




**Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Peace Operations Estimate – UNAMID**

**United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
(updated 12 September 2017)**



[UNAMID Deployment Map \(August 2017\)](#)
[CIA World Fact book --- Republic of Sudan](#)
[Link to UNAMID Mission](#)

budget by 50%. Some observers—most notably, Sudanese and some US leaders—suggest that the mission reductions are recognition of the improved stability in the Darfur region, thereby requiring less resources. However, many observers suggest these reductions negatively impact the tenuous stability in Darfur, due to functional inability to protect civilians, provide humanitarian assistance, and continue the disarmament programs. In addition, the “hand over” of some former UNAMID bases to Government of Sudan (GoS) affiliated forces—part of the phased UNAMID reduction—has been [controversial](#). Two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement, jointly denounced the hand-over as “illegal.” They claim the hand-over to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—an arm of the GoS’ army—violates the UN’s agreement that “property left by the peacekeeping mission should be handed over to the local authorities, and is to be used for civilian purposes only.” They claim that the RSF have detained more than 700 people since the hand-over.

Executive Summary

Established in 2007, UNAMID is among the largest of the world’s peacekeeping missions. It was created after four years of conflict between rebels and the Khartoum government. While Darfur’s stability has improved in the last few years, some areas in Darfur (such as Jebel Marra) remain unstable. Despite this continued instability, UNAMID was reduced in size in its June 2017 mandate revision [UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2363(2017)].

Major considerations include:

- **“[Explicit recognition of...peace and security \(in Darfur\)](#)” or “[hollowing out](#)” of the UNAMID mission?**

UNAMID observers offer differing perspectives regarding the June 2017 UNAMID mandate revision and its anticipated impact to the mission. UNSCR 2363 (2017) directed a phased 44% reduction of troops—and 30% of police officers—by the end of this year. At the same time, the UN General Assembly reduced the UNAMID

- **[No new UNAMID operating base authorized \(in Jebel Marra\), despite continuance of violence and lack of humanitarian access in that area.](#)** While security and stability has measurably improved in much of Darfur, the mountainous Jebel Marra area is still considered violent. Additionally, its remoteness complicates any humanitarian assistance efforts. Consequently, the UN requested Sudan to authorize a new base in Jebel Marra. Sudan refuses to do so. Thus far, four of the UNAMID team sites are [closed to date](#), with seven still operating.
- **The return of the Sudan Liberation Army's Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) from Libya, and increasing violence between Darfur tribes.** In the past few months, rebels affiliated with the [SLA-MM invaded Darfur from Libya](#), where many of them were fighting as “mercenaries” among the various Libyan factions. As observed:

The attack neatly laid bare the fragility of the narrative put forward recently by the US and by elements within the UN – and by Khartoum long before – namely that rebels no longer operate in Darfur and that peace has been restored there.

In the same period, two Arab tribes—with a long tradition of conflict over land ownership and cattle thefts—[escalated their violence against each other](#), causing the deaths of tens of tribal members and several wounded.

- **The emerging cholera epidemic.** Cholera is continuing to spread in Darfur, as well as in other Sudan and South Sudan areas. According to some sources, nearly 24,000 Sudanese have been infected and 940 patients have died since the [August 2016 cholera outbreak](#). Thus far, the Sudanese government has not acknowledged the acute crisis, but refers to the epidemic as "Acute Watery Diarrhea". In contrast, authorities in South Sudan are engaged in a large-scale vaccination program in collaboration with global health experts and organizations.

Mission Overview

1. Background. Sudan's Darfur region is populated by different ethnic groups. Since the 1970s, the continuous drought and population growth led to intra-group competition over the scarce resources of both water and usable land. Specifically, violence arose between the agrarian Africans and the traditional (Arab) nomads of northern Sudan and West Africa. In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) accused the Government of Sudan (GoS) of the deliberate oppression of non-Arab ethnic groups within the Darfur region. The GoS, with its associated forces and various armed groups, responded in violence. After the [Darfur Peace Agreement](#) was signed on 5 May 2006, with support of the United Nations (UN) and other partners, the African Union (AU) deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan (AMIS). However, the GoS ultimately rejected the UN's resolution and the violence continued. In 2008, the UN and the AU established **United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)**, with [UNSCR 1769 \(2007\)](#), as a [partnership for peacekeeping operations](#) to protect Darfur civilians. Initially, the GoS did not welcome the UN Peacekeeping Force, claiming the Darfur crisis was an internal affair.

The [All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference](#) in May 2011 was intended as another milestone to lasting peace. It resulted in the [Doha Document for Peace in Darfur \(DDPD\)](#), signed in July 2011. While the DDPD is still considered by international partners as the guiding outline for ultimate peace in Darfur, it was initially only one of many unsuccessful efforts in the past decade. The most recent of the internationally-facilitated peace efforts was in August 2016, when the **AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)** presided over dialogues between a coalition of different armed opposition groups (Sudan Call) and the government to sign the ["Roadmap for Ending the Conflict in Sudan"](#). Unfortunately, these dialogues did not seem any more

effective than previous efforts, as disagreements over security arrangements in Darfur and humanitarian access in the Two Areas (Sudan's Blue Nile and South Kordofan states) continued unabated for several months. However, by the early part of 2017, the security and stability in Darfur had improved to the point of cautious optimism on the part of the GoS as well as the UN which contributed to the international pressure to reduce UNAMID's overall troop and police numbers, as well as its operating budget.

