


Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
Peace Operations Estimate – UNISFA
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
(updated 16 May 2017)



[UNISFA Deployment Map](#)

[Link to CIA World Fact Book \(South Sudan\)](#)

[Link to UNISFA Mission Website](#)

UNISFA Executive Summary

Conflict in the Abyei region is at least a half-century old, and certainly predates the independence of South Sudan from the Republic of the Sudan--although some observers also suggest the oil-rich Abyei region was the “flash point” for the conflict that led to the separation of those States.

The **Abyei Area Administration** was established on 31 August 2008, permitting its citizens to be simultaneously members of the states of South Kurdufan (Republic of the Sudan) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (South Sudan) until a [referendum](#) was held in 2011. However, the Administration has not yet been fully implemented, nor did the referendum occur as planned. When violence increased along the disputed borders, the United Nations mission, UNISFA, was established for “demilitarizing and monitoring

peace.” The UN peacekeepers—the vast majority of them Ethiopians—travelled overland from Ethiopia just under a week after South Sudan formally declared its independence in 2011. **Major issues include:**

- Abyei’s oil reserves make the region economically desirable to both Sudan and South Sudan. Its border location also leads to conflicting ethnic, cultural, and linguistic claims. Resolving the status of the Abyei Area is one of the essential steps Sudan and South Sudan need to take to [ensure long-term peace in the region](#). Yet, continuing ethnic clashes in the Republic of the Sudan as well as in South Sudan leave Abyei vulnerable as well: “Armed elements from rival ethnic groups and the [proliferation of illegal arms](#) have been commonplace in recent months amid fights over territories.”
- The referendum process remains stalled for a variety of reasons. One main point is the determination of who is eligible to vote. As the Ngok Dinka tribes live year-around in Abyei, South Sudan strongly advocates for only permanent residents to have voting privileges. However, the Sudan-based Arab Misseriya nomads also spend several months in Abyei every year grazing their herds. Therefore, they demand voting privileges as well. A 2016 proposed resolution by [the African Union mediation team](#) was rejected by the Republic of the Sudan over the same point.
- The absence of the [Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism \(JBVMM\)](#) was a point of the new UNISFA mandate. It was intended to monitor the Sudan-South Sudan border with the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), but was suspended in November 2013 following South Sudan’s withdrawal from the mission. However, like the referendum process, it is stalled due to continued disagreements between Sudan and South Sudan on its implementation. Yet, a proposed withdrawal of international support for the JBVMM may “embolden” the disputing parties to act more aggressively towards one another.
- Concerns about UN “[cost-cutting](#)” and its potential to undermine mandates surrounded the renewal/revision discussion for UNISFA. In addition, there are also concerns regarding Ethiopia’s intentions—and capability—to remain as engaged in UNISFA (and other missions) at their current levels.

Ethiopia began an early [withdrawal of their troops](#) from AMISOM, citing the “financial burden” and “lack of support” as the influential factors. However, some experts suspect the force reduction is due to current unrest in Ethiopia, where the government has allegedly detained some 25,000 people and [killed](#) several hundred.

Mission Overview

1. **Background.** At the end of Sudan’s First Civil War (1955-1972), the Addis Ababa Agreement agreed to an Abyei referendum to determine whether they would remain a part of northern Sudan or join the newly formed southern region (at the time, still a part of the Republic of the Sudan). However, in 1983, Sudan’s Second Civil War erupted, in part because Sudan’s President refused to allow Abyei its referendum. To end the Second Civil War, northern and southern Sudan (still the same country) signed the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement](#), or CPA, in 2005. The CPA included the [Abyei Protocol](#), to give Abyei special administrative status until a final status referendum was conducted simultaneous with the southern Sudan Referendum in January 2011. When South Sudan was established as its own State, however, the Abyei referendum did not occur, which in turn led to armed clashes between Sudan Armed Forces (the army of the Sudanese government in Khartoum), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the army of South Sudan). Following the outbreak of violence, and the displacement of over 100,000

persons from their homes, both Sudans signed a temporary peace agreement, calling for a UN interim security force of Ethiopian soldiers, the withdrawal of SAF and SPLA troops, and the establishment of a new joint administration.

