controlled television station and about two dozen privately-owned radio stations. Many of them are run by religious organizations. BBC World Service (90.2 FM), Radio France Internationale and the Voice of America are available via local relays in Bangui. Radio Ndèke Luka ("bird of luck"), run by Swiss Non-Government Organization (NGO) Fondation Hirondelle, provides balanced output, and rebroadcasts international news bulletins. MINUSCA runs Guira FM, which is available in the capital and in the regions. The station is named after a tree under which differences are solved and is managed by a woman and has both Muslim and Christian members.
13. Infrastructure. There are 39 airports, two of which (Bangui and Ndole) have paved runways. Road infrastructure is poor and electricity is inadequate. There are several waterways including the Congo tributaries along the country’s southern borders. Supporting infrastructure for many sectors such as medicine and law has largely disintegrated.

Peace Operations Functions

14. Command and Control. MINUSCA leadership is as follows:

- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSCA:** Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon)
- **Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Deputy Head of MINUSCA:** Kenneth Gluck (U.S.)
- **Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in MINUSCA and UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP:** Najat Rochdi (Morocco)
- **Force Commander:** Lieutenant General Balla Keïta (Senegal)
- **Police Commissioner:** Roland Zamora (France)

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is currently headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative: François Louncény Fall (Guinea)

15. Intelligence. While MINUSCA apparently uses a “protection matrix” to identify “flashpoints” throughout the country and consider mitigation techniques, it is unclear how this process assisted (or did not assist) during the violent episodes throughout the country since late 2016 and throughout 2017.

In 2016, one observer highlighted that:

In recent years, the UN has started using a range of surveillance technologies, including unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, i.e., drones), helicopters (although this capacity is lacking in most missions30), mobile communications, geo graphic information systems (GIS), ground-based sensors, tethered balloons, satellites, and fullmotion video.31…Other kinds of aerial equipment are increasingly being used to improve force protection and security…and is already being used by the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) [emphasis added]. To date, however, missions lack the means to analyze the data collected by this equipment and often do not integrate it into operational planning.

In May 2017, the UN published its policy on “Peacekeeping Intelligence.” How—if any—of MINUSCA’s structure, equipment, and operations are aligned with this new policy is uncertain. However, the November mandate renewal indicated that the UN Security Council:

Requests the Secretary-General to take all possible steps, including through the full use of existing authorities and at his discretion, to maximize MINUSCA’s operational capacity and ability to discharge its mandate, with a specific focus on priority areas, over the entire territory of the CAR, including by using new rapidly deployable units and through enhancing MINUSCA’s personnel, mobility assets and capabilities for gathering timely, reliable and actionable information [emphasis added] on threats to civilians and the analytical tools to use it, while continuing to strengthen the performance of the Mission.

The November 2017 UN Defence [sic] Ministerial in Vancouver, Canada, highlighted:
Fragmentation across the United Nations remains a major impediment for early and effective engagement in peace and security challenges. We urge the UN Secretariat to bring greater coherency across the UN system and to operate as one, to help strengthen early warning, assessment, analysis and situational awareness, **including peacekeeping intelligence capacities** [emphasis added].

16. **Operations.** The mandate’s increase of 900 to the troop ceiling was due in large part to the UN Secretary-General’s [October 2017 report](#), which underscored MINUSCA’s needed adjustments—and additional manpower requirements—to address the withdrawal of the AU-RTF in the southeast and the corresponding increase in violence in the area:

To address the security vacuum in the east following the withdrawal of the African Union Regional Task Force, MINUSCA recalibrated its forces. An additional infantry company was deployed in Bria. The deployment of an engineering company was postponed so that the Mission could deploy an additional company in Bangui, which enabled it to dispatch additional detachments outside the city as needed. The area of responsibility of the contingent in the south-east was adjusted and its headquarters relocated from Bria to Bangassou. The special forces unit and the quick-reaction force rotated in deployment to secure the Bambari and Bangassou areas, while addressing emerging hotspots. The entire reserve of the Force Commander and parts of contingents in Bangui were redeployed to hotspots in the centre [sic] and the east. Meanwhile, a 450-strong battalion was deployed in the west to replace the repatriated contingent of the Congo.