2. Mandates. On June 29, 2017, [UNSCR 2363 \(2017\)](#) revised and renewed the UNAMID mandate until **June 30, 2018**. The most significant change in the new mandate is the reduction in force numbers over two six-month phases in this year:

...at the end of phase one of the drawdown, the authorized numbers of troops and police would be 11,395 and 2,888, respectively; at the end of phase two, 8,735 troops and 2,500 police. [UNAMID currently has an authorized ceiling of 15,845 troops and 3,403 police.]

The decision to move into the second six-month phases will be made based on an "assessment of whether the conditions on the ground remained conducive to the further planned reductions."

The new mandate reaffirmed UNAMID's strategic priorities as:

...the protection of civilians, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, mediation between the Government and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and support for mediation of inter-community conflict.

Further, the new mandate directs UNAMID to: "support the Government in a range of related tasks, such as capacity-building for transitional justice and solutions for the sustainable voluntary return of displaced persons."

UNAMID's [specified tasks](#) as described in the document are:

(a) Protection of civilians, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel

(i) Without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Sudanese authorities to protect civilians, to protect civilians across Darfur, including women and children, through, inter alia, continuing to move to a more preventative and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defence [*sic*] of its mandate; enhanced early warning; proactive military deployment and active and effective patrolling in areas at high risk of conflict and high concentration of [*internally displaced persons*] IDPs; more prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians, including through regular reviews of the geographic deployment of UNAMID's force; securing IDP camps, adjacent areas and areas of return

(ii) To identify and report threats to and attacks against civilians and implement prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation

(iii) To fully implement and deliver, in close consultation with humanitarian partners and other relevant partners, the Mission-wide protection of civilians strategy

(iv) To support, in coordination with the Government of Sudan, the capacity-building of the Government of Sudan police in Darfur, including the development and training of community policing, including on providing security in IDP camps and along migration routes, in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability

(v) To monitor through proactive patrolling policing activities in camps for internally displaced persons

(vi) To provide technical mine-action advice and coordination and demining capacity in support of national institutions

(vii) To assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the DDPD and any subsequent agreements relating to human rights and the rule of law and to contribute

to the creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights, accountability, and the rule of law, in which all are ensured effective protection, including through monitoring and reporting on human rights, and support to institutional development, advocacy with the authorities and increased capacity building to strengthen transitional justice and human rights institutions, including the Special Court for Darfur, and through supporting the establishment of criminal justice institutions and rural courts through the provision of advice and logistical support in areas of Darfur that are key to the voluntary return of displaced populations to address land disputes and other inter-communal conflict drivers

(viii) Support the Government of Sudan and local government authorities in extending state authority throughout Darfur through the provision of technical and logistical support to local conflict resolution mechanisms, as a means to reduce inter-communal conflict, enhance accountability and create conditions conducive to voluntary return of displaced populations

(ix) To ensure an adequate human rights, child protection and gender presence, capacity, and expertise in Darfur in order to contribute to efforts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur, with particular attention to vulnerable groups

(x) To monitor, verify, and draw to the attention of the authorities abuses and violations of human rights, including those committed against women and children, and violations of international humanitarian law and enhanced, detailed, full and public reporting by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on this issue as part of his regular 60 day reports

(xi) To support the implementation of provisions included in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the DDPD and any subsequent agreements relating to upholding the rights of women and children

(xii) To facilitate the effective and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in need

(xiii) To contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs to their homes, and support the Government in finding sustainable solution for the voluntary return of IDPs in line with international standards

(xiv) In the areas of its deployment and within its capabilities, to protect the hybrid operation's personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations-African Union personnel and humanitarian workers

(b) Mediation between Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements

(i) To support the AU-HIP-led peace process in Sudan, in coordination and collaboration with the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, including the negotiations on cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access in Darfur

(ii) To support and monitor the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the DDPD and subsequent agreements

(iii) To advise on the complementary implementation of all peace agreements in Darfur, particularly with regard to the national provisions of those agreements, and compliance with the Interim National Constitution

(iv) To support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the DDPD and any subsequent agreements, with particular focus on the provisions related to returns, internal dialogue, justice, reconciliation and land, within its capacities, including through the provision of technical assistance and logistical support to the residual bodies of the Darfur Regional Authority

(v) To assist in harnessing the capacity of women to participate in the peace process, including through political representation, economic empowerment and protection from gender-based violence

(c) Support to the mediation of inter-communal conflict including measures to address root causes

(i) To support the mediation of inter-communal conflict, including through supporting local conflict resolution mechanisms by working with the Government of Sudan, tribal and militia leaders, the United Nations Country Team and civil society, to develop an action plan on the prevention and resolution of inter-communal conflict in each state of Darfur, including resolving the underlying drivers of inter-communal conflict such as land, access to resources, migration issues and tribal rivalries

(ii) To support the implementation of a legal and institutional framework to address the root causes of conflict, including land issues, access to resources, migration issues and tribal rivalries, including with the involvement of paramilitary units and tribal militia

(iii) To assist all stakeholders and local government authorities, in particular in their efforts to transfer resources in an equitable manner from the federal Government to the Darfur states, and to implement reconstruction plans and existing and subsequent agreements on land use and compensation issues

(iv) To support the implementation of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation (DIDC), including through encouraging their inclusion in the constitutional review process

In addition to the UNAMID mandate, the UN oversees the work of the [Sudan Sanctions Committee 1591](#). The UN Security Council mandated an arms embargo on all belligerents [UNSCR 1591 (2005)] and a travel ban and asset freeze on four individuals [UNSCR 1672 (2006)]. UNSCR 2035 (2012) allows for travel and asset freeze sanctions to also apply to entities, not just individuals. While the [sanction measures do not expire](#), the mandate is reviewed and revised annually.