The UN Security Council's resolution [UNSCR 1990\(2011\)](#) established the **United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)** and tasked it with "monitoring the flashpoint border between north and south and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid" and authorized it "to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei." It was to comprise of a maximum of 4,200 military personnel, 50 police personnel, and appropriate civilian support. On 29 May 2013, [UNSCR 2104\(2013\)](#), increased UNISFA's military strength up to 5,326 peacekeepers, as requested by Sudan and South Sudan on 8 March 2013. [UNSCR 2352\(2017\)](#) of May 2017 decreases forces levels to near initial mandate levels.

UNISFA operates in the same countries as both **United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)** and **United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)**. While these missions do not appear to share resources, they occasionally share training venues, such as the recent police contingent training "[retreat](#)" in Kingali.

2. Mandate. [UNSCR 2352\(2017\)](#) is the most recent UNISFA mandate (renewed May 15, 2017); it extends the mission until **November 15, 2017**. It also reduces the force strength in the mission and threatens to "withdraw its support to the Sudan-South Sudan border monitoring force if they continue to impede the activation of the operation...Further, it urged the two countries to resume direct negotiations in order to agree on a final settlement of the Abyei question."

Expected progress on the [Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism \(JBVMM\)](#), which was agreed to in the 2012 Cooperation Agreement, was reinforced in the new mandate. The Security Council:

...takes note that continued investment in achieving full operational capability of the JBVMM should be based on a set of conditions, including resolution of the dispute over the SDBZ, and calls upon the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan to make timely and effective use of the JBVMM, JPSM and other agreed joint mechanisms to ensure the security and transparency of the SDBZ, including the "14 Mile Area"...

The previous mandate had also reinforced the need for "an Abyei Area Administration and Council, as well as a police service that would take over policing functions throughout the area, including the protection of oil infrastructure." It also emphasized its Protection of Civilians task, noting it was part of the original mandate, and called "upon Sudan and South Sudan to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement of all UNISFA personnel and equipment...(and) both Governments facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Mine Action Service in Abyei."

3. Deployment. [UNSCR 2352\(2017\)](#) reduces UNISFA's troop authorization from **5,326** to **4,791**, the first change in troop levels since 2013. As the new authorization level essentially matches the current troop strength, there is no immediate impact expected to the mission.

Current authorization

- 4,791 military personnel
- 50 police personnel
- An appropriate civilian support

Of the almost 5,000 personnel deployed in support of the UNISFA, **Ethiopia** provides almost

Strength: 4,769 total, including:

- *Uniformed personnel: 4,533*
 - Troops: 4,393
 - Military observers: 122
 - Police: 18
- *Civilian personnel: 204*
 - International civilians: 126
 - Local civilians: 78
- *UN Volunteers: 32*

4,450 of them. The entire force is approximately 7.6% women, making UNISFA one of the largest percentage of women in a peacekeeping mission.

4. Casualties. There have been [21 total casualties](#) in UNISFA since its 2011 inception, with one in 2016. However, the total number of fatalities do not reflect the overall level of violence against peacekeepers in general—and throughout the other missions in both Sudans.

The number of UN [peacekeeper fatalities](#) is steadily rising across all current missions. The most accepted reason for this growth is that UN members are deliberately targeted by increasingly capable armed groups. However, the rise in fatalities may also correspond to significant growth to the overall numbers of peacekeepers, combined with the ever more risky environments in which they are deployed. In fact, a [recent UN casualties analysis](#) suggests exactly this point—that “overall UN fatalities are not substantively on the rise” once data is controlled for deployment numbers. Instead, “total fatality ratios for the period 1990–2011 are declining...for all three levels: the national contingent, UN mission, and global levels.”

Situation

5. Drivers of Conflict. The [major driver of conflict](#) between both Sudans regarding Abyei is the issue of economics, in two parts: the rights to the oil reserves found in Abyei, and the use of land in general. Oil is an important commodity to the local citizens and the disputing Sudans. However, the land use disagreements may be of more immediate concerns to local residents, particularly between the nomadic herders that have traditionally grazed the region, and the Ngok Dinka tribes that live—and farm—permanently there. Beyond that, the political rights—especially voting privileges—remains a seemingly inviolable issue as the determination of who can vote will lead to the resolution of the border dispute—and the use of the land.

6. Significant Events.

a. Recent Events.

