

**Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
Peace Operations Estimate—MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH**

**United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
and
United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
(updated 18 April 2017)**



[MINUSTAH Deployment Map](#)
[Link to MINUSTAH Mission Website](#)
[Link to CIA Country Fact Sheet Haiti](#)

MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH Executive Summary

The new president of Haiti, [Jovenel Moïse](#), was [inaugurated](#) on February 7, 2017, for a term of five (5) years. He is the first democratically-elected Haitian president in several years, having endured a two year election process that was impacted by accusations of fraud, corruption, and natural disaster. The remainder of the [new government was sworn in](#) on March 21, 2017. Both the new president and the new prime minister—and many of the new Cabinet—have [negligible political expertise](#).

February 7, 1991, was the inauguration date for [Jean-Bertrand Aristide](#) as the first democratically elected president of Haiti.

In April 2017, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) extended the MINUSTAH mandate **for six months** (until October 2017) with [UN Security Council Resolution \(UNSCR\) 2350 \(2017\)](#). The mission maintains its authorized troop strength, but is expected to initiate drawdown procedures and transition activities with the smaller pending mission, **United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, or MINUJUSTH. Other major considerations are:**

- MINUSTAH's reputation within Haiti deteriorated significantly after [UN peacekeepers](#) (Nepal) introduced cholera to Haiti (almost 8 percent of the population affected) and the reports of [sexual abuse](#) by peacekeepers. The Mission's reputation saw some redemption in Hurricane Matthew's aftermath (2016), but the continuing sexual abuse and corresponding lack of accountability of the perpetrators reversed any advances in the relationship. Haitians welcomed the United Nations (UN)-proposed [compensation](#) package for cholera victims, but

According to figures from the UN, at least 102 allegations of sexual abuse or exploitation were made against MINUSTAH personnel since 2007. In at least one case, a peacekeeper unit operated a "sex ring" with children as young as 11 years old. In addition, there were at least 29 claims for paternity submitted to the UN in 2016.

[no money](#) has been disbursed yet. The January 2017 allegations that India's peacekeepers deployed to Haiti [without required cholera vaccinations](#) did not imbue confidence among Haiti's population in the UN's ability to manage its own representatives.

The United Nations has only \$2.66 million of the \$400 million that it needs for compensation, from only six countries — Britain, Chile, France, India, Liechtenstein and South Korea, according to [data posted on its website](#).

- The transition plan from MINUSTAH to MINUJUSTH is not defined (apparently at the behest of some Security Council member states, yet criticized by others). Feasibly, the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) may begin withdrawing their forces before the new Haitian government and its policing institutions [are firmly established](#), creating a security void. Also, while the tasks assigned to new Mission are not unique ("to assist the government of Haiti in strengthening rule of law institutions, further support and develop the Haitian National Police and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis"), some of the language in the recent UNSCR may be problematic. Specifically, the new UNSCR's [human rights task](#) to its Chapter VII provision is an addition from the original MINUSTAH mandate which was focused on "ensuring a secure and stable environment." Further, the new UNSCR authorizes mission forces "to use all necessary means" to both support and develop the **Haitian National Police (HNP)** and protect civilians. As the new mission will only be comprised

MINUSTAH's current strength is approximately 5,000 troops and police, combined. The new mission will retain only seven of the current 11 formed police units, and the individual police will be reduced to 295.

of police—and at a much smaller number than the current mission—it is unclear how "all necessary means" will or can be operationalized.

- The new Haitian government has [more than the usual challenges](#) inherent in establishing how to govern—and how to fund—the government. The "[donor fatigue](#)" environment, which includes foreign aid decrement and the pending MINUSTAH withdrawal, contributes to government coffers reduction and its inability to address the significant basic services needs and pay the government workers. [Hurricane Matthew](#) (October 2016) killed at least 1,000 people in Haiti and left 1.4 million in need of aid—including [750,000](#) people who lost their homes and crops. Recovery is still ongoing. Also still ongoing is the cholera epidemic, which is coupled with poor medical infrastructure. Population education is hindered by poor or non-existing schools and limited teacher numbers. Finally, the overall situation remains volatile with gang violence, murders, kidnappings, illegal arms trafficking, drug

trafficking and trafficking of persons (especially children), as well as the tense border management shared with Haiti's island neighbor, the Dominican Republic.

Mission Overview

1. Background. [UN peacekeepers first arrived in 1994](#), “to facilitate the return of ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, secure a stable environment in the country and promote the rule of law.” Over the next decade, there were various UN missions, with MINUSTAH established in 2004 during the aftermath of armed conflict within Haitian cities and following the exile of President Bertrand Aristide. In the following years, the [mandate](#) of MINUSTAH was adjusted on several occasions to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground and to the evolving requirements as dictated by the political, security and socio-economic situation prevailing in the country. In the wake of 2010's massive earthquake, which killed an estimated 310,000 Haitians and approximately 700,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the UN changed the mission and force levels to support recovery, reconstruction, and stabilization, in addition to the previous mandated tasks. Anticipated mission withdrawal for 2016 was set aside due to an increase in domestic violence during the national political campaigns and the Hurricane Matthew's devastation of Haiti in the same year.

2. Mandate. In April 2017, the UN adopted [UNSCR 2350 \(2017\)](#), to “replace it with a follow-up peacekeeping mission that would help the Government of Haiti strengthen rule-of-law institutions, further develop and support the Haitian National Police and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis.” MINUSTAH's last mission day is to be **16 October 2017**. The new mission is called the **United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)** and it is expected to be operational immediately following MINUSTAH's closure and remain in effect until **15 April 2018**.