The Sudan Sanctions Committee 1591 works closely with the [Sudan Panel of Experts](#). The most recent Panel of Experts mandate is **UNSCR 2340 (2017)**, which renewed the panel until **12 March 2018**.

3. Deployment. [UNSCR 2363 \(2017\)](#) reduces UNAMID's authorization for uniformed personnel in two phases of six months each. The first phase reduces the number of UNAMID military troops from 13,000 to about 11,400 between July 2017 and January 2018, followed by a second phase reduction to 8,735 by the end of June 2018. The police personnel number will reduce from 3,150 to 2,888 by January 2018 and to 2,500 by June 2018.

As of June 2017, the largest [Troop or Police Contributing Countries \(T/PCC\)](#) are African or Asian. The three largest are: Rwanda (2,465), Ethiopia (2,462), and Pakistan (2,274). TCCs with more than 1,000 personnel deployed include: Egypt, Senegal, and Nigeria. TCCs with over 500 personnel deployed include: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Nepal, and Tanzania.

Strength: 19,685 total, including:

- *Uniformed personnel: 16,673*
 - *Troops: 13,178*
 - *Military observers: 160*
 - *Staff officers: 288*
 - *Police: 3,047*
- *Civilian personnel: 2,888*
 - *International civilians: 747*
 - *Local civilians: 2,141*
- *UN Volunteers: 124*
 - *749*
 - *Local civilians: 2,148*
- *UN Volunteers: 120*

While not as large a contribution as other Asian countries, **China** provides 234 personnel. China also contributes an air transport team, publicized as China's "first [peacekeeping helicopter unit](#)." **Iran** provides three personnel to the Mission. With only thirteen personnel assigned, **Germany** is the largest of the European contributions. **Peru** (2) and **Ecuador** (4) are the only contributions from the Americas.

4.4% of UN personnel are women, to include the Deputy Joint Special Representative (Bintou Keita of Guinea) and the UNAMID's Police Commissioner (Priscilla Makotese of Zimbabwe).

Authorized Strength

(until 30 January 2018)(“phase one”):

- *military personnel: 11,395*
- *police personnel: 2,888 (including individual police officers and members of formed police units)*

(by 30 June 2018)(“phase two”):

- *military personnel: 8,735*
- *police personnel: 2,500 (including individual police officers and members of formed police units)*

[While not specified in UNSCR 2363 (2017), it may be assumed the civilian component authorizations is unchanged.]

4. Casualties. Like many UN missions, it is difficult to determine overall casualty figures with accuracy. However, it appears the number of UN [peacekeeper fatalities](#) is steadily rising across all current missions. The most accepted reason for this growth is that UN members are deliberately targeted by increasingly capable armed groups. The rise in fatalities may also correspond to significant growth to the overall numbers of peacekeepers, combined with the ever more risky environments in which they are deployed. In fact, a [2016 UN casualties analysis](#) suggested exactly this point—that “overall UN fatalities are not substantively on the rise” once data is controlled for deployment numbers.

According to [the UN Fact Sheet for this mission](#), UNAMID suffered [250](#) fatalities (over 65% were military or military observers) since 2007. The average number of fatalities per year was 25 from 2008 until 2011. However, the average spiked to 42 per year between 2012 and 2013. By 2014, the number of fatalities was again in the mid-20s, with a steady decrease in fatalities through 2015 and 2016. There were seven fatalities thus far in 2017.

Almost one third of all fatalities were due to “malicious acts,” while 60% are attributed to accident or illness.

The UN Development Program, Malicious Acts Insurance Policy, February 4, 2003, defines “[malicious acts](#)” as fatalities as a result of “war; invasion; hostilities; acts of foreign enemies, whether war be declared or not; civil war; revolution; rebellion; insurrection; military or usurped power; riots or civil commotion; sabotage; explosion of war weapons; or terrorist activities.” In contrast, “accidents” is defined to include “stray bullets, friendly fire, and road accidents” and other incidents, such as natural disasters.

The significant majority of the UNAMID fatalities fell to African or Asian contingents—which is likely because African and Asian countries contribute the majority of the peacekeepers to this Mission. Almost 50% of the total fatalities belong to either Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, or Sudan. (Nigeria represents over 15% of the total fatalities, or 38 peacekeepers.)

Situation

5. Drivers of Conflict. The drivers of conflicts in Darfur region are generally classified into three categories: political discordancy; ethnic incompatibilities; and competition for scarce resources such as land and water.

Most of the Darfur local groups, such as the Furs, are agriculturalist, while others are transient

pastoralists. Immigration and migration contributes to the over-crowding of Darfur—the population density is 4.5 times greater than 30 years ago. The continuous droughts make the water and land resources even more precious, and exacerbates the humanitarian crises.