- **15 May 2017.** UNISFA mandate renewed, reducing number of deployed troops.
- **26 April 2017.** The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, El Ghassim Wane, briefed the UNSC on the strategic review of UNISFA.
- **[December 2016-January 2017.](#)** On 21 December at night, in Noong, assailants fired two rocket-propelled grenades, injuring five people, including two women and a three-year-old child. On 9 January, UNISFA troops prevented violence by intercepting around 10 armed Misseriya near Nainai in the central sector. In the ensuing exchange of fire, one Misseriya was killed. The timing of these incidents suggested that the aim of these armed elements was to influence the deliberations at the meetings of intercommunity traditional leaders held on 30 December and 12 January.
- **15 November 2016.** The UNSC adopted [resolution 2318](#) renewing the mission’s mandate for six months.
- **12 May 2016.** The UNSC adopted [resolution 2287](#) renewing the mandate of UNISFA until 15 November 2017.
- **24 March 2016.** [Agreement](#) made “whereby the Ngok Dinka allowed the Misseriya and their cattle access to water and pasture in areas inhabited by the Ngok Dinka.”

b. Upcoming Events

- **15 November 2017.** UNISFA mandate expires.

Operational Environment (GPMESII)



7. Geographic. The Abyei Area covers 4,000 square miles of desert, farmland, and oil fields located along the ill-defined border between Sudan and South Sudan.

The Sudans are hot with seasonal rainfall influenced by the annual shift of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone; rainfall is heaviest in the upland areas of the south and diminishes to the north. The White Nile, flowing north out of the uplands of Central Africa, is the major geographic feature of the countries, supporting agriculture and extensive wild animal populations.

With almost no access to irrigation, food production is largely determined by rainfall. During the dry season (October to March), fields of six-foot-tall grass are burned, causing haze and falling ash. The dry season always brings the possibility of renewed violence and clashes. While violence continues throughout the rainy season, the dry season makes movement possible again and brings with it renewed insecurity. In the dry season, there is an increased risk of local road blocks and extortion, armed robbery and poor quality roads damaged by the previous rainy season. April is the beginning of what is called "The Hunger Gap," as the previous year's food stores run thin and the next harvest is not until September.

8. Political. The determination of "residency" is the major political contention in the ongoing dispute over Abyei—that is, who is allowed to vote on any future referendum on Abyei's status. Semi-nomadic Misseriya tribes travel through the area seasonally, but South Sudan disputes their actual residency. On

In 2013, the Ngok Dinka conducted a [unilateral referendum](#) which indicated they wanted to join South Sudan. However, none of the Governments nor any entity in the international community recognize the outcome.

the other hand, the Republic of the Sudan advocates that their presence in Abyei for several months of each year allows them residency status.

In the interim, both Governments "[treat the population of the \(Abyei\) region as its nationals](#)". As an example, in February 2017, the President of the Republic of the Sudan instructed his authorities "to provide its residents with full administrative services including issuance of identity cards and passports."

9. Military/Security. The [UN Secretary-General's recent report on Abyei](#) indicates:

The security situation in the Abyei Area is generally calm; however, in the absence of progress in the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement and discussions on the final status of the territory, intercommunal tensions and the proliferation of arms present a continued risk. During meetings of the joint security committee with both the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya communities during the reporting period, UNISFA received reports of the presence of armed elements in the Abyei Area. The Mission responded by enhancing its presence in the affected areas through supplementary patrols. There have been no reports of any Sudan Armed Forces or Sudan People's Liberation Army presence in the Abyei Area.

a. State Armed Groups. There are no state-affiliated armed groups operating formally in Abyei, as Abyei's referendum has not yet been held. However, the armies or their affiliates of both South Sudan and the Republic of the Sudan are known to incur into the region in the past.

(Republic of the Sudan) Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF is the official armed force of the GoS. It includes land forces, navy, air force and the **Popular Defence Force (PDF)**, which is a civilian

militia force. While the SAF is described as committed to the defense of national security, it allegedly supported the *Janjaweed* armed group against the Darfur population.