More robust operations are required against armed groups that do not abide by ceasefire and disarmament agreements. Yet, current MINUSCA elements’ level of operating capability stress the need for additional staff and unit training by TCCs prior to deployments.

17. **Protection.**

a. **Mission Protection.** UN agencies and other aid groups are under constant risk of attack, as are MINUSCA forces that attempt to provide them protection. Violence against peacekeepers significantly increased in the past year. Not only has MINUSCA suffered peacekeeper deaths, but **13 humanitarian aid workers** were killed and another 240 had to be evacuated thus far in 2017. In addition, many **aid compounds have been looted and attacked**, which resulted in several organizations withdrawing from the country.

b. **Protection of Civilians.** In early summer 2017, an anti-balaka armed group attacked a largely Muslim district of Bangassou. **At least 1,500 people**—mostly Muslim—took shelter in a Catholic church. Most of Bangassou’s 35,000 residents fled to IDP sites or into the DRC. Dishearteningly, there are some reports that the MINUSCA peacekeepers did not intervene to protect the population. In that respect, the incident is similar to the [October 2016 Kaga-Bandoro violence](#), in which MINUSCA peacekeepers deployed outside an IDP camp allegedly did not protect the civilians under attack.

Between **6 and 10 thousand children** are being used by armed groups as child soldiers, auxiliaries, or child labor. In the spring of 2016, the UN engaged with several armed groups, **signing an agreement**, to end and prevent the recruitment and use of, and other grave violations against, children. Since the agreement was signed, 1,446 children have been separated from armed groups. On average, almost **90% of the recovered children are from anti-balaka elements; 10% from former Séléka elements.**

In the [October 2016 Kaga-Bandoro incident](#), witnesses testified “that the mostly Muslim Seleka [sic] forces, possibly with assistance from Muslim civilians, shot, stabbed, or burned to death the civilians…”
18. Sustainment. Logistical operations are critical to sustain MINUSCA units in remote locations and to support humanitarian assistance. These are challenging because of the lack of roads and other infrastructure.

MINUSCA is funded by a Special Account for the Mission for $943.77 million from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, which includes: $882.80 million for the maintenance of the Mission, $44.65 million for the support account for peacekeeping operations, $11.16 million for the United Nations Logistics Base and $5.16 million for the Regional Service Centre. (All amounts are in U.S. dollars.)

Issues and Considerations

19. Issues. The major issues confronting MINUSCA and CAR are summarized as follows:

- The humanitarian situation is dire, with over one million IDPs and refugees in other countries and a lack of essential services for most of the population.
- Violence committed by ex-Séléka, anti-balaka, and other armed groups continues and prevents progress across all sectors.
- MINUSCA’s forces have difficulty influencing regions outside of Bangui because of low troop density, difficult terrain, poor unit capability and capacity, and a lack of legitimacy and credibility.

Reports of murder, as well as sexual abuse and exploitation by soldiers under MINUSCA command, led to the leadership replacement as early as August 2015. However, the complaints against peacekeepers have not abated in the two years since then, leading to over 120 troops repatriated in 2016 and an entire battalion (Congo) returned in 2017. A December 2016 UN investigation report identified an additional 41 peacekeepers for abuse that occurred from 2014-2015, and a more recent report (September 2017) accused the UN of “egregious mishandling” of sexual misconduct allegations. Recently, the UN Security Council directed the Secretary General to address issues of “lack of effective command and control, refusal to obey orders, (and) failure to respond to attacks on civilians…”

- While the international community is still supportive of the CAR government, there may be “reasons to be concerned…starting with what it (the government) says and does not say.”

Examples of CAR governmental non-response includes: its failure to openly condemn “hate-filled narratives”; its dismissal of pending genocide concerns (the president described the warnings as “mere exaggerations”); its failure to condemn massacres or extend sympathy to victims and its continued reluctance to address citizenship criteria, a key political reconciliation point.

20. Considerations.

a. U.S. Over the past two years, the United States has provided over $500 million of humanitarian, development, and security assistance to CAR. Some observers also suggest the USG should consider facilitating a suspension or mitigation of the Kimberley Process for CAR, in order to assist the new government in acquiring capital through the sale of diamonds, although such an action may engender unfortunate consequences.