The political turmoil within Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan and their regional neighbors also contributes to the Darfur conflict. As the [most recent Secretary-General report](#) indicates:

Residual clashes between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur rebel movements that had launched incursions late in May occurred in North Darfur, while the fragmentation of the armed oppositions continued, their breakaway factions forming alliances with or against the Government. Intercommunal fighting also persisted across Darfur, with a slight increase in the number of fatalities compared to the corresponding period of 2016, mainly over land and livestock disputes. Violence against civilians, perpetrated primarily by armed militia, also manifested resource dimensions, the majority of cases occurring in farmland, or as part of the efforts to deter internally displaced persons from returning to their home villages. Civilians were also caught in confrontations between armed militias and government security personnel, including attacks against the police and the Rapid Support Forces. The humanitarian situation was exacerbated by flooding and the outbreak of acute watery diarrhea [*sic*] in some parts of Darfur. Meanwhile, political reshuffles following the formation of the Government of National Accord were extended to the local level, but the ruling party maintained overall control of the existing structures. Progress pertaining to the Darfur peace process and the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur remained modest, a situation compounded by the refusal of the non-signatory movements of the Doha Document to commit themselves to the resumption of talks.

6. Significant Events.

a. Recent Events.

- [30 August 2017](#). Secretary-General's regular UNAMID report published, stating, in part:

The report provides an update and analysis of the conflict, as well as an overview of the political situation and the operational environment in Darfur, the main challenges to the effective implementation of the mandate, including violations of the status-of-forces agreement, from 6 June to 15 August 2017. It also presents the steps taken by UNAMID towards achieving its benchmarks and provides an update on progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review, including the financing strategy for the transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team.

- [18 August 2017](#). UNAMID removed itself from its El Malha site in North Darfur as part of the reconfiguration and reduction mandated by UNSCR 2363 (2017). The site was transferred to the GoS authorities.
- [5 August 2017](#). Chinese helicopter unit arrived in Darfur region.
- [3 July 2017](#). The Sudan Sanctions Committee 1591 [met](#) to discuss the report of the chair, Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine), regarding his 14 to 18 May 2017 visit to Sudan.
- [29 June 2017](#). [UNSCR 2363 \(2017\) adopted](#), renewing the mandate for UNAMID for an additional year. In line with the AU-UN strategic review,
- [14 June 2017](#). The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, El-Ghassim Wane, briefed the UN Security Council regarding the joint AU-UN strategic review on UNAMID ([S/PV.7969](#)).
- [8 June 2017](#). The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) briefed the Council on the situation in Darfur and cooperation with the ICC's work pursuant to [UNSCR 1593](#).

- **1 June 2017.** One [peacekeeper was killed](#) in a car-jacking incident by unidentified assailants.
- **4 April 2017.** The Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID, Jeremiah Mamabolo, [briefed](#) the UN Security Council, describing Darfur as “a very different place from what the region was in 2003.” However, he further noted the continued criminal behaviors.
- **8 February 2017.** The UN Security Council [adopted resolution 2340](#), which renewed the mandate of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts until 12 March 2018.
- **17 January 2017.** The Sudanese parliament passed the [Rapid Support Forces \(RSF\) Act](#) which integrates the notorious militia into the Sudanese army, with the commander appointed by the President of the Republic.
- **15 January 2017.** Sudan indicated readiness to sign a peace agreement with a major rebel group in the longstanding Darfur conflict, following a US decision to review a lifting of sanctions that have crippled the country's economy for two decades.
- **5 January 2017.** Sudanese Interior Minister, Ismat Abdel Rahman Zein al-Abdin called for the intervention of the army [to end the control of armed militias over gold mines](#) in North Darfur State. In their report of July 2016, UN experts said Abbala militiamen under the control of Musa Hilal control at least 400 mines. They said the group earns some \$54 million annually from levies on prospectors and support businesses, direct prospecting and the illegal exporting of mined gold.
- **December 2016.** Joint African Union-United Nations conducted a strategic review, with a briefing ready for January 2017.
- **4 October 2016.** Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council on UNAMID, noting that fighting continued in the Jebel Marra region between government forces and the Sudan Liberation Army–Abdul Wahid rebel group.
- **September 2016.** [Amnesty International](#) alleged that government forces had used chemical weapons in the Jebel Marra area, but that report appeared unsubstantiated.
- **8 August 2016.** Four groups of the [opposition umbrella Sudan Call](#) signed the Roadmap Agreement for peace and dialogue brokered by the African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in Addis Ababa. The Sudan Call includes the National Umma Party (NUP), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement /North (SPLM-N), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM). In March, they had rejected the peace plan, saying it excludes other opposition groups, and omitted important confidence building measures such as political freedoms and release of political detainees and prisoners.

b. Upcoming Events.

- **31 December 2017.** Sudan Sanctions Committee 1591 Chair's term ends.
- **30 January 2018.** First six-month phase for UNAMID reduction period closes. Implementation of second six-month dependent on the assessment of security by the Panel of Experts.
- **12 March 2018.** Panel of Experts mandate expires.
- **30 June 2018.** UNAMID mandate expires.

Operational Environment

7. Geographic. Darfur is located in the southwest of the Republic of Sudan, and covers an area of 493,180 square kilometers, with four main features of physical geography More

than half of the Darfur region is desert and includes the Marrah Mountains in the northern part of Sudan. Plains and low hills of sandy soils and sandstone hills—which are without water—comprise the eastern portion of the Darfur region. Western Darfur is basement rock, which is too infertile to be farmed, but provides sufficient forest cover to raise animals. Finally, the southern part of Darfur is a bush forest and with rich soil, but severely affected by drought. The Radom National Park is also located in the Southern Darfur, which is a member of the World Network of Biosphere Reserves.