(South Sudan) Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Divided loyalties and allegations of human rights abuses specifically targeting civilians has marred any real reform or accountability within the SPLA. Actual SPLA strength is unknown. Responsible for shooting down a UN helicopter in 2012 (and possibly again in 2014) and targeting UN humanitarian aid contractors in 2014 – as yet uninvestigated by the government – are two of many incidents.

b. Non-State Armed Groups. Local communities, often well-armed and not involved in elite politics, engage in the conflict on their own terms, usually in a self-protection manner (or perceived as such). The [UN Secretary-General's recent report on Abyei](#) suggests:

Criminality remained largely intra-ethnic; the majority of reported incidents were petty crime. There were also some cases of armed theft and carjacking. Over the past year, the central sector has developed into a hub for criminal activities, with a rise in the economic importance of the Amiet common market and in the north-south movement of traders along the all-weather road from Diffra in the northern sector to Amiet and further southwards to Abyei in the central sector. In response, UNISFA troops enhanced their presence along the critical Farouk-Diffra-Amiet-Abyei-Agok axis to deter criminal activity. On 19 October, armed assailants shot and killed a Ngok Dinka man and seriously wounded a woman. On 17 November, the Amiet market joint traditional court found that the available evidence was insufficient to convict two Misseriya accused of the attack. The two were handed over to the Misseriya traditional chief. UNISFA has increased its security presence at the Amiet common market while encouraging the two communities to cooperate with the Mission on addressing criminality.

c. Other International Actors. The relationship between either Sudanese or South Sudan forces with their near-neighbors is complex. Beyond UNISFA and its neighboring UN missions (UNMISS and UNAMID), there are many other international actors and organizations as well as regional neighbors interested in the determination of Abyei's future (albeit within their own national or regional concerns). The following list is not complete, but provides examples:

Ethiopia provides the vast majority of the troops to the UNISFA mission. It is also engaged in a ["diplomatic row"](#) with South Sudan based on stories that President Salva Kiir has allowed Ethiopian rebels to open their office in the capital Juba.

Sudan and South Sudan. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA have skirmished along the Sudan – South Sudan border, especially in the contested Abyei region. Sudan has bombed towns in South Sudan, with focus on the oil producing areas such as Unity State in South Sudan.

[Sudanese rebels have also supported the SPLA.](#) Sudan also accuses South Sudan of [harboring "rebel groups"](#) in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur."

Uganda. Uganda and Sudan are rivals; Sudan has supported SPLM/AiO to counter Ugandan influence.

10. Economic. Abyei is rich in oil resources—or, it was. Production is limited, but it is not certain if that is due to oil reserves depletion or the ongoing conflict.

South Sudan is also [rich in natural resources such as](#) oil; however, the ongoing conflict continues to stifle oil production and the drop in global oil prices has reduced government revenues. Years of conflict, poor infrastructure and an unskilled workforce have kept the impoverished country as one of the poorest in the world. Electricity is powered largely through costly and inefficient diesel generators. Most of the country survives by sustenance farming; soil is exceptionally fertile. Though it is, especially oil which

makes up over 90% of the Governments budget revenues, it is difficult to fully take advantage of these resources with limited infrastructure, unskilled labor, and the oil companies' aversion to risk. The recent downturn of the global oil market contributes to marked economic depression. In addition, the government intermittently shuts down oil production due to bilateral disagreements with Sudan and management incompetency. Total [USAID and State Assistance to South Sudan](#) (including funding for South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries) for FY 2014 and 15 was \$1,496,406,016.

11. Social. South Sudan is [very diverse](#), with major ethnicities of Dinka 35.8% and Nuer 15.6%. Other groups are Shilluk, Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Bviri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona, Acholi speaking many languages including English (official language), Arabic (includes Juba and Sudanese variants) and the regional languages which include Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande and Shilluk. There are 11,562,695 people and the religions are Christian and animist.

However, the Abyei region itself is somewhat homogeneous. It is the [traditional homeland](#) of the Ngok Dinka, a tribal group with strong ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties to the Dinka of South Sudan. Misseriya herders, members of a northern nomadic Arab tribe, seasonally traverse Abyei and other North-South border areas with their cattle in search of water and pasture in the dry season and to trade goods.

a. Rule of Law. It is unclear how Abyei manages Rule of Law issues, internally. UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan's April 2017 report indicates: "The failure by the parties to establish the Abyei Area Administration, and the resulting sense of insecurity, have hampered governance, the rule of law and the sustainable provision of public services, presenting a considerable impediment to the sustainable return of displaced people..."

b. Human Rights. There are no specific allegations of human rights violations in the Abyei region, excepting the seasonal clashes between the nomadic Misseriya herders and the Ngok Dinka tribes. However, in November 2016, the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide, [warned of a potential for genocide](#) in South Sudan.

c. Humanitarian Assistance. According to the UN Secretary-General's most recent report on Abyei, the humanitarian situation has remained relatively stable, but are in need of assistance.