While the vote on UNSCR 2350 (2017) was unanimous, a few member states expressed [concerns](#) over some of its language. Specifically, paragraph 18 included phrasing that apparently had not been part of the **Group of Friends of Haiti** draft resolution that was agreed upon in that venue, suggesting it was added without consensus.

[Paragraph 18](#) of UNSCR 2350 (2017) emphasizes “the importance of addressing issues of effective command and control, refusal to obey orders, failure to respond to attacks on civilians and inadequate equipment”, implying the current mission (MINUSTAH) has had challenges in these areas. A few Member States’ representatives expressed dissatisfaction in the paragraph, believing “it reflected neither reality on the ground nor the high-level performance of MINUSTAH’s troops.” However, the US representative pointed out the UN report regarding sexual abuse by peacekeepers in Haiti (and other missions) suggests the notice of professional behavior expectations in paragraph 18 is necessary.

MINUSTAH's mandate evolved over the past 12 years, depending on the situation in country. [In its most recent incarnation](#), MINUSTAH is charged to:

- Ensure security, stability and security conditions on the ground
- Support Haiti's free, fair, inclusive, and transparent legislative, partial senatorial, municipal and local elections, with increased women's political participation
- Renew efforts to mentor and train police and corrections officers, enhancing the capacity of the Haitian National Police
- Continue to assist the Government of Haiti in tackling gang violence, organized crime, illegal arms and drug trafficking, and trafficking of persons, especially children
- Encourage the Haitian authorities to continue to implement justice reform, strengthening the Rule of Law

- Promote and protect the rights of women and children
- Continue to support the country’s authorities in controlling the flow of small arms, developing a weapons registry, reforming the weapons permit system, and developing and implementing a national community policing doctrine
- Promote economic development
- Remain [concerned about the deterioration in the humanitarian situation, including increased food insecurity](#) and the need to support efforts to fight the cholera epidemic

MINUJUSTH’s mandate tasks are essentially the same, with much less manpower authorized. [In addition](#), it also:

“12. Authorizes MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support and develop the HNP and in paragraph 13;

13. Further authorizes the Mission to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed...”

3. Deployment. As of December 2016, the largest military [Troop Contributing Country \(TCC\)](#) is Brazil (985)—or 40% of the total. A Brazilian general officer also serves as MINUSTAH’s Force Commander. The other TCCs from the Americas includes Chile (397), Uruguay (245), Peru (162), and Canada (110). Other large TCCs include India (452), Bangladesh (435), and Jordan (357).

Authorized Strength:
4,971 total uniformed personnel, including:
2,370 military personnel
2,601 police

In January 2017, some Haitian news outlets reported that Brazil began its [withdrawal](#) ahead of any mandate-directed removal of UN-authorized soldiers and police. However, Brazil denied those reports. In regards to

[police](#), the bulk of the personnel are part of Formed Police Units (FPUs). With the exception of Pakistan, the other countries also include women as part of their FPUs (Bangladesh has had up to 86 women police on site.) Several other countries also provide individual police members, to include women, with Canada, Benin, and Burkina Faso among the largest individual police contributors.

Current Strength: 5,943 total.

- Uniformed personnel:
 - Troops: 2,342
 - Police: 2,433
- Civilian personnel: 1,082
 - International civilians: 278
 - Local civilians: 804
- UN Volunteers: 82

[Alleged sexual abusers among the peacekeepers](#) came from Bangladesh, Brazil, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Uruguay and Sri Lanka, according to UN data and interviews. More countries may have been involved, but the United Nations only started disclosing alleged perpetrators’ nationalities after 2015.

In accordance with [UNSCR 2350 \(2017\)](#), MINUJUSTH will comprise up to seven FPUs (of the current 11), or 980 FPU personnel, and 295 individual police officers. However, the resolution also allows for the Secretary-General “to consider adapting MINUJUSTH’s mandate and police force levels, as needed, to preserve the progress Haiti has made towards durable security and stability...”

4. Casualties. As of February 2017, MINUSTAH claims [186](#) fatalities since its establishment, which includes the deaths of [almost a hundred UN peacekeepers](#) in the 2010 earthquake—the biggest single loss of life event in the [history of UN peacekeeping](#). There were no reported casualties due to 2016’s Hurricane Matthew.

Disease remains the largest category for peacekeeping casualties in Haiti. Peacekeepers were not immune to the cholera outbreak, and, in fact, were [contributing carriers](#). They remain as vulnerable as the rest of the population to the [current Zika virus crisis](#).

Situation

5. Drivers of Conflict. Many observers suggest that Haiti's current woes—from internal conflict through humanitarian concerns to socioeconomic challenges—are rooted in Haiti's centuries-old history as a French colony, its violent experience in seeking independence, and the many subsequent physical and policy interventions (by many names) of imperialist nations (such as the United States) in more recent decades. While much of that history may be present in current conditions, the most obvious conflict driver in recent years are [the Haitian gangs and their relationship with political power](#)—or power-seekers.

Present dynamics between political power and gang violence can be traced back to the third term of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, from 2000 to 2004, when political elites with various agendas used Haiti's poor and disaffected youth—*chimères*—as instruments of intimidation and violence. In the decade since Aristide was dismissed, the gangs' relationship to political power—and their own organizational purpose—has varied, but appear to be primarily criminal in nature (across the entire spectrum of criminal activity).

While some politicians appeared to both fund and protect gangs from impunity from arrest, gangs also acquired some local-level legitimacy by providing goods (paying for school fees, providing food) and services (such as public order in the absence of state control) to the communities where they operate.