Map Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Darfur>

8. Political. The Republic of the Sudan is led by President **Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir**, head of the [National Congress Party](#) and in power since his 1989 coup power against the democratically elected government of Prime Minister [Sadiq al-Mahdi](#). While he has been elected three times as President, those elections are considered fraudulent due to corruption. He has the dubious distinction for being the first sitting president indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), for his campaign of mass killing, rape, and pillage against civilians in Darfur.

The Government of Sudan (GoS) is dominated by those of Arab-ethnicity and its policies are criticized as in favor of the Arabic ethnic groups. While the majority in Darfur area were of local African-tribe ethnicities, the GoS supported the [Janjaweed](#) (an armed Arabic pastoralist group) in its fight against the Darfur rebel groups.

The Darfur area was divided into five administrative states, governed from 2007 to June 2016 by an interim governing body called the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA). The Darfur Peace agreement intended the DRA to serve as a transitional authority with headquarters at Al-Fashir. Its executive committee consisted of governors from the five Darfur states, ministers from Sudan government, and a leader from the rebel groups (excepting the year 2011).

The administrative status of Darfur was newly determined by a referendum in April 2016. The majority voted to remain in the current five states, although the GoS dismissed the DRA upon its mandate expiration.

9. Military/Security. Compared to events of the past decade, the security situation in the Darfur area is generally peaceful, but remains volatile in small specific areas. The rebel groups have decreased from a maximum of 26 groups to three major ones, while only one of them (SLA-AW) still appears to in active conflict with the Sudanese army. Therefore, the main threat for civilians comes from conflicts between ethnic groups, demonstrated through intercommunal violence, crime and banditry. The GoS' [nationwide disarmament campaign](#) is having limited success. While the government-affiliated forces are “collecting illegal arms and unlicensed vehicles from civilians in the regions,” the [general population remains unconvinced of its safety](#) and security against each other, criminals, and from the government forces.

There are several influential players in the Darfur area concerning about military and security situation:

a. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF is the official armed force of the GoS. It includes land forces, navy, air force and the **Popular Defence [sic] Force** (PDF), which is a civilian militia force. While the SAF is understood to be committed to the defense of Sudanese national security in general, it allegedly supported the *Janjaweed* armed groups against the Darfur population in the past—and, perhaps, in some current clashes. Conflicts between SAF and various factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) are ongoing.

In January 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed the [Rapid Support Forces \(RSF\) Act](#) which integrates a para-military militia into the Sudanese army. The [RSF was formed in August 2013](#), allegedly from elements of the *Janjaweed* and under the auspices of Sudan's [National Intelligence and Security Service](#). [Allegations](#) against the RSF include charges of aerial bombardment as part of the counter-insurgency operations against civilian populations in South Kordofan and in Darfur.

The GoS intends to integrate other government-affiliated militias into the RSF. Those militia leaders have expressed varying opinions regarding their acceptance of this concept, from full appreciation to full opposition from the "Border Guards." Meanwhile, the RSF itself is [charged with violence against Darfur civilians](#) akin to that of the *Janjaweed*.

b. Non-State Armed Groups.

Janjaweed. The *Janjaweed* is an armed group of Arab-ethnicity. The GoS appeared to use the *Janjaweed* as a security force in Darfur region in the past, as they share the same Arab ethnicity. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted several *Janjaweed* leaders—in addition to the GoS president—for its role in genocidal crimes in Darfur. Although part of the *Janjaweed* was allegedly absorbed into the SAF/RSF, it is still a powerful actor in the region.

Musa Hilal is a Sudanese Arab tribal chief in Darfur's Um Jalul clan and current adviser to the Sudanese Minister of Internal Affairs. His tribe is part of a larger confederation of camel-herding (Abbala) tribes. He is also known as leader of the *Janjaweed* militia since 2003, [resolving in 2004](#) to "change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes." As advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs, he coordinates with regional leaders on the incorporation of *Janjaweed* militia into the Sudanese military. However, in 2014 he defected from the ruling National Congress Party to create his own party, the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (RAC). To date, he appears to still run his own administration in North Darfur, to [include the illegal gold mining](#).

Perhaps the largest remnant of the *Janjaweed* are those forces that comprise the "Border Guards"—a formerly pro-government militia and allegedly commanded by **Musa Hilal**. Government plans to integrate members of the many government-affiliated militias into the RSF [is strongly opposed by the Border Guards](#). Additionally, the RAC, a political party led by Musa Hilal, claims the GoS' disarmament programs "clearly targets Sheikh Musa Hilal and his tribe".

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Abdul Wahid (SLM/A-AW). The SLM/A-AW is a rebel group that claims to represent all of the oppressed in the Sudan. It was founded by three ethnic groups in Darfur: the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Masalit. Currently, the SLM-AW represents mostly the Fur group, who rejected the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006.

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni Minnawi (SLM/A-MM). The SLM/A-MM is one branch of the SLM which mainly represents the Zaghawa group. They broke with the SLM-AW when they signed the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. Since then, its leader has served as the chairperson of Darfur Regional Authority. However, in 2011, they withdrew from the agreement. After a two-year long conflict-free period, during which the SLM/A-MM [allegedly resided in Libya or South Sudan](#), they appear to have re-engaged the SLA/RSF in recent months.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The JEM is a rebel group founded by Khalil Ibrahim, with the aim to grant regional power and rotating presidency, and replace the injustice policies in order to achieve equality. Despite the fact that they fought against *Janjaweed* and the government years ago, JEM has been peaceful for a long period.

c. Other International Actors/Forces.