The presence of armed elements, sporadic inter-communal conflict, and the absence of public institutions and government services continue to drive humanitarian and recovery needs.

Pointing to the report, the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan states in its latest weekly bulletin that approximately 160,000 people are in need of some form of assistance in Abyei...

Funding for humanitarian activities however is scarce, including in the health sector, and engagement is mostly limited to humanitarian assistance, except for quick-impact projects that are allocated by UNISFA.

The International Organization for Migration, often in collaboration with international NGOs, helps with the implementation of quick-impact projects. The activities of international NGOs (funded directly by donors or through UN agencies) cover all sectors, including nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene, and livelihoods. These activities are conducted almost entirely in the central and southern parts of Abyei.

Some UN agencies and two national NGOs are able to operate in northern Abyei, with support focused on the rehabilitation of public buildings and water points, community livelihoods, and vaccination of livestock.

12. Information. It is unclear what information mechanisms are in place in the Abyei region.

13. Infrastructure. Similar to both Sudan and South Sudan, most of the Abyei region does not have electricity, and apparently lacks all aspects of physical infrastructure needed to support an efficient, productive economy. This dearth of infrastructure prevents many areas from becoming economically viable, leaving communities vulnerable to resource conflicts and food insecurity. During the rainy season many can only be reached by food air drops.

Peace Operations Functions

14. Command and Control.

Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander: Major General Hassen Ebrahim Mussa (Ethiopia)


15. Intelligence. It is unclear what specific intelligence assets are available to UNISFA. However, lack of adequate intelligence adversely affects neighboring UNMISS ability to protect civilians. As an example, UNMISS had no understanding the events of December 2013 would unfold as violently, having no early warning system or information gathering capability.

16. Operations. It is unclear what specific operational events have occurred in UNISFA at this time.

17. Protection.

a. Mission Protection. While UNISFA casualties are much less than those experienced in other UN Missions, all missions are experiencing increasingly hostile and insecure environments for UN personnel and other aid, humanitarian, and development agency personnel. In late-2016 and early 2017, several [hijackings of international aid workers](#) in and around the Abyei region led UNISFA to reinforce safety procedures for its staff and related workers.

b. Protection of Civilians. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) occupy—and traverse—the Abyei region.



Most of the regional Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites are in South Sudan. Intended originally to be a [short-term solution to a temporary crisis](#), the sites have become settlements of sorts for IDPs. Yet, the living spaces have still not been proportionately expanded and sanitation and water services have not been sufficiently improved, posing major health and protection risks, including the potential for outbreaks of communicable diseases like cholera, and both internal (to camps) and external security threats.

In the UN Secretary-General's most recent report on Abyei:

About 20,000 Ngok Dinka [remain displaced](#) after fleeing south of the Bahr El Arab River in 2011. Since April 2016, some 13,000 Ngok Dinka have returned to their areas of origin as a result of a gradual improvement in the security situation, though many continue to commute to areas further south to access education and other services. Many have settled very close to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) operating bases. Furthermore, about 8,000 South Sudan refugees remain in the area and receive humanitarian assistance across all sectors.

In addition to the Ngok Dinka, there are approximately 25,000 Misseriya in Abyei and 35,000 seasonally nomadic Misseriya who entered the area in late 2016 and are expected to return in mid-2017, the UNSG report said.

18. Sustainment. Poor infrastructure and the desert environment contribute to any UNISFA sustainment challenges.

Issues and Considerations

19. Issues. The major issues confronting UNISFA are summarized as follows:

- The roots of this conflict are embedded in the social and political fabric of several decades. Historical tensions are easily enflamed. Political solution remains elusive.
- The situation for civilians sheltering in the vicinity of UNISFA (and UNMISS) bases presents a challenge to humanitarians, who typically do not provide services inside military bases but have responded due to the unprecedented situation and level of need.