[Senate candidate and former paramilitary leader Guy Philippe](#) served as an example of the interwoven relationships between some of Haiti's political leadership and its gangs. He came on the international scene during the 2004 coup d'état that ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In 2016, Philippe threatened a "civil war" if the Privert government failed to hold elections in April. In May 2016, a police station was attacked and Philippe was accused. Although [he denied involvement](#), he failed to appear at a related hearing in June 2016. In January 2017, he was arrested in Haiti and was extradited to the United States to [face charges](#).

Haiti remains fragile due to internal gang-related security threats. Gangs may respond in large-scale violence if not satisfied with government actions.

Another conflict driver in Haiti has been the poor perception of the MINUSTAH mission among some observers in the population. This negative perception was due to peacekeeper-inflicted atrocities against civilians as well as the initial rationale of any peace mission. As a [recent report shares](#):

"There's been an ongoing question over whether Haiti ever needed peacekeepers," said Jake Johnston, a research associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. "It's not a country with an ongoing civil war. It's not at war with any of its neighbors."

"In many respects, Haitians have chafed over this incursion into their sovereignty," said Robert Maguire, a professor of international affairs at George Washington University.

Other current conflict drivers include:

- The [migrant crisis](#) at the Dominican Republic border, where nearly thousands of people moved into transient camps after leaving the Dominican Republic by force or by fear during its 2015-2016 crackdown on illegal migrants. In the United States, over [60,000 Haitian nationals are living there](#)

as beneficiaries of the Temporary Protection Status (TPS), which expires in July 2017. If that status is not renewed, they will be vulnerable to deportation back to Haiti.

- The most recent [cholera epidemic](#), which has claimed more than 9,500 lives and infected over 770,000 people in six years and continues to this point.
- The [worst food crisis since 2001](#), which makes the Haitian public more anxious and, for some, more likely to engage in violence.

6. Significant Events.

a. Recent Events.

- **15 April 2017.** MINUSTAH mandate renewed for only six months, and also created a new mission, MINUJUSTH.
- **21 March 2017.** The remainder of the new government was installed.
- **7 February 2017.** The new president of Haiti, [Jovenel Moïse](#), was [inaugurated](#) for a term of five (5) years.
- **4 January 2017.** UN Security Council welcomed the announcement of the final presidential results from Haiti.
- **20 November 2016.** Presidential election process in Haiti completed, after a delay due to Hurricane Matthew.
- **13 October 2016.** UN [extends MINUSTAH mandate](#) UNSCR 2313 (2016) for six months.
- **4 October 2016.** Hurricane Matthew impacts Haiti; over 1000 died.
- **11 July 2016.** Guy Philippe [warned the police officers](#): "Whatever the person dressed by Privert in military or police uniform to come to execute an illegal order against a candidate, I will consider them as mercenaries and will treat them as such."
- **May 2016.** Gunmen attacked a police station, looting weapons and leaving one officer dead.
- **25 April 2016.** UN Secretary-General's spokesperson issued a statement underlining concern that that the agreed-upon date for holding elections in Haiti was not met and that no alternate electoral calendar was announced.

b. Upcoming Events.

- **22 July 2017.** The TPS expires for over 60,000 Haitians living in the US.
- **16 October 2017.** Last mission day for MINUSTAH; and first day for MINUJUSTH.
- **15 April 2018.** MINUJUSTH mandate expires.

Operational Environment (GPMESII)

7. Geographic. Haiti covers the western third of the island of Hispaniola. It is bordered by water on three sides, the Atlantic Ocean on the north and by the Caribbean Sea on the west and south. The Dominican Republic forms its eastern and only land border with another country. The island of Hispaniola is about halfway between Cuba and Puerto Rico; the Windward Strait separates it from Cuba which is only 50 miles away. Haiti's 27,750 sq. km (10,714 sq. mi) includes the islands of Gonave,



Tortuga, Vache, Les Cayemites, and Navassa. About two-thirds of the country is mountainous. The mountain chains are separated by a small central plain which contains Port au Prince, which lies on the Gulf. Additional small areas of flat agricultural land are found in the midst of the northern mountain chain and along the north coast. Haiti's rivers and streams arise in the mountains. Flash flooding during rains is a significant hazard. The coast has many natural harbors most of which have good anchorage for the small craft used by fisherman. Hurricanes with torrential rain and destructive wind are a threat in the late summer. [Haiti is particularly susceptible to flooding](#) because of large-scale deforestation on the Haitian half of the island, where most trees have been cut down to make charcoal for cooking. Without trees to slow or stop rainfall, the water runs over the sunbaked ground, filling low spots. Seasonal algal blooms in Haitian coastal waters result in contamination of fish.

8. Political. [The landscape of Haiti's political parties is extremely crowded.](#) However, many of the parties that are registered within Haiti do not have any organizational structure, *per se*, and may have one (or less) actual candidates or party leaders. In 2015, [Haiti had its first round of legislative elections](#) in several years, with 1,857 candidates, 98 different political parties, and \$30 million from the U.S. as well as monetary support from the international community. Those elections resulted in a much divided Chamber of Deputies and Senate. However, the largest party representation in the Chamber of Deputies is the Tèt Kale Party (French: *Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale*, PHTK) (*Tèt Kale* means "Bald Head" in Haitian Creole) with 26 representatives. The second largest party is the Truth (*Verite*) with 13 representatives. All other parties in the Chamber of Deputies or Senate have less than ten representatives; most have only one or two representatives.

Haiti's long-running election cycle began in summer 2015 with approximately 54 candidates vying for presidential power. Shortly before the elections [the Verite \(Truth\) party](#) dropped out, in opposition to some of the procedural constraints on the election process. After the elections, candidates decried fraud and demanded an investigation. The results were nullified and a rerun election cycle was determined.