Regional Neighbors. Chad and Central African Republic

(CAR) are where most of Darfur refugees settled in the past decade. Chad provides some of the largest refugee camps, but the security environment remains disordered. The borders between these two countries and Sudan have been in chaos due to poor regulatory of immigrants and actions of armed group.

Libya appears to also have harbored Darfuri rebels for the past several years where many—if not most—fought as mercenaries alongside or against each other as part of Libya’s “[multifaceted conflict](#).” In early September 2017, Sudan [closed its land borders](#) to Libya, Chad and **South Sudan** to prevent arms smuggling.

Musa Hilal’s daughter, Amani Musa, married the President of Chad, Idriss Deby in 2012. Musa Hilal is a Sudanese Arabic tribal leader (and alleged Janjaweed leader). President Deby currently serves as the Chair of the African Union.

In recent months, the ongoing water and land disputes between Sudan, **Ethiopia**, and **Egypt** have re-emerged as a regional conflict driver. The specific land in question is the Halayeb Triangle, currently held by Egypt but claimed by Sudan. The water issue surrounds the question of “[who owns how much](#)” of the Nile River. Egypt claims around 85 percent of the Nile’s annual flow and has two treaties to support its position (1929 and 1959). However, those treaties were based upon the Nile’s agricultural use, of which Egypt traditionally has the greater percentage of in the region. In recent decades, the hydroelectric power usage by all three nations has emerged as important as the agricultural usage, as Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nears completion.

In 2013, the three countries formed a joint special committee of international experts to analyze the dam project and its potential effects on Nile River water flow. However, the countries did not agree with the findings. Sudan has traditionally sided with Egypt in the Nile River dispute, but has recently promoted Ethiopia’s position, perhaps as *quid pro quo* for Ethiopia’s support of Sudan’s claims of the Halayeb Triangle area.

Halayeb Triangle is a 20,000 square kilometer area on the Red Sea border between Egypt and Sudan. Most of the 27,000 people in the triangle are ethnic Sudanese. Thus far, Egypt has refused to submit the dispute to international arbitration.

[Sudan supported](#) Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in **Yemen**, sending “close to 8,000 combat soldiers on the ground.” This overt support of **Saudi Arabia** by Sudan is noteworthy in that its traditional affiliation has been to **Iran**, Saudi’s contender for regional dominance. However, recent reports of Sudanese casualties may result in their early withdrawal.

Other Countries. Several other countries—beyond regional neighbors—have interests in the Sudan, and in Darfur, specifically. In many cases, other countries operate within the auspices of international organizations and entities. However, there are also notable agreements, arrangements, and relationships. For example, while bilateral military and security exchanges between **China** and Sudan appear limited, [China is the biggest trade partner for Sudan](#), which is the third largest African trade partner for China. In particular, “China-Sudan cooperation now shines as a model for developing Sino-African relations, showcasing China’s contribution to Africa’s development.” Further:

In addition to the economic benefits, China’s oil investments have also brought about huge social benefits for local communities. For example, China has trained a contingent of Sudanese oil engineers and technical workers, many of them are even later recruited by oil-rich Gulf nations... Over the years, [the Chinese oil company] has contributed more than 120 million dollars to varied charity and poverty relief projects in Sudan, by building and donating 104 schools, 50 hospitals and clinics, and 400 water wells, to fulfill its social responsibilities.

Russia maintains cordial relations with Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, as evidenced by [President al-Bashir's visit to Moscow](#) in August 2017, despite his indictment on genocide charges by the [International Criminal Court](#). The Russian Ambassador to Sudan was found dead in his home in late August 2017. **The United States (US)** was one of the first entities that named *Janjaweed* and some Sudan government officials as suspected genocide criminals.

In 2000, Russia signed the Rome statute establishing the world's first permanent war crimes court, but never ratified the treaty. In November 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order withdrawing his country's signature from the founding treaty.

International Organizations. There are many other international agencies operating in Darfur, beyond those of the UN. Most notable is the **African Union (AU)**. In 2004, the AU initiated its own Darfur peacekeeping operation called African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS was later combined into the UN/AU UNAMID mission. The AU is still the largest troop contributing source and peacekeeping actor in the Darfur region. Also, the **International Criminal Court (ICC)** indicted President Omar al-Bashir along with several Janjaweed leaders for allegedly directing a genocide against civilians in Darfur region in 2009. It was their first time to indict a sitting president.

10. Economic. The Darfur area economy is essentially dependent on Sudan's national economy. Due to the unstable status, long-lasting war and chaos, there is no statistic available to evaluate the accurate economic growth specific to Darfur.

Darfur, itself, is primarily an agricultural and pastoralist-based economy, with extremely limited industries found near major cities. Therefore, UNAMID set up several workshops for local civilians, especially young people, to acquire skills to work in an industry. Still, the most significant economic threat specific to Darfur—other than conflict—is drought.

Several trade routes in the East Darfur region are truncated due to the ongoing conflicts, which further challenges the Darfur population. The region still relies heavily on humanitarian aid.