20. Considerations.

a. US. Trump Administration has not yet announced any changes or modifications to the United States approach regarding Abyei. However, the ongoing review of mandates by the US Ambassador to the United Nations and her office suggests a refocus on political solutions to ongoing peace operations, which certainly included UNISFA. [According to one report on the UNISFA mandate renewal](#),

Michele Jean Sison, the United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations hailed the adoption of the resolution. She further regretted that Sudan and South Sudan had yet to take the steps necessary to make the Mechanism fully operational. "Five years of obstacles to deployment [...] is enough," she said, adding "The status quo must be questioned when the status quo is not working."

b. UN. The [UN Secretary-General's recent report on Abyei](#) observed that the presence of UNISFA forces was in large part the reason for the lack of "major incident" during the annual migration south of the "35,000 Misseriya nomads" into Abyei region:

UNISFA maintains corridors to permit the Misseriya and their cattle to move through the Abyei Area, allowing the two communities to share grazing and water resources and, in so doing, preventing

intercommunal tensions. Robust monitoring, in particular of flashpoint areas, has been the foundation of this strategy, with patrols during the day and night and armed elements being prevented from entering the area.

Further, the Secretary-General reported that “while some instances of cattle rustling have occurred, both the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities have largely returned the cattle taken and compensation has been arranged through local peace committees.”

Therefore, in this description it appears self-evident that UNISFA is essential to the continued peace in the region—as long as there is no formal political agreement to the administration of the Abyei region. What is not clear is what UN efforts are ongoing to reach a political settlement.

c. Sudan, South Sudan, and Abyei. The role of various TCCs in the greater region influences the perception of the UNISFA (and UNMISS and UNAMID) by the population and the various conflict entities. All governments involved, and some citizens, have indicated distrust of either the UN, or its missions, or the [security forces of neighboring states](#) that may be part of those missions or other regional peace-facilitating initiatives.

However, it is obvious that the [greatest sense of distrust](#) is between the two nations—Sudan and South Sudan. Both Ambassadors to the UN alleged malfeasance on the part of the other during the discussions on UNISFA mandate renewal:

The **Sudanese Ambassador**...blamed the South Sudan for delaying the implementation of the cooperation agreement and Abyei interim intuitions. On the joint monitoring body, he declared: “We have never restricted the movement of this Mechanism.” He was pointing to the UN Secretary General report which said that the JBVM had cancelled 18 air patrols due to delayed approval by South Sudan...**South Sudan’s Ambassador**...said that the withdrawal of support for the JBVM would negatively impact the cooperation agreement between South Sudan and Sudan, emboldening each side to take a more combative posture along the border, he cautioned, pointing out that ceasing support could lead to proxy fights. He further pointed to the need fill the “vacuum of State responsibility”, and called on the international community to provide the need support adding it is “urgently needed to stabilise [sic] the situation in the area and create a conducive environment for a more constructive and fruitful dialogue on the future of Abyei.”

Resources

21. Key Documents and On-Line References (Selected).

- [Better World Campaign UN Peacekeeping Abyei](#)
- [CIA, The World Fact Book--South Sudan](#)
- [Department of State, US Embassy South Sudan](#) and [USAID, South Sudan](#)
- [Enough Project What is Abyei and Why is it Disputed?](#)
- [Global Security Abyei](#)
- United Nations, General Assembly Fifth Committee Seventy-first Session, 33rd Meeting (AM) [Stressing That Cost Cutting Must Not Undermine Mandates](#) (9 May 2017)
- [UNMIS \(Closed Mission\) Abyei Protocol Fact Sheet \(2009\)](#)
- [Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abyei \(11 April 2017\)](#)
- [Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 and Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017](#)
- [IRIN Who Can Stop the Threat of Genocide in South Sudan \(November 2016\)](#)
- [International Crisis Group, Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process](#)
- [Institute for Security Studies Beyond ARCISS New Fault Lines \(January 2017\)](#)

- [Relief Web South Sudan 2016](#)
- [UN, OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2016](#)
- [UN Peacekeeping Missions--UNMISS](#)
- [UN Reports, South Sudan and UNSCR2252/UNSCR2304](#)