The January 2016 presidential run off also [did not occur](#). Instead, a 5 February Agreement enabled **President Michel Martelly** to leave office on 7 February as prescribed by the Constitution and called for the National Assembly to elect, indirectly, a provisional President for a period not exceeding 120 days. The provisional **President Jocelerme Privert** nominated a new Prime Minister and cabinet and was expected to complete the outstanding third electoral round on 24 April 2016, allowing for the inauguration of a new President of the Republic on 14 May 2016. However, those elections did not happen for a variety of reasons, including concern among some Haitians that "real" free and fair elections could not happen in an [environment of international supervision](#).

Hurricane Matthew postponed the elections scheduled for October 9, 2016. Finally, the November 2016 elections concluded with [Jovenel Moïse](#) as President-elect, with [55.6% of the vote](#), but only 21% turn out. There were no major incidents reported. President Jovenel Moïse is a [businessman with no previous government experience](#) with continuing reservations regarding his financial irregularities.

[The "last round" of Haitian elections](#) occurred in January 2017. Over 5,000 posts were in contest, including runoffs for eight Senate seats and a rerun of the Lower Chamber of Deputies. More than 31,000 candidates were on the ballots nation-wide. There was still very low turn-out by Haitians, perhaps due to "election exhaustion."

In February and March 2017, the newly elected national government leadership were installed and other government members appointed. The new government appears dominated by individuals with little to no previous political or government experience, as seen with the new Prime Minister [Jack Guy Lafontant](#), a gastroenterologist.

9. Military/Security. The general security situation in Haiti is assessed as [largely stable, but fragile](#). While a Ministry of National Defense was established in May 2012, there are currently no regular military forces of Haiti [Haitian Armed Forces (FAdH)] with the exception of a very small Coast Guard. In the 1990s, then-President Aristide disbanded the forces, but then-President Michel Martelly (2011 to 2016), announced plans to reinstate it. [After the decree](#), a unit of military engineers was recreated and some recruits sent to Ecuador for training. In the latter part of 2015 and early 2016, uniformed armed groups paraded and protested (or attacked other protesting groups). No international group or advisors recognize these uniformed groups as a formal military institution.

President Moïse has also indicated that he wants to stand up national armed forces, but that there is no budget allowance for the concept. While there are some studies that suggest the Haiti population is favorable to a standing army, the US and the UN—as well as other international donors—are unlikely to support the concept, given the violent history of Haiti’s previous armies against their own people. Since over 50% of the population is under the age of 25 years, it is possible that history is unknown—or discounted—by the people.

Haiti has experienced over 20 coup d'états since its 1804 independence.

MINUSTAH rarely intervenes in protests or other criminal activity, but the UN perceived the mission as an important deterrent to large-scale violence. According to some reports, nearly 83% of homicides are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, almost half of which were reportedly gang-related. Kidnappings and rape remain commonplace. **Key actors are:**

a. Haitian National Police (HNP). The approximately 8,546 member HNP has sole responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of order. Created through international intervention in 1994, the HNP is Haiti’s first independent police force. [Challenges](#) for effective implementation of this force include, but not limited to: cultural barriers, lack of leadership within the force and incomplete connectivity with other

As the HNP grows in capacity and moves into areas and regions that it previously yielded to gangs and other criminal elements, the police themselves (and their families) have become targets of violence, to include assassinations. Consequently, some of the police organizations have started to conduct “days of reflection” during which they do not conduct patrols. (The HNP is not allowed by law to strike.) One such [period of “reflection”](#) occurred in late March 2016.

elements of the Haitian government. To address these challenges, the HNP had a [2012-2016 Development Plan](#) that covered several areas, specifically focused on progressively taking over security tasks from MINUSTAH. One of these initiatives was the [Community Policing Units](#), which had some limited success in Haiti’s urban areas.

While the capacity of the Haitian police is greatly improved, they are still extremely resource-constrained in equipment, personnel, and training.

b. Non-State Armed Groups.

Gangs. Gangs remain the predominant security threat for the Haitian people, except where they are considered [the instruments of stability in some communities](#). Gang-related activity includes aggravated assaults (and gender-based violence), kidnappings, and robberies—especially home invasions. Gang leaders and their supporters perceive themselves as the *baz* – the base of the neighborhood. The *baz* have functioned in the local area power vacuum for years as a kind of de facto community government, in a role that falls somewhere between political pressure group, warlord and tax collector, and protector of the community.

Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational). Organized crime in Haiti exists at all levels of society. Local collaborators include a complex and dynamic mix of legitimate business people;

Islamist extremists, terrorists, and kidnappers; police and army officers; militia groups; and local [politicians](#). Crime exists in many forms, the most prevalent being drug and human trafficking, robbery, and kidnapping. The country's strategic geographic location and its extremely weak institutions make it an attractive setting for trafficking [people](#), [drugs](#), [arms](#) and other contraband. Moreover, local security forces and the justice system [lack the capacity](#) to adequately address the challenges posed by criminal groups, and corruption in Haiti remains a [major issue](#). The combination of these factors makes for fertile grounds for organized crime, which is of significant concern given Haiti's location along the Caribbean drug trafficking routes that US authorities [say are growing in importance](#).

c. Other International Actors. Beyond the UN and its MINUSTAH, there are many other international actors and organizations as well as regional neighbors interested in the long-term stability of Haiti (albeit within their own national or regional concerns). **The following list is not complete, but provides examples:**

The Dominican Republic (DR). The DR has a [long and often problematic history](#) with Haiti. In 2016, it forced allegedly undocumented [Haitian-ethnic peoples](#) from its country to the border encampments, even though most of them are actually Dominican Republic-born and do not speak Creole. However, even more recently, the DR and Haiti have partnered for future [foreign investment opportunities](#), “harmonizing their economic relations and their socioeconomic development at regional and international levels.” Later in 2016, the DR [extended temporary migrant regularization card](#) for one year for over 140,000 Haitians.