11. Social. Darfur region mainly consists three different ethnic groups: the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Masalit. The Fur is the largest group, consisting of 36 immigrant/local, Arabic/Non-Arabic ethnic communities. Regardless of ethnicity, Muslim is the commonly shared religion in the whole region. The population was estimated to be around 6 million before the year 2003, and now around 5 million—just over a decade later. 50% of the population lives inside the triangle formed by El Fasher, Nyala and El Gene. Like Sudan, the median age in Darfur is very young with 53% of the people in Darfur aged 16 or younger. The official languages are Arabic and English, but a large number of groups have their own language, while using Arabic as the written language.

a. Rule of Law. Most crime and robbery target the cattle and horses of specific groups, as the most valuable property of the residents. There is a large amount of sexual assault reported—and much more unreported. These crimes are often considered as a punishment to an opponent group, or are conducted as entertainment by armed groups.

The crimes mostly occur in major towns of Darfur area, despite measures taken by the local leadership.

b. Human Rights. The basic human rights situation is the primary concern of UNAMID. By the end of August 2016, some 80,600 people, mainly women and children, were displaced across Darfur because of the fighting in the Jebel Marra. This may have included [exposure to chemical weapons](#). As the human rights environment remains troublesome, UNAMID

continues to work with the Sudanese government. However, UN human rights experts also continue to have challenges obtaining visas to Sudan



c. Humanitarian Assistance. The first half of 2017 saw much less conflict in Darfur, compared to previous years, contributing to the decisions to reduce the strength of UNAMID. However, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services continues to restrict the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The [2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#) suggests that 3 million people remain in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. In addition:

...approximately 8,200 people were newly displaced across Darfur, according to the UN and partners. Up to an additional 4,000 people were also reportedly displaced, but the UN and partners have not yet verified these figures... (and) about 66,300 South Sudanese refugees arrived in East, North and South Darfur between January and June 2017, bringing their total number in the region since December 2013 to about 127,800 people...

[Other reports indicate](#) an immediate need of direct intervention “to combat the spread of the AWD/cholera epidemic which has affected East, South and North Darfur, infecting 137 and killing 23 as of 30 June” and that “58% of IDPs and 78% of South Sudanese refugees are food insecure... despite this year’s harvest being more productive than last year.”

12. Infrastructure. The basic infrastructure in Darfur area is extremely limited. The national road network in Sudan is administered by the National Highway Authority (NHA), however, the Darfur area office is understaffed and ill resourced. Decades of under-investment, and failure to effectively maintain those investments, exacerbated the remoteness of Darfur. Major roads are mainly earth track and impassable in the wet season. While Nyala has a railway connection to Khartoum and Port Sudan, the lack of all-season road network connectivity and the poor rail network connection to major Sudan cities have limited the development of markets and growth opportunities. In the summer of 2017, [flash floods affected the livelihood of 9,000 people](#).

13. Information. In Sudan, a fixed line telephone system is found in less than 1% of the population, yet Sudan ranks as 46th in the world in regards to cell phone usage. However, cell phone (and fixed line) usage is much smaller in Darfur—and much of Darfur does not receive any cell coverage at all. Consequently, radio remains the main source of information in Darfur. The most popular station is Radio Dabanga, a shortwave radio station in local language, which provides the most updated news on Darfur area to the world. However, all types of information are supervised by the government. Internet connection are strictly restricted while television and radios has a permanent military censor and was controlled by the government in order to cover government policies.

Peace Operations Functions

14. Command and Control. Current UNAMID leadership includes:

Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, Head of UNAMID and Joint Chief Mediator: Jeremiah Mamabolo (South Africa)

Deputy Joint Special Representative: Bintou Keita (Guinea)

Force Commander: Lieutenant General [Leonard Muriuki Ngondi \(Kenya\)](#)

Police Commissioner: Priscilla Makotese (Zimbabwe)

15. Intelligence. While there does not appear to be any specific security-related information-gathering or intelligence apparatus in UNAMID, the current mandates continues to adjure UNAMID to:

...move to a more preventative and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defence [*sic*] of its mandate; enhanced early warning; proactive military deployment and active and effective patrolling in areas at high risk of conflict and high concentration of IDPs; more prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians, including through regular reviews of the geographic deployment of UNAMID's force; securing IDP camps, adjacent areas and areas of return...

16. Operations. Most of UNAMID's operations include its peacekeeping troops, both military and police. However, UNAMID troops have not directly engaged in military or other security actions in several months, and are transferring some of their military equipment to local law enforcement forces.

17. Protection.

a. Mission Protection. The safety of UN workers, especially civilian personnel, has always been a concern for UNAMID and other humanitarian organizations. In November 2016, three UN workers were [kidnapped in Darfur](#) and not released until December of the same year. There were seven fatalities thus far in 2017.

b. Protection of Civilians. In addition to the general violence against Darfur population—and the specific sexual violence—[children are particular targets for kidnapping](#). Kidnapping is generally a prelude to slavery, either as soldiers or domestic workers, and usually is accompanied by sexual abuse as well.

18. Sustainment. In October 2016, Sudan's Minister of Finance cleared a backlog of UNAMID equipment and supplies. However, while this action reduced some of UNAMID's sustainability issues, the infrastructure and continual potential of violence keeps UNAMID from meeting many of its tasks in regards to Protection of Civilians and humanitarian assistance.