For the US military, specifically, the US government should provide or augment intelligence assets to MINUSCA. It can also participate in pre-deployment training with TCCs to gain efficiencies and respond to the training needs identified by MINUSCA.
b. UN. Many recommendations for the UN and MINUSCA are general in nature and apply to any peacekeeping operations. Included, for example, is subjecting TCCs to more training to emphasis battalion and higher staff procedures (including intelligence analysis), patrolling, medical procedures at all levels (first aid, unit aid stations, evacuation, and Level II care), standards of conduct, convoy escort procedures, the protection of civilians, detention of suspects, disarmament procedures, and human rights. In addition, the most successful peacekeeping missions are tied to an effective political strategy, have clear goals and expectations, and include diplomatic tools, such as mediation and negotiations. Specific considerations for MINUSCA include the following:

- **Improve its capacity** to anticipate and rapidly respond to emerging security threats;
- Ensure presence of adequate military forces with appropriate equipment remain and conduct patrols in high risk and strategic areas;
- Forcibly disarm groups that continue to threaten populations;
- Assist the government in accountability for mass atrocity crimes and other violations and abuses;
- Continue efforts to implement a more victim-sensitive approach to combat SEA by peacekeepers.
- Continue efforts to **build common ground and serve as community liaisons**.

In a May 2017 meeting of UN Mission **Force Commanders (FC)**, Lieutenant General Keïta of MINUSCA observed:

...MINUSCA, which has, to some extent, been able to embody such a robust approach to peacekeeping by preventing the slaughter of the civilian population in a number of areas and in particular by defending the town of Bambari against a coalition of armed groups. That operation succeeded because we bent various administrative rules, challenged some limiting agreements with troops and changed morale where the use of force was involved. Our efforts also benefited from the unequivocal support of the Security Council, which took targeted measures at the right time. MINUSCA is an example, even if an imperfect one, of robust peacekeeping, although we recognize that we could have done better without various ongoing complications...

The UN special team deployed to CAR to conduct investigations may have additional and more specific recommendations and considerations for MINUSCA in its final report, expected sometime in January 2018.

c. Central African Republic (CAR). Most recommendations for CAR have not changed in several years. Despite the optimism prompted by the essentially peaceful presidential election in 2016, nothing much has changed to bring stability and economic resurgence to his country. It was suggested in 2016, “The new government must decisively break with that pattern” of corruption that existed with previous governments, and “demonstrate its competence, its inclusiveness and its commitment to development.” Most observers agree that consolidating the authority of a central government, with its attendant responsibilities to national programs and processes, requires time. Yet, many now express new frustrations over the increasing violence and lack of commitment to peace processes. Some specific recommendations still include:

- Commit to providing sustained support to enable MINUSCA to fulfil its mandate, including the protection of civilians
- Establish government control of gold and diamond mining sites and border crossings, to undermine the use of those economic places for extortion and other forms of corruption
- Expand the **training of police regarding gender issues**
- **Prioritize accountability for mass atrocity crimes and other violations and abuses**

**Other observers point out** that “supporting a negotiated solution with the armed groups involves combining strong coercive measures and positive incentives.” They suggest, in part, to:

- Reduce “the attractiveness of the war economy"
• Establish “a stronger power balance vis-à-vis armed groups by combining diplomatic efforts with strong pressure,” such as “the arrest and trial of rebel leaders organising \textit{[sic]} major attacks against civilians…”
• Obtain support from regional neighbors by cooperating over “shared interests” such as transnational livestock migrations.
• Acknowledge crimes committed by former government leaders “in order to draw a line under the past and open a new page.”

Resources


- Amnesty USA, Strengthening Peacekeeping in CAR
- CIA, The World Fact Book--Central African Republic
- CFR, Peace Operations in Africa
- Democracy in Africa Escalating Violence in Central African Republic Exposes Limits UN Peacekeeping (November 2017)
- Enough Project, Warlord Business: CAR’s Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power
- International Crisis Group, The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation
- International Peace Institute (IPI) Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations Toward an Organizational Doctrine (July 2016)
- Military Review Operation Sangaris A Case Study in Military Intervention, November December 2016
- MINUSCA, Special Report on Kaga Bandoro Incident, October 2016
- National Counter Terrorism Center, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
- U.S. Department of State Explanation of Vote at the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2387 on MINUSCA (November 2017)