With the assistance of the OAS, Haiti developed a “white paper” on defense and security. In addition, the [OAS](#) provided observers for the election process.

Regional Organizations. UNSCR 2243 emphasized the role of regional organizations in the ongoing process of stabilization and reconstruction of Haiti, in particular the **Organization of the American States (OAS)**, **Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)**, and the **Caribbean Community (CARICOM)**.

The **Group of Friends of Haiti**—a group that meets regularly to coordinate international support and policy options for Haiti—includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Peru, the US, and Uruguay (the current chair). The Groups of Friends of Haiti [traditionally drafts resolutions for approval](#) within the UN.

[The UN also includes a “Core Group”](#), represented by the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada, France, Spain, the U.S., the European Union and the Special Representative of the OAS, with focus attention on Haiti concerns. There are a substantial number of financial and humanitarian organizations that operate in the Haiti donor and loaner space, as well.

10. Economic: [The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere](#), Haiti is a free market economy subject to poverty, corruption, natural disasters, and low levels of education, all impediments to economic growth. 80% of the population lives under the poverty line and 54% in abject poverty. Two-fifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, and remain vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters, exacerbated by the country's widespread deforestation. [In 2015](#), cereal production was curtailed by severe dry weather, with a corresponding forecast of cereal imports for a record high in 2016. That forecast was unmet due to the impact of Hurricane Matthew in late 2016. During the same period, rice prices declined but maize and bean prices surged.

The Haitian drought of the two last years has caused the agricultural production to fall about 60% in comparison to 2013. This situation drags millions of Haitians into food insecurity and the increase in the malnutrition prevalence rates across the country. Currently it is estimated that about 130 thousand children may be affected by general acute malnutrition, from which 56 thousand may have severe acute

malnutrition. To date the food security, nutrition and agriculture projects in the 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan have been funded only up to 30% of the 105.5 US dollars requested.

The economic situation is improving. While [Haiti's economic freedom score is 51.3](#), making its economy the 150st in the 2016 Index (mostly unfree), it has enjoyed recent trade freedom and a score change of +0.6. Concerns remain: Property Rights, Corruption, and Financial Freedom. According to the [World Bank](#), a major challenge for Haiti will be to manage the substantial decrease in donor financing. Having declined for the last three years, the trend is expected to continue in the future. This will likely constrain Haiti's capital investments, which had increased for the last three years with limited impact on growth. With scarce resources, efficient and effective use domestic and external resources will remain crucial.

The US is [Haiti's largest trading partner](#), with a growing number of firms operating in Haiti. Opportunities for US businesses in Haiti include light manufacturing, in particular textile and clothing production; the development and trade of raw and processed agricultural products; medical supplies and equipment; building and modernizing Haiti's infrastructure; developing tourism and allied sectors such as arts and crafts; and improving capacity in waste disposal, transportation, energy, telecommunications, and export assembly operations.

The number of financial organizations—international or regional, government or non-government—operating in Haiti is significant. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), alone, provided over [\\$61 million dollars](#) to Haiti economic development in 2014. Following the October 2016 hurricane, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided \$41.6 million [Rapid Credit Facility](#) through the Banque de la République d'Haïti (BRH) to rebuild its net international reserves. Additionally, the DR and Haiti partnered for future [foreign investment opportunities](#) with many regional financial institutions.

A rapidly developing trend for donors is the funding of entrepreneurial opportunities that move the Haitian economy [from aid to trade](#) in recognition that “when relief organizations bring in donated goods that are distributed for free to people in need, one of the outcomes is often the death of local businesses that provided those goods.”

However, one of the most exciting financial funding opportunities appears to be [local in nature](#). Groups of neighbors—mainly women—pool their money together on a weekly basis to make short-term (three months) loans available to each other. These locally-funded savings and loans are contributing to substantial improvement in local economic ventures.

11. Social. Approximately 10 million people live in Haiti speaking French and Creole as official languages (over 90% speak only Creole). Population ethnicity is predominately black (95%) and over half the population is Roman Catholic, although many Haitians practice elements of [voodoo](#) (recognized as an official religion in 2003) in addition to another religion. Over 56% of the populations is under 25 years old. While life expectancy is over 65 years at birth, the current median age is only 22 years. Some sources indicate that literacy rates are around 60%; others suggest that [almost half of the population was illiterate](#) (above the age of 15). At the current pace, the [illiteracy](#) rate will not decrease in the next 20 years. Schools are locally funded, and over 90% are privately funded, leading to a widening gap between areas and social classes. International assistance has helped fund jobs, but the per capita income remains only a few dollars a day.

a. Rule of Law. The national police force remains grossly under-manned/trained/or equipped, with a police-to-population ratio of 1.15 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. [USAID continues to provide assistance](#) to Haiti for its Rule of Law sector through both funding and direct assistance in the following three

categories: strengthen public sector executive function and accountability, improve local governance capacity and service delivery, and improve access to and delivery of justice services.

The UN Expert reported in March 2016 that reduction of arbitrary prolonged detention [was another issue](#) that required serious attention. Although the Haitian Ministry of Justice launched a 2015 campaign to enhance the work of judges, that effort has not yet brought about concrete results for the persons in pre-trial detention, who comprised almost 72 per cent of the incarcerated population of Haiti.

b. [Human Rights](#). The UN provides an independent human rights expert (Gustave Gallon). However, the new government wants to see his mandate expire.