UNAMID has been considered, at times, among the UN's "[most costliest](#)" missions. Its budget from July 2016 through June 2017 was \$1,039,573,200. The 2017 mandate's reduction in force structure has a corresponding reduction in budget from July 2017 to June 2018. The UN adopted [a resolution on financing](#) for UNAMID:

...by which it appropriated to the Special Account for UNAMID \$33.56 million for the period of 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, including \$24.58 million for the support account for peacekeeping operations and \$6.15 million for the United Nations Logistics Base and \$2.84 million for the Regional Service Centre. Further, the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments of up to \$486 million for the Operation for the period 1 July to 31 December 2017.

Issues and Recommendations

19. Issues. The major issues that UNAMID is facing in Darfur are summarized as follows:

- Continued political conflict between Sudan Government and rebels with major actors either non-signatory to any cessation of hostilities agreement or national documents of reform, or non-compliant to them.
- Continued difficulty in providing humanitarian assistance, due to the lack of access to certain critical areas which blocked by government/rebels, and the large number of refugees and returnees, which make it hard to deliver assistance and protecting them from potential threats.
- Continued difficulty in setting up the Rule of Law due to the large amount of crime in rural areas, and lacking of supplies for local police.
- Sustained challenges in solving conflict and violence between different ethnic communities, and groups throughout the region which raise serious human right violation, including sexual violence and abuse.
- Persistent issues of land ownership and reformation due to the migration caused by regional conflicts and unequal distribution of resources.

20. Recommendations.

a. The UN and UNAMID. As the violence in the region has decreased recently, UNAMID is now able to focus on solving issues of Human Rights and continues its “exit strategy” to ensure a sustainable peace. In that process, UNAMID must continue cooperation with local authorities and the native administrations in order to transfer its power and to ensure the refugees and IDPs are settled safely. Local authorities must be charged with peace enforcement between ethnic groups and ensure the UNAMID mission continued access to conflict-affected communities to conduct monitoring, verification missions and deliver humanitarian assistance. Additional recommendations include:

- Ensure signature on a cessation of hostilities agreement immediately.
- Transfer responsibilities from UNAMID to function- or task-specific UN agencies’ teams.
- Ensure that disarmament efforts are applied to all civilians regardless of their affiliation, and focus on the areas most affected by the seasonal migration.
- Attend to programs enhancing the skills of rural court judges, who are also local leaders, and assist local economic develop programs.

b. Sudan and Darfur. Sudan—and the local Darfur government entities—must cease direct conflicts with non-state armed groups and begin the process of dialogue, negotiation and mediation required to reach agreement and ensure all the players will sign.

Additional recommendations include:

- Fully implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur clauses on land management, the compensation of internally displaced persons and transitional justice.

- Consult local commissions such as Darfur Land Commission and the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission for technical advice on reducing the conflict between ethnic groups.
- Conduct a mapping of the displaced population to determine potential voluntary returns, return areas and resettlement and develop relevant strategies, procedures and standards to settle refugees/IDPs issues.
- Ensure effective policing in rural area in order to enhance the rule of law against crimes.
- Increase visa numbers for UN officers.

c. **US.** The original [economic sanctions](#) applied to Sudan were intended, in large part, to address the massacre of significant segments of the Darfur population by “punishing” the Sudan leadership. However, if the Darfur situation continues to improve, prudent reversals or “lifting” of some or all of the sanctions’ tenets may be helpful to the sustainment of peace in the region, in that improvement of Sudan’s national economy may also improve the economy in Darfur.

Conversely, any indications that Sudan is [violating the sanctions’ tenets](#) may suggest it remains too early at this time to consider further sanction moderations.

Resources

21. Key Documents and On Line References.

- [African Union \(AU\) Document Repository \(Sudan\)](#)
- [Alarabiya Trump-official-visits-Khartoum-as-US-seems-poised-to-end-Sudan-sanctions \(August 2017\)](#)
- [Foreign Policy \(Darfur, Sudan\)](#)
- [Global Responsibility to Protect \(Sudan\)](#)
- [Governance and Social Development Resource Centre Cross-border-conflict-driversbreaks-across-sudan-egypt-and-jordan \(February 2017\)](#)
- [Human Rights Watch UN drastic-cuts-Darfur-mission-misguided \(June 2017\)](#)
- [Institute for Peace in Partnership, An Overview of UN and AU Cooperation, February 2016](#)
- [International Peace Institute Applying-hippo-recommendations-to-Darfur \(June 2017\)](#)
- [International Refugee Rights Initiative non-interference-non-indifference-african-union-and-responsibility-protect \(September 2017\)](#)
- [Mail&Guardian The-african-union-must-adapt-to-changing-realities \(July 2017\)](#)
- [Pass Blue UN-peacekeeping-big-budget-cuts-but-at-what-cost \(August 2017\)](#)
- [Peace Operations Review \(Darfur/Sudan\)](#)
- [Reliefweb \(Darfur\)](#)
- [Stimson Center Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Darfur: Toward Strategic, Prioritized, and Sequenced Mandates \(June 2017\)](#)
- [United Nations Documents \(Darfur/Sudan\) and OCHA Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 2 January 2017](#)
- [UN Secretary-GeneralReport-African-union-united-nations-hybrid-operation-darfur \(July 2017\)](#)
- [US Agency International Development \(Sudan\)](#)
- [US Department of State Documents and Statements \(Darfur/Sudan\)](#)