In 2014, the Haitian courts ruled that the statute of limitations cannot be applied to crimes against humanity. At the time, many believed that allegations of past human rights violations by the government would be investigated. However, it does not appear that any investigation will be concluded at any time soon. Gender-based violence and child abuse remains a widespread problem. Haiti does not currently have specific legislation criminalizing rape, domestic violence, or sexual harassment. Most troubling, the use of child domestic workers—known as *restavèks*—continues. Theoretically, *restavèks* are sent from low-income households to live with wealthier families with the intention that they will be schooled and cared for in exchange. In practice, they are often unpaid, denied education, and physically or sexually abused.

Most of Haiti's [trafficking](#) cases are *restavèks* and efforts to eliminate the practices are inconsistent. In a recent raid of a resort hotel, Haitian police arrested nine persons in connection with [sex trafficking](#) of over 30 women and girls (some as young as 13 years old). According to several reports, US and Canadian tourists booked the rooms and paid for the day passes for the children.

Tragically, many of Haiti's exploited children and women were abused by peacekeepers. While some were raped, others participated in "[survival sex](#)," trading their bodies for food or a few dollars. [A recent report highlighted:](#)

...at least 134 Sri Lankan peacekeepers exploited nine children in a [sex ring](#) from 2004 to 2007...the children in Haiti were passed around from soldier to soldier...In July 2011, four Uruguayan peacekeepers and their commanding officer allegedly gang-raped a Haitian teenager. The men also filmed the alleged attack on their phones, which went viral on the internet...The following year, three Pakistanis attached to the U.N.'s police units in Haiti were allegedly involved in the rape of a mentally disabled 13-year-old...the Pakistanis abducted the boy to keep him from detailing the abuse that had gone on for more than a year...


...the abandoned children tried to make a life for themselves. They begged and scavenged for food, but they never could scrape together enough to beat back the hunger, until the U.N. peacekeepers moved in a few blocks away. The men who came from a far-away place and spoke a strange language offered the Haitian children cookies and other snacks. Sometimes they gave them a few dollars. But the price was high: The Sri Lankan peacekeepers wanted sex from girls and boys as young as 12.

c. Humanitarian Assistance. Haiti is struggling to get the hundreds of thousands of Haitians living in poverty onto the development path by providing equal access to health, water and sanitation, safe housing and livelihoods. The [humanitarian situation deteriorated in 2015](#) with governance and development in a fragile situation. According the International Organization for Migration (IOM), only 3 percent of IDPs in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake remain in camps—or 60,000 IDPs. However, that number increased again after the 2016 Hurricane Matthew. A [December 2016 report](#) indicated over 1,519,900 persons affected by the hurricane with 115,000 without housing, despite that “most of the affected communities stayed in their place of origins or were hosted by relatives and neighbors. Some took shelter in public and private buildings... (yet)...Many remain cut off from any access, in remote mountainous and coastal areas and demand immediate Shelter...”

A similar number are food insecure, which is worsening given the El Niño-induced drought and infrastructural deficits and [Hurricane Matthew impacts](#).

Haiti faces a looming food crisis in the southwest region hit by October's Hurricane Matthew. South Florida-based charity Food for the Poor said 13 people have died in recent days as a result of a food shortage in the hurricane-devastated Grand' Anse region. Haitians are turning in desperation to poisonous fruits and foliage in an attempt to quell their hunger, the charity said, and more than 400,000 people are at risk of hunger. Crops replanted after Matthew were wrecked by a drought that followed.

The Humanitarian Snapshot (as of March 2017) indicates:



The [cholera epidemic](#), which began in October 2014, increased 300% in the first half of 2015 and continued to increase in 2016 as a [consequence of Hurricane Matthew](#). Still, an improvement of patient treatment and the use of rapid response teams with vaccinations controlled the outbreak again by 2017.

12. Infrastructure. Even before the January 2010 earthquake and the 2016 hurricane, [Haiti's infrastructure](#) was primitive and poorly maintained, the result of decades of under-investment and environmental damage. The 7.0 magnitude [earthquake](#) was the country's most powerful in more than 200 years. More than 200,000 people were killed, and 1.5 million of the country's 10 million people were left homeless. Thousands of homes, schools and hospitals were destroyed, as well as the U.N. headquarters in Port-au-Prince, the presidential palace and the main prison. Nineteen of the 20

government ministries collapsed. Estimates of damage and losses range between \$8 billion and \$14 billion.

The United Nations estimated that 70,000 buildings collapsed and tens of thousands were damaged, creating an estimated 10 million cubic meters of rubble – enough to fill 4,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools. It took two years to clear about half the rubble. Much of it was done by hand on hillsides and in densely populated areas of the capital that were inaccessible to heavy machinery. Overall damage and losses from the earthquake were evaluated at \$7.9 billion, according to the World Bank, though other estimates are higher. Six years later, much of Haiti remains inaccessible in both urban and remote areas. **The 2016 hurricane set recovery back for several years.**

13. Information. The [telecommunications infrastructure](#) is among the least-developed in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, domestic cell service have expanded greatly in the last five years due to low-cost GSM phones and pay-as-you-go plans with current mobile-cellular teledensity of 60% of the population. There are almost 100 AM/FM stations and 130 broadcasting television stations. Radio is an effective news outlet for spreading information MINUSTAH employs an FM radio station.

Peace Operations Functions

14. Command and Control. MINUSTAH is composed of military, police, international civilians, local staff, and UN volunteers. Leadership is as follows:

- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission:** Sandra Honoré (Trinidad and Tobago)
- **Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:** Carl Alexandre (United States)
- **Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator:** Mourad Mahba (Egypt)
- **Force Commander:** Lieutenant General Ajax Porto Pinheiro (Brazil)
- **Police Commissioner:** Serge Therriault (Canada)

When MINUJUSTH commences, it will be led by [a Special Representative of the Secretary-General](#) who would also play a good-offices and advocacy role at the political level to ensure full implementation of the mandate.

15. Intelligence. One of the first UN Missions with a Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), MINUSTAH's is staffed 30 personnel.

16. Operations. Decreasing reliance of the national police on the operational support of the MINUSTAH police component led to MINUSTAH drawdowns and operational recalibration. During the recent electoral period, in order to ensure maximum mobility and visibility of MINUSTAH uniformed components in supporting the national police, troops were located in Port-au-Prince (West) and Cap-Haïtien (North), with an operational detachment in Morne Casse (North-East). The reconfiguration of the air fleet, which includes three Mi-17 military medium-lift helicopters and two UH-1H helicopters, face continuing delays, but contingency measures were identified to ensure that the Mission would have the resources necessary to assist the national police as needed. MINUSTAH closed many regional support and liaison offices, redeploying to regional hubs. The operational priority remains support to the national police.

17. Protection.

a. Mission Protection. While MINUSTAH does not have the casualty count of other UN missions, there were more deaths due to in-country violence in the 2016 than in any other year. This was assumed to be related to the electoral period.

b. Protection of Civilians. While there are over 600K IDPs still in camps in Haiti (residual homeless due to the 2010 earthquake, or Dominican Republic migrants), MINUSTAH did not have a [specific](#) Protection of Civilians task. However, MINUSTAH did have tasks related to the protection of the rights of women and children and support of the HNP's efforts to tackle gang violence, organized crime, illegal arms and drug trafficking, and trafficking of persons, especially children.

MINUJUSTH's mandate does include [protection of civilians](#): "12. Authorizes MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support and develop the HNP and in paragraph 13; 13. Further authorizes the Mission to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed..."

18. Sustainment. There are only four paved airports, and only 16% of the 4,266 km of roads are paved. There are four seaports. Emergency response and contingency planning remain critical requirements, in particular in relation to cholera, drought and risks associated with hurricane season and an influx of persons crossing the border from the Dominican Republic. MINUSTAH and the international aid community are transitioning to a more development-focused approach, from relief to development. The US is currently the largest foreign aid donor in Haiti.

Issues and Considerations

19. Issues. The major issues confronting MINUSTAH—and future MINUJUSTH—in Haiti are summarized as follows:

- Haiti remains fragile across all spectrums of self-governance and –sufficiency, ranking 168 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI 2013) and the 5th most disaster-prone country in the world, with limited [resilience](#) in the population and infrastructure.
- Many international government and non-government organizations face donor-fatigue—including many national representatives in the UN—which may lead to premature cessation of MINUSTAH and other similar organizations and missions.
- Armed groups, such as gangs or para-military organizations, may not believe a strong central government is in their best interest and remain de-stabilizing influences on the political and developmental process.
- The Haitian population may experience “occupation”-fatigue, especially if internationally-supervised elected officials do not make good their platform promises.

20. Considerations.

a. Considerations for the United States (US). The US has been consistently the largest donor of aid and other assistance to Haiti for several years, either directly (bilateral) or through other funding and assisting entities [such as the United Nations programs, or the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), now the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act]. Then-President Obama's 2017 budget [increased Haiti expenditures by 9%](#) (to \$218.1 million), making it the second-largest assistance program in the region (Colombia is the largest).

It is yet unclear what, if any, policy changes the Trump Administration will make for Haiti, specifically.

Several persons in US leadership suggest that “throwing money” at Haiti is not of long term benefit to either Haiti or the US. Called by some a “primer of waste and fraud”, the 2015 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) [Report to Congress](#) highlights several assistance programs in Haiti that did not gain success.

President Jovenel Moïse indicated that he expects a close relationship with President Trump given their shared [business background](#). It does appear, however, that [several recent US policy decisions](#) already significantly impact Haiti or the Haitian people: immigration

procedures (Haitians granted temporary protected status expires on July 22, 2017), and proposed international aid reduction (given the [draft executive order reducing US funding of international organizations](#)). Modifications in climate change may also have longer term impacts to Haiti, which is vulnerable to flooding.

Most observers emphasize that the US must remain vested in the improvement of the Haitian environment for several reasons, such as its geographic proximity, traditional trade arrangements, security concerns and criminal activities, and the large diaspora of Haitian and Haitian-descent living in the US. [USAID](#) currently retains a four-pronged assistance strategy focused on infrastructure and energy, food and economic security, health and other basic services, and rule of law. [US foreign policy](#) toward Haiti is designed to foster the institutions and infrastructure necessary for it to achieve strong democratic foundations and meaningful poverty reduction through sustainable development. [Trade policy is a key component to that end](#).

Currently, both Haitian and US importers and exporters benefit under programs and initiatives for duty-free export of many Haitian products assembled from US components or materials. (2008) Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE II) Act; the (2010) Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP); and the (2015) Trade Preferences Extension Act, which extended trade benefits to Haiti through September 2025.

[A recent report from the Congressional Research Service \(CRS\)](#) offered the following policy considerations:

Aid Conditionality. The “aid conditionality” concept suggests that donor entities, such as the US, expect assistance and aid to be utilized by the nation-recipients “where leaders govern responsibly, set in place good policies, and make investments conducive to development” in order to achieve “sustainable outcomes.” In other words, aid could be withheld if good governance criteria is not met. However, developing consensus, domestically and internationally, on what constitutes “good governance” and its associated policies and procedures is difficult to attain even where governing institutions are firmly established. It may be impossible to develop said consensus for nation-recipients such as Haiti where national government is nascent.

Department of Defense Role in Security Assistance. The report highlights:

Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title 22 of the *U.S. Code* (Foreign Relations) and appropriated funding for these programs through State Department accounts in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations legislation. Since the 1980s, however, Congress has provided numerous security assistance authorities to the Department of Defense (DOD) under Title 10 of the *U.S. Code* (Armed Services) and the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and has appropriated funding for the new activities (referred to as “security cooperation” by DOD) through annual DOD appropriations. As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean nations receive training, equipment, and other support from DOD in addition to the assistance provided through the traditional U.S. foreign aid budget examined in this report.

While this type of assistance is not as prevalent in Haiti, there may be call for it in the future as other assistance and aid programs atrophy.

Trilateral Cooperation. The US can retain (and strengthen) its [partnership with other nations representing regional interests](#), such as the various Caribbean or western hemisphere groups. As the report points out: “As some nations in the hemisphere have transitioned from aid recipients to emerging aid donors, the U.S. government has partnered with them through...trilateral cooperation initiatives to jointly plan and fund assistance programs elsewhere in the region.”

The advantages to trilateral cooperation include the lower personnel and service costs in nations other than the US, as well as the “geographic, historical, and cultural ties emerging donors may have” with nation-recipients of aid. Particularly, US donations through third-party nations “facilitate U.S. engagement in countries that otherwise would be unreceptive to a U.S. presence.” The significant disadvantage, however, is that the US may lose accountability of its funding when exercised through third-party nations, potentially supporting entities and activities “that otherwise would be prohibited.”

b. Considerations for the United Nations (UN). The UN accomplished a significant portion of its MINUSTAH mandate. It trained police personnel, created a law enforcement office dedicated to addressing sexual and gender-based violence, reestablished law and order, helped draft laws to improve judicial independence, strengthened human rights and assisted in the renewal of democratic institutions. MINUSTAH was invaluable during Haiti’s natural disasters and in other humanitarian work with logistics and manpower.

It also learned many lessons in Haiti over the years, especially in regards to pre-deployment training, “certification,” and supervision of the MINUSTAH members. Lack of [basic soldier skills](#) in regards to hygiene may have directly contributed to the cholera outbreak, and poorly understood and/or reinforced professional standards contribute to the abusive conduct of the peacekeepers towards civilians.

If the UN wants [to bolster rather than undermine](#) its legitimacy as a global leader on human rights, justice and the rule of law, it must take responsibility for the suffering (cholera, sexual assault) it caused in Haiti by its own representatives. Allowing new rotations of peacekeepers to deploy [without required cholera vaccinations](#) only reinforced perceptions of the UN’s disregard for the local population’s safety and health. Further, the [lack of accountability](#) of the peacekeepers identified in sexual assaults or in paternity cases, and the inability of the UN to [compensate cholera victims](#) as promised, continues to impact Haiti’s local population and national government perception of peacekeepers—which may hinder the effectiveness of the future MINUJUSTH activities.

The UN should be aware that effective implementation of the recent UNSCR may be problematic. Its [human rights task](#) is an addition from the original MINUSTAH mandate. It also authorizes mission forces “to use all necessary means” to both support and develop the **Haitian National Police (HNP)** and protect civilians. As the new mission will only be comprised of police—and at a much smaller number than the current mission—it is unclear how “all necessary means” will or can be operationalized.

Leadership in both the UN in general and MINUSTAH specifically need to recognize that some Haitians can—and do—resent the perceived [“imperial”](#) interference in their local affairs.

c. Considerations for Haiti. Regardless of claims of election fraud and low voter turnout, Haiti appears a more fully transparent and representative democracy. Haitian leaders, at all levels, must continue to promote and advocate for an engaged population to exercise their voting rights and to respect opposing views without violence. Perhaps ironically, the [civic engagement of urban gangs](#) may be helpful to this

end. In addition, only when individuals and family groups and neighborhoods believe themselves to be protected and respected can the same begin consideration of larger security concerns as well as issues of education and economic prosperity.

Therefore, it is critical that Haiti continue its development of the PNH, as its most visible representative of the government in many neighborhoods. Through its program of [community policing](#), the community and the police can be in dialogue with each other. Also, the vigorous and impartial investigation and prosecution of those involved in illegal activities, especially [human trafficking](#), will boost the government's reputation as a protector of its citizens rather than a predator.

The expected decrement of donor dollars should accelerate the transition of aid to development programs. Therefore, Haiti must continue to support opportunities for Haitians to assist themselves, such as the [farming program](#) of Farmers of the Peasant Movement of Gros-Morne.

The farming program is in collaboration with a US-based partner, the Quixote Center. Called "Haiti Reborn - Yielding Change" it enables smallholder farmers to use international aid funds to buy crop seed. When harvested, another aid group (Peasant Movement) purchases the crops and distribute to those in need.

Unlike past and most current aid systems, which aim to alleviate the short-term needs of hungry Haitians, Haiti Reborn - Yielding Change will not only raise wages for farmers, but also meet disaster relief needs with locally-sourced food. Its goal is both to feed those in need and strengthen the Haitian farm economy, historically the country's economic backbone.

[Other considerations for Haiti](#) are controversial but should be deliberated:

- Wipe out the criminal elements and drug lords;
- Re-write the Constitution;
- Increase the number of and solidify law enforcement institutions, to include a [national military](#);
- Set-up an permanent electoral council with definite guidelines to block any candidate with prior criminal records; and
- Dissolve all monopolies held by "oligarchs", and push for a true real free enterprise system to increase food production and create employment.

Resources

21. Key Documents and On-line References.

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